There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports officials investigated or punished those responsible for such killings that had previously taken place.

Authorities in Tibetan areas continued to detain Tibetans arbitrarily for indefinite periods.

The whereabouts of the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the second-most prominent figure after the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhism’s Gelug school, remained unknown. Neither he nor his parents have been seen since Chinese authorities took them away in 1995, when he was six years old.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

According to credible sources, police and prison authorities employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. There were reports during the year Chinese officials severely beat some Tibetans who were incarcerated or otherwise in custody. In the past, such beatings have led to death.

On August 13, Chinese authorities released Gonpo Tseten, a Tibetan from Machu (Chinese: Maqu) county of Ganlho (Chinese: Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Gansu province who had served 10 years of a 12-year prison sentence for “inciting separatism.” On August 17, overseas website Free Tibet reported the authorities had severely tortured and subjected him to forced labor while he was in detention. According to media reports, Gonpo had spearheaded Tibetan protests against the Chinese government in 2008.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening due to physical abuse and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.

There were reports of recently released prisoners permanently disabled or in extremely poor health because of the harsh treatment they endured in prison (see Political Prisoners and Detainees subsection below). Former prisoners reported being isolated in small cells for months at a time and deprived of sleep, sunlight, and adequate food. According to individuals who completed their prison terms during the year, prisoners rarely received medical care except in cases of serious illness. There were many cases in which officials denied visitors access to detained and imprisoned persons.

Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. Public security agencies are required by law to notify the relatives or employer of a detained person within 24 hours of their detention, but they often failed to do so when Tibetans and others were detained for political reasons. Public security officers may legally detain persons throughout the PRC for up to 37 days without formally arresting or charging them. Criminal detention beyond 37 days requires approval of a formal arrest by the procuratorate, but in cases pertaining to “national security, terrorism, and major bribery,” the law permits up to six months of incommunicado detention without formal arrest. After formally arresting a suspect, public security authorities are authorized to detain a suspect for up to an additional seven months while the case is investigated. After the completion of an investigation, the procuratorate can detain a suspect an additional 45 days while determining whether to file criminal charges. If charges are filed, authorities can detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before beginning judicial proceedings. Public security sometimes detained persons beyond the period allowed by law, and pretrial detention periods of a year or longer were common.

Security officials frequently violated these legal requirements. It was unclear how many Tibetan detainees the authorities held under forms of detention not subject to judicial review.

According to the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), on January 28, authorities arrested and detained Lodoe Gyatso from Nagchu (Chinese: Naqu) prefecture of the TAR after he staged a peaceful protest in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. Prior to the protest, Lodoe Gyatso published a video announcing his plans to organize a peaceful demonstration in support of the Tibetan people’s commitment to world peace and nonviolence under the guidance of the Dalai Lama.

Legal safeguards for detained or imprisoned Tibetans were inadequate in both design and implementation. Prisoners in China have the right to request a meeting with a government-appointed attorney, but many Tibetan defendants, particularly those facing politically motivated charges, did not have access to legal representation. In cases which authorities claimed involved “endangering state security” or “separatism,” trials often were cursory and closed. Local sources noted trials were predominantly conducted in Mandarin, with government interpreters provided for Tibetan defendants who did not speak Mandarin. Court decisions, proclamations, and other judicial documents, however, generally were not published in Tibetan.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

In its annual work report, the TAR High People’s Court stated its top political tasks as fighting separatism, criticizing “the 14th Dalai (Lama) clique,” cracking down on the clique’s followers, and maintaining social stability, including by sentencing those who they claimed instigated protests and promoted separatism. The report also stated the court prioritized “political direction,” which included absolute loyalty to the Party.

In June the TAR High People’s Court hired 16 court clerks. Among the requirements for new employees were loyalty to the CCP leadership and having immediate family members with a “good record on combatting separatism” in the Tibet region.

Security forces routinely subjected political prisoners and detainees known as “special criminal detainees” to “political re-education” sessions.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

An unknown number of Tibetans were detained, arrested, and sentenced because of their political or religious activity. Authorities held many prisoners in extrajudicial detention centers and never allowed them to appear in public court.

Based on information available from the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, as of November 27, there were 303 Tibetan political prisoners known to be detained or imprisoned, most of them in Tibetan areas. Of those 303 cases, 132 were reported to be monks (current and former), nuns, or reincarnate teachers. Of the 123 cases for which there was available information on sentencing, punishment ranged from three years to life imprisonment. Observers believed the actual number of Tibetan political prisoners and detainees to be much higher, but the lack of access to prisoners and prisons, as well as the dearth of reliable official statistics, made a precise determination difficult. Authorities continued to hold an unknown number of people in detention centers rather than prisons.

Tibetan Self-Immolations

There were three known cases of Tibetans self-immolating during the year. There have been 155 known immolations since 2009, more than half of which took place in 2012. Local contacts reported the decline in reported self-immolations was due to tightened security by authorities, the collective punishment of self-immolators’ relatives and associates, and the Dalai Lama’s public plea to his followers to find other ways to protest Chinese government repression. Chinese officials in some Tibetan areas withheld public benefits from the family members of self-immolators and ordered friends and monastic personnel to refrain from participating in religious burial rites or mourning activities for self-immolators. According to many contacts in Ngaba county, Sichuan province, officials place family members, relatives, and close friends of self-immolators on a security watch list to prevent them from meeting and communicating with international visitors and, in some cases, deprive them from receiving public benefits.

Self-immolators reportedly viewed their acts as protests against the government’s political and religious oppression. According to multiple contacts, the law criminalizes various activities associated with self-immolation, including “organizing, plotting, inciting, compelling, luring, instigating, or helping others to commit self-immolation,” each of which may be prosecuted as “intentional homicide.”

The TAR regional government punished CCP members who followed the Dalai Lama, secretly harbored religious beliefs, made pilgrimages to India, or sent their children to study with exiled Tibetans. Authorities continued to electronically and manually monitor private correspondence and search private homes and businesses for photographs of the Dalai Lama and other politically forbidden items. Police examined the cell phones of TAR residents to search for “reactionary music” from India and photographs of the Dalai Lama. Authorities also questioned and detained some individuals who disseminated writings and photographs over the internet.

The TAR CCP has also launched specialized propaganda campaigns to counter “Tibetan independence” including promoting the proliferation of party media into every household to undermine popular support for the Dalai Lama.

The “grid system” (also known as the “double-linked household system”) continued. The grid system involves grouping households and establishments and encouraging them to report problems in other households, including monetary problems and transgressions, to the government. Authorities reportedly reward individuals with money and other forms of compensation for reporting. While this allows for greater provision of social services to those who need them, it also allows authorities to more easily control those it considers “extremists” and “splittists.”

According to contacts in the TAR, Tibetans frequently received phone calls from security officials ordering them to remove from their mobile phones photos, articles, and contact information for international contacts the government deemed sensitive. Security officials visited the residences of those who did not comply with such orders.

In June news portal Phayul reported local officials arrested two Tibetans from Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) of Sichuan province for possessing photos of the Dalai Lama after they raided the two men’s residences.

Palestinian terrorist groups and unaffiliated individuals killed seven Israeli civilians and five Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in terrorist attacks in the West Bank, and more were injured, according to the Israeli NGO B’Tselem. In addition, the Israeli government reported that security forces foiled approximately 500 terrorist attacks during the year.

For example, on September 17, 17-year-old Palestinian Khalil Jabarin fatally stabbed Ari Fuld at a shopping mall in the West Bank, before being shot by Fuld and another civilian and arrested by police. An Israeli military court indicted Jabarin on October 22 for “intentionally causing death,” and he remained in custody pending trial at year’s end.

During the year Israeli forces killed Palestinians in the West Bank who were attempting or allegedly attempting to attack Israelis, according to B’Tselem and media reports. According to media reports and B’Tselem, some of those killed did not pose a lethal threat to the Israeli Security Forces (ISF) or civilians at the time they were killed.

For example, on December 4, IDF soldiers shot and killed Mohammad Khosam Khabali in the West Bank city of Tulkarm. After the incident, the IDF claimed they were reacting to a group of rock throwing Palestinians. B’Tselem compiled security camera videos showing Khabali walking away from the soldiers when he was killed.

On March 30, Palestinians in Gaza launched the “March of Return,” a series of weekly protests along the fence between Gaza and Israel. The protests, some of which drew tens of thousands of people, and included armed terrorists, militants who launched incendiary devices into Israel, and unarmed protesters, continued throughout the year. Hamas took control of the weekly protests, and many of the protests were violent. IDF shot and killed 190 Palestinians at the Gaza border as of the end of the year, including 41 minors, according to B’Tselem. According to the World Health organization, 6,239 Palestinians in Gaza were injured by IDF live fire in the protests. B’Tselem stated that 149 of the Palestinian protesters who were killed did not take part in hostilities. The government stated that many of the victims were operatives of Hamas or encouraged by Hamas to protest near the border. For example, following media reports that the IDF shot and killed 62 Palestinians at the Gaza fence on May 14, Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed at least 53 were affiliated with their organizations, including some who were active members. The IDF stated they opened an internal inquiry into each Palestinian death at the border. The Israeli Military Advocate General opened five criminal investigations into IDF actions at the Gaza border, as of the end of the year.

On June 1, IDF shot and killed Razan al-Najjar north of Khuza’ah in Gaza during a Friday protest near the security fence with Israel. Al-Najjar was identified as a medical provider, according to B’Tselem. On October 29, media reported that Israel’s Military Advocate General (MAG) rejected the findings of an IDF inquiry that concluded a soldier did not deliberately shoot her. According to a New York Timesreport, an IDF sniper fired one round of live ammunition into a crowd including 14 white-coated medics, including al-Najjar, when no protesters in the immediate vicinity were conducting violent acts. According to the government, the circumstances of al-Najjar’s death were under investigation by the Military Police.

Gaza-based militant groups periodically conducted small arms attacks into Israel during the protests. In addition, from March 30 to December 5, Palestinian militant groups launched more than 1,150 rockets and mortars from the Gaza Strip indiscriminately toward civilian areas in Israel, as well as incendiary devices tied to kites and balloons that sparked nearly 2,000 fires and burned more than 5,600 acres of land in Israel, according to the government. More than 200 Israelis required treatment from these attacks, mostly for shock. Gaza-based militants shot and killed one Israeli soldier and a rocket launched by Gaza-based militant killed one Palestinian laborer in Ashkelon. On July 20, a Palestinian sniper shot and killed IDF Staff Sergeant Aviv Levi, an Israeli infantry soldier.

In August the Israeli military opened an investigation into the IDF shootings of two Palestinian minors in Gaza. According to an Israeli military statement, an initial probe suggested the soldiers who shot and killed 18-year-old Abed Nabi in March and 15-year-old Othman Hellis in July during Gaza border protests did not adhere to open-fire regulations.

Following multiple terrorist attacks by Palestinians in the West Bank in November and December, the IDF killed two Palestinian drivers and one minor passenger in three incidents in which IDF soldiers perceived attempts to ram vehicles into soldiers at checkpoints. According to B’Tselem, none of the three events were ramming attacks, and one of the adults and the minor passenger were shot in the back as their cars were driving away from checkpoints.

According to media reports, on October 28, an IDF drone strike killed three minors near the eastern Gaza perimeter fence. According to the IDF, the minors were planting an explosive device. The government stated it opened investigations into all deaths at the fence.

According to the government, Gaza-based militants, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, al-Mujahideen Movement, and other militant factions launched more than 1150 rockets and mortars toward Israel. These attacks killed a Palestinian laborer in Ashkelon and injured an IDF soldier. According to NGOs, media, and the Israeli government, Gaza-based militants fired rockets from civilian locations toward civilian targets.

In response to the rocket, mortar and incendiary attacks, and attempts to infiltrate Israel through the fence, the IDF launched 865 strikes against targets in Gaza during the year, according to the IDF. Air strikes and tank shellings killed 27 Palestinians at least seven of whom were civilians not participating in hostilities, according to B’Tselem. Seventeen of those killed in air strikes were militants, according to the Israeli government. According to B’Tselem, the IDF killed two minors in Gaza on July 14 in a “roof knocking,” a tactic in which a low-explosive projectile is dropped on the roof of a building to warn residents to vacate ahead of a full air strike. B’Tselem released a report on December 19 alleging the IDF withheld aerial footage of the event showing the teenage boys sitting on the edge of the roof. On August 9, the IDF struck more than 150 targets in the Gaza Strip in response to more than 180 rockets and mortars fired by Gaza-based militants into Israel. One of the IDF airstrikes killed one-year-old Bayan Abu Khamash and his pregnant mother, 22-year-old Inas Abu Kahmas, while they were asleep at home in Deir al-Balah, Gaza.

There were reports of Gazan fishermen killed by Israeli and Egyptian authorities. According to the NGO Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), Israeli soldiers on a naval vessel shot and killed an 18-year-old Gazan fisherman, Isma’il Saleh Abu Riyalah in February. On November 8, Egyptian naval forces allegedly shot and killed Gazan Mostafa Abu Audeh while he was fishing just off the coast of the Palestinian city of Rafah. According to press, the Egyptian military denied the reports.

In Gaza, according to PCHR, Hamas extrajudicially executed seven persons during the year and has issued 125 death sentences since 2007. At year’s end, there were 10 persons in Hamas prisons awaiting capital punishment. PCHR noted a significant increase in application of the death penalty in Gaza since 2007 and particularly in the last three years. By law the PA president must ratify each death penalty sentence, but Hamas proceeded with these executions without the PA president’s approval.

On May 8, Israeli authorities released IDF soldier Elor Azaria from a military prison after nine months’ incarceration for killing incapacitated Palestinian attacker, Abed al-Fatah al-Sharif, in Hebron in 2016. A military court found Azaria guilty of manslaughter in January 2017. IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot shortened Azaria’s sentence from 18 months to 14 months in September 2017. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin denied Azaria’s request for clemency in November 2017. The parole board approved releasing Azaria after completing two-thirds of his sentence, as is customary in Israel. According to media reports, Azaria’s punishment included demotion to the rank of private prior to his discharge from the IDF.

The sixth update of the MAG investigation into the 2014 Gaza war closed 88 more cases, bringing the total of alleged incidents closed without charges to 186 of 360. MAG previously brought charges against three soldiers for looting. The remaining investigations were ongoing or not mentioned. This update addressed the IDF application of the “Hannibal Directive,” which calls for overwhelming firepower when an enemy captures an IDF soldier to prevent use of the soldier as a hostage. A March State Comptroller report on the war criticized the Hannibal Directive–which the IDF replaced in 2017–for failing to mention distinction and proportionality, as well as for ambiguous wording that led to confusion about whether the IDF should risk killing its own soldier when attacking kidnappers to prevent a hostage situation. Human rights organizations criticized MAG for failing to find fault in hundreds of incidents that caused more than 1,000 Palestinian civilian deaths, and for focusing on actions by individual soldiers, who may have violated IDF rules or the law, rather than the conformity of IDF rules and policies with international law, including high-level orders regarding the use of force.

In the West Bank, there were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities in 2018. There was no new information on the disappearances in 2014 and 2015 of three Israeli citizens, Avraham Abera Mengistu, Hisham al-Sayed, and Juma Ibrahim Abu Ghanima, who crossed into Gaza and whom Hamas reportedly apprehended and held incommunicado.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The PA basic law prohibits torture or use of force against detainees; however, international and local human rights groups reported that torture and abuse remained a problem. According to an October Human Rights Watch (HRW) report based on 86 cases and dozens of interviews of former detainees, lawyers, and family members, torture occurred in detention centers in both Gaza and the West Bank by Hamas and PA security services. Based on 147 interviews with prisoners, HRW assessed abuse was systematic and routinely practiced in PA prisons, particularly in the PA’s Intelligence, Preventive Security, and Joint Security Committee detention facilities in Jericho. HRW reported tactics including forcing detainees to hold painful stress positions for long periods, beating, punching, and flogging. The spokesperson for PA’s security services, Adnan al-Dumairi, claimed the report was politically motivated and faulted HRW for not fact-checking it with the PA Ministry of Interior.

In September the Middle East Monitor reported that 28-year-old Ahmed Abu Hamada died in a PA jail. The PA reported that he died of natural causes. According to the Middle East Monitor, human rights groups alleged that he died due to torture in detention. Abu Hamada was reportedly a member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and had been charged with “causing security chaos.”

Palestinian detainees held by Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) registered complaints of abuse and torture with the Palestinian Authority’s Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). The PA Corrections and Rehabilitation Centers Department (CRCD), under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, continued to maintain a mechanism for reviewing complaints of prisoner abuse in civil prisons but reported no cases of inmate abuse by its staff. HRW reported that despite hundreds of complaints having been filed, no disciplinary action was taken in the majority of the cases. The PA denied the use of torture. CRCD conducted yearly assessments of all seven civil prisons in the West Bank to review prison operations, including mechanisms of reporting allegations of abuse and subsequent investigation and disciplinary action.

The ICHR and HRW reported that Hamas internal security tortured detainees. For example, one detainee reported being whipped on his feet and chest with a cable. In letters to HRW, Hamas denied the allegations.

Human rights organizations such as the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) reported that “special interrogation methods” used by Israeli security personnel against Palestinian security detainees in the West Bank included beatings, forcing an individual to hold a stress position for long periods, threats of rape and physical harm, and painful pressure from shackles or restraints applied to the forearms, sleep deprivation, and threats against families of detainees. Female prisoners and detainees reported harassment and abuse in detention by the ISF. According to PCATI there was no investigation into these complaints.

NGO HaMoked alleged that Israeli detention practices included prolonged solitary confinement, lack of food, exposure to the elements, and threats to demolish family homes.

Military Court Watch (MCW) and HaMoked claimed Israeli security services used these techniques to coerce confessions from minors arrested on suspicion of stone throwing or others acts of violence. Israeli officials stated they did not use these techniques.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Physical conditions in prisons and detention centers in the West Bank were reportedly poor. The PA does not publish data on detainee numbers. In responses to HRW in April, Preventive Security claimed it held 126 detainees and Intelligence Services claimed it held 61 detainees.

The basic conditions of Hamas-run prisons in Gaza were reportedly poor, prison cells were overcrowded, and there were many reports of abuses. There were an estimated 4,000 detainees in Gaza prisons with about 50 percent held in correctional facilities and 50 percent in temporary police detention, according to the United Nations. Approximately 100 detainees were held by Hamas’ Internal Security Agency. There were approximately 60 women and 60 minor detainees, each held in separate facilities.

Israeli authorities detained inside Israel 82 percent of Palestinian prisoners arrested by the ISF in the West Bank. According to the MCW, as of year’s end, these comprised 5,370 Palestinian detainees. According to Israel Prison Service figures obtained by MCW, the monthly average of minors in detention during the year was 283. As of year’s end, there were eight members of the PLC being held in Israeli prisons.

NGOs reported all prisons lacked adequate facilities and specialized medical care for detainees and prisoners with disabilities.

Physical Conditions: PA prisons continued to be crowded and lacked ventilation, heating, cooling, and lighting systems conforming to international standards. Authorities at times held male juveniles with adult male prisoners. Security services used separate detention facilities. Conditions for women were virtually identical to those for men. The PA used several refurbished structures and buildings as prisons, some of which lacked necessary security accommodations.

NGOs, including PCATI and MCW, stated that Israeli authorities appeared to use poor conditions or exposure to weather as an intimidation method.

Administration: According to HRW, mechanisms designed to hold employees and administrators accountable in both PA and Hamas detention facilities rarely, if ever, led to consequences for serious abuses. There were reports that prison administrators denied some detainees visits from family members.

Human rights groups such as the PCHR reported families of imprisoned Palestinians, particularly Gazans, had only limited ability to visit prisoners due to their detention inside Israel and the lack of entry permits to Israel for most Palestinians.

Independent Monitoring: In the West Bank, the PA permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detainees to assess treatment and conditions. The ICRC continued its regular visits to detention facilities, including interrogation centers, in accordance with its standard modalities, as in previous years. Human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers indicated that, as in previous years, there were some difficulties in gaining access to specific detainees held by the PA–depending on which PA security organization managed the facility.

In Gaza, Hamas granted ICRC access to detainees to assess treatment and conditions. The ICRC continued its regular visits to detention facilities, including interrogation centers, in accordance with its standard modalities, as in previous years. Human rights organizations conducted monitoring visits to some prisoners in Gaza, but Hamas authorities denied representatives permission to visit high-profile detainees and prisoners.

The Israeli government permitted visits by independent human rights observers. NGOs sent representatives to meet with Palestinian prisoners–including those on hunger strikes–and inspect conditions in Israeli prisons, detention centers, and some ISF facilities. Palestinian families and human rights groups reported delays and difficulties in gaining access to specific detainees from Israeli authorities. They also reported transfers of detainees without notice and claimed Israeli authorities at times used transfer practices punitively against prisoners engaging in hunger strikes.

For information on treatment of Palestinians in Israeli prisons as well as prison conditions in Israel, see the Israel report. PA law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. Nonetheless, the PA criminal justice system often did not provide a prompt and speedy trial. There were widespread instances of PA detention without charge or trial for selected security detainees in PASF custody. The PA also arrested without charge Palestinians who posted critical social media postings, journalists critical of the PA, and individuals from areas known to support PA President Abbas’ exiled Fatah rival Muhammad Dahlan, according to HRW.

In October the PA arrested in the West Bank a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem allegedly involved in the sale of an apartment in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter to a Jew, for allegedly violating a law that prohibits “transferring positions to the enemy.” On December 31, a criminal court sentenced him to life in prison with hard labor.

Hamas practiced widespread arbitrary detention in Gaza, particularly of Fatah members, civil society activists, journalists, and those accused of publicly criticizing Hamas. For example, Hamas arrested dozens of Fatah members for their planned participation in a gathering to watch President Abbas’ UN General Assembly speech in September. Some detainees registered complaints with the PA’s ICHR that their arrests were arbitrary. Information concerning the whereabouts and welfare of those detained was not consistently or reliably available. Hamas did not respect fair trial guarantees or provide access to family and legal counsel to many of those detained.

Since taking control of the West Bank in 1967, Israel has prosecuted Palestinian residents of the West Bank under military law. Since 1967 the Israeli Knesset has extended Israeli criminal and civil law protections to the 412,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank.

Under Israeli military law, the IPS may hold adults suspected of a security offense for four days prior to bringing them before a judge, with limited exceptions that allow the IPS to detain a suspect for up to eight days prior to bringing the suspect before the senior judge of a district court. Israeli law defines security offenses to include any offense committed under circumstances that might raise a suspicion of harm to Israel’s security and which the ISF believes may link to terrorist activity. Suspects between the ages of 12 and 14 can be held up to one day, with a possible one-day extension. Those between the ages of 14 and 16 can be held up to two days, with a possible two-day extension. Those between the ages of 16 and 18 can be held up to four days, with a possible four-day extension.

Under military law, in security-related cases, Israeli authorities may hold adults for 20 days prior to an indictment, with the possibility of additional 15-day extensions up to 75 days. An Israeli military appeals court can then extend the detention up to 90 days at a time. Prior to an indictment in security-related cases, authorities may hold minors for 15 days, with the possibility of 10-day extensions up to 40 days. An Israeli military appeals court can then extend the detention up to 90 days at a time.

The Emergency Powers Law allows the Israeli Ministry of Defense to detain persons administratively without charge for up to six months, renewable indefinitely.

The Illegal Combatant Law permits Israeli authorities to hold a detainee for 14 days before review by a district court judge, deny access to counsel for up to 21 days with the attorney general’s approval, and allow indefinite detention subject to twice-yearly district court reviews and appeals to Israel’s Supreme Court.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

West Bank Palestinian population centers mostly fall into Area A, as defined by the Oslo-era agreements. In Area A, which contains 55 percent of the Palestinian population on approximately 18 percent of West Bank land, the PA has formal responsibility for security and civil control. Nevertheless, according to media reports, since 2002 Israeli security forces regularly conducted security operations in Area A, at times without coordinating with the PASF. During the year the IDF conducted incursions throughout Area A in the West Bank, citing security concerns. The PA has civil control, and the PA and Israel maintain joint security control of Area B territory in the West Bank, which contains 41 percent of the population on approximately 21 percent of the land. Israel retains full civil and security control of Area C, which comprises approximately 4 percent of the Palestinian population and 61 percent of the land of the West Bank, although the majority of land in Area C is vacant, and according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Israel has designated 30 percent of Area C as closed military zones. According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, approximately 413,000 Israelis live in Area C Israeli settlements.

Six PA security forces operate in the West Bank. Several are under the PA Ministry of Interior’s operational control and follow the prime minister’s guidance. The Palestinian Civil Police have primary responsibility for civil and community policing. The National Security Force conducts gendarmerie-style security operations in circumstances that exceed the capabilities of the civil police. The Military Intelligence Agency handles intelligence and criminal matters involving PASF personnel, including accusations of abuse and corruption; it can refer cases to court. The General Intelligence Service is responsible for external intelligence gathering and operations. The Preventive Security Organization is responsible for internal intelligence gathering and investigations related to internal security cases (for example, antiterrorism, weapons violations, and money laundering). The Presidential Guard protects facilities and provides dignitary protection.

The PA maintained effective control over its security forces and has mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. Some Israeli officials claimed that PA authorities failed to prevent and, in fact, incited violence, including terrorist attacks, against Israelis.

The PA and the PLO continued to provide “martyr payments” to the families of Palestinian individuals killed during the commission of a terrorist act. The PA and the PLO also continued to provide payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons, including those convicted of acts of terrorism against Israelis. These payments and separate stipends for prisoners were first initiated by the PLO in 1965 and continued under the PA since the Oslo Accords with Israel. President Abbas said he will use his last penny “on the families of the prisoners and martyrs.”

In Gaza, Hamas forces exercised de facto authority. Impunity remained a problem. Hamas at times instigated violence at the fence with Israel and failed to prevent or deter violence in numerous other instances.

Israeli authorities maintained a West Bank security presence through the ISF, the ISA, the Israel National Police (INP), and Border Guard. According to organizations such as Yesh Din, PCATI, and B’Tselem, Israeli authorities took some steps to investigate and punish abuse and corruption, but there were reports of failure to take disciplinary action in cases of abuse (see section 1.a.). The ISF stated it continued to open investigations automatically into claims of abuse of Palestinians in Israeli military police custody. Yesh Din claimed the automatic opening of investigations applied only to some Israeli military activity in the West Bank, but not to Palestinians reporting abuse in custody. Reports of abuse go to the Israeli Attorney General’s Office; PCATI reported Israeli authorities systematically disregarded abuse allegations.

NGOs such as Yesh Din and Rabbis for Human Rights also criticized Israeli efforts and accountability in investigating reports of Israeli security forces killing Palestinians. In 2016 the State Attorney’s Office filed an indictment on charges of reckless and negligent use of a firearm against two soldiers who shot and killed a 16-year-old in the village of Budrus who was reportedly trying to flee a restricted area. The State Attorney’s Office proposed (among other actions) that the soldiers pay damages to the families, but the soldiers’ attorney rejected the offer. In June MAG withdrew a pending indictment against the soldiers.

According to NGOs Yesh Din and Bimkom, and media reports, the ISF did not respond sufficiently to violence perpetrated against Palestinians by Israelis in the West Bank (see section 6.).

In January the Israel Central District Attorney’s Office indicted two Israeli suspects on charges connected with a 2015 “price tag” arson attack on a Palestinian home in the West Bank village of Douma, which killed a toddler and his parents, and severely injured his four-year-old brother. A perpetrator also spray-painted “Revenge!” and a Star of David on the wall of the home. Authorities charged one Israeli with murder and another with conspiring to commit a crime. In May relatives of the Palestinian family killed in the attack filed a lawsuit against the Israeli government seeking admission of responsibility and damages. In July a defendant who was a minor at the time of the attack was released to house arrest for the remainder of the hearings. The case was ongoing at year’s end.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

PA law generally requires a warrant for arrest and provides for prompt judicial determination of the legality of detention. There are exceptions that allow for PA arrest without a warrant. PA law allows police to hold detainees for 24 hours if there is sufficient evidence to charge a suspect, and for up to 45 days with court approval. PA law requires that a trial start within six months, or authorities must release the detainee. PA authorities held some prisoners detained by order of Palestinian governors in lengthy pretrial detention, according to complaints received by the ICHR. Some PA security forces reportedly detained Palestinians outside appropriate legal procedures, including without warrants and without bringing them before judicial authorities within the required time. There were no known PA detentions extending beyond the six-month time limit without trial. PA authorities generally informed detainees of the charges against them, albeit sometimes not until interrogation. Bail and conditional release were available at the discretion of judicial authorities. PA authorities granted detainees access to a lawyer. PA courts consistently afforded the right to counsel to indigents charged with felony offenses. Indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors often did not receive counsel, although NGO efforts to represent indigent juveniles and adults in misdemeanor cases were at times successful. The Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) adopted a policy in May that restricted lawyers’ ability to represent indigents free of charge. An NGO challenged this policy in court, and in October the PBA rescinded it. Amnesty International reported that the PASF failed to provide prompt access to legal counsel to some detainees, effectively holding them incommunicado during interrogation.

The PA Military Intelligence Organization (PMI) operated without a service-specific mandate to investigate and arrest PA security force personnel and civilians suspected of “security offenses,” such as terrorism. The PMI conducted these activities in a manner consistent with the other PA security services. Hamas continued to charge that the PA detained individuals during the year solely due to their Hamas affiliation. The PA stated it charged many of these individuals with criminal offenses under PA civil or military codes.

In Gaza, Hamas detained a large number of persons during the year without recourse to legal counsel, judicial review, or bail. There also were instances in which de facto Hamas authorities retroactively issued arrest warrants and used military warrants to arrest Gaza residents.

Israeli military law applied to Palestinians in the West Bank. Israeli civil law applied to Israelis living in the West Bank. Under Israeli military law, authorities can hold detainees for up to 60 days without access to a lawyer. Israeli authorities informed Palestinian detainees of the charges against them during detention, but did not always inform them of the reasons for arrest at the time of arrest, according to the MCW. Israeli authorities stated their policy was to post notification of arrests within 48 hours, but senior officers could delay notification for up to 12 days, effectively holding detainees incommunicado during the interrogation process. An Israeli military commander may request that a judge extend this period.

In accordance with law, Israeli authorities generally provided Palestinians held in Israeli military custody inside Israel access to a lawyer of their choice (and provided lawyers for the indigent). Nonetheless, Palestinian detainees often obtained lawyers only after initial interrogations, and according to interviews with 29 minors, HaMoked reported that 22 of them did not see a lawyer prior to their interrogations. Impediments to movement on West Bank roads or at Israeli-operated crossings often made legal consultation difficult and delayed trials and hearings. According to the MCW, many Palestinian detainees saw their lawyer for the first time when they appeared before an Israeli military court. Based on the circumstances of each case, such as the severity of the alleged offense, status as a minor, risk of escape, or other factors, authorities either granted or denied bail to Palestinians detained for security violations, but denied bail in most cases. Israeli authorities delayed or deprived some Palestinian detainees of visits by their families or lawyers.

NGOs such as MCW and HaMoked claimed Israeli authorities in the West Bank frequently failed to inform Palestinian parents why authorities detained their children or where they had been taken. Israeli authorities stated their policy was to provide written notification about the arrest to parents when they arrested a child at home; however, the NGOs argued this occurred only in 19 percent of cases. Legally, minors who are 16 and 17 years old can be held for 96 hours before seeing a judge, the same period applied to adults. The law mandates audiovisual recording of all interrogations of minors in the West Bank but limits this requirement to nonsecurity-related offenses. NGOs expressed concern that the ISF entered Palestinian homes at night to arrest or photograph minors. Israeli military authorities began providing translations into Arabic of some recent changes to military laws affecting Palestinian minors.

During the year there was a decrease in the detention rate of minors, compared with the high in 2015, which coincided with a spike in knife attacks, but the rate remained higher than earlier levels.

In December 2017 the ISF arrested 16-year-old Palestinian Ahed Tamimi, who had a series of previous altercations with the IDF, and charged her with assault after she was filmed slapping an Israeli soldier in the West Bank town of Nabi Saleh. NGOs criticized the nighttime arrest and charges, arguing that Tamimi did not pose a true threat. Tamimi remained in custody for nine months as a result of a plea agreement and sentencing. Her attorney alleged that Tamimi was interrogated by male interrogators without a female present and without an interrogator specialized in questioning minors. It was also alleged that one of the interrogators sexually harassed Tamimi and that threats were made to arrest her relatives if she remained silent during questioning. A formal complaint was filed in April and an IDF spokesperson stated that an investigation had been opened.

In June MCW reported that the majority of minor detainees reported ISF use of blindfolds, hand ties, physical abuse, and threats of violence. The MCW said data from more than 400 MCW detainee testimonials collected between 2013 and 2017 confirmed widespread physical mistreatment by Israeli authorities of Palestinian minor detainees in the West Bank. HaMoked interviewed minors and their families, who reported very similar circumstances of detention, including lack of notification to families of where authorities detained their children, lack of family visits, and coercive interrogation techniques.

According to NGOs, the ISA engaged in the practice of incommunicado detention of Palestinians, including isolation from outside monitors, legal counsel, and family throughout the duration of interrogation.

Arbitrary Arrest: The PA in the West Bank and Hamas de facto authorities in Gaza made arbitrary arrests based on political affiliation, according to ICHR and HRW. In many cases detainees were held without formal charges or proper procedures. There were numerous reports that the PA and Hamas improperly detained Palestinian journalists and arrested Palestinians who posted criticism of the PA (in the West Bank) or Hamas (in Gaza) online. Hamas also targeted those suspected of ties to Israel.

According to human rights NGOs, including the MCW, B’Tselem, and HaMoked, throughout the year there were reports Israeli security forces in the West Bank arbitrarily arrested and detained Palestinian protesters and activists, particularly those participating in demonstrations against the security barrier or against killings of Palestinians.

Pretrial Detention: It was unclear how many Palestinians were held in pretrial detention in West Bank prisons.

Hamas’ de facto Ministry of Interior told HRW that as of April there were more than 4,000 persons in custody, which includes both charged and pretrial detention. It was unclear how long detainees in Hamas custody stayed in pretrial detention.

As of the end of the year, according to the IPS, 467 persons were in administrative detention, including 432 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and four Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Three people in administrative detention were minors. An Israeli military court must approve an administrative detention order. Palestinian detainees may appeal the ruling to the Israeli Military Appeals Court and the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ). The HCJ did not free any Palestinians under administrative detention during the year.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Palestinian detainees faced barriers to their ability to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention, and to obtain prompt release and compensation if found to have been unlawfully detained. Detainees held in PA custody faced delays in the enforcement of court rulings regarding their detention, especially regarding the PA’s obligation to release suspects who have met bail.

Hamas told HRW that between January 2016 and December 2017, Palestinians in Gaza lodged 314 complaints against the security services for “overstepping the law and mistreatment,” and 90 of them were proven true, according to Hamas’ internal investigations.

Palestinians held by Israeli military authorities in administrative detention have no right to trial and can only challenge their detention before a military court judge. In cases in which the evidence substantiating the charges against a detainee is classified, the detainee has no means of examining the evidence (nor, in some cases, to examine the charges) to challenge the detention.

Civil society organizations and some Israeli members of Knesset continued to criticize the Israeli government for using administrative detention excessively, adding that the practice was undemocratic since there was no due process. In its September 2017 submission regarding compliance with the UN Convention Against Torture, Israel claimed it issued administrative detention orders “as a preventive measure where there is a reasonable basis to believe that the detention is absolutely necessary for clear security purposes. Administrative detention is not employed where the security risk can be addressed by other legal alternatives, especially criminal prosecution.” The government further emphasized the role of military judges in reviewing administration detention orders.

The PA basic law provides for an independent judiciary. According to ICHR, the PA judicial system was subject to pressure from the security agencies and the executive, undermining judicial performance and independence. PA authorities did not always execute court orders.

Palestinians have the right to file suits against the PA but rarely did so. Seldom-used administrative remedies are available in addition to judicial remedies.

In Gaza Hamas-appointed prosecutors and judges operated de facto courts, which the PA considered illegal. Gaza residents can file civil suits. HRW reported Hamas internal security regularly tried civil cases in military courts.

Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected Israeli civil courts’ independence and impartiality. The ISF tried Palestinian residents of the West Bank accused of security offenses in Israeli military courts.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

PA law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right in the West Bank. Trials are public, except when the court determines PA security, foreign relations, a party’s or witness’ right to privacy, protection of a victim of a sexual offense, or an “honor crime” requires privacy. If a court orders a session closed, the decision may be appealed to a higher PA court. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to prompt and detailed information regarding the charges, with free interpretation as necessary, from the moment charged through all appeals. Amnesty International reported that PA political and judicial authorities sometimes failed to adhere to basic due process rights, including promptly charging suspects. PA law provides for legal representation, at public expense if necessary, in felony cases during the trial phase. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner during the trial, although during the investigation phase, the defendant only has the right to observe. Defendants have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Suspects and defendants in the PA justice system have a right to remain silent when interrogated by the prosecutor according to the law. Defendants also have a legal right to counsel during interrogation and trial. They have the right to appeal. PA authorities generally observed these rights.

Hamas authorities in Gaza followed the same criminal procedure law as the PA in the West Bank but implemented the procedures inconsistently.

Israeli authorities tried Israelis living in West Bank settlements under Israeli civil law in the nearest Israeli district court. Israeli military trials were provided for Palestinians in the West Bank. The same evidentiary rules used in Israeli criminal cases apply in both Israeli military and civilian proceedings; for example, Israeli authorities cannot base convictions solely on confessions. Indigent detainees do not automatically receive free legal counsel for military trials, but almost all detainees had counsel, in part because NGOs funded their representation. Israeli military courts use Hebrew, but Palestinian defendants have the right to simultaneous interpretation at every hearing. Various human rights organizations claimed the availability and quality of Arabic interpretation was insufficient; most interpreters were bilingual Israelis performing mandatory military service. Defendants can appeal through the Military Court of Appeals and petition Israel’s HCJ. According to NGO reports, Israeli military courts rarely acquitted Palestinians charged with security offenses, although they occasionally reduced sentences on appeal.

Human rights lawyers also argued that the structure of military trials–which take place in Israeli military facilities with Israeli military officers as judges, prosecutors, and court officials, and with tight security restrictions–limited Palestinian defendants’ rights to public trial and access to counsel. MCW reported that 65 percent of Palestinian minors were shown or made to sign documentation written in Hebrew, a language most Palestinian minors could not read, at the conclusion of their interrogation. Israeli authorities disputed these findings, asserting that interrogations of Palestinians took place only in Arabic and that authorities submitted no indictments based solely on a confession written in Hebrew.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

NGOs reported arrests of Palestinians on political grounds occurred in both the West Bank and Gaza. There was no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners the PA held in the West Bank during the year. In an April letter to HRW, the PA denied it had made any arrests based solely on political or party affiliation.

In Gaza, Hamas detained dozens of Palestinians due to political affiliation, public criticism of Hamas, or suspected collaboration with Israel and held them for varying periods. Hamas alleged that they arrested Fatah members on criminal, rather than political charges. Observers associated numerous allegations of denial of due process with these detentions. The ICRC and NGOs had limited access to these prisoners.

Some human rights organizations claimed Palestinian security prisoners held in Israel were political prisoners. The Israeli government described security prisoners as those convicted or suspected of nationalistically motivated violence.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

A Palestinian resident of the West Bank can file suit against the PA, including on matters related to alleged abuses of human rights, but this was uncommon.

A Palestinian resident of Gaza can file suit against de facto Hamas authorities, including on matters related to alleged abuses of human rights, but this was also uncommon.

Palestinian residents of the West Bank can file suit against the government of Israel. In November an Israeli court ruled that residents of Gaza are not able to seek redress or compensation from the Israeli government for damage to property or bodily harm due to Gaza’s classification as an “enemy territory” under the Civil Wrongs (State Liability) Law.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The Israeli government conducted multiple demolitions of Palestinian property in the West Bank based on lack of permits, use of the property by the ISF, or as punishment. Human rights NGOs claimed that in the West Bank, Israeli authorities often placed insurmountable obstacles against Palestinian applicants for construction permits, including the requirement that they document land ownership despite the absence of a uniform post-1967 land registration process, the imposition of high application fees, and requirements to connect new housing to often-unavailable municipal works.

Israeli authorities, including the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) in the West Bank; part of Israel’s Ministry of Defense; and the Ministry of the Interior continued to demolish Palestinian homes, cisterns, and other buildings and property on the basis that these buildings lacked Israeli planning licenses. According to B’Tselem, from 2000 to 2016, Palestinians filed 5,475 applications for building permits in Area C of the West Bank. Of these requests, the ICA approved 226 applications, approximately 4 percent.

During the year Israeli authorities demolished 272 Palestinian structures in the West Bank, 98 percent of which lacked an Israeli building permit and displaced 220 Palestinians, according to data from UNOCHA. The Israeli authorities demolished 15 unpermitted Israeli homes in the Netiv Ha’avot neighborhood of the Elazar settlement in July that the owners had partially built on private Palestinian land. In February the government authorized a financial compensation plan for the affected Netiv Ha’avot residents to provide temporary lodging nearby in the Alon Shvut settlement and money to rebuild their homes elsewhere.

As of year’s end, the Palestinian Bedouin community Khan al-Ahmar in the West Bank had not been demolished, although the Israeli government took administrative steps to do so during the year. Approximately 170 residents live in the community, in an area adjacent to a highway, with unpermitted, makeshift electrical and water connections. On May 24, after nearly 10 years of litigation, the HCJ ruled that the ICA’s demolition orders against the structures in Khan al-Ahmar were valid, which provided the ICA legal justification to demolish every structure in the village since all were built without ICA permits. Residents were not able to receive permits, as the Israeli government has not approved a master plan for the area. Following the ruling the HCJ issued a temporary injunction to delay the demolition pending a series of petitions from the PA and Khan al-Ahmar residents. On September 5, the HCJ convened a panel to judges to review these petitions. The panel ultimately rejected the petitions and upheld the HCJ’s May 24 decision, which terminated the temporary injunction beginning on September 12. In an effort to resolve the Khan al-Ahmar dispute, the government constructed an alternative site for the residents that included electric and water connections and a school building for the community’s children. Khan al-Ahmar residents rejected the transfer proposal, arguing that the site was unsuitable.

Israeli authorities sometimes charged demolition fees for demolishing a home; this at times prompted Palestinians to destroy their own homes to avoid the higher costs associated with Israeli demolition. Palestinians had difficulty verifying land ownership in Israeli courts, according to Israeli requirements for proof of land ownership. According to the government, all land ownership cases are assessed individually by an administrative committee, which is subject to judicial review, and decisions made according to the evidence provided.

The PA penal procedure code generally requires the PA Attorney General to issue warrants for entry and searches of private property; however, PA judicial officers may enter Palestinian houses without a warrant in case of emergency. NGOs reported it was common for the PA to harass family members for alleged offenses committed by an individual. According to Amnesty International, during the interrogation of a 31-year-old woman in Jericho the police threatened to hurt her family and take away her children.

Hamas de facto authorities in Gaza frequently interfered arbitrarily with personal privacy, family, and home, according to reporting from local media and NGO sources. Hamas authorities searched homes and seized property without warrants. They targeted Palestinian journalists, Fatah loyalists, civil society members, youth activists, and those whom Hamas security forces accused of criminal activity. Hamas forces monitored private communications systems, including telephones, email, and social media sites. They demanded passwords and access to personal information and seized personal electronic equipment of detainees. While Hamas membership was not a prerequisite for obtaining housing, education, or Hamas-provided services in Gaza, authorities commonly reserved employment in some government positions, such as those in the security services, for Hamas members. In several instances Hamas detained individuals for interrogation and harassment, particularly prodemocracy youth activists, based on the purported actions of their family members.

In response to reported security threats, the ISF frequently raided Palestinian homes, including in areas designated as areas under PA security control by Oslo-era accords, according to media and PA officials. These raids often took place at night, which the ISF stated was due to operational necessity. Only ISF officers of lieutenant colonel rank and above can authorize entry into Palestinian private homes and institutions in the West Bank without a warrant, based upon military necessity.

According to B’Tselem, the Israeli military forced Palestinian families in the Jordan Valley to temporarily vacate their homes 17 times to accommodate Israeli military training in the vicinity. In December the IDF forced 13 families, including 38 minors, to temporarily vacate their homes three separate times. A B’Tselem video from December 26 shows a convoy of Israeli military vehicles driving over crops as the IDF leads families away from their homes.

Israeli authorities froze family unification proceedings for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in 2000. HaMoked filed petitions to the High Court of Justice on November 1 on behalf of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and their foreign spouses, requesting that the Israeli government permit foreign spouses to legalize their status through a family unification procedure. HaMoked claimed the military’s refusal to review requests of foreign citizens for family unification is contrary to Israeli law, and to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Oslo-era agreements. HaMoked further claimed that the IDF rejects family unification requests based on a broad policy, and not on the facts of the individual cases brought before it, and as such does not appropriately balance relevant security needs and the right of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza–protected persons under international humanitarian law–to family life.

Israeli authorities reportedly permitted children in Gaza access to a parent in the West Bank only if no other close relative was resident in Gaza. Israeli authorities did not permit Palestinians who were abroad during the 1967 War or whose residency permits the Israeli government subsequently withdrew to reside permanently in the West Bank or Gaza.

The ISF continued punitive demolitions of the homes of the families of Palestinians implicated in attacks against Israelis. As of December 21, Israeli authorities partially or fully demolished six family homes of Palestinians who had carried out attacks on Israelis. These actions often also rendered other dwellings near the demolished homes uninhabitable. Punitive demolitions displaced 45 Palestinians, including 13 children, according to the United Nations. NGOs such as Amnesty International, HRW, and several Palestinian and Israeli NGOs widely criticized punitive demolitions as collective punishment.

Demolition of the family home of Islam Abu Hmeid, located in the al-Ama’ari refugee camp in Ramallah occurred on December 15. Israeli authorities arrested Abu Hmeid in June for killing a soldier during a May raid into the camp. The Israeli government asserted such demolitions had a deterrent effect on would-be assailants.

There were no reports that authorities or their agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution stipulates that no violence, threat, inducement, fraud, or other improper means should be used against accused persons, and there were no reports that officials employed these practices.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

There were no significant reports of prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.

Physical Conditions: There were no major concerns about physical conditions or inmate abuse in prisons and detention centers.

Administration: Prison authorities investigated claims of inhumane conditions and released the results of their investigations to judicial authorities and occasionally to the press. Authorities investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions.

During the active investigation phase of their cases, authorities deprived a small number of detainees of visitation rights, on court order, although these detainees retained access to legal counsel.

Independent Monitoring: Authorities allowed independent nongovernmental observers to investigate prison conditions.

Improvements: To ease overcrowding, the Ministry of Justice allowed inmates to work outside prison during the day. From January to September, prison authorities allowed 454 inmates to work outside of prison. They received monthly salaries of no less than 21,000 New Taiwan dollars (NT$) ($684). Prison authorities allocated 62.5 percent of the inmates’ income to improving prison conditions, skills training for inmates, and compensating crime victims.

The constitution and relevant laws prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and provide for the right of defendants to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The National Police Administration (NPA) of the Ministry of the Interior has administrative jurisdiction over all police units. Central authorities appoint city and county police commissioners. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the NPA, and those authorities had effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.

To address injustices committed during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, the ruling party passed the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice in December 2017. The law defines the authoritarian era as running from August 1945 to November 1992. The Executive Yuan set up the Transitional Justice Commission in May in accordance with the law.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law requires a warrant or summons, except when there is sufficient reason to believe the suspect may flee, or in urgent circumstances, as specified in the code of criminal procedures. Courts have judicial discretion to release indicted persons on bail. Prosecutors must apply to the courts within 24 hours after arrest for permission to continue detaining an arrestee. Authorities generally observed these procedures, and trials usually took place within three months of indictment. Prosecutors may apply to a court for approval of pretrial detention of an unindicted suspect for a maximum of two months, with one possible two-month extension. Courts may request pretrial detention in cases in which the potential sentence is five years or more and when there is a reasonable concern the suspect could flee, collude with other suspects or witnesses, or tamper with or destroy material evidence.

Legislation came into effect on January 1 that allows defendants and their lawyers access to case files and evidence while in pretrial detention. Previously, the accused and defense lawyers could only examine case files during the trial and were unable to obtain detailed information about the legal grounds of a pretrial detention. The amended law also stipulates that defendants must be assisted by a lawyer while in detention. For those who cannot afford to hire one, a public defender will be appointed. Another amendment specifies that suspects may no longer be interrogated late at night.

The judicial branch (Judicial Yuan) and the NPA operated a program to provide legal counsel during initial police questioning of indigenous suspects, qualifying indigent suspects who have a mental disability, or persons charged with a crime punishable by three or more years in prison. Detained persons may request the assistance of the Legal Aid Foundation (LAF), a publicly funded independent statutory organization that provides professional legal assistance through its 22 branch offices to persons who might not otherwise have legal representation. During regular consultations with police and when participating in police conferences, LAF officials remind police of their obligation to notify suspects of the existence of such counseling; the new amendments mentioned above were designed to address such concerns about access to counsel. Authorities can detain a suspect without visitation rights, except by legal counsel, or hold a suspect under house arrest based on a prosecutor’s recommendation and court decision. The law affords the right of compensation to those whom police have unlawfully detained.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. Some political commentators and academics, however, publicly questioned the impartiality of judges and prosecutors involved in high profile, politically sensitive cases. Judicial reform advocates pressed for greater public accountability, reforms of the personnel system, and other procedural improvements.

President Tsai convened a National Congress on Judicial Reform in 2017 to consider reform recommendations on issues of most concern to the public. These included: protecting the rights of crime victims and disadvantaged and marginalized groups; promoting a credible, fair, and professional judicial system; improving judicial accountability and efficiency; and enhancing judicial transparency and public participation. Based on the conclusions and recommendations of the congress, the Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice proposed several bills and sent them to the legislature for review.

The judicial system included options, beyond appeal, for rectifying an injustice. In a high-profile retrial in August, former convict Su Pin-kun, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison on robbery and attempted murder charges in 1987 and received a presidential pardon in 2000, cleared his name after a 32-year legal battle.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right.

By law, when any authority arrests or detains a person without a court order, any person, including the arrestee or detainee, may petition a court of justice having jurisdiction for a writ of habeas corpus, and the case must be brought before a judge within 24 hours. The law also requires agencies to inform detainees of their right to see a judge for a writ of habeas corpus. Detaining authorities who violate the law may face a maximum sentence of three years in prison and a fine of up to NT$100,000 ($3,260).

All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. They also have the right to an attorney and to be present at trial. Trials are public, although court permission may be required to attend trials involving juveniles or potentially sensitive issues that might attract crowds. Judges decide cases; all judges receive appointments from and answer to the Judicial Yuan. A single judge, rather than a defense attorney or prosecutor, typically interrogates parties and witnesses. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly of charges, hire an attorney of their choice or have one provided, prepare a defense, confront witnesses against them, and present witnesses and evidence. Defendants have the right to free interpretation service, if needed, from the moment charged through all appeals.

To enhance the transparency of the judicial process, the Legislative Yuan approved an amendment to the Organic Act of the Courts in May requiring prosecutors to release the details of indictments to the public, but only after the court concludes the first trial and announces the verdict. Previously, prosecutors could only share the bill of indictment with defendants and court officials and report on the general charges contained in an indictment in high-profile cases.

By law a suspect may not be compelled to testify and a confession may not be the sole evidence used to find a defendant guilty. All convicted persons have the right to appeal to the next two higher court levels. The law extends the above rights to all suspects and convicted persons.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

There is an independent and impartial judiciary for civil matters. Administrative remedies are available in addition to judicial remedies for alleged wrongdoing, including human rights violations.

In August 2018 and November 2017, the High Court awarded former death row inmates Cheng Tsing-tse and Hsu Tzu-chiang NT$17 million ($554,000) and NT$28 million ($912,000), respectively, in compensation for wrongful convictions. Cheng spent 14 years in prison before his acquittal in October 2017. Hsu was found not guilty in 2016 in the ninth retrial of his case, after he had spent two decades on death row.

The constitution prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

While the law prohibits extrajudicial killings by government security forces, there were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

On March 29, Abdurahmon Nazarov, a resident of Southern Kulob suspected of drug trafficking, died in police custody. Nazarov was detained by police officers in Dushanbe’s Sino district on March 28, and a source at a local hospital told the media that Nazarov was already dead when police officers brought him there the following day. Nazarov’s wife, Sadbarg Bobokhonova, believes her husband died due to mistreatment, accusing police of using excessive force after she saw evidence of beatings on her husband’s body. A police spokesperson claimed Nazarov had a heart attack when he was taken to the police station and he died on the way to the hospital. The Dushanbe chief prosecutor’s office launched an investigation into the matter, which was ongoing.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits the use of torture. Although the government amended the criminal code in 2012 to add a separate article to define torture in accordance with international law, there were reports of beatings, torture, and other forms of coercion to extract confessions during interrogations. Officials did not grant sufficient access to information to allow human rights organizations to investigate claims of torture.

There were reports that police tortured suspects, and in the first six months of the year the Prosecutor General’s Office received 37 complaints of torture. In the first three months of the year, 16 new cases of mistreatment were documented by the Coalition against Torture–a group of local NGOs–with a number of victims alleging severe physical abuse. Of these complaints, 14 were against the Interior Ministry and two were against the State Committee on National Security. On January 12, police arrested Rasht District residents Saidmurod Abdurahmonov, Madadsho Yatimov, and Ibrokhim Kakhhorov, and the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case against them in connection with the September 1998 unsolved murder of then head of the Rasht district Akbar Makhmadov. The three defendants stated that during their detention, they were tortured to obtain confessions, claiming the district inspector and officers of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Department of Internal Affairs for Rasht beat them on the lower part of the body and on the head. Abdurahmonov claimed he became deaf from the beatings. On May 29, the defendants’ lawyers sent a petition with allegations of torture to the Supreme Court, which approved the petition and sent the case to the general prosecutor’s office.

There were conflicting reports on the mistreatment of imprisoned lawyer Buzurgmehr Yorov, in prison since 2015 (see section 1.e.). After reports by Amnesty International that Yorov might have been held in solitary confinement four times, media reported that he was transferred to a high-security penal colony in December 2017.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions reportedly were harsh and life threatening due to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions.

Physical Conditions: The government operated 10 prisons, including one for women, and 12 pretrial detention facilities. Exact conditions in the prisons remained unknown, but detainees and inmates described harsh and life-threatening conditions, including extreme overcrowding and unsanitary conditions.

Penal Reform International, an organization conducting prison reform work with regional representation out of Kazakhstan, described the conditions in the women’s prison as frigid in the winter, with only intermittent electricity and heat, and a lack of food provisions for inmates and staff alike. Disease and hunger were serious problems. UN agencies reported that infection rates of tuberculosis and HIV in prisons were significant. Authorities often held juvenile boys with adult men.

Administration: A government Office of the Ombudsman exists, and its ombudsman visited prisons but resolved fewer than 2 percent of filed complaints. NGOs reported mistrust of the ombudsman due to the office’s loyalty to the president and frequent dismissal of human rights concerns. A special monitoring group with ombudsmen and NGO representatives conducted announced visits of prison conditions. No known complaints were filed regarding specific prison conditions.

Independent Monitoring: The Ministry of Justice continued to restrict access to prisons or detention facilities for representatives of the international community. Throughout the year the Coalition against Torture and the human rights ombudsman conducted visits of closed institutions, although officials denied Coalition against Torture monitors private interviews with detainees or access to internal correctional institution documents. The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to lack access due to the absence of an agreement with the government, a situation existing since 2004.

The law does not explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrests, which were common. The law states that police must prepare a detention report and inform the Prosecutor’s Office of an arrest within 12 hours and file charges within 10 days. The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but use of this provision was limited. Few citizens were aware of their right to appeal an arrest, and there were few checks on the power of police and military officers to detain individuals. Although military commissars throughout the country were dismissed in 2016 from their positions on the accusation of using force (so called “oblava”) to recruit young men into the army, human rights activists reported incidents of forced military conscription. In April local officials entered the house of 19-year-old Shahrom Abdulloev of Hissor to take him away for obligatory military service. Despite Abdulloev’s mother’s attempts to request his release from military service due to epilepsy, the officials dragged Abdulloev to their car and drove him to the commissariat for induction into the military. After Abdulloev lost consciousness en route the officials realized he was sick and released him.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, Drug Control Agency, Agency on State Financial Control and the Fight against Corruption (Anticorruption Agency), State Committee for National Security (GKNB), State Tax Committee, and Customs Service share civilian law enforcement responsibilities. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is primarily responsible for public order and manages the police. The Drug Control Agency, Anticorruption Agency, and State Tax Committee have mandates to investigate specific crimes and report to the president. The GKNB is responsible for intelligence gathering, controls the Border Service, and investigates cases linked to alleged extremist political or religious activity, trafficking in persons, and politically sensitive cases. The Customs Service reports directly to the president. The Prosecutor General’s Office oversees the criminal investigations that these agencies conduct.

Agency responsibilities overlap significantly, and law enforcement organizations defer to the GKNB. Law enforcement agencies were not effective in investigating organized criminal gangs, reportedly because the gangs maintained high-level connections with government officials and security agencies. A tacit understanding among law enforcement that certain individuals were untouchable prevented investigations.

Official impunity continued to be a serious problem. While authorities took some limited steps to hold perpetrators accountable, reports of torture and mistreatment of prisoners continued, and the culture of impunity and corruption weakened investigations and prosecutions. In some cases, during pretrial detention hearings or trials judges dismissed defendants’ allegations of abuse and torture during detention. Victims of police abuse may submit a formal complaint in writing to the officer’s superior or the Office of the Ombudsman. Most victims reportedly chose to remain silent rather than risk official retaliation. The Office of the Ombudsman made few efforts to respond to complaints regarding human rights violations and rarely intervened, claiming it did not have the power to make statements or recommendations regarding criminal cases.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

By law police may detain an individual for up to 12 hours before authorities must decide on whether to open a criminal case against the defendant. If authorities do not file charges after 12 hours, the individual must be released, but police often did not inform detainees of the arrest charges. If police file criminal charges, they may detain an individual 72 hours before they must present their charges to a judge for an indictment hearing. The judge is empowered to order detention, house arrest, or bail pending trial.

By law family members are allowed access to prisoners after indictment, but officials often denied access to attorneys and family members. The law states that a lawyer is entitled to be present at interrogations at the request of the detainee or lawyer, but in many cases authorities did not permit lawyers timely access to their clients, and initial interrogations occurred without them. Detainees suspected of crimes related to national security or extremism were held for extended periods without being formally charged.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government generally provided a rationale for arrests, but detainees and civil society groups frequently reported that authorities falsified charges or inflated minor incidents to make politically motivated arrests. On July 25, three activists informed the media that they were detained and interrogated by security agencies after signing a petition asking authorities to allow the grandson of Muhiddin Kabiri, the exiled leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. According to the activists, security personnel told them that by signing the petition, they support the activities of the banned party.

Some police and judicial officials regularly accepted bribes in exchange for lenient sentencing or release. Law enforcement officials must request an extension from a judge to detain an individual in pretrial detention after two, six, and 12 months.

Pretrial Detention: Defense advocates alleged prosecutors often held suspects for lengthy periods and registered the initial arrest only when the suspect was ready to confess. In most cases pretrial detention lasted from one to three months, but it could extend as long as 15 months.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Persons arrested or detained, regardless of charge, are entitled to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention. Despite such rights to challenge detention, the decrease in the number of lawyers licensed to take on criminal cases and the general apprehension with which lawyers take on sensitive cases limited the use of this entitlement for those arrested on cases suspected to be politically motivated.

Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the executive branch exerted pressure on prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. Corruption and inefficiency were significant problems.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

Defendants legally are afforded a presumption of innocence, but the presumption did not exist in practice. The courts found nearly all defendants guilty.

Although the law requires that defendants be informed of the criminal charges against them within 10 days, in practice they were not always promptly informed or granted a trial without undue delay. Courts generally allowed defendants to be present at their trial and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner during trials but often denied defendants the right to an attorney during the pretrial and investigatory periods, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Authorities continued to level politically motivated criminal charges against some defense lawyers to obstruct detained political opposition figures’ access to legal counsel and dissuade other lawyers from taking the cases.

The government provided attorneys at public expense when requested, but defendants and civil society complained the government sometimes appointed attorneys as a means to deny defendants’ access to the legal counsel of their choice. Defendants and private attorneys said government-appointed attorneys often provided a poor and counterproductive defense. Moreover, the government abolished a grandfather clause allowing experienced lawyers to continue to practice after a 2016 law required all lawyers to retake the bar exam to renew their licenses. As a result, the number of lawyers accepting criminal defense cases in the country shrank significantly. International observers of court cases stated there were criminal cases in which defendants did not have legal representation. Although criminal defendants enjoy the right to adequate time to prepare a defense, they were often not granted adequate facilities to do so.

Defendants may present witnesses and evidence at trial with the consent of the judge. Defendants and attorneys have the right to confront and question witnesses and to present evidence and testimony. An interpreter is provided for defendants who do not speak Tajik, the official language used for court hearings. No groups are barred from testifying and, in principle, all testimony receives equal consideration. Courts, however, generally give prosecutorial testimony far greater consideration than defense testimony. Tajik legislation allows criminal defendants not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants also enjoy the right to appeal.

Low wages for judges and prosecutors left them vulnerable to bribery, a common practice. Government officials subjected judges to political influence.

Although most trials are public, the law also provides for secret trials when there is a national security concern. Civil society members faced difficulties in gaining access to high-profile public cases, which the government often declared secret. Three trials involving human rights attorney Buzurgmehr Yorov, the defense attorney for members of the banned IRPT, were closed to the public because they were classified “secret.” Major international human rights organizations raised concerns over Yorov’s court hearings, which they alleged failed to ensure due process protections. He was convicted in 2016 of issuing public calls for the overthrow of the government and inciting social unrest and was initially sentenced to 23 years in prison. In January 2017 the court prolonged the same sentence by three years and sentenced him to two additional years in a subsequent closed-door trial for contempt of court and insulting a government official.

On August 22, the Sughd Regional Court did not allow media and other observers to attend the public appeal hearing for imprisoned journalist Khayrullo Mirsaidov, a whistleblower case that garnered international attention. Mirsaidov’s family members, the media, and civil society and international community representatives gathered in front of the courthouse but were not allowed to enter the courtroom. The court did not provide any explanation for its actions.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

While authorities claimed there were no political prisoners or politically motivated arrests, opposition parties and local and international observers reported the government selectively arrested and prosecuted political opponents. Although there was no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners, the government reported 239 prisoners who were members of banned political parties or movements.

In December 2017 local prosecutors in Rasht District arrested Farhod Khudoyorov, head of the Social Democratic Party branch office in Rasht Valley. Khudoyorov was charged with insulting and threatening authorities and in January was sentenced to 15 days of imprisonment for allegedly using coarse language with local officials. Khudoyorov did not admit his guilt and said he merely sent several SMS messages to the Rasht District head complaining about local problems.

On August 24, human rights lawyer Shukrat Khudratov was released after more than four years in jail. Khudratov was sentenced in 2015 to nine years in prison following a trial regarded by the human rights community as politically motivated.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Civil cases are heard in general civil courts, economic courts, and military courts. Judges may order monetary compensation for victims in criminal cases. No separate juvenile justice system exists, although there were some courts that provide a separate room for children linked to the courtroom by video camera. Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through domestic courts or through administrative mechanisms.

The constitution states that the home is inviolable. With certain exceptions, it is illegal to enter the home by force or deprive a person of a home. The law states that police may not enter and search a private home without the approval of a judge. Authorities may carry out searches without a prosecutor’s authorization in exceptional cases, “where there is an actual risk that the object searched for and subject to seizure may cause a possible delay in discovering it, be lost, damaged, or used for criminal purposes, or a fugitive may escape.” The law states that courts must be notified of such searches within 24 hours. Police frequently ignored these laws and infringed on citizens’ right to privacy, including personal searches without a warrant.

According to the law, “when sufficient grounds exist to believe that information, documents, or objects that are relevant to the criminal case may be contained in letters, telegrams, radiograms, packages, parcels, or other mail and telegraph correspondence, they may be intercepted” with a warrant issued by a judge. The law states that only a judge may authorize monitoring of telephone or other communication. Security offices often monitored communications, such as social media and telephone calls, without judicial authorization.

In August and September, in advance of the September 10 Independence Day celebration, local police again conducted door-to-door sweeps to identify “unregistered citizens”–individuals registered in one jurisdiction but residing in another.

According to the Law on Parental Responsibility, government authorities can punish family members for offenses allegedly committed by their relatives, such as if an underage child commits an offense. There were ongoing reports of Tajikistan-based relatives of perceived government critics in exile being harassed or targeted by local authorities.

There were some reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, on February 17, police attempting to disperse an opposition gathering on the eve of by-elections unintentionally shot and killed Akwilina Akwiline, who was aboard a passing commuter bus. Six police officers were arrested and later released with no charges filed. In the same month Daniel John, a member of the opposition CHADEMA party, who had been campaigning, was abducted and beaten to death by unknown assailants. Fellow party supporter Reginald Mallya was also abducted and found unconscious with a head wound and a broken arm. Godfrey Luena, a CHADEMA party official, was also killed in February. According to a press release by the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition, Luena had been working on the protection of land rights in the Morogoro Region when he was hacked to death with machetes by unknown assailants. The deaths of John and Luena came a few months after the September 2017 attempted killing of Tundu Lissu, a well-known CHADEMA politician and then president of the Tanganyika Law Society. Lissu was shot multiple times but survived. No charges were made in connection with these crimes. The leaders of CHADEMA and the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo) opposition parties alleged these killings were politically motivated.

In November 2017 Mwananchi Communication journalist Azory Gwanda disappeared in Kibiti district in Pwani Region while reporting on a spate of unexplained killings in the area and remained missing at year’s end. Some media and civil society observers claimed Gwanda may have been silenced for reporting on a sensitive security topic. In July 2017 Kibondo District Council Chairman Simon Kanguye was abducted by unknown persons while leaving his office. His family alleged that his disappearance was politically motivated and related to his stance on certain council issues. Ben Saanane, a CHADEMA policy analyst, also disappeared in late 2016. Investigations were ongoing, as the men remained missing at year’s end.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits such practices; however, the law does not reflect this constitutional restriction nor define torture. There were reports that police officers, prison guards, and soldiers abused, threatened, and otherwise mistreated civilians, suspected criminals, and prisoners. These abuses often involved beatings. On August 8, police officers severely beat Wapo Radio sports journalist Sillas Mbise while he was covering a soccer match at the national stadium in Dar es Salaam; a video of the incident went viral on social media. According to the Legal and Human Rights Center’s (LHRC’s) 2018 Mid-Year Human Rights Report, the brother of a parliamentarian was stabbed to death in April while in police custody; a police officer was arrested for the crime.

The law allows caning. Local government officials and courts occasionally used caning as a punishment for both juvenile and adult offenders. Caning and other corporal punishment were also used routinely in schools. On August 27, a 13-year-old student from Kagera Region died after being severely beaten by a teacher after mistakenly being accused of theft. On October 22, court proceedings began in a case involving two teachers accused of murdering the student.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Inadequate food, overcrowding, poor sanitation, and insufficient medical care were pervasive.

Physical Conditions: As of 2015 the prisons, whose total designed capacity was for 29,552 inmates, held 31,382, 6 percent above designed capacity. Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners were held together.

Authorities held minors together with adults in several prisons due to lack of detention facilities. In 2013 the independent government department, the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG), visited selected prisons and detention facilities and found 452 minors detained in the adult prisons visited. Among these, 101 were convicts and 351 were pretrial detainees. In several adult prisons, minors were placed in a separate cell but mixed with adults during the day and while being transported to court. In other prisons children and adults mixed at all times.

Information on the prevalence of deaths in prisons, whether deliberate or unintended, was not available.

Physical abuse of prisoners was common. Witnesses noted prisoners were routinely beaten.

Prison staff reported food and water shortages, a lack of electricity, inadequate lighting, and insufficient medical supplies. Prisons were unheated, but prisoners in cold regions of the country reportedly received blankets and sweaters. Sanitation was insufficient. In July President Magufuli publicly told the commissioner general of prisons that the government would no longer feed prisoners, who should cultivate their own food. While some prisons still provided prisoners with food, the Ministry of Home Affairs reported that prisoners were cultivating land to grow food for themselves. Other prisoners reported receiving no food from the prison authorities, relying solely on what family members provided.

Medical care was inadequate. The most common health complaints by prisoners concerned malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and diseases related to poor sanitation. Prison dispensaries offered only limited treatment, and friends and family members of prisoners generally had to provide medications or the funds to purchase them. Limited transportation also affected the ability of prison staff to take prisoners to health centers and hospitals.

In August female prisoners told visiting members of the Zanzibar Female Lawyers Association that they were subject to sexual harassment and beatings by prison authorities.

Administration: Judges and magistrates conducted regular visits to inspect prisons and hear concerns from convicts and detainees. In addition, relatives of inmates made complaints to the CHRAGG, which investigated reports of abuse, but the results of those investigations were not public.

On the mainland, prisoners could submit complaints to judicial authorities. The CHRAGG also served as the official ombudsman. The union Ministry of Home Affairs’ Public Complaints Department and a prison services public relations unit responded to public complaints and inquiries sent to them directly or through the media about prison conditions.

Prisoners and detainees usually had reasonable access to visitors and could worship freely, with some exceptions. Seventh-day Adventists reported they had to work on Saturday. The mainland authorities often moved prisoners to different prisons without notifying their families.

Independent Monitoring: The law prohibits members of the press from visiting prisons. Generally, access to prisoners was difficult for outside organizations, and the process for obtaining access was cumbersome.

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, although regional and district commissioners have discretionary authority to order someone detained for up to 48 hours without charge. This authority was used frequently to detain opposition members or persons expressing criticism of the government. The law allows persons arrested or detained, regardless of whether on criminal or other grounds, the right to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention and obtain prompt release and compensation if found to have been unlawfully detained. The law requires that a civil case must be brought in order to make such a challenge. In practice this was rarely done.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

Under the union’s Ministry of Home Affairs, the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF) has primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in the country. The Field Force Unit (FFU), a special division of the TPF, has primary responsibility for controlling unlawful demonstrations and riots. During the year there were reports of use of excessive force, police corruption, and impunity. As an example, an FFU officer beat a motorcyclist in front of a diplomatic mission in Dar es Salaam for failing to stop when requested. Mainland police sometimes acted as prosecutors in lower courts. Although the TPF stated this practice was being phased out, the Ministry of Justice reported police continued to act as prosecutors in all districts except for Monduli and regional headquarters. Police reported to civilian authorities (regional commissioners, district commissioners, and police leadership) appointed by the president. These authorities sometimes directed police to act in the interest of the ruling party, contravening the constitution.

Sungusungu, or citizens’ patrols, and traditional neighborhood anticrime groups existed throughout the mainland. The law grants them the power to make arrests. In general these groups provided neighborhood security at night. Sungusungu members are not permitted to carry firearms or machetes but may carry sticks or clubs. They coordinated with municipal governing authorities as well as police but operated independently from police. They formed or disbanded based on the perceived local need. In areas surrounding refugee camps, sungusungu members have authority to arrest refugees found outside the camps without permission. Within the camp, groups composed of refugees provided security, supplementing the police.

The Ministry of Defense and National Service oversees the Tanzania People’s Defense Force (TPDF) and the People’s Militia. The TPDF is responsible for external security and includes an army, air force, and navy; it also has some limited domestic security responsibilities. The National Service, a branch of military service similar to a national guard, is a paramilitary and parastatal organization that provides military and vocational training to volunteers. Its service is primarily domestic. After the completion of training, the National Service absorbs some of the volunteers into its economic wing, which is engaged in a wide variety of commercial activities. Others join the TPDF or return home and join the People’s Militia force in their respective areas. Both the National Service and the People’s Militia act as a reserve force for the TPDF.

Police and other security forces acted with impunity in many cases. While legal mechanisms exist for investigation and prosecution of security forces, authorities did not always use them. In February authorities decided not to file charges against police officers deemed responsible for the unintended killing of Akwilina Akwiline, a passenger on a commuter bus, while trying to disperse an opposition demonstration on the eve of by-elections. The bus conductor was injured by a stray bullet. Police continued to hold educational seminars for officers to combat corruption and sometimes took disciplinary action against officers implicated in wrongdoing.

The mainland community policing initiative to improve community relations with police and enhance police effectiveness continued. Community police received standardized training, and police conducted awareness campaigns for citizens on how to assist community-policing units. Between January and August in Zanzibar, the government conducted two community-policing training sessions, focusing on providing local leaders with capacities to identify criminals, terrorists, and thieves. Officials noted increases in assistance provided to police by civilians in areas where the program had been implemented, leading to arrests and improved law enforcement.

A group of security units, referred to collectively as the “Zanzibar Special Forces,” was deployed at the district level for activities that would fall under police jurisdiction on the mainland. These forces report to the government of Zanzibar and are not affiliated with the TPF or the Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces. Recruitment, training, and actual command and control of the “special units” were opaque, although all units officially report to a top ruling-party minister in Zanzibar. These units, including the fire brigade and prison guards, were often activated during political activities, such as voter registration or voting.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

On the mainland the law requires that an arrest for most crimes other than crimes committed in the presence of an officer be made with an arrest warrant based on sufficient evidence, although authorities did not always comply with the law. Police often detained persons without judicial authorization. The law also requires that a person arrested for a crime, other than a national security detainee, be charged before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays, but authorities failed to comply consistently with this requirement. Authorities usually informed detainees of the charges against them promptly, but there were several instances when this did not happen. There were reports of police using a rolling process of releasing and immediately rearresting individuals so that they would remain in custody while police completed their investigation and developed the required information for the accused to be charged. There were also reports of police detaining individuals without charge for short periods on the orders of local authorities.

The law does not allow bail for suspects in cases involving charges of murder, treason, terrorism, drugs, armed robbery, human trafficking, money laundering, or other offenses where the accused might pose a public safety risk. In some cases courts imposed strict conditions on freedom of movement and association when they granted bail. In the primary and district courts, persons sometimes bribed officials to grant bail. The law gives accused persons the right to contact a lawyer or talk with family members, but police often failed to inform detainees of this right. Indigent defendants and suspects charged with murder or treason could apply to the registrar of the court to request legal representation. Prompt access to counsel was often limited by the lack of lawyers in rural areas, lack of communication systems and infrastructure, and accused persons’ ignorance of their rights. The government often did not provide consular notification when foreign nationals were arrested and did not provide prompt consular access when requested.

The government conducted some screening at prisons and identified and assisted at least four trafficking victims imprisoned as smuggling offenders; however, screenings were not comprehensive, potentially leaving some trafficking victims unidentified in detention centers. The government also reported there were approximately 1,200 Ethiopians in detention centers, some of whom could be trafficking victims.

Arbitrary Arrest: By law the president may order the arrest and indefinite detention without bail of any person considered dangerous to the public order or national security. The government must release such detainees within 15 days or inform them of the reason for their continued detention. The law also allows a detainee to challenge the grounds for detention at 90-day intervals. The mainland government has additional broad detention powers under the law, allowing regional and district commissioners to arrest and detain for 48 hours anyone who “disturb[s] public tranquility.”

Pretrial Detention: According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, approximately 50 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees in 2015 (the latest available data). Detainees charged with crimes generally waited three to four years for trial due to a lack of judges to hear cases, an inadequate judicial budget, and the lengthy time required to complete police investigations.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but many components of the judiciary remained underfunded, corrupt, inefficient (especially in the lower courts), and subject to executive influence. Judges and senior court officers are all political appointees of the president. The need to travel long distances to courts imposes logistical and financial constraints that limit access to justice for persons in rural areas. There were fewer than two judges per million persons. Court clerks reportedly continued to take bribes to open cases or hide or misdirect the files of those accused of crimes. Magistrates of lower courts occasionally accepted bribes to determine the outcome of cases.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, but a weak judiciary often failed to protect this right.

The law provides for the presumption of innocence. In most cases authorities informed detainees in detail of the charges against them once they had been brought to the police station. Charges were generally presented in Kiswahili or English with needed interpretation provided when possible. With some exceptions criminal trials were open to the public and the press. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial. Courts that hold closed proceedings (for example, in drug trafficking cases and sexual offenses involving juveniles) generally are required to provide reasons for closing the proceedings. In cases involving terrorism, the law provides that everyone, except the interested parties, may be excluded from court proceedings and witnesses may be heard under special arrangements for their protection.

The law requires legal aid in serious criminal cases, although in practice only those accused of murder and treason were provided with free representation. Most other defendants could not afford legal representation and represented themselves in court. Defendants in criminal matters are entitled to legal representation of their choice. In practice legal representation was unavailable to defendants without the means to pay. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) represented some indigent defendants in large cities, such as Dar es Salaam and Arusha. In Zanzibar the government sometimes provided public defenders in manslaughter cases. The law prohibits lawyers from appearing or defending clients in primary-level courts whose presiding officers are not degree-holding magistrates. Human rights groups criticized reported cases where lawyers attempting to represent clients in sensitive cases were themselves threatened with arrest.

Authorities did not always allow detainees sufficient time to prepare their defense, and access to adequate facilities was limited. Defendants have the right to free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals. Defendants or their lawyers have the right to confront prosecution witnesses and the right to present evidence and witnesses on the defendant’s behalf. Defendants were not compelled to testify or confess guilt.

All defendants charged with civil or criminal matters, except parties appearing before Zanzibari qadi courts (traditional Muslim courts that settle issues of divorce and inheritance), could appeal decisions to the respective mainland and Zanzibari high courts. All defendants can appeal decisions to the union Court of Appeal.

Judicial experts criticized the practice of police acting as prosecutors because of the risk police might manipulate evidence in criminal cases. The mainland Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs continued hiring and training state prosecutors to handle the entire mainland caseload, although staffing shortages continued.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

Several opposition politicians and individuals critical of the government were arrested or detained during the year. Such individuals were usually charged with sedition, incitement, or unlawful assembly. For example, in February two opposition leaders, one a lawmaker, were sentenced to five months in prison for insulting President Magufuli in a move Freedom House said was “aimed at intimidating critics of the government.”

On October 31, opposition ACT-Wazalendo member of parliament (MP) Zitto Kabwe was arrested after publicly alleging that clashes between police and herdsmen in Kigoma had killed more than 100 persons. Kabwe was charged two days later with sedition and inciting hatred and released on a 10 million Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) ($4,400) bond. A preliminary hearing was set for December 13.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Persons may bring civil lawsuits seeking damages for or the cessation of human rights violations and can appeal those rulings to the Court of Appeal on the mainland and other regional courts. Civil judicial procedures, however, were often slow, inefficient, and corrupt. Individuals and organizations with observer status have the right to bring complaints to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

Between July and December 2017, the government demolished 2,000 houses along the Kimara-Kiluvya Road in Dar es Salaam without providing sufficient compensation, contending that the distance between the structures and the road did not meet setback standards required by law. During a June budget session in parliament, MP Saed Kubenea requested that the government compensate the affected persons, who had filed an unsuccessful injunction in court against the demolition before it occurred.

The law generally prohibits such actions without a search warrant, but the government did not consistently respect these prohibitions. While only courts may issue search warrants, the law also authorizes searches of persons and premises without a warrant if necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence or if circumstances are serious and urgent. The law relating to terrorism permits police officers at or above the rank of assistant superintendent or in charge of a police station to conduct searches without a warrant in certain urgent cases, but there were no reports this occurred.

It was widely believed government agents monitored the telephones and correspondence of some citizens and foreign residents. The nature and extent of this practice were unknown.

Authorities in Dar es Salaam demolished numerous homes built within reserved areas alongside rivers, roadways, and railways. Many demolitions along the Morogoro road occurred without prior notice; authorities stated they were enforcing a court order issued in 2005. Some residents had subsequently received title deeds for their property, and others had court injunctions or had cases in court challenging the demolitions when they occurred.

There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. According to the Ministry of Interior’s Investigation and Legal Affairs Bureau, from October 1, 2017 to December 5, security forces–including police, military, and other agencies–killed 12 suspects during the arrest process, a decrease from 16 in 2017.

On June 6, the Chiang Mai Provincial Court ruled against the military, stating soldiers operating a military checkpoint in Mueng Na Subdistrict of Chiang Mai Province shot and killed Chaiyaphum Pasae, a prominent ethnic Lahu student activist, in March 2017. Military officials claimed he possessed drugs and had attempted to attack the soldiers with a hand grenade. The court forwarded the case to the public prosecutor to determine liability. Community members and local human rights activists questioned the military’s account of the killing because the military did not submit existing CCTV footage as evidence to the court, and called for a full, transparent investigation into the incident.

There were reports of killings by both government and insurgent forces in connection with the conflict in the southernmost provinces (see section 1.g.).

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities from January to September. Prominent disappearance cases from prior years remained unsolved. In June the Department of Special Investigation reopened an investigation into the alleged forced disappearance of Pholachi “Billy” Rakchongcharoen, a prominent Karen human rights defender missing since 2014.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution states, “Torture, acts of brutality, or punishment by cruel or inhumane means shall not be permitted.” Nonetheless, the emergency decree effectively provides immunity from prosecution to security officers for actions committed during the performance of their duties. As of September the cabinet had renewed the emergency decree in the southernmost provinces consecutively since 2005. Three districts were exempted from the decree: Su-ngai Kolok in Narathiwat Province in March 2018, Betong in Yala Province in June 2018, and Mae Lan in Pattani Province in January 2011.

Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and legal entities reported police and military officers sometimes tortured and beat suspects to obtain confessions, and newspapers reported numerous cases of citizens accusing police and other security officers of brutality. In July, Sayuti Salae was hospitalized after officers from the Mayo Police Station in Pattani Province allegedly beat him in order to get him to confess to drug possession.

There were numerous reports of hazing and physical abuse by members of military units. Pvt. Khacha Phacha, a 22-year-old military conscript who was hospitalized for three weeks for injuries sustained after he was beaten by three senior soldiers at Lopburi army camp, died September 14. Unit commander Lt. Col. Monchai Yimyoo accepted responsibility for the death. The trial of three soldiers arrested for the murder was underway in military court. According to media outlets, two other conscripts died during the year.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Conditions in prisons and various detention centers–including drug rehabilitation facilities and immigration detention centers (IDCs) where authorities detained undocumented migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers–remained poor, and most were overcrowded. The Ministry of Justice’s Department of Corrections is responsible for monitoring prison conditions, while the Ministry of Interior’s Immigration Department monitors conditions in IDCs.

The military government held some civilian suspects at military detention facilities. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, there are at least two civilians at the 11th Military Circle detention facility in Bangkok, including a man charged with detonating a bomb at Bangkok’s busy Rajaprasong intersection. The suspect now denies the charges, saying his confession was due to police torture. It is unclear if he is an insurgent.

Physical Conditions: Prison and detention facility populations were approximately 60 percent more than designed capacity. As of August 1, authorities held approximately 359,500 persons in prisons and detention facilities with a maximum designed capacity of 210,000 to 220,000 persons.

In some prisons and detention centers, sleeping accommodations were insufficient, there were persistent reports of overcrowding and poor facility ventilation, and a lack of medical care was a serious problem. Authorities at times transferred seriously ill prisoners and detainees to provincial or state hospitals.

Pretrial detainees comprised approximately 18 percent of the prison population. Prison officers did not segregate these detainees from the general prison population. The government often held pretrial detainees under the emergency decree in the southernmost provinces in military camps or police stations rather than in prisons.

NGOs reported that authorities occasionally held men, women, and children together in police station cells, particularly in small or remote police stations, pending indictment. In IDCs, authorities sometimes placed juveniles older than 14 with adults.

By law authorities can hold detainees and their children in IDCs for years unless they pay a fine and the cost of their transportation home. NGOs urged the government to enact legislation and policies to end detention of children who are out of visa status and adopt alternatives, such as supervised release and noncustodial, community-based housing while resolving their immigration status. Other NGOs reported complaints, especially by Muslim detainees in IDCs, of inadequate Halal food.

Prison authorities sometimes used solitary confinement, as permitted by law, to punish male prisoners who consistently violated prison regulations or were a danger to others. Authorities also used heavy leg irons on prisoners deemed escape risks or potentially dangerous to other prisoners.

According to the Ministry of Interior’s Investigation and Legal Affairs Bureau, 536 persons died in official custody from October 2017 to August, including 21 deaths while in police custody and 515 in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Authorities attributed most of the deaths to natural causes. According to media reports, an inmate died in custody on April 18 after an apparent beating.

Administration: Authorities permitted prisoners and detainees or their representatives to submit complaints without censorship to ombudspersons but not directly to judicial authorities. Ombudspersons in turn can consider and investigate complaints and petitions received from prisoners and provide recommendations to the Department of Corrections, but they are not empowered to act on a prisoner’s behalf, nor may they involve themselves in a case unless a person files an official complaint. According to NGOs, authorities rarely investigated complaints and did not make public the results of such investigations.

IDCs, administered by the Immigration Police Bureau, which reports to the Royal Thai Police (RTP), are not subject to many of the regulations that govern the regular prison system.

Independent Monitoring: The government facilitated monitoring of prisons by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT), including meetings with prisoners without third parties present and repeat visits. According to human rights groups, no external or international inspection of the prison system occurred, including of military facilities such as Bangkok’s 11th Military Circle. International organizations reported cooperating with military and police agencies regarding international policing standards and the exercise of police powers.

Representatives of international organizations generally had access to some detainees in IDCs across the country for service delivery and resettlement processing.

NCPO Order 3/2015 grants the military authority to detain persons without charge or trial for a maximum seven days. Military officials frequently invoked this authority. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the military government summoned, arrested, and detained approximately 2,000 persons since the 2014 coup. Prior to releasing detainees, military authorities often required them to sign documents affirming they were treated well, would refrain from political activity, and would seek authorization prior to travel outside the local area. According to human rights groups, authorities often denied access to detainees by family members and attorneys.

The emergency decree, which gives the government authority to detain persons without charge for a maximum of 30 days in unofficial places of detention, remained in effect in the southernmost provinces (see section 1.g.).

Emergency decree provisions make it very difficult to challenge a detention before a court. Under the decree detainees have access to legal counsel, but there was no assurance of prompt access to counsel or family members, nor were there transparent safeguards against the mistreatment of detainees. Moreover, the decree effectively provides broad-based immunity from criminal, civil, and disciplinary liability for officials acting under its provisions.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The law gives military forces authority over civilian institutions, including police, regarding the maintenance of public order. NCPO Order No. 13/2016, issued in 2016, grants military officers with the rank of lieutenant and higher power to summon, arrest, and detain suspects; conduct searches; seize assets; suspend financial transactions; and ban suspects from traveling abroad in cases related to 27 criminal offenses, including extortion, human trafficking, robbery, forgery, fraud, defamation, gambling, prostitution, and firearms violations. The order also grants criminal, administrative, civil, and disciplinary immunity to military officials executing police authority in “good faith.”

The Border Patrol Police have special authority and responsibility in border areas to combat insurgent movements.

There were reports police abused prisoners and detainees, generally with impunity. Complaints of police abuse may be filed directly with the superior of the accused police officer, the Office of the Inspector General, or the police commissioner general. The NHRCT, the Lawyers’ Council of Thailand, the Office of the National Anticorruption Commission (NACC), the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the Prime Minister also accepted complaints of police abuse and corruption, as did the Office of the Ombudsman. Few complaints alleging police abuse resulted in punishment of alleged offenders, and there were numerous examples of investigations lasting years without resolution of alleged security force abuses. Human rights groups criticized the “superficial nature” of police and judicial investigations into incidents of alleged torture and other mistreatment by security forces and reported deficiencies in official investigations into deaths in custody.

In April an investigation was opened into the death of Pattanachirapong Boonyasema at Samut Prakan Provincial Prison after an autopsy revealed signs of physical abuse. Prison officials reported the prisoner was punished for selling drugs in the prison. The Department of Corrections was continuing its probe.

The Ministry of Defense requires service members to receive human rights training. Routine training occurred at various levels, including for officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and recruits. Furthermore, military service members who deploy in support of counterinsurgency operations in the southernmost provinces receive specific human rights training, including training for detailed, situation-specific contingencies. The RTP requires all cadets at its national academy to complete a course in human rights law.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

With few exceptions, the law requires police and military officers exercising law enforcement authority to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to making an arrest, although NCPO Order 3/2015 allows the detention of any individual for a maximum seven days without an arrest warrant. Issuance of arrest warrants was subject to a judicial tendency to approve automatically all requests for warrants. By law authorities must inform persons of likely charges against them immediately after arrest and allow them to inform someone of their arrest.

The law provides for access to counsel for criminal detainees in both civilian and military courts, but lawyers and human rights groups claimed police often conducted interrogations without providing access to an attorney.

Both the Court of Justice and the Justice Fund of the Ministry of Justice assign lawyers for indigent defendants. According to the most recent figures, from January to July the Court of Justice assigned attorneys to 16,357 adult and 14,383 juvenile defendants. From October 2017 to July, the Ministry of Justice provided lawyers for defendants in 1,863 cases.

The law provides defendants the right to request bail, and the government generally respected this right except in cases considered to involve national security, which included violations of the country’s lese majeste (royal insult) law.

Arbitrary Arrest: Under NCPO Order 3/2015, the military has authority to detain persons without charge for a maximum of seven days without judicial review. Under the emergency decree, authorities may detain a person for a maximum of 30 days without charge (see section 1.g.). Military officers invoked NCPO Order 3/2015 authority to detain numerous politicians, academics, journalists, and other persons without charge. The military held most individuals briefly but held some for the maximum seven days.

Pretrial Detention: Under normal conditions the law allows police to detain criminal suspects for 48 hours after arrest for investigation. Lawyers reported police rarely brought cases to court within the 48-hour period. Laws and regulations place offenses for which the maximum penalty for conviction is less than three years under the jurisdiction of district courts, which have different procedures and require police to submit cases to public prosecutors within 72 hours of arrest. According to the Lawyers’ Council of Thailand, pretrial detention of criminal suspects for as long as 60 days was common.

Before charging and trial, authorities may detain individuals for a maximum of 84 days (for the most serious offenses), with a judicial review required for each seven-day period. After formal charges and throughout trial, depending on prosecution and defense readiness, court caseload, and the nature of the evidence, detention may last for one to two years before a verdict and up to six years before a Supreme Court appellate review.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Persons arrested or detained by police are entitled to judicial review of their detention within 48 hours in most cases. Persons detained by military officials acting under authority granted by NCPO Order 3/2015 are entitled to judicial review of their detention within seven days. Detainees found by the court to have been detained unlawfully (more than 48 hours or seven days) are entitled to compensation.

The 2017 constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality, notwithstanding NCPO orders that prohibited members of the judiciary from making any negative public comments against the NCPO. Nevertheless, portions of the 2014 interim constitution left in place by the 2017 constitution’s transitory provisions (article 279) provide the NCPO power to intervene “regardless of its effects on the legislative, executive, or judiciary” to defend the country against national security threats.

Human rights groups continued to express concern about the NCPO’s influence on independent judicial processes, particularly the practice of prosecuting some civilians in military courts and the use of the judicial process to punish government critics.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The 2017 constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right, except in certain cases involving national security, including lese majeste cases.

The law provides for the presumption of innocence. A single judge decides trials for misdemeanors; regulations require two or more judges for more serious cases. Most trials are public; however, the court may order a closed trial, particularly in cases involving national security, the royal family, children, or sexual abuse.

In ordinary criminal courts, defendants enjoy a broad range of legal rights, including access to a lawyer of their choosing, prompt and detailed information on the charges against them, free assistance of an interpreter as necessary, the right to be present at trial, and the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. They also have the rights not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt, to confront witnesses, to present witnesses, and to appeal. Authorities did not always automatically provide indigent defendants with counsel at public expense, and there were allegations authorities did not afford defendants all the above rights, especially in small or remote provinces.

In a 2014 order, the NCPO redirected prosecutions for offenses against the monarchy, insurrection, sedition, weapons offenses, and violation of its orders from civilian criminal courts to military courts. In 2016 the NCPO ordered an end to the practice, directing that offenses committed by civilians after that date would no longer be subject to military court jurisdiction. According to the Judge Advocate General’s Office, military courts initiated 1,728 cases involving at least 2,211 civilian defendants since the May 2014 coup, most commonly for violations of Article 112 (lese majeste); sedition; failure to comply with an NCPO order; and violations of the law controlling firearms, ammunition, and explosives. As of August approximately 278 civilian cases remained pending before military courts.

Military courts do not provide the same legal protections for civilian defendants as do civilian criminal courts. Military courts do not afford civilian defendants rights outlined by the 2017 constitution to a fair and public hearing by a competent, impartial, and independent tribunal. Civilians facing trial for offenses allegedly committed from May 2014 to March 2015–the period of martial law–have no right of appeal.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

The NCPO routinely detained those who expressed political views (see section 1.d.). As of August the Department of Corrections reported there were 128 persons detained or imprisoned in the country under lese majeste laws that outlaw criticism of the monarchy (see section 2.a.). Human rights groups claimed the prosecutions and convictions of several lese majeste offenders were politically motivated. As of December there were no new prosecutions of lese majeste during the year. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights reported that courts dropped several lese majeste charges, opting instead to prosecute persons under statutes such as the Computer Crimes Act (see section 2.a.).

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The law provides for access to courts and administrative bodies to sue for damages for, or cessation of, a human rights violation. The government generally respected this right, but the emergency decree in force in the southernmost provinces expressly excludes administrative court scrutiny or civil or criminal proceedings against government officials. Victims may seek compensation from a government agency instead.

NCPO Order 3/2015, along with the emergency decree, gives government security forces authority to conduct warrantless searches. Security forces used this authority regularly, particularly in the southernmost provinces and other border areas. The amended Computer Crimes Act establishes procedures for the search and seizure of computers and computer data in cases where the defendant allegedly entered information into computer systems that is “likely to cause damage to the public,” is “false,” or is “distorted” (see section 2.a.). The act gives the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society authority to request and enforce the removal of information disseminated via the internet. There were complaints during the year from persons who claimed security forces abused this authority.

There were reports military officers harassed family members of those suspected of opposing the NCPO, including parents of students involved in anti-NCPO protests, the families of human rights defenders, and democracy demonstrators (see section 2.b.).

Security services monitored persons, including foreign visitors, who espoused highly controversial views.

There was one report that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. An off-duty police officer killed three civilians and injured others after firing his weapon at a party in Dili November 17. The minister of defense and security expressed condolences to families, and an informal dialogue between police and families eased immediate tensions. Two officers were suspended immediately, and the national police were investigating the incident.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits such practices and limits the situations in which police officers may resort to physical force and the use of firearms. During the year, there were multiple reports of the use of excessive force by security forces. Most complaints involved maltreatment or use of excessive force during incident response or arrest. Conduct of off-duty police officers was also a problem. A security sector nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported that in September an off-duty police officer in Manatuto escalated a verbal confrontation with a civilian by changing into his uniform and returning with a squad car and two other officers. The three officers allegedly beat the civilian, placed him under arrest, and beat him in the car while transporting him to the police station.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions generally did not meet international standards.

Physical Conditions: According to human rights monitoring organizations, police station detention cells generally did not comply with international standards and lacked sanitation facilities and bedding, although police were making efforts to improve them.

The prison in Dili (Becora), the country’s largest, was grossly overcrowded. It had an estimated capacity of 290 inmates, but in September held 585 adult and juvenile male convicts and pretrial detainees. According to independent monitors, juvenile and adult prisoners were held in the same block, although separate blocks housed pretrial detainees and convicts.

Gleno Prison was also overcrowded, with 110 inmates in a prison designed for 80 to 90. Gleno held women as well as adult male convicts and pretrial detainees, all in separate blocks. Conditions were the same for male and female prisoners, who shared recreation areas. Housing blocks separated nonviolent offenders from violent offenders. There were no specific supports for offenders with mental disabilities.

Pretrial detainees composed approximately 20 percent of the total prison population.

Authorities provided food three times daily in prisons and detention centers. While authorities provided water in prisons, it was not always available in detention centers and Gleno Prison experienced seasonal water shortages.

Medical care was inadequate. A doctor and a nurse staffed a clinic at Becora Prison five days per week and a psychiatrist visited once per week. A doctor visited Gleno Prison once per week. For urgent cases and more advanced care, authorities took inmates to a local hospital in Gleno or Dili. Prisoners who tested positive for tuberculosis shared cells with TB-negative prisoners. Access to clean toilets was generally sufficient, although without significant privacy. The Ombudsman’s Office for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ) assessed ventilation and lighting as adequate in prisons but not in detention centers. Prisoners were able to exercise for two hours daily.

Administration: Prisoners and detainees could submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and request investigation of credible allegations of problematic conditions. The PDHJ oversees prison conditions and prisoner welfare. It monitored inmates and reported the government was generally responsive to recommendations. Nonetheless, some human rights monitoring organizations questioned how widely known the complaint mechanism was and whether prisoners felt free to utilize it.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted prison visits by the PDHJ, foreign governments, international organizations, local NGOs, and independent human rights observers. During a routine monitoring visit to prisons in Gleno and Becora in October, local human rights NGO HAK met prisoners, guards, and administrators and provided human rights training for prisoners and guards.

Improvements: The prison system made administrative changes to ensure there were cars, drivers, and guards assigned to transport prisoners to court dates. These actions reduced the pretrial detention population.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these prohibitions.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The law does not fully clarify the particular authority of the national police (PNTL), the judicially mandated Scientific Police for Criminal Investigations, or the military (F-FDTL). Security-sector experts also said that the operational roles and relationship between the PNTL and the F-FDTL were unclear.

The PNTL is legally responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of order within the country. It has several specialized units, including border, maritime, and immigration units.

The F-FDTL is legally responsible for external security, and may play a role in internal security only in “crisis” or “emergency” situations declared by the government and president. The F-FDTL, however, may support police in joint operations if requested by a “competent entity.”

Civilian oversight of the PNTL and the F-FDTL improved, in comparison with previous years. Parliamentary Committee B–responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and security–was increasingly active in engaging the minister of defense and security and the commander general of the national police to address concerns with internal security and police professionalization. Various bilateral and multilateral partners continued efforts to strengthen the development of the police, especially through community policing programs and technical assistance efforts, including work to improve disciplinary and accountability mechanisms within the PNTL. The PDHJ and the UN Human Rights Adviser’s Unit provided human rights training to both the PNTL and the F-FDTL.

The PNTL’s internal accountability mechanisms remained somewhat ineffective but improved. The office responsible for internal affairs did not have sufficient resources to investigate and respond to all cases brought to its attention. The office increased its use of disciplinary measures, including demotions, written admonitions, and fines. Nonetheless, especially outside the capital, municipality commanders at times did not fully engage in the disciplinary process, perhaps due partly to lack of familiarity with disciplinary procedures.

The PNTL internal affairs office may recommend that the commanding general refer cases to the Office of the Prosecutor General for investigation. As of September the Office of the Prosecutor General had received 83 reports of excessive use of force from PNTL. This was a significant increase over the previous year, during which the office received approximately 70 reports.

An internal PNTL investigation into a 2017 incident in Maliana found that staff from the quick reaction unit used excessive force. The PNTL suspended the staff involved. Separately, the victim brought a civil case against the PNTL. As of November the case was awaiting trial in Suai District Court.

F-FDTL regulations permit referral of disciplinary incidents amounting to crimes to the prosecutor general (misconduct is processed internally). One security-sector NGO assessed the F-FDTL’s disciplinary system as strong but not entirely free of political influence.

The F-FDTL was investigating an October incident during which an F-FDTL member allegedly killed a civilian in Laga, Baucau. The PNTL and F-FDTL jointly investigated a July incident during which members of the PNTL and F-FDTL allegedly fired their weapons at a music festival in Maliana. Following the investigation, both entities opened internal disciplinary processes, which continued as of November.

Citizens reported obstacles to reporting complaints about police behavior, including repeated requests to return later or to submit their complaints in writing.

There was a widespread belief that members of the security forces enjoyed substantial impunity for illegal or abusive actions and that reporting abuse would lead to retaliation rather than positive change. Social media users posted and shared photos of injuries from alleged encounters with police. Prolonged investigations, delays in bringing cases to trial, and critical editorials from watchdog NGOs also contributed to this perception.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law requires judicial warrants prior to arrests or searches, except in exceptional circumstances or in cases of flagrante delicto.

The law requires a hearing within 72 hours of arrest. During these hearings, the judge may determine whether the suspect should be released because conditions for pretrial detention had not been met, released conditionally (usually after posting some form of collateralized bail or on condition that the suspect report regularly to police), or whether the case should be dismissed due to lack of evidence. Although the government’s 2014 decision to rescind visas for international legal advisers, who had filled critical roles as judges, prosecutors, and investigators, continued to affect the justice system, backlogs decreased during the year, particularly in courts outside of Dili. Justice-sector monitoring organizations reported that the system adhered much more closely to the 72-hour timeline than in past years.

Time in pretrial detention may be deducted from a final sentence, but there is no remedy to make up for pretrial detention in cases that do not result in conviction.

The law provides for access to legal representation at all stages of the proceedings and provisions exist for providing public defenders for all defendants at no cost (see section 1.e.). Due to a lack of human resources and transportation, however, public defenders were not always able to attend to their clients and sometimes met clients for the first time during their first court hearing.

Pretrial Detention: The law specifies that a person may be held in pretrial detention for up to one year without presentation of an indictment, two years without a first-instance conviction, or three years without a final conviction on appeal. If any of these deadlines are not met, the detained person may file a claim for release. Exceptionally complex cases can also provide justification for the extension of each of those limits by up to six months with permission of a judge. In many cases, the length of pretrial detention equaled or exceeded the length of the sentence upon conviction.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: While persons arrested or detained may challenge the legal basis of their detention and obtain prompt release, justice-sector monitoring organizations reported such challenges rarely occur, likely due to limited knowledge of the provision allowing such challenges.

The law provides that judges shall perform their duties “independently and impartially without improper influence” and requires public prosecutors to discharge their duties impartially. Many legal sector observers expressed concern about the independence of some judicial organs in politically sensitive cases, a severe shortage of qualified personnel, and the complex legal regime influenced by legacies of Portuguese, Indonesian, and UN administration, and various other international norms. An additional problem is that all laws and many trial proceedings and court documents are in Portuguese, a language spoken by approximately 10 percent of the population. Nonetheless, observers noted citizens generally enjoyed a fair, although not always expeditious, trial and that the judiciary was largely independent.

Administrative failings involving the judge, prosecution, or defense led to prolonged delays in trials. Moreover, the law requires at least one international judge on a panel in cases involving past human rights abuses. There have been no new such cases since 2014; in addition, cases opened before 2014 were left pending indefinitely with no timeline for coming to trial.

There were 32 judges and 35 prosecutors in the country as of November. The government and judicial monitoring organizations cited human resource challenges as a major issue in the justice system.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for the right to a fair, timely, and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Under the criminal procedure code, defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, access to a lawyer, and rights against self-incrimination, to be informed promptly of charges, and to attend their trial. Trials are held before judges or judicial panels; juries are not used. Defendants may be present at their trial and can confront hostile witnesses and present other witnesses and evidence, and may not be compelled to testify or admit guilt. Defendants have a right of appeal to higher courts. The government provides interpretation, as necessary, into local languages. Observers noted the courts made progress in providing interpretation services during court proceedings, and all courts had at least one interpreter.

Justice-sector NGOs expressed concern that judges did not provide clear information or take the time to explain and read their decisions. Observers also noted that in many cases judges did not follow the Law on Witnesses, which provides important protections for witnesses. Additionally, the country has not passed juvenile justice legislation, leaving many juveniles in the justice system without protections and perhaps subject to vigilante justice by frustrated communities seeking justice.

The constitution contemplates a Supreme Court, but it has not been established due to staffing and resource limits. The Court of Appeals carries out Supreme Court functions in the interim.

Mobile courts based in Dili, Baucau, Covalima, and Oecusse operated in areas that did not have a permanent court. These courts processed only pretrial proceedings.

For “semi-public” crimes, where the process does not begin unless a victim files a complaint, some citizens utilized traditional (customary) systems of justice that did not necessarily follow due process standards or provide witness protection, but provided convenient and speedy reconciliation proceedings with which the population felt comfortable.

The public defender’s office, concentrated in Dili, was too small to meet the need, and many defendants relied on lawyers provided by legal aid organizations. A number of defendants who were assigned public defenders reported they never saw their lawyers, and some observers noted public defenders were confused about their duties to the client versus the state and that few viewed their role as client advocates. Public defenders did not have access to transportation to visit clients in detention, so sometimes met their clients for the first time in court.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

As there is no separate civil judicial system in the country, civil litigation experienced the same problems encountered in the criminal justice system. No regional human rights body has jurisdiction in the country.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The government promulgated land tenure legislation in 2017. This new law, however, cannot be implemented without supplemental legislation addressing eviction, community property, and other issues. Community concerns over evictions and inadequate compensation for government expropriation of land continued during the year. Communities relocated for government infrastructure projects in Oecusse in 2017 had not received compensation for their land because they were unable to produce proof of ownership, according to an NGO network that monitored land disputes.

Although the law prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, observers noted a general lack of privacy protections throughout the government, particularly in the health sector.

There was one report that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

On May 15, media reported 10 prison guards beat a detainee to death in the Kpalime Civil Prison. The government detained the guards. One was released and nine remained in detention in Lome but had not been charged by year’s end.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices. There were several reports, however, that government officials employed cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In February civil society associations reported that police units detained dozens of protesters in Lome and chained them together in a field next to a police station. Police left the detainees without shelter overnight before releasing them.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions and detention center conditions remained harsh and potentially life threatening due to serious overcrowding, poor sanitation, disease, and unhealthy food.

Physical Conditions: Overcrowding was a problem. As of October 10, there were 5,109 convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees (including 165 women) in 13 prisons and jails designed to hold 2,720. Men often guarded women. There were 66 juveniles held in the Brigade for Minors facility. Authorities placed the infants of female pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners in the care of government-supported private nurseries. Officials held pretrial detainees together with convicted prisoners.

From January to October 10, there were 28 prison deaths from various causes, including malaria. Medical facilities, food, sanitation, ventilation, and lighting were inadequate or nonexistent, prisoners did not have access to potable water, and disease was widespread.

Administration: There were no ombudsmen to assist in resolving the complaints of prisoners and detainees. Although authorities allowed prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of inhuman conditions, they rarely investigated complaints and, when they did, did not release any findings. The government rarely monitored and investigated allegations of inhuman prison and detention center conditions.

Independent Monitoring: Representatives of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) accredited by the Ministry of Justice visited prisons. Such NGOs were generally independent and acted without government interference. Authorities generally denied requests by journalists to visit prisons. The government required international NGOs to negotiate an agreement to obtain access. The International Committee of the Red Cross and other international human rights organizations had access through such agreements. The government holds an annual Week of the Detainee program, during which all prisons are open to the public, allowing visitors to witness the harsh, sometimes deplorable, realities of prison life.

The constitution and law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge in court the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention. The government did not always observe these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The national police and the gendarmerie are responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of order within the country. The gendarmerie is also responsible for migration and border enforcement. The National Intelligence Agency provided intelligence to police and gendarmes but did not have internal security or detention facility responsibilities. Police are under the direction of the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, which reports to the prime minister. The gendarmerie falls under the Ministry of Defense but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and security. The Ministry of Defense, which reports directly to the president, oversees the military.

Civilian authorities did not always maintain effective control over the armed forces, gendarmerie, and police, and government mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse were often not effective. Corruption and inefficiency were endemic among police, and impunity was a problem. There were reports of police misusing arrest authority for personal gain. Abuses by security forces were subject to internal disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, but investigation and prosecution seldom occurred. The government generally neither investigated nor punished effectively those who committed abuses.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

There were no reports of persons arbitrarily detained in secret without warrants. The law authorizes judges, senior police officials, prefects, and mayors to issue arrest warrants. Detainees have the right to be informed of the charges against them, and police generally respected this right. The law provides for a suspect to be brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours of arrest. Although the law stipulates that special judges conduct a pretrial investigation to examine the adequacy of evidence and to decide on bail, authorities often held detainees without bail for lengthy periods regardless of a judge’s decision. Attorneys and family members have the right to see a detainee after 48 to 96 hours of detention, but authorities often delayed, and sometimes denied, access. All defendants have the right to an attorney, and the bar association sometimes provided attorneys for indigents charged with criminal offenses. The law gives indigent defendants the right to free legal representation, but the government provided only partial funding for implementation. No detainees were held incommunicado.

Arbitrary Arrest: On October 4, police detained nine civil society members who were distributing pamphlets encouraging participation in a protest. Although authorities stated police were only checking their identities, the nine were held for 12 hours before release.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detainees and persons in preventive detention totaled 3,212, or 63 percent of the total prison population. A shortage of judges and other qualified personnel, as well as official inaction, often resulted in pretrial detention for periods exceeding the time detainees would have served if tried and convicted, in many cases for more than six months.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: The constitution and law provide for the right of an arrested or detained person to challenge the lawfulness of detention, regardless of whether on criminal or other grounds. An individual found to have been unlawfully detained may file for damages.

The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, but the government did not always respect judicial independence and impartiality. The executive branch exerted control over the judiciary, and judicial corruption was a problem. There was a widespread perception lawyers bribed judges to influence the outcome of cases. The court system remained overburdened and understaffed.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but executive influence on the judiciary limited this right. The judicial system employs both traditional law and the Napoleonic Code in trying criminal and civil cases. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, with free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals. They have a right to a trial without undue delay, to be present at their trial, to communicate with an attorney of their choice or be provided with one at public expense if unable to pay, and to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Trials were open to the public and juries were used. Defendants have the right to confront prosecution witnesses and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Defendants have the right not to testify or confess guilt. Those convicted have the right to appeal. Authorities generally respected these rights, which are extended to all defendants including women, members of indigenous groups, older persons, and persons with disabilities.

In rural areas the village chief or a council of elders has authority to try minor criminal and civil cases. Those who reject traditional authority may take their cases to the regular court system.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were was one report of a political prisoner or detainee.

On August 22, authorities arrested civil society leader Folly Satchivi–spokesperson of the human rights organization Under No Circumstances that promotes setting presidential term limits–for conducting an unauthorized press conference. The government charged Satchivi with disruption of public order and other offenses. He was denied bail and no trial date had been set by year’s end.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The constitution and law provide for civil and administrative remedies for human rights violations, but the judiciary did not respect such provisions, and most citizens were unaware of them.

The constitution and law prohibit such actions. Unlike in prior years, there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.

Physical Conditions: Hu’atolitoli is the only prison facility for persons with mental disabilities. Government sources acknowledged the facility was not adequately equipped to treat them. Church leaders visited inmates approximately four to six times a week.

Administration: There were no reports that authorities did not allow prisoners and detainees access to visitors or religious observance.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring visits by international human rights observers, but there were no such visits as of November.

Improvements: The government began construction of a new facility for persons with mental disabilities.

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The national police force maintains internal security. His Majesty’s Armed Forces (HMAF) is responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. The police and HMAF report to the Ministry of Police and the Ministry of Defense, respectively. Civilian authorities maintained control over the HMAF and police, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Police may arrest suspects without a warrant during the commission of a crime; otherwise, authorities apprehend suspects with warrants issued by a local magistrate. In either case, authorities brought those arrested before a local magistrate within 24 hours, including on weekends and holidays, for judicial determination of the legality of the detention. Authorities promptly informed arrested persons of charges against them. The law provides for a functioning bail system. The constitution provides the right to initiate habeas corpus proceedings. Access to arrested persons by counsel, family, and others may be restricted, but authorities generally facilitated access. No legal aid framework existed to provide services for the indigent. Accused persons must generally represent themselves if they cannot afford legal counsel, although in more serious cases, the judge may, but is not required to, appoint a lawyer pro bono.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Although unavailability of judges, witnesses, or lawyers could delay cases, legal authorities processed most cases without undue delay. Defendants are presumed innocent and cannot be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Authorities inform them promptly and in detail of charges, and free interpretation is available if necessary. Defendants may present witnesses and evidence, confront witnesses against them, and appeal convictions. They have the right to be present at their trials, consult with an attorney of their choice in a timely manner, and have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. There is no provision for public defenders, but local lawyers accepted pro bono cases on an ad hoc basis. Defendants have free access to an interpreter in court, if needed.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Citizens may seek redress through domestic courts for any violation of a human right provided for in the law.

The constitution prohibits such actions, and police generally respect these provisions. In August, however, a court in Nuku’alofa found that evidence in a drug case recovered using a search warrant was inadmissible because the search was carried out in an unlawful manner.

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. According to official figures, police shot and killed 28 persons through October 9, compared with 46 in 2017. There were occasional discrepancies between the official reporting of shooting incidents and the claims made by witnesses regarding who fired the first shot and whether the officers fired in self-defense. Police investigated all police shooting deaths.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the law prohibits such practices, there were some reports that police officers and prison guards sometimes mistreated individuals under arrest or in detention.

Officials from the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), a civilian oversight body that investigates complaints about the conduct of police officers, reported receiving few cases of cruel and inhuman treatment.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Conditions in some of the prison system’s nine facilities continued to be harsh due to overcrowding.

Physical Conditions: Convicted inmates constituted approximately 37 percent of the country’s prison population, while the others were in pretrial status, according to figures from 2017, the most recent data available. Most prisons suffered from extreme overcrowding, although the maximum-security prison was not at full capacity. Observers noted the Port of Spain Prison, the remand prison, and the immigration detention center had particularly poor conditions and severe overcrowding, with as many as nine prisoners kept in cells of 80 square feet. The Port of Spain Prison, designed to hold 250 inmates, held 595, and the remand prison, designed to hold 655 inmates, held 1,049, according to figures from 2016, the most recent data available. By contrast, the maximum-security prison held inmates in three-person cells, each with a toilet and shower.

The remand section of the Port of Spain Prison had particularly poor lighting, ventilation, and sanitation facilities.

Although conditions at the women’s prison were better than those in the Port of Spain Prison, the women’s facility occasionally became overcrowded, since it held both women on remand and those serving prison sentences. The daily average female prison population was 109 in facilities with a maximum capacity of 158, according to figures from 2017. Since there was no female youth facility, authorities placed some underage female prisoners in a segregated wing of the women’s prison and returned others to their families. Observers raised concerns the prison held young girls who had not committed any offense but were merely in state custody.

The government also operated the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) to house irregular immigrants waiting to be deported. The average length of detention was one week to two months, depending on the speed with which the government secured public funding for deportation, as well as transit passports and visas. In some cases detention lasted more than four years. Observers reported the men’s section continued to be overcrowded.

In June a group of Cubans, Venezuelans, and Africans held at the IDC staged two protests against the conditions of the detention center and length of their stay in the facility. Some of those protesting had been at the IDC for more than one year, even after requesting repatriation.

Administration: Authorities generally conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment.

Independent Monitoring: The government did not permit outside observers, such as the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, or other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), free access to conduct monitoring visits or interviews in the IDC. Other than the IDC, the government permitted regular and open prison visits by UN officials and independent human rights observers upon approval of the Ministry of National Security. These observers enjoyed a reasonable degree of independence.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. Reports of abuses by police remained under investigation at year’s end.

In May the government passed an updated version of the Anti-Gang Act, which bans membership in criminal gangs and gang-related activities and permits authorities to hold suspects detained under the law without a warrant for up to 14 days, subject to a court order authorizing the detention. The opposition party raised human rights concerns; however, the government rarely relied upon measures contained in the act.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of National Security oversees three major divisions–the police service, immigration division, and defense force. The police service maintains internal security, while the defense force, which includes the coast guard, is responsible for external security but also has certain domestic security responsibilities. The coast guard is the main authority responsible for border security along the coastlines where there are no official ports of entry. The Customs and Excise Division and the Immigration Division are responsible for security at the ports. Members of the defense force often joined police officers in patrolling high-crime neighborhoods but do not have arrest authority (apart from the coast guard, which can arrest in territorial waters and the Southern Caribbean).

The independent Police Service Commission (PSC), in consultation with the prime minister, appoints a commissioner of police to oversee the police force. In August the PSC appointed former minister of national security Gary Griffith as the new commissioner of police. The PSC also makes hiring and firing decisions in the police service, and the Ministry of National Security typically has little direct influence over changes in senior positions. The PSC has the power to dismiss police officers, the commissioner of police can suspend officers, and the police service handles the prosecution of officers. Municipal police, under the jurisdiction of 14 regional administrative bodies, supplement the national police force. Public confidence in police was very low because of high crime rates and perceived corruption.

The PCA investigates complaints about the conduct of police officers, including fatal police shootings; however, it received insufficient funding and had limited investigative authority. By law the PCA is free from the direction or control of any other person in the performance of its functions. The PCA had 25 investigators, and from October 2017 through August 27, the unit received 373 complaints, 300 of which were pending as of November. Through investigations by the PCA and other bodies, authorities charged police officers with a number of offenses, including attempted murder and corruption. The Police Professional Standards Unit and the Police Complaints Division, both nonindependent bodies within the police service, also investigated complaints against police.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

A police officer may arrest a person based on a warrant issued or authorized by a magistrate, or without a warrant if the officer witnesses the commission of an offense. Detainees, as well as those summoned to appear before a magistrate, must appear in court within 48 hours. In cases of more serious offenses, the magistrate either commits the accused to prison on remand or allows the accused to post bail, pending a preliminary inquiry. Authorities granted detainees immediate access to a lawyer and to family members. Attorneys representing individual clients in the IDC also generally were allowed to visit them in the center.

Ordinarily, bail was available for minor charges. Persons charged with murder, treason, piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and hijacking, as well as persons convicted twice of violent crimes, are ineligible for bail for a period of up to 120 days following the charge, but a judge may grant bail to such persons under exceptional circumstances. When authorities denied bail, magistrates advised the accused of their right to an attorney and, with few exceptions, allowed them access to an attorney once they were in custody and prior to interrogation.

The minister of national security may authorize preventive detention to preclude actions prejudicial to public safety, public order, or national defense, in which case the minister must state the grounds for the detention.

Arbitrary Arrest: Instances of false arrest, although infrequent, were reported. Victims may pursue legal redress and the right to a fair trial through an independent judiciary.

Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention resulting from heavy court backlogs and inefficiencies in the judicial system continued to be a problem. Pretrial detainees or remand prisoners represented more than half the prison population. Most persons under indictment waited seven to 10 years for their trial dates in the High Court, although some waited much longer. Officials cited several reasons for the backlog, including an understaffed prosecutorial office, a shortage of defense attorneys for indigent persons, and the burden of the preliminary inquiry process. Additionally, the law requires anyone charged and detained to appear in person for a hearing before a magistrate’s court every 10 days, if only to have the case postponed for an additional 10 days, resulting in further inefficiency.

The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. Although the judicial process was generally fair, it was slow due to backlogs and inefficiencies. Prosecutors and judges stated that witness and jury intimidation remained a problem.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides all defendants with the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Magistrates try both minor and more serious offenses, but in the latter cases, the magistrate must conduct a preliminary inquiry. Defendants have the right to be present, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and to appeal. Authorities inform them promptly and in detail of all charges. Defendants have the right to consult with an attorney in a timely manner and have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Authorities provide an attorney at public expense to defendants facing serious criminal charges, and the law requires provision of an attorney to any person accused of murder. Although the courts may appoint attorneys for indigent persons charged with serious crimes, an indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney for cause and may obtain a replacement. Defendants can confront or question adverse witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The government provides free foreign language interpreters as well as sign-language interpreters as necessary in court cases.

Both civil and criminal appeals may be filed with the Court of Appeal and ultimately with the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Individuals or organizations are free to file lawsuits against civil breaches of human rights in both the High Court and petty civil court. The High Court may review the decisions of lower courts, order parties to cease and desist from particular actions, compel parties to take specific actions, and award damages to aggrieved parties. Court cases may be appealed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

Media and civil society reported the deaths of several individuals in detention as a result of suspected mistreatment or inadequate medical care. In its 2017 report, the independent Tunisian Organization against Torture (OCTT) noted 80 registered cases of torture and mistreatment of prisoners or detainees, including five cases of suspicious death during detention, a nearly 50-percent decline from the previous year.

In one example, the OCTT reported that Lotfi Arfaoui died in the custody of the Laarousa National Guard station in December 2017 following his arrest on December 9. Witnesses described to the OCTT that a medical responder’s vehicle had been outside of the detention center, although Arfaoui’s family was not provided a cause of death. An investigative judge initiated an investigation into his death, leading to the issuance of arrest orders for several of the National Guard officers. As of September the case remained underway.

In March authorities charged 17 police officers in the death of a young man who drowned after being chased into a stream by police following a soccer match at a stadium in a Tunis suburb. According to media reports of witnesses’ accounts, 19-year-old Omar Labidi had shouted to police that he did not know how to swim as the police stood by without offering assistance.

During the year, six National Guard officers were killed and dozens more security force personnel were injured both in terrorist attacks and in civil unrest. On July 8, terrorists attacked a National Guard patrol in the northwestern Jendouba governorate, killing six and wounding three.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the law prohibits such practices, police reportedly subjected detainees to harsh physical treatment, according to firsthand accounts provided to national and international organizations. Several prominent local human rights lawyers decried the practice of torture in police stations and detention centers. Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) criticized the government for its application of the antiterrorism law, the appearance of impunity for abusers, and for reluctance to investigate torture allegations. In a presentation for the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture in Tunis on June 27, the National Authority for the Prevention of Torture (INPT) stated  that abuse and ill treatment of detainees in police and National Guard detention centers has continued despite an overall decrease in instances of torture in prisons.

According to a poll conducted by the INPT in 2017, 14.4 percent of Tunisians reported they had experienced cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by public authorities during their lifetimes, while 3.3 percent reported having been a victim of an act of torture committed by a public official.

On February 22, police arrested Ameur Balaazi in Ben Arous (a suburb of Tunis) on suspicion of being involved in a carjacking. Through his lawyer, Balaazi alleged that the officers tortured him after his arrest, prompting the prosecutor for Ben Arous to authorize the INPT to conduct its own investigation. Shortly thereafter, the INPT published its findings, including a medical report and photographs showing that Balaazi had suffered injuries to different parts of his body. In the days that followed, three police officers were arrested and charged with torture, only to be released after police unions staged a protest at the court where the officers were being arraigned. Several prominent national lawyers’ and judges’ associations immediately published communiques condemning the police unions’ actions, arguing that the officers’ presence served to intimidate the judiciary and undermine its independence. As of September the case remained open.

According to the OCTT, on April 11, 16-year-old Mohamed Louay was arrested in Tunis for delinquency and taken to a nearby police station. Louay’s lawyer later contended that the authorities conducted a preliminary interrogation without his legal guardian or his lawyer, violating Louay’s legal rights. The day after his arrest, Louay’s mother was charged with insulting an officer during the exercise of his duties following an altercation when she was denied access to see him. She was subsequently sentenced to one year in prison, although she remained free pending an appeal. On April 16, Louay informed his mother that after his arrest, he was handcuffed, placed in solitary confinement, and physically assaulted by police officers. His mother filed a complaint for torture, leading the INPT to initiate an investigation into Louay’s case and to seek medical attention for him. As of September Louay remained in detention awaiting his trial.

Media reported that on June 8, a police officer and two friends sodomized a 32-year-old man in Monastir governorate using a police baton. The man filed a complaint with his local police station, which the LGBTI rights Shams Association published online. According to media reports, after the man filed a complaint against the officers, authorities requested that he undergo an anal examination to collect evidence with which to charge him with violating Article 230, which criminalizes sodomy. Police officers reportedly escorted the man to the examination room. As of September there was no verdict on his case.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions were below international standards, principally due to overcrowding and poor infrastructure.

Physical Conditions: As of September the following prisons had high rates of overcrowding: Morneg (148 percent), Kairouan (80 percent), Sfax (47 percent), and Monastir (70 percent).

The law requires pretrial detainees to be held separately from convicted prisoners, but the Ministry of Justice reported that overcrowding forced it to hold pretrial detainees together with convicts. The prison system lacked sufficient resources to transport detainees to court hearings securely.

Most prisons were originally constructed for industrial use and then converted into detention facilities, and, as a result, suffered from poor infrastructure, including substandard lighting, ventilation, and heating.

Of the country’s 27 prisons, one is designated solely for women, and five prisons contain separate wings for women (Sawaf, Harboub, Gafsa, Messadine, and El Kef). The Ministry of Justice has five juvenile centers located in Mejaz El Bab, Meghira, El Mourouj, Souk El Jedid, and Sidi El Hani. Minor convicts were strictly separated from adults; the majority of minors were detained in separate correctional facilities or rehabilitation programs.

Health services available to inmates were inadequate. Very few prisons had an ambulance or medically equipped vehicle. Officials mentioned they lacked equipment necessary for the security of guards, other personnel, and inmates.

Administration: According to prison officials, lengthy criminal prosecution procedures led to extended periods of pretrial detention, understaffing at prisons and detention centers, difficult work conditions, and low pay.

Authorities allowed prisoners to receive one family visit per week. A minority of adult prisoners reportedly had access to educational and vocational training programs, due to limited capacity.

As part of the Ministry of Justice’s rehabilitation program for countering violent extremism (CVE), the Directorate General for Prisons and Rehabilitation (DGPR) has a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Religious Affairs to permit vetted and trained imams to lead religious sessions with prisoners who were classified as extremists, in an effort to deradicalize their religious beliefs. As part of CVE measures, organized, communal prayers were prohibited, but prisons permitted individual detainees to have religious materials and to pray in their cells.

The INPT, an administratively independent body established in 2013 to respond to allegation of torture and mistreatment, reported increasing cooperation by government authorities and improved access to prisons and detention centers during the year. Its members have the authority to visit any prison or detention center without prior notice and at any time to document torture and mistreatment, to request criminal and administrative investigations, and to issue recommendations for measures to eradicate torture and mistreatment.

On February 27, INPT released its first public investigation report on alleged torture of a suspect by police in Ben Arous.

Independent Monitoring: The government granted access to prisons for independent nongovernmental observers, including local and international human rights groups, NGOs, local media, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the OCTT. The Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) may conduct unannounced prison visits and issue reports about conditions inside prisons. On September 5, the LTDH signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Interior to permit unannounced LTDH visits to all detention facilities under ministry control. Other organizations were issued a permit after a case-by-case examination of their requests.

Improvements: The DGPR continued to renovate and build new prisons to manage the prison population and improve the conditions of confinement. In April the minister of justice and director general of the DGPR inaugurated a new wing in the Messadine prison, with capacity for approximately 200 inmates.

The Ministry of Justice and the DGPR refurbished many prisons and added a new health-care center to one, increasing their capacity to accommodate additional inmates in new wings of the prisons in Sfax, Mahdia, Monastir, Messadine Sousse, and Borj el Roumi.

In an effort to reduce the potential for violence and mistreatment of detainees by prison staff, early in the year, the DGPR established an Emergency Response Unit composed of 200 law enforcement officers who are to be trained to intervene peacefully in significant security events within the prison system.

Throughout the year, the DGPR trained prison officials on a code of ethics and emergency management. The DGPR also opened a prison legal aid office and mental health unit in Messadine Sousse Prison. In addition, the DGPR began to classify inmates according to their level of threat, enabling prisoners to have access to vocational programs according to their classification.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, although security forces did not always observe these provisions. The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. Human rights organizations expressed concern that the government used its powers under the state of emergency to place citizens under house arrest with limited evidence or foundation for suspicion.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of Interior holds legal authority and responsibility for law enforcement. The ministry oversees the National Police, which has primary responsibility for law enforcement in the major cities, and the National Guard (gendarmerie), which oversees border security and patrols smaller towns and rural areas. The Ministry of Interior has three inspectorate general offices that conduct administrative investigations into the different ministry structures. These offices play a role in both onsite inspections to ensure officers’ appropriate conduct and investigations in response to complaints received by the public. They can hold agents accountable and issue administrative reprimands even before the courts announce a final verdict. Investigations into prisoner abuse lacked transparency and often lasted several months and, in some cases, more than a year.

On March 13, several weeks after the incident in Ben Arous, 15 Tunisian and international organizations published an open letter urging authorities to ensure “an end to the impunity that prevails for human rights violations by the Tunisian security forces.”

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law requires police to have a warrant to arrest an alleged suspect, unless a crime is in progress or the arrest is for a felony offense. The 2015 counterterrorism law allows for five days of incommunicado prearraignment detention for detainees suspected of terrorism, which can be renewed for two five-day extensions with the court’s approval. Arresting officers must inform detainees of their rights, immediately inform detainees’ families of the arrest, and make a complete record of the times and dates of such notifications. Media and civil society reported that police failed at times to follow these regulations and, on occasion, detained persons arbitrarily.

Detainees can exercise their right to representation by counsel and can request medical assistance immediately upon detention. Arresting officers must inform detainees of their rights and the accusations against them, immediately inform detainees’ families of the arrest, and make a complete record of the times and dates of such notifications. Police must also inform the lawyer of all interrogations and interactions between the accused and witnesses or victims of the alleged offense and allow the lawyer to be present, unless the accused explicitly waives the right to a lawyer, or unless the lawyer does not arrive at the prearranged time of questioning. The only exception is for terrorism suspects, who may be held without access to counsel for 48 hours. Media and civil society reported that police failed at times to follow these regulations and, on occasion, detained persons arbitrarily.

The law permits authorities to release accused persons on bail, and the bail system functioned. By law, the prosecutor provides legal representation in case of criminal offenses and for underage offenders. A lawyer may be assigned in a criminal case even if the accused person did not ask for one during the investigation. For those who cannot afford a lawyer, judicial aid is provided at the expense of the government if certain conditions are met. In civil cases, both parties can request judicial aid. In criminal cases, however, legal aid is only provided to nationals if the minimum possible sentence is at least three years and if the person on trial is not a recidivist, and to foreigners under conditions outlined by law. Judicial aid is also extended to administrative matters once the police investigation has been completed and the case goes to court. The military code of justice gives the same rights to detainees for assigning a legal counsel as described in the penal code, although it was unclear whether the government consistently provided this service. At arraignment, the examining magistrate may decide to release the accused or remand the detainee to pretrial detention.

In cases involving crimes for which the sentence may exceed five years or that involve national security, pretrial detention may last six months and may be extended by court order for two additional four-month periods. In cases involving crimes for which the sentence may not exceed five years, the court may extend the initial six-month pretrial detention only by three months. During this stage, the court conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and motions from both parties.

A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report issued on June 1 found that weak enforcement of the 2016 law resulted in systematic violations of detainees’ rights. While HRW praised the new law for the rights it grants precharge detainees to legal counsel and medical assistance, in practice, HRW found that police largely failed to inform suspects of these rights. HRW identified common violations of the law, alleging documented cases in which the police forcibly pressured detainees to waive their rights and, in some instances, even signed these waivers unbeknownst to the detainees.

The report also identified other legislative gaps that produce situations denying detainees their rights to a fair trial and humane treatment as guaranteed by the constitution. HRW asserted that the law does not provide sufficient protections to prevent authorities from interrogating detainees prior to the arrival of their lawyers. Similarly, HRW stated that the law does not sufficiently provide individuals convicted of certain minor crimes the right to a free public defender, thereby restricting poorer individuals’ ability to exercise their right to legal counsel. In January, Lawyers without Borders began working with the Tunisian Lawyers’ Association and the Ministry of Justice to provide public defenders to individuals accused of felonies or minor crimes. As part of this pilot project, 100 pro bono lawyers worked to represent defendants accused of felonies.

Arbitrary Arrest: NGOs criticized the use of the emergency law to put under house arrest any individual suspected of representing a threat to state security, often without offering these individuals access to the court orders that led to their initial arrest.

While praising new efforts to crack down on corruption, civil society observers claimed that in a handful of cases, in making arrests, authorities disregarded laws on due process and respect for human rights (see section 4).

Pretrial Detention: The length of pretrial detention remained unpredictable and could last from one month to several years, principally due to judicial inefficiency and lack of capacity.

In January, as part of a pilot project, the Sousse Probation Office began to promote alternatives to incarceration by imposing community service sentences in lieu of prison sentences for more than 300 cases in which the original prison sentence would have been less than one year. Through this program, judges worked with probation officers to substitute two hours of community service for each day of the jail sentence. Following this pilot program, the Ministry of Justice began expanding alternate sentencing programs to six other governorates.

The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right, although defendants complained authorities did not consistently follow the law on trial procedures. In civilian courts, defendants have the right to a presumption of innocence. They also have the right to consult with an attorney or to have one provided at public expense, to confront witnesses against them, to present witnesses and evidence, and to appeal verdicts against them. The law stipulates defendants must be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, with free interpretation if necessary. They must also be given adequate time and facilities to prepare their defense and not be compelled to testify or confess guilt.

The 2015 counterterrorism law stipulates that in cases involving terrorism, judges may close hearings to the public. Judges may also keep information on witnesses, victims, and any other relevant persons confidential, including from the accused and his or her legal counsel. The counterterrorism law also extends the amount of time that a suspect may be held without access to legal counsel from five to 15 days, with a judicial review required after each five-day period. Human rights organizations objected to the law for its vague definition of terrorism and the broad leeway it gives to judges to admit testimony by anonymous witnesses.

Military courts fall under the Ministry of Defense. Military tribunals have authority to try cases involving military personnel and civilians accused of national security crimes. A defendant may appeal a military tribunal’s verdict. A first appeal can be made to the military court of appeal, and a second appeal to the civilian second court of appeal. Human rights advocates argued that national security crimes are too broadly defined but acknowledged that, following the 2011 reform of military courts, defendants in military courts have the same rights as those in civilian courts. These include the right to choose legal representation, access case files and evidence, conduct cross-examinations, call witnesses, and appeal court judgments. There is no specialized code for military courts.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Citizens and organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through domestic courts; however, military courts handle claims for civil remedies for alleged security force abuses in civil disturbances during the revolution. Civilian courts heard cases involving alleged abuse by security forces during the year. Some cases did not move forward because security force officials, and occasionally civilian judges, failed to cooperate in the investigations. According to HRW, the lack of provisions criminalizing command dereliction, which would hold senior officers liable for crimes committed by subordinates with explicit or tacit approval, contributed to military courts’ light sentences for security force members.

The constitution provides for the right to privacy. The country’s counterterrorism law establishes the legal framework for law enforcement to use internationally recognized special investigative techniques, including surveillance and undercover investigations. The law allows interception of communications, including recording of telephone conversations, with advance judicial approval for a period not to exceed four months. Government agents are subject to a one-year prison sentence if they conduct surveillance without judicial authorization.

There were credible allegations that the government contributed to civilian deaths in connection with its fight against the terrorist PKK organization in the southeast, although at a markedly reduced level compared with previous years (see section 1.g.).

According to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT), in the first 11 months of the year, 33 civilians, 185 security force members, and 311 PKK militants were killed in eastern and southeastern provinces in PKK-related clashes. According to the Ministry of Interior, as of October 30, security forces had killed 1,451 PKK members. Human rights groups stated the government took insufficient measures to protect civilian lives in its fight with the PKK in the southeast.

The PKK continued its nationwide campaign of attacks on government security forces and, in some cases, civilians. On March 19, for example, PKK terrorists killed a villager and injured four others in Bitlis Province. On July 31, the wife and infant son of a Turkish soldier were killed in a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Hakkari Province. On October 4, eight Turkish soldiers were killed in an IED attack that represented the largest single loss of life in one PKK attack in at least two years.

During the year the government maintained tight control of its border with Syria, with the stated objective of restricting the entry of ISIS terrorists moving through the country. The government restricted humanitarian access to only those with urgent humanitarian needs, including medical cases.

There were reports Turkish border guards shot at Syrians and asylum-seekers of other nationalities attempting to cross the border, resulting in civilian killings or injuries. Turkish government statistics indicate that authorities apprehended 20-30,000 irregular migrants each month during the year. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, although not on the ground, recorded more than 190 alleged fatalities from January 2017 to June.

There were credible reports that children were among those killed. For example, on March 22, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported descriptions by nine Syrians of 10 incidents between September 2017 and early March in which Turkish border guards shot at them or others ahead of them as they tried to enter Turkey, killing 14 persons, including five children.

In January Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin district. International observers, including the United Nations, Amnesty International, and HRW, though not on the ground reported that the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkey-supported armed opposition groups caused civilian casualties and destroyed hospitals and protected sites, such as cultural monuments, during the conduct of the operation. The organizations also reported that Turkish forces may have failed to take necessary precautions in some cases to protect civilians from harm during the early days of the operation. Anecdotal evidence suggested Turkish forces later sought to protect the rights of civilians in areas of Syria under Turkish military control. The government stated that its conduct in the Afrin operation was consistent with international law and that the military took care to avoid civilian casualties throughout the operation. The government’s restrictions on humanitarian assistance and NGO access to Afrin since its seizure of the district early in the year resulted in limited information that would allow for confirmation of government claims.

Within Turkey’s borders, human rights groups documented several suspicious deaths of detainees in official custody, although overall numbers varied. HRFT reported 11 suspicious deaths in prison.

Following the October 2 disappearance of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi after entering the Consulate General of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, the government of Turkey launched an investigation to determine his whereabouts and ultimately the circumstances and cause of his death. On October 19, after Turkish officials alleged a 15-member team of Saudi nationals killed Khashoggi at the consulate, Saudi government officials confirmed Khashoggi’s October 2 murder. On October 23, President Erdogan stated Khashoggi had been murdered in a planned operation and called for the extradition of 18 Saudi nationals considered by the kingdom as potential suspects in the killing (see the Country Reports on Human Rights for Saudi Arabia).

There continued to be some unconfirmed reports of disappearances during the year, some of which human rights groups alleged were politically motivated. Human rights groups claimed 28 individuals disappeared or were the victims of politically motivated kidnapping attempts. For example, Umit Horzum disappeared in December 2017. In April, 133 days after his disappearance, unknown individuals delivered him to police. Following 11 days in police custody, the court released him on April 27.

The government engaged in a worldwide effort to apprehend suspected members of “FETO”, a term the government applied to the followers of Fethullah Gulen also known as members of the Gulen movement. In July Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu confirmed that the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) had facilitated the return of more than 100 alleged “FETO” members from 18 countries. In some cases, cooperative governments deported wanted individuals without due process. For example, Turan and Meydan Television reported two Turkish citizens were transferred from Azerbaijan to Turkey without due process in February. Kyivpost.com reported July 16 that on July 12 and 15, MIT brought back from Ukraine two alleged “FETO” members and that a Turkish government official thanked Ukraine’s security services for their assistance. In cooperation with Kosovo authorities, MIT brought six suspects from Kosovo to Turkey in late March.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but there were reports that some government forces employed these tactics. On February 27, UN special rapporteur on torture, Nils Melzer, expressed serious concerns about the rising allegations of torture and other mistreatment in Turkish police custody. Melzer said he was alarmed by allegations that large numbers of individuals suspected of links to the Gulen movement or PKK were exposed to brutal interrogation techniques aimed at extracting forced confessions or coercing detainees to incriminate others. Reported abuse included severe beatings, electrical shocks, exposure to icy water, sleep deprivation, threats, insults, and sexual assault. The special rapporteur said authorities appeared not to have taken any serious measures to investigate these allegations or to hold perpetrators accountable.

Human rights groups reported in December that torture and mistreatment in police custody occurred at reduced levels compared with 2017, although they contended that victim intimidation may account for reduced reporting. Reports indicated that police also abused detainees outside police station premises. The HRFT reported that, during the first 11 months of the year, it received 538 complaints related to abuse while in custody, 280 of which alleged torture or inhumane treatment. The HRFT also reported intimidation and shaming of detainees by police were common and that victims hesitated to report abuse due to fear of reprisal. Separately, the Human Rights Association reported that, in the first 11 months of the year, it received 2,719 complaints of abuse by security forces, including 284 complaints related to abuse while in detention facilities, 175 complaints of abuse outside detention facilities, and 2,260 complaints of abuse during demonstrations. The government has not released information on whether it undertook investigations into allegations of mistreatment in prison or detention centers during the year.

The government asserted that it followed a “zero tolerance” policy for torture. HRW maintained, however, that it was “not aware of any serious measures that have been taken to investigate credible allegations of torture.” In its World Report 2018, HRW stated: “Cases of torture and ill-treatment in police custody were widely reported through 2017, especially by individuals detained under the antiterror law, marking a reverse in long-standing progress, despite the government’s stated zero tolerance for torture policy. There were widespread reports of police beating detainees, subjecting them to prolonged stress positions and threats of rape, threats to lawyers, and interference with medical examinations.” According to 2017 Ministry of Justice statistics, the government opened 84 criminal cases related to allegations of torture. The government has not released data on its investigations into alleged torture.

The Civil Society Association in the Penal System (CISST) reported complaints of physical violence by prison staff and noted complaints from prisoners in Tarsus and Elazig prisons, who reported inhumane treatment and psychological abuse.

A June report by the Diyarbakir, Van, and Hakkari Bar Associations alleged Turkish soldiers tortured four shepherds in Korgan village, Hakkari Province on May 31. The report asserted that shepherd Nasir Tas suffered severe injuries after soldiers allegedly repeatedly held his head under water.

According to press reports, on June 8, in Istanbul, police detained and beat 22 high school students while they were handcuffed in a police van.

According to media reports, some military conscripts endured severe hazing, physical abuse, and torture that sometimes resulted in suicide. In May soldiers severely beat a Kurdish-speaking soldier in Van province for speaking Kurdish. Fethi Aydemir suffered serious injury to the skull and internal organ damage as a result. In a separate incident in Gaziantep, a soldier was attacked by fellow soldiers for having a photograph of Selahattin Demirtas, jailed former leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), on his smartphone.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison facilities in general met international standards for physical conditions in many respects, with certain exceptions. Overcrowding (particularly following the mass detentions after the 2016 coup attempt) and lack of access to adequate health care remained problems.

Physical Conditions: As of November the HRA estimated a total prison inmate population of 260,144 in government-operated detention facilities with a capacity of 211,766 inmates. Prison overcrowding remained a significant problem.

Children were housed in separate prison facilities, where available; otherwise, children were held in separate sections within separate male and female adult prisons. Pretrial detainees were held in the same facilities with convicted prisoners.

The government has not released data on inmate deaths due to physical conditions or actions of staff members.

Human rights organizations asserted that prisoners frequently lacked adequate access to potable water, proper heating, ventilation, and lighting.

Although authorities asserted that doctors were assigned to each prison, a Ministry of Justice Prison and Correctional Facilities official reported to parliament in February that there were 271 doctors, of whom only eight were full-time, serving a prison population of 235,888. Human rights associations expressed serious concern regarding the inadequate provision of health care to prisoners, particularly the insufficient number of prison doctors. The opposition HDP reported in August that there were 1,154 sick prisoners in the country’s prisons; more than 400 of them were in serious condition.

Human rights groups and media reported that, on April 28, prisoner Halime Gulsu died in a Mersin Province prison because she was unable to receive treatment for lupus.

Credible reports suggested that some doctors would not sign their names to medical reports alleging torture due to fear of reprisal, meaning victims were often unable to get medical documentation that would help prove their claims. According to one reported incident in January, an Istanbul University student, Berkay Ustabas, along with two other prisoners were stripped naked by Kirikkale prison authorities and subjected to a “welcome beating” with kicks, punches, and truncheons. According to Ustabas’ lawyer, the prison doctor refused to document the physical signs of abuse.

Chief prosecutors have discretion, particularly under the wide-ranging counterterrorism law, to keep prisoners whom they deem dangerous to public security in pretrial detention, regardless of medical reports documenting serious illness.

Administration: At times authorities investigated credible allegations of abuse and inhumane or degrading conditions, but generally did not document the results of such investigations in a publicly accessible manner or take action to hold perpetrators accountable. The government did not release data on investigations (both criminal and administrative) of alleged prison violence or mistreatment.

Independent Monitoring: The government allowed prison visits by some observers, including parliamentarians. There were no visits by an international body to the country’s prisons during the year. The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) visited the country in May 2017 and interviewed a large number of prisoners at various sites. As of year’s end, the government had not approved the public release of the CPT report and findings.

The government did not allow NGOs to monitor prisons. The Civil Society Association in the Penal System (CISST) published a report on prison conditions in June, based on information provided by parliamentarians, correspondence with inmates, lawyers, inmates’ family members, and press reports.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of arrest or detention in court, but numerous credible reports indicated the government generally did not observe these requirements. The Ministry of Justice reported in September that since July 15, 2016, more than 600,000 persons had been subjected to some type of “criminal procedure” (e.g., questioning, investigation, detention, arrest, judicial control, or a ban on travel). According to media reports, more than 80,000 persons had been detained or arrested under the state of emergency and following its expiration. The Ministry of Justice also reported that, between July 2016 and July 2018, “investigations have been opened into 612,347 persons alleged to be founders, executives, or members of armed organizations.” A majority of these were reportedly detained for alleged ties to the Gulen movement or the PKK, often with little due process or access to the evidence underlying the accusations against them (see section 2.a.).

The courts in some cases applied the law unevenly. For example, an Ankara court acknowledged the parliamentary immunity of HDP parliamentarian Kemal Bulbul and suspended his trial while a different court refused to accept the parliamentary immunity of Republican People’s Party (CHP) parliamentarian Enis Berberoglu and upheld his conviction, although execution of the sentence was suspended pending the completion of his parliamentary tenure in 2023.

Under antiterror legislation adopted by parliament on July 26, the government may detain without charge (or appearance before a judge) a suspect for 48 hours for “individual” offenses and 96 hours for “collective” offenses (see Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees, below).

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The National Police, under the control of the Ministry of Interior, are responsible for security in large urban areas. The Jandarma, a paramilitary force also under Interior Ministry control, is responsible for rural areas and specific border sectors where smuggling is common, although the military has overall responsibility for border control and overall external security. There were reports that Turkish border guards shot and killed Syrians fleeing the civil war seeking to enter the country (see section 1.a.). The Jandarma supervised the “security guards” (formerly known as “village guards”), a civilian militia that provide additional local security in the southeast, largely in response to the terrorist threat from the PKK. The MIT reports to the presidency and is responsible for collecting intelligence on existing and potential threats.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the National Police, the Jandarma, the military, and the MIT, but government mechanisms to investigate and punish alleged abuse and corruption by state security officials remained inadequate, and impunity remained a problem. MIT members are immune from prosecution. The law grants other security officials involved in fighting terror immunity from prosecution and makes it harder for prosecutors to investigate human rights abuses by requiring that they obtain permission from both military and civilian leadership prior to pursuing prosecution.

The law authorizes the Ombudsman Institution, the National Human Rights and Equality Institution (NHREI), prosecutors’ offices, criminal courts, and parliament’s Human Rights Commission (HRC) to investigate reports of security force killings, torture, or mistreatment, excessive use of force, and other abuses. Civil courts, however, remained the main recourse to prevent impunity. National and international human rights organizations reported credible evidence of torture and inhumane treatment, asserting that authorities took insufficient action against abuses, particularly of detainees in custody. The government has not released information on its efforts to address abuse through disciplinary action and training. Officials sometimes countersued or intimidated individuals who alleged abuse.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law requires that prosecutors issue warrants for arrests, unless the suspect is detained while committing a crime. The period for arraignment may be extended for up to four days. Formal arrest is a measure, separate from detention that means a suspect is to be held in jail until and unless released by a subsequent court order. For crimes that carry potential prison sentences of fewer than three years’ imprisonment, a judge may release the accused after arraignment upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as bail. For more serious crimes, the judge may either release the defendant on his or her own recognizance or hold the defendant in custody (arrest) prior to trial if there are specific facts indicating that the suspect may flee, attempt to destroy evidence, or attempt to pressure or tamper with witnesses or victims. Judges often kept suspects in detention without articulating a clear justification for doing so.

While the law generally provides detainees the right to immediate access to an attorney at any time, it allows prosecutors to deny such access for up to 24 hours. In criminal cases the law also requires that the government provide indigent detainees with a public attorney if they request one. In cases where the potential prison sentence for conviction is more than five years’ imprisonment or where the defendant is a child or a person with disabilities, a defense attorney is appointed, even absent a request from the defendant. Human rights observers noted that in most cases, authorities provided an attorney if a defendant could not afford one.

Under antiterror legislation adopted by parliament on July 26, the government may detain without charge (or appearance before a judge) a suspect for 48 hours for “individual” offenses and 96 hours for “collective” offenses. These periods may be extended twice with the approval of a judge, amounting to six days for “individual” and 12 days for “collective” offenses. Under the previous state of emergency law, authorities could detain persons without charge for up to 14 days. Human rights organizations raised concerns that police authority to hold individuals for up to 12 days without charge increased the risk of torture. There were numerous accounts of persons, including foreign citizens, waiting beyond 12 days to be formally charged. For example, prominent civil society leader Osman Kavala remained in pretrial detention without an indictment since November 2017 (see section 5).

The law gives prosecutors the right to suspend lawyer-client privilege and to observe and record conversations between accused persons and their legal counsel. Bar associations reported that detainees occasionally had difficulty gaining immediate access to lawyers, both because government decrees restricted lawyers’ access to detainees and prisons–especially those not provided by the state–and because many lawyers were reluctant to defend individuals the government accused of ties to the 2016 coup attempt. The Human Rights Joint Platform (HRJP) reported that the renewed 24-hour attorney access restriction was arbitrarily applied. The HRA reported that in terrorism-related cases, authorities often did not inform defense attorneys of the details of detentions within the first 24 hours, as stipulated by law. It also reported that attorneys’ access to the case files for their clients was limited for weeks or months pending preparations of indictments, hampering their ability to defend their clients.

Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported irregular implementation of laws protecting the right to a fair trial, particularly with respect to attorney access. Prior to the 2016 coup attempt, human rights groups alleged that authorities frequently denied detainees access to an attorney in terrorism-related cases until security forces had interrogated their clients.

Some lawyers stated they were hesitant to take cases, particularly those of suspects accused of PKK or Gulen movement ties, because of fear of government reprisal, including prosecution. Government intimidation of defense lawyers also at times involved nonterror cases. According to the Freedom House 2018 Freedom in the World report, “In many cases, lawyers defending those accused of terrorism offenses were arrested themselves.” The HRA reported in July on 78 cases in which authorities pressured or intimidated lawyers. According to an April statement by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, since 2016, authorities prosecuted 1,539 lawyers, arrested 580, and sentenced 103 to lengthy prison terms.

Arbitrary Arrest: Although the law prohibits holding a suspect arbitrarily or secretly, there were numerous reports that the government did not observe these prohibitions. Human rights groups alleged that in areas under curfew or in “special security zones,” security forces detained citizens without official record, leaving detainees at greater risk of arbitrary abuse. In March a report by the Office of UN Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) covering the year 2017 stated that OHCHR had gathered credible information that a number of police officers who refused to participate in arbitrary arrests, torture, and other repressive acts under the state of emergency were dismissed or arrested on charges of supporting terrorism.

Pretrial Detention: An August 2017 state of emergency decree increased from five to seven years the maximum time that a detainee could be held pending trial, including for crimes against the security of the state, national defense, constitutional order, state secrets and espionage, organized crime, and terrorism-related offenses. The length of pretrial detention generally did not exceed the maximum sentence for the alleged crimes. For other major criminal offenses tried by high criminal courts, the maximum detention period remained two years with the possibility of three one-year extensions, for a total of five years. HRW reported in July that people continued to be arrested and remanded to pretrial custody on terrorism charges, with at least 50,000 remanded to pretrial detention since the failed coup attempt. Amnesty International’s 2017/2018 publication The State of the World’s Human Rights reported “arbitrary, lengthy and punitive pretrial detention and fair trial violations continued routinely” in 2017 and 2018.

The trial system does not provide for a speedy trial, and trial hearings were often months apart, despite provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure for continuous trial. It sometimes took years after indictment before trials began, and appeals could take years more to reach conclusion.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Detainees’ lawyers may appeal pretrial detention, although the state of emergency and subsequent antiterror legislation imposed limits on their ability to do so. The country’s judicial process allows a system of lateral appeals to Criminal Courts of Peace that substitutes appeal to a higher court with appeal to a lateral court. Lawyers criticized the approach, which rendered ambiguous the authority of conflicting rulings by horizontally equal courts.

Detainees awaiting or undergoing trial prior to the state of emergency had the right to a review in-person with a lawyer before a judge every 30 days to determine if they should be released pending trial. The state of emergency suspended the requirement for in-person reviews. Under a new law passed on July 26, in-person review occurs once every 90 days with the 30-day reviews replaced by a judge’s evaluation of the case file only. Observers noted that this element of the law was contrary to the principle of habeas corpus and increased the risk of abuse, since the detainee would not be seen by a judge on a periodic basis.

In cases of alleged human rights violations, detainees have the right to apply directly to the Constitutional Court for redress while their criminal case is proceeding. Nevertheless, a backlog of cases at the Constitutional Court slowed proceedings, preventing expeditious redress.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that detention center conditions varied and were often challenging due to limited physical capacity and increased referrals. Refugee-focused human rights groups alleged that authorities prevented migrants placed in detention and return centers from communicating with the outside world, including their family members and lawyers, creating the potential for refoulement as migrants accept repatriation to avoid indefinite detention.

The law provides for an independent judiciary, but there were indications the judiciary remained subject to influence, particularly from the executive branch.

The executive branch also exerts strong influence over the Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), the judicial body that assigns and reassigns judges and prosecutors to the country’s courts nationwide, and is responsible for their discipline.

Although the constitution provides tenure for judges, the HSK controls the careers of judges and prosecutors through appointments, transfers, promotions, expulsions, and reprimands. Broad leeway granted to prosecutors and judges challenges the requirement to remain impartial, and judges’ inclination to give precedence to the state’s interests contributed to inconsistent application of criminal laws. Bar associations, lawyers, and scholars expressed concern regarding application procedures for prosecutors and judges described as highly subjective, which they warned opened the door to political litmus tests in the hiring process.

The judiciary faced a number of challenges that limited judicial independence, including the suspension, detention, or firing of judicial staff accused of affiliation with the Gulen movement.

The government also targeted some defense attorneys representing a number of high-profile clients. For example, a judge ordered the arrest of defense attorney Omer Kavili, who was representing the band Grup Yorum, at an October 5 hearing of the case at Istanbul’s Silivri Criminal Court. At his trial, the judge argued that Kavili was not performing the profession of defense, but was instead portraying his client and himself as victims and seeking vindication through “reverse psychology.” Kavili was released on October 6 following public outcry by opposition parties and bar associations.

The country has an inquisitorial criminal justice system. The system for educating and assigning judges and prosecutors created close connections between the two groups wherein prosecutors and judges studied together at the country’s Justice Academy before HSK assigned them to their first official posts. After appointment, they often lodged together, shared the same office space, worked in the same courtroom for many years, and even exchanged positions during their careers. A July 9 state of emergency decree changing this practice and creating separate training centers for judges and prosecutors had not been implemented as of year’s end.

Constitutional changes approved by referendum in 2017 abolished the country’s military courts, reserving military justice for disciplinary cases only.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, although bar associations and rights groups asserted that increasing executive interference with the judiciary and actions taken by the government through state of emergency provisions jeopardized this right.

As written, the law provides defendants a presumption of innocence and the right to be present at their trial, although in a number of high-profile cases, defendants increasingly appeared via video link from prison, rather than in person. Judges may restrict defense lawyers’ access to their clients’ court files for a specific catalogue of crimes (including crimes against state security, organized crime, and sexual assault against children) until the client is indicted.

A single judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Courtroom proceedings were generally public except for cases involving minors as defendants. The state increasingly used a clause allowing closed courtrooms for hearings and trials related to security matters, such as those related to “crimes against the state.” Court files, which contain indictments, case summaries, judgments, and other court pleadings, were closed except to the parties to a case, making it difficult for the public, including journalists and watchdog groups, to obtain information on the progress or results of a case. In some politically sensitive cases, judges restricted access to Turkish lawyers only, limiting the ability of domestic or international groups to observe some trials.

Defendants have the right to be present at trial and to consult an attorney in a timely manner. Observers and human rights groups noted that in some high-profile cases, these rights were not afforded to defendants.

Defendants have the right to legal representation in criminal cases and, if indigent, to have representation provided at public expense. Defendants or their attorneys could question witnesses for the prosecution, although questions must usually be presented to the judges, who are expected to ask the questions on behalf of counsel. Defendants or their attorneys could, within limits, present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Secret witnesses were frequently used, particularly in cases related to national security. Defendants have the right not to testify or confess guilt and the right to appeal. The law provides for court-provided language interpretation when needed. Human rights groups alleged interpretation was not always provided free of charge, leaving some poor, non-Turkish-speaking defendants disadvantaged by the need to pay for interpretation.

Observers noted the government often failed to establish evidence to sustain indictments and convictions in cases related to supporting terrorism, highlighting growing concerns regarding respect for due process and adherence to credible evidentiary thresholds. In numerous cases, authorities used secret evidence to which defense attorneys and the accused had no access.

In February a Turkish court sentenced U.S. citizen and Turkish dual national Serkan Golge to seven-and-a-half years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization (“FETO”). In September an appeals court reduced the charges to support of a terrorist organization and reduced the sentence to five years’ imprisonment. Authorities arrested Golge in 2016 based on specious evidence including witness testimony that was later recanted. He remained in prison at year’s end while his conviction was under appeal.

In 2016 authorities arrested U.S. citizen Pastor Andrew Brunson on charges of membership in an armed “terrorist” group, espionage, and attempts to overthrow the state. The indictment, issued after 17 months of pretrial detention, referenced “Christianization” activities related to his alleged crimes. On October 12, the Izmir court convicted Pastor Brunson and sentenced him to three years, one month, and 15 days. The court suspended his sentence for time served and lifted his travel ban, thereby allowing him to leave the country.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

The number of political prisoners remained a subject of debate at year’s end. In November the Interior Ministry reported that the government had detained 217,971 persons in connection with the 2016 coup attempt. Of those, the courts had convicted 16,684, and another 14,750 were in prison awaiting trial. An exact breakdown of numbers of alleged members or supporters of the PKK, ISIS, and “FETO” was not available at year’s end, though in public remarks on December 11, Vice President Fuat Oktay stated that 47,778 individuals remained detained as “FETO” suspects. Some observers considered many of these individuals political prisoners, a charge sharply disputed by the government.

Prosecutors used a broad definition of terrorism and threats to national security, and in some cases, according to defense lawyers and opposition groups, used what appeared to be legally questionable evidence to file criminal charges against and prosecute a broad range of individuals, including journalists, opposition politicians (primarily of the pro-Kurdish HDP), activists, and others critical of the government. At year’s end, 10 current and former HDP parliamentarians and 46 HDP co-mayors remained imprisoned. Hundreds more HDP officials were also detained throughout the country along with former HDP co-chair and presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas, who has been imprisoned since 2016. The government also removed from office on national security grounds numerous locally elected opposition politicians in Kurdish-majority areas, subsequently detaining or prosecuting some. According to media reports, the government removed the elected mayors of 99 municipalities from office. These included 94 pro-Kurdish Democratic Regions Party (DBP) or HDP mayors, four Justice and Development Party (AKP) mayors, and one National Movement party (MHP) mayor. The government removed, detained, or arrested the majority for allegedly supporting PKK terrorism. According to January Ministry of Interior statistics, out of 102 HDP or DBP-controlled municipalities, the government had installed trustees in all but four.

Authorities used antiterror laws broadly against many human rights activists, media outlets, suspected PKK sympathizers, and alleged Gulen movement members, among others. Human rights groups alleged that many detainees had no substantial link to terrorism and were detained to silence critical voices or weaken political opposition to the ruling AKP, particularly the HDP or its partner party, the DBP. Authorities used both antiterror laws and state of emergency powers to detain individuals and seize assets, including those of media companies, charities, businesses, pro-Kurdish groups accused of supporting the PKK, and individuals alleged to be associated with the Gulen movement. During the first quarter of the year, the government targeted nearly 1,000 critics of Operation Olive Branch, the country’s military operation in northern Syria, with detention and prosecution.

Students, artists, and association members, including 11 senior members of the Turkish Medical Association, faced criminal investigations for alleged terror-related activities, primarily due to their social media posts. The government did not consider those in custody for alleged PKK or “FETO” ties to be political prisoners and did not permit access to them by human rights or humanitarian organizations.

Credible reports claimed that some persons jailed on terrorism-related charges were subject to a variety of abuses, including long solitary confinement, severe limitations on outdoor exercise and out-of-cell activity, inability to engage in professional work, denial of access to the library and media, slow medical attention, and in some cases the denial of medical treatment. Media reports also alleged that visitors to prisoners accused of terrorism-related crimes faced abuse, including limited access to family, strip searches, and degrading treatment by prison guards.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The constitution provides for an independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters, although this differed in practice. Citizens and legal entities such as organizations and companies, have the right to file a civil case for compensation for physical or psychological harm, including for human rights violations. On constitutional and human rights issues, the law also provides for individuals to appeal their cases directly to the Constitutional Court, theoretically allowing for faster and simpler high-level review of alleged human rights violations within contested court decisions. Critics complained that, despite this mechanism, the large volume of appeals of dismissals under the state of emergency and decreased judicial capacity caused by purges in the judiciary resulted in slow proceedings. Citizens who have exhausted all domestic remedies have the right to apply for redress to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

The Commission of Inquiry on Practices under the State of Emergency, established in January 2017, was designed to adjudicate appeals of wrongfully dismissed civil servants. The commission reported that, as of November, it had received 125,678 applications, adjudicated 42,000 cases, approved 3,000, and rejected 39,000. Critics complained that the appeals process was opaque, slow, and did not respect citizens’ rights to due process, including by prohibiting defendants from seeing the evidence against them or presenting exculpatory evidence in their defense.

Figures regarding the breadth of state of emergency dismissals released by human rights groups and multiple officials during the course of the year varied. According to the HRJP, since the coup attempt and pursuant to state of emergency decrees, more than 130,000 public employees had been dismissed or suspended; more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors had been dismissed; more than 2,300 private educational institutions–including schools, tutoring academies, and dormitories–had been closed along with 15 private universities and 19 unions and trade confederations; 200 media companies had been shut down; and nearly 1,500 associations or foundations had been closed. Individuals and legal entities affected by the state of emergency decrees were eligible to appeal to the commission of inquiry. Rights groups, legal experts, and international organizations criticized the commission of inquiry for being opaque, slow, and ineffective. An October Amnesty International report stated the commission “is in effect a rubber stamp for the government’s arbitrary dismissals.”

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

In multiple parts of the southeast, many citizens continued efforts to appeal the government’s expropriations of properties in 2016 to reconstruct areas damaged in government-PKK fighting.

In May the Constitutional Court denied a request from residents of Diyarbakir’s Sur District to annul the government’s 2016 expropriation order for an “urban renewal” program.

According to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey, as of March 5, the government had seized approximately 1,124 businesses worth an estimated 49.4 billion lira ($9.4 billion) since the 2016 coup attempt. Real estate confiscated from dissolved legal entities was worth an additional 15 billion lira ($2.9 billion).

While the constitution provides for the “secrecy of private life” and states that individuals have the right to demand protection and correction of their personal information and data, the law provides MIT authority to collect information while limiting the ability of the public or journalists to expose abuses. Oversight of MIT falls within the purview of the presidency, and checks on MIT authorities are limited. MIT may collect data from any entity without a warrant or other judicial process for approval. At the same time, the law establishes criminal penalties for conviction of interfering with MIT activities, including data collection or obtaining or publishing information concerning the agency. The law allows the president to grant MIT and its employees immunity from prosecution.

Police possess broad powers for personal search and seizure. Senior police officials may authorize search warrants, with judicial permission to follow within 24 hours. Individuals subjected to such searches have the right to file complaints, but judicial permission occurring after a search has already taken place failed to serve as a check against abuse.

Security forces may conduct wiretaps for up to 48 hours without a judge’s approval. As a check against potential abuse of this power, the State Inspection Board may conduct annual inspections and present its reports for review to parliament’s Security and Intelligence Commission. Information on how often this authority was used was not available. Human rights groups noted that wiretapping without a court order circumvented judicial control and potentially limited citizens’ right to privacy. Many citizens asserted that authorities tapped their telephones and accessed their email or social media accounts, perpetuating widespread self-censorship. The Ministry of Interior disclosed that, during a one-week period from July 9 to July 16, it examined 459 social media accounts and took legal action against 266 users who it accused of propagandizing or promoting terror organizations, inciting people to enmity and hostility, or insulting state institutions. Between 2016 and April 2018, authorities investigated more than 45,000 social media accounts and took legal action against 17,000 on charges of “propagandizing for and praising a terror organization,” according to HRJP. Human rights groups asserted that self-censorship due to fear of official reprisal accounted in part for the relatively low number of complaints they received regarding allegations of torture or mistreatment.

Under the state of emergency and continuing with the implementation of antiterror legislation, the government targeted family members to exert pressure on some wanted suspects. Government measures included cancelling the passports of family members of civil servants suspended or dismissed from state institutions, as well as of those who had fled authorities. In some cases the government cancelled or refused to issue passports for the minor children of individuals outside the country who were wanted for or accused of ties to the Gulen movement. On July 25, the Ministry of Interior announced it would lift travel bans on 155,000 individuals whose family members had alleged connections with “terror organizations.”

Government seizure and closure over the previous two years of hundreds of businesses accused of links to the Gulen movement created ambiguous situations for the privacy of client information.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year, nor were there reports of killings by narcotics traffickers or similar criminal groups. The UN Human Rights Committee on August 9, however, made public its conclusion that the government was responsible for the 2006 torture and death of journalist and human rights activist Olgusapar Muradova.

There were no reports of new politically motivated disappearances during the year. A nongovernmental organization (NGO)-led advocacy campaign called “Prove They Are Alive!” maintained a list of disappeared prisoners. The number of disappeared prisoners on the list increased from 112 to 121 as of September, although opposition media reported two of the prisoners died during the year. The list included political dissident Gulgeldy Annaniyazov, former minister of foreign affairs Boris Shikhmuradov, former director of the Turkmenbashy oil refinery Guychmyrad Esenov, and many others accused of participation in an alleged 2002 assassination attempt on former president Saparmurat Niyazov.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution and law prohibit mistreatment, in January the UN Committee against Torture noted its concern at “consistent allegations of widespread torture and ill-treatment, including severe beatings, of persons deprived of their liberty, especially at the moment of apprehension and during pretrial detention, mainly in order to extract confessions.”

In its 2017-18 annual report, Amnesty International (AI) reported, “torture and other ill-treatment was committed in pretrail detention and prisons, sometimes resulting in death.”

The law requires the government to protect the health and lives of members of the armed forces. Observers reported in October that hazing of first-year conscripts continued and involved violations of human dignity, including brutality. During the year there were no reports of hazing deaths among conscripts.

In October the opposition website Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported food was in short supply in some army units and cheaper, less nutritious ingredients were being used. According to the report, not all units faced the same shortage, with the food supply differing across branches and military units.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions reportedly remained unsanitary, overcrowded, harsh, and in some cases life threatening.

Physical Conditions: Official data on the average sentence or numbers of prisoners, including incarcerated juveniles, were not available. Persons in pretrial detention facilities were predominantly those sentenced but not transferred to penal colonies. The six pretrial detention facilities reportedly were designed for 1,120 persons but reportedly held many times that number.

Independent news site Alternative News of Turkmenistan (ANT) reported in October 2017 that the deputy head of the prison in Ovadan Depe targeted prisoners from minority groups such as Balochis, Persians, and Afghans for mistreatment in his prison by giving collective punishment to all prisoners from a group for an alleged infraction by one. Punishments included making prisoners stand in the sun for five to six hours at a time.

In October ANT reported that the head of Tejen Prison extracted bribes totaling 20,000 manat ($5,700) a month from prisoners. Prisoners unable to pay the bribes were punished by solitary confinement or by being made to stand outside without food or water for up to two days. ANT reported that Ministry of Internal Affairs investigators found that food supplies were insufficient for the population.

According to the Independent Lawyers Association and the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, there were 22 prisons and 30,452 prisoners in the country as of September 2017. Their December 2017 report stated 40 percent of the inmates had tuberculosis (TB). The same report claimed that approximately 20 detainees died every month, mostly from TB.

During the year there were no reports that officials held inmates diagnosed with TB and skin diseases with healthy detainees due to overcrowding. Previously, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that inmates with TB were held separately from healthy inmates at the Dashoguz women’s prison; however, there continued to be concern the government did not adequately test and treat prisoners with TB before they returned to the general population, despite government claims to the contrary.

Mansur Mingelov, an activist for the rights of Baloch minorities, remained in Seydi prison since his arrest in 2012. He was serving a 22-year sentence for alleged drug and child pornography offenses. ANT and AI reported in June he suffered from fever, high blood pressure, and heart pain, but prison doctors refused to admit him to the medical unit without a bribe. His relatives brought him the necessary medication.

Administration: Authorities reported investigations of mistreatment were conducted; however, the government did not provide written reports of its investigations to the diplomatic community. The government did not confirm whether it established a prison ombudsman.

According to relatives, prison authorities sometimes denied family members’ access to prisoners; denied family members permission to give food, medical, and other supplies to some prisoners; and did not make religious facilities available to all prisoners.

Independent Monitoring: In November government officials allowed members of the diplomatic corps to visit Tejen (AH-K/6) prison in Ahal Province.

Improvements: In November the facilities in Tejen prison (AH-K/6) were refurbished in preparation for a diplomatic corps visit.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but both remained serious problems. Persons arrested or detained are not entitled to challenge the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention while detained.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the criminal police, which works closely with the Ministry of National Security on matters of national safety and security. The security ministry plays a role in personnel changes in other ministries, often dictating assignments, and enforces presidential decrees. There were continued reports both the security ministry and criminal police operated with impunity in the prosecution of criminal cases and in the harassment of unregistered religious groups and persons perceived to be critical of the regime. No information was available on whether the presidential commission created in 2007 to review citizen complaints of abuse had conducted any inquiries that resulted in accountability of any members of the security forces for abuses. There was no national strategy to reform the police or security apparatus.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

A warrant is not required for arrest when officials catch a suspect in the act of committing an offense. The prosecutor general must issue an authorization for arrest within 72 hours of detention. If investigating authorities do not find evidence of guilt and issue a formal indictment within 10 days of detention, they must release the detainee; however, authorities did not always comply with this requirement. If they find evidence, an investigation may last as long as two months. A provincial- or national-level prosecutor may extend the investigation period to six months. The national prosecutor general or deputy prosecutor general may extend the investigation period to a maximum of one year. Following the investigation, the prosecutor prepares a bill of indictment and transfers the case to the court. Courts generally followed these procedures, and the prosecutor promptly informs detainees of the charges against them.

The criminal procedure code provides for a bail system and surety; however, authorities did not implement these provisions. The law entitles detainees to immediate access to an attorney of their choice after a formal accusation. For a number of reasons, however, detainees may not have had prompt or regular access to legal counsel–they may have been unaware of the law; security forces may have ignored the entitlement to counsel; or the practice of seeking formal legal counsel was not a cultural norm. Authorities denied some detainees family visitation during the year. Families sometimes did not know the whereabouts of detained relatives. Incommunicado detention was a problem. The extent to which authorities failed to protect due process in the criminal justice system was unclear.

Arbitrary Arrest: The law characterizes any opposition to the government as treason. Persons convicted of treason faced life imprisonment and were ineligible for pardoning. In the past the government arrested and filed charges on economic or criminal grounds against those expressing critical or differing views instead of charging its critics with treason.

There were reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions. Authorities frequently singled out human rights activists, journalists, members of religious groups, ethnic minorities, and dissidents, as well as members of NGOs who interacted with foreigners.

According to the NGO Forum 18, Jehovah’s Witness member Bahram Hemdemov had been imprisoned since March 2015 and was serving a four-year sentence in Seydi prison for allegedly inciting religious hatred during a peaceful Jehovah’s Witness meeting.

In September, Forum 18 reported 10 Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objectors were jailed and were serving a two-year sentence in a labor camp for refusing to do their mandatory military service. The government was concerned that an alternative service system would be abused by young persons to avoid military service.

Pretrial Detention: In most cases the law permits detention of no more than two months, but in exceptional cases it may be extended to one year with approval of the prosecutor general. For minor crimes a much shorter investigation period applies. Authorities rarely exceeded legal limits for pretrial detention. In the past chronic corruption and cumbersome bureaucratic processes contributed to lengthy trial delays; however, the government’s anticorruption efforts and the establishment of the Academy of State Service to Improve State Employees’ Qualifications generally eliminated such delays. Forced confessions also played a part in the reduction of time in pretrial detention. Accused persons are entitled to challenge the court but were unlikely to do so due to fear of retribution.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Persons arrested or detained are not entitled to challenge the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention while detained or obtain prompt release if unlawfully detained. There were no reports of prompt release or compensation of unlawfully detained persons. Persons arrested or detained unlawfully may seek reimbursement for damages following release. Law enforcement authorities found guilty of unlawful detention or arrest may be punished by demotion or suspension for five years, correctional labor service for up to two years, or imprisonment for up to eight years.

Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the executive controls it, and it is subordinate to the executive. There was no legislative review of the president’s judicial appointments and dismissals. The president had sole authority to dismiss any judge. The judiciary was widely reputed to be corrupt and inefficient.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for due process for defendants, including a public trial; the right to attend the trial; access to accusatory material; the right to call witnesses; the right to a defense attorney, including a court-appointed lawyer if the defendant cannot afford one; and the right to represent oneself in court. Authorities, however, often denied these rights. Defendants frequently did not enjoy a presumption of innocence. The government permits the public to attend most trials, but it closed some, especially those considered politically sensitive. There were few independent lawyers available to represent defendants. The criminal procedure code provides that defendants be present at their trials and consult with their attorneys in a timely manner. The law sets no restrictions on a defendant’s access to an attorney. The court at times did not allow defendants to confront or question a witness against them and denied defendants and their attorneys access to government evidence. In some cases courts refused to accept exculpatory evidence provided by defense attorneys, even if that evidence might have changed the outcome of the trial. Courts did not offer interpreters to defendants who did not speak Turkmen.

Even when the courts observed due process, the authority of the government prosecutor far exceeded that of the defense attorney, making it difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. Court transcripts frequently were flawed or incomplete, especially when there was a need to translate defendants’ testimony from Russian to Turkmen. Defendants could appeal a lower court’s decision and petition the president for clemency. There were credible reports that judges and prosecutors often predetermined the outcome of the trial and sentence.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

Opposition groups and some international organizations stated the government held political prisoners and detainees. The precise number of these persons, which included those charged with involvement in the 2002 alleged attack on then president Niyazov, remained unknown. According to one international representative, however, the government asserted in 2014 it imprisoned 104 persons in the wake of the coup attempt and released 32. Those convicted of treason faced life imprisonment and were ineligible for amnesty, although they could receive reductions of sentence from the president. The government continued to assert that none of these persons was a political prisoner. Humanitarian and human rights organizations were not permitted to visit these prisoners.

In March, Chronicles reported Begmurat Otuzov died in February in Ovadan Depe prison. Relatives claimed Otuzov’s body weighed 99 pounds (45 kilograms) and could only be identified by a birthmark. According to the “Prove They Are Alive!” campaign, Otuzov was sentenced to a 25-year term in 2002 on unknown charges. At the time of his arrest in 2002, Otuzov was first deputy governor of Lebap Province, chairperson of the council for coordinating activities of law enforcement and military bodies of the province. He also served as deputy general prosecutor, head of the investigation department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Also in March, ANT reported on the death of Allamurat Allakulyev. Allakulyev was held in Ovadan Depe prison before transferring to Akdash prison in Balkan Province. No cause of death was reported. Allakulyev was a department chief in the Ministry of National Security. He was convicted in 2002 and sentenced to 18 years in prison for “grave crimes.”

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The civil judiciary system was neither independent nor impartial, as the president appointed all judges. According to the law, evidence gathered during a criminal investigation can serve as the basis for a civil action in a process called “civil lawsuit in criminal justice.” In the past there were reports of bribes in the civil court system to ensure a particular outcome. In cases in which the state had interests regarding an individual citizen, it used the judiciary to impose court orders. Persons and organizations may appeal adverse decisions to regional human rights bodies, but local courts were unlikely to reverse decisions in light of successful appeals.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The government failed to enforce the law consistently with respect to restitution or compensation for confiscation of private property. The government continued to demolish private homes as part of an urban renewal program without adequately compensating owners. Housing offered as compensation to displaced homeowners was often smaller than housing lost because gardens and outbuildings surrounding a house were not considered “useful living space.” There were credible reports some residents received no compensation. If housing offered as compensation had more living space than the demolished home, the displaced homeowner could be forced to pay up to 4,200 manat ($1,200) per square meter (10.7 square feet) for the additional space. Although a process existed for displaced homeowners to file complaints and appeals, it was not possible to determine how the process worked in practice.

In May, Chronicles reported an 82-year-old resident of Ashgabat City lost his home in 2008 and had not received compensation. He wrote appeals to various government agencies, including the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Supreme Court, the National Institute of Democracy and Human Rights, and the president. The President’s Office forwarded his letter to the human rights Ombudsman’s Office. The Ombudsman’s Office reportedly replied, “Yes, your rights were violated, but since we do not have enough staff, we cannot provide any assistance.”

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary or unlawful inference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, but authorities frequently did not respect these prohibitions. Authorities reportedly searched private homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization.

The law does not regulate surveillance by the state security apparatus, which regularly monitored the activities of officials, citizens, opponents, and critics of the government, and foreigners. Security officials used physical surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and informers. Authorities frequently queried the parents of students studying overseas and sometimes threatened state employees they would lose their jobs if they maintained friendships with foreigners.

The government reportedly intercepted surface mail before delivery, and letters and parcels taken to the post office had to remain unsealed for government inspection.

Persons harassed, detained, or arrested by authorities, as well as their family members, reported the government caused family members to be fired from their jobs or expelled from school. Authorities sometimes also detained and interrogated family members.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.

The Island Courts (Amendment) Act No 5 of 2017 prohibited traditional assemblies of local hereditary elders from exercising physical punishment.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.

Physical Conditions: There were no major concerns in prisons and detention centers regarding physical conditions or inmate abuse.

Administration: The ombudsperson can act on behalf of prisoners and detainees and respond to prisoner complaints. The government did not investigate or monitor prison conditions and did not receive any complaints or allegations of inhuman conditions.

Independent Monitoring: The government permits visits by independent human rights observers, but there were no reported visits during the year.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The national police service, under the Office of the Prime Minister, maintains internal security. In addition to law enforcement, it maintains separate units for customs, immigration, maritime surveillance, and prisons. The country has no military force. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the national police service, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. There were no reports of impunity involving security forces during the year.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law permits arrests without a warrant if a police officer witnesses the commission of an unlawful act or has “reasonable suspicion” an offense is about to be committed. Police estimated the majority of arrests were without warrant. Police may hold a person arrested without a warrant for a maximum of 24 hours without a hearing before a magistrate. When a court issues an arrest warrant, the warrant states the maximum permissible detention time before the court must hold a hearing, which is normally one to two weeks. Authorities did not hold suspects incommunicado or under house arrest.

Authorities generally informed arrested persons promptly of the charges against them, although bureaucratic delays sometimes occurred because persons charged with serious offenses must await trial at a semiannual session of the High Court. There was a functioning system of bail. The People’s Lawyer was available free of charge to arrested persons and for other legal advice. Persons living on the outer islands did not have rapid access to legal services because the People’s Lawyer, based on the main island of Funafuti, traveled infrequently to the outer islands. The country had only one attorney in private practice.

The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. The law provides for a presumption of innocence. Judges conduct trials and render verdicts. Defendants have the right to be promptly informed in detail of the charges against them, including free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals; consult with an attorney in a timely manner; and have access to the People’s Lawyer and adequate time and resources to prepare a defense. They also have the right to be present at their trial, confront witnesses, present witnesses and evidence, and appeal any convictions. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt and have a right to appeal a judge’s decision. The law extends these rights to all defendants.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Individuals and organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through domestic courts.

The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including due to torture.

On August 13, the presidential guard Special Forces Command (SFC) shot and killed Member of Parliament (MP) Robert Kyagulanyi’s (alias Bobi Wine) driver, Yasin Kawuma, while he was seated in Kyagulanyi’s car (see section 1.e.).

According to local media, between February 2017 and September, the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) killed at least nine men whom it accused of illegal fishing. On January 22, local media reported that the UPDF’s Marine Patrol Unit beat, shot, and drowned unarmed civilians it suspected of illegal fishing practices. Fishing communities told local media that UPDF soldiers tied weights to the legs of the fishermen and threw them into the lake. The UPDF’s head of marine operations James Nuwagaba told local media that UPDF soldiers only used force to defend themselves against those fishermen who fled imminent arrest and used their oars to attack soldiers. In an April 14 statement, the president stated, “Although the UPDF personnel had been accused of some excesses, such as beating people, the lake had been saved. Those who spend time blaming the army for some mistakes should know that the first mistake was bad fishing.”

Local civil society organizations (CSOs) and local media reported that on March 25, UPDF personnel shot and killed unarmed civilian Python Okello, a resident of Apaa village in Adjumani district. The UPDF and the Uganda Wildlife Authority were forcefully evicting local residents from a contested village (see section 6). On May 16, the UPDF spokesperson denied the killing and insisted that the eviction was peaceful.

The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) noted in its annual report on June 8 that the Uganda Police Force (UPF) at Runga Police post in Kibiro parish, Kigorobya subcounty, Hoima district, had in 2017 tortured to death a suspect accused of theft. The UHRC was investigating the incident at year’s end.

Local media reported several disappearances of Kyagulanyi’s supporters. On October 10 and 23, media reported that families of two Kyagulanyi supporters had reported the father and son missing for more than a week after unidentified men picked them up at their homes. The UPF and UPDF denied knowledge of their detention. On August 2, local media reported that armed men dressed in UPDF uniforms had, on July 9, captured chief of police Kale Kayihura’s aide Enoch Buntu at his house near Kampala and taken him to an unknown destination. His family told local media that they had not seen him since. The UPDF and UPF denied having knowledge of his arrest.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices. The Anti-Torture Act stipulates that any person convicted of an act of torture may be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 7.2 million shillings ($1,920), or both. The penalty for conviction of aggravated torture is life imprisonment. Nevertheless, there were credible reports security forces tortured and physically abused suspects.

On August 13, the SFC arrested MPs Kyagulanyi and Francis Zaake, among others (see section 1.e.). On August 15, local media published images of Zaake taken at a health facility in Arua where he had been arrested. The images showed wounds and deep cuts on Zaake’s hands and ears, and bruises and swelling on his face, and reported that he had incurred these while in military detention. According to local media, the military later dumped Zaake’s unconscious body at a hospital in Kampala where medics placed him on life support. Kyagulanyi was also reportedly tortured while in detention. On August 16, when the UPDF arraigned him in a military court in the presence of his two lawyers, the lawyers reported that Kyagulanyi had bruises and swelling on his face, and could not stand, sit, see, or hear. Kyagulanyi was carried into the proceedings by two soldiers who placed his slumped body into a seat. Two weeks later Kyagulanyi was able to fly overseas for medical treatment. While abroad Kyagulanyi stated that SFC soldiers hit him on the head with a metal bar, beat, kicked and punched him all over his body including in the eyes, mouth and nose, and pulled and squeezed his genitals. In a letter to the speaker of parliament dated August 31, President Museveni cautioned the house from referring to Kyagulanyi’s treatment as torture because the full facts “had yet to be established.”

The African Center for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (ACTV) reported that through July, it had registered 63 allegations of torture committed by the UPF, seven by the Flying Squad Unit of the UPF, 12 by the UPDF, and three by the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI).

On October 10, local television stations aired a video showing an individual wearing a UPDF uniform kicking, slapping, and beating with sticks a detainee. The video footage showed the uniformed individual interrogating the detainee about his association with Kyagulanyi and local CSOs. The UPDF denied its officers were involved in the beating. A UPDF spokesperson told local media that it would launch an investigation, and implied that the soldier in the video was not an actual member of the UPDF. The UPDF had not released the results of the investigation by year’s end.

The UHRC reported that during 2017, it awarded 800 million shillings ($213,000) in compensation to victims of torture.

Local media and CSOs reported multiple cases of the security agencies torturing detainees to secure confessions or as punishment. On July 12, a lawyer representing 10 men accused of kidnap and murder reported to local media that the UPF and the UPDF had forced his clients to sleep on steep stairs, beat and electrocuted them, and stepped on their stomachs to force them to vomit water they had been compelled to drink during interrogation in an undisclosed detention facility.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Conditions in detention centers remained poor and, in some cases, life threatening. Serious problems included overcrowding, physical abuse of detainees by security staff and fellow inmates, inadequate food, and understaffing. Local human rights groups, including the ACTV, received numerous reports of torture by security forces and prison personnel. Reports of forced labor continued. Most prisons did not have accommodations for persons with disabilities. The Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) reported that the domestic intelligence agency Internal Security Organization (ISO) also maintained unofficial detention facilities in and around Kampala where it detained suspects without charge (see section 2.a.).

Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding remained a problem. The UHRC reported in June that “some prisons housed twice or up to three times their designated capacities,” especially prisons holding male detainees. The Uganda Prisons Service (UPS) reported that it held 49,322 inmates, yet its capacity was 22,000. The UHRC reported that it found the 250-person-capacity Arua Government Prison holding 840 inmates and the eight-person-capacity Kamwenge Police Station men’s cell holding 30 detainees. The UHRC reported that delays in the judicial process caused overcrowding in police cells. The UPS reported that overcrowding had increased the spread of communicable diseases, especially multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis.

According to the UHRC, authorities violated the law by holding juveniles and adult detainees together in police stations it visited due to absence of specialized holding cells for children, ignorance of the law by UPF personnel, and failure to ascertain the juvenile’s age. In at least five police stations it visited, the UHRC found juveniles aged 11 to 14 years detained in the same cell as adults. The UHRC also reported that authorities kept pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners together in all but two prisons.

The FHRI and the UPS noted there were reports of prison food shortages, which led some inmates to trade sex in exchange for food from fellow inmates and UPS staff. The UHRC reported that detainees in an unspecified number of police stations spent entire days without receiving a meal while those in the Kasese and the Fort Portal police stations received one meal a day. The UHRC reported that the majority of detainees relied on family members for food.

Administration: Authorities did not always carry out investigations into credible allegations of mistreatment and, according to the FHRI, even turned away persons reporting violations. The UPDF did not make efforts to investigate and bring to account alleged perpetrators of beatings of two MPs (see section 1.e.). A lawyer representing six Rwandan nationals whom authorities detained December 20, 2017, and deported to Rwanda on December 29, told local media on January 9 that the UPDF’s CMI blocked their lawyers, family, and friends from accessing them.

Independent Monitoring: Authorities allowed the ACTV to conduct prison visits with advance notification. The International Committee of the Red Cross declined to comment on whether it conducted prison visits during the year.

Improvements: On January 19, the UPS reported that it recruited 706 new wardens, increasing the number of UPS staff to 9,787. The UPS acknowledged, however, that it still had a staff shortage of 39,683. The UPS also reported that it had completed the construction of wards in three prisons to ease overcrowding.

Although the law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, security forces often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, including opposition leaders, politicians, activists, demonstrators, and journalists. The law provides for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but this mechanism was seldom employed and rarely successful.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

Under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the UPF has primary responsibility for law enforcement. The UPDF, under the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for external security and may aid civil authorities when responding to riots or other disturbances of the peace. The CMI is legally under UPDF authority and may detain civilians suspected of rebel or terrorist activity. Other agencies with law enforcement powers include the Directorate of Counter Terrorism, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Special Forces Brigade.

The security services used excessive force, including torture, failed to prevent societal violence, and at times targeted civilians. On August 19, local media reported that in the town of Mityana, UPF personnel who were responding to protests fired on a minivan transporting football supporters, killing two and injuring five. On September 4, the security minister said the UPF was pursuing the two officers responsible for the killing, who had deserted the force after the act. The UPF had not released any further details by year’s end.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the UPDF and UPF. Due to corruption, political interests, and weak rule of law, however, the government’s mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse were ineffective, and impunity was pervasive (see sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The state did not pursue a 2016 criminal case against Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kayihura for his supervisory role during public beatings of unarmed supporters of opposition leader Kizza Besigye in Kampala. On January 10, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) dropped murder charges against former Kampala central police station commander Aaron Baguma for his alleged role in a 2015 killing of a businesswoman. Although Baguma pled not guilty, the DPP said Baguma had agreed to testify against his cosuspects.

The UHRC reported it trained 1,104 UPF and 361 UPDF personnel on human rights provisions pertaining to the freedom of assembly, freedom from torture and the rights of detainees.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law requires that judges or prosecutors issue a warrant before an arrest is made, unless the arrest is made during commission of a crime or while in pursuit of a perpetrator. Nevertheless, authorities often arrested suspects without warrants. The law requires authorities to arraign suspects within 48 hours of arrest, but they frequently held suspects longer without charge. Authorities must try suspects arrested under the Antiterrorism Law within 120 days (360 days if charged with a capital offense) or release them on bail; if prosecution presents the case to the court before the expiration of this period, there is no limit on further pretrial detention. While the law requires authorities to inform detainees immediately of the reasons for detention, at times they did not do so. The law provides for bail at the judge’s discretion, but many suspects were unaware of the law or lacked the financial means to cover the bond. Judges generally granted requests for bail. The law provides detainees the right to legal representation and access to a lawyer, but authorities did not always respect this right. The law requires the government to provide an attorney for indigent defendants charged with capital offenses. Security forces often held opposition political members and other suspects incommunicado and under house arrest.

Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention, particularly of opposition political party members, remained problems (see section 1.e.). On July 24, the UPF arrested at least 11 members of opposition politician Asuman Basalirwa’s campaign team three days before the July 27 election. The UPF said it arrested Basalirwa’s supporters on suspicion that they were planning acts of violence. The police released the supporters on July 28 after the election without charge.

Pretrial Detention: Case backlogs due to an inefficient judiciary that lacks adequate funding and staff, the absence of plea-bargaining prior to 2015, insufficient use of bail, and the absence of a time limit for the detention of detainees awaiting trial contributed to frequent prolonged pretrial detentions. The UHRC reported 52 percent of the country’s 49,322 inmates were pretrial detainees. In 2017 the FHRI reported that 20 percent of prisoners had spent at least three years in pretrial detention. According to the UHRC, the average length of time pretrial detainees spent in prison was 10 months for those facing capital charges, and two months for noncapital offenses.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Citizens detained without charge have the right to sue the Attorney General’s Office for compensation for unlawful detention; however, this right was rarely exercised.

The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, but the government did not always respect this provision. Corruption, understaffing, inefficiency, and executive branch interference with judicial rulings often undermined the courts’ independence. In response to a Constitutional Court ruling that scrapped a parliamentary and presidential term extension that parliament had earlier passed, the president on July 30 wrote that “the judges are not in charge of the country,” and that he and his party would effect the legislatives changes they wanted “judges or no judges.”

The president appoints Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Court judges and members of the Judicial Service Commission (which makes recommendations on appointments to the judiciary) with the approval of parliament.

Due to vacancies on the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, High Court, and the lower courts, the judiciary did not deliver justice in a timely manner. At times the lack of judicial quorum precluded cases from proceeding.

Judicial corruption was a problem, and local media reported numerous cases where judicial officers in lower courts solicited and accepted bribes from the parties involved. On June 26, the chief justice told local media that ministers and local politicians undermined courts by issuing counterorders to court pronouncements. On July 12, magistrate Joseph Angole wrote an open letter in the media to the chief justice noting that because of poor pay, “Judicial officers are living off litigants and in such a situation we can’t pretend that there is justice and fairness.” On September 10, the Judicial Service Commission suspended Angole to enable it to investigate him for corruption.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

Although the law provides for a presumption of innocence, authorities did not always respect this right. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them and are entitled to free assistance of an interpreter. An inadequate system of judicial administration resulted in a serious backlog of cases, undermining suspects’ right to a timely trial. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to consult with an attorney of their choice. The law requires the government to provide an attorney for indigent defendants charged with capital offenses. Defendants have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense and appeal. The law allows defendants to confront or question witnesses testifying against them and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf, but authorities did not always respect this right. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt, and they have the right to appeal.

All nonmilitary trials are public. A single judge decides cases in the High Court, while a panel of at least five judges decides cases in the Constitutional and Supreme Courts. The law allows military courts to try civilians who assist members of the military in committing offenses or are found possessing arms, ammunition, or other equipment reserved for the armed forces.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

During the year authorities detained numerous opposition politicians and activists on politically motivated grounds. Authorities released many without charge but charged others with crimes including treason, unlawful possession of firearms, inciting violence, holding illegal meetings, and abuse of office. No statistics on the number of political detainees or prisoners were available.

On August 13, the SFC arrested Robert Kyagulanyi in his hotel room in Arua town, on accusations that he illegally possessed military-grade weapons in the room. Earlier that day, Kyagulanyi had joined a section of other opposition MPs to campaign for opposition candidate Kassiano Wadri in a by-election. Kyagulanyi’s supporters clashed with supporters of rival NRM candidate Nusura Tiperu. Police fired live bullets and teargas to disperse the crowds. President Museveni, who claimed that the crowds had struck his vehicle with projectiles, directed the SFC to join the police to restore order in Arua. The SFC subsequently shot and killed Kyagulanyi’s driver in his car (see section 1.a.). That same evening the UPF also arrested opposition MPs Francis Zaake, Paul Mwiru, Gerald Karuhanga, candidate Wadri and former MP Mike Mabikke on accusation that they incited their supporters to attack the president’s motorcade. On August 16, the UPF arraigned Mwiru, Karuhanga, Mabikke, and Wadri before a magistrate’s court and charged them with treason. The court released them on bail on August 27 and the cases continued at year’s end. On August 16, the UPDF also arraigned Kyagulanyi before a military court and charged him with illegal possession of arms. On August 17, Kyagulanyi’s family and lawyers were allowed to see him and alleged he had been tortured (see section 1.c.). On August 23, the UPDF dropped the arms charges against Kyagulanyi, and the UPF then charged him with treason. On August 30, after being granted bail, Kyagulanyi attempted to depart the country to receive medical treatment. After initially preventing him to leave, the police allowed him to depart on August 31. Kyagulanyi returned to Uganda on September 20, and upon arrival was forcibly escorted by police to his home. The police prevented him from holding the meetings and displays of support that his supporters had planned. Kyagulanyi’s trial continued at year’s end.

On June 13, the UPDF arrested former IGP Kayihura, detained him at Makindye Military Barracks, and said it was questioning him on a matter it could not divulge. Local media reported that the UPDF held Kayihura on suspicion that he spied for a foreign country and that he was involved in the 2017 killing of Assistant IGP Andrew Felix Kaweesi. Through his lawyers, Kayihura said ISO had forged evidence to link him to Kaweesi’s killing. The government permitted UHRC, a government human rights agency, to visit Kayihura. On August 24, the UPDF charged Kayihura with failure to control war materials, and aiding and abetting kidnap from Uganda. The UPDF on August 28 released Kayihura on bail and his trial continued at year’s end.

The High Court did not fix a trial date for the Rwenzururu king Charles Wesley Mumbere and his bodyguards whom the state arrested and charged with murder, terrorism, and treason in a 2016 raid on the king’s palace in Kasese. At year’s end the state continued to hold the bodyguards on remand at Luzira prison and to limit the king’s movements to the Kampala, Wakiso, and Jinja districts.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through the regular court system or the UHRC, which has judicial powers under the constitution. These powers include the authority to order the release of detainees, pay compensation to victims, and pursue other legal and administrative remedies, such as mediation. Victims may appeal their cases to the Court of Appeal and thereafter to the Supreme Court but not to an international or regional court. Civil courts and the UHRC have no ability to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses criminally liable, and bureaucratic delays hampered enforcement of judgments that granted financial compensation.

The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but there were reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Police did not always obtain search warrants to enter private homes and offices.

The Antiterrorism Act and the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act authorize government security agencies to tap private conversations to combat terrorism-related offenses. The government utilized both statutes to monitor telephone and internet communications.

The government continued to encourage university students and government officials, including members of the judiciary, to attend NRM political education and military science courses known as “chaka mchaka.”

There was at least one report that the government or its agents committed possible arbitrary or unlawful killings.

Human rights organizations and media outlets reported deaths in prisons or detention centers due to torture or negligence by police or prison officers (see section 1.c., Prison and Detention Center Conditions). For example on September 2, a detainee who was being held alone in a cell was found dead in Lukyanivske pretrial facility in Kyiv. According to the forensic examination, the cause of death was damage to the internal organs. Police opened a murder investigation.

There were civilian casualties in connection with the conflict in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts between government and Russia-led forces (see section 1.g.).

There were reports of politically motivated killings by nongovernment actors, and in one case with the alleged involvement of a parliamentary aide. For example, on July 31, an unknown person poured concentrated sulfuric acid on public activist and advisor to the Kherson city mayor, Kateryna Handzyuk, resulting in serious chemical burns to over a third of her body. Handzyuk died of her injuries on November 4. Police at first opened a criminal investigation for “hooliganism.” They later requalified the attack as “causing severe bodily harm,” and then changed it to “attempted murder.” In August authorities arrested five suspects. In November authorities arrested a sixth individual, Ihor Pavlovsky, who at the time of the attack was an assistant to Mykola Palamarchuk, member of parliament for Bloc Petro Poroshenko. Human rights groups believed that the men arrested were credibly connected to the attack but criticized authorities for not identifying the individuals who ordered the attack. On November 6, parliament formed an interim parliamentary commission to investigate the murder of Handzyuk and attacks on other activists. Activists and media questioned the committee’s ability to impartially and effectively investigate or resolve the attacks because of the alleged political connections of some committee members.

On January 2, the body of lawyer Iryna Nozdrovska was found in a river in Kyiv Oblast with stab wounds and other signs of a violent death. Nozdrovska had criticized law enforcement and court authorities while pursuing justice for her sister, who had been hit and killed in 2015 by a car driven by an intoxicated driver, Dmytro Rossoshanskiy, who was the nephew of a powerful local judge. On January 8, authorities arrested Yuriy Rossoshanskiy, the father of Dmytro, and charged him with murdering Nozdrovska. Yuriy and Dmytro Rossoshanskiy were reported to have previously threatened Nozdrovska and her mother in retaliation for their support of the case against Dmytro. Authorities referred the case for trial on August 15. Media and civil society widely criticized a lack of transparency in the investigation and noted that many questions remain unanswered about the case, including the possibility that there were other assailants involved in the killing.

Authorities made no arrests during the year in connection with the 2016 killing of prominent Belarusian-Russian journalist Pavel Sheremet. On August 2, Sheremet’s widow filed a lawsuit against the prosecutor general, alleging inaction by his office on the case. Human rights and press freedom watchdog groups expressed concern about the lack of progress in the government’s investigation, suggesting high-level obstruction or investigatory incompetence as potential reasons. Independent journalistic investigations of the killing released in May 2017 uncovered significant evidence that investigators had apparently overlooked. President Poroshenko expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of the investigation in February during a press conference.

Law enforcement agencies continued to investigate killings and other crimes committed during the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013-14. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) noted some progress in the investigation of the killings of protesters. Human rights groups criticized the low number of convictions despite the existence of considerable evidence. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, as of late November, 279 persons had been indicted and 52 had been found guilty.

The HRMMU noted there was limited progress in the investigation and legal proceedings connected to a 2014 trade union building fire in Odesa that stemmed from violent clashes between pro-Russian and Ukrainian unity demonstrators. During the clashes and fire, 48 persons died, including six prounity and 42 pro-Russia individuals. On May 30, an indictment against the former heads of the Odesa city police and the city public security department for “abuse of authority or office” was submitted to the Prymorsky district court in Odesa. The trial against the head of the Odesa Oblast police on charges of abuse of authority, forgery, and dereliction of duty in protecting people from danger continued. Observers noted that appeal proceedings challenging the September 2017 acquittal by the Chornomorsk court in Odesa Oblast of 19 defendants in the 2014 trade union building fire case due to lack of evidence appeared to be stalled.

There were multiple reports of politically motivated disappearances in connection with the conflict between the government and Russia-led forces in the Donbas region (see section 1.g.).

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution and law prohibit torture and other cruel and unusual punishment, there were reports that law enforcement authorities engaged in such abuse. While courts cannot legally use as evidence in court proceedings confessions and statements made under duress to police by persons in custody, there were reports that police and other law enforcement officials abused and, at times, tortured persons in custody to obtain confessions.

In the Donbas region, there were reports that government and progovernment forces at times committed abuses, including torture, against individuals detained on national security grounds. There were reports that Russia-led forces in the so-called “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk systematically committed numerous abuses, including torture, to maintain control or for personal financial gain. According to international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), abuses included beatings, forced labor, psychological and physical torture, public humiliation, and sexual violence (see section 1.g.).

Abuse of prisoners and detainees by police remained a widespread problem. In its report on the seventh periodic visit to the country, published on September 6, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) expressed concern over a considerable number of recent and credible allegations from detained persons regarding excessive use of force by police and physical abuse aimed at obtaining additional information or extracting a confession.

In a report released on June 8 on his visit to the country, the UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UN SRT) stated that, according to victims he had interviewed, during interrogations “police forces reportedly resorted to kicking and beating, used suffocation techniques, most notably by placing plastic bags over the head, suspension and prolonged stress position. Numerous inmates also reported having been electrocuted and, in some cases, subjected to mock executions. Several detainees showed signs of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and some still displayed visible marks of mistreatment and torture. Others reported having been subjected to techniques of torture specifically designed to leave no marks.” On February 26, in Odesa Oblast, two patrol police detained and allegedly beat motorist Serhiy Grazhdan, claiming that he was driving drunk. According to press reports, police threw Grazhdan to the ground, handcuffed him, and beat him until he lost consciousness. When Grazhdan’s wife attempted to intervene, police threatened her with a gun. Grazhdan was taken to the hospital in critical condition. Police opened two investigations–one into the actions of the police officers and another into allegations that Grazhdan insulted and inflicted minor injuries on one of the arresting officers.

There were reports of sexual violence being committed in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine (see section 1.g.).

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions remained poor, did not meet international standards, and at times posed a serious threat to the life and health of prisoners. Physical abuse, lack of proper medical care and nutrition, poor sanitation, and lack of adequate light were persistent problems.

Physical Conditions: Overcrowding was a problem in some pretrial detention facilities. While authorities generally held adults and juveniles in separate facilities, there were reports that juveniles and adults were often not separated in some pretrial detention facilities, a concern emphasized in the June 8 UN SRT report.

Physical abuse by guards was a problem. For example on June 8, staff of the Chernivtsi pretrial facility brutally beat detainees, one of whom was hospitalized in the intensive care unit of the local hospital as a result. According to the detainees’ relatives, staff allegedly beat detainees while they were handcuffed, and humiliated them by making them squat and crawl. The administration of the remand facility claimed they were attempting to put down a riot. The local prosecutor’s office conducted an investigation of the incident, which concluded that prison staff had not exceeded their authority.

There were reports of prisoner-on-prisoner violence. The CPT noted that inter-prisoner violence was a problem in all but one of the establishments it visited. For example, on August 18, staff of the Lukyanivske penitentiary facility found a 34-year-old inmate who had been beaten to death by his cellmate.

Conditions in police temporary detention facilities and pretrial detention facilities were harsher than in low- and medium-security prisons. Temporary detention facilities often had insect and rodent infestations and lacked adequate sanitation and medical facilities. The CPT expressed concern that prisoners in pretrial detention were generally not offered any out-of-cell activities other than outdoor exercise for an hour per day in small yards.

The quality of food in prisons was generally poor. According to the June report of the UN SRT, inmates received three meals a day, although in most places the food was described as “inedible,” leading inmates to rely on supplementary food they received through parcels from family. According to CPT, in some pretrial detention centers, detainees did not have consistent access to food and water. According to UN SRT, most hygienic products including toilet paper, soap, and feminine hygiene products were not provided and detainees relied on supplies provided by family or donated by humanitarian organizations. In some facilities, cells had limited access to daylight and were not properly heated or ventilated.

UN and other international monitors documented systemic problems with the provision of medical care. The CPT observed a lack of medical confidentiality, poor recording of injuries, and deficient access to specialists, including gynecological and psychiatric care. There was a shortage of all kinds of medications with an over-reliance on prisoners and their families to provide most of the medicines. Conditions in prison healthcare facilities were poor and unhygienic. Bureaucratic and financial impediments prevented the prompt transfer of inmates to city hospitals, resulting in their prolonged suffering, and delayed diagnoses and treatment.

As of February more than 9,000 detainees were in Russia-controlled territory. On February 7, under the auspices of the Ombudsman’s Office, 20 prisoners incarcerated in Russia-controlled territory were transferred to penal facilities on government-controlled territory. Since 2015 a total of 198 inmates had been transferred to the penitentiary facilities in government-controlled areas.

The condition of prison facilities and places of unofficial detention in Russia-controlled areas continued to deteriorate. According to the Justice for Peace coalition, there was an extensive network of unofficial places of detention in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts located in basements, sewage wells, garages, and industrial enterprises. In most cases, these places were not suitable for even short-term detention. There were reports of severe shortages of food, water, heat, sanitation, and proper medical care. The HRMMU was denied access to detainees in the Russia-controlled territory of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR)” and “Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR).” The lack of access to detainees raised concerns about the conditions of detention and treatment. The UN SPT was granted access to places of detention in the “DPR” and “LPR,” but this was limited to preselected sites and he was unable to conduct confidential interviews with detainees. The UN SPT indicated that these restrictions did not allow him to fulfill his mandate in this part of Ukraine. Based upon his limited observations of official detention facilities in the “DPR,” he reported that healthcare appeared to be restricted, the quality of the food was reported to be unacceptable, and ventilation and sanitation appeared very poor. The East Human Rights Group continued to report systemic abuses against prisoners in the “LPR,” such as torture, starvation, denial of medical care, and solitary confinement as well as the extensive use of prisoners as slave labor to produce goods that, when sold, provided personal income to the leaders of the Russia-led forces.

Administration: Although prisoners and detainees may file complaints about conditions in custody with the human rights ombudsman, human rights organizations noted prison officials continued to censor or discourage complaints and penalized and abused inmates who filed them. Human rights groups reported that legal norms did not always provide for confidentiality of complaints. According to representatives of the national preventive mechanism, an organization that conducted monitoring visits of places of detention, authorities did not always conduct proper investigations of complaints.

While officials generally allowed prisoners, except those in disciplinary cells, to receive visitors, prisoner rights groups noted some families had to pay bribes to obtain permission for prison visits to which they were entitled by law.

Independent Monitoring: The government generally permitted independent monitoring of prisons and detention centers by international and local human rights groups, including the CPT, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the UN SRT. During its May-June visit, the UN SRT also had access to a very restricted set of facilities in the “DPR” and the “LPR.”

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but the government did not always observe these requirements.

The HRMMU and other monitoring groups reported numerous arbitrary detentions in connection with the conflict in eastern Ukraine (see section 1.g.).

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for maintaining internal security and order. The ministry oversees police and other law enforcement personnel. The SBU is responsible for state security broadly defined, nonmilitary intelligence, and counterintelligence and counterterrorism matters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, and the SBU reports directly to the president. The State Fiscal Service exercises law enforcement powers through the tax police and reports to the Cabinet of Ministers. The State Migration Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs implements state policy regarding border security, migration, citizenship, and registration of refugees and other migrants.

Security forces generally prevented or responded to societal violence. At times, however, they used excessive force to disperse protests or, in some cases, failed to protect victims from harassment or violence. For example, on June 8, a group of violent nationalists from the National Druzhina organization–established with support from the National Corps–attacked and destroyed a Romani camp in Kyiv after its residents failed to respond to their ultimatum to leave the area within 24 hours. Police were present but made no arrests, and in a video of the attack posted on social media, police could be seen making casual conversation with the nationalists following the attack.

Civilian authorities generally had control over law enforcement agencies but rarely took action to punish abuses committed by security forces. Impunity for abuses by law enforcement agencies remained a significant problem that was frequently highlighted by the HRMMU in its reports as well as by other human rights groups. The HRMMU noted authorities were unwilling to investigate allegations of torture and other abuses, particularly when the victims had been detained on grounds related to national security or were seen as pro-Russian.

While authorities sometimes brought charges against members of the security services, cases often remained under investigation without being brought to trial while authorities allowed alleged perpetrators to continue their work. According to an April report by the Expert Center for Human Rights, only 3 percent of criminal cases against law enforcement authorities for physical abuse of detainees were transferred to court. In addition, human rights groups criticized the lack of progress in investigations of alleged crimes in areas retaken by the government from Russia-led forces, resulting in continuing impunity for these crimes. In particular, investigations of alleged crimes committed by Russia-led forces in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in 2014 appeared stalled. Human rights groups believed that many local law enforcement personnel collaborated with Russia-led forces when they controlled the cities.

Under the law, members of the parliament have authority to conduct investigations and public hearings into law enforcement problems. The human rights ombudsman may also initiate investigations into abuses by security forces.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs indicated it provides 80 hours of compulsory human rights training to security forces, focusing on the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Law enforcement training institutions also include courses on human rights, rule of law, constitutional rights, tolerance and nondiscrimination, prevention of domestic violence, and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

By law, authorities may detain a suspect for three days without a warrant, after which a judge must issue a warrant authorizing continued detention. Authorities in some cases detained persons for longer than three days without a warrant.

Prosecutors must bring detainees before a judge within 72 hours, and pretrial detention should not exceed six months for minor crimes and 12 months for serious ones. Persons have the right to consult a lawyer upon their detention. According to the law, prosecutors may detain suspects accused of terrorist activities for up to 30 days without charges or a bench warrant. Under the law, citizens have the right to be informed of the charges brought against them. Authorities must promptly inform detainees of their rights and immediately notify family members of an arrest. Police often did not follow these procedures. Police at times failed to keep records or register detained suspects, and courts often extended detention to allow police more time to obtain confessions. In its September report, the CPT expressed concern about a widespread practice of unrecorded detention, in particular, the unrecorded presence in police stations of persons “invited” for “informal talks” with police, and noted that they encountered several allegations of physical mistreatment that took place during a period of unrecorded detention. Authorities occasionally held suspects incommunicado, in some cases for several weeks.

According to the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement, detainees were not always allowed prompt access to an attorney of their choice. Under the law the government must provide attorneys for indigent defendants. Compliance was inconsistent because of a shortage of defense attorneys or because attorneys, citing low government compensation, refused to defend indigent clients.

The law provides for bail, but many defendants could not pay the required amounts. Courts sometimes imposed travel restrictions as an alternative to pretrial confinement.

Arbitrary Arrest: The HRMMU and other human rights monitors reported a continued pattern of arbitrary detention by authorities. For example, according to the HRMMU, on March 12, the SBU searched the apartment of an opposition journalist in Kharkiv. SBU staff presented a search warrant but did not allow the suspect to contact a lawyer. After the SBU seized a plastic bottle with ammunition rounds which they claimed they found in the journalist’s apartment, they took him to the regional SBU department, interrogated him for 12 hours, and pressured him to cooperate with SBU. They released him later without pressing official charges.

There were multiple reports of arbitrary detention in connection with the conflict in eastern Ukraine. As of mid-August the HRMMU documented 28 cases in which government military or SBU personnel detained presumed members of armed groups and held them in unofficial detention facilities before their arrests were properly registered. According to the HRMMU, on June 16, armed men wearing military uniforms and masks stormed a house where a Russian citizen was staying. They blindfolded him and brought him to an unofficial detention facility located in Pokrovsk at a transportation company facility where he allegedly spent two days handcuffed to an iron bed. On June 18, SBU officers offered him two options, either to be placed in custody or “to disappear.” He was brought to a court hearing and then sent to pretrial detention.

There were reports that members of nationalist hate groups, such as C14 and National Corps, at times committed arbitrary detentions with the apparent acquiescence of law enforcement. For example according to the HRMMU, on March 14, members of C14 unlawfully detained a man in Kyiv Oblast who was suspected of being a member of an armed group in the “LPR.” After interrogating him while he was face down and handcuffed, C14 handed him over to the SBU.

Arbitrary arrest was reportedly widespread in both the “DPR” and the “LPR.” The HRMMU raised particular concern over the concept of “preventive arrest” introduced in February by Russia-led forces in the “LPR.” Under a preventive arrest, individuals may be detained for up to 30 days, with the possibility of extending detention to 60 days, based on allegations that a person was involved in crimes against the security of the “LPR.” During preventive arrests, detainees were held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and relatives.

While the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, courts were inefficient and remained vulnerable to political pressure and corruption. Confidence in the judiciary remained low.

Despite efforts to reform the judiciary and the Prosecutor General’s Office, corruption among judges and prosecutors remained endemic. Civil society groups continued to complain about weak separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of government. Some judges claimed that high-ranking politicians pressured them to decide cases in their favor, regardless of the merits. Some judges and prosecutors reportedly took bribes in exchange for legal determinations. Other factors impeded the right to a fair trial, such as lengthy court proceedings, particularly in administrative courts, inadequate funding, and the inability of courts to enforce rulings.

The National Bar Association reported numerous cases of intimidation and attacks against lawyers, especially those representing defendants considered “pro-Russian” or “pro-Russia-led forces.” For example on July 27, representatives of nationalist hate group C14 attacked lawyer Valentyn Rybin, who was representing a citizen charged with separatism at the Kyiv City Appeals Court. Police opened an investigation into the incident.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

A single judge decides most cases, although two judges and three public assessors who have some legal training hear trials on charges carrying the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The law provides for cross-examination of witnesses by both prosecutors and defense attorneys and for plea bargaining.

The law presumes defendants are innocent, and they cannot be legally compelled to testify or confess, although high conviction rates called into question the legal presumption of innocence. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, with interpretation as needed; to a public trial without undue delay; to be present at their trial, to communicate privately with an attorney of their choice (or one provided at public expense); and to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The law also allows defendants to confront witnesses against them, to present witnesses and evidence, and the right to appeal.

Trials are open to the public, but some judges prohibited media from observing proceedings. While trials must start no later than three weeks after charges are filed, prosecutors seldom met this requirement. Human rights groups reported officials occasionally monitored meetings between defense attorneys and their clients.

Russia-led forces terminated Ukrainian court system functions on territories under their control in 2014. The so-called “DPR” and “LPR” did not have an independent judiciary, and the right to a fair trial was systematically restricted. The HRMMU reported that in many cases individuals were not provided with any judicial review of their detention, and were detained indefinitely without any charges or trial. In cases of suspected espionage or when individuals were suspected of having links to the Ukrainian government, closed-door trials by military tribunals were held. There were nearly no opportunities to appeal the verdicts of these tribunals. According to the HRMMU, “accounts by conflict-related detainees suggest that their degree of culpability in the imputed ‘crime’ was already considered established at the time of their ‘arrest,’ amounting to a presumption of guilt. Subsequent ‘investigations’ and ‘trials’ seemed to serve merely to create a veneer of legality to the ‘prosecution’ of individuals believed to be associated with Ukrainian military or security forces.” The HRMMU reported that de facto authorities generally impede private lawyers from accessing clients and that court-appointed defense lawyers generally made no efforts to provide an effective defense, and participated in efforts to coerce guilty pleas.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were reports of a small number of individuals that some human rights groups considered to be political prisoners.

As of October the trial of Zhytomyr journalist Vasyl Muravytsky, was ongoing. Muravytsky was charged with state treason, infringement of territorial integrity, incitement of hatred, and support for terrorist organizations based on statements deemed pro-Russian. He could face up to 15 years of prison. Some domestic and international journalist unions called for his release, claiming the charges were politically motivated.

On February 20, the Dolyna court returned an indictment against Ruslan Kotsaba, a blogger from Ivano-Frankivsk, to the prosecutor’s office for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Kotsaba was not incarcerated at the time and had been released in 2016 following his 2015 arrest on charges of impeding the work of the armed forces by calling on Ukrainians to ignore the draft. During the period of his arrest, human rights groups had deemed him a political prisoner.

According to the SBU, Russia-led forces kept an estimated 113 hostages in Donbas.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The constitution and law provide for the right to seek redress for any decisions, actions, or omissions of national and local government officials that violate citizens’ human rights. An inefficient and corrupt judicial system limited the right of redress. Individuals may also file a collective legal challenge to legislation they believe may violate basic rights and freedoms. Individuals may appeal to the human rights ombudsman at any time and to the ECHR after exhausting domestic legal remedies.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The country endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration but has not passed any laws dealing with the restitution of private or communal property, although the latter has been dealt with partly through regulations and decrees. In recent years most successful cases of restitution have taken place as a result of tacit and behind-the-scenes lobbying on behalf of the Jewish groups.

The constitution prohibits such actions, but there were reports authorities generally did not respect the prohibitions.

By law, the SBU may not conduct surveillance or searches without a court-issued warrant. The SBU and law enforcement agencies, however, sometimes conducted searches without a proper warrant. In an emergency authorities may initiate a search without prior court approval, but they must seek court approval immediately after the investigation begins. Citizens have the right to examine any dossier in the possession of the SBU that concerns them; they have the right to recover losses resulting from an investigation. There was no implementing legislation, and authorities generally did not respect these rights, and many citizens were not aware of their rights or that authorities had violated their privacy.

There were some reports that the government had accessed private communications and monitored private movements without appropriate legal authority. For example on April 26, a judge of the Uzhhorod city court complained of illegal surveillance. Representatives of the National Guard who were entrusted with guarding the court premises had allegedly installed a listening device in his office. Police opened an investigation into the complaint.

There were reports that the government improperly sought access to information about journalists’ sources and investigations (see section 2.a.).

Russian occupation authorities did not adequately investigate cases of abductions and killings of Crimean residents from 2014 and 2015. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 Crimean residents who had disappeared during the occupation were later found dead. Occupation authorities did not investigate other suspicious deaths and disappearances, occasionally categorizing them as suicide. Human rights observers reported that families frequently did not challenge findings in such cases due to fear of retaliation.

There were reports of abductions and disappearances by occupation authorities. For example, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), a Kharkiv resident disappeared at the Russian Federation-controlled side of the administrative boundary on April 11. The Federal Security Service (FSB) initially detained the victim without charge. Documents reviewed by the HRMMU indicated further formalized detention of the victim for 12 days, allegedly for committing an administrative offense. On the day when he was supposed to be released, he disappeared again. Despite efforts of relatives and human rights defenders to inquire about the whereabouts of the victim, the law enforcement and penitentiary institutions in Crimea failed to provide any information.

According to September data by the HRMMU, from 2014 to June 30, 2018, 42 persons were victims of enforced disappearances. The victims (38 men and four women) include 27 ethnic Ukrainians, nine Crimean Tatars, four Tajiks, one person of mixed Tatar-Russian origins, and one Uzbek. Twenty-seven were released after being illegally detained for periods lasting from a few hours to two weeks; 12 were missing and feared dead by their relatives; two were held in custody; and one was found dead. According to the HRMMU, in none of these cases have the perpetrators been brought to justice. Russian occupation authorities did not adequately investigate the deaths and disappearances. Human rights groups reported that police often refused to register reports of disappearances and intimidated and threatened with detention those who tried to report a disappearance. Ukrainian government and human rights groups believed Russian security forces kidnapped the individuals for opposing Russia’s occupation to instill fear in the population and prevent dissent.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

There were widespread reports Russian authorities in Crimea tortured and otherwise abused residents who opposed the occupation. Human rights monitors reported that Russian occupying forces subjected Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in particular to physical abuse. For example, on June 28, members of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) searched Crimean Tatar activist Akhtem Mustafayev’s house and detained him. FSB officers put a plastic bag over his head and brought him to the basement of an unknown building. Unknown men beat him, forced him to his knees with his hands cuffed behind his back, and threatened that no one would ever find him. He was reportedly tortured for four hours and immediately fled for mainland Ukraine after being released.

Occupation authorities demonstrated a pattern of using punitive psychiatric incarceration as a means of pressuring detained individuals. On June 28, occupation authorities committed Crimean Tatar journalist Nariman Memedinov to a psychiatric hospital for a mental health evaluation that human rights advocates believed to be a punitive measure in retaliation for his vocal opposition to the occupation. Memedinov had previously been arrested on March 22 on terrorism charges that were widely considered to be politically motivated. The charges were based on videos he posted on YouTube in 2013 in which authorities alleged he recruited people to join Hizb ut-Tahrir, a group that is banned in Russia but legal in Ukraine. According to the Crimean Human Rights Group, as of early October, 17 Crimean Tatar defendants had been subjected to psychiatric evaluation and confinement against their will without apparent medical need since the beginning of the occupation (see section 1.d.).

Human rights monitors reported that occupation authorities also threatened individuals with violence or imprisonment if they did not testify in court against individuals authorities believed were opposed to the occupation.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions reportedly remained harsh and life threatening due to overcrowding and poor conditions.

Physical Conditions: The HRMMU reported that detainees were often held in conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and that health care in prisons deteriorated after the occupation began.

According to the Crimean Human Rights group, 31 Crimean prisoners had been transferred to the Russian Federation since occupation began in 2014. One factor in the transfers was the lack of specialized penitentiary facilities in Crimea, requiring the transfer of juveniles, persons sentenced to life imprisonment, and prisoners suffering from serious physical and mental illnesses.

According to the Crimean Human Rights Group, at least four persons, including two Crimean Tatars, died under suspicious circumstances in the Simferopol pretrial detention center in April. On April 6, Server Bilialov and Oleg Goncharov were allegedly found hanged. On April 12, Dmitriy Shaposhnik was found hanged in a punishment cell. On April 13, Islam Iskerov was found with his throat slit in an isolation cell. The Federal Penitentiary Service Department of Russia officially confirmed three of the deaths; occupation authorities, however, did not open an investigation.

There were reports of physical abuse by prison guards. For example, on July 20, more than 70 convicts at the Kerch Penal Colony Number Two filed a complaint with prison authorities alleging systematic severe beatings and other forms of abuse at the facility. The occupation authorities’ appointed “human rights ombudsman,” Lyudmila Lubina, who was generally not considered to provide independent oversight of government actions, called the treatment of prisoners at the colony “barbaric.”

In June Crimean Tatar detainee Izmail Ramazanov filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights alleging inhuman conditions at the Simferopol pretrial detention center, citing overcrowding, cells covered in mold, the housing of prisoners with tuberculosis with healthy prisoners, and poor ventilation and sanitation. The HRMMU reported that detainees in the facility had to sleep in shifts due to overcrowding.

Prison authorities reportedly retaliated against detainees who refused Russian Federation citizenship by placing them in smaller cells or in solitary confinement.

Independent Monitoring: Occupation authorities did not permit monitoring of prison or detention center conditions by independent nongovernmental observers or international organizations. Occupation authorities permitted the “human rights ombudsman,” Lyudmila Lubina, to visit prisoners, but human rights activists regarded Lubina as representing the interests of occupation authorities and not an independent actor.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

Russian government agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Federal Investigative Committee, and the Office of the Prosecutor General applied and enforced Russian law in Crimea. The FSB also conducted security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism activities and combatted organized crime and corruption. A “national police force” operated under the aegis of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In addition to abuses committed by Russian forces, “self-defense forces”–largely consisting of former Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs officers allegedly linked to local organized crime–reportedly continued to operate and commit abuses. These forces often acted with impunity in intimidating perceived occupation opponents and were involved in extrajudicial detentions and arbitrary confiscation of property. The HRMMU cited the FSB as the most common perpetrator of abuses in recent years, while Crimean “self-defense forces” committed most abuses in the earlier years of the occupation.

According to human rights groups, there was total impunity for human rights abuses committed by both Russian occupation authorities and Crimean “self-defense forces.”

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

See the Country Reports on Human Rights for Russia for a description of the relevant Russian laws and procedures that the Russian government applied and enforced in occupied Crimea.

Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrests continued to occur as a means of instilling fear, stifling opposition, and inflicting punishment on those who opposed the occupation. According to the HRMMU, in many cases victims were neither charged nor tried but were detained as a form of extrajudicial punishment or harassment. Detention under such circumstances usually lasted from several hours to several days, in which victims were often held incommunicado and sometimes subjected to abuse during interrogations. The HRMMU noted the prevalence of members of the Crimean Tatar community among those apprehended during police raids. Detainees were typically taken to a police station, photographed, fingerprinted, and made to provide DNA samples before being released. For example on January 25, authorities raided Crimean Tatar homes in several cities. During the raids, they arrested two Crimean Tatar activists, Enver Krosh and Ebazer Islyamov, and charged them with “propagating extremist symbols and organizations,” charges rights groups described as baseless.

There were reports that authorities arbitrarily arrested the family members of known dissidents to exert pressure on them. For example, on July 19, representatives of the FSB searched the house of the Aliev family. Their target was the daughter of Muslim Aliev, a political prisoner. The FSB brought her to the Investigative Committee in Alushta for interrogation and released her after a couple of hours.

On November 25, Russian authorities fired on and seized three Ukrainian naval ships and 24 crew attempting legally to transit the Kerch Strait. The crewmembers were brought to Kerch Prison, Crimea and then Lefortovo detention center in Moscow, where they subsequently asserted their rights to detainee status under the Geneva Convention of 1949. Russia treated them instead as criminals; a Simferopol “court” sentenced them to two months’ detention.

Under the Russian occupation regime, the “judiciary” was neither independent nor impartial. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys were subject to political directives from occupation authorities, and the outcomes of trials appeared predetermined by government interference. The HRMMU documented 39 cases between September 2017 and June where due process and fair trial guarantees were disregarded by Crimea occupation authorities, including judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, and FSB officers.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

See the Country Reports on Human Rights for Russia for a description of the relevant Russian laws and procedures that the Russian government applied and enforced in occupied Crimea.

Occupation authorities interfered with defendants’ ability to access an attorney. For example on May 4, FSB officers detained five crewmen of a Ukrainian fishing boat near the coast of Crimea for a month and a half under inhuman conditions at the FSB border control facility in Balaklava. During their detention, the men did not have access to a Ukrainian consul or lawyers. FSB officers psychologically pressured and intimidated the men during interrogations. The crew did not have access to lawyers. The vessel’s captain, Viktor Novitsky, was charged with “illegal extraction of marine biological resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian federation.” No charges were filed against the other members of the crew. On September 30, they were released and left Crimea.

According to the HRMMU defendants facing terrorism or extremism-related charges were often pressured into dismissing their privately hired lawyers in exchange for promised leniency. For example the HRMMU’s September report on Crimea described three Crimean Tatar defendants who cancelled a contract with their lawyers after being prompted to do so by FSB officers and warned, through their family members, that having “pro-Ukrainian” lawyers would damage their defense.

Occupation authorities retroactively applied Russian Federation laws to actions that took place before the occupation began. The HRMMU documented at least 10 such cases since September 2017, including sentences imposed for years-old social media posts and for taking part in protest actions that occurred before the occupation began.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

Human Rights advocates estimated there were more than 60 political prisoners in occupied Crimea; the Crimean Tatar Mejlis organization claimed that by the end of the year Russia held 96 Ukrainian citizen political prisoners, of whom 63 were Crimean Tatar. Charges of extremism, terrorism, or violation of territorial integrity were particularly applied to opponents of the occupation, such as Crimean Tatars, independent journalists, and individuals expressing dissent on social media. The HRMMU noted that justifications underpinning the arrests of alleged members of “terrorist” or “extremist” groups often provided little evidence that the suspect posed an actual threat to society by planning or undertaking concrete actions.

Russian occupation authorities also transferred Crimean cases to Russia’s legal system and changed the venue of prosecution for some detainees.

On July 5, an occupation “court” in Crimea sentenced Ukrainian activist Volodymyr Balukh to five years in a penal colony and imposed a fine of 10,000 rubles ($170). The five-year sentence was the combination of a previous three year, five month sentence imposed on him in January for supposed “weapons possession,” plus additional time for allegedly “disrupting the activities of a detention center.” The January conviction resulted from a retrial after his October 2017 conviction on the same charges was overturned. Both charges were seen as retaliation for Balukh’s pro-Ukrainian views, which he displayed by hanging a plaque and Ukrainian flag in the courtyard of his house. The FSB initially detained Balukh in 2016, claiming it found ammunition and explosives in the attic of his house. Human rights defenders asserted that the material was planted. Balukh had been repeatedly threatened by authorities to remove pro-Ukrainian symbols or face prosecution. On March 19, Balukh went on a hunger strike, during which prison authorities denied him a medical examination, despite indications that his health was deteriorating. He ended his hunger strike on October 9, after being notified that he was to be transferred to the Russian Federation to serve his sentence.

On July 13, the “supreme court” of Crimea convicted Ukrainian citizen Yevhen Panov of plotting sabotage against Crimea’s military facilities and critical infrastructure. He was sentenced to eight years in a high-security penal colony. Occupation authorities arrested Panov in August 2016. According to human rights groups, the case against Panov bore signs of political motivation, including indications that Panov had been subjected to electric shocks and other forms of torture in an attempt to coerce his confession and a lack of other evidence against him.

See the Country Reports on Human Rights for Russia for a description of the relevant Russian laws and procedures that the Russian government applied and enforced in occupied Crimea.

Occupation authorities and others engaged in electronic surveillance, entered residences and other premises without warrants, and harassed relatives and neighbors of perceived opposition figures.

Russian occupation authorities routinely conducted raids on homes to intimidate the local population, particularly Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, ostensibly on the grounds of searching for weapons, drugs, or “extremist literature.” The HRMMU documented 38 such searches between January and June; 30 of these concerned properties of Crimean Tatars.

Human rights groups reported that Russian authorities had widespread authority to tap telephones and read electronic communications and had established a network of informants to report on suspicious activities. According to Mejlis members, Russian authorities had invited hundreds of Crimean Tatars to “interviews” where authorities played back the interviewees’ telephone conversations and read their email aloud. Authorities reportedly encouraged state employees to inform on their colleagues who might oppose the occupation. According to human rights advocates, eavesdropping and visits by security personnel created an environment in which persons were afraid to voice any opinion contrary to the occupation authorities, even in private.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits such practices, but there were some reports of occurrences during the year. Based on reports of released prisoners and their family members, diplomatic observers, and human rights organizations, UN human rights experts believed that some individuals imprisoned for suspected state security and nonstate security violations were subjected to severe abuse or mistreatment. Human rights groups alleged mistreatment took place during interrogations and as inducement for signed confessions. UN human rights experts and those released from detention in recent years alleged that authorities used techniques including beatings, forced standing, and threats to rape or kill, including by electrocution. In some cases judges ordered investigations, including medical examinations by state-appointed doctors, into allegations of torture or mistreatment.

Sharia courts, which adjudicate criminal and family law cases, may impose flogging as punishment for adultery, prostitution, consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and drug or alcohol charges. Reports of flogging were rare and tended to be confined to only a few jurisdictions.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions varied widely among the individual emirates and between regular prisons, which housed those accused of nonpolitical crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and killings, and state security detention facilities, which hold political activists or those the government defines to be terrorists. There were instances of overcrowding, long waits for health care access, and poor sanitary conditions.

Physical Conditions: The government did not release statistics on prison demographics and capacity. Diplomatic observers reported that in Abu Dhabi some prisoners complained of overcrowding, poor temperature control, retaliation for raising complaints to their embassies, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.

There were reports that individuals within state security detention facilities were mistreated, abused, and tortured. Prisoners complained to Western diplomatic missions that they witnessed routine abuse of fellow prisoners, stating that prison guards claimed they were able to erase footage from security cameras.

There were reports of prisoner-on-prisoner violence that led to injury and death. There were also allegations of inmate suicide attempts.

Overcrowding was a major problem in Abu Dhabi, especially in drug units. In one example prisoners complained that most detainees had to share beds or sleep on the concrete floor due to lack of mattresses. There were reports that cellblocks built to hold 148 inmates held 220 and had only two functioning toilets.

According to Western diplomatic missions, overcrowding was at times a problem in prisons in Dubai and the northern Emirates. In particular prisoners awaiting transfer to Abu Dhabi for federal prosecution experienced longer stays in police holding cells equipped only for short-term incarceration. In Dubai several procedural and judicial reforms were recently implemented with the aim of reducing overcrowding. The Smart Bail initiative, jointly piloted by Dubai Police and Dubai Public Prosecution, allowed those charged with misdemeanors and some minor financial crimes to obtain bail online without being incarcerated.

Some prisoners were not permitted exercise or reading materials. There were reports some prisoners did not have access to outside areas and exposure to sunlight. In Abu Dhabi there were also reports of dangerously hot conditions when air conditioners broke during periods of extreme temperatures.

In drug units there were reports of insects in food, poor food handling, and inadequate general hygiene.

Medical care was generally adequate in regular prisons, although some prisoners reported delays of up to six weeks in receiving medical treatment and difficulty obtaining necessary medication, including insulin for diabetics. Media reports and nongovernmental organizations stated some detainees in State Security Department custody did not receive adequate access to medical care.

Prisons attempted to accommodate persons with disabilities based on their specific needs, such as placing wheelchair users on a lower floor. Some reports alleged inconsistencies in providing support for prisoners with mental disabilities. In Dubai and to some extent in Abu Dhabi, prison officials worked with mental health professionals to provide support and administer needed medication. Training and capabilities to accommodate prisoners with mental health disabilities were allegedly less well developed in the other emirates. It was reportedly common for authorities to grant a humanitarian pardon in cases where a person with a disability had been convicted of a minor offense.

Within prisons the authorities required Muslims to attend weekly Islamic services, and non-Muslims reported some pressure to attend ostensibly nonmandatory lectures and classes about Islam. In some of the emirates, Christian clergy were not able to visit Christian prisoners.

Administration: Some state security detainees did not have access to visitors or had more limited access than other prisoners. Although prisoners had a right to submit complaints to judicial authorities, details about investigations into complaints were not publicly available, and there were no independent authorities to investigate allegations of poor conditions. Inmates reported retaliation from authorities after raising issues about prison conditions with diplomatic missions. There was also no publicly available information on whether authorities investigated complaints about prison conditions. Dubai maintained a website where individuals could obtain basic information about pending legal cases, including formal charges and upcoming court dates. Western embassies reported a similar website in Abu Dhabi but said, in many instances, cases could not be located in the system or the site would not function. There were standard weekly visiting hours in regular prisons, but unmarried and unrelated visitors of the opposite sex had to receive permission from a prosecutor.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted charitable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to visit prisons and provide material support on a limited basis. Members of the government-sanctioned Emirates Human Rights Association (EHRA) met with prisoners during regular visits to detention facilities and reported their findings to federal Ministry of Interior officials. Their reports were not publicly available. Authorities did not grant regular consular access for State Security Department detainees.

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. The government, however, reportedly often held persons in custody for extended periods without charge or a preliminary judicial hearing. The law permits indefinite detention, including incommunicado detention, without appeal. In some cases authorities did not allow detainees contact with attorneys, family members, or others for indefinite or unspecified periods.

In cases of foreign nationals detained by police, which in view of the country’s demographic breakdown were the vast majority of cases, the government often did not notify the appropriate diplomatic missions. For state security detainees, notification was exceptionally rare, and information about the status of these detainees was very limited.

Authorities treated prisoners arrested for political or security reasons differently from other prisoners, including placing them in separate sections of a prison. A specific government entity, the State Security Department, handled these cases and, in some cases, held prisoners and detainees in separate undisclosed locations for extended periods prior to their transfer to a regular prison.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

Each emirate maintained a local police force called a general directorate, which was officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior. All emirate-level general directorates of police enforced their respective emirate’s laws autonomously. They also enforced federal laws within their emirate in coordination with each other under the federal ministry. The federal government maintained federal armed forces for external security.

There were no public reports of impunity involving security forces, but there was also no publicly available information on whether authorities investigated complaints of police abuses including prison conditions and mistreatment (see section 1.c., Administration).

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Police stations received complaints from the public, made arrests, and forwarded cases to the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor then transferred cases to the courts. The law prohibits arrest or search of citizens without probable cause. Within 48 hours police must report an arrest to the public prosecutor, and police usually adhered to the deadline. The public prosecutor must then question the accused within 24 hours of initial arrest. Authorities did not consistently provide consular notification for arrests.

Police investigations can regularly take up to three months, during which time detainees are often publicly unaccounted. The law requires prosecutors to submit charges to a court within 14 days of police report and to inform detainees of the charges against them. Judges may grant extensions to prosecutors, sometimes resulting in extended periods of detention without formal charges. Multiple detainees complained that authorities did not inform them of the charges or other details of their case for months at a time. Noncitizen detainees reported that when the prosecutor presented the charges, they were written in Arabic with no translation, and no translator was provided. There were also reports of authorities pressuring or forcing detainees to sign documents before they were allowed to see attorneys.

Public prosecutors may order detainees held as long as 21 days without charge and this can be extended by court order. Judges may not grant an extension of more than 30 days of detention without charge; however, with charge, they may renew 30-day extensions indefinitely. As a result pretrial detention sometimes exceeded the maximum sentence for the crime charged. Public prosecutors may hold suspects in terrorism-related cases without charge for six months. Once authorities charge a suspect with terrorism, the Federal Supreme Court may extend the detention indefinitely. Diplomatic sources reported nonstate security detentions of more than two years without charges.

Authorities may temporarily release detainees who deposit money, a passport, or an unsecured personal promissory statement signed by a third party. In April Dubai Public Prosecution announced that it would no longer keep passports of residents or tourists charged with certain misdemeanors in exchange for bail, instead issuing an electronic travel ban. Law enforcement officials often held detainees’ passports. Authorities may deny pretrial release to defendants in cases involving loss of life, including involuntary manslaughter. Authorities released some prisoners detained on charges related to a person’s death after the prisoners completed “diya” (blood money) payments. Once an accused is found guilty of death under criminal procedure, judges may grant diya payments as compensation to the victim’s family in an amount determined to be in accordance with sharia.

A defendant is entitled to an attorney after authorities complete their investigation. Authorities sometimes questioned the accused for weeks without permitting access to an attorney. The government may provide counsel at its discretion to indigent defendants charged with felonies punishable by provisional imprisonment. The law requires the government to provide counsel in cases in which indigent defendants face punishments of life imprisonment or the death penalty.

Authorities held some persons incommunicado, particularly in cases involving state security.

Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports the government committed arrests without informing the individual of the charge, notably in cases of alleged violations of state security regulations. In these cases authorities did not give notice to the individual or to family members regarding the subject of the inquiry or arrest.

Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention occurred, especially in cases involving state security. The speed at which these cases were brought to trial increased, as it did the previous year, with a higher number of State Security Court acquittals and convictions in comparison with recent years. There was no estimate available of the percentage of the prison population in pretrial status. On December 31, the State Security Court at the Federal Supreme Court upheld a 10-year prison sentence and fine of one million dirhams ($272,000) issued in May against citizen and human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor. Mansoor spent more than a year in pretrial detention leading to the initial verdict. Mansoor was convicted under the cybercrime law for insulting the “status and prestige of the UAE and its symbols” and seeking to damage the country’s relationship with its neighbors by publishing false information on social media. According to human rights organizations, Mansoor was held in solitary confinement without access to lawyers and granted only a limited number of family visits pretrial.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: There were reports authorities sometimes delayed or limited an individual’s access to an attorney and did not give prompt court appearances or afford consular notification, both for the average prisoner and in state security cases. There were no reports of courts finding individuals to have been unlawfully detained and eligible for compensation. Diplomatic observers reported that this was a particular problem for foreign residents who were vulnerable to loss of job, home, and accrual of debt due to unlawful detention.

Osama al-Najjar, convicted in 2014 of making unlawful postings on social media and having links to al-Islah, an organization with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and designated by the government as a terrorist organization, was scheduled to be released in March 2017 after completing a three-year prison sentence and paying a 500,000 AED ($136,000) fine. The Federal Supreme Court, however, issued an order in 2017 to keep him in detention on grounds that he still represented a danger to society and required additional guidance; he remained imprisoned throughout the year.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, court decisions remained subject to review by the political leadership. Authorities often treated noncitizens differently from citizens. The judiciary consisted largely of contracted foreign nationals subject to potential deportation, further compromising its independence from the government.

A diplomatic observer reported that in Abu Dhabi a doctor, without receiving notification of a trial, was charged and convicted in his absence of criminal medical malpractice before police attempted arrest. The doctor was sentenced to one year in prison, ordered to pay 200,000 AED ($54,447) in diya or compensation to the victim’s family, and 300,000 AED ($81,670) in fines.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right.

The law presumes all defendants innocent until proven guilty. By law a defendant enjoys the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges. The law requires all court proceedings be conducted in Arabic. Despite the defendant’s procedural right to an interpreter, there were reports authorities did not always provide an interpreter or that quality was sometimes poor. In June the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department began issuing court summons in Arabic, English, and Urdu.

Defendants’ rights were circumscribed in national security cases or cases the judge deemed harmful to public morality. Defendants have the right to be present at their trials and have a right to legal counsel in court for cases that carry punishment other than a fine. While awaiting a decision on official charges at a police station or the prosecutor’s office, a defendant is not entitled to legal counsel. In cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment, the defendant has a right to government-provided counsel after charges have been filed. The government may also provide counsel, at its discretion, to indigent defendants charged with felonies punishable by provisional imprisonment. The law provides prosecutors discretion to bar defense counsel from any investigation. Defendants and their attorneys may present witnesses and question witnesses against them. Defendants may not to be compelled to testify or confess. Some defendants said they did not have adequate time to prepare a defense, sometimes due to limited phone access, and requested additional time. Diplomatic observers noted cases where the time defendants spent waiting for a court date surpassed the maximum sentence for the crime. Verdicts were announced in open court, even if the case was heard in a closed session.

Both local and federal courts have an appeals process; cases under local jurisdiction are appealed to the Court of Cassation and federal cases to the Federal Supreme Court. Dubai has its own Court of Cassation. With the additional exception of Ras al-Khaimah, appeals in all other emirates are heard before the Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi. Convicted defendants may also appeal death sentences to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed or to the president of the federation. In murder cases the victim’s family must consent to commute a death sentence. The government normally negotiated with victims’ families for the defendant to offer diya payment, compensation in accordance with sharia, in exchange for forgiveness and a commuted death sentence. The prosecutor may appeal acquittals and provide new or additional evidence to a higher court. An appellate court must reach unanimous agreement to overturn an acquittal.

In May Dubai Courts announced a judicial reform aimed at reducing overall trial duration and curbing jail overcrowding. Under the C3 Court initiative, Dubai’s courts of first instance, appeal, and cassation will all be integrated into one court with three departments, each with a judge.

State security cases are heard at the Federal Court of Appeal and may be appealed to the higher Federal Supreme Court.

On November 25, president Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan issued a pardon for British academic Matthew Hedges, who was released the following day and returned to the United Kingdom. Authorities arrested Hedges on May 5 at the Dubai airport on suspicion of spying for the UK government, and a court sentenced him to life in prison on November 21. Hedges said he was in the country doing academic research on the UAE security sector. Advocates for Hedges said he was not allowed access to a lawyer and was mistreated in detention. The government denied the allegations and stated he was treated in accordance with the law.

When authorities suspected a foreigner of crimes of “moral turpitude,” authorities sometimes deported the individual without recourse to the criminal justice system. At the judge’s discretion, foreigners charged with crimes may be permitted to defend themselves while on bail.

The penal code also requires all individuals to pay diya to victims’ families in cases where accidents or crimes caused the death of another person, and media reported multiple cases of courts imposing this punishment. Diya was granted by the judge in criminal cases at the time of sentencing. Standard diya for the death of a man was 200,000 AED ($54,500) and 100,000 AED ($27,225) for the death of a woman. In some cases sharia courts imposed more severe penalties during the month of Ramadan.

Women faced legal discrimination because of the government’s interpretation of sharia (see section 6).

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

During the year there were reports of persons held incommunicado and without charge because of their political views or affiliations, which often involved alleged links to Islamist organizations. Since 2011 the government has restricted the activities of organizations and individuals allegedly associated with al-Islah, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate and government-designated terrorist organization, and others critical of the government. Similar restrictions were placed on Osama al-Najjar (see section 1.d.).

As part of its security and counterterrorism efforts, the government issued or updated restrictive laws–such as the 2014 antiterrorism law and the 2012 cybercrimes law–and monitored and blocked activities, including the use of the internet and social media. Numerous observers criticized these laws as extending beyond security concerns by also outlawing activities and speech of a political nature.

In March security officers reportedly pulled over Loujain al-Hathloul, a Saudi women’s rights activist, while she was driving in Abu Dhabi. She was subsequently extradited to Saudi Arabia.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Citizens and noncitizens had access to the courts to seek damages for, or cessation of, human rights violations. The civil courts, like all courts, lacked full independence. In some cases courts delayed proceedings.

The constitution prohibits entry into a home without the owner’s permission, except when police present a lawful warrant. Officers’ actions in searching premises were subject to review by the Ministry of Interior, and officers were subject to disciplinary action if authorities judged their actions irresponsible.

The constitution provides for free and confidential correspondence by mail, telegram, and all other means of communication. There were reports, however, that the government monitored and in some cases censored incoming international mail, wiretapped telephones, and monitored outgoing mail and electronic forms of communication without following appropriate legal procedures. A 2016 study by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab reported that since 2012 local journalists, activists, and dissidents were targeted by sophisticated spyware attacks, which the researchers found may be linked to the government (see also section 2.a., Internet Freedom).

Local interpretation of sharia prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims and Muslim men from marrying women “not of the book,” generally meaning adherents of religions other than Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.

The country employs judicial supervision for individuals considered at risk from relatives threatening to commit honor crimes against or otherwise harming them. Judicial supervision typically included providing housing to individuals for their safety and well-being and family mediation and reconciliation.

In 2015 in response to a request from Yemeni president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi for Arab League/Gulf Cooperation Council military intervention, Saudi officials announced the formation of a coalition to counter the 2014 overthrow of the legitimate government in Yemen by militias of the Ansar Allah movement (also known colloquially as “Houthis”) and forces loyal to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Saudi-led Coalition, which also includes the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Senegal, conducted air and ground operations. UAE forces continued an active military role in Yemen, including conducting ground operations along the western coast and in and around Hudaydah city, and against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State in southern Yemen.

Killings: The UN, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), and some Yemeni sources voiced concerns about Coalition activities in Yemen, alleging some Saudi-led Coalition air strikes have been disproportionate or indiscriminate, and appeared not to sufficiently minimize impact on civilians.

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: The UN Panel of Experts, human rights organizations, and some press reports alleged that UAE and UAE-supported local Yemeni forces abducted, arbitrarily detained, and tortured individuals as part of counterterrorism efforts in southern Yemen. The UN Panel of Experts released a report in January stating that the UAE detained individuals in Yemen at possibly three centers in Yemen, which were “administered and supervised exclusively by the United Arab Emirates.” It also reported that UAE forces were responsible for torture, denial of timely medical treatment, denial of due process rights, and enforced disappearances of detainees. Detainees informed the panel that at the Bureiqa detention site, there was “[t]orture, including beatings, electrocution, constrained suspension, imprisonment in a metal cell (‘the cage’) in the sun and sexual violence. UAE soldiers and officials reportedly inflicted these abuses to obtain information or to punish individuals.”

In June the Associated Press (AP) published articles alleging that the UAE controlled secret prisons in Yemen, with Yemeni guards working under the direction of Emirati officers and prisoners being held without charge or trial. The AP alleged that those prisoners were subjected to sexual violence, electric shocks, and beatings. The AP alleged that at least five prisons used sexual torture against inmates, including electric shocks on prisoners’ genitals, hanging rocks from their testicles, and rape. The UAE government denied that it maintained any secret prisons in Yemen or that it tortured prisoners.

In August a UN Human Rights Council-mandated Group of Experts looking into the human rights situation in Yemen reported that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the Emirati, Saudi, and Yemeni governments were responsible for human rights violations in Yemen, including “unlawful deprivation of the right to life, arbitrary detention, rape, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and child recruitment, and serious violations of freedom of expression and economic, social and cultural rights.”

Other Conflict-related Abuse: In September international humanitarian organizations said Saudi and Emirati policy decisions in Yemen continued to hamper their ability to respond to the crisis, impede the import of necessary food and fuel, and slow the delivery of aid. The organizations cited examples, stating the coalition refused to grant multi-entry visas to international-NGO staff; interfered with staff access to project sites; continued insistence on extra inspections for shipments to Hudaydah port; and maintained the closure of the Sana’a airport.

For additional details see the Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights for Yemen.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

On March 4, according to British authorities, agents of Russian military intelligence spread the nerve agent Novichok on the front door of the home of former Russian military intelligence offer Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in an apparent attempt to kill him. Skripal and his daughter Yulia were hospitalized in serious condition but both ultimately survived. On June 30, Salisbury residents Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were hospitalized after accidentally coming in contact with a bottle of Novichok that the assassins had discarded. Sturgess died on July 8.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.

Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards but had serious problems.

Physical Conditions: The Annual Report for 2017-18 by the chief inspector of prisons for England and Wales released on July 11 documented “some of the most disturbing prison conditions we have ever seen,” and “conditions which have no place in an advanced nation in the 21st century.” Among 39 men’s prisons, safety outcomes had declined in 14 and improved in nine.

The Urgent Notification protocol allows Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons to alert directly the lord chancellor and secretary of state for justice if he or she has an urgent and significant concern about the performance of a prison. It was used for the first time in January with respect to Nottingham Prison. An inspection report at Liverpool Prison was considered so troubling that the parliamentary Justice Select Committee decided to carry out an investigation.

Regarding young individuals, the Annual Report notes, “For young adults aged 18-21 in young offenders’ institutions, the picture was particularly dire with 385 reporting they were unlocked for less than 2 hours each day.”

There were 291 deaths in male prisons in England and Wales in 2017-18, 33 fewer than in the previous year. These included 68 self-inflicted deaths; 165 deaths from natural causes; five apparent homicides; and 53 other deaths, 52 of which had not been classified.

Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentencing introduced in 2005 allows keeping serious offenders in prison indefinitely as long as the Parole Board believes they pose a threat to society. IPP was abolished in 2012 following a European Court of Human Rights ruling, but the abolition was not retroactive.

There are 13 publicly managed and two privately managed prisons in Scotland. The number of deaths in custody remained steady at 28 in 2017. In 2017-18 there were 94 serious prisoner-on-prisoner assaults, an increase from 74 the previous year, but minor assaults saw a slight reduction. The Scottish Prison Service has an ongoing building and refurbishment program to improve conditions. The women’s prison at Cornton Vale was a particular concern; overcrowding was a serious issue.

The Northern Ireland Prison Service Report for 2017-18 found that further measures were required to help prisoners with mental health conditions. Women do not have a separate facility from juveniles. According to the report, the ombudsperson began investigations into three deaths. Two of the deaths appeared to be suicides, with the other due to natural causes.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers. Every prison, immigration removal center, and some short-term holding facilities at airports have an independent monitoring board. Each board’s members are independent, and their role is to monitor day-to-day activity in the facility and to ensure proper standards of care and decency. Members have unrestricted access to the facility at any time and can talk to any prisoner or detainee they wish, out of sight and hearing of staff, if necessary.

In Northern Ireland, the position of prisoner ombudsman has been vacant since August 2017 due to a lack of a functioning government.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government routinely observed these requirements.

In Scotland guidelines that came into force in May 2017 allow police to stop and search persons only when police have “reasonable grounds.”

Except in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the national police maintained internal security and reported to the Home Office. The army, under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for external security and supports police in extreme cases. The National Crime Agency (NCA) investigates many serious crimes in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and it has a mandate to deal with organized, economic, and cybercrimes as well as border policing and child protection. The NCA director general has independent operational direction and control over the NCA’s activities and is accountable to the home secretary.

By law authorities must refer to the Independent Police Complaints Commission all deaths and serious injuries during or following police contact, including road traffic fatalities involving police, fatal police shootings, deaths in or following police custody, apparent suicides in or following police custody, and other deaths to which the action or inaction of police may have contributed.

In 2017, 23 persons died in or following police custody or contact, according to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The office also said that 17 individuals were subjected to the use of force or restraint “by the police or others” before they died, but the use of force or restraint “did not necessarily contribute to the deaths.”

Scotland’s judicial, legal, and law enforcement system is fully separate from that of the rest of the UK. Police Scotland reports to the Scottish justice minister and the state prosecutor. Police Scotland reports cross-border crime and threat information to the national UK police and responds to UK police needs in Scotland upon request.

Northern Ireland also maintains a separate police force, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The PSNI reports to the Northern Ireland Policing Board, a nondepartmental public body composed of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and independent members of the community. The chair of the Independent Police Monitoring Board said in March 2018 that he is concerned about the lack of oversight for the PSNI in the continued absence of a functioning government in Northern Ireland.

The Bermuda Police Service (BPS) is responsible for internal security on the island. The BPS reports to the governor appointed by the UK but is funded by the elected government of the island.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.

Nationally there is a functioning bail system, but defendants awaiting trial judged to be flight risks, likely to commit another offense, suspected terrorists, or in certain other limited circumstances may be denied bail.

If questioned at a police station, all suspects have the right to legal representation, including counsel provided by the government if they are indigent. Police may not question suspects who request legal advice until a lawyer is present. Detainees may make telephone calls. The maximum length of pretrial detention is 182 days. The court may extend pretrial detention in exceptional cases. Suspects were not held incommunicado or under house arrest. Authorities routinely respected these rights.

In Gibraltar the Committee for the Prevention of Torture found that, while the right of access to a lawyer is adequately enshrined in law, a lawyer was only accessible at the detainee’s own expense.

In Scotland police may detain a subject for no more than 24 hours. After an initial detention period of 12 hours, a police custody officer may authorize further detention for an additional 12 hours without authorization from the court, if the officer believes it necessary. Only a judge can issue a warrant for arrest if he or she believes there is enough evidence against a suspect. A suspect must be informed immediately of allegations against him or her and be advised promptly of the charges if there is sufficient evidence to proceed. Police may not detain a person more than once for the same offense. Depending on the nature of the crime, a suspect should be released from custody if he or she is deemed not to present a risk. There is a functioning bail system.

In Bermuda a court must issue a warrant for arrest. The law permits arrests without warrant only in certain conditions. When a police officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that any offense, that is not an arrest-able offense, has been or is being committed or attempted, they may arrest the relevant person if it appears that service of a summons is impracticable. No arrests or detentions can be made arbitrarily or secretly, and the detainee must be told the reason for his or her arrest immediately. Individuals may be detained initially for six hours, and for two further periods of up to nine hours each subject to review and justification.

There is a functioning system of bail in Bermuda. A detainee has an immediate right of access to a lawyer, either through a personal meeting or by telephone. Free legal advice is provided for detainees. Police must inform the arrestee of his or her rights to communication with a friend, family member, or other person identified by the detainee. The police superintendent may authorize incommunicado detention for serious crimes such as terrorism. House arrest and wearing an electronic monitoring device may be a condition of bail.

Formal complaints about arrests in Bermuda can be made to an independent criminal compensation board, the police complaints authority, the Human Rights Commission, or a court.

The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government respected judicial independence and impartiality.

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary routinely enforced this right. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, and the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges, with free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals. Criminal proceedings must be held without undue delay and be open to the public except for cases in juvenile court or those involving public decency or security. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial. Under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.

Defendants have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice or to have one provided at public expense if unable to pay. Defendants and their lawyers have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense and free assistance of an interpreter if necessary. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them, present witnesses and evidence, and not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants have the right to appeal adverse verdicts.

In Bermuda the law requires a defendant to declare to the prosecutor and the court within 28 days of his arraignment whether he intends to give evidence at his trial. Failure to do so permits the court to direct the jury to draw inferences from the defendant’s refusal to testify.

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

Nationally, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and groups of individuals may seek civil remedies for human rights violations and have the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights decisions involving alleged violations by the government of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In Bermuda the Human Rights Tribunal adjudicates complaints.

The UK complies with the goals of the 2009 Terezin Declaration and 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices. The government has laws and mechanisms in place, and NGOs and advocacy groups reported that the government made significant progress on resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens.

The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.

In contrast with 2017, there were no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during the year against Uruguayan peacekeeping personnel. In 2017 an allegation of transactional sex was made against eight Uruguayan troops serving as UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After an investigation the case was found to be unsubstantiated due to insufficient evidence and was subsequently closed. The Ministry of Defense established a protocol on Conduct Related to Reports of Abuse, Sexual Exploitation, and Paternity, and peacekeepers are required to pass a course on human rights and gender issues prior to deployment.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions continued to be poor and inhuman in some facilities due to overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, inadequate socioeducational programming, and high levels of violence among inmates.

Physical Conditions: In November the prisons held 10,243 inmates, compared with 10,735 in 2017. The average prison population density (total number of inmates per spaces available) was 103 percent in 2017, with 18 of the 29 prisons surpassing 100 percent; however, two prisons were above 200 percent capacity. Parliament’s special rapporteur on the prison system reported overcrowding affected sections of prisons in several of the 19 departments (provinces). The special rapporteur stated 30 percent of inmates suffered from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and that 30 percent of inmates experienced insufficient conditions for social reintegration. The worst prison conditions were in units with high overpopulation rates and the largest overall prison populations. The National Human Rights Institute (INDDHH) reported prisoners sometimes spent 23 hours of the day in their cells, specifically naming Unit 4 and Unit 13. Certain prisons had a lack of hygiene, insufficient access to water, insufficient food and poor quality of food, and very few socioeducational and labor activities. Inmates were sometimes exposed to electrical, sanitary, and other risks due to poor infrastructure.

In its annual report, the INDDHH reported a lack of medical care in prisons, especially in Unit 13 and Unit 26. Medical services were available only for emergencies and did not always include preventive care and routine medical care. The lack of prison personnel limited the ability of inmates to have outside medical appointments. Mental health services were not adequately available to tend to the population that required attention, monitoring, and treatment. Administrative delays sometimes affected the issuance of medications.

The INDDHH and the special rapporteur reported high levels of institutional and interpersonal violence in many prisons. Of 47 prisoner deaths in 2017, 17 were due to prisoner-on-prisoner violence; 10 prisoner deaths were suicides. Overpopulation, isolation, and a lack of socioeducational activities led to high risk of violence. Shortages in personnel and basic elements of control, such as security cameras, made prevention, control, and the clarification of facts in security incidents difficult. Shortages of prison staff to securely transport and accompany inmates affected prisoners’ ability to participate in workshops, classes, sports, and labor-related activities.

The situation for female inmates, who made up 5 percent of the prison population, varied around the country. Children accompanying their mothers in prison lived in facilities with problems such as poor planning and design, security concerns due to a lack of prisoner classification, health and environmental concerns, a lack of specialized services and facilities, and undefined and unclear policies for special-needs inmates. In some cases pregnant women were not given house arrest as an option due to bureaucratic obstacles. Women were located in some of the worst parts of prisons, leading to difficulties in access to food, intimate spaces, and visits with family members as well as difficulties obtaining information and technical and human resources.

Some juvenile offenders were imprisoned at age 17 and remained in prison for up to five years. According to the INDDHH, the prison situation for some adolescents violated human rights, due to verbal and physical abuse by officials. Prisons increased educational services but they remained insufficient, with only three to four hours per week for inmates. Security constraints at prison facilities often interfered with or altogether eliminated educational, recreational, and social activities for juvenile inmates. In some cases socioeducational programs were scarce, fragile, or replaced with confinement.

Juvenile facilities had deficiencies in physical conditions, including sites with crumbling infrastructure and prisons that were not designed or conducive to rehabilitation activities. The INDDHH specifically pointed to the Center for Intake, Study, Diagnostics, and Referrals and the Belloni Complex as prison centers with serious infrastructure problems. In response to recommendations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the National Institute for Adolescent Social Inclusion closed the intake center in September. High turnover of staff and leadership in the juvenile prison system, as well as a lack of trained and specialized staff, were causes for concern.

In April the INDDHH reported an abuse case at a juvenile prison facility. The INDDHH issued a habeas corpus petition for a 16-year-old male inmate in a grave medical state and without access to the necessary services. The INDDHH and the government-funded University of the Republic intervened, citing violations of the rights to health, individual security, and physical integrity. The juvenile inmate was then transferred to a medical facility for treatment.

Detention centers suffered from poor lighting, ventilation, and hygiene. Centers had inadequate or incomplete records related to the rights and guarantees of detainees. Detention centers lacked basic supplies for detainees, including personal hygiene articles, food, warm clothing, and potable water.

Administration: Independent authorities conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers, local human rights groups, media, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and international bodies. Parliament’s special rapporteur on the prison system and the INDDHH were also allowed to monitor prisons.

Improvements: The National Institute for Rehabilitation (INR) improved intake and monitoring procedures, including establishing an intake form, carrying out an initial entry interview, and starting files to track the activities and progress of individual inmates. The INR also developed and distributed clear guidelines on inmate treatment, education goals, and rehabilitation and looked into reports of mistreatment or irregularities.

The INR began providing specialized attention to vulnerable prison populations, including inmates who were disabled or transgender, or who committed sexual crimes. The special rapporteur indicated that the Center for Penitentiary Training was an innovative, best practice model for prison reform, responding with creativity and sensitivity to prison management problems and incorporating human rights principles. Model prisons, such as Unit 6, Unit 10, Unit 18, Unit 28, and Unit 20, served as positive examples for the corrections system.

The law and constitution prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The National Police, under the Ministry of Interior, maintain internal security. The National Directorate for Migration, also under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for migration and border enforcement. The armed forces, under the Ministry of National Defense, are responsible for external security and have some domestic responsibilities as guardians of the outside perimeter of six prisons. As of October the law authorized the armed forces to patrol the country’s borders and support agencies that worked along the borders. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the National Police, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.

During the year the country hosted a regional training course for national investigation officers to familiarize participants with the processes, procedures, and techniques to improve the effectiveness of conduct and discipline investigations in UN peacekeeping.

The judiciary continued to investigate human rights violations committed during the 1973-85 military dictatorship, which the law classifies as crimes against humanity.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Police apprehended suspects with warrants issued by a duly authorized official and brought them before an independent judiciary. Arrests may be made without a judge’s order when persons are caught in the commission of a crime. The law provides detainees with the right to a prompt judicial determination of the legality of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain the legal grounds for the detention. For a detainee who cannot afford a defense attorney, the court appoints a public defender at no cost to the detainee. The apprehended suspect must be brought before a judge within 24 hours. If no charges are brought, the case is closed, but the investigation may continue and the case reopened if new evidence emerges.

The possibility of bail exists but is an unusual and little-developed procedure and was seldom used. Most persons facing lesser charges were not jailed. Officials allowed detainees prompt access to family members. Confessions obtained by police prior to a detainee’s appearance before a judge and without an attorney present are not valid. A prosecutor leads the investigation of a detainee’s claim of mistreatment.

Pretrial Detention: The new criminal procedure code reduced the problem of lengthy pretrial detention, since cases were processed with greater speed. According to the special rapporteur, in late 2017, 69 percent of inmates had not been sentenced for a crime and were subject to lengthy pretrial detentions. By October that figure had decreased to 47 percent. All criminal cases originating before January were processed under the old criminal code and remained subject to long periods of pretrial detention. After judicial reforms to the new criminal procedure code, pretrial detention was limited to cases of recidivism, risk of flight, grave crimes, or if an individual poses a risk to society. Prosecutors were required to request pretrial detention, and a judge determined whether to grant it in each case. The INDDHH reported that an individual’s presumption of innocence was undermined by the fact that pretrial detention was linked to previous crimes and recidivism.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the executive branch of the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. If judicial officials received threats from organized crime groups, the government assigned police protection to them.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Defendants have the right to a presumption of innocence and to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges brought against them. In addition they have the right to a trial without undue delay; to be present at their trial; to communicate with an attorney of their choice, or have one provided at public expense if they are unable to afford one; to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; to receive free assistance of an interpreter; to not be compelled to testify or confess guilt; to confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses; to present one’s own witnesses and evidence; and to appeal. Juries are not used.

During the year the government transitioned from an inquisitorial system to an accusatory system of criminal justice to address inefficiency, opacity, and the overuse of pretrial detentions, as well as to establish a more fair and transparent judicial system that provides greater advocacy to victims. The Prosecutor General’s Office went from prosecuting approximately 400 cases per month in November 2017 to prosecuting more than 1,000 cases per month in August. Of the approximately 8,300 cases processed since the switch to the accusatory system through August, 79 percent went through alternative dispute resolution processes.

A few months after the new criminal procedure code legislation passed, the code was again reformed through legislation that amplified police discretion in the first moments of detention and in the investigations phase and suspended precautionary measures. These changes, according to the INDDHH, undermined human rights guarantees at the moment of detention relating to the right to liberty, right to due process, presumption of innocence, and use of pretrial detention. The second wave of changes to the criminal procedure code also limited the application of conditional release.

With revisions to the Children and Adolescents Code in late 2017, human rights monitoring agencies expressed concern that the changes reduced judicial guarantees for juvenile offenders. According to the INDDHH, the new law reduces medical checks and increases pretrial detention from 90 days to 150 days.

The government continued to train police, prosecutors, and judicial personnel. The government also carried out numerous interagency training sessions with support from civil society and international organizations to train legal and judicial officials on the new code.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

There are transparent administrative procedures to handle complaints of abuse by government agents. An independent and impartial judiciary handles civil disputes, but its decisions were sometimes ineffectively enforced. Local police lacked the training and staff to enforce restraining orders, which often were generated during civil disputes related to domestic violence. Cases involving violations of an individual’s human rights may be submitted through petitions filed by individuals or organizations to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which in turn may submit the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The court may order civil remedies including fair compensation to the individual injured.

The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of politically motivated long-term disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

In its 2018 annual report, the Geneva-based UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances noted it had seven outstanding cases from previous years. According to the working group, the government did not respond to the group’s latest request to visit the country, issued in January.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

While the constitution and law prohibit such practices, law enforcement and security officers routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions, incriminating information, or for corrupt financial gain. Sources reported that torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment occurred primarily in pretrial facilities, and local police and security service precincts for those arrested or detained on religious or extremism charges. Reported methods of abuse included harsh beatings, denial of food and the use of a toilet, and tying of hands. There were also continued reports that authorities exerted psychological pressure on detainees, including threats against family members and blackmail. Torture continued for members of faith communities organized outside of the state religion, including Muslims, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, according to members of the religious communities.

In 2010 the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern that the definition of torture in the criminal code did not conform to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the country is a party. In March 2017 the government approved rules governing the conduct of law enforcement officers and addressed torture. Article 8 of the updated Law on Police states, “employees of the internal affairs may not employ torture, violence, or other cruel or degrading treatments. The employee of the internal affairs is obliged to prevent intentional acts causing pain, physical or moral suffering to the citizen.” In November 2017 the law banned the use of evidence obtained by torture in court proceedings.

In April President Mirziyoyev signed an antitorture law, which increases liability for the use of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Prior to the adoption of the law, there were formal obstacles to the prosecution of persons involved in torture. These restrictions have been eliminated. According to human rights advocates, the torture law, while drafted without the participation of independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), addresses the ambiguities of the previous legislation with a concrete definition of torture as well as sentencing guidelines. In September 2017 Journalist Bobomurod Abdullayev was arrested by officers from the former National Security Service (NSS), renamed the State Security Service (SSS) in January) and charged with plotting to overthrow the government. Human rights monitors, including Human Rights Watch, noted the openness of his trial, which took place in Tashkent in May; nonetheless, human rights observers believed there was clear evidence Abdullaev was tortured by the security services. According to Abdullayev’s open court testimony, police investigators beat him, kept him naked in a freezing cell, and did not allow him to sit down or sleep for six days. On May 7, Abdullayev was released from custody. Following an investigation of Abdullayev’s case and a criminal trial, a Military Tribunal convicted Colonel Nodir Turakulov and, on October 25, sentenced the former deputy head of the National Security Service (now the State Security Service), who was reportedly involved in torture of Abdullayev, to 16 years in prison. Turakulov was tried in accordance with the antitorture law.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were in some circumstances harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.

Physical Conditions: Reports of overcrowding, severe abuse, and shortages of medicine were common. Inmates generally had access to potable water and food, but both reportedly were of poor quality, and visiting family members often brought provisions to detained family members. There were sporadic reports of prisoners of conscience held in cells without proper ventilation and subjected to temperatures below freezing in winter and more than 120 degrees Fahrenheit in summer; detention facilities, such as Jaslyk Prison, commonly lacked heat or air conditioning. Family members of inmates did not report any incidents of sexual abuse. Upon release, political prisoners reported to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and others of being beaten and otherwise tortured, including the use of stress positions, while in prison.

Prison administration officials reported an active World Health Organization tuberculosis program in the prisons and an HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention program. Visiting Centers for Disease Control and Prevention officials noted continued high rates of TB infection in the prison system. Government efforts to lower infection rates were largely unsuccessful due to poor compliance with treatment plans. Officials reported hepatitis was not present in high numbers and that hepatitis patients received treatment in existing medical facilities and programs. Reports of such treatment could not be verified independently access to such facilities was frequently denied.

Administration: There was no information available whether recordkeeping on prisoners was adequate. Authorities frequently used administrative measures such as bail, house arrest, and correctional work as alternatives to criminal sentences for nonviolent offenders. In addition, the criminal code mandates that courts may not sentence individuals to prison if he or she has paid a fine in full. The government usually respected these injunctions unless a case was considered politically sensitive.

The Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office and the Prosecutor General’s Office may investigate complaints from detainees and the public. The Ombudsman’s Office may make recommendations on behalf of specific prisoners, including changes to the sentences of nonviolent offenders to make them more appropriate to the offense. Family members of detained or released prisoners said their complaints to the ombudsman went unanswered or were referred to the original sentencing court for redress.

Prison officials allowed family members to visit prisoners for up to four hours two to four times per year. Relatives of prisoners held on religious or extremism charges reported occasional denial or delay of visitation rights. Officials also permitted longer visits of one to three days two to four times per year, depending on the type of prison facility, as well as overnight stays. Family members of political prisoners reported that officials frequently delayed or severely shortened visits arbitrarily.

The government stated prisoners have the right to practice any religion or no religion, but prisoners frequently complained to family members that they were not able to observe religious rituals conflicting with the prison’s schedule. Such rituals included traditional Islamic morning prayers. Authorities forbid prisoners to observe religious holidays such as Ramadan, with no fasting allowed. Although some prison libraries had copies of the Quran and the Bible, family members continued to complain that authorities did not allow prisoners access to religious materials.

According to official government procedures, prisoners have the right to “participate in religious worship and family relations, such as marriage.” “Close relatives” also have the right to receive oral and written information from prison officials regarding the health and disciplinary records of their family members. Families continued to report that the government provided limited to no information or withheld information contained in health and prison records.

Independent Monitoring: Independent observers had extremely limited access to some parts of the penitentiary system, including pretrial detention facilities, women’s prisons, and prison settlements. UNICEF regularly accessed the country’s four juvenile offenders’ colonies. The International Committee for the Red Cross has not visited detainees since 2013. In October 2017 the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed, visited Jaslyk, a maximum-security prison.

The constitution and the law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, but authorities continued to engage in such practices. During the year several prominent political prisoners were released from prison. Nonetheless, arbitrary arrest on political grounds continued amidst such releases.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The government authorizes three different entities to investigate criminal activity. The Ministry of Interior controls the police, who are responsible for law enforcement, maintenance of order, and the investigation of general crimes. The Prosecutor General’s Office investigates violent crimes such as homicide as well as corruption by officials and abuse of power. The State Security Service, headed by a chairman who reports directly to the president, deals with national security and intelligence issues including terrorism, corruption, organized crime, border control, and narcotics.

Impunity remained widespread, although the government was taking steps to address it. The Ministry of Interior investigates and disciplines those officers accused of human rights violations. The Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, affiliated with parliament, also has the power to investigate cases, although its decisions on such investigations have no binding authority.

The government did take steps to prosecute officials suspected of human rights abuses. According to Radio Freedom’s Uzbek Service, citing a law enforcement source, in June, five senior security officials in Bukhara region were convicted of torture and abuse of office and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Reportedly, a former chief of the NSS Directorate in Bukhara, Rustam Azimov, was convicted at a closed trial and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Four former associates of Azimov, including head of the NSS Anticorruption Department for Bukhara region Inam Marupov, deputy head of the Internal Security Division of the NSS in Bukhara Azim Yunusov, Special Interrogator Umid Bobomurodov, and deputy of the head of Bukhara Regional Tax Agency Rovshan Rajapov, were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 16 to 18 years. In addition, four former guards at a detention center in Bukhara were sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment each after being convicted on similar charges.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

By law a judge must review any decision to arrest accused individuals or suspects. Judges granted arrest warrants in most cases. Defendants have the right to legal counsel from the time of arrest. State-appointed attorneys are available for those who do not hire private counsel. Officials did not always respect the right to counsel and occasionally forced defendants to sign written statements declining the right. Authorities’ selective intimidation and disbarment of defense lawyers produced a chilling effect that also compromised political detainees’ access to legal counsel. The law authorizes the use of house arrest as a form of pretrial detention.

The law allows detainees to request hearings before a judge to determine whether the detainees remain incarcerated or may be released before trial. Authorities rarely granted these hearings. The arresting authority is required to notify a relative of a detainee of the detention and to question the detainee within 24 hours of arrest. There were complaints authorities tortured suspects before notifying either family members or attorneys of their arrest to gain confessions.

Suspects have the right to remain silent and must be informed of the right to counsel. Detention without formal charges is limited to 48 hours, although a prosecutor may request an additional 48 hours, after which the person must be charged or released. Authorities typically held suspects after the allowable period of detention, according to human rights advocates. After formal charges are filed, the prosecutor decides whether a suspect is released on bail (or on the guarantee of an individual or public organization acting as surety), stays in pretrial detention, or is kept under house arrest. The judge conducting the arrest hearing is allowed to sit on the panel of judges during the individual’s trial.

The law requires authorities at pretrial detention facilities to arrange a meeting between a detainee and a representative from the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office upon the detainee’s request. Officials allowed detainees in prison facilities to submit confidential complaints to the Ombudsman’s Office and the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Once authorities file charges, suspects may be held in pretrial detention for up to three months while investigations proceed. The law permits an extension of the investigation period for as much as one year at the discretion of the appropriate court upon a motion by the relevant prosecutor, who may also release a prisoner on bond pending trial. According to human rights advocates, authorities frequently ignored these legal protections. Those arrested and charged with a crime may be released without bail until trial on the condition they provide assurance of “proper behavior” and that they would appear at trial.

A decree requires that all defense attorneys pass a comprehensive relicensing examination. In past years several experienced and knowledgeable defense lawyers who had represented human rights activists and independent journalists lost their licenses after taking the relicensing examination or because of letters from the bar association under the control of the Ministry of Justice claiming that they violated professional ethical norms. As a result several activists and defendants faced difficulties in finding legal representation.

In July the Samarkand city criminal court reviewed and upheld the request of the regional Prosecutor’s Office to arrest Sanat Umarov, a Kattakurgan district police officer accused of abuse of power and using torture and other cruel treatment. Umarov and others allegedly forced a woman, who was detained on suspicion of theft, to strip naked. The Interior Ministry announced Umarov’s dismissal and a general “cleansing” of law enforcement bodies. Ombudsperson Ulugbek Mukhammadiyev called the incident “an outrageous case of inhumanity and degrading treatment to a woman and mother,” deserving “public censure and punishment under the law.”

Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities continued to arrest or detain persons arbitrarily on charges of extremist sentiments or activities and association with banned religious groups. Local human rights activists reported that police and security service officers frequently detained and mistreated family members and close associates of registered religious and banned religious groups. Allegations of coerced confessions and testimony in such cases were commonplace.

In June 2017 the government began to phase out the use of preventative watchlists, which contained the names of those convicted for religious crimes or crimes against the regime. Authorities compelled named individuals on the watchlist to submit to police for interrogation, denied issuance of passports and travel visas, and, in some cases, prohibited the purchase and use of smartphones. The government asserted it removes individuals from the “blacklist” after a government commission examines the offenders for suitability to reintegrate into society. According to the government, more than 16,000 individuals have been removed from this watchlist since 2017.

In 2017 President Mirziyoyev signed a decree authorizing the creation of a commission to review the prison profiles of convicts sentenced on charges of religious extremism. Based on the work of the commission, since 2017 the president pardoned more than 3,000 prisoners. During the year the president signed another decree establishing a commission to review the petitions of persons “who mistakenly became members of banned organizations.” The commission has the power to exonerate citizens from all criminal liability.

Based on a resolution adopted by the Cabinet on March 22, the Tashtyurma detention center was closed. Tashtyurma Prison, officially known as Detention Center No. 1 and built in 1891, was the oldest in the country, and, according to human rights defenders, it was dilapidated and substandard. In January its former inmates were moved to a newly built jail in the Zangiota district outside the capital.

Pretrial Detention: Prosecutors generally exercised discretion regarding most aspects of criminal procedures, including pretrial detention. Detainees had no access to a court to challenge the length or validity of pretrial detention, despite the right to do so granted by law. Even when authorities did not file charges, police and prosecutors frequently sought to evade restrictions on the length of time persons could be held without charges by holding them as witnesses rather than as suspects. Human rights defenders noted incidents where security personnel used pretrial detention from one to three months without formal charges or a court hearing. The government did not provide information regarding the number of persons held in pretrial detention centers.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: By law detainees or former detainees are able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court. Appeals are sometimes open to the public by request of the applicant. New evidence is rarely heard. Appeal courts generally review previous trial records and ask applicants to declare for the record their innocence or guilt. Appeals rarely resulted in the courts overturning their original decisions.

Amnesty: Authorities annually grant amnesty and release individuals imprisoned for religious extremism or political grounds. For example, in February journalist Dilmurod Saidov was released after eight years in jail for conviction of alleged charges of extortion. Additionally, in March civil society activist Gaybullo Jalilov was released. Jalilov, who was sentenced in 2009 on security related charges and for membership in an unregistered religious organization, consistently maintained his innocence. In 2013 the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Arrest and Detention called for Jalilov’s release. Also in March, journalist Gayrat Mikhliboev and activists Yuldash Rasulov, Chuyan Mamatkulov, and Kudrat Rasulov were released. More than 16 other prisoners of conscience were released during the year. In May the Committee for the Protection of Journalists reported the country’s prisons were free of journalists for the first time in more than two decades. According to Human Rights Watch, since September 2016 Uzbek authorities have released approximately 40 persons imprisoned on politically motivated charges.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, there were some instances in which the judiciary did not operate with complete independence and impartiality. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, members of the judiciary reportedly rendered verdicts desired by the Prosecutor General’s Office or other law enforcement bodies. This was due in part to a shortage of judges and high caseloads, which the government was moving to address by increasing the number of law students.

Under amended Articles 63, 63-1, and 63-2, which came into effect in April 2017, judges are appointed by the newly established Supreme Judicial Council, subject to concurrence by the Senate. “Lifetime” appointments became possible, “a judge shall be appointed or elected in accordance with the established procedure for an initial five-year term, a regular 10-year term and a subsequent indefinite period of tenure.”

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The criminal code specifies a presumption of innocence. Most trials were officially open to the public, although access was sometimes restricted. Judges may close trials in exceptional cases, such as those involving state secrets or to protect victims and witnesses. Judges generally permitted international observers at proceedings without requiring written permission from the Supreme Court or court chairmen, but judges or other officials arbitrarily closed some proceedings to observers, even in civil cases. Authorities generally announced trials only one or two days before they began, and hearings were frequently postponed.

A panel of one professional judge and two lay assessors, selected by committees of worker collectives or neighborhood committees, generally presided over trials. Lay judges rarely speak, and the professional judge usually accepts the prosecutors’ recommendations on procedural rulings and sentencing.

Defendants have the right to attend court proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence, but judges declined defense motions to summon additional witnesses or to enter evidence supporting the defendant into the record. While the overwhelming majority of criminal cases brought to trial resulted in guilty verdicts, the number of acquittals has risen. From 2011 to 2016, there were just seven acquittals, according to the Supreme Court. In 2017 there were 162 acquittals out of 59,135 criminal court cases. By contrast, as of September, the country’s courts acquitted 569 individuals. The number of acquittals has risen in recent years due to criminal justice reforms that include greater transparency in court procedures and broader access for defense teams to prosecutorial evidence.

Defendants have the right to hire an attorney although some human rights activists encountered difficulties finding legal representation. The government provided legal counsel and interpreters without charge when necessary. According to credible reports, state-appointed defense attorneys routinely acted in the interest of the government rather than of their clients because of their reliance on the state for a livelihood and fear of possible recrimination.

By law a prosecutor must request an arrest order from a court, and courts rarely denied such requests. Prosecutors have considerable power after obtaining an arrest order: they direct investigations, prepare criminal cases, recommend sentences to judges, and may appeal court decisions, including sentences. After formal charges are filed, the prosecutor decides whether a suspect is released on bail, stays in pretrial detention, or is kept under house arrest. Although the criminal code specifies a presumption of innocence, a prosecutor’s recommendations generally prevailed. If a judge’s sentence does not correspond with the prosecutor’s recommendation, the prosecutor may appeal the sentence to a higher court. Judges often based their verdicts solely on confessions and witness testimony, which authorities allegedly were thought to extract through abuse, threats to family members, or other means of coercion. This was especially common in religious extremism cases. Lawyers may, and occasionally did, call on judges to reject confessions and investigate claims of torture.

Following the president’s December 2017 decree prohibiting the use of evidence derived from torture, judges increasingly responded to claims of torture. In September Jahongir Umarov, a businessman who was earlier sentenced to five years in prison for conviction of drug abuse, was released after he claimed in court proceedings that he was tortured by security service personnel into providing a false confession. A court-ordered examination revealed a rib fracture from physical abuse.

In September the government introduced live coverage of court hearings. Online translation services allow the real time monitoring of court hearings in Uzbek and Russian, including for mobile phone users. Legal protections against double jeopardy were not applied.

The law provides a right of appeal to defendants, but appeals rarely resulted in reversals of convictions. In some cases, however, appeals resulted in reduced or suspended sentences.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

International and domestic human rights organizations estimated that authorities held hundreds of prisoners on political grounds. The government allows limited access to such persons by human rights or humanitarian organizations such as the Tashkent-based independent human rights organization Ezgulik. According to Human Rights Watch and the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, Uzbekistan continued to release prisoners of conscience during the year, which resulted in no imprisoned journalists or civil society activists for the first time in more than two decades. Also according to Human Rights Watch, since September 2016 Uzbek authorities have released approximately 40 persons imprisoned on politically motivated charges; however, many others are still being held. The exact number of political prisoners has not been determined.

According to numerous former political prisoners, the government provides released prisoners with material compensation upon parole. Such compensation includes travel expenses to one’s place of residence, health benefits, and the issuance of a passport, which is the primary form of identification in the country. Upon release, convicts sign a document acknowledging they understand the terms of their parole. This typically includes a prohibition on travel abroad for up to one year. Several former prisoners reported that authorities levied a fine against them as a condition of their parole. Failure to abide by the terms of payment may result in the termination of parole. One former prisoner, for example, was reportedly required to pay 20 percent of his monthly salary to the government for 18 months following his release.

HRW reported that “though Uzbek authorities have amnestied some political prisoners and released others early, in some cases such prisoners were unable to obtain materials necessary to appeal their unlawful convictions.” In May, Samandar Kukanov, a former member of parliament released in November 2016 after a 23-year sentence that human rights organizations claimed was the result of peaceful opposition activity, filed an appeal with the Tashkent Regional Court to review his criminal conviction. According to HRW, in September, Kukanov received a letter from the court informing him that in April the “materials of his criminal case” had been “destroyed in accordance with established procedure” by the Tashkent Region State Archive and thus his requests for “full rehabilitation” could not be reviewed.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Citizens may file suit in civil courts for alleged human rights violations by officials, excluding investigators, prosecutors, and judges. There were reports that bribes to judges influenced civil court decisions.

Although the constitution and law forbid arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, authorities did not respect these prohibitions. The law requires that prosecutors approve requests for search warrants for electronic surveillance, but there is no provision for judicial review of such warrants.

There were reports that police and other security forces entered the homes of human rights activists and members of religious groups without a warrant. According to Forum 18, a Norwegian NGO that reports on religious freedom, members of Baptist, Protestant, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other minority churches holding worship services in private homes reported that armed security officers raided services and detained and fined church members for religious activity deemed illegal. Among such incidents were raids in Fergana in February, in Karakalpakstan in July and in Chust in August. Baptist congregants reported home intrusions by authorities even when they gathered to celebrate important occasions such as birthdays. They also reported harassment and interference by authorities when publicly reading the Bible.

Human rights activists and political opposition figures generally assumed that security agencies covertly monitored their telephone calls and activities.

The government continued to use an estimated 12,000 neighborhood (mahalla) committees as a source of information on potential “extremists.” The committees provided various social support functions, but they also functioned as an informational link from local society to government and law enforcement. Mahallas in rural areas tended to be more influential than those in cities.

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits such practices, and there were no reports government officials employed them.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions in prisons created harsh conditions. A media report in May described eight men sleeping in a cell measuring approximately four feet by 20 feet and unhygienic conditions.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits by media and independent human rights observers. Representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross, judges from the Supreme Court, and contractors of the New Zealand Correctional Services visited the prisons.

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Vanuatu Police Force (VPF), with approximately 600 officers, maintains internal security, and the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), a paramilitary police unit, makes up the country’s defense force. The commissioner of police heads the police force.

Civilian authorities did not always have effective mechanisms to punish police abuse or corruption but exercised overall control of the force. Allegations of police impunity, particularly in the VMF, continued. Political instability and a series of legal cases in previous years exacerbated divisions between the VMF and VPF and undermined policing capacity. These political and legal battles continued, and in September the police commissioner was suspended because of “administrative issues.” As of October an acting interim commissioner was in place.

The law mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints of security force abuses. Additionally, the police Professional Standards Unit (PSU) investigates allegations of ethics violations and misuse of force, and may also prosecute cases in court. As of October the PSU had received 50 complaints, nearly half the number of complaints received in previous years. Of those 50, 34 were dealt with internally, and 16 were referred to the court.

In January the minister for internal affairs suspended Ephraim Kalorib, a senior police officer allegedly involved in an assault on the husband of a government official. Kalorib was also charged under the law.

Foreign assistance designed to address some of the problems confronting the security forces continued. Under the Vanuatu-Australia Police Project, the number of Australian Federal Police advisers working full time with the VPF increased from three to four.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

A warrant issued by a court is required for an arrest, although police made a small number of arrests without warrants. Authorities generally observed the constitutional provision to inform suspects of the charges against them.

The law outlines the process for remanding alleged offenders in custody. To remand a person in custody requires a valid written warrant from a magistrate or a Supreme Court justice. Warrants typically are valid for 14 days in the first instance, and the court may extend them in writing. In general the Correctional Services Department’s practice was not to accept any detainee into custody without a valid warrant. A system of bail operated effectively, although some persons not granted bail spent lengthy periods in pretrial detention due to judicial inefficiency. Authorities allow detainees prompt access to counsel and family members. The Public Defender’s Office provides free legal counsel to indigent defendants, defined as those who earn less than 50,000 vatu ($445) per year.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detainees constituted approximately one-quarter of the prison population. Judges, prosecutors, and police complained about large case backlogs due to a lack of resources and limited numbers of qualified judges and prosecutors. The average length of time spent in remand before a case went to trial was approximately 12 weeks, although it could be longer in the outer islands.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. The judicial system derives from British common law. Judges conduct trials and render verdicts. The courts uphold constitutional provisions for a presumption of innocence, a prohibition against double jeopardy, a right to counsel, a right to free assistance of an interpreter, a right to question witnesses, a right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt, a right to be present, and a right of appeal. The constitution also states that if the accused does not understand the language used in court proceedings, an interpreter must be provided. The law extends these rights to all defendants.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

There is an independent and impartial judiciary for civil matters, including for human rights violations. The government, including police, generally complied with court decisions on human rights violations. Reports continued that police sometimes did not promptly enforce court orders related to domestic violence (see section 6, Women).

The constitution prohibits such actions, and there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.

Although the government did not release statistics on extrajudicial killings, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported national, state, and municipal police entities, as well as the armed forces and government-supported colectivos, carried out such killings during the year.

There was also no official information available on the number of public officials prosecuted or sentenced to prison for involvement in extrajudicial killings, which, in the case of killings committed by police, were often classified as “resistance to authority.” The NGO Committee for the Families of Victims of February-March 1989 (COFAVIC) continued to report there was no publicly accessible national registry of reported cases of extrajudicial killings.

On January 15, approximately 400 government security forces, including the National Guard (GNB), Special Actions Force (FAES), Venezuelan National Police (PNB), National Antiextortion and Kidnapping Command, and Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), raided a home in El Junquito, a residential community less than an hour from the nation’s capital, and killed seven persons, including Oscar Perez, a former officer in the National Police Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Corps (CICPC). Perez, according to government reports, had stolen a military airplane and dropped four hand grenades at a government building in July without causing structural damage or injury. According to information presented in the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) June report on human rights violations in the country, “[a]lthough the group had initiated negotiations with commanders of the GNB to surrender, officers received counterorders from the Strategic Operational Command to use lethal force and execute all members of the group once they had been subdued.” Perez had released a series of videos on social media during the siege in which the group’s negotiations with security forces could be heard. Death certificates revealed all seven individuals were shot in the head and killed. Many local NGOs termed the raid a massacre.

According to investigative journalists, 147 individuals younger than age 20 were killed in the Caracas metropolitan area between January and August. Of those deaths, 65 were committed by police. FAES, a specialized CICPC unit created by President Maduro in 2017 to quash “terrorist gangs” participating in large-scale countrywide protests, continued to be one of the deadliest. Between May and November 2017, FAES committed 31 percent of homicides by security forces. FAES tactics resembled the government’s nationwide anticrime strategy begun in 2015, the Operation for the Liberation and Protection of the People (OLP), which was characterized by large-scale raids conducted by hundreds of government security agents in neighborhoods allegedly harboring criminals. NGOs reported that during OLP operations, officials committed grave human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, blackmail, torture, and destruction of property.

There were no developments in the cases of protesters killed in 2017. Government and NGO sources estimated at least 125 persons were killed in protests from April through July 2017. The Public Ministry reported 65 percent were victims of government repression. The NGO Foro Penal put the number at 75 percent, with colectivos responsible for half the deaths and the remainder divided between PNB and GNB forces. The NGO Venezuelan Program for Human Rights Action and Education (PROVEA) estimated that 83 percent of regime victims died from gunshot wounds. On numerous occasions security forces also used nonlethal ammunition at close range, severely injuring and in some cases killing protesters. Following the four months of antiregime protests, in September 2017 the government appointed a new attorney general, Tarek William Saab, who reopened investigations conducted during his predecessor’s tenure to undo the previous findings that held government security forces and colectivos responsible for widespread, violent repression.

According to NGOs, prosecutors occasionally brought cases against perpetrators of extrajudicial killings, but prosecutions often resulted in light sentences, and convictions were often overturned on appeal.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits such practices, there were credible reports that security forces tortured and abused detainees. There were no reports of any government officials being charged under the law.

The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman did not publish statistics regarding allegations of torture by police during the year. Several NGOs detailed cases of widespread torture and “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.” Human rights groups reported the government continued to influence the attorney general and public defenders to conduct investigations selectively and subjectively. No data was available on investigations, prosecutions, or convictions in cases of alleged torture. Foro Penal maintained that hundreds of cases were not reported to government institutions because victims feared reprisal.

Press and NGO reports of beatings and humiliating treatment of suspects during arrests were common and involved various law enforcement agencies and the military. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners were reported during the year. Cruel treatment frequently involved authorities denying prisoners medical care and holding them for long periods in solitary confinement. The latter practice was most prevalent with political prisoners. NGOs also published reports that authorities generally mistreated, sexually abused, and threatened to kill detainees.

NGOs detailed reports from detainees whom authorities allegedly sexually abused, threatened with death, and forced to spend hours on their knees in detention centers. Foro Penal reported multiple instances of political prisoners denied adequate medical treatment while in government custody. Foro Penal noted instances in which authorities transferred detainees to a medical facility, where instead of receiving treatment, detainees were interrogated by security officials. The executive director of the Casla Institute for the Study of Latin America, Tamara Suju, and human rights lawyer Juan Carlos Gutierrez denounced 357 cases of physical abuse, alleged torture, and violence by security forces against political prisoners before the International Criminal Court. Among the 357 cases, there were 190 allegations of rape or sexual abuse.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Most prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding, food shortages, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, systemic violence, and poor infrastructure. Armed gangs effectively controlled some prisons in which they were incarcerated. Conditions were most acute in pretrial detention facilities such as police station jails.

Physical Conditions: The Ministry of Penitentiary Services reported there were 51,693 inmates in the country’s 41 prisons and penitentiaries and an estimated 33,000 inmates in police station jails in 2017. NGOs reported records for detainees were not properly maintained and often contained incomplete information. According to the NGO A Window to Liberty (UVL), the capacity was approximately 19,000 inmates for penitentiaries and 5,000 for police station jails. Overcrowding was 172 percent for penitentiaries and 415 percent for police station jails on average, although the NGO Venezuelan Observatory for Prisons (OVP) noted that in some jails the overcrowding ranged from 800 to 1,200 percent.

There were two women’s prisons, one in Miranda State and the other in Zulia State. The law stipulates women in mixed prisons must be held in annexes or separate women’s blocks. A local NGO reported that in practice male and female prisoners intermingled. Security forces and law enforcement authorities often held minors together with adults, even though separate facilities existed. Because institutions were filled beyond capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions were confined in juvenile detention centers, where they were reportedly crowded into small, unsanitary cells.

The CICPC and police station jails and detention centers also were overcrowded, causing many police station offices to be converted into makeshift prison cells. Prisoners reportedly took turns sleeping on floors and in office chairs, and sanitation facilities were inadequate or nonexistent. A 2017 UVL study of 89 facilities holding pretrial detainees revealed 432 percent overcrowding. According to the study, more than 80 percent of facilities provided no medical services, recreational areas, designated visiting areas, or laundry facilities. More than 60 percent did not have potable water, and more than 50 percent did not have regular trash collection or proper restrooms.

The GNB and the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace have responsibility for prisons’ exterior and interior security, respectively. The government failed to provide adequate prison security. The OVP estimated a staffing gap of 90 percent for prison security personnel, with only one guard for every 100 inmates, instead of one for every 10 as recommended by international standards. The OVP reported 173 prisoner deaths and 268 serious injuries in 2016, the most recent year for which information was available. The OVP assessed that 90 percent of prison deaths were violent, resulting from prisoner-on-prisoner altercations, riots, and fires. The OVP reported some inmates also succumbed to the generally unsanitary and unsafe conditions prevalent in prisons. During the March 2017 renovation of Guarico State’s central prison, the construction team discovered 14 bodies in a shallow grave. The case remained under investigation at year’s end but highlighted uncertainty over the true number of annual prison deaths.

During the year prison and detention center riots resulted in inmate deaths and injuries. For example, on March 28, a fire erupted in an overcrowded police station in Valencia, Carabobo State, killing 66 male prisoners and two female visitors; more than 100 persons received burns in the fire. Media reported that after an argument with a guard, a group of prisoners lit their bed linens on fire. Many NGOs called the fire a massacre, noting some prisoners died from the fire itself, while others died of physical trauma or gunshot wounds.

A 2016 law limiting cell phone and internet availability inside prisons to prevent inmates from using the technology to engage in criminal activity remained unimplemented. Minister of Penitentiary Affairs Iris Varela admitted communicating with inmates by cell phone immediately before and during the 2017 Puente Ayala prison riot. There were credible reports that Varela may have had a hand in directing the violence, including her own admission to that effect during a media interview.

The UVL reported authorities required family members to provide food for prisoners at police station jails throughout the country due to inadequate provisioning of food by the prison administration. According to a UVL report, in 2017 at least 28 inmates died from complications associated with malnutrition and preventable disease such as tuberculosis. The OVP reported that due to inadequate nutrition plans and lack of potable water, stomach illnesses were common among inmates.

On February 24, Vista Hermosa prison inmate Alejandro Manuel Mago Coraspe was admitted into a local Bolivar state hospital after he fell ill, apparently from eating poisoned rodents. Vista Hermosa prisoners customarily ate wild birds and rodents to survive, according to Mago Coraspe. After undergoing surgery, he explained to journalists that he customarily killed and cooked rats but had most recently eaten rats he found in the prison garbage that were potentially poisoned. According to reports from Mago Coraspe’s family, prison guards beat him severely upon his return to the prison, allegedly for having spoken to media members. According to media reports, a judge ordered Mago Coraspe to serve out the remainder of his sentence under house arrest. Prison authorities disregarded the order, and Mago Coraspe died in prison on April 24.

The government restricted information regarding deaths in prisons from tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases or from lack of medical care. A study by the NGO Solidarity Action found prison rules regarding the classification of inmates resulted in the isolation of those with HIV/AIDS in “inadequate spaces without food and medical attention.” The OVP reported a generalized lack of medical care, drugs, equipment, and physicians for prisoners. Inmates often received the same pills regardless of their symptoms, and pregnant women lacked adequate facilities for their medical attention.

Administration: The Ministry of Penitentiary Services did not respond to requests from the OVP, UVL, other human rights organizations, inmates, or families regarding inmates or investigations of the harsh conditions that led to hunger strikes or violent uprisings.

Prisoners and detainees generally had access to visitors, including some with overnight privileges, but in some cases prison officials harassed or abused visitors. Prison officials imposed significant restrictions on visits to political prisoners. When allowed access, visitors were at times subjected to strip searches.

Independent Monitoring: Human rights observers continued to experience lengthy delays and restrictions in gaining access to prisons and detention centers. Authorities had not approved requests by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit penitentiary centers and interview inmates in confidentiality since 2013. More than 300 lay members from the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church volunteered in 40 prisons. Although prohibited from formally entering prisons, Catholic laity visited prisoners on family visitation days.

The constitution prohibits the arrest or detention of an individual without a judicial order and provides for the accused to remain free while being tried, but judges and prosecutors often disregarded these provisions. The law provides for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but the government generally did not observe this requirement. While NGOs such as Foro Penal, COFAVIC, the Institute for Press and Society, Espacio Publico, and PROVEA noted at least 2,000 open cases of arbitrary detentions, authorities rarely granted them formal means to present their petitions. Authorities arbitrarily detained individuals, including foreign citizens, for extended periods without criminal charges.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The GNB–a branch of the military that reports to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace–is responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key government installations and prisons, conducting counternarcotics operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas. The Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace controls the CICPC, which conducts most criminal investigations, and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), which collects intelligence within the country and abroad, and is responsible for investigating cases of corruption, subversion, and arms trafficking. SEBIN maintained its own detention facilities separate from those of the Ministry of Penitentiary Services. Police include municipal, state, and national police forces. Mayors and governors oversee municipal and state police forces. The PNB reports to the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace. According to its website, the PNB largely focused on policing Caracas’s Libertador municipality; patrolling Caracas-area highways, railways, and metro system; and protecting diplomatic missions. The PNB maintained a minimal presence in seven of the country’s 23 states.

Corruption, inadequate police training and equipment, and insufficient central government funding, particularly for police forces in states and municipalities governed by opposition officials, reduced the effectiveness of the security forces. There were continued reports of police abuse and involvement in crime, including illegal and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and the excessive use of force.

Impunity remained a serious problem in the security forces. The Public Ministry is responsible for initiating judicial investigations of security force abuses. The Office of Fundamental Rights in the Public Ministry is responsible for investigating cases involving crimes committed by public officials, particularly security officials.

According to the Public Ministry’s 2016 annual report (the most recent one available), the Office of Fundamental Rights cited 13,343 specific actions taken to “process claims” against police authorities for human rights abuses and charged 320 with violations. Neither the Attorney General’s Office nor the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman provided information regarding alleged human rights violations committed by police and military personnel.

State and municipal governments also investigated their respective police forces. By law the national, state, and municipal police forces have a police corps disciplinary council that takes action against security officials who commit abuses. The National Assembly also may investigate security force abuses.

The government at both the local and national levels took few actions to sanction officers involved in abuses. According to the NGO Network of Support for Justice and Peace, the lack of sufficient prosecutors made it difficult to prosecute police and military officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses. In addition NGOs reported the following problems contributed to an ineffective judicial system: long procedural delays, poor court administration and organization, lack of transparency in investigations, and impunity of government officials. In June 2017 Human Rights Watch reported the then attorney general Luisa Ortega Diaz had opened investigations in more than 600 cases of injury caused during the protests that began in April 2017. In at least 10 cases, her office charged security forces with unlawful killings of demonstrators or bystanders. After her removal, her successor did not pursue the cases.

NGOs and police noted that many victims did not report violent crimes to police or other authorities due to fear of retribution or lack of confidence in the police and that the actual occurrence was likely far higher than what was reported.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

While a warrant is required for an arrest, detention is permitted without an arrest warrant when an individual is apprehended in the act of committing a crime or to secure a suspect or witness during an investigation. Police often detained individuals without a warrant. The law mandates that detainees be brought before a prosecutor within 12 hours and before a judge within 48 hours to determine the legality of the detention; the law also requires that detainees be informed promptly of the charges against them. Authorities routinely ignored these requirements.

Although the law provides for bail, it is not available for certain crimes. Bail also may be denied if a person is apprehended in the act of committing a crime or if a judge determines the accused may flee or impede the investigation. The law allows detainees access to counsel and family members, but that requirement was often not met, particularly for political prisoners. The constitution also provides any detained individual the right to immediate communication with family members and lawyers who, in turn, have the right to know a detainee’s whereabouts. A person accused of a crime may not be detained for longer than the possible minimum sentence for that crime or for longer than two years, whichever is shorter, except in certain circumstances, such as when the defendant is responsible for the delay in the proceedings.

Arbitrary Arrest: Foro Penal reported 498 cases of arbitrary detention between January 1 and November 15, compared with 5,462 protest-related cases of arbitrary detention from April through December 2017. Opposition politicians and human rights NGOs attributed the reduction largely to a significant decrease in large-scale protests following National Constituent Assembly (ANC) elections in July 2017.

Caracas municipal councilmember Fernando Alban died on October 8 while in SEBIN custody. SEBIN officials had arrested Alban upon his return from a foreign trip on October 5 and held him in detention as a suspect in the August 4 drone attack believed to have been a presidential assassination attempt. Attorney General Tarek William Saab reported via social media and press statements that Alban jumped from a 10th-floor bathroom window, while Minister of Interior Nestor Reverol stated Alban jumped from a 10th-floor waiting room. NGOs and members of the opposition denounced these conflicting stories and alleged Alban was murdered.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention remained an egregious problem. According to the OVP, approximately 79 percent of the prison population was in pretrial detention. According to the Public Ministry, in 2016 only 21 percent of trials concluded or reached sentencing. The NGO Citizen Observatory of the Penal Justice System attributed trial delays to the shortage of prosecutors and penal judges (4.7 penal judges per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010, the latest date for which information was available).

Despite constitutional protections that provide for timely trials, judges reportedly scheduled initial hearings months after the events giving rise to the cause of action. An automated scheduling system was ineffective at streamlining case logistics. Proceedings were often deferred or suspended when an officer of the court, such as the prosecutor, public defender, or judge, failed to attend.

According to the Public Ministry’s 2015 annual report (the most recent available), the ministry pressed charges in 9.7 percent of the 556,000 cases involving common crimes. The ministry reported the closure of the remainder of the complaints but did not indicate final outcomes. Prisoners reported to NGOs that a lack of transportation and disorganization in the prison system reduced their access to the courts and contributed to trial delays.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Detained individuals may challenge the grounds for their detention, but proceedings were often delayed and hearings postponed, stretching trials for years. Courts frequently disregarded defendants’ presumption of innocence. Authorities often failed to allow detainees to consult with counsel or access their case records when filing challenges. Some detainees remained on probation or under house arrest indefinitely.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary lacked independence and generally judged in favor of the government at all levels. There were credible allegations of corruption and political influence throughout the judiciary. According to reports from the International Commission of Jurists, 66 to 80 percent of all judges had provisional appointments and were subject to removal at will by the TSJ Judicial Committee. Provisional and temporary judges, who legally have the same rights and authorities as permanent judges, allegedly were subjected to political influence from various ministries and the newly appointed attorney general to make progovernment determinations. There was a general lack of transparency and stability in the assignments of district attorneys to cases and a lack of technical criteria for assigning district attorneys to criminal investigations. These deficiencies hindered the possibility of bringing offenders to justice and resulted in a 90 percent rate of impunity for common crimes and a higher percentage of impunity for cases of alleged human rights violations.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial with oral proceedings for all individuals. By law defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty. The law requires that detainees be informed promptly of the charges against them, but the requirement was often ignored and, even when respected, involved dubious allegations, according to human rights organizations. Defendants have the right to consult with an attorney. According to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, there were approximately 1,500 public defenders in 2017, but indigent defendants’ right to free counsel was often not respected because of attorney shortages. Free interpretation was often not available to defendants. Some NGOs provided pro bono counsel to defendants.

Defendants may request no fewer than 30 days and no more than 45 days to prepare their defense. Defendants have the right to question adverse witnesses and present their own witnesses. By law defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants and plaintiffs have the right of appeal.

Trial delays were common. Trials “in absentia” are permitted in certain circumstances, although opponents of the procedure claimed the constitution prohibits such trials. The law also states that, in the absence of the defense attorney, a trial may proceed with a public defender that the court designates. The law gives judges the discretion to hold trials behind closed doors if a public trial could “disturb the normal development of the trial.”

At the January 31 hearing of Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni, the judge did not set a date for the next phase of her trial, when it was expected a verdict would be announced. Afiuni was accused of corruption and abuse of authority for her 2009 decision conditionally to release a businessman who had been held in pretrial detention beyond the maximum time prescribed by law. Afiuni continued to be subjected to protective measures in place since her release to house arrest in 2011 that mandate she may not leave the country, talk to media, or use social media, although the law states such measures may not last more than two years.

The law mandates that municipal courts handle “less serious” crimes, i.e., those carrying maximum penalties of imprisonment of less than eight years. Municipal courts may levy penalties that include three to eight months of community service. Besides diverting some “less serious” crimes to the municipal courts, this diversion also permits individuals accused of “lesser crimes” to ask the courts to suspend their trials conditionally in exchange for their admission of responsibility, commitment to provide restitution “in a material or symbolic form,” community service, or any other condition imposed by the court.

The law provides that trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses after 1999 be held in civilian rather than military courts. In addition, under the Organic Code of Military Justice, an individual may be tried in the military justice system for “insulting, offending, or disparaging the national armed forces or any related entities.” NGOs and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed concern with the government’s practice of trying civilians under the military justice system for protests and other actions not under military jurisdiction. According to Foro Penal, military courts processed at least 35 civilians between January 1 and August 1.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

The government used the judiciary to intimidate and selectively prosecute individuals critical of government policies or actions. The regime reportedly continued the policy it began in 2012 of denying the ICRC access to prisons. Foro Penal reported 286 political prisoners in government custody as of November 18, down from 676 political prisoners reported at the height of 2017’s wave of political protests but well above averages recorded in 2015 and 2016. The government routinely held political prisoners in SEBIN installations or the Ramo Verde military prison without an explanation of why they were not being held in civilian detention facilities.

On June 2, the government provisionally released opposition coalition leader Roberto Picon and former San Cristobal mayor Daniel Ceballos. The two, like many others released immediately following the May 20 elections, were prohibited from leaving the country or speaking to media, and they were required to appear before a judge on a monthly basis. Ceballos was released from the Ramo Verde military detention facility, where prison authorities routinely held him in solitary confinement and denied him visitation. Picon was released from house arrest, which the government granted in December 2017, as part of a larger “good will” pardon. According to media reports and NGO representatives, SEBIN arrested Picon in June 2017 without an arrest warrant. At a military hearing on charges of rebellion and theft of items belonging to the military, NGO representatives claimed the prosecution entered evidence that included a paperweight and a reference to the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

The government increased its attack against civil liberties after an alleged failed presidential assassination attempt on August 4. On August 7, masked men abducted National Assembly Deputy Juan Requesens from his home during a nationally televised presidential address in which Maduro accused Requesens of involvement in the alleged August 4 attack. On August 9, the government released a video of a disheveled Requesens admitting he had information on one of the assassination plotters. On August 10, a second video appeared on social media showing Requesens, visibly weak and naked aside from his notably soiled underwear. Despite daily requests from his lawyer and family members, government authorities granted Requesens only two visits–September 21 and October 7–following his detention on August 7. According to reports, Requesens was held in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day. As of December 6, his detention conditions had improved slightly under new SEBIN leadership. Nevertheless, Requesens was not receiving medical attention in a timely fashion, and due process had yet to be afforded in his case.

As of October 1, jailed opposition party leader and former Chacao municipality mayor Leopoldo Lopez remained under house arrest and barred from communicating with individuals outside his home.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

While there are separate civil courts that permit citizens to bring lawsuits seeking damages, there are no procedures for individuals or organizations to seek civil remedies for human rights violations.

The constitution provides for the inviolability of the home and personal privacy, but the government generally did not respect these prohibitions. In some cases government authorities searched homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization, seized property without due process, or interfered in personal communications. FAES and other security forces regularly conducted indiscriminate household raids.

There were multiple reports indicating officials or other agents under the command of the Ministry of Public Security or provincial public security departments committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including reports of at least 11 deaths implicating police officers on duty. In most cases authorities either provided little information on investigations into the deaths or stated the deaths were the result of suicide or medical problems. Authorities sometimes harassed and intimidated families who questioned the police determination of cause of death. In a small number of cases, the government held police officials responsible, typically several years after the death. Despite guidance from the Supreme People’s Court to charge police officers responsible for causing deaths in custody with murder, such officers typically faced lesser charges. Family members of individuals who died in police custody reported harassment and abuse by local authorities.

On August 2, Hua Hoang Anh died after local police officers in Chau Thanh district, Kien Giang Province, interrogated him concerning his participation in mass demonstrations in June against a draft law on Special Administrative Economic Zones (SAEZ) and a new cybersecurity law. Social media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that there were many injuries to his body, including to his head, neck, and belly, possibly indicating torture. State-run media only stated that he died.

In some cases the government held security officers responsible for arbitrary deprivation of life. On September 13, a court in Ninh Thuan Province sentenced five former police officers to between three and seven years in prison on charges of “use of corporal punishment” for beating a drug user to death in the police station in 2017. The court also banned these police officers from holding any law enforcement positions for one to three years after finishing their jail terms.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits physical abuse of detainees, but suspects commonly reported mistreatment and torture by police, plainclothes security officials, and compulsory drug-detention center personnel during arrest, interrogation, and detention. Police, prosecutors, and government oversight agencies seldom conducted investigations of specific reports of mistreatment. Some activists reported receiving death threats from plainclothes individuals they said were associated with the government.

On August 12, over 200 individuals receiving treatment at a drug treatment center in Tien Giang Province broke out of the center, according to state-run media. The individuals said they were forced to work eight hours per day without compensation and were subject to punishment, including beatings, if they “misbehaved.”

Police and plainclothes authorities routinely mistreated, harassed, and assaulted activists and those involved in demonstrating against the government; for example in June Ho Chi Minh City police beat and detained some 180 individuals at a stadium related to anti-SEAZ and cybersecurity law demonstrations. There were also numerous reports of police mistreatment and assaults against individuals who were not activists or involved in politics. On March 1, Nguyen Cong Chi was hospitalized with a brain injury after going to the local police station in Chu Puh district, Gia Lai Province, the day before for a traffic violation. Chi’s family accused local police of beating him; they denied the accusation and said they were looking into the case.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions varied substantially by prison and province. In most cases they were austere but generally not life threatening. Insufficient diet and unclean food, overcrowding, lack of access to potable water, and poor sanitation remained serious problems. Prison officials singled out political prisoners for harsher treatment and often held them in small groups separate from the general inmate population, and subjected them to extreme harassment from both prison authorities and other inmates.

Physical Conditions: Authorities generally held men and women separately, with some reported exceptions in local detention centers. Although authorities generally held juveniles in prison separately from adults, on rare occasions authorities reportedly held juveniles in detention with adults for short periods. Authorities sometimes kept children in prison with their mothers until age three, according to a former political prisoner.

In March 2017 the Ministry of Public Security released a five-year review of its execution of criminal judgements covering 2011-16, the most recent period for which such information was available. The report acknowledged lack of quality infrastructure and overcrowded detention centers were ongoing challenges. The report stated the average floor space was 5.44 square feet per prisoner compared with the standard requirement of 6.6 square feet per prisoner.

As of November at least 11 deaths of persons in custody were reported; many were presumed to have been the result of abuse. On August 24, Hoang Tuan Long died in Ha Dong hospital approximately a week after local police in Tho Quan ward, Dong Da district, Hanoi held him in custody for drug-related allegations. Authorities conducted an autopsy and found that he suffered multiple injuries, including a hole in the head and four broken ribs. Local police said he committed suicide by chewing his own tongue; the family said they believed police beat him.

Former political prisoners reported that police beat individuals in custody with books to prevent visible bruising. Prison officials failed to prevent prisoner-on-prisoner violence and in some cases encouraged prisoners to physically assault and harass political prisoners. In late July political prisoner Tran Thi Nga reported that a fellow inmate at Gia Trung detention facility, Gia Lai Province, had severely beat her. On November 18 prison officials allowed her partner to visit for the first time in two years, but they denied visits by her two minor children.

Activist Le Dinh Luong’s family said he was held for one year in solitary confinement at the Nghe An Provincial Detention Center in Nghe An province with no access to sunlight prior to his August conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison for “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.”

Some former and existing political prisoners and their families reported prisoners received insufficient, poor quality food. Former prisoners reported they received only two small bowls of rice and vegetables daily, often mixed with foreign matter such as insects or stones. Family members continued to make credible claims prisoners received extra food or other preferential treatment by paying bribes to prison officials. Prisoners had access to basic health care, although there were instances of officials preventing family members from providing medication and of prison clinics not reviewing predetention health records of prisoners. Family members of many imprisoned activists who were or became ill claimed medical treatment was inadequate and resulted in long-term health complications. Tran Thi Xuan’s health deteriorated after her transfer in October to Thanh Hoa Detention Facility No. 5, according to her family, who said she suffered from edema related to a kidney disease.

Authorities placed prisoners in solitary confinement for standard periods of three months, although officials often subjected political prisoners to more extended periods of solitary confinement. An American citizen imprisoned for a nonpolitical charge reported he was only allowed out of his cell for five minutes per day during a continuous 39-month period except to meet with consular officials.

Prison authorities reportedly also placed some transgender individuals in solitary confinement due to confusion regarding whether to place them with men or women. Ministry of Public Security officials sometimes prohibited reading and writing materials. In January the Law on Temporary Detention and Custody came into effect, which transferred authority for approving such materials for those in temporary detention to the “agency handling the case” (i.e. the courts) rather than the prison authorities. Pham Van Troi said he was not able to receive reading materials at the B14 detention facility in Hanoi after the new law came into effect. Prison authorities said they were working to address implementation gaps and acknowledged that the law provides prisoners the right to receive gifts, books, newspapers, and documents.

Prison authorities often held political prisoners far from their homes, making family visits difficult and routinely did not inform family members of prison transfers. On July 5, Truong Minh Duc was transferred to Detention Facility No. 6 in Thanh Chuong district, Nghe An Province, 870 miles from his home in Ho Chi Minh City. On November 18, Nguyen Viet Dung’s father went to Nghi Kim prison in Nghe An Province to visit Dung who was serving a six-year prison term. Prison authorities informed him then that Dung had been transferred to Nam Ha prison in Ha Nam Province.

Administration: There was no active system of prison ombudsmen with whom prisoners could file complaints, but the law provides for oversight of the execution of criminal judgments by the National Assembly, people’s councils, and the CPV’s Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), an umbrella group that oversees the country’s government-sponsored social organizations. Tran Huynh Duy Thuc reported he was not permitted to send a petition to government officials asking that he be released because under the new penal code the crime he was convicted of is only punishable by five years’ imprisonment. Thuc had served nine years of his 16-year sentence for “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.”

Authorities limited prisoners to one family visit of no longer than an hour per month and generally permitted family members to provide various items, including money, supplemental food, and bedding to prisoners. Political prisoners and their family members reported that prison authorities at times revoked, denied, or delayed visitation rights and did not allow them provide items to family members. Imprisoned Pastor Nguyen Trung Ton’s family said prison authorities at Gia Trung detention center in Gia Lai routinely required additional procedures and paperwork to approve what should be routine prison visits with family as provided for by law.

In July and August respectively, political prisoners Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh and Tran Huynh Duy Thuc conducted lengthy hunger strikes to protest prison conditions. Thuc, whose hunger strike lasted 34 days, told family members that authorities at the Number 6 detention facility in Nghe An province also restricted the number of letters he could send after some of his letters from jail were publicized on Facebook.

While government-sanctioned Vietnam Buddhist Sangha monks were able to visit prisoners according to state-run media, Roman Catholic democracy activist Ho Duc Hoa said he was repeatedly denied a visit by a priest for confession. Prison authorities at the Nam Ha detention facility in Ha Nam Province said they did not have a chapel and therefore could not facilitate such a visit.

Family members of prisoners and former prisoners reported certain prison authorities did not permit prisoners to have religious texts in detention, despite provisions in the law for access to such materials. Ho Duc Hoa said he had access to a Bible and “Pure” Hoa Hao Buddhist Bui Van Trung Tham was allowed to have a censored version of the “Pure” Hoa Hao Buddhist scripture, according to an NGO.

Independent Monitoring: Local and regional International Committee of the Red Cross officials neither requested nor carried out prison visits during the year. Diplomatic representatives conducted supervised visits to several political prisoners at both temporary and long-term detention facilities. The visits were monitored and did not afford the opportunity for independent assessment of the prisoners or prison conditions.

The constitution states that a decision by a court or prosecutor is required for the arrest of any individual, except in the case of a “flagrant offense.” The law allows the government to arrest and detain persons “until the investigation finishes” for particularly serious crimes, including national security cases. Those detained may question the legality of their detention with the body responsible, but officials denied this right to political prisoners.

According to an NGO, between June and September authorities imprisoned 14 activists for social media posts and charged three for “abusing democratic freedom” and three with “making, storing, and spreading information, materials, and items for the purpose of opposing the state.” Authorities routinely subjected activists and suspected criminals to de facto house arrest without charge.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for internal security and controls the national police, a special national security investigative agency, and other internal security units. The Bureau of Investigation of the Supreme People’s Procuracy (national-level public prosecutor’s office) examines allegations of abuse by security forces. The ministry had a substantial voice in national policymaking; three of the 17 members of the Politburo were actual or former Ministry of Public Security officials.

People’s committees (the executive branch of local governments) had substantial authority over police forces and prosecutors at the provincial, district, and local levels. Provincial and local police often had, consequently, significant independence in their activities.

Although the Supreme People’s Procuracy had authority to investigate security force abuse, police organizations operated with little legal restraint or transparency, and no public oversight. Police officers sometimes acted with impunity. At the commune level, guard forces composed of residents or members of government-affiliated social organizations commonly assisted police and sometimes committed human rights abuses.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

In January a number of criminal laws including the 2015 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), 2015 Penal Code, and 2015 Law on Custody and Detention went into effect.

The new CPC introduced adversarial elements into civil and criminal trial proceedings. The CPC also provides a full chapter on the roles and responsibilities of defense attorneys, which includes attorneys’ right of access to evidence and access to the accused at the time of arrest.

Activists reported Ministry of Public Security officials assaulted political prisoners to exact confessions or used other means to induce written confessions, including instructing fellow prisoners to assault them or making promises of better treatment. Some activists also reported routine police interrogations to obtain incriminating information concerning other human rights activists.

By law police usually need a warrant issued by the People’s Procuracy to arrest a suspect, although in some cases a decision from a court (different from the procuracy) is required. There were numerous instances where activists were taken into custody by plainclothes individuals without an arrest warrant. The new CPC allows police to “hold an individual” without a warrant in “urgent circumstances,” such as when evidence existed that a person was preparing to commit a crime or when police caught a person in the act of committing a crime. Police may hold a suspect for 72 hours without an arrest warrant. In such cases the People’s Procuracy must approve or disapprove the arrest within 12 hours of receiving notice from police.

Police frequently used excessive force when making an arrest. There were cases where plainclothes individuals attempted to instigate an altercation in order to arrest an individual. On April 1, plainclothes officers arrested former political prisoner Vu Van Hung on the street near his house after he attended an unsanctioned meeting. Two plainclothes officers reportedly followed him from the meeting and beat Hung when he resisted their attempts to arrest him. Hung was ultimately charged and convicted of “deliberately inflicting injuries against others.”

The People’s Procuracy must issue a decision to initiate a formal criminal investigation of a detainee within three days of arrest; otherwise, police must release the suspect. The law allows the People’s Procuracy to request two additional three-day extensions allowing for an extension of the custody time limit to a maximum of nine days.

The new criminal code reduces the time limit for detention while under investigation, including for “serious” and “particularly serious” crimes. For the latter an individual may be held for 20 months. The law, however, allows the Supreme People’s Procuracy to detain an individual “until the investigation finishes” in cases of “particularly serious crimes,” including national security cases. The government in some cases exceeded these limits for both activists and those accused of other crimes. On October 5, Luu Van Vinh, Phan Trung, and Nguyen Van Duc Do were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms after being held in pretrial detention for almost two years. Consistent with a pattern of increasingly lengthy sentences for human rights activists, Luu Van Vinh received a 15-year sentence for conviction of “conducting activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration”.

During the period of detention, authorities may deny family visits, which they routinely did for those arrested under national security and related articles such as “disrupting public order.”

The law allows for bail as a measure to replace temporary detention, but authorities seldom granted bail. Investigators, prosecutors, or courts may allow the depositing of money or valuable property in exchange for bail.

The law requires authorities to inform persons held in custody, accused of a crime, or charged with a crime, of their legal rights, including the right to an attorney. The law provides for legal aid services for persons younger than age 18, those with disabilities, or to those accused of a capital crime.

The law affords detainees access to counsel from the time of their detention, but authorities continued to use bureaucratic delays to deny timely access to legal counsel. In many cases authorities only permitted attorneys access to their clients or the evidence against them immediately before the case went to trial, denying them adequate time to prepare their cases.

In cases investigated under national security laws, the government has and routinely used authority to prohibit access by defense lawyers to clients until after officials complete an investigation and formally charge the suspect with a crime.

Authorities did not allow Le Dinh Luong to meet with his lawyer until July, approximately a year after his arrest. On August 18, a court in Nghe An Province sentenced Luong to 20 years in prison, consistent with a pattern of increasingly lengthy sentences for human rights activists.

Suspects routinely were not brought promptly before a judicial officer. Before a formal indictment, detainees have the right to notify family members. Although police generally informed families of detainees’ whereabouts, the Ministry of Public Security held a number of blogger and activist detainees suspected of national security violations incommunicado. On September 2, blogger Ngo Van Dung disappeared; his family did not receive informal confirmation of his whereabouts until mid-October. As of November the whereabouts of more than a dozen other bloggers taken into custody across the country at the same time remained unknown.

Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly for political activists and individuals protesting land seizures or other injustices, remained a serious problem.

During the year security officers abducted activist Pham Doan Trang and questioned her for multiple times. On February 24, security officers took her from her house to the Security Investigation Agency of Ministry of Public Security, interrogating her for hours regarding her book titled “Politics for the Masses”.

Authorities subjected many religious and political activists to varying degrees of arbitrary detention in their residences, in vehicles, at local police stations, at “social protection centers,” or at local government offices. Officials also frequently detained human rights activists upon their return from overseas trips.

The government arrested numerous individuals for expressing political views or protesting economic conditions, including dozens arrested in June in the aftermath of nationwide demonstrations against a draft special administrative economic zone and the new cybersecurity law. Authorities said three of those were arrested for “abusing freedoms and democratic rights to infringe upon the State’s interests or lawful rights and interests of organizations or individuals,” which carries a sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment; two others were arrested for “producing, storing, spreading or disseminating information, documents or objects to oppose the State,” which carries a sentence of up to 20 years’ imprisonment; and one was arrested for “intentionally inflicting injury to or causing harm to the health of other persons.”

Taken into custody on September 2 for comments made on Facebook, activist Doan Thi Hong remained in detention without charge at year’s end; friends say she disappeared after dropping off her toddler with a friend. Her family had no information concerning her whereabouts for several weeks, but they eventually located her in Binh Thanh Ward, Ho Chi Minh City; they have not been allowed to meet with her.

Pretrial Detention: The allowable time for temporary detention during an investigation, equivalent to pretrial detention, varies depending on the offense: three months for less serious offenses, 16 months for the most serious cases, and 20 months for “especially serious” crimes. These limits were exceeded with impunity, including for cases not involving activists. Police and prosecutors used these lengthy periods of pretrial detention to punish or to pressure human rights defenders to confess to crimes, activists said. By law authorities must provide justification for detention beyond the initial four months, but there were reports that court officials routinely ignored the legal requirement of providing such justification.

Lengthy pretrial detention was not limited to activists. The Ho Chi Minh City People’s Procuracy reported that as of May 2017, 452 persons had been in custody for more than 12 months without trial and police had detained seven persons past the maximum period allowed by law. The Ho Chi Minh City’s People’s Procuracy attributed the delays to disagreements among the police investigation agency, the People’s Court, and the People’s Procuracy on whether to charge detainees under criminal or civil codes.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Persons arrested or detained may request that the agency responsible review the decision. If a decision is deemed improper by that body, the individual may be eligible for appropriate compensation.

The law provides for an independent judiciary and lay assessors, but the judiciary was effectively under the control of the CPV, exercised through the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). During the year there were credible reports that political influence, endemic corruption, bribery, and inefficiency strongly distorted the judicial system. Most if not all judges were members of the CPV and underwent screening by the CPV and local officials during their selection process to determine their suitability for the bench. Judges are reappointed every five years, following review by party officials. The party’s authority was particularly notable in high-profile cases and other instances in which authorities charged a person with corruption, challenging or harming the party or state, or both. Defense lawyers routinely complained that, in many cases, it appeared judges made a determination of guilt prior to the trial.

There continued to be credible reports that authorities pressured defense lawyers not to take religious or democracy activists as clients and questioned their motivations for so doing. Authorities also restricted, harassed, and disbarred, human rights attorneys who represented political activists. While the new penal code maintained the requirement for attorneys to violate attorney client privilege in cases relating to “national security,” or other “serious crimes,” it did away with such requirements for other, less “serious” offenses.

On March 12, the Ho Chi Minh City bar association disbarred lawyer Pham Cong Ut, who frequently defended human rights activists and “victims of injustice,” in many cases at no charge. The bar association said he had violated its code of ethics. State media accused him of failing to fully refund a legal consulting fee, while social media stated that such claims were spurious and the disbarment was instead related to his defense of “victims of injustice.”

By law authorities must request the local bar association, legal aid center, or the VFF appoint an attorney for criminal cases involving juveniles, individuals with mental or physical disabilities, and persons formally charged with capital crimes. In many such cases, however, authorities did not provide attorneys access to their clients until immediately before the case went to trial, depriving them of adequate time to prepare cases. In August authorities informed lawyer Nguyen Kha Thanh of the appeal trial of his client, Nguyen Viet Dung, only 24 hours in advance. Thanh said he did not have sufficient time to travel to attend the trial, and the court denied his request for a delay. Dung was not represented by an attorney. The court upheld his conviction for “conducting propaganda against the state” but reduced his seven-year sentence by one year.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

While the constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, this right was not evenly enforced. The law states that defendants are innocent until proven guilty. Defendants have the right to prompt, detailed information of the charges levied against them, but defendants rarely experienced such treatment. Defendants have the right to a timely trial, and public trials generally were open to the public, but in sensitive cases, judges closed trials or strictly limited attendance.

Authorities generally upheld the rights of defendants to be present at their trial. The court sometimes denied the suspect the right to his/her own choice of attorney and assigned one. The new CPC modified the courtroom setting to have defendants seated adjacent their defense attorney. Defendants have the right to communicate with a lawyer at trial for a criminal charge that could result in a 15-year or longer sentence, although not necessarily with the lawyer of their choice.

Although the defense has the right to cross-examine witnesses, there were multiple instances in which neither defendants nor their lawyers knew which witnesses would be called, nor were they allowed to cross-examine witnesses or challenge statements against them. In political trials neither defendants nor their attorneys were allowed to examine or review evidence relied upon by the prosecution. A defendant has the right to present a defense, but the law does not expressly state that the defendant has the right to call witnesses. Judges presiding over politically sensitive trials often did not permit defense lawyers and defendants to exercise their legal rights.

Police and prosecutors attempted to coerce confessions by offering lighter sentences in some sensitive cases. On January 31, Vu Quang Thuan stated at trial that investigators told him while he was in pretrial detention that he would receive only 16 months in prison if he cooperated with the investigation. He was charged with antistate propaganda, convicted, and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

The law stipulates that the spoken and written language of criminal proceedings is Vietnamese, but the state provides interpretation if participants in a criminal procedure use another spoken or written language. The law did not specify whether such services are free of charge.

The court uses an inquisitorial system, in which the judge plays the primary role of asking questions and ascertaining facts in a trial. Authorities permitted foreign diplomats to observe via closed circuit television four high-profile cases and one regular criminal trial during the year, including three involving individuals charged under national security articles. In most of those trials, defense attorneys were given time to address the court and question their clients, but they were not permitted to call official witnesses or examine evidence used to prosecute the defendants. The Hanoi appellate court permitted a defendant to answer only questions posed by his attorneys rather than the judges. In other cases involving individuals charged under national security articles, judges occasionally silenced defense lawyers who were making arguments on behalf of their clients in court. Convicted persons have the right to at least one appeal.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

According to Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other NGOs, more than 100 persons were in prison in the country for political or religious reasons in 2018. One NGO stated that as of September 22, courts had convicted 36 “activists and bloggers” for exercising internationally recognized human rights, including freedom of expression and association.

Between April 4 and September 12, courts sentenced nine members of the Brotherhood for Democracy to lengthy prison terms for “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.” Nguyen Trung Truc and Pastor Nguyen Trung Ton both received 12-year sentences, and land and religious freedom activist Nguyen Bac Truyen, was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Hoang Duc Binh, an environmental and labor activist, was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment, and activist Le Dinh Luong received a 20-year sentence for “resisting persons in the performance of their official duties,” “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State” and “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.”

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The constitution provides that any person illegally arrested and detained, charged with a criminal offense, investigated, prosecuted, brought to trial, or subjected to judgment enforcement illegally has the right to compensation for material and mental damages and restoration of honor. The law provides a mechanism for pursuing a civil action to redress or remedy abuses committed by authorities. Administrative and civil courts heard civil suits, with legal procedures being similar to criminal cases and using members of the same body of judges and people’s assessors to adjudicate the cases. Administrative and civil courts continued to be vulnerable to corruption and outside influence, lack of independence, and inexperience. Very few victims of government abuse sought or successfully received redress or compensation through the court system.

The government continued to prohibit class action lawsuits against government ministries, thus rendering ineffective joint complaints from land rights petitioners.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

By law all land belongs to the government (“all the people of Vietnam”) which has granted considerable decision-making authority for land pricing, allocation, and reclamation to local people’s committees and people’s councils, which has contributed to unfair business practices and corruption.

There were numerous reports of clashes between local residents and authorities at land expropriation sites during the year. Disputes regarding land expropriation for development projects remained a significant source of public grievance. Many whose land the government forcibly seized protested at government offices for failure to address their complaints. Some coercive land seizures resulted in violence and injury to state officials and residents. There were also reports of suspected plainclothes police officers and “thugs” hired by development companies to enforce government seizures by intimidating and threatening residents or breaking into their homes. Authorities arrested and convicted multiple land rights protesters on charges of “resisting persons on duty” or “causing public disorder.”

The law prohibits such actions, but the government did not consistently protect these rights and at times violated them.

By law, security forces need public prosecutorial orders for forced entry into homes, but Ministry of Public Security agents and local police officers regularly entered homes, particularly of activists, without legal authority. They often intimidated residents with threats of repercussions for failure to allow entry.

According to social media, on July 6, three plainclothes individuals broke into the home of Tran Van Chuc in Loc Thang town, Bao Lam district, Lam Dong province and beat him badly with wooden sticks, breaking his arm and causing multiple injuries. Activists reported that the assault was retaliation for attendance at a mass demonstration on June 10.

Without legal warrants, authorities regularly opened and censored targeted private mail; confiscated packages and letters; and monitored telephone conversations, email, text messages, blogs, and fax transmissions. The government cut telephone lines and interrupted cell phone and internet services of a number of political activists and their family members.

The Ministry of Public Security maintained a system of household registration and block wardens to monitor unlawful activity. While this system was less intrusive than in the past, the ministry closely monitored individuals engaged or suspected of engaging in unauthorized political activities. Local officials in several provinces in the Central Highlands, including Doan Ket village, Dak Ngo commune, Tuy Duc district, Dak Nong province, denied registration to 700 Hmong Christians who had migrated there in recent years, according to an NGO. As a result school officials did not allow their children to attend to school.

Family members of activists reported numerous incidents of physical harassment, intimidation, and questioning by Ministry of Public Security officials. Such harassment included harassment at the work place, and denying education and employment to family members of former or existing political prisoners or activists.

The constitution stipulates that society, families, and all citizens implement “the population and family planning program,” which allows couples or individuals the right to have one or two children, with exceptions based on government decree. There is no legal provision punishing citizens who have more children than the program allows; however, there were reported instances where local authorities imposed administrative fees on families in Nghe An province who had more than two children.

The CPV and certain ministries and localities issued their own regulations on family size for their staff. A decree issued by the Politburo, for example, subjects CPV members to reprimand if they have three children, removes them from a ranking position if they have four children, and expels them from the CPV if they have five children. Violating the decree also decreases the likelihood of promotion and may lead to job termination. The CPV did not enforce these provisions consistently.

CPV membership remained a prerequisite to career advancement for employees in nearly all government and government-linked organizations and businesses. Economic diversification, however, continued to make membership in the CPV and CPV-controlled mass organizations less essential for financial and social advancement.

Representatives from state-run organizations and progovernment groups visited activists’ residences and attempted to intimidate them into agreeing that the government’s policies were correct, according to social media and activists’ reports. For example on August 8, a group of injured veterans surrounded the private residence of activist Nguyen Lan Thang, calling him names and playing loud music for hours, according to social media. The group repeated the harassment for several days and authorities did not intervene despite repeated requests.

Family members of activists reported numerous and sometimes severe instances of harassment by Ministry of Public Security officials and agents, ranging from threatening telephone calls and insulting activists in local media and online to attacks on activists’ homes with rocks, shrimp paste, and gasoline bombs. There were reports that such abuses caused injury and trauma requiring hospitalization.

There were no reports that the Moroccan government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of Moroccan government authorities during the year.

During the year the Laayoune branch of the National Council on Human Rights (CNDH), a publicly funded Moroccan national human rights institution, continued to investigate individual claims of disappearances dating from the 1970s through the 1980s. When warranted, the CNDH recommended reparations in the form of money, health care, employment, or vocational training to victims of forced disappearance (or victims’ families) from previous years. According to the CNDH, the government allocated additional funds this year to the CNDH for reparations to individuals (or their living beneficiaries) not previously compensated due to technical errors in the work of the now-defunct Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In addition to direct financial compensation, the government funded professional reinsertion and medical assistance programs as well as recovered stolen assets as reparations to individuals or their living family members that the commission identified.

The International Committee of the Red Cross worked as a neutral intermediary with the parties and families regarding the cases of persons still unaccounted for. For more information on unresolved disappearances dating from the 1970s, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Moroccan law and practice apply. The Moroccan constitution and Moroccan law prohibit such practices, and the government of Morocco denies it authorizes the use of torture.

In the event of an accusation of torture, Moroccan law requires judges to refer a detainee to a forensic medical expert when the detainee or lawyer requests it or if judges notice suspicious physical marks on a detainee. Local and international human rights advocates claimed that Moroccan courts often refused to order medical examinations or to consider medical examination results in such cases. According to local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Moroccan authorities did not always investigate complaints, and medical personnel sometimes failed to document traces of injuries from torture and abuse.

Reports of torture have declined over the last several years, although Moroccan government institutions and NGOs continued to receive reports about the mistreatment of individuals in official custody. Reports of mistreatment occurred most frequently in pretrial detention. Most accusations stated that degrading treatment occurred during or following proindependence demonstrations or protests calling for the release of alleged political prisoners.

The October 3 UN secretary-general’s report noted that the OHCHR continued to receive reports alleging lack of accountability for human rights violations, including allegations of torture. The Laayoune branch of the CNDH received five complaints relating to allegations of torture or mistreatment and sent letters about these claims to the local branches of the Moroccan Prison Administration (DGAPR), which oversees prisons in the territory. The status of investigation into these allegations was unknown at year’s end.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention center conditions generally mirrored those in internationally recognized Morocco. Conditions improved during the year, but in some cases they did not meet international standards. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Physical Conditions: Prison and detention center conditions generally were similar to those in internationally recognized Morocco.

Families of detainees from Western Sahara charged that they faced unusually harsh prison conditions. The DGAPR contested this claim and asserted that prisoners in Western Sahara and Sahrawi prisoners in internationally recognized Morocco received the same treatment as all other prisoners under DGAPR authority.

Police arrested 23 Sahrawi individuals during the 2010 dismantling of the Gdeim Izik Camp and subsequent violence in Laayoune that resulted in the death of 11 members of the security forces; the individuals have been detained since their arrest. In 2016 the UN Committee against Torture declared that Morocco had violated its treaty obligations in Gdeim Izik detainee Naama Asfari’s case, alleging that he was convicted by the military court based on a confession obtained under torture and that no adequate investigation was conducted. In 2017 the civilian court, as part of the new trial, offered medical exams in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol to look for residual signs of torture to the 21 individuals who remained in detention from the group’s 2010 arrests and interrogations; however, Asfari declined to participate. Reports on the 15 detainees who willingly participated in the exams were admitted as evidence at the trial, and no link was found between the detainees’ complaints and the alleged torture. As of October 1, the Court of Cassation was in the process of reviewing the appeals to the verdicts the Court of Appeals in Rabat issued in July 2017.

On February 13, Asfari was placed in solitary confinement. On July 31, the Committee’s rapporteur on reprisals decided to continue a dialogue with the government on the case. On August 13, the UN secretary general released an annual report on allegations of reprisals and intimidation saying that Asfari’s treatment in detention had reportedly deteriorated.

For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Administration: Moroccan law and practice apply. While authorities generally permitted relatives and friends to visit prisoners, there were reports that authorities denied visiting privileges in some instances. The DGAPR assigned each prisoner to a risk classification level, which determined visiting privileges. At all classifications, prisoners may receive visits, although the length, frequency, and number of visitors may vary. Most prisons assigned each prisoner a designated “visit day” to manage the number of visits to the prison. The DGAPR authorizes religious observances and services provided by religious leaders for all prisoners, including religious minorities.

Independent Monitoring: The CNDH conducted 24 monitoring visits to prisons in or near Western Sahara from April 2017 to March. According to the DGAPR, various NGOs conducted 20 monitoring visits from January through June.

The CNDH received two complaints of prison staff mistreating detainees in the local prison in Laayoune and conducted five site visits. The CNDH found the prison to be overcrowded and insufficiently equipped to provide appropriate living conditions to the detainees and recommended that the government build a new prison in the city.

Improvements: According to the CNDH, in December 2017 the government built a new prison in the city of Smara and built a new healthcare facility staffed by a permanent doctor at Taouerta prison in Dakhla. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Moroccan law and practice apply. Moroccan law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge in court the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention. Observers indicated that police did not always respect these provisions or consistently observe due process, particularly during and in the wake of protests. According to local NGOs and associations, police sometimes arrested persons without warrants or while wearing civilian clothing. The October 3 UN secretary-general’s report on Western Sahara cited claims by some local NGOs alleging a lack of accountability for human rights violations perpetrated against Sahrawis, including arbitrary arrests.

On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released an opinion in favor of the appeal submitted by Freedom Now and the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Foundation on behalf of Mohamed al-Bambary. Al-Bambary was arrested in 2015 and sentenced to 12 years for charges including forming a criminal gang and participating in a murder during riots that followed a 2011 football match. In 2016 the Laayoune Appeals Court of Second Instance upheld the 2015 conviction, but reduced the sentence to six years. The UN working group concluded that al-Bambary’s arrest and detention constituted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. According to the May 2017 petition submitted by Freedom Now and the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Foundation, al-Bambary is a media activist (not a registered journalist) and was arrested in 2015 without being presented an arrest warrant or informed of the charges against him.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Human rights organizations continued to track alleged abusers who remained in leadership positions or who had been transferred to other positions. International and local human rights organizations claimed that authorities dismissed many complaints of abuse and relied only on police statements. Government officials generally did not provide information on the outcome of complaints. The CNDH and the Prison Administration reported human rights training for prison officials and members of the security forces in Western Sahara.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Arbitrary Arrest: Security forces often detained groups of individuals, took them to a police station, questioned them for several hours, and released them without charge.

NGOs reported several cases of alleged arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly following proindependence demonstrations, although there were fewer allegations than in previous years. Authorities argued that such temporary detentions without charges were not arbitrary but legal under Moroccan law, which allows detention of suspects without charge for preliminary investigations for up to six days for non-terrorism-related crimes, and 12 days for terrorism-related crimes. Detentions noted by local NGOs were generally less than six days.

Pretrial Detention: Conditions generally were similar to those in internationally recognized Morocco, with large proportions of detainees in pretrial detention; the government of Morocco does not disaggregate statistics for Western Sahara. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Moroccan law and practice apply. The Moroccan constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and, as in previous years, NGOs asserted that corruption and extrajudicial influence weakened judicial independence. The Supreme Judicial Council, mandated by the 2011 constitution, manages the courts and day-to-day judicial affairs in place of the Ministry of Justice. The president of the Court of Cassation (the highest court of appeals) chairs the 20-member body. Additional members include the president of the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation; the prosecutor general (equivalent of the attorney general); the mediator (national ombudsman); the president of the CNDH; 10 members elected by the country’s judges; and five members appointed by the king. In October the Supreme Judicial Council established its internal mechanisms and began the process of taking over day-to-day management and oversight from the Ministry of Justice, although the activities of the Supreme Judicial Council experienced delays due to administrative and legal impediments. While the government stated the aim of creating the council was to improve judicial independence, its effect on judicial independence was not clear. According to media reports and human rights activists, outcomes of trials in which the government had a strong interest, such as those touching on Islam as it related to political life and national security, the legitimacy of the monarchy, and Western Sahara, sometimes appeared predetermined.

As of October 1, the Court of Cassation was in the process of reviewing the appeals to the verdicts the Court of Appeals in Rabat issued in July 2017 against 23 Sahrawi individuals arrested during the 2010 dismantling of the Gdeim Izik Camp. The sentences the civilian Court of Appeals in Rabat issued ranged from time already served to life imprisonment. The individuals had been previously convicted in a military trial in 2013. A 2015 revision of the Code on Military Justice eliminated military trials for civilians, and in 2016 the Court of Cassation ruled on appeal that the group should receive a new civilian trial. Two received reduced sentences (from 25 years to 4.5 years and 6.5 years) and were released, joining two others whose 2013 sentences of time served were confirmed by the civilian court. Two other individuals also received reduced sentences (from 30 years to 25 years and from 25 years to 20 years). In November 2017 the CNDH determined that the December 2016 to July 2017 trial hearings met the conditions of a fair trial as indicated in the Moroccan Constitution and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

Moroccan law and practice apply. Moroccan law does not define or recognize the concept of a political prisoner. The Moroccan government did not consider any of its prisoners to be political prisoners and stated it had charged or convicted all individuals in prison under criminal law. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Human rights and proindependence groups considered a number of imprisoned Sahrawis to be political prisoners. This number included the Gdeim Izik prisoners (see section 1.e.) as well as members of Sahrawi rights or proindependence organizations.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

Moroccan law and practice apply. For more information, see the Department of State’s 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights for Morocco.

There were numerous reports that current or former members of the security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Politically motivated killings by non-state actors, including Houthi forces and terrorist and insurgent groups claiming affiliation with AQAP or ISIS, also increased significantly during the year (see section 1.g.).

As many as 27 clerics were killed in Aden and nearby areas. On May 9, an unknown gunman killed cleric Safwan al-Sharjabi as he walked along a crowded road in Aden. Many of the assassinated clerics, including Sharjabi, were members of Yemen’s influential Islamist political party, known as Islah. Brig. Gen. Shalal Ali Shaiya, head of Aden’s security and a top leader of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council, denied speculation that his forces were behind the killings. He blamed Islamist extremists. Secessionist officials said the Islah party was responsible for the clerics’ assassinations. These officials alleged Islah was killing the moderate clerics to replace them with more extreme voices. No group claimed responsibility for any of the assassinations, and no perpetrators were arrested.

Following their assassination of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017, Houthis actively targeted members of his political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). Press reported that during the year Houthis either abducted or executed hundreds of GPC members in a crackdown on Saleh loyalists.

There were reports of politically motivated disappearances and kidnappings of individuals associated with political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and media outlets critical of government security forces and the Houthi movement (see section 1.g.). Houthis and their allies sometimes detained civilian family members of government security officials. Non-state actors targeted and detained foreigners, including those believed to be working for foreign diplomatic missions.

The government’s National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights (NCIAVHR) documented 3,697 cases of arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearance committed by parties to the armed conflict from February 1 to July 31. Of these, 3,036 cases were committed by Houthi militias and 661 cases were committed by the ROYG and Coalition forces.

An Associated Press (AP) investigation in June alleged that 18 United Arab Emirates (UAE)-administered clandestine detention centers operated by Yemeni guards in eastern Yemen held hundreds of prisoners suspected of terrorism without charge or trial. The ROYG stated it had no control over the alleged UAE-run prisons. Several dozen detainees were reportedly released in the days following publication of the AP report.

The Baha’i International Community reported armed soldiers linked to the Houthis in Sana’a seized Abdullah Al-Olofi, the spokesperson for the Yemeni Baha’i community, on October 11 and took him to an unknown location. He was released several days later.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits torture and other such abuses. Although the law lacks a comprehensive definition of torture, there are provisions allowing prison terms of up to 10 years for acts of torture.

According to multiple NGO and press reports, Yemeni guards working at detention centers allegedly administered by forces aligned with the UAE (see section 1.b.) used sexual torture and humiliation to “break” inmates. In a letter to Human Rights Watch (HRW) in April, the ROYG acknowledged that some security forces were not fully under their control, and confirmed they had issued an order to close one facility and terminate the employment of its director. President Hadi ordered an investigation into the reports of torture. The UAE denied any involvement in torture of prisoners.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) reported that Security Belt Forces (SBF), part of the ROYG yet reportedly funded and directed by the UAE, committed rape and other forms of serious sexual violence targeting foreign migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other vulnerable groups. The SBF have since 2017 controlled the Al Basateen area of the Dar Saad district of Aden, which hosts a population of at least 40,000 refugees and IDPs. Residents reported that SBF regularly abducted and raped, or threatened to rape, women to extort money from their families and communities. The authorities did not conduct investigations or make arrests in relation to these violations, which were still being reported in May.

During the year UNOHCHR continued to receive information concerning ill-treatment and torture of detainees at the Political Security Organization (PSO) and the National Security Bureau (NSB), as well as the Criminal Investigation Department and in the Habrah and al-Thawra prisons in Sana’a, as well as other facilities under Houthi control.

Torture and other forms of mistreatment were common in Houthi detention facilities and by Houthis, according to NCIAVHR, international NGOs, and media reporting. An HRW report released in September documented 16 cases in which Houthis treated detainees brutally after arbitrarily arresting them, often in ways that amounted to torture, including whippings and hanging on walls with arms shackled behind the back. A December 7 AP report documented numerous cases of torture, including hanging prisoners by their genitals and burning them with acid. In some cases, Houthi minders would torture detainees to obtain information or confessions. An advocacy group associated with families of detainees alleged that 126 individuals died from torture in Houthi detention since 2014.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening and did not meet international standards. The ROYG exercised limited control over prison facilities. In past years, government officials and NGOs identified overcrowding, lack of professional training for corrections officials, poor sanitation, inadequate access to justice, intermingling of pretrial and convicted inmates, lack of effective case management, lack of funding, and deteriorating infrastructure as problems within the 18 central prisons and 25 reserve prisons (also known as pretrial detention centers). Without special accommodations, authorities held prisoners with physical or mental disabilities with the general population. The UNOHCHR reported during the year that conditions of detention facilities deteriorated, including overcrowding, damaged buildings, and shortages of food and medicine.

Media and international NGO reporting during the year found squalid conditions in Houthi detention facilities, including food infested with cockroaches, widespread torture, and absence of any medical care. According to the UNOHCHR, Houthi-affiliated tribal militias, known locally as popular committees, operated at least eight detention facilities in Sana’a, including Habra in the al-Shu’aub District, Hataresh in the Bani Hashaysh District, and al-Thawra and the House of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in Haddah.

Tribes in rural areas operated unauthorized “private” detention centers based on traditional tribal justice. Tribal leaders sometimes placed “problem” tribesmen in private jails, sometimes simply rooms in a sheikh’s house, to punish them for noncriminal actions. Tribal authorities often detained persons for personal or tribal reasons without trial or judicial sentencing.

Physical Conditions: The continuing armed conflict negatively affected the condition of prisons. Observers described most prisons, particularly in rural areas, as overcrowded with poor sanitary conditions, inadequate food and access to potable water, and inadequate medical care. Limited information was available on prison populations during the year.

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, local NGOs reported that prison authorities held juveniles with adults in some rural and women’s prisons as well as in some prisons in the capital. By custom, young children and infants born in prison remained in custody with their mothers until age nine. Prison authorities performed pregnancy tests on all female prisoners upon entry into a facility.

Political prisoners reportedly faced torture, abuse, and other forms of mistreatment, while all prisoners experienced harsh physical conditions.

In a report released by HRW in September, individuals formerly detained by the Houthis claimed prison guards beat them and described poor hygiene, limited access to toilets, and lack of food and health care. They said many formal and all informal detention facilities refused access to family members. There was no defined process for detainees to challenge their detention or report mistreatment. In many instances, Houthi guards moved detainees between facilities without notifying family members.

No credible statistics were available on the number of inmate deaths during the year (see section 1.a.).

Administration: Limited information was available on prison administration since the Houthi takeover in 2014. Poor recordkeeping and a lack of communication between prisons and the government made it difficult for authorities to estimate accurately the size of the prison population.

There was no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees. Under past practice, prisoners could submit complaints to judicial authorities; according to NGO reports, authorities largely ignored such complaints. Authorities generally allowed visitors to see prisoners and detainees when family members knew a detainee’s location but granted limited access to family members of those accused of security offenses. They generally allowed prisoners and detainees to engage in religious observances.

Independent Monitoring: The continuing conflict prevented substantial prison monitoring by independent human rights observers. International monitors were granted limited access to some facilities allegedly administered by UAE-aligned forces.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but both continued to occur. The law prohibits arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, but local NGOs reported that authorities took some persons suspected of crimes from their homes at night without warrants. Ministry of Interior security forces remained largely under the control of Houthis at year’s end.

Amnesty International (AI) reported that professor and political figure Mustafa al-Mutawakel was arbitrarily arrested by ROYG forces in Marib in April 2017. At year’s end, he remained in detention without charge.

In August the Houthis detained and continued to hold Kamal Al-Shawish, a co-founder of NGO Mwatana. Mwatana has been an outspoken critic of human rights conditions in the country.

AI reported that Houthis continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain scores of critics and opponents in areas under their control. Detained individuals included journalists, private individuals, human rights defenders and members of the Baha’i community.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The primary state security and intelligence-gathering entities, the PSO and the NSB, came under Houthi control in 2014, although their structure and operations appeared to remain the same. The Yemeni government, however, maintained its own appointments to the PSO and NSB in the parts of the country under government control. By law the PSO and NSB report first to the interior minister and then to the president. The relationship and coordination efforts between the PSO and NSB were unclear. The law charges the PSO with identifying and combating political crimes and acts of sabotage. There was no clear definition of many of the NSB’s duties.

The Criminal Investigation Division reports to the Ministry of Interior and conducted most criminal investigations and arrests. The ministry’s paramilitary Special Security Forces, often responsible for crowd control, was under the direct authority of the interior minister, as was the counterterrorism unit. The Ministry of Defense also employed units under its formal supervision to quell domestic unrest and to participate in internal armed conflicts.

Impunity for security officials remained a problem, in part because the Yemeni government exercised limited authority and in part due to the lack of effective mechanisms to investigate and prosecute abuse and corruption. The SSF, the Yemen Special Operations Forces, the Presidential Guard (formerly the Republican Guard), the NSB, and other security organizations ostensibly reported to civilian authorities in the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Office of the President. Civilian control of these agencies continued to deteriorate, however, as regional efforts to promote national reconciliation stalled. Exacerbating the problem of impunity, interest groups–including former president Saleh’s family and other tribal and party entities–expanded their influence over security agencies, often through unofficial channels rather than through the formal command structure.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Since its relocation in 2015 the ROYG lost control over much of the court and prison systems, and both deteriorated. The law provides that authorities cannot arrest individuals unless they are apprehended while committing a criminal act or being served with a summons. In addition, authorities must arraign a detainee within 24 hours or release him. The judge or prosecuting attorney, who decides whether detention is required, must inform the accused of the basis for the arrest. The law stipulates authorities may not hold a detainee longer than seven days without a court order. The law prohibits incommunicado detention, provides detainees the right to inform their families of their arrest, and allows detainees to decline to answer questions without an attorney present. The law states the government must provide attorneys for indigent detainees. United Nations, NGO, and media reporting concluded that these stipulations were frequently ignored by all parties to the conflict during the year. The law contains provisions for bail, and Houthi authorities in particular were accused of allowing bail only if they received a bribe. Tribal mediators commonly settled rural cases without reference to the formal court system.

Detainees often did not know which investigating agency arrested them, and the agencies frequently complicated matters by unofficially transferring custody of individuals between entities. Prior to the Houthi takeover, security forces routinely detained relatives of fugitives as hostages until the fugitive was located. Authorities stated they detained relatives only when the relatives obstructed justice, but human rights organizations rejected this claim.

Arbitrary Arrest: Prior to the outbreak of conflict, authorities did not record many detainees’ names, did not transfer some detainees to official detention centers, and arrested and released many detainees multiple times during the year. In September the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen reported their investigations confirmed widespread arbitrary detention throughout the country, with most detainees receiving no information of the reasons for their arrests or the charges against them, denial of access to lawyers or a judge and held incommunicado for prolonged or indefinite periods. The UN Group of Eminent Experts further reported that parties to the conflict were using undeclared detention facilities in an apparent attempt to put detainees outside the reach of the law.

Between October 2016 and April, Coalition forces arrested 148 fishermen, who were reportedly taken to detention facilities in Saudi Arabia and were held incommunicado. Most were released, but 18 fishermen, all held for more than one year, remained missing.

In many areas, Houthi forces and their allies arbitrarily detained persons and kept them in temporary prisons, including at military sites. Other non-state actors also arbitrarily detained persons. NGOs reported that Houthi forces denied detainees family visits or legal representation. In an HRW report released in September (see section 1.c.), former detainees recounted instances where Houthis held individuals unlawfully to extort money from relatives or to exchange them for those held by opposing forces. The report documented dozens of such cases since 2014.

The UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen concluded the Houthis had “committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including cruel treatment and torture [and] outrages upon personal dignity.” The experts documented the Houthis detaining students, human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents and members of the Baha’i community.

Pretrial Detention: Limited information was available on pretrial detention practices during the year, but prolonged detentions without charge or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing within a reasonable time were believed to be common practices despite their prohibition by law. Staff shortages, judicial inefficiency, and corruption caused trial delays.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Information was limited on whether persons arrested or detained were entitled to challenge the legal basis of their detention in court. The law provides that authorities must arraign a detainee within 24 hours or release him. It also provides that the judge or prosecuting attorney must inform the accused of the basis for the arrest. The ROYG, however, lacked the capacity to enforce the law.

UNOHCHR reported that in Aden and Mukalla, areas controlled by the Hadi-government, detainees carried out hunger strikes protesting the absence of due process. HRW noted that in several cases in which individuals disappeared into detention centers allegedly run by UAE-supervised forces in the South, the Aden prosecutor’s office issued release orders that were not respected.

Mwatana claimed that those detained by the Houthis were often not informed of the charges against them. In some cases, detainees who were issued release orders from the Houthi-controlled courts had yet to be released.

The UNOHCHR reported the criminal justice system had become largely defunct in the areas where progovernment forces reclaimed control, with Coalition-backed forces filling the void. In most cases, as documented by the UNOHCHR, detainees were not informed of the reasons for their arrest, were not charged, were denied access to lawyers or a judge, and were held incommunicado for prolonged or indefinite periods.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but under Houthi control, the judiciary was weak and hampered by corruption, political interference, and lack of proper legal training. Judges’ social and political affiliations and occasional bribery influenced verdicts. The government’s lack of capacity and reluctance at times to enforce court orders, especially outside of cities, undermined the credibility of the judiciary. Criminals threatened and harassed members of the judiciary to influence cases.

Houthi authorities sentenced Hamed Kamal bin Haydara, a Baha’i, to public execution on January 2 after detaining him since 2013 without trial. The NSB claimed he was guilty of apostasy, proselytizing, and spying for Israel. Bin Haydara reported authorities tortured him during the first 45 days of his detention. After their takeover, Houthis kept him imprisoned and continued court proceedings against him. Bin Haydara remained in prison awaiting execution.

The Baha’i International Community and AI reported that more than 20 Baha’is, including national-level leaders, were indicted in a September 15 Sana’a court hearing without being notified of the trial. The Houthi-controlled court accused them of apostasy and espionage. Only the judge, prosecutor, and other court officials were present at the beginning of the hearing. In a subsequent hearing on September 29, the judge asked the prosecutor to publish the names of the accused in a newspaper and ordered their properties frozen until the court reached a verdict.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The law considers defendants innocent until proven guilty. Trials were generally public, but all courts may conduct closed sessions “for reasons of public security or morals.” Judges, who play an active role in questioning witnesses and the accused, adjudicate criminal cases. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner. Defendants can confront or question witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf. The law provides for the government to furnish attorneys for indigent defendants in serious criminal cases; in the past, the government did not always provide counsel in such cases. The law allows defense attorneys to counsel their clients, address the court, and examine witnesses and any relevant evidence. Defendants have the right to appeal and could not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. There was limited information available regarding respect for due process.

A court of limited jurisdiction considers security cases. A specialized criminal court, the State Security Court, operated under different procedures in closed sessions and did not provide defendants the same rights provided in the regular courts. Defense lawyers reportedly did not have full access to their clients’ charges or court files. The lack of birth registration compounded difficulties in proving age, which reportedly led courts to sentence juveniles as adults, including for crimes eligible for death sentences (see section 6, Children).

In addition to established courts, there is a tribal justice system for noncriminal issues. Tribal judges, usually respected sheikhs, often also adjudicated criminal cases under tribal law, which usually involved public accusation without the formal filing of charges. Tribal mediation often emphasized social cohesion more than punishment. The public often respected the outcomes of tribal processes more than the formal court system, which was viewed by many as corrupt and lacking independence.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were numerous reports of political prisoners and detainees.

An AI report stated the UAE and Yemeni militias aligned with it detained 51 men between 2016 and May in five provinces in the southern portion of the country. Of the 51, 19 were missing at year’s end. Many of those taken into custody were arrested on unfounded terrorism-related charges, activists say. AI added that many of the arrests were based on “unfounded suspicions” of being members of al-Qaida or the Islamic State. Rather, AI reported, those detained included critics of the coalition and its allies, including activists and journalists and members of Islah, a political party that is the country’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Following their takeover of state institutions, Houthis detained activists, journalists, demonstration leaders, and other political figures representing various political groups and organizations opposed to the Houthis. They did not charge detainees publicly, and severely restricted or barred information to and access by local or international human rights organizations. NGOs claimed that, absent public charges, it was often difficult to determine whether authorities held detainees for criminal or political activity.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

The law provides a limited ability to pursue civil remedies for human rights violations as tort claims against private persons. There were no reports of such efforts during the year. Citizens cannot sue the government directly but may petition the public prosecutor to initiate an investigation.

The law prohibits these actions, but authorities continued such interference. According to human rights NGOs, Houthi security actors searched homes and private offices, monitored telephone calls, read personal mail and email, and otherwise intruded into personal matters without legally issued warrants or judicial supervision.

The law required that the attorney general personally authorize telephone call monitoring and reading of personal mail and email, but there was no indication the law was followed in practice.

Citizens may not marry a foreigner without permission from the Ministry of Interior, the NSB, and, in some instances, the PSO, under a regulation authorities enforced arbitrarily. The ministry typically approved marriages to foreigners if they provided a letter from their embassy stating that the government of the non-Yemeni spouse had no objection to the marriage and presented a marriage contract signed by a judge. Bribes frequently facilitated approval. There was no available information on current practice.

In 2014 Houthis took control of the capital and occupied many government offices, precipitating the relocation of President Hadi and his government in 2015. The ensuing conflict continued as of year’s end. The UN-led peace process included attempts to re-establish a cessation of hostilities at intervals throughout the year, the most recent in December. These efforts made some progress, although the conflict continues. Throughout the year, the Saudi-led Coalition continued military operations against Houthis, including an active military role by the UAE.

The Yemeni government re-established a presence in Aden and additional areas in the South in 2016. On October 18, Abdulmalik Maeen Saeed replaced Ahmed Bin Dagher as prime minister of Yemen. Part of the cabinet remained in Aden with Saeed, with some cabinet members also present in Marib. President Hadi remained abroad in Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the year, clashes occurred as warring parties lost and regained territory. The military’s loyalty was divided among numerous local actors. Armed clashes expanded to several areas of the country among Houthis, supporters of the Islah Party (Sunni Islamist) and the Rashad Party (Salafi), armed separatists affiliated with the southern separatist movement Hirak tribal forces, progovernment resistance forces, and Saudi-led coalition ground forces, with participation by elements of the ROYG’s armed forces. Terrorist groups, including AQAP, carried out many deadly attacks against government representatives and installations, Houthi combatants, members of Hirak, and other actors accused of behavior violating sharia law.

In June the Coalition began a ground offensive on Hudaydah led by the UAE and Yemeni forces. The Coalition captured the airport in the south of the city and eventually Kilos 16 and 10, effectively restricting movement and travel for individuals and goods to Sana’a.

International observers criticized all parties to the conflict for civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure resulting from shelling and airstrikes.

As a result of the fighting, the humanitarian situation in the country deteriorated significantly, with 8.4 million individuals at potential risk for famine and a reported 80 percent of the country’s population requiring humanitarian assistance by year’s end, according to the United Nations. An estimated 2.3 million citizens remained internally displaced during the year. The United Nations estimated that only 55 percent of health facilities remained functional.

The country experienced a cholera outbreak in 2016 and a second, larger surge in April 2017 that the United Nations reported was the largest outbreak worldwide, with more than one million suspected cases. The World Health Organization reported more than 79,500 suspected cases and 166 associated deaths between July 15 and September 22.

Killings: The United Nations, NGOs, media outlets, and humanitarian and international organizations reported what they characterized as disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by all parties to the continuing conflict.

Per UNOHCHR, from March 2015 to June, there were at least 16,706 civilian casualties, with 6,475 killed and 10,231 injured in the conflict. According to their data, Coalition air strikes caused most of the documented civilian casualties. UNOHCHR’s Group of Experts reviewed 60 instances where air strikes hit residential areas, killing more than 500 civilians, and 29 incidents where air strikes hit public spaces, killing more than 300 civilians. For example, on August 9, a Coalition airstrike hit a school bus in Sa’ada governorate, killing at least 40 and wounding 79, including a significant proportion of schoolchildren. The Coalition later determined the school bus incident was “unjustified.”

Media and NGOs also reported civilian casualties also resulted resulting from indiscriminate shelling by Houthis and their affiliated popular committees. In an August 17 report, the UN Group of Eminent Experts cited instances of women and children hit by shelling and sniper fire by Houthi forces around Taiz while in their homes or outside acquiring water or food. On August 8, fragments from a missile fired into Saudi Arabia by Houthi forces killed one civilian and injured 11, according to Saudi media reports.

Following a visit to Aden early in the year, HRW reported in an April statement that Houthi forces used land mines in six governorates, including in residential areas, which appear to have killed and maimed hundreds of civilians since the conflict began. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, mines laid by Houthi forces killed 222 civilians since 2016. A March report by Conflict Armament Research found that roadside bombs in Yemen were similar to bombs used by Hezbollah and Iran-linked insurgents in Iraq and Bahrain. In August Coalition demining teams reported decommissioning more than 300,000 mines explosive remnants of war (ERW) over the past two years. Additionally, internationally funded ERW clearance operations carried out by the United Nations Development Programme cleared 5.1 million square meters and more than 136,000 explosive hazards in 2017.

Other deaths resulted from attacks and killings by armed groups, including AQAP and ISIS.

The Guardian newspaper reported that fighting between both sides within the densely populated city of Hudaydah killed at least 150 individuals in the second two weeks of November and led more than 445,000 to flee since the summer.

The UNOHCHR recorded at least 32 instances where Coalition missiles struck humanitarian sites, despite their designation on a no-strike list. On June 11, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) reported that an air strike hit a new cholera treatment center in the Abs district of Hajjah Governorate. MSF indicated that the facility’s coordinates were shared with the Coalition on 12 separate occasions.

The Coalition has conducted investigations of civilian casualties, acknowledged mistakes, and committed to reviewing targeting procedures. The Coalition’s Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT), based in Riyadh and consisting of 14 military and civilian members from coalition member states, investigated some incidents of airstrikes that reportedly resulted in civilian casualties. The UNOHCHR and others asserted the Coalition’s JIAT investigations did not provide sufficient transparency on the targeting process for strikes and HRW stated that the JIAT’s public conclusions raised serious questions regarding the ways in which the JIAT conducted investigations and applied international humanitarian law.

Abductions: The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented the abduction of seven Akhbar al-Youm staff on March 1, whom Security Belt forces held for a month. Fathi bin Lazraq, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Aden al-Ghad, told CPJ the Emergency Battalion in Aden detained  him for eight hours on July 1. Lazraq said that the Emergency Battalion operated under the umbrella of the Security Belt forces. Lazraq was eventually released the same day by order of the commander of anti-terror forces.

HRW reported that the Houthi-controlled Political Security Office kidnapped individuals for ransom, sometimes letting months pass before informing relatives they were detained. A woman interviewed by HRW claimed she had paid 1.5 million Yemeni riyals ($6,000) to Houthi officials over the last three years to free her husband, who remained in Houthi custody. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen found that Political Security Office members were “profiting from detentions.”

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: An August HRW report alleged more than 49 persons died as a result of torture administered by Yemeni guards in UAE-operated clandestine detention centers. AI investigated the cases of 51 men detained by Security Belt and Elite Forces between March 2016 and May 2018 in Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Hadramawt, and Shabwa governorates. Current and former detainees and families gave Amnesty accounts of abuse including beatings, use of electric shocks, and sexual violence. One detainee told Amnesty he saw a fellow detainee carried away in a body bag after being repeatedly tortured. Another former detainee said UAE soldiers at a coalition base in Aden repeatedly inserted an object into his anus until he bled. He said he was also kept in a hole in the ground with only his head above the surface and left to defecate and urinate on himself in that position.

HRW reported Houthi forces frequently detained hostages for extortion and profiteering. While detained by the Houthis, detainees described being beaten, whipped, shackled to walls, caned, and threatened with rape or rape of their family members by Houthi officers. Detainees were refused medical assistance or treatment after their abuse and many released suffered from physical and psychological health complications.

Following a visit to Aden early in the year, HRW reported in an April statement that Houthi forces used land mines in six governorates, including in residential areas, which appear to have killed and maimed hundreds of civilians since the conflict began. In August Coalition demining teams reported decommissioning more than 300,000 mines explosive remnants of war (ERW) over the past two years. Additionally, internationally funded ERW clearance operations carried out by the United Nations Development Programme cleared 5.1 million square meters and more than 136,000 explosive hazards in 2017.

Child Soldiers: Although Yemeni law and ROYG policy expressly forbid the practice, children younger than age of 18 participated in armed conflict for government, tribal, Houthi, and militant forces. The ROYG military strongly denied it recruited child soldiers. Nearly one-third of the combatants in the country were younger than 18, by some estimates. The lack of a consistent system for birth registration compounded difficulties in proving age, which at times contributed to the recruitment of minors into the military.

The UNOHCR Secretary-General reported 842 verified cases of recruitment and use of boys as young as 11 years old in 2017. Nearly two thirds of these cases were attributed to the Houthi Forces, with a substantial increase in the number attributed to the Security Belt Forces and the Yemen Armed Forces as compared with 2016. The United Nations also documented the deprivation of liberty of boys by armed forces and groups for their alleged association with opposing parties.

Tribes, primarily affiliated with the Houthis and including some armed and financed by the government to fight alongside the regular army, used underage recruits in combat zones, according to reports by international NGOs, such as Save the Children. The UNOHCHR investigation found information indicating government, Coalition-backed forces, and Houthi forces all conscripted or enlisted children into armed forces or groups and used them to participate actively in hostilities. These reports were strongly denied by the ROYG. Houthis also routinely used children to staff checkpoints, act as human shields, or serve as suicide bombers. Combatants reportedly involved married boys between the ages of 12 and 15 in fighting in the northern tribal areas; tribal custom considered married boys as adults who owe allegiance to the tribe. As a result, according to international and local human rights NGOs, one-half of tribal fighters were youths younger than age 18. Other observers noted that tribes rarely placed boys in harm’s way but used them as guards rather than fighters.

During the year the Houthis and other armed groups, including tribal and Islamist militias and AQAP, increased their recruitment, training, and deployment of children as participants in the conflict. According to a February AI report, Houthi representatives ran local centers where young boys and men were encouraged to fight. One source said the Houthis imposed recruitment quotas on local representatives. UNOHCHR reported Houthi forces also forcibly recruited children in schools, hospitals, and door-to-door or used appeals to patriotism and financial incentives.

Also see the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Other Conflict-related Abuse: All parties to the conflict routinely imposed severe restrictions on movements of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance. Food insecurity, fuel shortages, damage to local infrastructure, and lack of access for humanitarian organizations to vulnerable populations contributed to the deteriorating humanitarian situation.

The government, the Coalition, or both delayed or denied clearance permits for some humanitarian and commercial aid shipments bound for rebel-held Red Sea ports and government-controlled ports. The Coalition continued to place restrictions on certain cargoes and its secondary clearance process led to uncertainty and delays experienced by vessels approved by the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen.

The Houthi militias’ forceful takeover and misadministration of government institutions led to dire economic consequences–nonpayment of workers’ wages and allegations of widespread corruption, including at checkpoints controlled by Houthi militias–that severely affected the timely and efficient distribution of food aid and exacerbated food insecurity.

Militias held trucks containing food, medical supplies, and aid equipment at checkpoints and prevented or delayed them from entering major cities.

There were reports of attacks on health-care facilities and health-care workers. Physicians for Human Rights confirmed 12 armed attacks against healthcare facilities and personnel, including two attacks on ambulances. On February 24, Al-Thawra Hospital in Taizz closed in protest after masked gunmen kidnapped a doctor at its front gate. On May 6, dozens of armed fighters invaded the hospital’s emergency and operating rooms, threatening doctors and shooting a patient. Physicians for Human Rights reported several instances of mortar shells hitting hospitals in Taizz and al-Hudaydah in March, April, and May.

There were reports of the use of civilians to shield combatants. Houthi forces reportedly used captives as human shields at military encampments and ammunition depots under threat of coalition airstrikes.

There were numerous reports of arbitrary and unlawful killings by police during the year. On October 5, police used excessive force in response to protests at the University of Zambia over delayed meal allowances; a police raid on a dormitory that housed some protesters resulted in the death of a fourth year student, Vespers Shimuzhila, who died of asphyxiation after police fired teargas into the building, and her room caught fire. Another student suffered serious injuries leaping from the third-floor room while 20 others were treated for minor injuries.

The government, through the attorney general, accepted responsibility for the killing in March 2017 of an Air Force officer, Mark Choongwa, by police officers while in police custody. Choongwa’s family sued the state and six police officers for damages. In March, Attorney General Likando Kalaluka informed the High Court the government had conceded and accepted liabilities. Four persons, including two police officers, were subsequently arrested and charged with manslaughter for Choongwa’s death; the trial was ongoing at year’s end. Following this case, the government subsequently resolved to stop recruiting police reservists who do not meet minimum high school qualification, the Ministry of Home Affairs reported.

There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits subjecting any person to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment, no laws address torture specifically. According to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), police and military officers used excessive force–including torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment–to obtain information and confessions when apprehending, interrogating, and detaining criminal suspects. The killing of Lemmy Mapeke by two police officers from the Macha Police Post in Choma on March 16, while in their custody, drew significant public attention. Both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the HRC confirmed police used excessive force when arresting Mapeke. According to the HRC, Mapeke’s detention from March 10-16 was unlawful and not in accordance with the due process of the law. HRC investigations indicated that Mapeke died because of the “torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” from the two named police officers. Authorities arrested the two officers who were charged with murder. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

The HRC reported allegations of such abuse in every detention facility it monitored, but noted that it was difficult to prosecute perpetrators because no law exists that explicitly prohibits torture or the use of excessive force. Confessions obtained through torture are admissible in court.

On August 3, the Kapiri Mposhi Magistrates Court convicted two men for same-sex sexual conduct, a criminal act in which penalties for conviction are 15 years’ to life imprisonment (see section 6). During the investigation of the case, police ordered the two defendants to subject themselves to a forced anal exam 10 days after the alleged incident took place. The examination, detailed in the court judgment, included a test of the “tone of the anus.” The test required the defendants to hold the doctor’s finger (due to the unavailability of instruments) within their anus to test its strength and likelihood of sodomy.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Physical conditions in prisons and detention centers remained harsh and life threatening due to overcrowding, frequent outbreaks of disease, food and potable water shortages, and poor sanitation and medical care.

Physical Conditions: According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Prisons Care and Counseling Association (PRISCCA), there were over 21,000 detainees (3,500 of whom were awaiting trial at year’s end) in 90 prison facilities with a capacity of 9,050 inmates. A slow-moving judicial system, outdated laws, and increased incarceration due to higher numbers of petty offenses contributed to prison congestion, according to the NGO. Other factors included limitations on magistrates’ powers to impose noncustodial sentences, a retributive police culture, and poor bail and bonding conditions. Indigent inmates lacked access to costly bail and legal representation through the Law Association of Zambia. Other organizations such as the Legal Aid Board and the National Prosecutions Authority were also difficult for inmates to access due to a lack of representation outside Lusaka. Vacant seats of High Court judges in six provinces caused delays in the confirmation of reformatory orders made by magistrates in these areas.

The law requires separation of different categories of prisoners, but only female prisoners were held separately. According to the HRC, conditions for female prisoners were modestly better during the year, primarily because of less crowded facilities. Juveniles were detained in the same holding cells with adult detainees. Prisons held an undetermined number of children who were born in prison or living in prisons while their mothers served sentences. Incarcerated women who had no alternative for childcare could choose to have their infants and children under age four with them in prison. According to PRISCCA correctional facilities designated for pretrial detainees included convicted inmates because there were only three reformatory schools for juveniles and three designated remand prisons for adult detainees.

Many prisons had deficient medical facilities and meager food supplies. Lack of potable water resulted in serious outbreaks of water- and food-borne diseases, including dysentery and cholera. PRISCCA reported that prison food was nutritionally inadequate. The prison system remained understaffed with only one full-time medical doctor and 84 qualified health-care providers serving the prison population. In November the president appointed Dr. Chisela Chileshe, the prison system’s only medical doctor, as commissioner general of the Zambia Correctional Service, leaving no full-time doctors to attend to prisoners. The incidence of tuberculosis remained very high due to overcrowding, lack of compulsory testing, and prisoner transfers. The supply of tuberculosis medication and other essential drugs was erratic. A failure to remove or quarantine sick inmates resulted in the spread of tuberculosis and other illnesses, and the deaths of several prisoners. The HRC and PRISCCA expressed concern at the lack of isolation facilities for the sick and for persons with psychiatric problems. Although prisoners infected with HIV were able to access antiretroviral treatment services within prison health-care facilities, their special dietary needs and that of those on tuberculosis treatment were not met adequately. Prisons also failed to address adequately the needs of persons with disabilities. Inadequate ventilation, temperature control, lighting, and basic and emergency medical care remained problems.

Female inmates’ access to sexual and reproductive health services was limited, according to organizations providing services to the population. Gynecological care, cervical cancer screening, prenatal services, and prevention of mother-to-child transmission programs were nonexistent. Female inmates relied on donations of underwear, sanitary pads, diapers for infants and toddlers, and soap. Authorities denied prisoners access to condoms because the law criminalizes sodomy and prevailing public opinion weighed against providing condoms. Prison authorities, PRISCCA, and the Medical Association of Zambia advocated for prisoners’ conjugal rights as a way to reduce prison HIV rates. Discriminatory attitudes toward the most at-risk populations (persons in prostitution and men who have sex with men) stifled the development of outreach and prevention services for these groups.

Administration: A formal mechanism of investigations of allegations of mistreatment of prisoners existed through the Police Public Complaints Commission (PPCC). The PPCC exists to receive complaints and discipline erring police and prison officers, but human rights groups reported it did not effectively investigate complaints and consists of former officers who are often hesitant to prosecute their colleagues.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted prison monitoring by independent local and international NGOs and religious institutions. Among notable organizations permitted during the year were missionaries from abroad and the BBC, which conducted and filmed an education program on children living in prison with their incarcerated mothers at Lusaka Central Correctional Facility.

Improvements: PRISCCA noted that there was a reduction in the complaints of physical abuse by prison authorities owing to the establishment of legal desks for complaints in prisons. There were notable improvements in the area of recreation. The construction of four new dormitories at Kansenshi Correctional Facility further increased the capacity by an additional 500 spaces. The government also procured uniforms for both prisoners and prison officials across the country. Other improvements included the provision of food for children incarcerated with their mothers and arrangements for detainees to exercise their right to vote.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. It also provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. Although the government generally observed these requirements, there were frequent reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The Zambia Police Service (ZPS) and Zambia Correctional Service report to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Divided into regular and paramilitary units, the ZPS has primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Zambia Security and Intelligence Service (ZSIS), under the Office of the President, is responsible for external and internal intelligence. The Central Police Command in Lusaka oversees 10 provincial police divisions with jurisdiction over police stations in towns countrywide.

The Zambia Defense Force–consisting of the Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force, and Zambia National Service–is responsible for external security. The commander of each service reports to the president through the minister of defense. By law defense forces have domestic security responsibilities only in cases of national emergency. In addition to security responsibilities, the Zambia National Service performs road maintenance and other public works projects and runs state farms and youth skills training programs.

Paramilitary units of the ZPS, customs officers, and border patrol personnel guard lake, river, and other border areas. The Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) is responsible for enforcing the laws on illegal drugs, fraud, counterfeiting, and money laundering. The DEC, customs, and border patrol personnel operate under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over police and military services; however, impunity was a problem. Senior police officers disciplined some officers for engaging in extortion of prisoners by suspending them or issuing written reprimands, but many abuses went unaddressed. Dismissals of officers for extortion were rare.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The constitution and law require authorities to obtain a warrant before arresting a person for most offenses. Police do not need a warrant, however, when they suspect a person has committed offenses such as treason, sedition, defamation of the president, or unlawful assembly. In practice, police rarely obtained warrants before making arrests regardless of the offense.

Although the law requires that detainees appear before a court within 24 to 48 hours of arrest and be informed of the charges against them, authorities routinely held detainees for as long as six months before trial, which often exceeded the length of the prison sentence corresponding to the conviction for the defendant’s alleged crime. The HRC noted this abuse remained common, particularly in rural districts, where subordinate courts operated in circuits because detainees could be tried only when a circuit court judge was in the district.

Based on a presumption of innocence provided for in the constitution, the Criminal Procedure Code provides for bail in case of any detention. Before granting bail, however, courts often required at least one employed person, usually a government employee, to vouch for the detainee. Bail is not granted in cases of murder, aggravated robbery, violations of narcotics laws, and treason.

Authorities frequently refused or delayed bail in politically sensitive cases. For example, on April 24, police arrested and detained opposition New Labor Party leader, Fresher Siwale, and charged him after several days in detention for defamation of the president. Although the court later granted him bail, Siwale remained in detention for 31 days due to excessive conditions the court attached to his bail. The conditions required two working sureties from government institutions at a managerial level. His lawyer argued Siwale had remained in detention, as no civil servant was willing to sign the bail on his behalf because his case had political connotations. Subsequently, the court relaxed the bail conditions to require sureties working in a “reputable organization.”

Detainees generally did not have prompt access to a lawyer. Although the law obligates the government to provide an attorney to indigent persons who face serious charges, many indigent defendants were unaware of this right. The government’s legal aid office and the Legal Resources Foundation provided legal services to some indigent arrestees.

Arbitrary Arrest: According to human rights groups, arbitrary or false arrest and detention remained problematic. Police often summoned family members of criminal suspects for questioning, and authorities arrested criminal suspects based on uncorroborated accusations or as a pretext for extortion. Human rights groups reported police routinely detained citizens after midnight, a practice legal only during a state of emergency. On March 22, Roan Member of Parliament (MP), Chsihimba Kambwili, was arrested and placed in police custody for being “in possession of money reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime.” He was denied bond on three separate occasions. The HRC challenged the state to grant Kambwili bond as a matter of right, stating prosecutors deliberately denied him bail for punitive political reasons.

Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention continued to be a problem. In 2017, 32 percent of prison inmates were in pretrial detention. On average detainees spent an estimated six months in pretrial detention, which often exceeded the maximum length of the prison sentence corresponding to the detainee’s alleged crime. Contributing factors included inability to meet bail requirements, trial delays, and adjournments due to absent prosecutors and their witnesses.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Detainees had the ability to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention, but police often prevented detainees from filing challenges to prolonged detention.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. While the government largely refrained from direct interference, judicial independence was limited by control of its budget through the Ministry of Justice and public comments from officials directed at the courts. For example, in November 2017 President Lungu warned judges against being “adventurous” in deciding political cases. The remarks were seen as a threat to Constitutional Court judges against making an adverse ruling in the impending judgment on his eligibility to stand for a third time as president in 2021. “I have information that some judges want to be adventurous and emulate those in Kenya. Don’t be copy-cats and think you will be a hero by plunging the nation into chaos. I am not intimidating you, but I am simply warning you,” the president said at a public gathering. On December 7, just over a year after the case was initially filed, the court ruled President Lungu’s January 2015 to September 2016 first term in office does not constitute a full term; as such the president is eligible to seek election for a third time in 2021.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judicial system was open to influence by the ruling party in cases in which it has an interest. Defendants enjoy the right to a presumption of innocence, to be informed promptly of charges against them, and to be present at a fair and timely trial. Nevertheless, defendants were not always informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, and trials were usually delayed. Defendants enjoy the right to consult with an attorney of their choice, to have adequate time to prepare a defense, to present their own witnesses, and to confront or question witnesses against them. Indigent defendants were rarely provided an attorney at state expense. Interpretation services in local languages were available in most cases. There were no reports defendants were compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants had the right to appeal.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

While there were cases of politically motivated arrests and detentions, there were no new reports of political prisoners or detainees during the year.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Complainants may seek redress for human rights abuses from the High Court. Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations and appeal court decisions to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 2015 a group of Barotse activists appealed to the court, seeking to compel the government to respond to a legal argument for the region’s independence. The appeal remained pending at year’s end.

The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but the government frequently did not respect these prohibitions. The law requires a search or arrest warrant before police may enter a home, except during a state of emergency or when police suspect a person has committed an offense such as treason, sedition, defaming the president, or unlawful assembly. Police routinely entered homes without a warrant even when one was legally required. Domestic human rights groups reported authorities routinely detained, interrogated, and physically abused family members or associates of criminal suspects to obtain their cooperation in identifying or locating the suspects.

The law grants the Drug Enforcement Commission, ZSIS, and police authority to monitor communications using wiretaps with a warrant based on probable cause, and authorities generally respected this requirement. The government required cell phone service providers to register all subscriber identity module (SIM) cards.

There were two reported incidents of the government or its agents committing arbitrary or unlawful killings. On August 1, the military killed six unarmed protestors when it responded to an opposition-led election related demonstration in Harare’s central business district (CBD). A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) killed two civilians on February 22 while enforcing a ban on vendors and unlicensed taxi drivers in the CBD. Security-sector forces participated in political violence in the post-election period during the month of August. Security-sector impunity for politically motivated abuses remained a problem.

Impunity for past politically motivated violence also remained a problem. Investigations continued of prior years’ cases of violence resulting in death committed by security forces and ZANU-PF supporters, but by year’s end there were no arrests or charges in these cases.

Unwillingness to acknowledge past atrocities or seek justice for victims continued to affect relations between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups negatively.

There were no reports of long-term disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

The High Court ordered the government to provide updates on the 2015 disappearance of democracy activist Itai Dzamara, but government officials failed to do so. There were no reports of authorities punishing any perpetrators of previous acts of disappearance.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, there were reports security forces engaged in such practices with impunity and with the implicit support of officials affiliated with the government. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported security forces assaulted and tortured citizens in custody, including targeted assault on and torture of perceived opponents of the government. Throughout the year, police used excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal suspects. In some cases police arrested and charged the victims of violence rather than the perpetrators. Political opponents of President Emmerson Mnangagwa stated security forces arrested, detained, and tortured them after the July 30 election.

Human rights groups reported government agents continued to perpetrate physical and psychological torture. Reported torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, cables, gun butts, sjamboks (a heavy whip), and falanga (beating the soles of the feet).

According to one NGO, from January through August, 367 victims of organized violence and torture sought medical treatment and counseling after sustaining injuries in multiple incidents across the country. The NGO reported ZANU-PF supporters committed 35 percent of the violations, ZRP committed 31 percent, and the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) committed 22 percent. Nearly 39 percent of the cases occurred in the capital, Harare. The majority of victims, more than 51 percent, associated themselves with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance. More than 39 percent did not indicate their political affiliation. The other roughly 10 percent were associated with other smaller independent political parties.

From August 1 to 7, uniformed soldiers systematically assaulted civilians in the Harare CBD and suburbs of Chitungwiza, Highfield, Kuwadzana, Seke, and Warren Park, according to the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and local NGOs. The soldiers accused many of the victims of participating in the August 1 opposition-led protests.

There were also reports of short-term abductions during this same period during which victims were abused. Victims in several Harare suburbs reported assaults and hours-long interrogations in remote locations regarding opposition members’ whereabouts. For example, according to NGO and local news accounts, plain-clothed state security agents abducted MDC Alliance Information and Public Secretary Simbarashe Mujeye and his brother from their Chitungwiza home on August 2. Mujeye claimed the agents handcuffed and beat him while demanding to know the whereabouts of senior MDC leaders. The men then took Mujeye to Harare Central Police station on charges of inciting public violence related to the August 1 protests.

According to a local NGO, from January to June, 23 victims of organized violence and torture sought assistance after security agents found them mining illegally at the Chiadzwa diamond mine in Manicaland Province. Victims reported security forces detained them at torture bases, beat them with sticks, kicked them, and sometimes allowed security dogs to attack them.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh due to financial constraints and overcrowding in some of the older facilities. The Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) struggled to provide adequate food and sanitary conditions and worked with community organizations to help address these issues. The 2013 constitution added prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration into society to ZPCS responsibilities. The ZPCS provided inmates with opportunities to participate in sewing, mechanics, woodworking, and agricultural activities, as well as allows churches and other organizations to teach life skills training.

Physical Conditions: Conditions in prisons, jails, and detention centers were often harsh. There were approximately 17,000 prisoners, spread across 46 main prisons and 26 satellite prisons. While some prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported that overcrowding continued, due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs. In March President Mnangagwa granted amnesty to approximately 3,000 prisoners, including most women and all juveniles, to address overcrowding.

Prison guards occasionally beat and abused prisoners, but NGOs reported that the use of excessive force by prison guards was not systematic. Relations between prison guards and prisoners improved during the year as part of a positive trend NGOs have observed during the past several years.

NGOs reported female prisoners generally fared better than did male prisoners. Authorities held women in separate prison wings and provided women guards. Women generally received more food from their families than did male prisoners. The several dozen children younger than age four living with their incarcerated mothers shared their mothers’ food allocation, rather than receiving their own. NGOs were unaware of women inmates reporting rapes or other physical abuse. With support from NGOs, prisons distributed some supplies such as sanitary pads for women. Officials did not provide pregnant women and nursing mothers with additional care or food rations out of the ZPCS budget, but the ZPCS solicited donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.

There was one juvenile prison housing boys only. Girls were held together with women. Authorities also held boys in adult prisons throughout the country while in remand. Officials generally tried to place younger boys in separate cells, but NGOs reported older prisoners often physically assaulted the younger boys when left together. Authorities generally sent juveniles to prison rather than to reformatory homes as stipulated in the law, as there is only one adequate reformatory home in the country, located in the Harare suburbs. Juveniles remained vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.

Prisoners with mental health issues were often held together with regular prisoners until a doctor was available to make an assessment. Psychiatric sections were available at some prisons for these individuals but offered little specialized care.

According to the ZPCS, remand prisons were overcrowded. Authorities often held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings. Due to fuel shortages, the ZPCS was at times unable to transport pretrial detainees to court hearings, resulting in delayed trials and longer detentions.

According to NGOs, food shortages were widespread in prisons but not life threatening. Prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners. Protein was in short supply, particularly meat. Prisoners’ access to clean water varied by prison.

Diarrhea was prevalent in most prisons. Diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses thrived in those with the poorest conditions. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate. There were insufficient mattresses, blankets, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products.

Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at nearly every prison. In partnership with NGOs, the ZPCS offered peer education on HIV/AIDS. The ZPCS tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by prisoners or prison doctors. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases. Due to financial constraints, the ZPCS was at times unable to transport prisoners with emergency medical needs to local hospitals.

Administration: The inspections and audit unit of the ZPCS, intended to assess prison conditions and improve monitoring of prisoners’ rights, did not release the results of such assessments. The ZHRC continued to conduct monitoring visits. There was no prison ombudsman, but there were statutory mechanisms to allow alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders.

Prisoners and detainees had relatively unrestricted access to visitors, except in maximum-security prisons, where remoteness hampered access by prisoners’ relatives. The ZPCS afforded prisoners the opportunity to practice their chosen religion. NGOs reported prisoners had sufficient access to chaplains and most prisons offered minority religious services as well.

Independent Monitoring: The law provides international human rights monitors the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, gained access. All organizations working in prisons reported that meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present and with minimal restrictions.

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although other sections of the law effectively weakened these prohibitions. The government enforced security laws in conflict with the constitution. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists and journalists perceived as opposing the government. Security forces frequently arrested large numbers of persons during antigovernment protests.

ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The constitution provides for a National Security Council (NSC) composed of the president, vice president, and selected ministers and members of the security services. The NSC never met, however. Instead, the Joint Operations Command, an informal administrative body, discharged the functions of the NSC at national, provincial, and district levels. All security-sector chiefs reported directly to the president, who is the commander in chief of all security services.

The ZRP is responsible for maintaining internal law and order. The Department of Immigration and the ZRP, both under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. Although the ZRP is officially under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the President directed some ZRP roles and missions in response to civil unrest. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces under the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes deployed them as a back-up to police as a show of force. The Central Intelligence Organization, under the Office of the Vice President, is responsible for internal and external security.

The military-assisted government transition in November 2017 weakened the ZRP as an institution. In January the government forcibly retired 11 senior ZRP officials and reassigned dozens more in March.

Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces, neither did the government have effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. There were reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year. For example, the government has not held accountable the ZRP officers who killed two civilians during a protest in Harare on February 22. Likewise, the government has not established an independent complaints mechanism to investigate allegations of security force misconduct as called for in the constitution.

ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

The law stipulates that arrests require a warrant issued by a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody. Police did not always respect these rights. The law requires authorities to inform a person at the time of arrest of the reason for the arrest. A preliminary hearing must be held before a magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest. According to the constitution, only a competent court may extend the period of detention.

The law provides for bail for most accused persons. In 2015 the Constitutional Court declared section 121(3) of the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act unconstitutional. According to human rights attorneys, it allowed prosecutors to veto bail decisions made by the courts and keep accused persons in custody for up to seven days based on the prosecution’s stated intent to appeal bail. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling against section 121(3), the government amended the law by including provisions that allow prosecutors a veto over judicial bail decisions. Prosecutors relied on the provisions to extend the detention of opposition political activists.

Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees or those with authority to grant access were unavailable. An indigent detainee may apply to the government for an attorney in criminal cases, but these requests only apply in capital cases. This occurred with cases involving opposition party members, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens.

The government also monitored, harassed, and intimidated human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients.

On August 8, former finance minister and senior MDC Alliance official Tendai Biti was detained trying to flee Zimbabwe via Zambia and forcibly returned to Harare. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) claimed police denied Biti access to legal counsel. Biti was subsequently charged with inciting post-election violence and unlawfully announcing election results. On December 14, a magistrate dropped the incitement of violence charge. His trial for violating electoral law continued at year’s end. Additionally, ZLHR claimed police assaulted Biti’s lawyer and deliberately prevented him from accompanying Biti to Harare Central Police station on August 9.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government used arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against political activists, civil society members, journalists, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights. There were NGO and media reports that security forces arbitrarily arrested political and civil society activists and then released them without charge. On July 13, police arbitrarily arrested three MDC Alliance members when they attempted to observe postal voting at a police camp in Mutare citing trespassing and violation of the electoral act. A magistrate later declined to charge them. Similarly, prosecutors declined to charge three Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) members in Gweru who police arrested for demonstrating against government economic measures on October 11.

The law absolves individual security agents from criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention. Police officers routinely argued that they merely followed orders in conducting arrests and were not responsible for compensating victims of unlawful arrests. In April 2017, however, a High Court judge ruled that officials could be sued, especially if they acted unlawfully. The case related to the abduction and torture of human rights activist Jestina Mukoko, who was held incommunicado by state security officials for 21 days in 2008. On October 5, the High Court ordered the state to pay Mukoko $150,000 in damages.

Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was limited for nonpolitical prisoners. Delays in pretrial procedures were common, however, due to a shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, the low capacity of court officials, and a lack of resources. The constitution provides for the right to bail for detained suspects. Despite this provision, the government routinely opposed bail for political detainees.

Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail, which remained exorbitant in view of economic conditions in the country. Magistrates rarely exercised the “free bail option” that authorizes them to waive bail for destitute prisoners. Lawyers reported juveniles usually spent more time in pretrial detention than did adults because they could not attend court unless a parent or guardian accompanied them. Authorities occasionally did not notify parents of a juvenile’s arrest or the closest kin of an adult detainee’s arrest.

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but executive influence and interference remained a problem. There continued to be instances where the judiciary demonstrated its independence despite being under intense pressure to conform to government policies.

The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Judicial corruption was widespread, extending beyond magistrates and judges. For example, NGOs reported senior government officials undermined judicial independence, including by giving farms and homes to judges.

Magistrates heard the vast majority of cases. Legal experts claimed defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates’ courts than in higher courts. In higher courts justices were more likely to make politicized decisions due to the use of threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government’s favor. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers such as prosecutors and private attorneys also faced pressure, including harassment and intimidation. Some urban-based junior magistrates demonstrated a greater degree of independence and granted opposition party members and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes.

TRIAL PROCEDURES

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but political pressure and corruption frequently compromised this right. By law, defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, although courts did not always respect this right. Magistrates or judges held trials without juries. Trials were open to the public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Assessors–usually nonlawyers who sit together with a judge to provide either expert advice or guidance on local practices–in lieu of juries, could be appointed in cases in which conviction of an offense could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Defendants have the right to a lawyer of their choosing, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases an indigent defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases, in which the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. Individuals in civil cases may request free legal assistance from the Legal Resources Foundation or the ZLHR. The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association also provided some free legal assistance to women and youth. The law provides for free interpretation, and Shona-English interpretation was generally available. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense is also provided for by law but was often lacking.

Authorities sometimes denied attorneys’ access to their clients. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and to confront adverse witnesses. Any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense has the right to remain silent and may not be compelled to confess. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to access all government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Authorities did not always respect these rights.

Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The right to appeal both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed.

Unlike in normal criminal proceedings, which proceed from investigation to trial within months, in cases of members of political parties or civil society critical of the government, prosecuting agents regularly took abnormally long to submit their cases for trial. In many cases wherein authorities granted bail to government opponents, they did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but instead chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays. On August 22, a Bindura magistrate ordered the case against MDC Alliance politician Agrippa Mutambara to proceed in this manner after witnesses who accused him of vandalizing a state monument failed to appear in court. The prosecutors and police routinely retained material confiscated from the accused as evidence.

Government officials frequently ignored court orders in such cases, delayed bail and access to medical care, and selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those associated with the government.

The public had fair access to the courts of law, particularly the magistrates’ courts, although observers reported occasional physical and procedural impediments, such as limited available seating areas.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including opposition party officials, their supporters, NGO workers, journalists, and civil society activists. Authorities held many such individuals for one or two days and released them. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees, and prison authorities arbitrarily denied access to political prisoners. There were reports police beat and physically abused political and civil society activists while they were in detention.

In August and September, police arrested more than 30 individuals affiliated with the MDC Alliance for allegedly inciting public violence through involvement in a protest in which six individuals were shot and killed by security forces. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests. Police released all of these defendants on bail as they await trial.

On January 4, a magistrate court released an American citizen who was arrested in November 2017 and tried on charges of subverting a constitutional government and undermining the authority of and insulting former president Mugabe. The American was held in a maximum-security prison for seven days, and then released on bail with instructions to have very limited social contact. She was ultimately released and allowed to leave the country when the prosecutor failed to present evidence, but the charges remained open.

CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

Civil judicial procedures allow for an independent and impartial judiciary, but the judiciary was subject to political influence and intimidation, particularly in cases involving high-ranking government officials, politically connected individuals, or individuals and organizations seeking remedies for violations of human rights.

Lack of judicial and police resources contributed to problems enforcing domestic court orders.

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The constitution stipulates the government must compensate persons for improvements made on land subsequently taken by the government, but it does not set a timeline for the delivery of compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or compensation for the taking of private property, and police generally did not take action against individuals who seized private property without having secured sanction from the state to do so.

Support was uneven and inconsistent for households resettled from the diamond mining grounds of Marange in Chiadzwa to a government-owned agricultural estate outside Mutare. Since 2010, authorities relocated more than 1,800 families. Each household was entitled to receive $1,000 for relocation, although reportedly only a handful received the money. Most of the relocated families had not received compensation of any kind, including agricultural land, while the government classified them as “people with no recognizable legal rights or claim to the land that they are occupying,” stating that their former land became state land, despite customary and traditional rights to the contrary.

Nearly all white commercial farmers reported the government had not compensated them for losses suffered from the land resettlement program that began in 2000 (see Section 1.f.).

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, or home, but local NGOs reported the government did not respect these prohibitions. Early in the year government officials pressured local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists to monitor and report on persons suspected of supporting political parties other than ZANU-PF. Through threats and intimidation, local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists also compelled individuals, mostly in rural areas, to contribute money toward ZANU-PF political rallies. On May 16, the High Court ruled that traditional leaders should not interfere in the political process. It further ordered the President of the Chiefs Council, Fortune Charumbira, to retract two statements insisting traditional leaders must support the ruling party in the July elections. Charumbira did not make the retractions and challenged the ruling in court.

Government entities manipulated the distribution of government-provided food aid, agricultural inputs, and access to other government assistance programs such as education assistance to exclude suspected political opposition supporters and to compel support for ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF supporters threatened to withhold food aid in constituencies such as Hurungwe, Murehwa, and Gokwe during the run-up to the July 30 elections. For example, Heal Zimbabwe Trust reported that village heads in Hurungwe Ward 9 told their villagers that government-provided maize seed would only be distributed to those citizens who proved they registered to vote and were members of ZANU-PF.

Shortly after President Mnangagwa took office, he announced the government would no longer forcibly displace persons from their homes. In February the government returned Lesbury Estate to tobacco farmer Robert Smart, who was forcibly evicted from his land in June 2017. According to local human rights and humanitarian NGOs, Lesbury Estate was the only land the government returned to its previous owner during the year.

According to the attorney general and Ministry of Lands, beginning in 2000 a description of every white-owned farm in the country was published in state media and the farms effectively became state property. According to the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe (CFU), after authorities published a description of the property, it was transferred to a politically connected individual at the first available opportunity.

CFU reported since 2000 titleholders who lost their homes or properties–where most of their life earnings were invested–were not compensated. As a result of evictions, there were scores of destitute elderly former farmers and former farm workers.

The government established the Zimbabwe Land Commission in 2015 as a mechanism for dispossessed farmers to claim compensation for seized lands. The CFU reported the commission had functioned as an arbiter in zoning disputes, but it had not provided compensation to any of its claimants.

Estimates by the CFU put the number of remaining white commercial farmers at fewer than 400, although the exact number was unknown. Those remaining continued to be targeted, harassed, and threatened with eviction by farm beneficiaries, unemployed youth, and individuals hired by those standing to benefit.

In January the government announced it would grant white farmers 99-year leases on their remaining land, but the CFU and other NGOs pointed out the leases do not constitute legal property rights that banks would accept as collateral for loans. CFU reports none of its members had received a 99-year lease, citing in part a cumbersome application process set by the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement.

In March 2017 officials purporting to represent the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement and police arbitrarily demolished and burned the homes of approximately 200 families on Arnold Farm in Mashonaland Central, reportedly owned by former president Mugabe’s family. Farm residents obtained a High Court order to stop the evictions. Police allegedly told lawyers representing the farm residents that they were acting on the orders of their superiors but did not have a High Court order approving the evictions. Antiriot police ordered residents to leave the farm and destroyed property, attacking those who resisted. In August those who remained reported suspected ZANU-PF youth members trespassed on the property and damaged farming equipment before security guards chased them away.

The law permits the interception and monitoring of any communication (including telephone, postal mail, email, and internet traffic) in the course of transmission through a telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. Civil liberties advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and target political and civil society activists (see Section 2.a.).