Australia is a party to bilateral investment treaties with Argentina, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Laos, Lithuania, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay and Vietnam.

In addition to the AUSFTA free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, Australia has bilateral FTAs in force with Chile, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and a multilateral FTA with New Zealand and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), all of which contain chapters on investment.  Australia signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in March 2018, and it entered into force in December 2018. Australia has signed, but not yet ratified, bilateral FTAs with Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Peru, and the multilateral Pacific trade and economic agreement known as“PACER Plus”.

Australia is currently engaged in bilateral FTA negotiations with the EU and India, and in the following plurilateral FTA negotiations: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, consisting of the ASEAN + Six group of nations); the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); and the Pacific Alliance (comprising Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia.

The U.S.-Australia Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes has been in place since 1982, with amendments made in 2001.  In addition to the United States, Australia has income tax treaties with 44 other countries and Taiwan.

In 2014, Australia signed an Intergovernmental Agreement with the United States to implement the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and improve tax cooperation. Under FATCA, Australian financial institutions are required to submit information on accounts held by U.S. citizens.  The Intergovernmental Agreement allows financial institutions to report the information via the Australian Tax Office under the existing Australia–US tax treaty arrangements.

The Australian government has moved aggressively in efforts to fight tax avoidance schemes by multinational corporations.  Australia ratified the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in September 2018, and it entered into force on January 1, 2019.  Australia has used this instrument to modify its tax treaties with several countries, but not with the United States. Australia has actively participated in the OECD Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) recommendations but has also moved further than the BEPS recommendations.  Multinational anti-avoidance legislation targets companies that do business in Australia without establishing a permanent establishment, and Australia’s diverted profits tax legislation targets tax schemes that recognize income in lower tax jurisdictions. Australia has implemented the OECD’s hybrid mismatch rules (as of January 2019) and limits interest deductions through a Safe Harbor Debt Limit of 60 percent (further legislation dealing with thin capitalization is before parliament at the time of writing.).

Political protests (e.g., rallies, demonstrations, marches, public conflicts between competing interests) form an integral, though generally minor, part of Australian cultural life.  Such protests rarely degenerate into violence.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

*Australian Bureau of Statistics, based on most recently available data.  Year-end foreign investment data is published in May of the following year.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

China has 109 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in force and multiple Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters.  Generally speaking, these agreements cover topics like expropriation, most-favored-nation treatment, repatriation of investment proceeds, and arbitration mechanisms.  Relative to U.S.-negotiated BITs and FTA investment chapters, Chinese agreements are generally considered to be weaker and offer less protections to foreign investors.

A list of China’s signed BITs:

• http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201111/20111107819474.shtml  
• http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu  .

The United States and China last held BIT negotiations in January 2017.  China has been in active bilateral investment agreement negotiations with the EU since 2013.  The two sides have exchanged market access offers and have expressed an intent to conclude talks by 2020.  China also has negotiated 17 FTAs with trade and investment partners, is currently negotiating 14 FTAs and FTA-upgrades, and is considering eight further potential FTA and FTA-upgrade negotiations.  China’s existing FTA partners are Maldives, Georgia, ASEAN, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Australia, Singapore, Pakistan, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  China concluded its FTAs with Maldives and Georgia in 2017.

China’s signed FTAs:

• http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/index.shtml  
• http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml  

The United States and China concluded a bilateral taxation treaty in 1984.

The risk of political violence directed at foreign companies operating in China remains low.  Each year, government watchdog organizations report tens of thousands of protests throughout China.  The government is adept at handling protests without violence, but given the volume of protests annually, the potential for violent flare-ups is real.  Violent protests, while rare, have generally involved ethnic tensions, local residents protesting corrupt officials, environmental and food safety concerns, confiscated property, and disputes over unpaid wages.

In recent years, the growing number of protests over corporate M&A transactions has increased, often because disenfranchised workers and mid-level managers feel they were not included in the decision process.  China’s non-transparent legal and regulatory system allows the CCP to pressure or punish foreign companies for the actions of their governments. The government has also encouraged protests or boycotts of products from certain countries, like Korea, Japan, Norway, Canada, and the Philippines, in retaliation for unrelated policy decisions.  Examples of politically motivated economic retaliation against foreign firms include boycott campaigns against Korean retailer Lotte in 2016 and 2017 in retaliation for the decision to deploy the Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Korean Peninsula, which led to Lotte closing and selling its China operations; and high-profile cases of gross mistreatment of Japanese firms and brands in 2011 and 2012 following disputes over islands in the East China Sea.  Recently, some reports suggest China has retaliated against some Canadian companies and products as a result of a domestic Canadian legal issue that impacted a large Chinese enterprise.

There have also been some cases of foreign businesspeople that were refused permission to leave China over pending commercial contract disputes.  Chinese authorities have broad authority to prohibit travelers from leaving China (known as an “exit ban”) and have imposed exit bans to compel U.S. citizens to resolve business disputes, force settlement of court orders, or facilitate government investigations.  Individuals not directly involved in legal proceedings or suspected of wrongdoing have also been subject to lengthy exit bans in order to compel family members or colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts or investigations. Exit bans are often issued without notification to the foreign citizen or without a clear legal recourse to appeal the exit ban decision.

In the past few years, Chinese authorities have detained or arrested several foreign nationals, including American citizens, and have refused to notify the U.S. Embassy or allow access to the American citizens detained for consular officers to visit.  These trends are in direct contravention of recognized international agreements and conventions.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S.  FDI in Host Country/Economy

*China’s National Bureau of Statistics (90.031 trillion RMB converted at 6.8 RMB/USD estimate)
** Statistics gathered from China’s Ministry of Commerce official data

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS)

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

Indonesia has investment agreements with 41countries, including: Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Guyana, Iran,  Jamaica, Jordan, Libya, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

In 2014, Indonesia began to abrogate its existing BITs by allowing the agreements to expire. By 2018, 26 BITs had expired, including those with Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, and Vietnam. However, Indonesia renewed its BIT with Singapore in October 2018. Indonesia is currently developing a new model BIT that could limit the scope of Investor-State Dispute Settlement provisions.

