a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings
There were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. From January 1 to September 30, UNAMA reported 2,560 civilian deaths, a decrease from 2,870 during the same period in 2018. The total number of civilian casualties remained approximately the same (8,240 compared with 8,239). The number of civilian deaths attributed to progovernment forces increased from 717 to 1,149, a 36 percent increase from the corresponding period in 2018.
According to the quarterly report released by UNAMA in October, verified civilian casualties from July to September increased by 42 percent in comparison with the same period in 2018. In July, moreover, UNAMA documented the highest number of civilian casualties ever recorded in a single month since the United Nations began its systematic documentation of civilian casualties in the country in 2009.
There were numerous reports of politically motivated killings or injuries by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other insurgent groups. UNAMA reported 5,117 civilian casualties from antigovernment element attacks that deliberately targeted civilians. These groups caused 62 percent of total civilian casualties, with 46 percent attributed to the Taliban, 12 percent to ISIS-K, and 3 percent to unidentified antigovernment elements. On August 7, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide car bomb that targeted a Kabul police station, killing 14 and wounding 145. Human rights defenders were disproportionately targeted. On September 5, the body of Abdul Samad Amiri, acting chief of the Ghor provincial office of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), was found alongside a highway. The AIHRC stated Taliban insurgents shot Amiri. On August 17, militants, later identified as ISIS-K, bombed a wedding in Kabul, killing 91 and injuring 143, according to UNAMA.
b. Disappearance
There were reports of disappearances committed by security forces and antigovernment forces.
UNAMA, in its biannual Report on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan, reported 34 incidents of enforced disappearances in Kandahar, with some cases publicly alleging ANP complicity.
Two professors, working for the American University of Afghanistan and kidnapped by the Taliban in 2016 in Kabul, were released in November.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Although the constitution and law prohibit such practices, there were numerous reports that government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police committed abuses.
NGOs reported security forces continued to use excessive force, including torturing and beating civilians. Despite legislation prohibiting these acts, independent monitors continue to report credible cases of torture in detention centers.
UNAMA’s 2019 Report on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees stated that in 28 of 34 provinces an average of nearly one in three prisoners provided credible and reliable accounts of ill treatment. The report linked one ANP facility in Kandahar to a 77 percent torture rate, well above the 31 percent ANP average. The Kandahar findings included allegations of suffocation, electric shocks, pulling of genitals, and suspension from ceilings. The UNAMA report shows a decrease in the prevalence of torture reported by those interviewed in the custody of the NDS in Kandahar, down from 60 percent in 2018 to 7.4 percent. Herat showed a similar improvement, but NDS facilities in Kabul, Khost, and Samangan remained areas of concern.
There were numerous reports of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other antigovernment groups. On May 26, UNAMA reported that it interviewed 13 detainees from a group of 53 rescued from a Taliban detention facility in Uruzgan Province. The Taliban kept detainees in poor conditions and subjected them to forced labor. The interviewees stated the Taliban killed some of its captives and shackled them permanently while in captivity.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were harsh due to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and limited access to medical services. The General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC), part of the Ministry of Interior, has responsibility for all civilian-run prisons (for both men and women) and civilian detention centers, including the large national prison complex at Pul-e-Charkhi. The Ministry of Justice’s Juvenile Rehabilitation Directorate is responsible for all juvenile rehabilitation centers. The NDS operates short-term detention facilities at the provincial and district levels, usually co-located with its headquarters facilities. The Ministry of Defense runs the Afghan National Detention Facilities at Parwan. There were credible reports of private prisons run by members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and used for abuse of detainees. The Taliban also maintain illegal detention facilities throughout the country. The ANDSF discovered and liberated several Taliban detention facilities during the year and reported that prisoners included children and adults accused of moral crimes or association with the government.
Physical Conditions: Overcrowding in prisons continued to be a serious, widespread problem. Based on standards recommended by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 28 of 34 provincial prisons for men were severely overcrowded. In September the country’s largest prison, Pul-e Charkhi, held 13,453 prisoners, detainees, and children of incarcerated mothers, 58 percent more than it was designed to hold.
According to media reports, in May a conflict between police force members and a number of prisoners at the Pul-e-Charkhi prison left four prisoners dead and 33 others, including 20 police officers, wounded.
Authorities generally lacked the facilities to separate pretrial and convicted inmates or to separate juveniles according to the seriousness of the charges against them. Local prisons and detention centers did not always have separate facilities for female prisoners.
According to NGOs and media reports, authorities held children younger than age 15 in prison with their mothers, due in part to a lack of capacity of separate children’s support centers. These reports documented insufficient educational and medical facilities for these minors.
Access to food, potable water, sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, and medical care in prisons varied throughout the country and was generally inadequate. The GDPDC’s nationwide program to feed prisoners faced a severely limited budget, and many prisoners relied on family members to provide food supplements and other necessary items. In 2017 the local NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan reported that Wardak Prison had no reliable source of clean drinking water and that prisoners in Pul-e Charkhi, Baghlan, and Wardak had limited access to food, with prisoners’ families also providing food to make up the gap.
Administration: The law provides prisoners with the right to leave prison for up to 20 days for family visits. Most prisons did not implement this provision, and the law is unclear in its application to different classes of prisoners. Additionally, most prisons did not allow family visits.
Independent Monitoring: The AIHRC, UNAMA, and the ICRC monitored the NDS, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Defense detention facilities. NATO Mission Resolute Support monitored the NDS, ANP, and Defense Ministry facilities. Security constraints and obstruction by authorities occasionally prevented visits to some places of detention. UNAMA and the AIHRC reported difficulty accessing NDS places of detention when they arrived unannounced. The AIHRC reported NDS officials usually required the AIHRC to submit a formal letter requesting access at least one to two days in advance of a visit. NDS officials continued to prohibit AIHRC and UNAMA monitors from bringing cameras, mobile phones, recording devices, or computers into NDS facilities, thereby preventing AIHRC monitors from properly documenting physical evidence of abuse, such as bruises, scars, and other injuries. The NDS assigned a colonel to monitor human rights conditions in its facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but both remained serious problems. Authorities detained many citizens without respecting essential procedural protections. According to NGOs, law enforcement officers continued to detain citizens arbitrarily without clear legal authority or due process. Local law enforcement officials reportedly detained persons illegally on charges not provided under local criminal law. In some cases authorities improperly held women in prisons because they deemed it unsafe for the women to return home or because women’s shelters were not available to provide protection in the provinces or districts at issue (see section 6, Women). The law provides a defendant the right to object to his or her pretrial detention and receive a court hearing on the matter, but authorities generally did not observe this requirement.
There were reports throughout the year of impunity and lack of accountability by security forces. According to observers, ALP and ANP personnel were largely unaware of their responsibilities and defendants’ rights under the law, as most are illiterate and lack training. Accountability of the NDS, ANP, and ALP officials for torture and abuse was weak, not transparent, and rarely enforced. Independent judicial or external oversight of the NDS, MCTF, ANP, and ALP in the investigation and prosecution of crimes or misconduct, including torture and abuse, was limited or nonexistent.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
UNAMA, the AIHRC, and other observers reported arbitrary and prolonged detention frequently occurred throughout the country. Authorities often did not inform detainees of the charges against them.
Understanding and knowledge of the penal code that took effect in February 2018 to modernize and consolidate criminal laws, among justice sector actors and the public was not widespread.
Existing law provides for access to legal counsel and the use of warrants, and it limits how long authorities may hold detainees without charge. Police have the right to detain a suspect for 72 hours to complete a preliminary investigation. If police decide to pursue a case, they transfer the file to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). After taking custody of a suspect, the AGO may issue a detention warrant for up to seven days for a misdemeanor and 15 days for a felony. With court approval, the investigating prosecutor may detain a suspect while continuing the investigation, with the length of continued detention depending on the severity of the offense. The investigating prosecutor may detain a suspect for a maximum of 20 days for a misdemeanor and 60 days for a felony. The prosecutor must file an indictment or release the suspect within those deadlines; there may be no further extension of the investigatory period if the defendant is already in detention. After a case is referred to the court, the court may issue detention orders not to exceed a total of 120 days for all court proceedings (primary, appeal, and Supreme Court stages). Compliance with these time limits was difficult to ascertain in the provincial courts. In addition, there were multiple reports that judges often detained prisoners after their sentences were completed because bribes for release were not paid. Incommunicado imprisonment remained a problem, and prompt access to a lawyer was rare. Prisoners generally were able to receive family visits.
The criminal procedure code provides for release on bail. Authorities at times remanded “flight risk” defendants pending a prosecutorial appeal despite the defendants’ acquittal by the trial court. In other cases authorities did not re-arrest defendants released pending appeal, even after the appellate court convicted them in absentia.
According to international monitors, prosecutors filed indictments in cases transferred to them by police, even where there was a reasonable belief no crime occurred.
