Argentina
Executive Summary
Argentina presents significant investment and trade opportunities, particularly in infrastructure, health, agriculture, information technology, energy, and mining. In 2018, President Mauricio Macri continued to reform the market-distorting economic policies of his immediate predecessors. Since entering office in December 2015, the Macri administration has taken steps to reduce bureaucratic hurdles in business creation, enacted some tax reforms, courted foreign direct investment, and attempted to implement labor reforms through sector-specific agreements with unions. However, Argentina’s economic recession coupled with the political stagnation of an election year have reduced the Macri administration’s ability to enact pro-business reforms and have choked international investment to Argentina.
In 2018, Argentina´s economy suffered from stagnant economic growth, high unemployment, and soaring inflation: economic activity fell 2.6 percent and annual inflation rate reached 47.6 percent by the end of year. This deteriorating macroeconomic situation prevented the Macri administration from implementing structural reforms that could address some of the drivers of the stagflation: high tax rates, high labor costs, access to financing, cumbersome bureaucracy, and outdated infrastructure. In September 2018, Argentina established a new export tax on most goods through December 31, 2020, and in January 2019, began applying a similar tax of 12 percent on most exports of services. To account for fluctuations in the exchange rate, the export tax on these goods and services may not exceed four pesos per dollar exported. Except for the case of the energy sector, the government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to curb the power of labor unions and enact the reforms required to attract international investors.
The Macri administration has been successful in re-establishing the country as a world player. Argentina assumed the G-20 Presidency on December 1, 2017, and hosted over 45 G-20 meetings in 2018, culminating with the Leaders’ Summit in Buenos Aires. The country also held the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) presidency for 2017-2018 and served as host of the WTO Ministerial in 2017.
In 2018, Argentina moved up eight places in the Competitiveness Ranking of the World Economic Forum (WEF), which measures how productively a country uses its available resources, to 81 out of 140 countries, and 10 out of the 21 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Argentina is courting an EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement and is increasing engagement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the goal of an invitation for accession this year. Argentina ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on January 22, 2018. Argentina and the United States continue to expand bilateral commercial and economic cooperation, specifically through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the Commercial Dialogue, the Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Investment and Energy Cooperation, and the Digital Economy Working Group, in order to improve and facilitate public-private ties and communication on trade and investment issues, including market access and intellectual property rights. More than 300 U.S. companies operate in Argentina, and the United States continues to be the top investor in Argentina with more than USD $14.9 billion (stock) of foreign direct investment as of 2017.
Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
The Macri government actively seeks foreign direct investment. To improve the investment climate, the Macri administration has enacted reforms to simplify bureaucratic procedures in an effort to provide more transparency, reduce costs, diminish economic distortions by adopting good regulatory practices, and increase capital market efficiencies. Since 2016, Argentina has expanded economic and commercial cooperation with key partners including Chile, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Canada, and the United States, and deepened its engagement in international fora such as the G-20, WTO, and OECD.
Over the past year, Argentina issued new regulations in the gas and energy, communications, technology, and aviation industries to improve competition and provide incentives aimed to attract investment in those sectors. Argentina seeks tenders for investment in wireless infrastructure, oil and gas, lithium mines, renewable energy, and other areas. However, many of the public-private partnership projects for public infrastructure planned for 2018 had to be delayed or canceled due to Argentina’s broader macroeconomic difficulties and ongoing corruption investigations into public works projects.
Foreign and domestic investors generally compete under the same conditions in Argentina. The amount of foreign investment is restricted in specific sectors such as aviation and media. Foreign ownership of rural productive lands, bodies of water, and areas along borders is also restricted.
Argentina has a national Investment and Trade Promotion Agency that provides information and consultation services to investors and traders on economic and financial conditions, investment opportunities, Argentine laws and regulations, and services to help Argentine companies establish a presence abroad. The agency also provides matchmaking services and organizes roadshows and trade delegations. The agency’s web portal provides detailed information on available services (http://www.produccion.gob.ar/agencia). Many of the 24 provinces also have their own provincial investment and trade promotion offices.
The Macri administration welcomes dialogue with investors. Argentine officials regularly host roundtable discussions with visiting business delegations and meet with local and foreign business chambers. During official visits over the past year to the United States, China, India, Vietnam, and Europe, among others, Argentine delegations often met with host country business leaders.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
Foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law 19,550), the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, and rules issued by the regulatory agencies. Foreign private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in nearly all sectors.
Full foreign equity ownership of Argentine businesses is not restricted, for the most part, with exception in the air transportation and media industries. The share of foreign capital in companies that provide commercial passenger transportation within the Argentine territory is limited to 49 percent per the Aeronautic Code Law 17,285. The company must be incorporated according to Argentine law and domiciled in Buenos Aires. In the media sector, Law 25,750 establishes a limit on foreign ownership in television, radio, newspapers, journals, magazines, and publishing companies to 30 percent.
Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes that a foreigner cannot own land that allows for the extension of existing bodies of water or that are located near a Border Security Zone. In February 2012, the government issued Decree 274/2012 further restricting foreign ownership to a maximum of 30 percent of national land and 15 percent of productive land. Foreign individuals or foreign company ownership is limited to 1,000 hectares (2,470 acres) in the most productive farming areas. In June 2016, the Macri administration issued Decree 820 easing the requirements for foreign land ownership by changing the percentage that defines foreign ownership of a person or company, raising it from 25 percent to 51 percent of the social capital of a legal entity. Waivers are not available.
Argentina does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not at a disadvantage to other foreign investors or singled out for discriminatory treatment.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
Argentina was last subject to an investment policy review by the OECD in 1997 and a trade policy review by the WTO in 2013. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has not done an investment policy review of Argentina.
Business Facilitation
Since entering into office in December 2015, the Macri administration has enacted reforms to normalize financial and commercial transactions and facilitate business creation and cross-border trade. These reforms include eliminating capital controls, reducing some export taxes and import restrictions, reducing business administrative processes, decreasing tax burdens, increasing businesses’ access to financing, and streamlining customs controls.
In October 2016, the Ministry of Production issued Decree 1079/2016, easing bureaucratic hurdles for foreign trade and creating a Single Window for Foreign Trade (“VUCE” for its Spanish acronym). The VUCE centralizes the administration of all required paperwork for the import, export, and transit of goods (e.g., certificates, permits, licenses, and other authorizations and documents). Argentina subjects imports to automatic or non-automatic licenses that are managed through the Comprehensive Import Monitoring System (SIMI, or Sistema Integral de Monitoreo de Importaciones), established in December 2015 by the National Tax Agency (AFIP by its Spanish acronym) through Resolutions 5/2015 and 3823/2015. The SIMI system requires importers to submit detailed information electronically about goods to be imported into Argentina. Once the information is submitted, the relevant Argentine government agencies can review the application through the VUCE and make any observations or request additional information. The number of products subjected to non-automatic licenses has been modified several times, resulting in a net decrease since the beginning of the SIMI system.
The Argentine Congress approved an Entrepreneurs’ Law in March 2017, which allows for the creation of a simplified joint-stock company (SAS, or Sociedad por Acciones Simplifacada) online within 24 hours of registration. Detailed information on how to register a SAS is available at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/crear-una-sociedad-por-acciones-simplificada-sas . As of April 2019, the online business registration process is only available for companies located in Buenos Aires. The government is working on expanding the SAS to other provinces. Further information can be found at http://www.produccion.gob.ar/todo-sobre-la-ley-de-emprendedores/.
Foreign investors seeking to set up business operations in Argentina follow the same procedures as domestic entities without prior approval and under the same conditions as local investors. To open a local branch of a foreign company in Argentina, the parent company must be legally registered in Argentina. Argentine law requires at least two equity holders, with the minority equity holder maintaining at least a five percent interest. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing itself in Argentina must legalize the parent company’s documents, register the incoming foreign capital with the Argentine Central Bank, and obtain a trading license.
A company must register its name with the Office of Corporations (IGJ, or Inspeccion General de Justicia). The IGJ website describes the registration process and some portions can be completed online (http://www.jus.gob.ar/igj/tramites/guia-de-tramites/inscripcion-en-el-registro-publico-de-comercio.aspx ). Once the IGJ registers the company, the company must request that the College of Public Notaries submit the company’s accounting books to be certified with the IGJ. The company’s legal representative must obtain a tax identification number from AFIP, register for social security, and obtain blank receipts from another agency. Companies can register with AFIP online at www.afip.gob.ar or by submitting the sworn affidavit form No. 885 to AFIP.
Details on how to register a company can be found at the Ministry of Production and Labor’s website: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/crear-una-empresa . Instructions on how to obtain a tax identification code can be found at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/obtener-el-cuit .
The enterprise must also provide workers’ compensation insurance for its employees through the Workers’ Compensation Agency (ART, or Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo). The company must register and certify its accounting of wages and salaries with the Directorate of Labor, within the Ministry of Production and Labor.
In April 2016, the Small Business Administration of the United States and the Ministry of Production of Argentina signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to set up small and medium sized business development centers (SBDCs) in Argentina. The goal of the MOU is to provide small businesses with tools to improve their productivity and increase their growth. Under the MOU, in June 2017, Argentina set up the first SBDC pilot in the province of Neuquen.
The Ministry of Production and Labor offers a wide range of attendance-based courses and online training for businesses. The full training menu can be viewed at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/capacitacion
Outward Investment
Argentina does not have a governmental agency to promote Argentine investors to invest abroad nor does it have any restrictions for a domestic investor investing overseas.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Government incentives do not make any distinction between foreign and domestic investors.
The Argentine government offers a number of investment promotion programs at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels to attract investment to specific economic sectors such as capital assets and infrastructure, innovation and technological development, and energy, with no discrimination between national or foreign-owned enterprises. They also offer incentives to encourage the productive development of specific geographical areas. The Investment and International Trade Promotion Agency provides cost-free assessment and information to investors to facilitate operations in the country. Argentina’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: http://www.investandtrade.org.ar/?lang=en http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/en/where_tax_benefits.php?wia=1&lang=en<http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/docs/pdf/Doing_Business_in_Argentina-2018.pdf, and http://www.produccion.gob.ar.
The National Fund for the Development of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises provides low cost credit to small and medium-sized enterprises for investment projects, labor, capital, and energy efficiency improvement with no distinction between national or foreign-owned enterprises. More information can be found at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/financiamiento
The Ministry of Production and Labor supports numerous employment training programs that are frequently free to the participants and do not differentiate based on nationality.
Some of the investment promotion programs require investments within a specific region or locality, industry, or economic activity. Some programs offer refunds on Value-Added Tax (VAT) or other tax incentives for local production of capital goods.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Argentina has two types of tax-exempt trading areas: Free Trade Zones (FTZ), which are located throughout the country, and the more comprehensive Special Customs Area (SCA), which covers all of Tierra del Fuego Province and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2023.
Argentine law defines an FTZ as a territory outside the “general customs area” (GCA, i.e., the rest of Argentina) where neither the inflows nor outflows of exported final merchandise are subject to tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or other taxes on goods. Goods produced within a FTZ generally cannot be shipped to the GCA unless they are capital goods not produced in the rest of the country. The labor, sanitary, ecological, safety, criminal, and financial regulations within FTZs are the same as those that prevail in the GCA. Foreign firms receive national treatment in FTZs.
Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ may receive export incentive benefits, if applicable, only after the goods are exported from the FTZ to a third country destination. Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ and later exported to another country is not exempt from export taxes. Any value added in an FTZ or re-export from an FTZ is exempt from export taxes. For more information on FTZ in Argentina see: http://www.afip.gob.ar/zonasFrancas/ .
Products manufactured in an SCA may enter the GCA free from taxes or tariffs. In addition, the government may enact special regulations that exempt products shipped through an SCA (but not manufactured therein) from all forms of taxation except excise taxes. The SCA program provides benefits for established companies that meet specific production and employment objectives.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Employment and Investor Requirements
The Argentine national government does not have local employment mandates nor does it apply such schemes to senior management or boards of directors. However, certain provincial governments do require employers to hire a certain percentage of their workforce from provincial residents. There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. Under Argentine Law, conditions to invest are equal for national and foreign investors. As of March 2018, citizens of MERCOSUR countries can obtain legal residence within five months and at little cost, which grants permission to work. Argentina suspended its method for expediting this process in early 2018.
Goods, Technology, and Data Treatment
Argentina has local content requirements for specific sectors. Requirements are applicable to domestic and foreign investors equally. Argentine law establishes a national preference for local industry for most government procurement if the domestic supplier’s tender is no more than five to seven percent higher than the foreign tender. The amount by which the domestic bid may exceed a foreign bid depends on the size of the domestic company making the bid. On May 10, 2018, Argentina issued Law 27,437, giving additional priority to Argentine small and medium-sized enterprises and, separately, requiring that foreign companies that win a tender must subcontract domestic companies to cover 20 percent of the value of the work. The preference applies to procurement by all government agencies, public utilities, and concessionaires. There is similar legislation at the sub-national (provincial) level.
On September 5, 2018, the government issued Decree 800/2018, which provides the regulatory framework for Law 27,437. On November 16, 2016, the government passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law (27,328) that regulates public-private contracts. The law lowered regulatory barriers to foreign investment in public infrastructure projects with the aim of attracting more foreign direct investment. Several projects under the PPP initiative have been canceled or put on hold due to an ongoing investigation on corruption in public works projects during the last administration. The PPP law contains a “Buy Argentina” clause that mandates at least 33 percent local content for every public project.
Argentina is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but it became an observer to the GPA in February 1997.
On July 5, 2016, the Ministry of Production and Labor and the Ministry of Energy and Mining issued Joint Resolutions 123 and 313, which allow companies to obtain tax benefits on purchases of solar or wind energy equipment for use in investment projects that incorporate at least 60 percent local content in their electromechanical installations. In cases where local supply is insufficient to reach the 60 percent threshold, the threshold can be reduced to 30 percent. The resolutions also provide tax exemptions for imports of capital and intermediate goods that are not locally produced for use in the investment projects.
On August 1, 2016, Argentina passed law 27,263, implemented by Resolution 599-E/2016, which provides tax credits to automotive manufacturers for the purchase of locally-produced automotive parts and accessories incorporated into specific types of vehicles. The tax credits range from 4 percent to 15 percent of the value of the purchased parts. The list of vehicle types included in the regime can be found here: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/260000-264999/263955/norma.htm . On April 20, 2018, Argentina issued Resolution 28/2018, simplifying the procedure for obtaining the tax credits. The resolution also establishes that if the national content drops below the minimum required by the resolution because of relative price changes due to exchange rate fluctuations, automotive manufacturers will not be considered non-compliant with the regime. However, the resolution sets forth that tax benefits will be suspended for the quarter when the drop was registered.
The Media Law, enacted in 2009 and amended in 2015, requires companies to produce advertising and publicity materials locally or to include 60 percent local content. The Media Law also establishes a 70 percent local production content requirement for companies with radio licenses. Additionally, the Media Law requires that 50 percent of the news and 30 percent of the music that is broadcast on the radio be of Argentine origin. In the case of private television operators, at least 60 percent of broadcast content must be of Argentine origin. Of that 60 percent, 30 percent must be local news and 10 to 30 percent must be local independent content.
Argentina establishes percentages of local content in the production process for manufacturers of mobile and cellular radio communication equipment operating in Tierra del Fuego province. Resolution 66, issued July 12, 2018, replaces Resolution 1219/2015 and maintains the local content requirement for products such as technical manuals, packaging, and labeling. Resolution 66 eliminated the local content requirement imposed by Resolution 1219 for batteries, screws, and chargers. The percentage of local content required ranges from 10 percent to 100 percent depending on the process or item. In cases where local supply is insufficient to meet local content requirements, companies may apply for an exemption that is subject to review every six months. A detailed description of local content percentage requirements can be found here .
There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, nor does the government prevent companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory.
Argentina does not have forced localization of content in technology or requirements of data storage in country.
Investment Performance Requirements
There is no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors in investment incentives. There are no performance requirements. A complete guide of incentives for investors in Argentina can be found at: http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/invest_argentina.php .
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Macri administration has enacted a series of macroeconomic reforms (unifying the exchange rate, settling with holdout creditors, annulling most of the trade restrictions, lifting capital controls, to mention a few) to improve the investment climate. In May 2018, the Congress approved a new capital markets law aimed at boosting economic growth through the development and deepening of the local capital market. The law removed over-reaching regulatory intervention provisions introduced by the previous government and eased restrictions on mutual funds and foreign portfolio investment in domestic markets. Argentina also signed several bilateral agreements and MOUs with other countries aimed to increase foreign direct investment. There are no restrictions on payments and transfers abroad (in accordance with IMF Article VIII).
The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comision Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 16 percent of GDP, according to the World Bank. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores).
U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina.
