Executive Summary

Despite persistent corruption and fiscal mismanagement, the long-term economic prognosis of Guinea, buoyed by strong endowments of natural resources, energy opportunities, and arable land, remains promising. Constrained by an austere budget, Guinea has increasingly looked to foreign investment and the private sector to stimulate growth. China, Guinea’s largest trading partner, has dramatically increased its role through investment agreements in 2016.

Blessed with abundant mineral resources, Guinea has the potential to be an economic leader in extractive industry. Guinea is home to over half the world’s reserves of bauxite (aluminum ore). Bauxite is the most active mining sector in Guinea, accounting for over half of Guinea’s present exports. Guinea also possesses over four billion tons of untapped high-grade iron ore, significant gold and diamond reserves, undetermined amounts of uranium, as well as prospective off-shore oil reserves. Most of the country’s bauxite is exported by Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) via a designated port in Kamsar. CBG, a joint venture between the Government of Guinea, American company Alcoa and Anglo-Australian firm Rio Tinto, is the largest single producer of bauxite in the world. New investment in CBG in addition to new market entries are expected to significantly increase Guinea’s bauxite output over the next five to ten years. Medium to long term, Guinea’s greatest potential economic driver is the Simandou iron ore project. Simandou is slated to be the largest greenfield project ever developed in Africa. Chinalco (China Aluminum Corporation) recently bought out Rio Tinto’s shares in the project and the Guinean government is anxious to move forward with developing the iron ore concessions. The infrastructure costs for the project are projected to be $20 billion, which is enormous considering Guinea’s GDP is less than $7 billion/year. When fully operational, the project could double Guinea’s GDP.

Guinea’s abundant rainfall and natural geography bode well for hydroelectric and renewable energy production. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 240MW Kaleta Dam project that began operating its first hydro turbine in May 2015. Built and financed ($526 million) by China, Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply and for the first time furnished Conakry with reliable, albeit seasonal electricity. The government is seeking backing for even larger hydroelectricity projects and investing in distribution infrastructure to become an energy supplier in West Africa. The government is also looking to invest in solar and other energy sources to compensate for lost hydroelectric production in Guinea’s dry season.

Agriculture and Fisheries are other areas for opportunities and growth in Guinea. Already an exporter of fruits, vegetables, and palm oil to its immediate neighbors, Guinea is climatically well-suited for large-scale agricultural production. However, the sector has suffered from decades of neglect and mismanagement and was the sector hit hardest by the 2014-2015 Ebola Crisis. Guinea also remains an importer of rice, its primary staple crop.

Guinea’s Macroeconomic and Financial situation is weak. Ebola stifled Guinea’s economic growth prospects in 2014 and 2015 leaving the government with few financial resources to support the Guinean economy. Decreased natural resource revenues stemming from a drop in world prices and ill-advised government loans have strained an already sparse government budget: however, improved macroeconomic discipline in 2016 stabilized exchange rates, rebuilt government reserves, and improved government revenue collection. Growth for 2016 was pegged at 5.3 percent, but little of that growth was felt by the largely impoverished population and the government is under pressure to deliver tangible development progress. The demand for credit, particularly for small and medium sized enterprises, exceeds available supply. The government is increasingly looking to international investment to increase growth, provide jobs, and kick-start the economy.

Guinea has recently updated its Investment Code and renewed efforts to attract international investors. Guinea’s investment promotion agency rolled out a new website (invest.gov.gn) in 2016 to increase transparency and streamline investment. However, Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system.

Table 1

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 142 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/
World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business” 2017 163 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2016 127 of 128 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2014 $188 Million http://www.bea.gov/
World Bank GNI Per Capita 2015 $470 http://data.worldbank.org/

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

After the conclusion of the 2014-2016 Ebola Crisis, President Conde’s election to a second term, and the inauguration of a new government at the end of 2015, the Guinean government has adopted a strong positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Facing budget shortfalls and low commodity prices, the Guinean government seeks FDI to diversify its economy, spur GDP growth, and provide reliable employment. There are no laws in Guinea that discriminate against foreign investors with the exception of prohibition of foreign ownership of media. In late 2015, the U.S. Embassy facilitated establishment of an informal international investors group to liaise with the government. More formally, there is a “Chambre des Mines,” a government sanctioned advisory organization that includes Guinea’s major mining firms. Guinea’s Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (APIP) offers six categories of services to potential investors:

  • Creating and registering a business
  • Facilitating access to advantages offered under the investment code
  • Providing information and resources to potential investors
  • Publishing studies and statistics for targeted sectors
  • Training and technical assistance
  • Facilitating needs for investors in Guinea’s interior
  • More information about APIP can be found at: http://apip.gov.gn/ 

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Investors can register as one of four types of businesses in Guinea. More information on the four types of business registrations is available at http://invest.gov.gn/fr/investir-en-guinee/creer-votre-entreprise . There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control, and 100 percent ownership by foreign firms is legal in most sectors. As mentioned above, foreign-majority owned print media, radio, and television stations are not permitted. Also, the government is required to own a 10 percent interest in any major mining operations in Guinea. Mining and media notwithstanding, there are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access applicable to foreign investment.

According to the Investment Code, there is no specific screening of FDI. However, the National Investment Commission does have a role in reviewing requests for approval, and for monitoring companies’ efforts to comply with investment obligations. This commission is headed by the Minister for Planning and International Cooperation, who also holds the secretariat. Approval of investments is granted based upon a request to the Secretary of the National Investment Commission. The government grants approved companies, particularly industrial firms, the use of the land necessary for their plant, for duration and according to conditions set out in the terms of approval. The land and associated buildings belong to the State, but can also be rented by or transferred to another firm with Government approval.

Other Investment Policy Reviews
There has been no investment policy review conducted by UNCTAD or OECD within the past several years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a review of Guinea in 2011. The 2011 report can be viewed here: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm .

Business Facilitation

Business registration and facilitation is managed by APIP, which maintains a guide on Guinea’s investment website (http://invest.gov.gn ). Business registration, however, must be completed in person at APIP’s office in Conakry. The only internationally accredited business facilitation organization that assesses Guinea is GER.co which gives Guinea’s business creation/investment website a 4/10 rating. The process of business registration now requires around seventy two hours. Its services are available to both Guinean and foreign investors. The use of a notary is not necessary in the creation of small and medium size enterprises since the “One-Stop-Shop” at APIP’s Conakry office has the credentials to provide a business with requisite registration numbers including tax administration numbers and social security numbers. Notaries are required for the creation of any other type of enterprise.

A small or medium size enterprise in Guinea is defined as a business with less than 50 employees and revenue less than 500 million GNF (around $50,000). SMEs are taxed at a yearly fixed rate of 15 million GNF ($1,500). Administrative modalities are simplified and funneled through the “One Stop Shop.” These advantages are available for both Guinean and foreign investors.

Outward Investment

Guinea does not formally promote outward investment and the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

Guinea has bilateral investment agreements with Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, China, Egypt, France, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, and Turkey. Although Guinea does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty or Free Trade Agreement with the United States, ECOWAS and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in May 2014. There is no Bilateral Tax Treaty between Guinea and the United States. The agreement created a Council on Trade and Investment responsible for identifying and removing trade impediments between the United States and ECOWAS countries.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Guinea has accomplished much in the past seven years to make laws and regulations more transparent. While draft bills were not made available for public comment, the Presidency and National Assembly have worked closely with international partners to modernize its legal framework. However, Guinea’s legal system hampers the implementation of clear “rules of the game.”

Ministries do not develop forward-looking regulatory plans and do not publish summaries or proposed legislation. Laws in Guinea are proposed by either the President or members of the National Assembly and are not presented for public comment. Once ratified, laws are not formally considered enforceable until they are published in the government’s official gazette. All laws relevant to international investors are posted (in French) on invest.gov.gn. When investing, it is important to engage with all levels of government that will be affected to ensure each authority is aware of mutual expectations and responsibilities.

Guinea’s amended Mining Code commits the country to increasing transparency in the mining
sector. In the code, the government commits to award mining contracts by competitive tender and to publish all past, current, and future mining contracts for public scrutiny. Members of mining sector governing bodies and employees of the Ministry of Mines are prohibited from owning shares in mining companies active in Guinea or their subcontractors. Each mining company must sign a code of good conduct and develop and implement a corruption monitoring plan. Guinea has already implemented a portion of its transparency approach through the creation of a public database of its mining contracts designed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (http://www.contratsminiersguinee.org/ ).

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ensures more transparency in how Guinea’s natural resources are governed, and full disclosure of government revenues from its extractive sector. The EITI Standard aims to provide a global set of conditions that ensures more transparency in the management of a country’s oil, gas, and mineral resources. EITI reiterates the need to augment support for countries and governments that are making genuine efforts to address corruption but lack the capacity and systems necessary to effectively manage the business, revenues, and royalties derived from extractive industries.

Guinea was accepted as EITI Compliant for the first time by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City on July 2, 2014. As a country implementing the EITI, Guinea regularly discloses the government’s revenues from natural resources, completing their most recent report in December 2016 for the 2014 reporting period.

While Guinea’s laws promote free enterprise and competition, the government often lacks transparency in the application of the law. Business owners openly assert that application procedures are sufficiently opaque to allow for corruption, and regulatory activity is often applied based on personal interest.

International Regulatory Considerations

Guinea is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but not a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and as such has its own currency. At the beginning of 2017, Guinea adopted ECOWAS’s Common Exterior Tariff (TEC) which harmonizes Guinea’s import taxes with other West African states and eliminates the need product taxes on Guinea’s land borders. Guinea is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but is not party to any trade disputes.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The country’s legal system is codified and largely based upon French civil law. However, the Guinean judicial system is reported to be understaffed, corrupt, and lacking in transparency. Accounting practices in Guinean courts are frequently unreliable. U.S. businesspersons should exercise extreme caution when negotiating contract arrangements, and do so with proper local legal representation. Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and corrupt. Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, nepotism, and ethnic bias limited the judiciary’s effectiveness. President Conde’s administration has successfully implemented some judicial reforms and has increased the salaries of judges by 400 percent in order to discourage corruption.

Despite the rights to dispute settlement set forth in Guinean law, business executives complain of the glacial pace of Guinean justice in business disputes. Most legal cases take years and numerous legal fees to resolve. In speaking with local business leaders, the general sentiment is that any resolution occurring within 3-5 years would be considered relatively fast.

In many cases, the government does not meet payment obligations to private suppliers of goods and services, either foreign or Guinean, in a timely fashion. Arrears to the private sector are a major issue that is often ignored. Guinea is currently looking for ways to finance past arrears to the private sector – possibly through issuing a public debt instrument. There is no independent enforcement mechanism for collecting debts from the government, although some contracts have international arbitration clauses. The government, while bound by law to honor judgments made
by the arbitration court, often actively influences the decision itself.

Although the situation has improved recently, business executives, Guinean and foreign, have publicly expressed concern over the absence of rule of law in the country. In 2014, foreign managers of a telecommunications company were harassed by high-ranking members of the military for not renewing a contract. Some businesses have been subject to sporadic harassment and “requests” for donations from military and police personnel.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
The National Assembly ratified a new Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and International Monetary Fund, the new code harmonizes Guinea’s investment climate with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI in Guinea. The Code also organizes avenues for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT Law and the Customs Code.

The Government of Guinea states it will let the legal system deal with domestic cases involving foreign investors. The legal system is weak, in the midst of much needed reforms, and is subject to interference. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and overtly corrupt. Factors limiting the judiciary’s effectiveness include budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, nepotism, an egregious prison system, and ethnic bias. Although the government is making an effort to better equip judges, most are poorly trained and corruption plays a role in many court proceedings. There are few international investment lawyers accredited in Guinea and it is best practice to include international arbitration clauses in all major contracts. U.S. companies have identified the absence of a dependable legal system as a major barrier to investment.

The Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (APIP) launched a new website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors as well as strategy documents for specific sectors. (http://invest.gov.gn ). Further information on APIP’s services is available at (http://www.apiguinee.org ). APIP is run by a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

There are no agencies that review transactions for competition-related concerns.

Expropriation and Compensation

Guinea’s Investment Code states that the Guinean government will not, except for reasons of public interest, take any steps to expropriate or nationalize investments made by individuals and companies. It also promises fair compensation for expropriated property.

In 2011, the government claimed full ownership of several languishing industrial facilities in which it had previously held partial shares as part of joint ventures—including a canned food factory and processing plants for peanuts, tea, mangoes, and tobacco—with no compensation for the private sector partner. Each of these facilities had been privatized under corrupt circumstances in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By expropriating these businesses from their owners, whom the government deemed to be corrupt and/or ineffective, and putting them to public auction, Guinea hopes to correct past mistakes and put the assets in more productive hands. The private partner in at least one of these joint ventures has protested the seizure of its assets and has been battling the government decision in court. As of 2016, there was no resolution of the case. Government representatives have said that this expropriation applies only to former state-owned firms; fully-owned private businesses and other joint ventures with the government will not be affected. Guinea’s previous government created another major expropriation case over the Simandou mining asset in 2008. The legal proceedings associated with the case are ongoing.

The government realizes that future expropriations carry too much risk and are not beneficial to the future economic development of the country. The country desperately needs foreign investment and policy makers are not willing to risk the negative consequences that expropriation will cause. Furthermore, the government has demonstrated that it cannot manage small and medium enterprises in a profitable manner and would prefer the private sector to manage these assets. The investment climate is welcoming to foreign and American firms and the government is working to reduce corruption and increase transparency. The current government is aware of its international image and does not want to risk losing possible foreign investment in the economy.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Guinea is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States with over one hundred and forty member states (https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx ). Guinea is also a member of the New York Convention, which applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration.
(http://www.newyorkconvention.org ).

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The Investment Code states that competent Guinean judicial authorities shall settle disputes resulting from interpretation of the Code in the accordance with laws and regulations and provides several avenues to see arbitration. In practice, however, fair settlements may be difficult. The current Guinean constitution mandates an independent judiciary, although many business owners and high level government officials frequently claim that poorly trained magistrates, high levels of corruption, and nepotism plague the administration of justice. Guinea established an arbitration court in 1999, independent of the Ministry of Justice, to settle business disputes in a less costly and more expedient manner. The Arbitration Court is based upon the French system in which arbitrators are selected from among the Guinean business sector, rather than from among lawyers or judges, and are supervised by the Chamber of Commerce. All parties must be in agreement in order for their case to be settled in the arbitration court. In general, Guinea’s arbitration court has a better reputation than the judicial court system for settling business disputes.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

In 1993, Guinea became a member of the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique (Organization for the Harmonization of Commercial Law in Africa), known by its French initials, OHADA, which allows investors to appeal legal decisions on commercial and financial matters to a regional body based in Abidjan. The organization also seeks to create harmonization of commercial law, debt collection, bankruptcy, and secured transactions throughout the OHADA region. The treaty superseded the Code of Economic Activities and other national commercial laws when it was ratified in 2000, though many of the substantive changes to Guinean law have yet to be implemented. U.S. companies seeking to do business in Guinea should be aware that under OHADA, managers may be individually liable for corporate wrongdoing. See the OHADA website for specific OHADA rules and regulations
(http://www.ohada.com ).

Bankruptcy Regulations

Guinea, as member country of OHADA, has the same bankruptcy laws as most West African francophone countries. The OHADA’s Uniform Act enforces collective proceedings for writing off debts and defines bankruptcy from articles 227 to 233. The Uniform Act also distinguishes from fraudulent from non-fraudulent bankruptcies. There is no distinction between foreign and domestic investors. The only distinction made is a “privilege” ranking that defines which claims must be paid first from the bankrupt company’s assets. Articles 180 to 190 of the OHADA’s Uniform Act on the organization of securities define which creditors are entitled to priority compensation. Bankruptcy is only criminalized when it occurs due to fraudulent actions. Bankruptcy is penalized though OHADA, which leaves criminal penalties to national authorities.

In the World Bank’s 2017 Ease of Doing Business Report on Resolving Insolvency, Guinea ranked 113/190. According to the report, resolving insolvency takes an average of 3.8 years and costs 8.0 percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold as piecemeal sale. The average recovery rate is 19.9 cents on the dollar.

Investment Incentives

The Investment Code provides preferential taxes for investments meeting certain criteria. Other exemptions can be reached in contract negotiations with the government. The government’s priority investments are: promotion of small and medium-sized Guinean businesses, development of non-traditional exports, processing of local natural resources and local raw materials, and establishment of activities in less economically developed regions. Priority activities include agricultural promotion, especially of food and rural development, commercial farming involving processing and packaging, livestock – especially when coupled with veterinary services, fisheries, fertilizer production, chemical or mechanical preparation, processing industries for vegetable, animal, or mineral products, health and education businesses, tourism facilities and hotel operations, real estate development with social benefit, and investment banks or any credit institutions settled outside specified population centers. Detailed information on each of these opportunities is available at http://invest.gov.gn .

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Guinea has no foreign trade zones or free ports.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Under the 2011 Mining Code, amended in April 2013 to reduce taxes and royalties, mining companies are required to hire Guinean citizens as a certain percentage of their staff, to eventually transition to a Guinean country director, and to award a certain percentage of contracts to Guinean owned firms. The percentage varies based on employment category and the chronological phase of the project. The mining code requires that 20 percent of senior managers be Guinean. However, the code does not define what constitutes senior management. The Code also aims to liberalize mining development and secure investment. In 2013, the Code called for the creation of a Mining Promotion and Development Center, a One-Stop-Shop for mining to simplify the administrative process for investors. The Development Center opened in May 2016. Post is not aware of non-mining sectors having performance requirements, but that is likely to change as the Guinean economy becomes more developed.

Guinea has no forced localization policy related to the use of domestic content in goods or technology. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. There are also no requirements to store data within Guinea.

Real Property

The Land Tenure Code of 1996 provides a legal base for documentation of property ownership. As with ownership of business enterprises, both foreign and national individuals have the right to own property. However, enforcement of these rights depends upon a corrupt and inefficient Guinean legal and administrative system. It is not uncommon for the same piece of land to have several overlapping deeds. Furthermore, land sales and business contracts generally lacked transparency.

According to the 2017 World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Guinea ranks 140 out of 190
countries for the ease of “registering property:” http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/guinea/ .

Intellectual Property Rights

Guinea is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), comprised of 15 African countries, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), comprised of 186 members. The African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) is in charge of implementing administrative procedure resulting from a uniform system for the protection of intellectual property rights. OAPI systems provide a relatively cheap easy and effective way of extending patent protection to a total of 17 African countries and create a common system of protection against unfair competition. OAPI is signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the TRIPS agreement, and several other intellectual property treaties. Guinea modified its intellectual property right laws in 2000 to bring them into line with established international standards. There have been no formal complaints filed on behalf of American companies concerning intellectual property rights infringements in Guinea. However, it is not certain that an intellectual property judgment would be enforceable, given the general lack of law enforcement capability. The Property Rights office in Guinea is severely understaffed and underfunded. Guinea is not cited in the USTR’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Market Report. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Commercial credit for private and public enterprise is difficult and expensive to obtain in Guinea. The legislature passed a Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) convention law in 1998, which provides rules and guidelines for BOT and related infrastructure development projects. The law lays out the obligations and responsibilities of the government and investors and stipulates the guarantees provided by the government for such projects.

The Investment Code allows transfers of income derived from investment in Guinea, the proceeds of liquidating this investment, and the compensation paid in the event of nationalization to any country in convertible currency. The legal and regulatory procedures, based on French civil law, are not always applied uniformly or transparently.

Individuals or legal entities making foreign investments in Guinea are guaranteed the freedom to transfer to any country of their choice the original foreign capital, profits resulting from investment, capital gains on disposal of investment, and fair compensation paid in the case of nationalization or expropriation of the investment. The Guinean franc uses a managed floating exchange rate. The few commercial banks in Guinea are dependent on the Central Bank for foreign exchange liquidity, making large transfers of foreign currency difficult.

Laws governing takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and cross-shareholding are limited to rules for documenting financial transactions and filing any change of status documents with the economic register. There are no laws or regulations that specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation that limit or prohibit investment.

Money and Banking System

Guinea’s financial system is small and dominated by the banking sector. It comprises 15 active banks and 22 microfinance institutions totaling 146 branches across the country. Guinea also has ten insurance firms, three money-transfer companies, and 45 currency exchange offices. Guinea’s banking sector is overseen by the Central Bank (BCRG) and it serves as the agent of the treasury for overseeing banking and credit operations in Guinea and abroad. The BCGR manages the foreign exchange reserves on behalf of the State. Further information on the BCRG can be found in French at http://www.bcrg-guinee.org .

Due to the difficulty of accessing funding from commercial banks, small commercial and agricultural enterprises have increasingly turned to microfinance, which has been growing rapidly with a net increase of deposits and loans, but the quality of its products remains mediocre, with bad debt accounting for five percent of loans with approximately 17 percent of gross loans outstanding.

Guinea plans to broaden the country’s SME base through investment climate reform, solutions to improve access to finance, and the establishment of SME growth corridors. Severely limited access to finance (especially for SMEs), inadequate supply of infrastructure, deficiencies in logistics and trade facilitation, corruption and low capacity of the government, inflation, and poor education of the workforce has seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinean institutions. Guinea’s weak enabling environment for business, its history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory enforcement exacerbate the country’s reputation as an investment destination. As a result, private participation in the economy remains low and firms’ productivity measured by value added is one of the lowest in Africa. Firms’ links with the financial sector are weak – only 6 percent of firms surveyed in the 2006 World Bank Enterprise survey have a bank loan. Credit to the private sector is low, but increasing, at around 14 percent of GDP in 2015 from 5 percent in 2010. Sub-Saharan African averages around of 60 percent. The banking sector is highly concentrated, technologically behind, and banks tend to favor short-term lending at high interest rates. While the microfinance sector grew strongly from a small base, microfinance institutions were hit hard in the Ebola crisis, were not profitable, and needed capacity and technology upgrades. Finally, the efficiency and the use of payment services by all potential users needs to be improved, in a context of financial inclusion. Guinea is a cash society and the economy is driven by trade, agriculture, and the informal sector, which all rely on cash transactions outside the banking sector. However, digital cellphone transfers of funds are increasing their penetration in the country.

Generally there are no undue restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish bank accounts in Guinea. However, one dual citizen (Guinea-American) commented that his preferred bank declined his request to establish an account due to U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FACTA) reporting requirements. Post was unable to find any information related to rules concerning hostile takeovers.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors for converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment. Although there have been no recent changes to remittance policies, it is difficult to obtain foreign exchange in Guinea’s economy. Guinea has experienced significantly weakened liquidity levels over the last several years due to government mismanagement, populist policies, corruption, and a decrease in mining revenue due to lower global commodity prices. Further, liquidity levels of commercial banks are affected by tight reserve requirements (22 percent of deposits) that are in line with IMF performance criteria.

Until December 2015, the exchange rate was managed by the Guinean Central Bank (BCRG) and held to a four percent variance from the unofficial rate. The exchange rate had remained relatively stable since 2013 and only recently depreciated versus the U.S. dollar. Between 2013 and 2015 the Guinean franc (GNF) maintained a value between 7,000 and 7,500 GNF/USD. In late 2015 the unofficial rate reached a value 10 percent higher than the official rate while Guinea had nearly exhausted its foreign currency reserves. The IMF recommended BCRG float the GNF and the official rate jumped to over 9,000 GNF/USD by March 2016.

Remittance Policies

Guinea has no limitations on the conversion and transfer of money or the repatriation of capital and earnings, including branch profits, dividends, interest, royalties, or management or technical service fees. The Central Bank needs to be informed of any major transfers and the wait time to remit investment returns is less than 60 days. Guinea is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa, but is not included on the Financial Action Task Force. Guinea is listed as a country of primary concern the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

There are no limits on the conversion of U.S. dollars to Guinean francs (GNF). Post knows of no issues related to currency conversion and does not see any issues with convertibility risks going forward. The official exchange rate is relatively unstable, but is currently holding at approximately 9,000 GNF/USD (as of March 2016). A weakened economy largely resulting from low commodity prices has caused the GNF to depreciate from an average of 7,000 GNF/USD in early 2015. Since mid-2016 the official exchange rate has been keeping pace with the rate in the parallel black market.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Guinea does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

While Guinea maintains some SOEs for public utilities (water and electricity), the Conde Administration is moving towards allowing private enterprises to operate in this sphere, handing over management of the state-owned electric utility Energie de Guinee (EDG) to the French firm Veolia in 2015. Veolia is taking steps to improve the urban electricity infrastructure by reducing system losses and electricity theft. Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s hydroelectric energy potential are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and to neighboring countries.

The hydroelectricity sector could provide the basis for Guinea’s modernization and also supply regional markets. Guinea’s large hydropower potential is estimated at over 6000 MW, making Guinea a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries. In 2015, Guinea completed Kaleta Dam, doubling the country’s electricity generating capacity and providing urban Conakry with a reliable source of power for most of the year. The government is now pushing forward with the more ambitious Souapiti Dam and numerous renewable and non-renewable power generation plans for which EDG would be the primary vendor.

The government does not publish significant information concerning the financial stability of its SOEs. EDG is listed in the national budget as a line item. Its balance sheet is in the red and the utility received $32 million in state subsidies in 2017.

R&D expenditures are not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s failing SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D given the lack of sophistication in the Guinean economy. Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in the capital. Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement.

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs

Corporate Governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines and are generally highly insolvent organizations. SOEs typically report to the line minister. However, in theory, they typically report to the Office of the President. Seats on the board are allocated by the ruling government and usually by presidential decree. It is most likely that domestic courts will side with SOEs over investment disputes.

Privatization Program

The Guinean government is considering the privatization of the energy sector. In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state owned electrical utility EDG. Veolia of France won the tender and has begun a four year program to manage and rehabilitate the poor performing, insolvent utility that has suffered from decades of poor management. Post understands that at the conclusion of Veolia’s contract, the government will look to privatize EDG or seek a Public Private Partnership. The government also wants a private company to operate the recently completed Kaleta Dam.

The bidding process is spelled out clearly for potential bidders. However, Post has learned that Guinea has given weight to competence with the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa. In spring 2015 a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience.

The amended 2011 Mining Code includes Guinea’s first legal framework outlining corporate social responsibility. Under the provisions of the code, mining companies must submit social and environmental impact plans for approval before operations can begin and sign a code of good conduct, agreeing to refrain from corrupt activities and to follow the precepts of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, lack of capacity in the various ministries involved make government monitoring and enforcement of corporate social responsibility requirements difficult, a gap that some NGOs play a role in filling. Guinea was deemed an EITI compliant country in July 2014.

In its 2017 “Ease of Doing Business” index, the World Bank ranked Guinea 163rd of 190 countries worldwide. Transparency International’s 2016 “Corruption Perception Index” ranked Guinea 142nd of 176 countries listed.

The business and political cultures, coupled with low salaries, have historically combined to create and encourage a culture of corruption throughout Guinea’s government system. Business is often conducted through the payment of bribes rather than by the rule of law. Though it is illegal to pay bribes in Guinea, there is no enforcement of these laws. In practice, it is difficult and time-consuming to conduct business without paying bribes in Guinea, leaving U.S. companies who must comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at a disadvantage.

Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government does not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The World Bank’s most recent Worldwide Governance Indicators reflected that corruption continued to be a severe problem. Public funds were diverted for private use or for illegitimate public uses, such as buying vehicles for government workers. Land sales and business contracts generally lacked transparency.