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) arrangement came into effect on January 1, 2016, and was expected to reduce barriers for goods, services and some skilled employees across ASEAN. Under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, duties on imports from ASEAN countries generally range from zero to five percent, except for products specified on exclusion lists. Indonesia also provides preferential market access to Australia, China, Japan, Korea, India, Pakistan, and New Zealand under regional ASEAN agreements and to Japan under a bilateral agreement. In accordance with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in August 2012 Indonesia increased the number of goods from China receiving duty-free access to 10,012 tariff lines. Indonesia is also participating in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes the 10 ASEAN Member States and 6 additional countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). In February 2019, RCEP entered the 25^th round of negotiations, which included discussion on trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute settlement, e-commerce, SMEs and other issues. In March 2019, ASEAN and Japan signed the First Protocol to Amend their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

Indonesia has been actively engaged in bilateral FTA negotiations. In 2018, Indonesia signed trade agreements with Australia, Chile, and the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). Indonesia is currently negotiating bilateral trade agreements with the European Union, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, South Korea, Tunisia, and Turkey. In addition, Indonesia seeks to initiate trade negotiations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Gulf Cooperation Council, South Africa, and Kenya.

The United States and Indonesia signed the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of the Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income in Jakarta on July 11, 1988. This was amended with a Protocol, signed on July 24, 1996. There is no double taxation of personal income.

As in other democracies, politically motivated demonstrations occasionally occur throughout Indonesia, but are not a major or ongoing concern for most foreign investors.

Since the large-scale Bali bombings in 2002 that killed over 200 people, Indonesian authorities have aggressively and successfully continued to pursue terrorist cells throughout the country, disrupting multiple aspirational plots. Despite these successes, violent extremist networks and terrorist cells remain intact and have the capacity to become operational and conduct attacks with little or no warning, as do lone wolf-style ISIL sympathizers.

According to the industry, foreign investors in Papua face certain unique challenges. Indonesian security forces occasionally conduct operations against the Free Papua Movement, a small armed separatist group that is most active in the central highlands region. Low-intensity communal, tribal, and political conflict also exists in Papua and has caused deaths and injuries. Anti-government protests have resulted in deaths and injuries, and violence has been committed against employees and contractors of a U.S. company there.

Travelers to Indonesia can visit the U.S. Department of State travel advisory website for the latest information and travel resources: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Indonesia.html.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

*Bank of Indonesia, GDP from the host country website is converted into USD with the exchange rate 13.400 for 2018.

*Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), January 2019

There is a discrepancy between U.S. FDI recorded by BKPM and BEA due to differing methodologies. While BEA recorded transactions in balance of payments, BKPM relies on company realization reports. BKPM also excludes oil and gas, non-bank financial institutions, and insurance.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Source:  IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey for inward investment data. World Investment Report 2018 UNTCAD for outward investment data, country specific data for outward investment is unavailable.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 2018. Sources of portfolio investment are not tax havens.

The Bank of Indonesia published comparable data.

The 1953 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation gives national treatment and most favored nation treatment to U.S. investments in Japan.

As of March 2019, Japan had concluded 33 bilateral investment treaties (BITs):  Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Korea, Kuwait, Laos,  Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  In addition, Japan has a trilateral investment agreement with China and South Korea. Japan also has 17 EPAs that include investment chapters (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), European Union (EU), Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Chile, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, Switzerland, Vietnam, India, Peru, Australia, and Mongolia)

On  December 30, 2018, Japan and ten other countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam signed the CPTPP.  Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam have already ratified the agreement. This agreement includes an investment chapter. The United States is not a signatory of this agreement.   The text of the agreement is available online (https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/naiyou/tpp_text_en.html#TPP11  

On February 1, 2019, the Japan – EU economic partnership agreement went into force.  This agreement includes a chapter on investment liberalization. The text of the agreement is available online (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684  ).

The United States and Japan have a double taxation treaty.  The current treaty allows Japan to tax the business profits of a U.S. resident only to the extent those profits are attributable to a permanent establishment in Japan.  It also provides measures to mitigate double taxation. This permanent establishment provision, combined with Japan’s high corporate tax rate that nears 30 percent, serves to encourage foreign and investment funds to keep their trading and investment operations off-shore.

In January 2013, the United States and Japan signed a revision to the bilateral income tax treaty, to bring it into closer conformity with the current tax treaty policies of the United States and Japan.  The revision is awaiting ratification by the U.S. Congress.

Japan has concluded 61 double taxation treaties that cover 71 countries and jurisdictions.  More information is available from the Ministry of Finance: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax_policy/tax_conventions/international_182.htm  

Political violence is rare in Japan.  Acts of political violence involving U.S. business interests are virtually unknown.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

*2017 Nominal GDP data (Calendar Year Data) from “Annual Report on National Accounts for 2017”, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government, released on December 25, 2018  . (Note: uses 2017 yearly average exchange rate of 112.2 Yen to 1 U.S. Dollar)

** 2017 FDI data from “JETRO Invest Japan Report 2018 (Summary) and FDI stock, Japan’s Outward and Inward Foreign Direct Investment,” Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).

The discrepancy between Japan’s accounting of U.S. FDI into Japan and U.S. accounting of that FDI can be attributed to methodological differences, specifically with regard to indirect investors, profits generated from reinvested earnings, and differing standards for which companies must report FDI.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment