Executive Summary

Tajikistan presents high-risk, high-reward opportunities for foreign investors who have experience with the region and are willing to put in significant research and effort. The Tajik government has expressed interest in attracting more U.S. investment, but has not yet implemented reforms that would make the poorest of the Central Asian countries a more competitive investment destination.

Tajikistan’s economy is heavily exposed to external shocks, especially to those from Russia, where it sends close to one million labor migrants whose remittances fund about 30 percent of Tajikistan’s economy. Tajikistan’s banking sector, which had suffered from lower remittance flows during the 2015 Russian recession, began to stabilize in 2017 despite an official non-performing loan rate of 36.5 percent in December. Some Embassy contacts believe this rate should be closer to 70 percent of the total loan portfolio. Nonetheless, the improved stability was more a result of a rebounding world economy and larger remittance volumes than a result of structural, economic changes. At present, the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT)’s policy rate is at 14 percent, with nominal lending rates at about 27 percent for loans in local currency and 18 percent for dollar loans. A low financial inclusion rate of about 11 percent has forced commercial banks to restrict loan amounts they make available to borrowers. Loans are therefore unaffordable for small and medium sized businesses (SMEs). Although international financial institutions (IFIs) have worked to make Tajikistan’s banking sector more resilient, many of the same vulnerabilities that led to Tajikistan’s 2015 liquidity crisis remain.

As the Russian ruble devalued in 2014 in response to lower oil prices and Western sanctions, Tajik households received fewer somoni after their ruble-denominated remittances lost value. In addition to precipitating Tajikistan’s banking crisis, the fall in remittances decreased consumption, and – in return – government revenue. This hurt the government’s ability to hit its consumption targets, anecdotally a driver of the country’s GDP growth. To compensate, Tajikistan’s tax authority has increased business inspections and tax audits to recover the shortfall. Besides worsening Tajikistan’s business climate, these policies had the double effect of hurting workers. This transfer to the government occurred as real incomes slipped more than 40 percent between 2015 and 2016 and again by 12 percent in 2017.

While the somoni appreciated against the ruble, it lost value against the dollar, causing the price of all imported goods to rise. Tajikistan’s real effective exchange rate, a weighted average against its import partners, has also steadily declined. Since Tajikistan relies on imports for about 70 percent of the food needed to feed its population and 60-70 percent of consumable spending, this depreciation proved inflationary.

Despite Tajikistan’s March 2, 2013 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), contract sanctity and adequate intellectual property right protections remain elusive. The Tajik government has not fully engaged with international stakeholders to provide these protections. The Tajik government has also imposed arbitrary trade policy to protect fledgling, domestic industries without notifying its partners, as occurred with its ban on imported chicken meat in 2017. It continues to develop its WTO post-accession plan which requires adaptation and amendment of the legislation and regulation aspects for the post-accession period. Tajikistan is still considering joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Should they apply for membership and be accepted, it could result in higher trade tariffs and greater difficulty for U.S. firms to invest in Tajikistan. In 2017, Chinese trade, investment, and loans made China Tajikistan’s dominant economic partner. Tajikistan’s external debt to China as of the beginning of 2018 was USD 1.2 billion or 41.3 percent of all external debt.

Tajikistan has focused heavily on energy security since a 2008 dispute with Uzbekistan left it without gas to heat its population. Since independence, Tajikistan has struggled to provide year-round electricity to its households and businesses. The Tajik government reported in 2017 however, that it had supplied uninterrupted electricity for the first time. To meet domestic energy demand while also generating surplus electricity for export, Tajikistan has pursued the construction of Roghun Dam – the world’s tallest when construction is complete; this pursuit often occurred unilaterally and to the detriment of its public finances. In 2017, it issued its maiden, USD 500 million Eurobond which propelled debt-to-GDP to about 40 percent. Many experts have warned that Roghun’s construction puts its macro-fiscal stability at risk.

Despite these challenges and risks to potential investors, Tajikistan is in the midst of historical opportunities. Some economists believe the Tajik government recognizes the harm its tax and customs policies, as well as its fragile banking sector, pose to economic growth and understands that they may not finish Roghun’s construction without sustainable economic andstructural changes. Other experts are optimistic that improved regional cooperation might lead to supply and value chains and the harmonization of customs and standards.

In 2016, the government introduced a 2016-2030 National Development Strategy and a 2016-2020 Mid-Term Economic Development Strategy. These strategies emphasize the importance of investment as a driver of growth. The Tajik president conducts annual meetings with his investment council, however the council has had a limited impact boosting investment and improving the country’s business climate. In February, the newly appointed Chairman of the State Investment Committee Farrukh Khamralizoda reported that competition led 30,000 businesses to close in 2017. In reality, tight regulatory mechanisms and tax burdens were more likely to blame.

Table 1

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 161 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/
World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business” 2018 123 of 190 doingbusiness.org/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2017 86 of 128 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 N/A http://www.bea.gov/
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 1280 USD http://data.worldbank.org/

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Tajikistan has traditionally courted state-led investment and external loans from larger regional neighbors, including China, Russia, and Iran. In 2017, China continued as Tajikistan’s largest investor, with investments totaling USD 303 million, or 30 percent of total investment to Tajikistan. For the last 10 years, China remains Tajikistan’s main investor, with investments over USD 2.25 billion. China provided financing for the construction of a new USD 200 million government office building in Dushanbe.

In 2017, the Tajik government increased efforts to attract investments from the Gulf States. In April, a delegation of Tajik officials headed by Chairman of State Investment Committee and State Property Management Farrukh Khamralizoda met in Riyadh with their counterparts to discuss establishing a Tajik-Saudi Joint Fund on FDI and Business Council. In 2007-2017, Saudi investments to Tajikistan were USD 160.2 million. In addition, Qatar has invested USD 384.5 million in a high-rise luxury apartment complex and the construction of the region’s biggest mosque. Qatar’s central bank is also investigating banking opportunities in Tajikistan. In March, Tajikistan’s Finance Minister Fayziddin Qahhorzoda and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development Deputy Chairman Hesham Al-Vakayam signed a loan agreement in Dushanbe that will provide USD 25.5 million to Tajikistan for the construction of a road linking Kulyab-Kalaikhumb, two cities in Tajikistan’s south.

Anecdotally, dozens of both foreign-owned and jointly-foreign-owned companies in Tajikistan have complained to resident European and U.S. officials about continual inspections and arbitrary and discriminatory application of the tax code to exact burdensome payments.

Despite a general deterioration in the investment climate, progressive legislative action on a few issues may yield positive results. A cotton fiber tax was abolished in June 2016, the sales tax was reduced by one per cent in January 2017, and a simplified tax system means that a larger population of small-scale entrepreneurs is now eligible for more favorable tax treatment.

Tajikistan’s Investment Law (Article 4) guarantees equal rights for both local and foreign investors. According to this law, foreigners can invest by jointly owning shares in existing companies with other Tajik companies or Tajik citizens; by creating fully foreign-owned companies; or by concluding agreements with legal entities or citizens of Tajikistan that provide for other forms of foreign investment activity. Foreign firms may acquire assets, including shares and other securities, as well as land and mineral usage rights. Foreign firms may also exercise all property rights to which they are entitled, either independently or shared with other Tajik companies and citizens of Tajikistan. Most of Tajikistan’s current international agreements provide most-favored-nation status.

Although Tajik law recognizes the sanctity of contracts, the country’s judicial system is opaque and enforcement is poor. The country’s tax policy is neither predictable nor always favorable to legitimate business interests. The Tajik government typically takes an opportunistic interest in private companies that turn a profit. As one businessperson put it, “birds are only permitted to fly with the government’s permission.”

Tajikistan’s legal code does not discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment. To receive permission and licenses for operation, however, a foreign investor must navigate a complicated, cumbersome, and often corrupt bureaucratic system.

Several Tajik government agencies are responsible for investment promotion, but they frequently have competing interests. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan (http://gki.tj/ ) chiefly facilitates FDI. In addition to this, there is state-owned enterprise Tajinvest under the State Committee on Investments and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan which is also responsible for attracting investment into Tajikistan (www.tajinvest.tj ).

Tajikistan has established several formal mechanisms to maintain open channels of communication with existing and potential investors. With EBRD support, the government established a Consultative Council on Improvement of Investment climate in 2007. This annual Council provides a formal venue for dialogue with donors, international financial institutions, and members of the private sector (http://investmentcouncil.tj/en/ ). In January 2018, President Rahmon led the 18th meeting of the Consultative Council on Improvement of Investment Climate. The government also established in January 2015 a National Entrepreneurship Day (NED), which is annually celebrated in October. Nevertheless, investors continue to claim that many of their complaints to the government go unheeded.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Tajikistan’s legislation provides a right for all forms of foreign and domestic ownership to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control of firms and no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access. Local law considers all land and subsoil resources to belong exclusively to the state, although initial efforts to establish a private land market are underway.

Tajikistan’s legislation allows for 100 percent foreign ownership of local companies. In the context of jointly-owned companies, local partners generally seek to possess a controlling share (51 percent or more) at the initial stage of business development and in some cases may seek to increase their stake over time.

All sectors of Tajikistan’s economy are open to foreign participation with the exception of aviation, defense, security, and law enforcement which require special government permission for the operation of such types of businesses or services. Tajikistan does not restrict foreign investment; it does not mandate local stakeholder equity positions or local partnering. In some cases licenses are required. There are no mandatory IP/technology transfer requirements.

Tajikistan’s government maintains an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investments, including investments into Free Economic Zones, issuing approval or rejection statements in particular for investments requiring government financial support or state guarantees. The State Investments and Property Management Committee is responsible for filing and coordinating foreign investment project proposals as they pass through the review pipeline. The government takes particular interest in determining whether the proposed project may impact the county’s national security and/or economic performance.

Investors must submit their proposals for screening to all relevant government agencies. This process can be lengthy and cumbersome. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management circulates the investor’s proposal among the relevant government offices and ministries with instructions to review and express their formal opinion. If a ministry objects to the proposed investment activity, it submits an official note to the State Committee. This procedure applies to investment projects involving privatization of state property, but not to investment projects involving the private sector.

Screening proposals often involve background checks on the company, the person(s) representing the company, and identification of a financial source to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. U.S. businesses have not identified screening mechanisms as a barrier to investment.

The purpose of the investment screening process is to ensure that a proposed investment/project does not violate Tajik laws. If a proposal is rejected during the review process, the Tajik government may flag it as “incomplete.” Applicants may appeal the government’s decision by submitting a claim to the Tajik Economic Court.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) presented a draft Investment Policy Review of Tajikistan on November of 2015 to stakeholders from the government, local and international private sector, and civil society and development partners. The final report was published on August 10, 2016 (http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1596 ).

Tajikistan has not conducted a WTO Trade Policy Review and the WTO has not scheduled a review of Tajikistan in 2017.

Some international and local consulting companies in the recent years produced guides and reports on investment and business in Tajikistan:

Business Facilitation

Although the Tajik government has simplified the business registration process by adopting a single-window registration system, that process still requires significant legal and human resources, government connections, and time. The Tax Committee is the primary agency responsible for business registration (www.andoz.tj ). In addition to obtaining the state registration, a company must also register with the Social Protection Agency (www.nafaka.tj ); Statistics Agency under the President of Tajikistan (www.stat.tj ); Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment (www.mehnat.tj ); Sanitary-Epidemiological Service at the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan (www.moh.tj ); as well as with local authorities, municipal services, and other agencies. According to the country’s regulations, registering a business should take less than five business days; in reality it may take several days or even months due to inappropriate and illegal actions of registering agencies. All businesses must be notarized by the Government of Tajikistan.

The State Committee on State Property Management and Attraction of Investments is the key agency that collects information and project proposals from investors. However, numerous other agencies are involved in the investment coordination process, making it cumbersome.

According to Tajik legislation, micro enterprises have less than 10 employees, small enterprises 11 to 50 employees, and medium enterprises 51 to 100 employees. The international donor community, in coordination with the government, funds a number of projects which stimulate development of small and medium enterprises in Tajikistan.

Outward Investment

The Tajik government does not promote outward investments. Private companies from Tajikistan invested in Kazakhstan, Russia, and UAE in 2017, primarily in trade, real estate, and business development.

The Tajik government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

Tajikistan signed bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. These BITs are in force. It has also signed BITs that have not yet come into force with Algeria, Armenia, the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. BIT information is available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/206 .

Tajikistan’s other investment agreements include: the Eurasian Investment Agreement with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation (came into force December 2, 2015); the Economic Cooperation Organization Investment Agreement (not yet in force); the European Community-Tajikistan Partnership Agreement with the European Union; the Commonwealth of Independent States Investor Rights Convention with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Republic of Moldova; the Energy Charter Treaty; the Organization of the Islamic Conference Investment Agreement, and the U.S.- Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Tajikistan became a signatory to the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the United States, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 2004, but Tajikistan and the U.S. have not signed a Free Trade Agreement or bilateral investment treaty.

Tajikistan currently has bilateral agreements to avoid double taxation with Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Brunei, China, Czech Republic, Finland, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, Moldova, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The provisions of double tax agreements prevail over Tajikistan domestic law. Although Tajikistan is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (ECC), and therefore not a party to its trade agreements, it nevertheless pledged in 1992 to uphold certain USSR treaty obligations, including an Income Tax Treaty that entered into force in 1976.

Although Tajikistan adopted a new national tax code in January 2013, its tax system remains internally inconsistent and administratively burdensome. Investors are required to pay social security taxes on non-Tajik employees’ salaries. There is an exemption on paying social security tax for non-Tajik employees who work in Tajikistan for government investment projects. Investors should also be aware that any financial transfers from parent companies to branches within Tajikistan will be taxed as revenue.

Investors who qualify for a value-added tax (VAT) exemption on imported materials should be aware that applications for exemption must be submitted no later than January 1 and that any exemptions granted will expire December 31 of that year. In practice, exemptions are often not granted until October, leaving a short window to file. While the exemption applies retroactively for the calendar year, the Tajik government has said the tax code has no legal mechanism to authorize refunds of VAT paid prior to the date the exemption was granted.

The U.S. government has a bilateral income tax treaty with Tajikistan, but the Tajik government does not want to recognize this treaty and believes that Tajikistan and the United States should sign a new treaty that formally recognizes Tajikistan’s independence (https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/tajikistan-tax-treaty-documents ).

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Tajikistan’s regulatory system lacks transparency. Executive documents – presidential decrees, laws, government orders, instructions, ministerial memos, and regulations – are often inaccessible to the public. Businesspeople and investors must purchase access to Adliya, a commercial legal database, to obtain updated legal and regulatory information. Each ministry has its own set of unpublished regulations and these may contradict the laws and/or regulations of other ministries.

Proposed laws and regulations are seldom published in draft form for public comment. Although the Tajik government solicited public comment on the 2013 Tax Code, it did not modify the draft law based on the input received.

TajikStandard, the government agency responsible for certifying goods and services, calibrating and accrediting testing laboratories, and supervising compliance with state standards, lacks experts and appropriate equipment. TajikStandard does not publish its fees for licenses and certificates or its regulatory requirements.

The World Bank-funded Public Financial Management Modernization Project helps the Ministry of Finance adopt International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). A state utility company and Tajik Air Navigation company are two pilot businesses using the IPSAS reporting standard. According to a 2017 World Bank Public Finance Management Modernization Project Report, all state agencies will become IPSAS-compliant by December 2018 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/193691512132668403/pdf/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-Public-Finance-Management-Modernization-Project-2-P150381-Sequence-No-05.pdf ).

The Tajik central government is the highest rule-making and regulatory authority. On a case by case basis, the central government will delegate some regulatory functions to state, regional, or local levels.

Regulatory procedures are not transparent. Tajikistan is now in the process of shifting to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The majority of state companies prepare their accounting and financial reports according to national accounting standards. Private sector, donor agencies, and the banking system use IFRS. If the company also operates internationally, then it is in its interest to abide by international standards as well.

The Office of General Prosecution, Anti-corruption Agency, Tax Committee, and State National Security Committee oversee government and administrative procedures.

No regulatory system and enforcement reforms have been announced in 2017. However, the International Finance Corporation Business Regulation and Investment Policy Project conducted an annual review of existing investment stimuli and preferences and concluded that there are in total 93 different investment stimuli offered to investors in Tajikistan. They are broken up by tax, customs, licensing, property management, and inspections incentives.

Government agencies submit proposed draft regulations to working group commissions, which are headed by government representatives. Once cleared, draft regulations receive final review by the relevant Ministries.

Legally the enforcement process is reviewable and could be made accountable to the public. In practice, however, Tajikistan’s regulations are seldom enforced. Regulations are not reviewed on the basis of scientific or data-driven assessments. Tajikistan archives its laws, regulations and policies at www.mmk.tj .

International Regulatory Considerations

Tajikistan is a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). To date, Tajikistan has decided against membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.

CIS and U.S. technical norms are incorporated in the regulatory system that governs Tajikistan’s cotton sector. Tajikistan is a WTO member and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Tajikistan has a civil legal system. The parties to a contract can seek enforcement by submitting their claims to Tajikistan’s Economic Court. Tajikistan has written laws on commercial activities and contracts. Tajikistan’s economic courts review economic/commercial disputes.

Legally, the judicial system is independent. In practice, the executive branch interferes in judiciary matters. The current judicial process is neither fair nor reliable. Outcomes tend to be decided by the government’s executive branch.

Legally, regulation and enforcement actions are appealable and appeals should be adjudicated in the national court system. In practice, national courts typically carry out executive preferences, leaving business and commercial interests vulnerable to government interference.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Several government websites provide information on laws/regulations:

The Tajik government regulates investments through a number of laws, inter alia, the Law on Investment Agreement, Law on Concessions, Law on Resources, Law on Legal Status of Foreigners, Law on Free Economic Zones, Law on Investments, Concept of State Policy on Investments and Protection of Investments, Law on Natural Resources Tenders, and Law on Privatization of Housing. The government also established the New Coordination Council of Inspection Agencies. According to the proposed draft decree, inspections will now be guided by an initial risk assessment. Historically, inspections have been undertaken without any justification whatsoever.

The government’s Action Plan for the Improvement of Investment Climate of Industry Sector, Support of Introduction Entrepreneurship, and Development of National Production for 2016-2018 was approved July 27, 2016.

The Tajik government does not offer a “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors, however the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has expressed interest in helping the Tajik government establish one.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The State Agency for Anti-Monopoly Policy and Enterprise Support is responsible for providing support for entrepreneurship and regulating prices for products of monopolistic enterprises, as well as preventing and eliminating monopolistic activity, abuse of dominant market position, and unfair competition.

In November 2016, the State Agency for Anti-Monopoly Policy and Enterprise Support received a notification on the transaction between the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED) and Swedish Group Telia Sonera; this transaction will sell 100 percent of the shares of TCELL, a mobile provider, to AKFED. Telia Sonera and AKFED completed the deal in April 2017, giving AKFED 100 percent ownership of TCELL in Tajikistan.

Expropriation and Compensation

The Tajik government can legally expropriate property under the terms of Tajikistan’s Law on Investments, Law on Privatization, Civil Code, and Criminal Code. The laws authorize expropriation if the Tajik government identifies procedural violations in privatizations of state-owned assets or determines that property has been used in anti-government or criminal activities, as defined in the Criminal Code. Under the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the government may request that a court cancel the private purchase of shares in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) if it determines that there was a violation to the procedure within the original sale.

Tajikistan has a history of expropriating land on the grounds that the properties involved were illegally privatized following Tajikistan’s independence. Following an investigation by government anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, and other law enforcement agencies, the State Committee for Investments and Property Management can issue a finding that the asset was illegally privatized, and request that the Tajik court system order its return to government control. Local domestic law requires owners to be reimbursed for expropriated property, but the amount of the compensation is usually well below the property’s fair market value.

In several cases, Tajik officials have used government regulatory agencies to pressure businesses and individuals into ceding properties and business assets. The Tajik government has not shown any pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons by way of illegal expropriation. All privately owned operations are vulnerable to expropriation actions.

The Tajik government may threaten to impose inflated and baseless taxation charges on companies, and use this as leverage to negotiate the transfer of some share of a company to the government. In cases of expropriations, claimants and others have generally not had access to due process.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Tajikistan is not a member state of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Tajikistan became the 147th country to sign and ratify the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). Notwithstanding this, if recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would be sought in the Tajik courts, the ill-functioning judicial system of Tajikistan may cause a lot of “technical” troubles for the applicant.

Tajikistan acceded to the Convention on August 14, 2012, but it entered into force on November 12, 2012 – 90 days after the deposit of the signed text at the UN and in accordance with Article XII (2) of the Convention.

Tajikistan signed the Convention with a number of reservations regarding types of arbitration agreements and decisions that can be recognized and implemented in Tajikistan.

One of the reservations established that Tajikistan does not apply the provisions of the Convention to disputes with immovable property. A similar reservation was established by Norway, which acceded to the Convention in 1961.

Another reservation established that Tajikistan apply the Convention only to disagreements and decisions “arising after the entry into force of the Convention and to decisions made in the territory of third countries.”

The decision to accede the Republic of Tajikistan to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was adopted by the Majlisi Namoyandagon (Lower House of Parliament) of the Majlis Oli (Upper House of the Parliament) of the Republic of Tajikistan on May 31, 2012.

Tajikistan is not a member state at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. In 2011, Tajikistan also joined the Cape Town Convention on International Interests and Mobile Equipment. The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, together usually referred to as the Cape Town Treaty, is an international treaty intended to standardize transactions involving movable property, particularly aircraft and aircraft engines. The treaty creates international standards for registration of ownership, security interests (liens), leases and conditional sales contracts, and various legal remedies for default in financing agreements, including repossession and the effect of particular states’ bankruptcy laws.

There have been no claims by U.S. investors under a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA), because Tajikistan does not have a BIT or an FTA with the United States.

Disputes involving foreign investors have primarily centered on the implementation of tax incentives. In the last ten years, a minimum of three foreign investors have reported to Embassy officials difficulty utilizing promised value-added tax exemptions on imported items. Tajik procedures require businesses to submit in January of the calendar year a list of goods to be imported, the exemption then expires at the end of December in that same year.

It takes an average of 430 days to obtain a resolution on a commercial dispute/contract enforcement proceeding in Tajikistan: 40 days for filing and service, 120 days for trial and judgment, and 270 days for enforcement of the decision.

In 2013, Rusal, a Russian Aluminum company, which is owned by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, prevailed over the Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO) at the Swiss Arbitration Court with a claim of USD 274 million. In response, the Tajik Tax Committee launched a case against Deripaska’s companies in Tajikistan, including a Business Center and Hyatt hotel. The Tajik government accused Deripaska’s businesses of failure to pay USD 60 million in taxes to the Tajik state budget. Deripaska resolved this dispute by agreeing to sell the business center and hotel to TALCO for an undisclosed sum. In return Rusal declined to pursue the USD 274 million claim, and TALCO agreed to pay Rusal’s USD 60 million of tax debts to the Tajik authorities.

The government has also been involved in disputes with the governments of Iran and Russia over revenue sharing arrangements at the jointly-owned Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plants.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Tajik law recognizes the role of local courts in dispute resolution and arbitration but in reality there is not a reputable arbitration institution that is a popular venue for resolving disputes domestically among individuals and businesses. In practice, however, these courts are primarily used to resolve disputes over agricultural plot demarcations as part of the land reform process, and do not serve as venues to resolve non-agricultural commercial disputes.

Tajikistan has signed bilateral agreements with several countries on arbitration and investment disputes, but local domestic courts do not always properly enforce or recognize awards.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Under Tajikistan’s Law on Bankruptcy (2003), both creditors and debtors may file for an insolvent firm’s liquidation. The debtor may reject overly burdensome contracts, and may choose whether or not to continue contracts supplying essential goods or services, or avoid preferential or undervalued transactions. The law does not provide for the possibility of the debtor obtaining credit after the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Creditors have the right to demand the debtor return creditors’ property if that property was assigned to the debtor less than four months prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Tajik law does not criminalize bankruptcy.

Investment Incentives

According to statements by President Rahmon, there are 240 tax, regulatory, and legal incentives for businesses. According to IFC Business Regulation and Investment Policy project there are 97 incentives for investments as of April. In practice, businesses and investors cannot access or utilize most of these incentives.

The Tajik government has officially expressed an interest in attracting FDI but has taken little practical action to do so. In 2016, Tajikistan’s government approved an ambitious National Development Strategy 2016-2030, which highlights the critical role of private sector investment. According to this strategy, the Tajik government plans to attract as much as USD 55 billion in FDI by 2030. Given the country’s business and tax environment, however, this plan appears to be more aspirational than realistic. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management’s website lists government-promoted investment opportunities (http://gki.tj/en/ ).

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The Tajik government has established four Free Economic Zones (FEZs), which offer reduced taxes and customs fees to both foreign and domestic businesses. To be eligible for preferential tax treatment, manufacturing companies must invest a minimum of USD 500,000, trading companies USD 50,000, and service and consulting companies USD10,000.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

According to the Tajik Law on Audits, for local companies at least 70 per cent of the workforce must be local employees. If the CEO of the company is foreign, then the percentage of local staff should be at least 75 percent. This requirement is sometimes waived.

In June 2015, the Minister of Labor, Migration and Employment announced that for large-scale projects implemented in Tajikistan, which are signed between the Tajik government and either a company registered in another country or a government of another country, at least 80 percent of the workforce must be locally hired. Depending on the qualifications of the local labor force, this requirement may be increased to 90 percent.

Tajik legislation permits foreigners to hold senior management and directorial positions.

It is possible to obtain visas and residence/work permits, but applicants are required to provide documentary support, and most permits cannot exceed one year.

Relevant ministries must review and approve all investment proposals.

The government does not practice a forced localization policy. Tajikistan abandoned its plan to require IT providers to turn over source code and provide access for surveillance purposes in 2009, due both to lobbying from telecom providers and appreciation of the high cost of creating and maintaining such a monitoring system.

The government does not impede the transmission of customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory unless the data violates anti-terrorist and anti-extremist laws and policies.

In 2017, Tajikistan’s Telecommunication’s agency formally completed a unified communication center (single gateway), monopolizing internet access.

Real Property

The Tajik government uses a cadaster system to record, protect, and facilitate acquisition and disposition of property, but it needs improvement. Even when secured interests in property do exist, enforcement remains an issue. Investors should be aware that establishing title may be a more involved process than in Western countries because title histories can be difficult to find.

The government passed mortgage legislation in March 2008 which allows parties to use immovable property as collateral. The government also adopted revised Land Code amendments in August 2012.

According to local domestic law, all land belongs exclusively to the state; individuals or entities may be granted first or second-tier land use rights. The government restricts foreigners’ first-tier land use rights to 50 years, while Tajik individuals and entities may have indefinite first-tier land use rights. Foreigners may request second-tier land use rights from the government similar to the first-tier rights of Tajik individuals and entities, for periods of up to 50 years. Tajik first-tier land use rights holders may also grant foreigners lease agreements for up to 20 years. Ownership of rural land use rights can be particularly opaque, since many nominally privatized former collective farms continue to operate as a single entity. Many of the new owners do not know where their land is and do not exercise their property rights.

Officially, all of Tajikistan’s land is clearly demarcated by title and affiliated either with state-ownership or allocated for private usage.

Land in Tajikistan cannot be sold. All land is the property of the state. If land is not being used according to the purpose of the lease, then authorities can revert it to other owners.

Intellectual Property Rights

While Tajikistan is a signatory to several international conventions that protect intellectual property rights (IPR), including the World International Property Organization (WIPO) Convention, the country has signed only eight of the 26 WIPO treaties, including the Patent Law treaty and the Trademark Law Treaty. Tajikistan’s enforcement of IP violations needs strengthening (regulatory authority is divided between the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Agriculture). Most software and other media products sold in Tajikistan are unlicensed copies, and many “brand name” consumer goods are counterfeit.

No new IPR related laws or regulations were enacted in 2017, though the Tajik government did formulate an action plan for the implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, which includes IPR enforcement provisions as part of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty requirements.

Article 156 of the Criminal Code allows for seizures of counterfeit goods. The Tajik Ministry of Interior has declined to report statistics on criminal cases opened for consumer fraud from 2013 onward. Information on successful prosecutions is likewise unavailable.

As part of its WTO membership, Tajikistan pledged to improve IPR enforcement. At the end of 2015, the government established a Working Group under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to work on legal regulation that would ban the use of unlicensed software by state entities, but the government has yet to release such a regulation. The Tajik government is currently developing an implementation work plan and attempting to attract technical assistance.

In early 2016, the Tajik government adopted a 2014-2020 National Strategy for the Development of Intellectual Property, and is seeking funding from outside donors to implement the strategy. Pirated software and audio-visual media remain widely available in Tajikistan.

As part of its WTO accession process, Tajikistan amended Article 441 of its Customs Code to provide ex officio authority to its customs officers to seize and destroy counterfeit goods. The Department on Disclosing and Seizing of Counterfeit Products within the Customs Service of Tajikistan has the responsibility to detect IPR-related violations. According to the department’s own data, there were no seizures of counterfeit products by the Customs Service in 2015. Currently, the Customs Service has only three IPR products registered in its customs registry. Tajikistan’s Law on Quality and Safety of Products requires IPR violators to pay all expenses for storage, transportation, and destruction of counterfeit goods.

To register a patent or trademark with the National Center for Patents and Information (NCPI), applicants must submit an application with all relevant information on the IP, and pay a fee. The NCPI (www.ncpi.tj ) will search its records for conflicts and, if none are found, register the IP within 30 days from the time the application is received. In general, the registration of a trademark might take four to seven months, while obtaining a patent for an invention could take up to two years.

Tajikistan’s weak implementation of its IP laws makes it difficult for investors to protect their rights. IPR enforcement has the potential to improve if the Tajik government effectively implements its action plan to comply with WTO TRIPS requirements.

Tajikistan was removed from the watch list of the USTR’s Special 301 report listing governments that fail to provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of IP rights in 2016 but returned in 2018  due to its failure to issue an order prohibiting the use of unlicensed software in government ministries.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Resources for Rights Holders

U.S. Embassy
Economic Section

American Chamber of Commerce in Tajikistan
+992 (93) 577 23 23 +992 (93) 577 29 29

Public list of local lawyers: https://tj.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/.

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Foreign portfolio investment is not a priority of the Tajik government. Tajikistan lacks a securities market. According to government statistics, portfolio investment in Tajikistan by the end of 2017 totaled USD 576.2 million, this includes the USD 500 million Eurobond debt which National Bank of Tajikistan made in September 2017. The Tajik government does not regard this sector as a significant part of the national economy. Tajikistan’s National Bank made efforts to develop a system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investments, including credit rating mechanism implemented by Moody’s and S&P. There is little liquidity in Tajikistan’s capital markets. Tajikistan has not established policies to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets.

Tajikistan does not have an official stock market. The National Bank of Tajikistan and Commercial banks in 2015 facilitated the creation of the new Central Asian Stock Exchange, but it is early development stages of development (http://case.com.tj/ ).

Tajikistan does not place any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, per IMF Article VIII. It regards transfers from all international sources as revenue, however, and taxes accordingly.

Yet, per IMF Article VIII, the government refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credits are allocated on market terms, but commercial banks are also under considerable pressure by the governing elites and their family and friends to provide favorable loans for commercially questionable projects. Much of the loan may be lost through corrupt channels. An estimated 70 percent of Tajikistan’s commercial loans are non-performing, the official data from National Bank reports 35.8 percent as non-performing loans as of end of December 2017.

The private sector offers access to several different credit instruments. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, but those operating in Tajikistan do not obtain local credit because of comparatively high associated interest rates.

Money and Banking System

According to the latest National Bank report in December 2017 there are 84 credit institutions, including 17 banks, 27 microcredit deposit organizations, 7 microcredit organizations and 33 microcredit funds function in the Republic of Tajikistan. Tajikistan has 343 bank branches, a 22 percent reduction since 2016.

Tajikistan’s banking system is in a state of crisis. Its commercial banks lack liquidity and more than 70 percent of its loans are estimated to be non-performing;official data from the National Bank reports that 36.5 percent are non-performing loans. In 2016, President Rahmon publicly stated that the government would resolve the banking crisis, and pledged USD 500 million to do so, however, in 2017, the government used those resources for fiscal purposes, including tax repayments by banks to government reserves. Some international observers have questioned how the government will be able to meet the pledge without taking steps that would lead to future inflation and balance of payment pressure. Total liabilities of commercial banks decreased in 2017 and reached USD 1.7 billion. Total assets of the country’s largest banks equaled USD 2.37 billion as of December 2017, which is a USD 400 million decrease since 2016.

The National Bank of Tajikistan is the country’s central bank (www.nbt.tj ). Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country subject to National Bank regulations. The United States used to have correspondent banking relations with several Tajik commercial banks, but those have been discontinued.

To establish a bank account, foreigners must submit a letter of application, a passport copy, and Tajik government-issued taxpayer identification number.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

Tajikistan traditionally does not restrict conversion or transfer of monies if these sums are deemed to be reasonable. Until 2015, “reasonable” meant no more than USD 10,000 per transaction. Because of the current economic and financial crisis, the National Bank is now determining “reasonableness” on a case-by-case basis.

Tajikistan places no legal limits on commercial or non-commercial money transfers, and investors may freely convert funds associated with any form of investment into any world currency. However, in 2017, the National Bank of Tajikistan exercised stricter control of foreign currency operations and outflows due to the economic and financial crisis. According to National Bank regulations, anyone seeking to exchange an amount exceeding 1500 somoni (approximately USD 200) must register the exchange, and present a passport and an explanation of the reason for the exchange (e.g., business trip abroad).

Businesses often find it difficult to conduct large currency transactions due to the limited amount of foreign currency available in the domestic financial market. Investors are free to import currency, but once it is deposited in a Tajik bank account it may be difficult to withdraw.

In December 2015, the National Bank reorganized foreign currency operations and shut down all private foreign exchange offices in Tajikistan. Since that time, only commercial bank exchange offices have been allowed to exchange foreign currency, which requires registration of a foreign passport and other personal information.

The government’s policy has been to support a stable exchange rate. The National Bank maintained an exchange rate at 4.75 somoni per U.S. dollar from mid-2011 until early 2014.

Defending the somoni’s rate to the dollar depleted Tajikistan’s foreign currency and gold reserves, leaving the government with little capacity for future currency interventions. Whereas a dollar could buy 5.4 somoni in 2015, the currency devalued to about 8.4 somoni per dollar in the first quarter of April 2017. The government expects the somoni to slide further to 9.2 somoni per dollar by the end of 2018.

Remittance Policies

The National Bank mandated that remittances could only be received in local currency in early 2016. There are no official time or quantity limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances. Tajikistan’s tax code classifies all inflows as revenue and taxes them accordingly, however remittances from labor migrants are not taxed.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Tajikistan does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The country does have a “Special Economic Reforms Fund,” but, according to official statistics, it is empty.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in travel, automotive/ground transportation, energy, mining, metal manufacturing/products, food processing/packaging, agriculture, construction, building and heavy equipment, services, finance, and information and communication sectors. The government divested itself of smaller SOEs in successive waves of privatization, but retained ownership of the largest Soviet-era enterprises and any sector deemed to be a natural monopoly.

The government appoints directors and boards to SOEs, but their actions are not governed or reviewed by any internal control procedures. Tajik SOEs do not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Third party market analysts regard SOEs as closely connected to the Tajik government. When SOEs are involved in investment disputes, it is highly likely that the domestic courts will find in the SOE’s favor. Court processes are generally non-transparent and discriminatory.

The State Committee for Investments and State-Owned Property Management maintains a database of all SOEs in Tajikistan, but does not make this information publicly available.

Major SOEs include:

  • Travel: Tajik Air, Dushanbe Airport, Kulob Airport, Qurghonteppa Airport, Khujand Airport, and Tajik Air Navigation;
  • Automotive & Ground Transportation: Tajik Railways;
  • Energy & Mining: Barqi Tojik, TajikTransGas, Oil, Gas, and Coal, and VostokRedMet;
  • Metal Manufacturing & Products: Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO), and AluminSohtMon (TALCO subsidiary);
  • Agricultural, Construction, Building & Heavy Equipment: Tajik Cement; Food Processing & Packaging: Konservniy Combinat Isfara;
  • Services: Dushanbe Water and Sewer, Vodokanal Khujand, and ZhKX (water utility);
  • Finance: AmonatBonk (savings bank), TajikSarmoyaguzor (insurance), TajikSugurta (insurance);
  • Information and Communication: Tajik Telecom, Tajik Post, and TeleRadioCom.

In sectors that are open to both the private sector and foreign competition, SOEs receive a larger percentage of government contracts/business than their private sector competitors. As a general rule, private companies cannot compete successfully with SOEs unless they have good government connections.

SOEs purchase goods and services from, and supply them to, private sector and foreign firms through the Tajik government’s tender process. Tajikistan has undertaken a commitment, as part of its WTO accession protocol, to initiate accession to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). At present, however, Tajik SOEs are not covered under the GPA.

Per government policy, private enterprises cannot compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share (since the government continually increases the role and number of SOEs in any market), products/services, and incentives. Private enterprises do not have the same access to financing as SOEs. Most lending from state-owned banks is politically directed.

Local domestic law makes SOEs subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but the Tajik government regularly writes off SOE tax debts via administrative orders or decrees. SOEs are afforded material advantages, including preferential access to land and raw materials that are not granted to private enterprises.

Privatization Program

The Tajik government conducted privatization on an ad-hoc basis in the 1990s, and then again in the early 2000s. The government plans to split national electrical utility Barqi-Tojik into three public/private partnerships, responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution, by the end of 2020, but progress has been slow.

Foreign investors are able to participate in Tajikistan’s privatization programs.

There is a public bidding process, but privatizations historically have been non-transparent. Privatized properties have been subject to re-nationalization, often on the grounds that the original privatization process was conducted illegally.

The Tajik government officially protects consumer rights through its Law on Consumer Protection. Citizens may file lawsuits against violators of consumer rights with the court system. Tajikistan’s state Labor Union is charged with safeguarding labor and employment rights. In practice, enforcement is rarely carried out. The Tajik government does not fairly enforce domestic law to protect individuals from adverse business impacts.

The Tajik government lacks corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. The Tajik government does not encourage public disclosure of these issues. The Tajik government does not enforce corporate governance practices.
There are no independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations in Tajikistan that promote or monitor responsible business conduct.

The Tajik government does not encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Tajikistan was suspended from the EITI in March 2016.

Tajikistan has enacted anti-corruption legislation, but enforcement is highly selective, and generally ineffective in combating corruption of public officials. Tajikistan’s parliament approved new amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2016. Now, individuals convicted of crimes related to bribery may be released in return for payment of fines (roughly USD 25 for each day they would have served in prison had they been convicted under the previous criminal code).

Tajikistan’s anti-corruption laws officially extend to family members of officials and political parties. Tajikistan’s laws provide conditions to counter conflict of interest in awarding contracts.

The Tajik government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Prosecutions for corruption are primarily politically motivated.

Private companies do not use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

Tajikistan became a signatory to the UN’s Anticorruption Convention in 2006. Tajikistan is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

Tajikistan does not provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to investment and have reported instances of corruption in government procurement, award of licenses and concessions, dispute settlements, regulations, customs, and taxation.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Sulaimon Sultonzoda, Head
The Agency for State Financial Control and Fight with Corruption
78 Rudaki Avenue, Dushanbe
992 37 221-48-10; 992 27 234-3052
(The agency requests that contact be made via a form on their website – www.anticorruption.tj )

United Nations Development Program
39 Aini Street, Dushanbe
+992 44 600-56-00

Tajikistan has a recent history of politically motivated violence. Its civil war lasted from 1992 to 1997, resulting in the death of over 50,000 people.

Since the end of the country’s civil war in 1997, political violence has been rare. There was a minor uprising in September 2015.

Negative trends, including banking sector instability, growing total debt, declining remittances, flat or declining exports of cotton and aluminum (Tajikistan’s key exports), growing unemployment (unofficially already at 25-30 per cent), rapidly expanding population (2.2 percent), a large unskilled labor force, low and declining FDI, a predatory business and investment environment, rent seeking by the political elite, and vanishing arable soil (due to salination and poor planting regimes) are ongoing concerns regarding Tajikistan’s economy.

As of June 2017, the official unemployment rate in Tajikistan was reported as 2.3 percent, but this does not include the roughly one million citizens (12.5 percent of the population) that seasonally migrate in search of work in other countries – primarily to Russia.

According to information provided by the Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment of Tajikistan, Tajikistan’s labor force is 5.2 million workers strong. Due to demographic growth, the World Bank estimates that demand for jobs exceeds job growth by a ratio of two to one.

Unskilled labor is widely available, but skilled labor is often in short supply, as many Tajiks with marketable skills have chosen to emigrate due to limited domestic employment opportunities. Corruption in secondary schools and universities means degrees may not accurately reflect an applicant’s level of professional training or competency.

Due to its weak education system, Tajikistan’s domestic labor force is generally becoming less skilled, and is ill-equipped to provide international standards of customer service and management. Foreign businesses and nongovernmental organizations report difficulty recruiting qualified staff for their organizations in all specialties.

The Tajik Ministry of Labor and Social Protection announced a plan to expand its network of training centers at which Tajik workers can become more marketable. The curriculum at these centers is primarily focused on the migrant community, offering training in English, Russian, culture, and history. It also provides certification of a worker’s existing skills, and short term vocational training as welders, electricians, tractor operators, textile workers, and confectioners.

Article 36 of Tajikistan’s Labor Code gives employers the right to change workers’ contracts (remuneration, hours, responsibilities, etc.) due to fluctuating market conditions. If the worker does not accept the amended contract, the worker may be terminated, but is entitled to a severance payment equivalent to two months of salary payments.

Tajikistan’s Labor Code does not include any provisions for waiving labor regulations to attract or retain investments, but the Tajik government has waived the 70 percent requirement for the employment of Tajik workers in some cases.

There are no special regulations regarding treatment of labor in Tajikistan’s four free economic zones.

The labor market favors employers. Although the majority of workers are technically unionized, most are not aware of their rights, and few unions effectively advocate for workers’ rights. The Tajik government controls unions, and the national trade union federation has not had many disputes with the government. Tajikistan has no formal labor dispute resolution mechanisms. Although collective bargaining has been known to occur, it is rare. There have been no significant labor strikes in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s labor code regulates employer-employee relations. The domestic labor code is designed with reference to international labor standards but employers may frequently violate or misinterpret the procedure.

No strikes were officially registered in Tajikistan in 2017.

OPIC is active in Tajikistan. OPIC has recently supported a potato chip factory, the campus expansion at the University of Central Asia, and consulting companies.

Tajikistan signed an investment incentive agreement with the U.S. in 1992, with provisions for issuing investment insurance, loans, and guarantees administered by OPIC.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2017 USD 6.9 2016 USD 6.91 www.worldbank.org/en/country 
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 USD 13.8 2017 N/A BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_ companies_comprehensive_data.htm 
Host Country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 N/A 2017 N/A BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_ companies_comprehensive_data.htm 
Total Inbound Stock of FDI as % host GDP ($M USD) 2017 USD 354.4 2017 N/A N/A

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward Amount 100% Total Outward Amount 100%
China 235 66% N/A
Russia 63 18%
USA 13.8 4%
Great Britain 6.1 3%
Iran 9.2 2%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Source: Agency on Statistics at the President of Tajikistan

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Tajikistan is not listed in the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS).

Mr. Andrew Bury
Economic Officer
109A I. Somoni
+992 37 2292504

2018 Investment Climate Statements: Tajikistan
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