Money and Banking System
Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. The main challenge for banks is to rebuild long-term assets and liabilities. Due to adverse international and domestic conditions with the economy entering into a recession with high inflation and interest rates, credit to the private sector in local currency (for both corporations and individuals) decreased 18 percent in real terms in 2018. In spite of falling credit, banks remain well equipped to weather weak economic conditions. The largest bank is the Banco de la Nacion Argentina. Non-performing private sector loans constitute less than four percent of banks’ portfolios. The ten largest private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 2,643 billion (USD 64 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 5,506 billion (USD 134 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system.
Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years.
The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Blockchain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using blockchain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally. One Argentine NGO, through funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), is developing blockchain-based banking applications to assist low income populations.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
President Macri has issued a number of regulations that lifted all capital controls and reduced trade restrictions. In November 2017, the government repealed the obligation to convert hard currency earnings on exports of both goods and services to pesos in the local foreign exchange market.
Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The BCRA limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 10 percent of their net worth.
In June 2018, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Argentina announced a Standby Arrangement agreement (SBA). Three months after agreeing to a USD 50 billion SBA, Argentina and the IMF announced in September 2018 a set of revisions, including an increase of the line of credit by USD 7.1 billion and front loading the disbursement of funds. The revised program sought to erase any doubts about the government’s ability to cover its financing needs for 2018 and 2019 and in turn, Argentina committed to meeting strict new budget and monetary policy targets. On the monetary side, the BCRA replaced inflation targeting with a policy to ensure zero growth of the monetary base through December 2019. The BCRA also allows the exchange rate to float freely between a floor and ceiling of 34 and 44 pesos per dollar (at the time of introducing the framework).
Originally, the BCRA hoped that the floor and ceiling bounds would avoid a real appreciation of the peso; the adjustment started with a 3 percent monthly increase for the last quarter of 2018, and would drop to a monthly 1.75 percent increase for the second quarter of 2019. However, in mid-April 2019, the BCRA announced that the floor and ceiling will remain constant until the end of 2019, at 39.8 and 51.5 pesos per dollar, respectively. Under this framework, the BCRA may only sell up to USD 150 million reserves per day when trading above the ceiling.
Remittance Policies
According to Resolutions 3,819/2015 and 1/2017, companies and investors have no official restrictions on money conversion, remittances, or repatriation of their earnings.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
The Argentine Government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund.
9. Corruption
Argentina’s legal system incorporates several measures to address public sector corruption. The government institutions tasked with combatting corruption include the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), the National Auditor General, and the General Comptroller’s Office. Public officials are subject to financial disclosure laws, and the Ministry of Justice’s ACO is responsible for analyzing and investigating federal executive branch officials based on their financial disclosure forms. The ACO is also responsible for investigating corruption within the federal executive branch or in matters involving federal funds, except for funds transferred to the provinces. While the ACO does not have authority to independently prosecute cases, it can refer cases to other agencies or serve as the plaintiff and request a judge to initiate a case.
Argentina enacted a new Corporate Criminal Liability Law in November 2017 following the advice of the OECD to comply with its Anti-Bribery Convention. The full text of Law 27,401 can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/295000-299999/296846/norma.htm . The new law entered into force in early 2018. It extends anti-bribery criminal sanctions to corporations, whereas previously they only applied to individuals; expands the definition of prohibited conduct, including illegal enrichment of public officials; and allows Argentina to hold Argentines responsible for foreign bribery. Sanctions include fines and blacklisting from public contracts. Argentina also enacted an express prohibition on the tax deductibility of bribes.
Corruption has been an issue in Argentina. In its March 2017 report, the OECD expressed concern about Argentina’s enforcement of foreign bribery laws, inefficiencies in the judicial system, politicization and perceived lack of independence at the Attorney General’s Office, and lack of training and awareness for judges and prosecutors. According to the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators, corruption remains an area of concern in Argentina. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks countries and territories by their perceived levels of corruption, Argentina ranked 85 out of 180 countries in 2018, an improvement of 10 places versus 2016. Allegations of corruption in provincial as well as federal courts remained frequent. Few Argentine companies have implemented anti-foreign bribery measures beyond limited codes of ethics.
Since assuming office, President Macri made combating corruption and improving government transparency a priority objective for his administration. In September 2016, Congress passed a law on public access to information. The law explicitly applies to all three branches of the federal government, the public justice offices, and entities such as businesses, political parties, universities, and trade associations that receive public funding. It requires these institutions to respond to citizen requests for public information within 15 days, with an additional 15-day extension available for “exceptional” circumstances. Sanctions apply for noncompliance. The law also mandates the creation of the Agency for Access to Public Information, an autonomous office within the executive branch. President Macri also proposed a series of criminal justice and administrative reforms. Chief among these are measures to speed the recovery of assets acquired through corruption, plea-bargaining-type incentives to encourage judicial cooperation, and greater financial disclosure for public servants. In early 2016, the Argentine government reaffirmed its commitment to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), became a founding member of the Global Anti-Corruption Coalition, and reengaged the OECD Working Group on Bribery.
Argentina is a party to the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption. It ratified in 2001 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention). Argentina also signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and participates in UNCAC’s Conference of State Parties. Argentina also participates in the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC).
Since Argentina became a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, allegations of Argentine individuals or companies bribing foreign officials have surfaced. A March 2017 report by the OECD Working Group on Bribery indicated there were 13 known foreign bribery allegations involving Argentine companies and individuals as of that date. According to the report, Argentine authorities investigated and closed some of the allegations and declined to investigate others. The authorities determined some allegations did not involve foreign bribery but rather other offenses. Several such allegations remained under investigation.
Resources to Report Corruption
Laura Alonso
Director
Government of Argentina Anti-Corruption Office
Oficina Anticorrupción, Tucumán 394, C1049AAH, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Phone: +54 11 5167 6400
Email: anticorrupcion@jus.gov.ar and http://denuncias.anticorrupcion.gob.ar/
Poder Ciudadano (Local Transparency International Affiliate)
Phone: +54 11 4331 4925 ext 225
Fax: +54 11 4331 4925
Email: comunicaciones@poderciudadano.org
Website: http://www.poderciudadano.org
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
* https://www.indec.gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/pib_03_19.pdf ; www.bcra.gov.ar
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data |
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) |
Inward Direct Investment |
Outward Direct Investment |
Total Inward |
$80,373 |
100% |
Total Outward |
N/A |
100% |
United States |
$17,713 |
22% |
|
N/A |
N/A |
Spain |
$13,874 |
17% |
|
N/A |
N/A |
Netherlands |
$9,300 |
12% |
|
N/A |
N/A |
Brazil |
$4,983 |
6% |
|
N/A |
N/A |
Chile |
$4,650 |
6% |
|
N/A |
N/A |
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. |
No information from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for Outward Direct Investment is available for Argentina.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.
Brazil
Executive Summary
Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the eighth largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the fourth largest destination for global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2017. In recent years, Brazil received more than half of South America’s total incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) reported the United States had the largest single-country stock of FDI by final ownership, representing 22 percent of all FDI in Brazil (USD 118.7 billion) in 2017, the latest year with available data. The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in infrastructure during 2017 and 2018.
The current economic recovery, which started in the first quarter of 2017, ended the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expanded by 1.1 percent in 2018, below most initial market analysts’ projections of 3 percent growth in 2018. Analysts forecast a 2 percent growth rate for 2019. The unemployment rate reached 11.6 percent at the end of 2018. Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for FDI in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD. The nominal budget deficit stood at 7.1 percent of GDP (USD132.5 billion) in 2018 and is projected to end 2019 at around 6.5 percent of GDP (USD 148.5 billion). Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 76.7 percent in 2018 with projections to reach 83 percent by the end of 2019. The BCB has maintained its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate at 6.5 percent since March 2018 (from a high of 13.75 percent at the end of 2016).
President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, following the interim presidency by President Michel Temer, who had assumed office after the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016. Temer’s administration pursued corrective macroeconomic policies to stabilize the economy, such as a landmark federal spending cap in December 2016 and a package of labor market reforms in 2017. President Bolsonaro’s economic team pledged to continue pushing reforms needed to help control costs of Brazil’s pension system, and has made that issue its top economic priority. Further reforms are also planned to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system. In addition to current economic difficulties, since 2014, Brazil’s anti-corruption oversight bodies have been investigating allegations of widespread corruption that have moved beyond state-owned energy firm Petrobras and a number of private construction companies to include companies in other economic sectors.
Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors. Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, and air transport sectors. The Brazilian Congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property and air carriers.
Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil. Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, still relatively rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil.
Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD. The GoB actively encourages FDI – particularly in the automobile, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and transportation infrastructure sectors – to introduce greater innovation into Brazil’s economy and to generate economic growth. GoB investment incentives include tax exemptions and low-cost financing with no distinction made between domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investment is restricted in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, insurance, and air transport sectors.
The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) plays a leading role in attracting FDI to Brazil by working to identify business opportunities, promoting strategic events, and lending support to foreign investors willing to allocate resources to Brazil. APEX is not a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, but the agency can assist in all steps of the investor’s decision-making process, to include identifying and contacting potential industry segments, sector and market analyses, and general guidelines on legal and fiscal issues. Their services are free of charge. The website for APEX is: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en .
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
A 1995 constitutional amendment (EC 6/1995) eliminated distinctions between foreign and local capital, ending favorable treatment (e.g. tax incentives, preference for winning bids) for companies using only local capital. However, constitutional law restricts foreign investment in the healthcare (Law 13097/2015), mass media (Law 10610/2002), telecommunications (Law 12485/2011), aerospace (Law 7565/1986 a, Decree 6834/2009, updated by Law 12970/2014, Law 13133/2015, and Law 13319/2016), rural property (Law 5709/1971), maritime (Law 9432/1997, Decree 2256/1997), insurance (Law 11371/2006), and air transport sectors (Law 13319/2016).
Screening of FDI
Foreigners investing in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the BCB within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil. In cases of investments involving royalties and technology transfer, investors must register with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). Investors must also have a local representative in Brazil. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM).
To enter Brazil’s insurance and reinsurance market, U.S. companies must establish a subsidiary, enter into a joint venture, acquire a local firm, or enter into a partnership with a local company. The BCB reviews banking license applications on a case-by-case basis. Foreign interests own or control 20 of the top 50 banks in Brazil. Santander is the only major wholly foreign-owned retail bank remaining in Brazil. Brazil’s anti-trust authorities (CADE) approved Itau bank’s purchase of Citibank’s Brazilian retail banking operation in August 2017. In June 2016, CADE approved Bradesco bank’s purchase of HSBC’s Brazilian retail banking operation.
Currently, foreign ownership of airlines is limited to 20 percent. Congressman Carlos Cadoca (PCdoB-PE) presented a bill to Brazilian Congress in August of 2015 to allow for 100 percent foreign ownership of Brazilian airlines (PL 2724/2015). The bill was approved by the lower house, and since March 2019, it is pending a Senate vote. In 2011, the United States and Brazil signed an Air Transport Agreement as a step towards an Open Skies relationship that would eliminate numerical limits on passenger and cargo flights between the two countries. Brazil’s lower house approved the agreement in December 2017, and the Senate ratified it in March 2018. The Open Skies agreement has now entered into force.
In July 2015, under National Council on Private Insurance (CNSP) Resolution 325, the Brazilian government announced a significant relaxation of some restrictions on foreign insurers’ participation in the Brazilian market, and in December 2017, the government eliminated restrictions on risk transfer operations involving companies under the same financial group. The new rules revoked the requirement to purchase a minimum percentage of reinsurance and eliminated a limitation or threshold for intra-group cession of reinsurance to companies headquartered abroad that are part of the same economic group. Rules on preferential offers to local reinsurers, which are set to decrease in increments from 40 percent in 2016 to 15 percent in 2020, remain unchanged. Foreign reinsurance firms must have a representation office in Brazil to qualify as an admitted reinsurer. Insurance and reinsurance companies must maintain an active registration with Brazil’s insurance regulator, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and maintaining a minimum solvency classification issued by a risk classification agency equal to Standard & Poor’s or Fitch ratings of at least BBB-.
In September 2011, Law 12485/2011 removed a 49 percent limit on foreign ownership of cable TV companies, and allowed telecom companies to offer television packages with their service. Content quotas require every channel to air at least three and a half hours per week of Brazilian programming during primetime. Additionally, one-third of all channels included in any TV package have to be Brazilian.
The National Land Reform and Settlement Institute administers the purchase and lease of Brazilian agricultural land by foreigners. Under the applicable rules, the area of agricultural land bought or leased by foreigners cannot account for more than 25 percent of the overall land area in a given municipal district. Additionally, no more than 10 percent of agricultural land in any given municipal district may be owned or leased by foreign nationals from the same country. The law also states that prior consent is needed for purchase of land in areas considered indispensable to national security and for land along the border. The rules also make it necessary to obtain congressional approval before large plots of agricultural land can be purchased by foreign nationals, foreign companies, or Brazilian companies with majority foreign shareholding. Draft Law 4059/2012, which would lift the limits on foreign ownership of agricultural land,
has been awaiting a vote in the Brazilian Congress since 2015.
Brazil is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but became an observer in October 2017. By statute, a Brazilian state enterprise may subcontract services to a foreign firm only if domestic expertise is unavailable. Additionally, U.S. and other foreign firms may only bid to provide technical services when there are no qualified Brazilian firms. U.S. companies need to enter into partnerships with local firms or have operations in Brazil in order to be eligible for “margins of preference” offered to domestic firms to participate in Brazil’s public sector procurement to help these firms win government tenders. Foreign companies are often successful in obtaining subcontracting opportunities with large Brazilian firms that win government contracts. Under trade bloc Mercosul’s Government Procurement Protocol, member nations Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment of government-procured goods, services, and public works originating from each other’s suppliers and providers. However, only Argentina has ratified the protocol, and per the Brazilian Ministry of Economy website, this protocol has been in revision since 2010, so it has not yet entered into force.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 2018 Brazil Economic Survey of Brazil highlights Brazil as a leading global economy. However, it notes that high commodity prices and labor force growth will no longer be able to sustain Brazil’s economic growth without deep structural reforms. While praising the Temer government for its reform plans, the OECD urged Brazil to pass all needed reforms to realize their full benefit. The OECD cautions about low investment rates in Brazil, and cites a World Economic Forum survey that ranks Brazil 116 out of 138 countries on infrastructure as an area in which Brazil must improve to maintain competitiveness.
The OECD’s March 15, 2019 Enlarged Investment Committee Report BRAZIL: Position Under the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations noted several areas in which Brazil needs to improve. These observations include, but are not limited to: restrictions to FDI requiring investors to incorporate or acquire residency in order to invest; lack of generalized screening or approval mechanisms for new investments in Brazil; sectoral restrictions on foreign ownership in media, private security and surveillance, air transport, mining, telecommunication services; and, restrictions for non-residents to own Brazilian flag vessels. The report did highlight several areas of improvement and the GoB’s pledge to ameliorate several ongoing irritants as well.
The IMF’s 2018 Country Report No. 18/253 on Brazil highlights that a mild recovery supported by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is currently underway. But the economy is underperforming relative to its potential, public debt is high and increasing, and, more importantly, medium-term growth prospects remain uninspiring, absent further reforms. The IMF advises that against the backdrop of tightening global financial conditions, placing Brazil on a path of strong, balanced, and durable growth requires a committed pursuit of fiscal consolidation, ambitious structural reforms, and a strengthening of the financial sector architecture. The WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Brazil notes the country’s open stance towards foreign investment, but also points to the many sector-specific limitations (see above). All three reports highlight the uncertainty regarding reform plans as the most significant political risk to the economy. These reports are located at the following links:
http://www.oecd.org/brazil/economic-survey-brazil.htm ,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Code-capital-movements-EN.pdf ,
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17216.ashx , and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp458_e.htm .
Business Facilitation
A company must register with the National Revenue Service (Receita) to obtain a business license and be placed on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ). Brazil’s Export Promotion and Investment Agency (APEX) has a mandate to facilitate foreign investment. The agency’s services are available to all investors, foreign and domestic. Foreign companies interested in investing in Brazil have access to many benefits and tax incentives granted by the Brazilian government at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Most incentives target specific sectors, amounts invested, and job generation. Brazil’s business registration website can be found at http://receita.economia.gov.br/orientacao/tributaria/cadastros/cadastro-nacional-de-pessoas-juridicas-cnpj .
Outward Investment
Brazil does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, and APEX-Brasil supports Brazilian companies’ efforts to invest abroad under its “internationalization program”: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/como-a-apex-brasil-pode-ajudar-na-internacionalizacao-de-sua-empresa . Apex-Brasil frequently highlights the United States as an excellent destination for outbound investment. Apex-Brasil and SelectUSA (the U.S. government’s investment promotion office at the U.S. Department of Commerce) signed a memorandum of cooperation to promote bilateral investment in February 2014.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The GoB extends tax benefits for investments in less developed parts of the country, including the Northeast and the Amazon regions, with equal application to foreign and domestic investors. These incentives were successful in attracting major foreign plants to areas like the Manaus Free Trade Zone in Amazonas State, but most foreign investment remains concentrated in the more industrialized southern states in Brazil.
Individual states seek to attract private investment by offering tax benefits and infrastructure support to companies, negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Competition among states to attract employment-generating investment leads some states to challenge such tax benefits as beggar-thy-neighbor fiscal competition.
While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, the state-owned Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) is the traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit as well as export credits. BNDES provides foreign- and domestically-owned companies operating in Brazil financing for the manufacturing and marketing of capital goods and primary infrastructure projects. BNDES provides much of its financing at subsidized interest rates. As part of its package of fiscal tightening, in December 2014, the GoB announced its intention to scale back the expansionary activities of BNDES and ended direct Treasury support to the bank. Law 13483, from September 2017, created a new Long-Term Lending Rate (TLP) for BNDES, which will be phased-in to replace the prior subsidized loans starting on January 1, 2018. After a five-year phase in period, the TLP will float with the market and reflect a premium over Brazil’s five-year bond yield (a rate that incorporates inflation). The GoB plans to reduce BNDES’s role further as it continues to promote the development of long-term private capital markets.
In January 2015, the GoB eliminated the industrial products tax (IPI) exemptions on vehicles, while keeping all other tax incentives provided by the October 2012 Inovar-Auto program. Through Inovar-Auto, auto manufacturers were able to apply for tax credits based on their ability to meet certain criteria promoting research and development and local content. Following successful WTO challenges against the trade-restrictive impacts of some of its tax benefits, the government allowed Inovar-Auto program to expire on December 31, 2017. Although the government has announced a new package of investment incentives for the auto sector, Rota 2030, it remains at the proposal stage, with no scheduled date for a vote or implementation.
On February 27, 2015, Decree 8415 reduced tax incentives for exports, known as the Special Regime for the Reinstatement of Taxes for Exporters, or Reintegra Program. Decree 8415 reduced the previous three percent subsidy on the value of the exports to one percent for 2015, to 0.1 percent for 2016, and two percent for 2017 and 2018.
Brazil provides tax reductions and exemptions on many domestically-produced information and communication technology (ICT) and digital goods that qualify for status under the Basic Production Process (PPB). The PPB is product-specific and stipulates which stages of the manufacturing process must be carried out in Brazil in order for an ICT product to be considered produced in Brazil. The major fiscal benefits of the National Broadband Plan (PNBL) and supporting implementation plan (REPNBL-Redes) have either expired or been revoked. In 2017, Brazil held a public consultation on a National Connectivity Plan to replace the PNBL, but has not yet published a final version.
Under Law 12598/2013, Brazil offers tax incentives ranging from 13 percent to 18 percent to officially classified “Strategic Defense Firms” (must have Brazilian control of voting shares) as well as to “Defense Firms” (can be foreign-owned) that produce identified strategic defense goods. The tax incentives for strategic firms can apply to their entire supply chain, including foreign suppliers. The law is currently undergoing a revision, expected to be complete in 2018.
Industrial Promotion
The InovAtiva Brasil and Startup Brasil programs support start-ups in the country. The GoB also uses free trade zones to incentivize industrial production. A complete description of the scope and scale of Brazil’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en/home .
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
The federal government grants tax benefits to certain free trade zones. Most of these free trade zones aim to attract investment to the country’s relatively underdeveloped North and Northeast regions. The most prominent of these is the Manaus Free Trade Zone, in Amazonas State, which has attracted significant foreign investment, including from U.S. companies. Constitutional amendment 83/2014 came into force in August 2014 and extended the status of Manaus Free Trade Zone until the year 2073.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Government Procurement Preferences: The GoB maintains a variety of localization barriers to trade in response to the weak competitiveness of its domestic tech industry.
- Tax incentives for locally sourced information and communication technology (ICT) goods and equipment (Basic Production Process (PPB), Law 8248/91, and Portaria 87/2013);
- Government procurement preferences for local ICT hardware and software (2014 Decrees 8184, 8185, 8186, 8194, and 2013 Decree 7903); and the CERTICS Decree (8186), which aims to certify that software programs are the result of development and technological innovation in Brazil.
Presidential Decree 8135/2013 (Decree 8135) regulated the use of IT services provided to the Federal government by privately and state-owned companies, including the provision that Federal IT communications be hosted by Federal IT agencies. In 2015, the Ministry of Planning developed regulations to implement Decree 8135, which included the requirement to disclose source code if requested. On December 26, 2018, President Michel Temer approved and signed the Decree 9.637/2018, which revoked Decree 8.135/2013 and eliminated the source code disclosure requirements.
The Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) mandated the localization of all government data stored on the cloud during a review of cloud computing services contracted by the Brazilian government in Ordinance No. 9 (previously NC 14), this was made official in March 2018. While it does provide for the use of cloud computing for non-classified information, it imposes a data localization requirement on all use of cloud computing by the Brazil government.
Investors in certain sectors in Brazil must adhere to the country’s regulated prices, which fall into one of two groups: those regulated at the federal level by a federal company or agency, and those set by sub-national governments (states or municipalities). Regulated prices managed at the federal level include telephone services, certain refined oil and gas products (such as bottled cooking gas), electricity, and healthcare plans. Regulated prices controlled by sub-national governments include water and sewage fees, vehicle registration fees, and most fees for public transportation, such as local bus and rail services. As part of its fiscal adjustment strategy, Brazil sharply increased regulated prices in January 2015.
For firms employing three or more persons, Brazilian nationals must constitute at least two-thirds of all employees and receive at least two-thirds of total payroll, according to Brazilian Labor Law Articles 352 to 354. This calculation excludes foreign specialists in fields where Brazilians are unavailable.
Decree 7174 from 2010, which regulates the procurement of information technology goods and services, requires federal agencies and parastatal entities to give preferential treatment to domestically produced computer products and goods or services with technology developed in Brazil based on a complicated price/technology matrix.
Brazil’s Marco Civil, an Internet law that determines user rights and company responsibilities, states that data collected or processed in Brazil must respect Brazilian law, even if the data is subsequently stored outside the country. Penalties for non-compliance could include fines of up to 10 percent of gross Brazilian revenues and/or suspension or prohibition of related operations. Under the law, Internet connection and application providers must retain access logs for specified periods or face sanctions. While the Marco Civil does not require data to be stored in Brazil, any company investing in Brazil should closely track its provisions – as well provisions of other legislation and regulations, including a data privacy bill passed in August 2018 and cloud computing regulations.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) embarked in October 2016 on a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to 6.5 percent in December 2018. Inflation for 2018 was 3.67 percent, within the 1.5 percent plus/minus of the 4 percent target. In June 2018, the National Monetary Council (CMN) set the BCB’s inflation target to 4.25 percent in 2019, 4.5 percent in 2020, and 3.75 percent for 2021. Because of a heavy public debt burden and other structural factors, most analysts expect the “neutral” policy rate will remain higher than target rates in Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the forecast period.
After a boom in 2004-2012 that more than doubled the lending/GDP ratio (to 55 percent of GDP), the recession and higher interest rates significantly decreased lending. In fact, the lending/GDP ratio remained below 55 percent at year-end 2017. Financial analysts contend that credit will pick up again in the medium term, owing to interest rate easing and economic recovery.
The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, with public banks now accounting for over 55 percent of total loans to the private sector (up from 35 percent). Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital.
While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit. BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES increased 27 percent year-over-year, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital.
The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) is the sole stock market in Brazil, while trading of public securities takes place at the Rio de Janeiro market. In 2008, the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F) merged with the BOVESPA to form what is now the fourth largest exchange in the Western Hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges. As of April 2019, there were 430 companies traded on the BM&F/BOVESPA. The BOVESPA index increased 15.03 percent in valuation during 2018. Foreign investors, both institutions and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives. Foreign investors are limited to trading derivatives and stocks of publicly held companies on established markets.
Wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil. Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks.
Money and Banking System
The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated. Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies. Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, and concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates. According to BCB data collected from 2011 through the first quarter of 2019, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks was 9.22 percent, with an average monthly high of 11.34 percent in July 2016, and an average monthly rate of 7.7 percent for March 2019.
The financial sector is concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the four largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 70 percent of the commercial banking sector assets, totaling USD 1.59 trillion as of Q1, 2019. Three of the five largest banks (by assets) in the country – Banco do Brasil, Caixa Economica Federal, and BNDES – are partially or completely federally owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies. Citibank sold its consumer business to Itau Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the sole U.S. bank operating in the country.
In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately. It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In April 2018, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 20 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative. The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies with penalties against insider trading.
Foreigners may find it difficult to open an account with a Brazilian bank. The individual must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number issued by the Brazilian government (CPF), either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income. On average, this process from application to account opening lasts more than three months
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small, despite recent growth. The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements, conducted in December 2016, showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps and currency options) was USD 19.7 billion, up from USD 17.2 billion in 2013. This was equivalent to around 0.3 percent of the global market in both years.
Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rates and fees. Per an April 2018 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, all banks exceeded required solvency ratios, and stress testing demonstrated the banking system has adequate loss absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios. Furthermore, the report noted 99.9 percent of banks already met Basel III requirements, and possess a projected Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio above the minimum 7 percent required at the beginning of 2019.
There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil. Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces. All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized.
The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans. In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.” In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity. Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian Senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB.
Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB. Early payments can also be made without additional approvals, if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt.
In March 2014, Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service consolidated the regulations on withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities resident or domiciled outside Brazil. The regulation states that the cost of acquisition must be calculated in Brazilian currency (reais). Also, the definition of “technical services” was broadened to include administrative support and consulting services rendered by individuals (employees or not) or resulting from automated structures having clear technological content.
Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties. Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes.
Remittance Policies
Under Law 13259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds. The capital gains marginal tax rates are: 15 percent up to USD 1.5 million in gains; 17.5 percent for USD 1.5 million to USD 2.9 million in gains; 20 percent for USD 2.9 million to USD 8.9 million in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than USD 8.9 million in gains.
Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962. Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Law 11887 established the Sovereign Fund of Brazil (FSB) in 2008. It was a non-commodity fund with a mandate to support national companies in their export activities and to offset counter-cyclical development, promoting investment in projects of strategic interest to Brazil both domestically and abroad. The GoB also had the authority to use money from this fund to help meet its fiscal targets when annual revenues were lower than expected, and to invest in state-owned companies. In May 2018, then-President Temer signed an executive order abolishing the fund. The money in the fund was earmarked for repayment of foreign debt.
9. Corruption
Brazil has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but their effectiveness is inconsistent. Several bills to revise the country’s regulation of the lobbying/government relations industry have been pending before Congress for years. Bribery is illegal, and a bribe by a local company to a foreign official can result in criminal penalties for individuals and administrative penalties for companies, including fines and potential disqualification from government contracts. A company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from its taxes. While federal government authorities generally investigate allegations of corruption, there are inconsistencies in the level of enforcement among individual states. Corruption is problematic in business dealings with some authorities, particularly at the municipal level. U.S. companies operating in Brazil are subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Brazil signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, and ratified it in 2005. Brazil is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on bribery. It was one of the founders, along with the United States, of the intergovernmental Open Government Partnership, which seeks to help governments increase transparency.
In 2018, Brazil ranked 105th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. The full report can be found at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
Since 2014, the federal criminal investigation known as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) has uncovered a complex web of public sector corruption, contract fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion stemming from systematic overcharging for government contracts, particularly at parastatal oil company Petrobras. The ongoing investigation led to the arrests of Petrobras executives, oil industry suppliers including executives from Brazil’s largest construction companies, money launderers, former politicians, and political party operatives. Many sitting Brazilian politicians are currently under investigation. In July 2017, former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula) was convicted of corruption and money laundering charges stemming from the Lava Jato investigation. The Brazilian authorities jailed Lula in April 2018, and the courts sentenced him in February 2019 to begin serving an almost 13-year prison sentence. In March 2019, authorities arrested former President Michel Temer on charges of corruption.
In December 2016, Brazilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht and its chemical manufacturing arm Braskem agreed to pay the largest FCPA penalty in U.S. history and plead guilty to charges filed in the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland that alleged the companies paid hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to government officials around the world. The U.S. Department of Justice case stemmed directly from theLava Jatoinvestigation and focused on violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Details on the case can be found at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve
In January 2018, Petrobras settled a class-action lawsuit with investors in U.S. federal court for USD 3 billion, which was one of the largest securities class action settlements in U.S. history. The investors alleged that Petrobras officials accepted bribes and made decisions that had a negative impact on Petrobras’ share value. In September 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Petrobras would pay a fine of USD 853.2 million to settle charges that former executives and directors violated the FCPA through fraudulent accounting used to conceal bribe payments from investors and regulators.
In 2015, GoB prosecutors announced Operacão Zelotes (Operation Zealots), in which both domestic and foreign firms were alleged to have bribed tax officials to reduce their assessments. The operation resulted in a complete closure and overhaul of Brazilian tax courts, including a reduction in the number of courts and judges as well as more subsequent rulings in favor of tax authorities.
Resources to Report Corruption
Petalla Brandao Timo Rodrigues
International Relations Chief Advisor
Brazilian Federal Public Ministry
contatolavajato@mpf.mp.br
Transparencia Brasil
Bela Cintra, 409; Sao Paulo, Brasil
+55 (11) 3259-6986
http://www.transparencia.org.br/contato
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
* IBGE and BCB data, year-end.
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data |
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, billions) |
Inward Direct Investment |
Outward Direct Investment |
Total Inward |
635.12 |
100% |
Total Outward |
254.23 |
100% |
Netherlands |
158.42 |
24.9% |
Cayman Islands |
72.58 |
28.5% |
United States |
109.61 |
17.3% |
British Virgin Islands |
46.73 |
18.4% |
Luxembourg |
60.12 |
6.5% |
Bahamas |
37.21 |
14.6% |
Spain |
57.98 |
9.1% |
Austria |
32.14 |
12.6% |
France |
33.30 |
5.2% |
United States |
14.92 |
5.9% |
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. |
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Assets |
Top Five Partners (billions, US Dollars) |
Total |
Equity Securities |
Total Debt Securities |
All Countries |
40.13 |
100% |
All Countries |
31.11 |
100% |
All Countries |
9.02 |
100% |
United States |
13.84 |
34.5% |
United States |
10.37 |
33.3% |
United States |
3.47 |
38.5% |
Bahamas |
6.80 |
16.9% |
Bahamas |
6.76 |
21.7% |
Spain |
2.64 |
29.3% |
Cayman Islands |
4.25 |
10.6% |
Cayman Islands |
3.93 |
12.6% |
Korea, South |
0.50 |
5.5% |
Spain |
3.72 |
9.3% |
Switzerland |
2.01 |
6.5% |
Switzerland |
0.41 |
4.5% |
Switzerland |
2.42 |
6.0% |
Luxembourg |
1.69 |
5.4% |
Denmark |
0.38 |
4.2% |
Chile
Executive Summary
As the seventh largest economy in the Western Hemisphere, Chile enjoys levels of stability and prosperity that are among the highest in the region. Chile’s solid macroeconomic policy framework has smoothed adjustment to economic cycles, contributing to relatively low unemployment, resilient household consumption, and a stable financial sector. Due to its attractive investment climate, trade openness, and reputation for strong financial institutions and sound policies, Chile also boasts the strongest sovereign bond rating in Latin America. The country’s economy grew 4 percent in 2018, and the forecast for Chile’s economic growth in 2019 is in the range of 3 percent to 4 percent.
Chile has successfully attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) despite its relatively small domestic market. The country’s market-oriented policies have created significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic growth. Chile has a sound legal framework and there is general respect for private property rights. Sectors that attract significant FDI include mining, finance/insurance, chemical manufacturing, and wholesale trade. Mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory are restricted from foreign ownership, but companies may enter into contracts with the government to extract these resources. Corruption exists in Chile but on a much smaller scale than in most Latin American countries, ranking of 27 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index.
Although Chile is an attractive destination for foreign investment, challenges remain. Despite a general respect for intellectual property (IP) rights, Chile has not fully complied with its IP obligations set forth in the U.S.-Chile FTA. Environmental permitting processes, indigenous consultation requirements, and cumbersome court proceedings have made large project approvals increasingly time consuming and unpredictable, especially in cases with political sensitivities. The current administration has prioritized attracting foreign investment and is implementing measures to streamline the process, including the creation of an investment projects management office in the Ministry of Economy.
Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment
Chile has a successful track record of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), despite the relatively small size of its domestic market. For nearly four decades, promoting FDI has been an essential part of the Chilean government’s national development strategy. The country’s market-oriented economic policies create significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate. Laws and practices are not discriminatory against foreign investors, who receive treatment similar to Chilean nationals. While Chile’s business climate is generally straightforward and transparent, the permitting process of infrastructure, mining and energy projects has become increasingly contentious, especially regarding politically sensitive environmental impact assessments and indigenous consultations.
InvestChile is the government agency that implements various types of initiatives aimed to foster the entry and retention of FDI into Chile. It provides services in four categories:
- attraction (information provision about Chile’s business climate and specific investment opportunities in both public and private projects);
- pre-investment (sector-specific legal advisory services and information for decision-making);
- landing (advice for installation of the company, foreign investor certificates, access to funds and regional support networks), and
- after-care (management of inquiries, assistance for exporting and information for re-investment).
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
Foreign investors have access to all productive activities, except for the internal waterways freight transportation sector, in which there is a cap on foreign equity ownership of companies of 49 percent. In 2019, Chile loosened maritime cabotage rules and began allowing large foreign cruise ships to move between Chilean ports. Some international reciprocity restrictions exist for fishing.
Most enterprises in Chile may be 100 percent owned by foreigners. Chile only restricts the right to private ownership or establishment in what it defines as certain “strategic” sectors, such as nuclear energy and mining. The Constitution establishes the “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and permanent domain” of the Chilean state over all mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory. However, Chilean law allows the government to grant concession rights to individuals and companies for exploration and exploitation activities, and to assign contracts to private investors, without discrimination against foreign investors.
FDI is subject to pro forma screening by InvestChile. Businesses in general do not consider these screening mechanisms as barriers to investment because approval procedures are expeditious and investments are usually approved.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has not conducted a Trade Policy Review for Chile since June 2015 (available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp415_e.htm ). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has not conducted an Investment Policy Review for Chile since 1997, and the country is not part of the countries covered to date by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Reviews.
Business Facilitation
The Chilean government took significant steps towards business facilitation during the present decade, including introducing digital processes to start a company. According to the World Bank, Chile has one of the smoothest and shortest processes among Latin American and Caribbean countries – 11 procedures over an average of 29 days – to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC). Drafting corporate statutes and obtaining an authorization number can be done online at the platform www.tuempresaenundia.cl . Electronic signature and electronic invoicing allow one to register a company, obtain a taxpayer ID number, and get legal receipts, invoices, credit and debit notes, and accountant registries. A company typically needs to register with Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, obtain a business license from a municipality, and register either with the Institute of Occupational Safety (public) or with one of three private nonprofit entities that provide work-related accident insurance, which is mandatory for employers. In addition to the steps required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing a subsidiary in Chile must authenticate the parent company’s documents abroad and register the incoming capital with the Central Bank. This procedure, established under Chapter XIV of the Foreign Exchange Regulations, requires a notice of conversion of foreign currency into Chilean pesos when the investment exceeds USD 10,000.00. The registration process at the Registry of Commerce of Santiago is available online.
Outward Investment
The Government of Chile does not have an active policy of promotion or incentives for outward investment, nor does it impose restrictions on it.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The Chilean government generally does not subsidize foreign investment, nor does it issue guarantees or joint financing for FDI projects. There are, however, some incentives directed to isolated geographical zones and to the information technology sector. These benefits relate to co-financing of feasibility studies as well as to incentives for the purchase of land in industrial zones, the hiring of local labor, and the facilitation of project financing. Other important incentives include accelerated depreciation accounting for tax purposes and legal guarantees for remitting profits and capital. Additionally, the Start-Up Chile program provide selected entrepreneurs with grants for USD 15,000 to USD 80,000, along with a Chilean work visa to develop a “startup” business in Chile over a period of 4 to 7 months. Chile has other special incentive programs aimed at promoting investment and employment in remote regions, as well as other areas that suffer development lags.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Chile has two free trade zones: one in the northern port city of Iquique (Tarapaca Region) and the other in the far south port city of Punta Arenas (Magallanes Region). Merchants and manufacturers in these zones are exempt from corporate income tax; value added tax (VAT) – on operations and services that take place inside the free trade zone – and customs duties. The same exemptions also apply to manufacturers in the Chacalluta and Las Americas Industrial Park in Arica (Arica and Parinacota Region). Mining, fishing, and financial services are not eligible for free zone concessions. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities in these zones as Chilean firms. The process for setting up a subsidiary is the same inside as outside the zones, regardless of whether the company is domestic or foreign-owned. Zofri is the main FTZ located in Iquique.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Chile mandates that 85 percent of workforces must be local employees. Exceptions are described in Section 11. The costs associated with migration regulations do not significantly inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees.
Chile does not follow “forced localization.” A draft bill that moved forward in Congress and is currently pending final approval could result in additional requirements (owner’s consent) for international data transfers in cases involving jurisdictions with data protection regimes below Chile’s standards. The bill also proposes the creation of an independent Chilean Data Protection Agency that would be responsible for enforcing data protection standards. Private sector legal experts believe that this draft legislation would impose fewer restrictions on the international transfer of commercial data compared to current U.S. law.
Neither Chile’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency nor the Central Bank applies performance requirements in their reviews of proposed investment projects. The investment chapter in the U.S.–Chile FTA establishes rules prohibiting performance requirements that apply to all investments, whether by a third party or domestic investors. The FTA investment chapter also regulates the use of mandatory performance requirements as a condition for receiving incentives and spells out certain exceptions. These include government procurement, qualifications for export and foreign aid programs, and non-discriminatory health, safety, and environmental requirements.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors. Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds. Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up its insurance sectorwith very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America. However, when compared to other OECD countries, it does not rank high in terms of market liquidity.
Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity-dependent economy. Chile accepts the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank does reserve the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists. To date, this authority has not been exercised.
Money and Banking System
Nearly a quarter of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but a lower proportion (16 percent) has a checking account. However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile.
The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards, which are part of a reform to the General Banking Law, enacted in January 2019 (Basel III standards will be introduced gradually over the next several years). Capital adequacy ratio of the system is slightly above 13 percent as of January 2019 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans are below two percent when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion.
The Chilean banking system’s total assets, as of February 2019, amounted to USD 371.9 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. The largest four banks account for approximately 65 percent of banking assets (Banco Santander-Chile, Banco de Credito e Inversiones, Banco de Chile and Banco Estado). Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks.
Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile. Out of 18 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks. Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile. There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile.
In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
Law 20.848, which regulates FDI (described in section 1), prohibits arbitrary discrimination against foreign investors and guarantees access to the formal foreign exchange market, as well as the free remittance of capital and profits generated by investments. There are no other restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors for the conversion, transfer or remittance of funds associated with an investment.
Investors, importers, and others have unrestricted access to foreign exchange in the official inter-bank currency market. The Central Bank reserves the right to deny access to the inter-bank currency market for royalty payments in excess of five percent of sales. The same restriction applies to payments for the use of patents that exceed five percent of sales. In such cases, firms would have access to the informal market. The Chilean tax service reserves the right to prevent royalties of over five percent of sales from being counted as expenses for domestic tax purposes.
Chile has a free-floating (flexible) exchange rate system. Exchange rates of foreign currencies are fully determined by the market. The Central Bank reserves the right to intervene (and seldom uses it in practice) under exceptional circumstances to correct significant deviations of the currency from its fundamentals.
Remittance Policies
Remittances of profits generated by investments are allowed at any time after tax obligations are fulfilled; remittances of capital can be made after one year since the date of entry into the country. In practice, this permanency requirement does not constitute a restriction for productive investment, because projects normally need more than one year to mature. Under the investment chapter of the U.S.–Chile FTA, the parties must allow free and immediate transfer of covered investments into and out of its territory. These include transfers of profits, royalties, sales proceeds, and other remittances related to the investment. However, for certain types of short-term capital flows this chapter allows Chile to impose transfer restrictions for up to 12 months as long as those restrictions do not substantially impede transfers. If restrictions are found to impede transfers substantially, damages accrue from the date of the initiation of the measure. In practice, these restrictions have not been applied in the last two decades.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Chile has two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) where the government deposits savings from effective fiscal surpluses. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at USD 14.2 billion as of February 2019. The FEES seeks to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to USD 10 billion as of February 2019. The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold.
Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles.
Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies. As of February 2019, FEES’ portfolio consisted of 55.5 percent of sovereign bonds, 3.5 percent of inflation-indexed sovereign bonds, 33.8 percent of money market instruments and 7.2 percent of stocks. At the same date, FRP’s portfolio consisted of 38.0 percent of sovereign bonds and related instruments, 10.8 percent of inflation-indexed sovereign bonds, 21.0 percent of corporate and high-yield bonds, 5.9 percent of mortgage backed securities from U.S. agencies and 24.3 percent of stocks.
9. Corruption
Chile applies, in a non-discriminatory manner, various laws to combat corruption of public officials, including the 2009 Transparency Law that mandated disclosure of public information related to all areas of government and created an autonomous Transparency Council in charge of overseeing its application. In 2018, a new provision of law expanded the number of public trust positions required to release financial disclosure, mandated disclosure in greater detail, and allowed for stronger penalties for noncompliance.
Anti-corruption laws do extend to family members of officials, in particular mandatory asset disclosure, and a draft bill incorporating restrictions on appointments and incompatibilities for family members of public officials has been submitted to Congress. Political parties are subject to laws that limit campaign financing and require transparency in party governance and contributions to parties and campaigns.
Regarding government procurement, the website of ChileCompra (central public procurement agency) allows users to anonymously report irregularities in procurement. There is a decree that defines sanctions for public officials who do not adequately justify direct contracts.
The Corporate Criminal Liability Law provides that corporate entities can have their compliance programs certified. Chile’s Securities and Insurance Superintendence (SVS) authorizes a group of local firms to review companies’ compliance programs and certify them as sufficient. Certifying firms are listed on the SVS website.
Private companies have increasingly incorporated internal control measures, as well as ethics committees as part of their corporate governance, and compliance management sections. Additionally, Chile Transparente (Chilean branch of Transparency International) developed a Corruption Prevention System to provide assistance to private firms to facilitate their compliance with the Corporate Criminal Liability Law.
Chile signed and ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Corruption. The country also ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention on September 13, 2006. Chile is also an active member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and, as an OECD member, adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
NGO’s that investigate corruption operate in a free and adequately protected manner.
U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI.
Resources to Report Corruption
Raul Ferrada
Director General
Consejo para la Transparencia
Morande 360 piso 7
(+56)-(2)-2495-2000
rferrada@consejotransparencia.cl
Alberto Precht
Executive Director
Chile Transparente (Chile branch of Transparency International)
Perez Valenzuela 1687, piso 1, Providencia, Santiago de Chile
(+56)-(2)-2236 4507
chiletransparente@chiletransparente.cl
Renata Avila
Executive Director
Ciudadania Inteligente (Founder NGO of the Anticorruption Observatory)
Holanda 895, Providencia, Santiago, Chile
(+56)-(2)-2419-2770
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
|
Host Country Statistical Source* |
USG or International Statistical Source |
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other |
Economic Data |
Year |
Amount |
Year |
Amount |
|
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD million) |
2017 |
$281,452 |
2017 |
$277,076 |
www.worldbank.org/en/country |
Foreign Direct Investment |
Host Country Statistical Source* |
USG or International Statistical Source |
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other |
U.S. FDI in partner country (USD million, stock positions) |
2017 |
$32,266 |
2017 |
$25,884 |
BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data |
Host country’s FDI in the United States (USD million, stock positions) |
2017 |
$10,334 |
2017 |
$2,097 |
BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data |
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP |
2017 |
100.3% |
2017 |
109.6% |
UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx |
* Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Chile.
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
According to the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), total stock of FDI in Chile in 2017 amounted to USD 274.7 billion, compared to USD 248.6 billion in 2016. The United States remains the main source of FDI to Chile with USD 31.7 billion, representing 12 percent of the total. The following top sources (Canada, Spain and the Netherlands) accounted for 25 percent of Chile’s inward FDI stock. Cayman Islands, a tax haven, is Chile’s fifth source of FDI. Chile’s outward direct investment stock in 2017 remains concentrated in South America, where Brazil, Peru and Argentina together represented 31 percent of total Chilean outward FDI. The United States accounted for 9 percent of the total.
Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data |
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) |
Inward Direct Investment |
Outward Direct Investment |
Total Inward |
274,653 |
100% |
Total Outward |
$123,643 |
100% |
United States |
31,750 |
12% |
Brazil |
$18,234 |
15% |
Canada |
26,647 |
10% |
Panama |
$15,232 |
12% |
Spain |
22,170 |
8% |
Peru |
$11,122 |
9% |
Netherlands |
17,899 |
7% |
United States |
$9,818 |
8% |
Cayman Islands |
9,179 |
4% |
Argentina |
$9,142 |
7% |
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. |
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
According to the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), total stock of portfolio investment in Chile as of June 2018 amounted to USD 180.6 billion, of which USD 139 billion were equity and investment funds shares, and the rest were debt securities. The United States are the main source of portfolio investment to Chile with USD 55.6 billion, representing 31 percent of the total. The following top source is Luxembourg (a tax haven), which is also the main source of equity investment, with 40 percent of the total. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany are the following top sources of total portfolio investment to Chile, while Mexico and Japan are among the top five sources of debt securities investment.
Portfolio Investment Assets |
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) |
Total |
Equity Securities |
Total Debt Securities |
All Countries |
$180,621 |
100% |
All Countries |
$138,958 |
100% |
All Countries |
$41,663 |
100% |
United States |
$55,613 |
31% |
Luxembourg |
$55,007 |
40% |
United States |
$15,571 |
37% |
Luxembourg |
$55,214 |
31% |
United States |
$40,042 |
29% |
Mexico |
$5,450 |
13% |
Ireland |
$11,459 |
6% |
Ireland |
$11,412 |
8% |
Japan |
$4,239 |
10% |
United Kingdom |
$6,743 |
4% |
United Kingdom |
$5,120 |
4% |
Germany |
$2,192 |
5% |
Germany |
$6,556 |
4% |
Germany |
$4,364 |
3% |
United Kingdom |
$1,623 |
4% |
Colombia
Executive Summary
With markedly improved security conditions, a market of 49 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and an educated and growing middle-class, Colombia continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investment in Latin America. In the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report, Colombia ranked 65 out of 190 countries in the “Ease of Doing Business” index.
Colombia’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The country has a comprehensive legal framework for business and foreign direct investment (FDI). The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA), which took effect on May 15, 2012, has strengthened bilateral trade and investment. Through the CTPA and several international conventions and treaties, Colombia’s dispute settlement mechanisms have improved. Weaknesses include protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), as Colombia has yet to implement certain IPR-related provisions of the CTPA. Colombia was on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Priority Watch List in 2018.
The Colombian government has made a concerted effort to develop efficient capital markets, attract investment, and create jobs. However, the government has struggled both to replace the lost energy-sector revenues after the price of oil, its largest export, collapsed in 2014, and to adjust to a concomitant devaluation of the peso. President Ivan Duque took office in August 7, 2018. The new administration passed a tax reform on December 2018, aimed at alleviating the tax burden on companies, increasing private investment, and strengthening economic growth.
Restrictions on foreign ownership in specific sectors still exist. FDI decreased 20.4 percent from 2017 to 2018, with more than half of the 2018 inflow dedicated to the extractives, finance, and transportation sectors. Roughly half of the Colombian workforce is in the informal economy, and unemployment registered at 9.7 percent for 2018.
Security in Colombia has improved significantly in recent years, with kidnappings down from 3,572 cases in 2000 to 170 cases in 2018. Since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the country’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity. Negotiations between the National Liberation Army (ELN), another terrorist organization, and the government have stalled, and the ELN continues its attacks on energy infrastructure and security forces. The ELN is one of several powerful narco-criminal operations that poses a threat to commercial activity and investment, especially in rural zones outside of government control. Despite improved security conditions, coca production is at the highest levels since the 1990s.
Corruption remains a significant challenge in Colombia. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (2018) ranked Colombia 60 out of 137 countries. The Colombian government continues to work on improving its business climate, but U.S. and other foreign investors have voiced complaints about non-tariff and bureaucratic barriers to trade and investment at the national, regional, and municipal levels.
Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
The Colombian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). In the early 1990s, the country began economic liberalization reforms, which provided for national treatment of foreign investors, lifted controls on remittance of profits and capital, and allowed foreign investment in most sectors. Colombia imposes the same investment restrictions on foreign investors that it does on national investors. Generally, foreign investors may participate in the privatization of state-owned enterprises without restrictions. All FDI involving the establishment of a commercial presence in Colombia requires registration with the Superintendence of Corporations (‘Superintendencia de Sociedades’) and the local chamber of commerce. All conditions being equal during tender processes, national offers are preferred over foreign offers. Assuming equal conditions among foreign bidders, those with major Colombian national workforce resources, significant national capital, and/or better conditions to facilitate technology transfers are preferred.
ProColombia is the Colombian government entity that promotes international tourism, foreign investment, and non-traditional exports. ProColombia assists foreign companies that wish to enter the Colombian market by addressing specific needs, such as identifying contacts in the public and private sectors, organizing visit agendas, and accompanying companies during visits to Colombia. All services are free of charge and confidential. Business process outsourcing, software and IT services, cosmetics, health services, automotive manufacturing, textiles, graphic communications, and electric energy are priority sectors. ProColombia’s “Invest in Colombia” web portal offers detailed information about opportunities in agribusiness, manufacturing, and services in Colombia (www.investincolombia.com.co/sectors).
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
Foreign investment in the financial, hydrocarbon, and mining sectors is subject to special regimes, such as investment registration and concession agreements with the Colombian government, but is not restricted in the amount of foreign capital. The following sectors require that foreign investors have a legal local representative and/or commercial presence in Colombia: travel and tourism agency services; money order operators; customs brokerage; postal and courier services; merchandise warehousing; merchandise transportation under customs control; international cargo agents; public service companies, including sewage and water works, waste disposal, electricity, gas and fuel distribution, and public telephone services; insurance firms; legal services; and special air services, including aerial fire-fighting, sightseeing, and surveying.
According to the World Bank’s Investing Across Sectors indicators, among the 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean covered, Colombia is one of the economies most open to foreign equity ownership. With the exception of TV broadcasting, all other sectors covered by the indicators are fully open to foreign capital participation. Foreign ownership in TV broadcasting companies is limited to 40 percent. Companies publishing newspapers can have up to 100 percent foreign capital investment; however, there is a requirement for the director or general manager to be a Colombian national.
According to the Colombian constitution and foreign investment regulations, foreign investment in Colombia receives the same treatment as an investment made by Colombian nationals. Any investment made by a person who does not qualify as a resident of Colombia for foreign exchange purposes will qualify as foreign investment. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, except in activities related to defense, national security, and toxic waste handling and disposal. There are no performance requirements explicitly applicable to the entry and establishment of foreign investment in Colombia.
Foreign investors face specific exceptions and restrictions in the following sectors:
Media: Only Colombian nationals or legally constituted entities may provide radio or subscription-based television services. For National Open Television and Nationwide Private Television Operators, only Colombian nationals or legal entities may be granted concessions to provide television services. Colombia’s national, regional, and municipal open-television channels must be provided at no extra cost to subscribers. Foreign investment in national television is limited to a maximum of 40 percent ownership of the relevant operator. Satellite television service providers are obliged to include within their basic programming the broadcast of government-designated public interest channels. Newspapers published in Colombia covering domestic politics must be directed and managed by Colombian nationals.
Accounting, Auditing, and Data Processing: To practice in Colombia, providers of accounting services must register with the Central Accountants Board; have uninterrupted domicile in Colombia for at least three years prior to registry; and provide proof of accounting experience in Colombia of at least one year. No restrictions apply to services offered by consulting firms or individuals. A legal commercial presence is required to provide data processing and information services in Colombia.
Banking: Foreign investors may own 100 percent of financial institutions in Colombia, but are required to obtain approval from the Financial Superintendent before making a direct investment of ten percent or more in any one entity. Portfolio investments used to acquire more than five percent of an entity also require authorization. Foreign banks must establish a local commercial presence and comply with the same capital and other requirements as local financial institutions. Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary or office in Colombia, but not a branch. Every investment of foreign capital in portfolios must be through a Colombian administrator company, including brokerage firms, trust companies, and investment management companies. All foreign investments must be registered with the central bank.
Fishing: A foreign vessel may engage in fishing and related activities in Colombian territorial waters only through association with a Colombian company holding a valid fishing permit. If a ship’s flag corresponds to a country with which Colombia has a complementary bilateral agreement, this agreement shall determine whether the association requirement applies for the process required to obtain a fishing license. The costs of fishing permits are greater for foreign flag vessels.
Private Security and Surveillance Companies: Companies constituted with foreign capital prior to February 11, 1994 cannot increase the share of foreign capital. Those constituted after that date can only have Colombian nationals as shareholders.
Telecommunications: Barriers to entry in telecommunications services include high license fees (USD 150 million for a long distance license), commercial presence requirements, and economic needs tests. While Colombia allows 100 percent foreign ownership of telecommunication providers, it prohibits “callback” services.
Transportation: Foreign companies can only provide multimodal freight services within or from Colombian territory if they have a domiciled agent or representative legally responsible for its activities in Colombia. International cabotage companies can provide cabotage services (i.e. between two points within Colombia) “only when there is no national capacity to provide the service,” according to Colombian law. Colombia prohibits foreign ownership of commercial ships licensed in Colombia and restricts foreign ownership in national airlines or shipping companies to 40 percent. FDI in the maritime sector is limited to 30 percent ownership of companies operating in the sector. The owners of a concession providing port services must be legally constituted in Colombia and only Colombian ships may provide port services within Colombian maritime jurisdiction; however, vessels with foreign flags may provide those services if there are no capable Colombian-flag vessels.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
In the past three years, the government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD.
Business Facilitation
New businesses must first register with the chamber of commerce of the city in which the company will reside. Applicants also register using the Colombian tax authority’s portal at www.dian.gov.co. Apart from the registration with the chamber and the tax authority, companies must register a unified form to self-assess and pay social security and payroll contributions. The unified form can be submitted electronically to the Governmental Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, or SENA), the Colombian Family Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, or ICBF), and the Family Compensation Fund (Caja de Compensación Familiar). After that, companies must register employees for public health coverage, affiliate the company to a public or private pension fund, affiliate the company and employees to an administrator of professional risks, and affiliate employees with a severance fund.
Colombia went down six spots from 59 to 65 in the World Bank’s 2019 “Ease of Doing Business” index. According to the report, starting a company in Colombia requires eight procedures and takes an average of 11 days. Information on starting a company can be found at www.ccb.org.co/en/Creating-a-company/Company-start-up/Step-by-step-company-creation ; http://www.investincolombia.com.co/how-to-invest.html#slider_alias_steps-to-establish-your-company-in-colombia ; and www.dian.gov.co.
Outward Investment
ProColombia, the government’s FDI promotion agency, also promotes Colombian investment abroad. The “Colombia Invests” web portal (http://www.colombiainvierte.com.co/ ) offers detailed information for opportunities in the priority sectors of agribusiness, manufacturing, and services for Colombian investors in a range of countries. ProColombia also offers a network of foreign contacts and plans commercial missions.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The Colombian government offers investment incentives, such as income tax exemptions and deductions in specific priority sectors, including the so-called “orange economy,” which refers to the creative industries, as well as agriculture and entrepreneurship. More recently, the government has offered additional incentives in an effort to generate investments in former conflict municipalities. Investment incentives through free trade agreements between Colombia and other nations include national treatment and most favored nation treatment of investors; establishment of liability standards assumed by countries regarding the other nation’s investors, including the minimum standard of treatment and establishment of rules for investor compensation from expropriation; establishment of rules for transfer of capital relating to investment; and specific tax treatment.
The government offers tax incentives to all investors, such as preferential import tariffs, tax exemptions, and credit or risk capital. Some fiscal incentives are available for investments that generate new employment or production in areas impacted by natural disasters and former conflict-affected municipalities. Companies can apply for these directly with participating agencies. Tax and fiscal incentives are often based on regional, sector, or business size considerations. Border areas have special protections due to currency fluctuations in neighboring countries which can impact local economies. National and local governments also offer special incentives, such as tax holidays, to attract specific industries.
Special tax exemptions have existed since 2003 and range from 10 to 30 years. Income tax exemptions for investments in tourism cover new hotels constructed between 2003 and 2017, and remodeled and/or expanded hotels though 2017, for a period of 30 years. Investments in ecotourism services benefit from income tax exemptions through 2023. New forestry plantations and sawmills also have benefitted from income tax exemptions since 2003. Late yield crops planted through 2014 are tax exempt for 10 years from the beginning of the harvesting. Electricity from wind power, biomass, and agricultural waste were tax exempt until January 1, 2018, as were river-based transportation services provided with certain shallow draft vessels and barges. Certain printing and publishing companies can benefit from tax exemptions through 2033. Software developed in Colombia has been tax exempt for up to five years since 2013. To meet exemption requirements, the software must have its intellectual property rights protected, be based upon a high concentration of national scientific and technological research, and be certified by Colciencias (Colombia’s agency for promoting science, technology, and innovation).
Foreign investors can participate without discrimination in government-subsidized research programs, and most Colombian government research has been conducted with foreign institutions. R&D incentives include Value-Added Tax (VAT) exemptions for imported equipment or materials used in scientific, technology, or innovation projects, and qualified investments may receive tax credits up to 175 percent. A 2012 reform of Colombia’s royalty system allocates 10 percent of the government’s revenue to science, technology, and innovation proposals executed by subnational governments. Although only subnational governments can submit a project, anyone, including foreigners, can partner with them.
In a tax reform passed in December 2016, the Colombian government created two tax incentives to support investment in the 344 municipalities most affected by the armed conflict (ZOMAC). Small and microbusinesses that invest in ZOMACs and meet a series of other criteria will be exempt from paying any taxes from 2017 to 2021, while medium and large-sized businesses will pay 50 percent of their normal taxes. The second component is entitled “works for taxes” (“Obras por Impuestos”), a program through which the private sector can directly fund infrastructure investment in lieu of paying taxes.
In the financing law of 2019 (tax reform), the Colombian government introduced exemption incentives in the payment of income tax for the new orange economy companies that invest more than COP 150 million in three years and that generate at least three jobs. In addition, it created incentives for new projects in the agricultural sector which will be exempt from income taxes for seven years. Finally, the law created an incentive for the tourism sector for the construction of new hotel infrastructure, and the benefits were extended to projects such as boat docks, theme parks, and eco and agro-tourism projects.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
To attract foreign investment and promote the importation of capital goods, the Colombian government uses a number of drawback and duty deferral programs. One example is free trade zones (FTZs). As of the end of 2018, there were 112 FTZs (including permanent, single company, and special types). These have generated development of new industry infrastructure for more than 840 companies in 63 municipalities and 19 geographic departments. While DIAN oversees requests to establish FTZs, the Colombian government is not involved in their operations.
Decree 2147 of 2016 integrated the regulatory framework for FTZs dating back to 2007 in one document, and made clarifications to certain processes without significant changes. The government revised tax treatment of companies operating FTZs with the December 2016 tax reform, maintaining a preferential corporate income tax for FTZs while increasing it from 15 to 20 percent. FTZ users with contracts of legal stability will continue to pay 15 percent. Other changes include VAT exemption for raw materials, inputs, and finished goods sold from the national customs territory to the FTZs, as long as those purchases are directly related to the corporate purpose. By contrast, no matter the purpose of the purchase, companies not located in the FTZs are affected by VAT. The 2016 tax reform increased VAT from 16 to 19 percent, and eliminated the Income Tax for Equality (CREE), a nine percent tax on company profits over COP 800 million (approximately USD 275,000) designed to contribute to employment generation and social investments.
In return for these and other incentives, every permanent FTZ must meet specific investment and direct job creation commitments, depending on their total assets, during the first three years. Special FTZs are required to generate a certain number of direct jobs depending on the economic sector. According to the figures of the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), FTZs reached cumulative exports valuing USD 28,346 million between 2005 and 2018. Between January and December of 2018, exports amounted to USD 2,812 million.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Performance requirements are not imposed on foreigners as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investments. The Colombian government does not have performance requirements, impose local employment requirements, or require excessively difficult visa, residency, or work permit requirements for investors. Under the CTPA, Colombia grants substantial market access across its entire services sector.
In 2017, Colombia issued implementing regulations of its Data Protection Law 1581 of 2012. The SIC, under the Deputy Office for Personal Data Protection, is the Data Protection Authority (DPA) and has the legal mandate to ensure proper data protection. The SIC issued a circular on August 10, 2017 defining adequate data protection and responsibilities of data controllers with respect to international data transfers. The circular details several general criteria reflecting the SIC’s view of adequate data protection and also provides a list of countries, which includes the United States, that meet the SIC’s data protection guidelines.
In Colombia, software and hardware are protected by IPR (Dirección Nacional de Derecho de Autor – DNDA – http://www.derechodeautor.gov.co/). There is no obligation to submit source code for registered software. However, if the IT provider is contracting with the Colombian government, through a clause of the service contract, the source code must be provided to the entity that the government IT provider is contracting. The SIC launched a national database registry in November 2015 to implement Law 1581 pertaining to personal information protection and management. It requires data storage facilities that hold personal data to comply with government requirements for security and privacy, and data storage companies have one year to register. The SIC enforces the rules on local data storage within the country through audits/investigations and imposed sanctions.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia. The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives. The BVC also provides listing services for issuers. The BVC is part of the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA) along with the Mexican Stock Exchange, the Lima Stock Exchange, and the Santiago Stock Exchange. BVC market capitalization has risen from USD 14 billion in 2003 to USD 126 billion in the first quarter of 2019. In the face of a lame-duck government and inflexible spending commitments, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Colombia’s credit rating to BBB- in December 2017. Moody’s maintained their lowest investment-grade evaluation but modified the outlook from “stable” to “negative” in February 2018. Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute. These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Foreign investment capital funds are forbidden from acquiring more than 10 percent of the total amount of a Colombian company’s outstanding shares. Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification.
The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions. The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements.
Money and Banking System
In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence. Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. According to the Financial Superintendence, as of December 2018, the combined estimated assets of Colombia’s major banks totaled USD 219 billion.
Colombia’s financial system is strong by regional standards. The financial sector as a whole is investing in new risk assessment and portfolio management procedures. As of December 2018, two private financial groups, the Sarmiento Group (Grupo Aval) and the Business Group of Antioquia (Bancolombia), together own over half of all Colombian banking assets. Grupo Aval controls about 27 percent of the sector and Bancolombia controls about 26 percent. No foreign bank is a major player in the Colombian financial sector.
Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia. Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies. Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers.
Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. No block chain technology use in financial transactions is approved by the Financial Superintendence as of the end of 2018. In order to operate in Colombia, foreign banks must set up a Colombian branch. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad. No correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
There are no restrictions on transferring funds associated with FDI. Foreign investment into Colombia must be registered with the central bank in order to secure the right to repatriate capital and profits. Direct and portfolio investments are considered registered when the exchange declaration for operations channeled through the official exchange market is presented, with few exceptions. The official exchange rate is determined by the central bank. The rate is based on the free market flow of the previous day. Colombia does not manipulate its currency to gain competitive advantages.
Remittance Policies
The government permits full remittance of all net profits regardless of the type or amount of investment. Foreign investments must be channeled through the foreign exchange market and registered with the central bank’s foreign exchange office within one year in order for those investments to be repatriated or reinvested. There are no restrictions on the repatriation of revenues generated from the sale or closure of a business, reduction of investment, or transfer of a portfolio. Colombian law authorizes the government to restrict remittances in the event that international reserves fall below three months’ worth of imports. International reserves have remained well above this threshold for decades.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country. The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. The fund was valued at USD 3.1 billion in 2018 from an initial value of USD 500 million in 2012. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation. At the end of 2018, the FAE was invested in 67 percent AAA sovereign bonds. There are no known negative ramifications for U.S. investors in the Colombian market. According to the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (http://www.ifswf.org/our-members), Colombia is not one of the 30 nations that voluntarily upholds the Santiago Principles.
9. Corruption
Corruption has been reported as a serious obstacle for companies operating or planning to invest in Colombia. Analyses of the business environment, such as the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, consistently cite corruption as a problematic factor, along with high tax rates, inadequate infrastructure, and inefficient government bureaucracy. Transparency International’s latest “Corruption Perceptions Index” released in January 2019 assigned Colombia a score of 36/100, down one point from 2018. The group’s analysis noted that corruption in the judiciary contributed to the drop. Overall, Colombia placed 99th of the 180 countries surveyed, a drop of three spots. Among OECD member states, only Mexico ranked lower. Customs, taxation, and public works contracts are commonly-cited areas where corruption exists.
In December 2016, one of the biggest corporate corruption cases in history broke when the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Brazil-based construction conglomerate Odebrecht had paid USD 800 million in bribes over six years regionally, including USD 11 million in Colombia, in order to win infrastructure contracts. The latter figure was subsequently increased to USD 37 million. Two high-priority infrastructure projects are on hold as a result of the corruption revelations, though other highway modernization projects critical to implementation of the peace accord continue. At least 23 Colombian officials have been implicated in the scandal. The judicial influence–peddling scandal mentioned above, commonly known as the “Cartel of the Robe,” and numerous other reports of official corruption made public over the past year have kept the subject in the public discourse.
Colombia has adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and is a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Committee. It also passed a domestic anti-bribery law in 2016. It has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. Additionally, it has adopted the OAS Convention against Corruption. The CTPA protects the integrity of procurement practices and criminalizes both offering and soliciting bribes to/from public officials. It requires both countries to make all laws, regulations, and procedures regarding any matter under the CTPA publicly available. Both countries must also establish procedures for reviews and appeals by any entities affected by actions, rulings, measures, or procedures under the CTPA.
Resources to Report Corruption
Useful resources and contact information for those concerned about combating corruption in Colombia include the following:
- The Transparency and Anti-Corruption Observatory is an interactive tool of the Colombian government aimed at promoting transparency and combating corruption available at http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/.
- The National Civil Commission for Fighting Corruption, or Comisión Nacional Ciudadana para la Lucha Contra la Corrupción (CNCLCC), was established by Law 1474 of 2011 to give civil society a forum to discuss and propose policies and actions to fight corruption in the country. Transparencia por Colombia is the technical secretariat of the commission. http://ciudadanoscontralacorrupcion.org/es/inicio
- The national chapter of Transparency International, Transparencia por Colombia: http://transparenciacolombia.org.co/
- The Presidential Secretariat of Transparency advises and assists the president to formulate and design public policy about transparency and anti-corruption. This office also coordinates the implementation of anti-corruption policies. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/secretaria-transparencia/Paginas/default.aspx/ .
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
*Data from the Colombian Statistics Departments, DANE, (https://www.dane.gov.co/ ) and the Colombian central bank (http://www.banrep.gov.co ).
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI – 2018
Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data 2018 |
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) 2018 |
Inward Direct Investment |
Outward Direct Investment |
Total Inward |
11,010 |
100% |
Total Outward |
5,121 |
100% |
United States |
2,482.6 |
23% |
Mexico |
880.5 |
17% |
Spain |
1,445.2 |
13% |
Holland |
681.0 |
13% |
England |
1,351.7 |
12% |
Panama |
557.1 |
11% |
Panama |
1,149.4 |
10% |
United States |
516.7 |
10% |
Switzerland |
891.6 |
8% |
Chile |
457.4 |
9% |
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. |
Data from the Colombian central bank (http://www.banrep.gov.co).
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Assets |
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) (June 2017) |
Total |
Equity Securities |
Total Debt Securities |
All Countries |
38,963 |
100% |
All Countries |
24,228 |
100% |
All Countries |
14,735 |
100% |
United States |
25,654 |
66% |
United States |
17,699 |
73% |
United States |
7,955 |
54% |
Luxembourg |
4,649 |
12% |
Luxembourg |
4,573 |
19% |
Mexico |
1,025 |
7% |
Mexico |
1,040 |
3% |
Ireland |
650 |
3% |
International Organizations |
994 |
7% |
International Organizations |
1,006 |
3% |
United Kingdom |
302 |
1% |
Canada |
715 |
5% |
Canada |
783 |
2% |
Cayman Islands |
237 |
1% |
France |
711 |
5% |
Data from IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey. Source: http://data.imf.org/?sk=B981B4E3-4E58-467E-9B90-9DE0C3367363&sId=1481568994271
Mexico
Executive Summary
Mexico is one of the United States’ top trade and investment partners. Bilateral trade grew 650 percent 1993-2018 and Mexico is the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading partner. The United States is Mexico’s top source of foreign direct investment (FDI) with USD 12.3 billion (2018 flows) or 39 percent of all inflows to Mexico.
The Mexican economy has averaged 2.6 percent economic growth (GDP) 1994-2017. Mexico has benefited since the 1994 Tequila Crisis from credible economic management that has allowed the country to weather a period of low oil prices and significant global volatility. The fiscally prudent 2019 budget targets a one percent primary surplus, and the new government has upheld the Central Bank’s (Bank of Mexico) independence. Inflation at end-2018 was 4.8 percent, an improvement from 6.6 percent at the end of 2017, but still above the Bank of Mexico’s target of 3 percent due to peso depreciation against the U.S. Dollar and higher retail fuel prices caused by government efforts to stimulate competition in that sector.
The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement ratification prospects for 2019 and a historic change in the Mexican government December 1, 2018 remain key sources of investment uncertainty. The new administration has signaled its commitment to prudent fiscal and monetary policies since taking office. Still, conflicting policies, programs, and communication from the new administration have contributed to ongoing uncertainties, especially related to energy sector reforms and the financial health of state-owned oil company Pemex. Most financial institutions, including the Bank of Mexico, have revised downward Mexico’s GDP growth expectations for 2019 to 1.6 percent (Banxico consensus). Major credit rating agencies have downgraded or put on a negative outlook Mexico’s sovereign and some institutional ratings.
The administration followed through on its campaign promises to cancel the new airport project, cut government employees’ salaries, suspend all energy auctions, and weaken autonomous institutions. Uncertainty about contract enforcement, insecurity, and corruption also continue to hinder Mexican economic growth. These factors raise the cost of doing business in Mexico significantly.
Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Mexico is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the vast majority of economic sectors and has consistently been one of the largest emerging market recipients of FDI. Mexico’s macroeconomic stability, large domestic market, growing consumer base, rising skilled labor pool, welcoming business climate, and proximity to the United States all help attract foreign investors.
Historically, the United States has been one of the largest sources of FDI in Mexico. According to Mexico’s Secretariat of Economy, FDI flows to Mexico from the United States totaled USD 12.3 billion in 2018, nearly 39 percent of all inflows to Mexico (USD 31.6 billion). The automotive, aerospace, telecommunications, financial services, and electronics sectors typically receive large amounts of FDI. Most foreign investment flows to northern states near the U.S. border, where most maquiladoras (export-oriented manufacturing and assembly plants) are located, or to Mexico City and the nearby “El Bajio” (e.g. Guanajuato, Queretaro, etc.) region. In the past, foreign investors have overlooked Mexico’s southern states, although that may change if the new administration’s focus on attracting investment to the region gain traction.
The 1993 Foreign Investment Law, last updated in March 2017, governs foreign investment in Mexico. The law is consistent with the foreign investment chapter of NAFTA. It provides national treatment, eliminates performance requirements for most foreign investment projects, and liberalizes criteria for automatic approval of foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Law provides details on which business sectors are open to foreign investors and to what extent. Mexico is also a party to several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agreements covering foreign investment, notably the Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the National Treatment Instrument.
The new administration stopped funding ProMexico, the government’s investment promotion agency, and is integrating its components into other ministries and offices. PROMTEL, the government agency charged with encouraging investment in the telecom sector, is expected to continue operations with a more limited mandate. Its first director and four other senior staff recently left the agency. In April 2019, the government sent robust participation to the 11th CEO Dialogue and Business Summit for Investment in Mexico sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Mexican equivalent, CCE. Cabinet-level officials conveyed the Mexican government’s economic development and investment priorities to dozens of CEOs and business leaders.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
Mexico reserves certain sectors, in whole or in part, for the State including: petroleum and other hydrocarbons; control of the national electric system, radioactive materials, telegraphic and postal services; nuclear energy generation; coinage and printing of money; and control, supervision, and surveillance of ports of entry. Certain professional and technical services, development banks, and the land transportation of passengers, tourists, and cargo (not including courier and parcel services) are reserved entirely for Mexican nationals. See section six for restrictions on foreign ownership of certain real estate.
Reforms in the energy, power generation, telecommunications, and retail fuel sales sectors have liberalized access for foreign investors. While reforms have not led to the privatization of state-owned enterprises such as Pemex or the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), they have allowed private firms to participate.
Hydrocarbons: Private companies participate in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities through contracts with the government under four categories: competitive contracts, joint ventures, profit sharing agreements, and license contracts. All contracts must include a clause stating subsoil hydrocarbons are owned by the State. The government has held four separate bid sessions allowing private companies to bid on exploration and development of oil and gas resources in blocks around the country. In 2017, Mexico successfully auctioned 70 land, shallow, and deep water blocks with significant interest from international oil companies. The Lopez Obrador administration decided to suspend all future auctions until 2022.
Telecommunications: Mexican law states telecommunications and broadcasting activities are public services and the government will at all times maintain ownership of the radio spectrum.
Aviation: The Foreign Investment Law limited foreign ownership of national air transportation to 25 percent until March 2017, when the limit was increased to 49 percent.
Under existing NAFTA provisions, U.S. and Canadian investors receive national and most-favored-nation treatment in setting up operations or acquiring firms in Mexico. Exceptions exist for investments restricted under NAFTA. Currently, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have the right to settle any dispute or claim under NAFTA through international arbitration. Local Mexican governments must also accord national treatment to investors from NAFTA countries.
Approximately 95 percent of all foreign investment transactions do not require government approval. Foreign investments that require government authorization and do not exceed USD 165 million are automatically approved, unless the proposed investment is in a legally reserved sector.
The National Foreign Investment Commission under the Secretariat of the Economy is the government authority that determines whether an investment in restricted sectors may move forward. The Commission has 45 business days after submission of an investment request to make a decision. Criteria for approval include employment and training considerations, and contributions to technology, productivity, and competitiveness. The Commission may reject applications to acquire Mexican companies for national security reasons. The Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) must issue a permit for foreigners to establish or change the nature of Mexican companies.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The World Trade Organization (WTO) completed a trade policy review of Mexico in February 2017 covering the period to year-end 2016. The review noted the positive contributions of reforms implemented 2013-2016 and cited Mexico’s development of “Digital Windows” for clearing customs procedures as a significant new development since the last review.
The full review can be accessed via: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp452_e.htm .
Business Facilitation
According to the World Bank, on average registering a foreign-owned company in Mexico requires 11 procedures and 31 days. In 2016, then-President Pena Nieto signed a law creating a new category of simplified businesses called Sociedad for Acciones Simplificadas (SAS). Owners of SASs will be able to register a new company online in 24 hours. The Government of Mexico maintains a business registration website: www.tuempresa.gob.mx . Companies operating in Mexico must register with the tax authority (Servicio de Administration y Tributaria or SAT), the Secretariat of the Economy, and the Public Registry. Additionally, companies engaging in international trade must register with the Registry of Importers, while foreign-owned companies must register with the National Registry of Foreign Investments.
Outward Investment
In the past, ProMexico was responsible for promoting Mexican outward investment and provided assistance to Mexican firms acquiring or establishing joint ventures with foreign firms, participating in international tenders, and establishing franchise operations, among other services. Various offices at the Secretariat of Economy and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs now handle these issues. Mexico does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Land grants or discounts, tax deductions, and technology, innovation, and workforce development funding are commonly used incentives. Additional federal foreign trade incentives include: (1) IMMEX: a promotion which allows manufacturing sector companies to temporarily import inputs without paying general import tax and value added tax; (2) Import tax rebates on goods incorporated into products destined for export; and (3) Sectoral promotion programs allowing for preferential ad-valorem tariffs on imports of selected inputs. Industries typically receiving sectoral promotion benefits are footwear, mining, chemicals, steel, textiles, apparel, and electronics.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
The new administration launched a two-year program in January 2019 that established a border economic zone (BEZ) in 43 municipalities in six northern border states within 15.5 miles from the U.S. border. The BEZ program entails: 1) a fiscal stimulus decree reducing the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 16 percent to 8 percent and the Income Tax (ISR) from 30 percent to 20 percent, 2) a minimum wage increase to MXN 176.72 (USD 8.75) per day, and 3) the gradual harmonization of gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and electricity rates with neighboring U.S. states. The purpose of the BEZ program is to boost investment, promote productivity, and create more jobs in the region. Interested businesses or individuals must apply to the government’s “Beneficiary Registry” by March 31 demonstrating income from border business activities comprise at least 90 percent of total income. The company headquarters or branch must be located in the border region for at least 18 months prior to the application. Sectors excluded from the preferential ISR rate include financial institutions, the agricultural sector, and export manufacturing companies (maquilas).
Separately, the administration announced plans to review and possibly end the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) program throughout the country.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Mexican labor law requires at least 90 percent of a company’s employees be Mexican nationals. Employers can hire foreign workers in specialized positions as long as foreigners do not exceed 10 percent of all workers in that specialized category. Mexico does not follow a “forced localization” policy—foreign investors are not required by law to use domestic content in goods or technology. However, investors intending to produce goods in Mexico for export to the United States should take note of the rules of origin prescriptions contained within NAFTA if they wish to benefit from NAFTA treatment.
Mexico does not have any policy of forced localization for data storage, nor must foreign information technology (IT) providers turn over source code or provide backdoors into hardware or software. Within the constraints of the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data, Mexico does not impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Mexican government is generally open to foreign portfolio investments, and foreign investors trade actively in various public and private asset classes. Foreign entities may freely invest in federal government securities. The Foreign Investment Law establishes foreign investors may hold 100 percent of the capital stock of any Mexican corporation or partnership, except in those few areas expressly subject to limitations under that law. Foreign investors may also purchase non-voting shares through mutual funds, trusts, offshore funds, and American Depositary Receipts. They also have the right to buy directly limited or nonvoting shares as well as free subscription shares, or “B” shares, which carry voting rights. Foreigners may purchase an interest in “A” shares, which are normally reserved for Mexican citizens, through a neutral fund operated by one of Mexico’s six development banks. Finally, Mexico offers federal, state, and local governments bonds that are rated by international credit rating agencies. The market for these securities has expanded rapidly in past years and foreign investors hold a significant stake of total federal issuances. However, foreigners are limited in their ability to purchase sub-sovereign state and municipal debt. Liquidity across asset classes is relatively deep.
Mexico established a fiscally transparent trust structure known as a FICAP in 2006 to allow venture and private equity funds to incorporate locally. The Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores) established the creation of three special investment vehicles which can provide more corporate and economic rights to shareholders than a normal corporation. These categories are: (1) Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima de Promotora de Inversion or SAPI); (2) Stock Exchange Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Promotora de Inversion Bursatil or SAPIB); and (3) Stock Exchange Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Bursatil or SAB). Mexico also has a growing real estate investment trust market, locally referred to as Fideicomisos de Infraestructura y Bienes Raíces (FIBRAS) as well as FIBRAS-E, which allow for investment in non-real estate investment projects. FIBRAS are regulated under Articles 187 and 188 of Mexican Federal Income Tax Law.
Money and Banking System
Financial sector reforms signed into law in 2014 have improved regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries and have fostered greater competition between financial services providers. While access to financial services – particularly personal credit for formal sector workers – has expanded in the past four years, bank and credit penetration in Mexico remains low compared to OECD and emerging market peers. Coupled with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, reforms have created a positive environment for the financial sector and capital markets. According to the National Banking Commission (CNBV), the banking system remains healthy and well capitalized. Non-performing loans have fallen sixty percent since 2001 and now account for 2.1 percent of all loans.
Mexico’s banking sector is heavily concentrated and majority foreign-owned: the seven largest banks control 85 percent of system assets and foreign-owned institutions control 70 percent of total assets. Under NAFTA’s national treatment guarantee, U.S. securities firms and investment funds, acting through local subsidiaries, have the right to engage in the full range of activities permitted in Mexico.
Banco de Mexico (Banxico), Mexico’s central bank, maintains independence in operations and management by constitutional mandate. Its main function is to provide domestic currency to the Mexican economy and to safeguard the Mexican Peso’s purchasing power by gearing monetary policy toward meeting a 3 percent inflation target over the medium term.
Mexico’s Financial Technology (FinTech) law came into effect in March 2018, creating a broad rubric for the development and regulation of innovative financial technologies. Although investors await important secondary regulations that will fully define the rules of the game for FinTech firms, the law covers both cryptocurrencies and a regulatory “sandbox” for start-ups to test the viability of products, placing Mexico among the FinTech policy vanguard.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
The Government of Mexico maintains a free-floating exchange rate.
Mexico maintains open conversion and transfer policies. In general, capital and investment transactions, remittance of profits, dividends, royalties, technical service fees, and travel expenses are handled at market-determined exchange rates. Mexican Peso (MXN)/USD exchange is available on same day, 24- and 48-hour settlement bases. In order to prevent money-laundering transactions, Mexico imposes limits on USD cash deposits. Border- and tourist-area businesses may deposit more than USD 14,000 per month subject to reporting rules and providing justification for their need to conduct USD cash transactions. Individuals are subject to a USD 4,000 per month USD cash deposit limit. In 2016, Banxico launched a central clearing house to allow for USD clearing services wholly within Mexico, which should improve clearing services significantly for domestic companies with USD income.
Remittance Policies
There have been no recent changes in Mexico’s remittance policies. Mexico continues to maintain open conversion and transfer policies.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
The Mexican Petroleum Fund for Stability and Development (FMP) was created as part of 2013 budgetary reforms. Housed in Banxico, the fund distributes oil revenues to the national budget and a long-term savings account. The FMP incorporates the Santiago Principles for transparency, placing it among the most transparent Sovereign Wealth Funds in the world. Both Banxico and Mexico’s Supreme Federal Auditor regularly audit the fund. Mexico is also a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Fund is expected to receive MXN 520.6 billion (approximately USD 26 billion) in income in 2019. The FMP is required to publish quarterly and annual reports, which can be found at www.fmped.org.mx .
9. Corruption
Corruption exists in many forms in Mexican government and society, including corruption in the public sector (e.g., demand for bribes or kickbacks by government officials) and private sector (e.g., fraud, falsifying claims, etc.), as well as conflict of interest issues, which are not well defined in the Mexican legal framework. A key pillar of President Lopez Obrador’s presidential campaign was combatting corruption at all levels of government.
Still, a significant concern is the complicity of government and law enforcement officials with criminal elements. While public and private sector corruption is found in many countries, the collaboration of government actors (often due to intimidation and threats) with criminal organizations poses serious challenges for the rule of law in Mexico. Some of the most common reports of official corruption involve government officials stealing from public coffers or demanding bribes in exchange for awarding public contracts. The current administration supported anti-corruption reforms (detailed below) and judicial proceedings in several high-profile corruption cases, including former governors. However, Mexican civil society assert that the government must take more effective and frequent action to address corruption.
As described in Section 4, Mexico adopted a constitutional reform in 2014 to transform the current Office of the Attorney General into an Independent Prosecutor General’s office in order to shore up its independence. President Lopez Obrador’s choice for Prosecutor General was confirmed by the Mexican Senate January 18, 2019. In 2015, Mexico passed a constitutional reform creating the National Anti-Corruption System (SNA) with an anti-corruption prosecutor and a citizens’ participation committee to oversee efforts. The system is designed to provide a comprehensive framework for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of corruption cases, including delineating acts of corruption considered criminal acts under the law. The legal framework establishes a basis for holding private actors and private firms legally liable for acts of corruption involving public officials and encourages private firms to develop internal codes of conduct. Implementation of the mandatory state-level anti-corruption legislation varies. .
The new laws mandate a redesign of the Secretariat of Public Administration to give it additional auditing and investigative functions and capacities in combatting public sector corruption. The Mexican Congress approved legislation to change economic institutions, assigning new responsibilities and in some instances creating new entities. Reforms to the federal government’s structure included the creation of a General Coordination of Development Programs to manage the newly created federal state coordinators (“superdelegates”) in charge of federal programs in each state. The law also created the Secretariat of Public Security and Citizen Protection, and significantly expanded the power of the president’s Legal Advisory Office (Consejería Jurídica) to name and remove each federal agency’s legal advisor and clear all executive branch legal reforms before their submission to Congress. The law eliminated financial units from ministries, with the exception of the Secretariat of Finance (SHCP), the army (SEDENA), and the navy (SEMAR), and transferred control of contracting offices in other ministries to the SHCP. Separately, the law replaced the previous Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) with a Welfare Secretariat in charge of coordinating social policies, including those developed by other agencies such as health, education, and culture. The Labor Secretariat gained additional tools to foster collective bargaining, union democracy, and to meet International Labor Organization (ILO) obligations.
Four opposition parties filed a legal challenge with the Supreme Court, which agreed January 18 to hear constitutional challenges to the law. The legal challenge contends the reforms infringe on state powers and violate the balance of powers stipulated in the constitution.
Mexico ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and passed its implementing legislation in May 1999. The legislation includes provisions making it a criminal offense to bribe foreign officials. Mexico is also a party to the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Corruption and has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The government has enacted or proposed strict laws attacking corruption and bribery, with average penalties of five to 10 years in prison.
Mexico is a member of the Open Government Partnership and enacted a Transparency and Access to Public Information Act in 2015, which revised the existing legal framework to expand national access to information. Transparency in public administration at the federal level has noticeably improved, but access to information at the state and local level has been slow. According to Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perception Index, Mexico ranked 138 of 180 nations, and has fallen every year since 2012. Civil society organizations focused on fighting corruption are increasingly influential at the federal level, but are few in number and less powerful at the state and local levels.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report for 2016-2017 found corruption is “the most problematic factor for doing business” in Mexico. For example, the WEF notes bribes to facilitate procurement of necessary permits or government contracts can increase business costs by 10 percent. Business representatives, including from U.S. firms believe public funds are often diverted to private companies and individuals due to corruption and perceive favoritism to be widespread among government procurement officials. The GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal states compliance with procurement regulations by state bodies in Mexico is unreliable and that corruption is extensive, despite laws covering conflicts of interest, competitive bidding, and company blacklisting procedures.
The U.S. Embassy has engaged in a broad-based effort to work with Mexican agencies and civil society organizations in developing mechanisms to fight corruption and increase transparency and fair play in government procurement. Efforts with specific business impact include government procurement best practices training and technical assistance under the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s Global Procurement Initiative. In addition, USAID is working with SFP and Transparency International to drive adoption of the internationally accepted Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), as well as technical assistance to upgrade the Mexican government procurement system, CompraNet, to be based on OCDS and international best practices. (CompraNet is also described in the regulatory transparency portion of Section 3, above.)
UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery
Mexico ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2004. It ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999.
Resources to Report Corruption
Contact at government agency:
Secretariat of Public Administration
Miguel Laurent 235, Mexico City
52-55-2000-1060
Contact at “watchdog” organization:
Transparencia Mexicana
Dulce Olivia 73, Mexico City
52-55-5659-4714
Email: info@tm.org.mx
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
|
Host Country Statistical Source* |
USG or International Statistical Source |
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other |
Economic Data |
Year |
Amount |
Year |
Amount |
|
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) |
2018 |
$1,220,000 |
2017 |
$1,150,000 |
www.worldbank.org/en/country
https://inegi.org.mx/ |
Foreign Direct Investment |
Host Country Statistical Source* |
USG or International Statistical Source |
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other |
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) |
2018 |
N/A* |
2017 |
$109,600 |
BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data |
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) |
2018 |
N/A* |
2017 |
$18,000 |
BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data |
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP |
2018 |
N/A* |
2017 |
49.5% |
UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx |
*Mexico does not report total FDI stock, only flows of FDI. https://datos.gob.mx/busca/organization/se
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
The data included in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is consistent with Mexican government data.
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data, 2017 |
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) |
Inward Direct Investment |
Outward Direct Investment |
Total Inward |
$490,574 |
100% |
Total Outward |
$172,919 |
100% |
United States |
$215,899 |
44% |
United States |
$73,199 |
42% |
Netherlands |
$83,214 |
17% |
Netherlands |
$36,498 |
21% |
Spain |
$53,483 |
11% |
United Kingdom |
$10,362 |
6% |
United Kingdom |
$23,845 |
4.9% |
Brazil |
$9,532 |
5.5% |
Canada |
$18,034 |
3.7% |
Spain |
$9,475 |
5.47% |
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. |
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
The data included in the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) is consistent with Mexican government data.
Portfolio Investment Assets, June 2018 |
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) |
Total |
Equity Securities |
Total Debt Securities |
All Countries |
$62,148 |
100% |
All Countries |
$39,738 |
100% |
All Countries |
$22,410 |
100% |
United States |
$28,487 |
45.8% |
Not specified |
$21,340 |
54% |
United States |
$17,441 |
78% |
Not specified |
$24,204 |
39% |
United States |
$11,046 |
28% |
Not specified |
$2,864 |
13% |
Ireland |
$2,631 |
4.2% |
Ireland |
$2,631 |
6.7% |
Brazil |
$1,617 |
7% |
Luxembourg |
$2,376 |
3.8% |
Luxembourg |
$2,376 |
6% |
Colombia |
$70 |
.3% |
Brazil |
$1,655 |
2.7% |
United Kingdom |
$601 |
1.5% |
Netherlands |
$52 |
.2% |
Peru
Executive Summary
Peru was one of the fastest growing Latin American economies between 2004 and 2013, growing at an average rate of 6 percent per year. Though growth slowed from 2014-2018, the country recovered and grew by 4 percent in 2018, significantly higher than the estimated 1.2 percent regional average. The government’s counter-cyclical stimulus spending, consumption, and private investment are the driving forces of this growth. Private investment totaled USD 41 billion in 2018. As the economy has grown, poverty in Peru has decreased, falling from 56 percent in 2005 to 20.5 percent in 2018. President Martin Vizcarra aims to increase private investment by fostering strong public investment, streamlining administrative processes, and reducing bureaucracy, while addressing corruption and social conflict.
The Government of Peru (GOP) has encouraged integration with the global economy by signing a number of free trade agreements, including the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force in February 2009. In 2018, trade of goods between the United States and Peru totaled USD 17.5 billion, up from USD 9.1 billion in 2009, the year the PTPA entered into force. From 2009 to 2018, Peruvian exports of goods to the United States jumped from USD 4.2 billion to USD 7.9 billion (a 88 percent increase) while U.S. exports of goods to Peru jumped from USD 4.9 billion to USD 9.6 billion (a 96 percent increase). The United States also enjoys a favorable trade balance in services; exports of services in 2016 to Peru amounted to USD 2.7 billion and contributed to a USD 1.1 billion services surplus the same year.
Corruption and social conflicts around extractive projects continue to negatively affect Peru’s investment climate. Transparency International ranked Peru 105th out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2016, Brazilian company Odebrecht admitted it had paid USD 29 million in bribes in Peru, leading to investigations involving high-level officials of the last four Peruvian administrations and halting progress on major infrastructure projects. Odebrecht agreed to pay Peru USD 180 million in civil reparation in December 2018. According to the Ombudsman, there were 132 active social conflicts in Peru as of March 2019, of which 71 befell mining projects.
- Extractive industries are a key draw of foreign investment. According to Peru’s Private Investment Promotion Agency (ProInversion), 22 percent of foreign direct investment in 2018 went to the mining sector, 21 percent to the communications sector, and 18 percent to the financial sector. Other destinations for investment included energy (13 percent) and industry (12 percent).
Table 1
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
The GOP seeks to attract investment — both foreign and domestic — in nearly all sectors of the economy. The GOP prioritized USD 10.3 billion in public-private partnership projects in transportation infrastructure, electricity, mining, broadband expansion, gas distribution, health and sanitation for 2019-2021. The Ministry of Energy and Mines aims to spur exploration and investment in the mining sector, increase oil and gas exploration, and modernize the Talara refinery.
The 1993 Constitution grants national treatment for foreign investors and permits foreign investment in almost all economic sectors. Under the Constitution, foreign investors have the same rights as national investors to benefit from investment incentives, such as tax exemptions. In addition to the 1993 Constitution, Peru has several laws governing foreign direct investment (FDI) including the Foreign Investment Promotion Law (Legislative Decree (DL) 662 of September 1991) and the Framework Law for Private Investment Growth (DL 757 of November 1991). Other important laws include the Private Investment in State-Owned Enterprises Promotion Law (DL 674), the Private Investment in Public Services Infrastructure Promotion Law (DL 758), and specific laws related to agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, forestry, mining, oil and gas, and electricity. Article 6 of Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF (the implementing regulations of DLs 662 and 757) authorizes private investors to enter all industries except investments in natural protected areas and manufacturing of weapons.
Peruvians and Americans benefit from the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force on February 1, 2009. The PTPA established a secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Peru. The PTPA protects all forms of investment. U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in Peru on an equal footing with local investors in almost all circumstances.
The GOP created ProInversion, in 2002, based on an existing, similar investment promotion agency. ProInversion has completed both privatizations and concessions of state-owned enterprises and natural resource-based industries. The agency regularly organizes international roadshow events, including in the United States, to attract investors and manages the GOP’s public-private investment project portfolio. Major recent concession areas include ports, water treatment plants, power generation facilities, mining projects, electrical transmission lines, oil and gas distribution, and telecommunications. Project opportunities are available on ProInversion’s Project Portfolio page at: http://www.proyectosapp.pe/modulos/JER/PlantillaProyectoEstadoSector.aspx?are=1&prf=2&jer=5892&sec=30 .
The GOP passed legislative decrees in July 2018 to attract and facilitate investment. These include measures to reform the public-private partnership (PPP) process. The reforms establish the Economy and Finance Ministry (MEF) as the PPP policymaking authority in the country and allows government entities to contract out PMO services throughout all stages of the PPP process, including through the GOP promotion investment agency Proinversion. The regulations also established that Proinversion’s board of directors will be composed of GOP Ministers, reversing an earlier decree that allowed for two private sector representatives on the board. The GOP established an investment research portal within the invierte.pe public investment online database (https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/aplicativos-invierte-pe?id=5455). While ProInversion does not maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors, it has authority to oversee PPP investments throughout their lifecycles. The GOP plans to publish a National Infrastructure Plan in July 2019, with infrastructure projects keyed to critical sectors outlined in a National Competitveness Plan that will be published by the end of 2019.
To spur project financing, the GOP loosened banking regulations to enable an entity to operate more than one tier-one financial institution in the country. A new Tourism Entrepreneurship Fund created in 2017 will provide grants to finance or co-finance business ventures that incorporate conservation, sustainable use, and economic development in the tourism industry. The GOP later developed a four-year Tourism Entrepreneurship Program to channel the USD 3 million fund to tourism ventures (http://turismoemprende.pe/ ). The program aims to fund 24 new tourism ventures worth USD 450,000 in 2018.
Although all Peruvian administrations since the 1990s have vowed to support private investment and abide by Peruvian laws, the GOP occasionally passes measures that some observers regard as a contravention of Peru’s open investment laws. Furthermore, the GOP in December 2011 signed into law a 10-year moratorium on the entry into Peru of live genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to be used for cultivation. Peru also implemented two sets of rules for importing pesticides, one for commercial importers, which requires importers to file a full dossier with technical information, and another for end-user farmers, which only requires a written affidavit.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
The Constitution (Article 6 under Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF) authorizes foreign investors to carry out any economic activity provided investors comply with all constitutional precepts, laws, and treaties. Exceptions exist, including exclusion of foreign investment activities in natural protected reserves and manufacturing of military weapons, pursuant to Article 6 of Legislative Decree No. 757. While long-term concessions are granted, the law states Peruvians must maintain majority ownership in certain strategic sectors: media; air, land and maritime transportation infrastructure; and private security surveillance services.
Prior approval is required in the banking and defense-related sectors. Foreigners are legally prohibited from owning a majority interest in radio and television stations in Peru; nevertheless, foreigners have in practice owned controlling interests in such companies. Under the Constitution, foreign interests cannot “acquire or possess under any title, mines, lands, forests, waters, or fuel or energy sources” within 50 kilometers of Peru’s international borders. However, foreigners can obtain concessions and rights within the restricted areas with the authorization of a supreme resolution approved by the Cabinet and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces.
The GOP does not screen, review, or approve foreign direct investment outside of those sectors that require a governmental waiver.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review on Peru in 2013. The WTO commented that foreign investors receive the same legal treatment as local investors in general, although foreign investment on maritime services, air transport, and broadcasting is restricted. The report also noted that the Peruvian government promotes public-private partnerships to build infrastructure and spur economic growth, with tax exemptions and low-cost financing available for domestic and foreign investors alike.
Report available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp389_e.htm
Peru aspires to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Peru launched an OECD Country Program on December 8, 2014, comprising policy reviews and capacity building projects, and allowing it to participate in substantive work of OECD’s specialized committees. An 18-month OECD review identified economic, social, and political obstacles that could hamper Peru’s OECD membership aspirations. The government noted that the study would act as a “roadmap” for Peru’s goal to achieve membership by 2021. The OECD published the Initial Assessment of its Multi-Dimensional Review of Peru in October 2015, finding that in spite of economic growth, Peru “still faces structural challenges to escape the middle-income trap and consolidate its emerging middle class.” In every year since this study was published, Peru has enacted and implemented dozens of governance reforms to modernize its governance practices in line with OECD recommendations.
Report: www.oecd.org/countries/peru/multi-dimensional-review-of-peru-9789264243279-en.htm
Peru has not had any third-party investment policy review (IPR) through the OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD in the past three years.
Business Facilitation
The GOP does not have a regulatory system to facilitate business operations but the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency (INDECOPI) regulates the enactment of new regulations by government entities that can place burdens on business operations. INDECOPI’s authority allowing it to block any new business regulations can limit restrictions of businesses. In addition, the GOP passed in 2016 a “sunset law” that requires a review of existing regulations by government agencies.
Peru allows foreign business ownership, provided that a company has at least two shareholders and that its legal representative is a Peruvian resident. The process takes an average of 43 days and involves 11 procedures. An entrepreneur must reserve the company name through the national registry, SUNARP (www.sunarp.gob.pe ), and prepare a deed of incorporation through Portal de Servicios al Ciudadano y a las Empresas (http://www.serviciosalciudadano.gob.pe/ ). The deed is then signed and filed with a Public Notary, with notary fees of up to 1 percent of a company’s capital, before submission to the Public Registry. The company’s legal representative must obtain a Certificate of Registration and tax identification number from the National Tax Authority. Finally, the company must obtain a license from the municipality of the jurisdiction in which it is located.
All foreign investments must be registered with ProInversion. The agency helps potential investors navigate investment regulations and provides sector-specific information on the investment process.
Outward Investment
The GOP promotes outward investment by Peruvian entities through the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR). Trade Commission Offices of Peru (OCEX’s), under the supervision of Peru’s export promotion agency (PromPeru) are located in numerous countries, including the United States, and promote the export of Peruvian goods and services and inward foreign investment. The GOP does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Peru offers both foreign and national investors legal and tax stability agreements to stimulate private investment. These agreements guarantee that the statutes on income taxes, remittances, export promotion regimes (such as drawbacks, or refunds of duties), administrative procedures, and labor hiring regimes in effect at the time of the investment contract will remain unchanged for that investment for 10 years. To qualify, an investment must exceed USD 10 million in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors or USD 5 million within two years in other sectors. An agreement to acquire more than 50 percent of a company’s shares in the privatization process may also qualify an investor for a legal or tax stability agreement, provided that the added investment will expand the installed capacity of the company or enhance its technological development.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Peruvian law currently covers two types of trade zones: export, transformation, industry, trade and services zones (CETICOS), and a free trade zone (ZOFRATACNA) in Tacna. The rules and tax benefits applying to these zones are the same for foreign and national investors. These zones have failed to attract sizable investment and their economic importance is negligible.
CETICOS exist at Ilo, Matarani, and Paita. A CETICOS is authorized in Loreto department but is not operational. There is concern that the GOP does not have the proper WTO waivers to validate the CETICOS export requirement. The U.S. automotive industry has expressed a specific concern that U.S. brands are unable to compete with used Japanese vehicles that enter the Peruvian market duty-free through the CETICOS. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications banned the importation of right-hand drive vehicles in 2013, citing environmental, and safety concerns. Imports of used cars more than five years old and used buses and trucks more than two years old are prohibited.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
The PTPA has greatly reduced burdensome investor requirements in Peru. Under the PTPA, Peru made concessions beyond its commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO), eliminating investment barriers such as the requirement for U.S. firms to hire nationals rather than U.S. professionals, and measures requiring the purchase of local goods. The GOP does not maintain any measures that are inconsistent with Trade-Related Investment Measure (TRIM) requirements, according to a WTO Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measure notification dated August 19, 2010.
Current law limits foreign employees to 20 percent of the total number of employees in a local company (whether owned by foreign or national interests). The combined salaries of foreign employees are limited to no more than 30 percent of the total company payroll. However, DL 689 from November 1991 provides a variety of exceptions to these limits. For example, a foreigner is not counted against a company’s total if he or she holds an immigrant visa, has a certain amount invested in the company (approximately USD 4,000), or is a national of a country that has a reciprocal labor or dual nationality agreement with Peru. The United States and Peru tolerate dual nationality, but do not have a formal agreement. Furthermore, the law exempts foreign banks, and international transportation companies from these hiring limits, as well as all firms located in free trade zones. Companies may apply for exemptions from the limitations for managerial or technical personnel. Sector-specific regulating bodies enforce performance requirements.
Although there are no discriminatory or onerous visa requirements, residence, or work permit requirements that inhibit foreign investors’ mobility, the application and approval process can be cumbersome and lengthy.
There are no performance requirements that apply exclusively to foreign investors. Peruvian civil law applies to legal stability agreements, which means the GOP cannot unilaterally alter agreements. Notwithstanding these protections, investors should be aware that government officials have delivered negative remarks to the press regarding companies exercising their contractual rights and obligations.
Peru does not follow a policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology.
Data Storage
A data controller who processes personal data must notify the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (ANPDP for its Spanish acronym), which keeps a public register of data processors and the type of data they collect. Personal data is defined by the Law as any information on an individual which identifies or makes him/her identifiable through means that may be reasonably used. Sensitive personal data means any of the following: biometric data, data on racial and ethnic origin; political, religious, philosophical or moral opinions or convictions, personal habits, union membership, and information related to health or sexual preference. Unless otherwise exempted by statute, data controllers are generally required to obtain the consent of data subjects for the processing of their personal data. Consent must be prior, informed, expressed, and unequivocal. In the case of sensitive personal data, consent must also be given in writing, which may be done digitally. Even without the consent of the subject, sensitive data may be processed when authorized by law, provided it is in the public interest.
Data controllers may process personal data without consent:
- When the personal data are compiled or transferred for public entities in control of the personal data and in the performance of its duties;
- When personal data is accessible to the public or is intended to be accessible to the public;
- To comply with other laws related to financial solvency and credit;
- In the case of a law for the promotion of competition in regulated markets under certain circumstances;
- When necessary to perform a contract to which the data subject is a party;
- For personal data related to health, under certain circumstances;
- When processing is carried out by non-profit organizations with political, religious or union purposes, under certain circumstances; or
- In an anonymization or disassociation procedure.
A data controller may transfer personal data to places outside of Peru only if the recipients have adequate protection measures. The ANPDP supervises compliance with this requirement. That provision does not apply in the following cases:
- When the data subject has given his/her prior, informed, express and unequivocal consent;
- Agreements under international treaties to which Peru is a party;
- International judicial cooperation;
- International cooperation between intelligence agencies for the fight against terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, human trafficking and other forms of organized crime;
- When necessary to implement a contract to which the data subject is a party;
- To comply with laws concerning the transfer of bank or stock exchanges; or
- When the transfer is for the prevention, diagnosis or medical or surgical treatment of the data subject; or when necessary to carry out epidemiological or similar studies (provided that adequate disassociation procedures are applied).
Data controllers must adopt technical, organizational, and legal measures to guarantee the security of personal data and avoid their alteration, loss, unauthorized processing or access. Peru’s law does not require any notifications to any data subject or any other entity upon a breach. Peru does not mandate special regulations be enacted for the processing of personal data of minors. The ANPDP is responsible for enforcement and can issue the following administrative sanctions/fines based upon whether the violation is mild, serious or very serious. The law provides a “principle for availability of recourse for the data subject” stating that any data subject must have the administrative and/or jurisdictional channel necessary to claim and enforce his/her rights when they are violated by the processing of his/her personal data. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption.
Peru adopted the Personal Data Protection Law (N° 29733) in July 2011 and went into effect on March 22, 2013. The Law is available here in English: https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/migrated/Peru percent20Data percent20Protection percent20Law percent20July percent2028_EN percent20_2_.pdf
The implementing regulations are available in Spanish here: http://spij.minjus.gob.pe/normas/textos/220313T.pdf (page 28)
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The GOP allows foreign portfolio investment. Neither the GOP nor its Central Bank place restrictions on international transactions.
The country has its own stock market, the Lima Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Lima or BVL). The BVL is a member of the Integrated Latin American Market (MILA), which includes the stock markets from Pacific Alliance countries (Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) and seeks to integrate their stock exchanges to develop their capital markets. In December 2017, the GOP implemented a capital markets promotion law that enables mutual funds registered in Pacific Alliance countries to trade in the Lima Stock Exchange starting in July 2018. In July 2018 the Securities Market Superintendence (SMV) published implementing regulations to enable the trade of funds in Pacific Alliance countries.
The Securities Market Superintendence is the GOP entity charged with regulating the securities and commodities markets. Following the IMF’s recommendations, the GOP passed a law reforming the SMV’s predecessor, CONASEV (the National Commission for the Supervision of Companies, Securities, and Exchanges). SMV’s mandate includes controlling securities market participants, maintaining a transparent and orderly market, setting accounting standards, and publishing financial information about listed companies. SMV requires stock issuers to report events that may affect the stock, the company, or any public offerings. This requirement promotes market transparency, and aims to prevent fraud. Trading on insider information is a crime, with some reported prosecutions in past years. SMV must vet all firms listed on the Lima Stock Exchange or the Public Registry of Securities. SMV also maintains the Public Registry of Securities and Stock Brokers. SMV is studying ways to improve the regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) maintained the Emerging Market status of the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL), which was under review for reclassification to Frontier status in 2017.
The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Mutual funds managed USD 7.8 billion in December 2016. Private pension funds managed a total of USD 45 billion in December 2018.
Money and Banking System
Economic opening since the 1990s, coupled with competition, has led to banking sector consolidation. Sixteen commercial banks comprise the system, with assets accounting for 89.4 percent of Peru’s financial system. In 2018, three banks accounted for 71 percent of local loans and 69 percent of deposits among commercial banks. Of USD 128 billion in total banking assets at the end of December 2018, assets of the three largest commercial banks amounted to USD 79.99 billion.
The banking system is considered generally sound, thanks to lessons learned during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and continues to revamp operations, increase capitalization, and reduce costs. Non-performing bank loans rose to 2.95 percent of gross loans as of December 2018, down from a high of 11 percent in early 2001. Able bank supervision and strong GDP growth over the last decade also helped banks weather the 2008-2009 global financial crises with little trouble.
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) serves as the country’s central bank. The BCRP is an independent institution, free to manage monetary policy to maintain financial stability. The BCRP’s primary goal is to maintain price stability, via inflation targeting. Inflation at year-end in Peru reached 6.7 percent in 2008, 0.2 percent in 2009, 2.1 percent in 2010, 4.7 percent in 2011, 2.6 percent in 2012, 2.9 percent in 2013, 3.2 percent in 2014, 4.4 percent in 2015, 3.2 percent in 2016, 1.4 percent in 2017, and 2.2 percent in 2018. Peru’s target inflation range is 1-3 percent.
Under the PTPA, U.S. financial service suppliers have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and insurance companies.
Peruvian law and regulations do not authorize or encourage private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association to limit or restrict foreign participation. There are no private or public sector efforts to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting organizations. However, larger private firms often use “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict investment by outsiders — not necessarily foreigners — in their firms. As close families or associates generally control ownership of Peruvian corporations, hostile takeovers are practically non-existent. In the past few years, several companies from the region, China, North America, and Europe have begun actively buying local companies in power transmission, retail trade, fishmeal production, and other industries. While foreign banks are allowed to freely establish banks in the country, they are subject to the supervision of Peru’s Superintendent of Banks and Securities (SBS).
The country has not explored or made announcements on its intention to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions.
Peru’s financial system has 11 specialized institutions (“financieras”), 27 thriving micro-lenders and savings banks (although several large banks also lend to small enterprises), one leasing institution, two state-owned banks, and one state-owned development bank. In 2018, the Economist Intelligence Unit again ranked Peru number two worldwide, after Colombia, on microfinance business environment because of its sophisticated legal and regulatory framework and competitive microfinance sector. The GOP established regulations to supervise savings and loan associations in January 2019. These institutions had until the end of March to register with the SBS which will supervise savings and loan associations nationwide; 413 saving and loan cooperatives are registered with the SBS for supervision.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange Policies
There are no reported difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange. Under Article 64 of the 1993 Constitution, the GOP guarantees the freedom to hold and dispose of foreign currency. The GOP has eliminated all restrictions on remittances of profits, dividends, royalties, and capital, although foreign investors are advised to register their investments with ProInversion to ensure these guarantees. Exporters and importers are not required to channel foreign exchange transactions through the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) and can conduct transactions freely on the open market. Anyone may open and maintain foreign currency accounts in Peruvian commercial banks. U.S. firms have reported no problems or delays in transferring funds or remitting capital, earnings, loan repayments or lease payments since Peru’s economic reforms of the early 1990s. Under the PTPA, portfolio managers in the United States are able to provide portfolio management services to both mutual funds and pension funds in Peru, including funds that manage Peru’s privatized social security accounts.
The 1993 Constitution guarantees free convertibility of currency. However, limited capital controls still exist as private pension fund managers (AFPs) are constrained by how much of their portfolio can be invested in foreign securities. The maximum limit is set by law (currently 50 percent since July 2011), but the BCRP sets the operating limit AFPs can invest abroad. Over the years, the BCRP has gradually increased the operating limit. Peru reached the 50 percent limit in September 2018.
A combination of GOP policies and market forces has led to gradual de-dollarization of the economy. U.S. dollars account for a decreasing share of banking system transactions, according to the Bank Supervisory Authority (SBS). In 2001, U.S. dollars accounted for 82 percent of loans and 73 percent of deposits. The amount of credit issued in USD increased 1.5 percent and deposits in 0.4 percent in 2018 compared to the previous year. In December 2018, dollar-denominated loans reached 28 percent, and deposits 37 percent. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency.
The foreign exchange market operates freely, for the most part. To quell “extreme variations” of the exchange rate, the BCRP intervenes through purchases and sales in the open market without imposing controls on exchange rates or transactions. Since 2014, the BCRP has pursued de-dollarization to reduce dollar denominated loans in the market and purchased U.S. dollars to mitigate the risk that spillover from expansionary U.S. monetary policy might result in over-valuation of the Peruvian Sol relative to the U.S. dollar. As the U.S. economic recovery begins to tighten credit conditions and stronger terms of trade support a more stable currency, this policy may shift. Because of the free convertibility of currency, the U.S. Embassy purchases Peruvian currency for expenses on an as-needed basis at the market exchange rate. The USD averaged PEN 3.29/USD in 2017.
Remittance Policies
There have not been any new developments related to investment remittance policies.
Peruvian law grants foreign investors the following rights: freedom to buy shares from national investors; free remittance of earnings and dividends; free capital repatriation; unrestricted access to local credits; freedom to hire technology and to pay back royalties; freedom to hire investment insurance abroad; possibility to sign juridical stability agreements for their investments in Peru with the Peruvian state.
Article 7 of the Legislative Decree N° 662 provides that foreign investors may send, in freely convertible currencies, remittances of the entirety of their capital derived from investments, including the sale of shares, stocks or rights, capital reduction or partial or total liquidation of companies, the entirety of their dividends or proven net profit derived from their investments, and any considerations for the use or enjoyment of assets that are physically located in Peru, as registered with the competent national entity, without a prior authorization from any national government department or decentralized public entities, or regional or municipal Governments, after having paid all the applicable taxes.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Peru’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) manages the Fiscal Stabilization Fund. The fund had a balance of USD 5.8 billion at the end of 2018 and consists of treasury surplus, concessional fees, and privatization proceeds, with a cap of 4 percent of GDP. The MEF released investment guidelines for the Fiscal Stabilization Fund in December 2015. The guidelines permit investment in demand deposits, variable and fixed interest rate time deposits, and seven currencies including the USD. The Fund is not a party to the IMF International Working Group or a signatory to the Santiago Principles. The fund serves as a buffer for the GOP’s fiscal accounts in the event of adverse economic conditions.
9. Corruption
It is illegal in Peru for a public official or employee to accept any type of outside remuneration for the performance of his or her official duties. The law extends to family members of officials and to political parties. Regulations published in March 2017 aim to limit conflicts of interest.
Peru has ratified both the UN Convention against Corruption and the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Peru is not a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but it signed a Country Program agreement in December 2014 to provide an anchor for policy reforms aimed at meeting OECD standards and practices. It has signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Contraloria General is the responsible government agency for overseeing proper procedures in public administration. In January 2017, the GOP passed legislative decrees extending the scope of civil penalties for domestic acts of bribery, including by NGOs, corporate partners, board members, and parent companies if its subsidiaries acted under authorization. Penalties include an indefinite exclusion from government contracting and substantially increased fines. The Controlaria General also began implementing audits of reconstruction projects that run in parallel to the project, rather than after project implementation, in an effort to improve transparency.
U.S. firms have reported problems resulting from corruption, usually in government procurement processes and in the judicial sector, with defense and police procurement generally considered among the most problematic in spite of PTPA’s stipulations and of Peru’s Government Procurement Law (Legislative Decree No. 1017, DL 1017, one of several laws passed with the specific intention to implement PTPA). Transparency International lowered Peru’s ranking to 105th out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index from 96th in 2017.
Of the 25 regional governors elected in 2018 regional elections, at least five were under preliminary investigation or had been convicted of corruption-related charges. A study published in May of 2014 by the office of the anti-corruption solicitor reported that 92 percent of the over 1,800 district-level mayors in office between 2011 and 2014 had been investigated for criminal activity. A study published in August 2017 counted 395 investigations of corruption or trials against current or former governors, with 30 percent of the cases in the regions of Pasco, Tumbes, and Ucayali. It also identified 1,052 investigations of corruption or trials against 530 current or former mayors, with Lima leading the list with 109 cases (10.4 percent of the total). https://plataformaanticorrupcion.pe/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/INFORME-CORRUPCION-SOBRE-GOBERNADORES-Y-ALCALDES.pdf
In December 2016, Brazilian company Odebrecht admitted in a settlement with the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland that it had paid USD 29 million in bribes in Peru between 2004 and 2015. In 2017, the Peruvian Government issued an emergency decree restricting the sale of Odebrecht assets to ensure payment of corruption-related reparations. In May 2018, the Peruvian Government formally filed a request with the United States to extradite former President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) who resides in the United States, for allegedly laundering over USD 20 million in Odebrecht bribes in exchange for facilitating Odebrecht’s winning bid to build the Inter-Oceanic Highway. High-ranking officials from the last four Peruvian administrations have also been investigated in connection with the Odebrecht scandal.
Resources to Report Corruption
Susana Silva Hasenbank
Secretary of Public Integrity of the Prime Minsiter Office and General Coordinator
High Commission to Fight Corruption (CAN)
Jr. Carabaya Cdra. 1 S/N – Lima
(51) (1) 219-7000, ext. 7118
Email: ssilva@pcm.gob.pe
General Comptroller’s Office
Jr. Camilo Carrillo 114, Jesus Maria, Lima
(51) (1) 330-3000
Email: contraloria@contraloria.gob.pe
Contact at “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International):
Samuel Rotta
Executive Director
ProEtica, the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International
Calle Manco Capac 816, Miraflores, Lima
(51) (1) 446-8581, 446-8941, 446-8943
Email: srotta@proetica.org.pe
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available. IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey data for 2016 is not available for Peru.