Guinea’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) is an autonomous agency established by presidential decree in 2004. The ANLC reports directly to the president and is currently the only state agency focused solely on fighting corruption. However, it has been largely ineffective in its role with only two cases prosecuted and no convictions. The ANLC receives anonymous tips concerning possible corruption cases received through a hotline. However, during the past three years there have been no prosecutions as a result of these tips. The ANLC executive director died in 2014 and has yet to be replaced. The agency is underfunded, understaffed, and lacks the basics to fight corruption such as computers and vehicles. The ANLC is comprised of 52 employees in seven field offices and operates on a budget of $1.1 million per year.

The ANLC’s Bureau of Complaint Reception fields anonymous tips forwarded to the ANLC. Investigations and cases must then be prosecuted through criminal courts. During the year there were no prosecutions as a result of tips.

A poll by Afrobarometer and Stat View International of 1,200 citizens from 2011 to 2013 found that 57 percent of the respondents reported paying a bribe within the past 12 months. A separate survey by the ANLC, Open Society Initiative West Africa, and Transparency International found that among private households 61 percent of the respondents stated they were asked to pay a bribe for national services and 24 percent for local services. Furthermore, 24 percent claimed to have paid traffic-related bribes to police, 24 percent for better medical treatment, 19 percent for better water or electricity services, and 8 percent for better judicial treatment.

The Conde Administration has promised to combat corruption in both government and
commercial spheres as one of its top priority agenda items. In general, the situation has improved over the past few years as the government earnestly attempts to improve transparency and reduce corruption.

Guinea is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 

Guinea is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm 

Resources to Report Corruption:

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Seko Mohamed Sylla
Deputy Executive Director
Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ANLC – National Agency Against Corruption)
Cite des Nations, Conakry, Guinea
+224- 669 22 82 51

Contact at NGO:

Transparency International
Dakar, Senegal

Guinea has a long history of political violence. The country suffered under authoritative rule from independence in 1958 until its first democratic election (presidential) in 2010 and it has seen political violence during its transition as a new democracy, although the level of political violence has decreased with each subsequent election since 2010 (legislative in 2013 followed by its second democratic presidential election in 2015). The state persecuted political dissidents and opposition parties for decades. The Sekou Toure regime (1958-1984) and the Lansana Conte regime (1984-2008) were both marked by political violence and human rights abuses.

Following the death of President Lansana Conte on December 22, 2008, a military junta calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) took power in a bloodless coup. Immediately following the coup, the U.S. government suspended all but its humanitarian and election assistance to Guinea. The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea’s membership pending democratic elections and a relinquishment of power by the military junta.

On September 28, 2009, after months of public opposition to the tactics of the military regime, the Forces Vives, a group formed of political opposition, civil society, economic actors, and labor unions, organized a large rally at the capital’s soccer stadium to symbolize their rejection of junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara’s intention to run in upcoming presidential elections. Soon after the rally began, members of Guinea’s armed forces entered the facility and opened fire on the crowd, killing at least 150 people and injuring over a thousand others. Many of the female protestors were also publicly and brutally raped. In the aftermath of the massacre, the military continued to target political and economic opposition. Much of the international community condemned the massacre and the gross human rights abuses. On December 3, 2009 Moussa Dadis Camara was shot by his Aide-de-camp Lt. Abubaker “Toumba” Diakite and was flown to Morocco for treatment. Camara’s bodyguard and driver were killed in the attack. After over a month of recuperation in Morocco, Camara flew to Burkina Faso on January 13, 2010. On January 15, Camara, Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore, and Guinean Minister of Defense Sekouba Konate signed the Ouagadougou Accord, creating a transition government and naming Konate as the Interim President of Guinea, and a civilian, Jean Marie Dore, as Prime Minister. The Transition Government was tasked with organizing presidential and legislative elections to usher in a new democratic government of Guinea.

Guinea experienced additional violent incidents during 2011 and thereafter. On July 19, 2011, the President’s personal residence was attacked with small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. Following the attack the government arrested and charged 38 people, mostly military personnel. The government also temporarily reinstituted road blocks nationwide with night time check points continuing for months.

The small mining town of Zogota located in Guinea’s Forest Region, saw the deaths of five villagers including the village chief during August 2012 clashes with security forces over hiring practices at Brazilian iron-mining company Vale. The villagers alleged that Vale was not hiring enough local employees and was instead bringing workers from other regions of Guinea. The ensuing instability led to Vale evacuating all expatriate personnel from the town. Also in 2012, the Ministry of Economy and Finance official and anticorruption activist Aissatou Boiro was shot and killed in her car in November, allegedly for her anticorruption efforts. Authorities arrested two persons in December 2012 and charged them with the killing. However, they remain in pretrial detention.

In 2013, numerous protests resulting in more than 30 deaths took place in the lead-up to the national legislative elections that had been repeatedly postponed prior to finally being held on September 28, 2013. Many other protests were held in 2013 by citizens and residents angry about the extreme lack of water and electricity in the capital city of Conakry. Some of these protests turned violent and many small businesses were negatively impacted by the frequency of the protests.

Since the July 3 accords brokered by the United States, EU, and France in 2013, there have been minimal occurrences of political violence. The accords led to legislative elections in September 2013 that were internationally recognized as being free and fair and, more importantly, the results were accepted by the population.

On July 15, 2013, violence erupted in N’Zerekore, the administrative capital of Guinea’s Forest Region, 350 miles southeast of Conakry. Conflicting accounts exist of what triggered the onset of the violence that escalated as confrontations ensued between members of Guerze and Konianke ethnic groups. According to local officials, mob and riot-inspired retaliation attacks put the death toll at more than 95 people dead and at least 150 injured. Local police and gendarmerie security forces were deployed to break up the fighting but were initially unable to quell the violence despite an imposed curfew.

Other instances of violence occurred in 2014 and 2015 related to the Ebola epidemic. There were instances since the start of the Ebola epidemic where locals attacked the vehicles and facilities of aid workers. The Red Cross, MSF (Doctors Without Borders) and the World Health Organization (WHO) all reported cases of property damage (destroyed vehicles, ransacked warehouses, etc.). On September 16, 2014 in the Forest Region village of Womei, eight people were killed by a mob when they visited the village as part of an Ebola education campaign. The casualties included radio journalists, local officials and Guinean health care workers. Thirty eight people have been arrested and are awaiting trial.

Presidential Elections in 2015 sparked some violent protests in Conakry, but clashes between police and demonstrators were largely contained and widespread post-election violence never materialized.

Sporadic and generally peaceful protests against fuel prices, lack of electricity, union complaints, and other issues have occurred in the capital and sometimes beyond from 2014 to 2017. In February 2017, seven civilians died in confrontations with security service during large protests against education reforms. Teachers’ unions and the government resolved the dispute in an agreement on February 20.

Although none of these events targeted American or foreign investors, they were disruptive to business in general and eroded confidence in the security situation under which investors must operate in Guinea.

Guinea’s National Assembly adopted a new labor code in February 2014. Guinea’s Labor Code protects the rights of employees and is enforced by the Ministry of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion. The Labor Code sets forth guidelines in various sectors, the most stringent being the mining sector. Guidelines cover wages, holidays, work schedules, overtime pay, vacation, and sick leave. The new labor code also outlaws all discrimination in hiring, including sex, disabilities, and ethnicity. It also prohibits all forms of workplace harassment, including sexual harassment. However, the law does not provide antidiscrimination protections for persons based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

The National Assembly increased employer rights to hire and fire under the 1999 revision of the Labor Code. Employers no longer need to go through the labor office in order to contract or terminate the work of an employee, and the Act removed the requirement to hire only Guinean employees. Some employers, including the Guinean government, avoid paying mandatory benefits by employing people as contractors for years at a time rather than as permanent employees. Some foreign managers cite incidents of theft, low productivity, and difficulties in terminating employees as problems.

Although the law provides for the right of workers to organize and join independent unions, engage in strikes, and bargain collectively, the law also places restrictions on the free exercise of these rights. The 2014 labor code requires unions to obtain support of 20 percent of the workers in a company, region, or trade that the union claims to represent. The new code mandates that unions provide 10 days’ notice to the labor ministry before striking, but the code does allow work slowdowns. Strikes are only permitted for “professional claims.” However, the new labor code says it does not apply to government workers, members of the armed forces, or temporary government workers. While the labor code protects union officials from anti-union discrimination, it does not extend that same protection to other workers. The labor code prohibits employers from taking into consideration union membership and activities with regard to decisions about employee hiring, firing, and conduct. The new labor code allows workers 30 days to appeal any labor decisions.

The law prohibits child labor in the formal sector and sets forth penalties of three to 10 years imprisonment and confiscation of resulting profits. The law does not protect children in the informal sector. The minimum age for employment is 16. Exceptions allow children to work at age 12 as apprentices for light work in such sectors as domestic service and agriculture, and at 14 for other work. The law does not permit workers and apprentices under 18 to work more than 10 consecutive hours, at night, or on Sundays. The Ministry of Labor maintained a list of occupations in which youth under 18 cannot be employed, but enforcement is limited to large firms in the modern sector of the economy. The penal code increases penalties for forced labor if minors are involved, but penalties do not meet international standards, and enforcement is not sufficient to deter child labor violations. The most recent statistics indicated that more than one-third of all children under 18 worked in industries considered dangerous by the United Nation’s International Labor Organization (ILO). Although the child code requires the country’s laws to respect treaty obligations and is regarded as law by the justice system, ambiguity remained about the code’s validity, because the government did not pass a required implementation text.

The Ministry of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion is responsible for enforcing child labor laws, and it conducted occasional inspections. The police division OPROGEM under the Ministry of Security was responsible for investigating child trafficking and child labor violations. While its funding and resources are generally insufficient, a budget allocation by the government to OPROGEM in 2017 signified recognition by the government of OPROGEM’s critical role investigating cases and transporting victims to NGOs for care. In 2016-2017, the government initiated four trafficking investigations primarily involving children, prosecuted four alleged traffickers and parents for facilitating trafficking, and convicted three offenders. It also continued one investigation involving 14 alleged traffickers.

Child labor occurs most frequently in the informal sectors of subsistence farming, small-scale commerce, and mining. Smaller numbers of girls, mostly migrants from neighboring countries, are subjected to domestic servitude. Forced child labor occurs primarily in the cashew, cocoa, coffee, gold, and diamond sectors of the economy. Many children between the ages of five and 16 work 10 to 15 hours a day in the diamond and gold mines for minimal compensation and little food. Child laborers extract, transport, and clean the minerals. They operate in extreme conditions, lack protective gear, do not have access to water or electricity, and face a constant threat of disease and sickness.

According to a government study conducted with the ILO and issued in 2011, 43 percent of all children between five and 17 worked, including 33 percent of children ages five to 11, 55.9 percent between 12 and 15, and 61.3 percent between 16 and 17. Of those, 93.3 percent worked in what the ILO defines as hazardous conditions – meaning 40.1 percent of all children in the country worked in hazardous conditions. This included more than one million children in fishing and agriculture, 30,619 in manufacturing, 46,072 in mining, 15,169 in construction, 204,818 in commerce and restaurants, 6,816 in transport, and 92,873 in other hazardous or dangerous work.

The Labor Code outlines general guidelines related to health and safety, but the Guinean government has yet to implement a set of practical occupational standards. The government has limited resources for this activity. The law provides that the government should support children’s rights and welfare, although in practice, the government has neither the capability nor the political will to curb the high rate of child labor. The Labor Code also stipulates that the Minister of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth under the age of 18 cannot be employed. In practice, enforcement by ministry inspectors is limited to large firms in the modern sector of the economy.

The labor code allows the government to set a minimum monthly wage enforced by the Ministry of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion. On April 29, 2014 the government exercised this provision for the first time, setting the minimum wage for domestic workers at 440,000 GNF (approximately $64) per month. No minimum wage for other sectors was established. There is no known official poverty income level established by the government.

The law mandates that regular work should not exceed 10 hour days or 48 hour weeks, and it mandates a period of at least 24 consecutive hours of rest each week, usually on Sunday. Every salaried worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at the rate of at least two workdays per month of work. There also are provisions in the law for overtime and night wages, which are a fixed percentage of the regular wage. The law stipulates a maximum of 100 hours of compulsory overtime a year.

The law contains general provisions regarding occupational safety and health, but the government has not established a set of practical workplace health and safety standards. Moreover, it has not issued any orders laying out the specific safety requirements for certain occupations or for certain methods of work called for in the labor code. All workers, foreign and migrant included, have the right to refuse to work in unsafe conditions without penalty.

The Ministry of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion is responsible for enforcing labor standards, and its 160 inspectors were empowered to suspend work immediately in situations deemed hazardous to workers’ health. Nevertheless, enforcement efforts were sporadic. According to the ILO, inspectors received inadequate training and had limited resources. Retired labor inspector positions went unfilled. Inspectors lacked computers and transportation to carry out their duties. Penalties for violation of the labor law were not sufficient to deter violations. The penal code calls for prison terms of up to 10 years for people found guilty of trafficking in persons. Additionally, the law subjects traffickers to forfeiture of objects of value or money received through forced labor of others. Offering someone into forced labor is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.

Authorities rarely monitored work practices or enforced the workweek standards and the overtime rules. Teachers’ wages were extremely low, and teachers sometimes went six months or more without pay. Salary arrears were not paid, and some teachers lived in abject poverty.

Violation of wage, overtime, and occupational health and safety standards were common across sectors. Forced child labor, which constituted the majority of forced labor victims, occurred primarily in the gold, diamond, cashew, cocoa, and coffee sectors. There were, for example, reports of unsafe working conditions in the artisanal (small-scale) gold mining communities in the northern section of the country, where inspectors found occupational health and environmental hazards.

Despite legal protection against working in unsafe conditions, many workers feared retaliation and did not exercise heir right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions. Data were not available on workplace fatalities and accidents in 2016, but accidents in unsafe working conditions were common. The government banned artisanal gold and other mining during the rainy season to prevent deaths from mudslides, but the practice continues.

Pursuant to the Guinean Labor Code, any person is considered a worker, regardless of gender or nationality, who is engaged in any occupational activity in return for remuneration, under the direction and authority of another individual or entity, whether public or private, secular or religious. In accordance with this Code, forced or compulsory labor means any work or services extracted from an individual under threat of a penalty and for which the individual concerned has not offered himself willingly.

A contract of employment is a contract under which a person agrees to be at the disposal and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration. The contract may be agreed upon for an indefinite or a fixed term and may only be agreed upon by individuals of at least 16 years of age, although minors under the age of 16 may be contracted only with the authorization of the minor’s parent or guardian. An unjustified dismissal provides the employee the right to receive compensation from the employer in an amount equal to at least six months’ salary with the last gross wage paid to the employee being used as the basis for calculating the compensation due.

The law provides that the government should support children’s rights and welfare, although in practice, the government has neither the capability nor the political will to curb the high rate of child labor. The Labor Code also stipulates that the Minister of Social Action, Women, and Child Promotion maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth under the age of 18 cannot be employed. In practice, enforcement by ministry inspectors is limited to large firms in the modern sector of the economy.

Guinea has a young population with a high unemployment rate and lacks employees with specialized skills. The country has a poor educational system and lacks professionals in all sectors of the economy. Guinea lacks the specialized skills needed for large-scale projects.

Workers at the Port Autonome Conakry (PAC) have occasionally held strikes. The most recent call for a strike was in October 2014 to protest the awarding of the Roll On/Roll Off concession for vehicles from PAC to the secure container operator, Bollore of France. Although PAC employees did not go on strike as this time, a strike has the potential to bottleneck port operations, which would have a ripple effect in the economy as customs revenues account for 45 percent of Guinea’s revenues with 98 percent of these revenues collected at the Port of Conakry.

Guinea and the United States have had an agreement on private investment guarantees in effect since 1962, making investors eligible for Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs. OPIC had been active recently in Guinea, investing in the expansion project of Guinea’s largest bauxite exporter, and is currently considering support for a project in the energy sector. U.S. private sector firms are interested in utilizing OPIC for infrastructure related projects in the mining and energy sectors. A USAID Power Africa transaction advisor visited Conakry in April 2017 for meetings and fact finding to gauge Power Africa’s potential role in Guinean renewable energy contracts.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2015 $6.7 Billion http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or international Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2014 $188 Million http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2015 $0 http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Data not available.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

Before 7/2017

Michael Westendorp
Economic and Commercial Officer
BP 603, Transversale 2 Ratoma

After 7/2017

John Stark
Economic and Commercial Officer
BP 603, Transversale 2 Ratoma

2017 Investment Climate Statements: Guinea
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