According to the juvenile code, the arrest of a child “should be a matter of last resort and should last for the shortest possible period.” Reports indicated children in juvenile rehabilitation centers across the country lacked access to adequate food, health care, and education. Detained children frequently did not receive the presumption of innocence, the right to know the charges against them, access to defense lawyers, and protection from self-incrimination. The law provides for the creation of special juvenile police, prosecution offices, and courts. Due to limited resources, special juvenile courts functioned in only six provinces (Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Kunduz). Elsewhere children’s cases went to ordinary courts. The law mandates authorities handle children’s cases confidentially.
Some children in the criminal justice system were victims rather than perpetrators of crime. In the absence of sufficient shelters for boys, authorities detained abused boys and placed them in juvenile rehabilitation centers because they could not return to their families and shelter elsewhere was unavailable. In addition victims of bacha bazi–the social and sexual exploitation of boys–were charged with “moral crimes” and treated as equally responsible perpetrators as the adult.
Police and legal officials often charged women with intent to commit zina (sex outside marriage) to justify their arrest and incarceration for social offenses, such as running away from their husband or family, rejecting a spouse chosen by their families, fleeing domestic violence or rape, or eloping to escape an arranged marriage. The constitution provides that in cases not explicitly covered by the provisions of the constitution or other laws, courts may, in accordance with Hanafi jurisprudence (a school of Islamic law) and within the limits set by the constitution, rule in a manner that best attains justice in the case. Although observers stated this provision was widely understood to apply only to civil cases, many judges and prosecutors applied this provision to criminal matters. Observers reported officials used this article to charge women and men with “immorality” or “running away from home,” neither of which is a crime. Police often detained women for zina at the request of family members.
Authorities imprisoned some women for reporting crimes perpetrated against them and detained some as proxies for a husband or male relative convicted of a crime on the assumption the suspect would turn himself in to free the family member.
Authorities placed some women in protective custody to prevent violence by family members. They also employed protective custody (including placement in a detention center) for women who had experienced domestic violence, if no shelters were available to protect them from further abuse. The 2009 Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) presidential decree–commonly referred to as the EVAW law–obliges police to arrest persons who abuse women. Implementation and awareness of the EVAW law was limited, however.
Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrest and detention remained a problem in most provinces. Observers reported some prosecutors and police detained individuals without charge for actions that were not crimes under the law, in part because the judicial system was inadequate to process detainees in a timely fashion. Observers continued to report those detained for moral crimes were primarily women.
Pretrial Detention: The law provides a defendant the right to object to his or her pretrial detention and receive a court hearing on the matter. Nevertheless, lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. Many detainees did not benefit from the provisions of the criminal procedure code because of a lack of resources, limited numbers of defense attorneys, unskilled legal practitioners, and corruption. The law provides that, if there is no completed investigation or filed indictment within the code’s 10-, 27-, or 75-day deadlines, judges must release defendants. Judges, however, held many detainees beyond those periods, despite the lack of an indictment.
Amnesty: Around the Eid-ul-Fitr Islamic holiday and leading up to the intra-Afghan peace talks in June, the government began releasing more than 800 Taliban prisoners. President Ghani stated government officials vetted the prisoners and that measures were taken to prevent them from threatening security.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary continued to be underfunded, understaffed, inadequately trained, largely ineffective, and subject to threats, bias, political influence, and pervasive corruption.
Judicial officials, prosecutors, and defense attorneys were often intimidated or corrupt. In May, UNAMA reported that, in 2018, the enforcement of the Code of Conduct for judges resulted in the dismissal of six judges and their referral to the AGO for prosecution; deduction of salary for 43 judges; written warnings to 36 judges, and written advices to 120 judges. In addition the Supreme Court’s judicial monitoring department arrested 55 persons, including one judge, five administrative support staff, and five defense lawyers for corruption in the same period.
Bribery and pressure from public officials, tribal leaders, families of accused persons, and individuals associated with the insurgency impaired judicial impartiality. Most courts administered justice unevenly, employing a mixture of codified law, sharia, and local custom. Traditional justice mechanisms remained the main recourse for many, especially in rural areas. Corruption was common within the judiciary, and often criminals paid bribes to obtain their release or a sentence reduction (see section 4).
There was a widespread shortage of judges, primarily in insecure areas, leading to the adjudication of many cases through informal, traditional mediation. A shortage of women judges, particularly outside of Kabul, limited access to justice for women. Many women are unable to use the formal justice system because cultural norms preclude their engagement with male officials. During the year only 257 of 2,029, or 13 percent, of judges were women, a slight increase from 2018. The formal justice system is stronger in urban centers, closer to the central government, and weaker in rural areas. In rural areas lacking physical space for judges or prosecutors to operate and adequate security protection, police operated unchecked with almost unlimited authority. Courts and police continued to operate at less than full strength nationwide. The judicial system continued to lack the capacity to absorb and implement the large volume of new and amended legislation. A lack of qualified judicial personnel hindered the courts. Some municipal and provincial authorities, including judges, had minimal training and often based their judgments on their personal understanding of sharia without appropriate reference to statutory law, tribal codes of honor, or local custom. The number of judges who graduated from law school continued to increase. Access to legal codes and statutes increased, but their limited availability continued to hinder some judges and prosecutors.
In major cities courts continued to decide criminal cases. Authorities frequently resolved civil cases using the informal system, the government mediation mechanism through the Ministry of Justice Huquq (civil rights) office, or, in some cases, through negotiations between the parties facilitated by judicial personnel or private lawyers. Because the formal legal system often does not exist in rural areas, local elders and shuras (consultative gatherings, usually of men selected by the community) are the primary means of settling both criminal matters and civil disputes. They also imposed punishments without regard to the formal legal system. UNAMA and NGOs reported several cases where perpetrators of violence against women crimes that included domestic abuse reoffended after their claims were resolved by mediation.
In areas controlled by the Taliban, the group enforced a parallel judicial system based on a strict interpretation of sharia. Punishments included execution and mutilation. According to media reporting, in May a Taliban court in Shahrak District, Ghor Province, shot and killed a boy and girl for allegedly having an extramarital affair. In March media reported the Taliban killed a pregnant woman and her unborn child in Sancharak District, Sar-e-Pol Province, for allegedly calling the Taliban’s war against the government “illegitimate.” The Taliban dragged her from her home, took her to a Talib commander who issued her death sentence, and shot her immediately.
Trial Procedures
The constitution provides the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary rarely enforced this provision. The administration and implementation of justice varied in different areas of the country. The government formally uses an inquisitorial legal system. By law all citizens are entitled to a presumption of innocence, and those accused have the right to be present at trial and to appeal, although the judiciary did not always respect these rights. Some provinces held public trials, but this was not the norm, although the constitution does mandate the right of public trials. The law requires judges to provide five days’ notice prior to a hearing, but judges did not always follow this requirement, and many citizens complained that legal proceedings often dragged on for years.
Three-judge panels decide criminal trials, and there is no right to a jury trial under the constitution. Prosecutors rarely informed defendants promptly or in detail of the charges brought against them. Indigent defendants have the right to consult with an advocate or counsel at public expense when resources allow. The judiciary applied this right inconsistently, in large part due to a severe shortage of defense lawyers. Citizens were often unaware of their constitutional rights. Defendants and attorneys are entitled to examine physical evidence and documents related to a case before trial, although observers noted court documents often were not available for review before cases went to trial, despite defense lawyers’ requests.
Criminal defense attorneys reported the judiciary’s increased respect and tolerance for the role of defense lawyers in criminal trials, but defendants’ attorneys continued to experience abuse and threats from prosecutors and other law enforcement officials.
The criminal procedure code establishes time limits for the completion of each stage of a criminal case, from investigation through final appeal, when the accused is in custody. The code also permits temporary release of the accused on bail, but this was rarely honored. An addendum to the code provides for extended custodial limits in cases involving crimes committed against the internal and external security of the country. Courts at the Justice Center in Parwan regularly elected to utilize the extended time periods. If the judiciary does not meet the deadlines, the law requires the accused be released from custody. Often courts did not meet these deadlines, but detainees nevertheless remained in custody.
In cases where no clearly defined legal statute applied, or where judges, prosecutors, or elders were unaware of the statutory law, judges and informal shuras enforced customary law. This practice often resulted in outcomes that discriminated against women.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There were no reports the government held political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Corruption and limited capacity restricted citizen access to justice for constitutional and human rights abuses. Citizens submit complaints of human rights abuses to the AIHRC, which reviews and submits credible complaints to the AGO for further investigation and prosecution. Some female citizens report that when they approach government institutions with a request for service, government officials, in turn, demand sexual favors as a quid pro quo.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law prohibits arbitrary interference in matters of privacy, but authorities did not always respect its provisions. The criminal procedure code contains additional safeguards for the privacy of the home, prohibiting night arrests, requiring the presence of a female officer during residential searches, and strengthening requirements for body searches. The government did not always respect these prohibitions.
Government officials continued to enter homes and businesses of civilians forcibly and without legal authorization. There were reports that government officials monitored private communications, including telephone calls and other digital communications, without legal authority or judicial warrant.
Media and the government reported that the Taliban routinely used civilian homes as shelters, bases of operation and shields. There were also reports that the Taliban and ISIS-K used schools for military purposes.
g. Abuses in Internal Conflict
Continuing internal conflict resulted in civilian deaths, abductions, prisoner abuse, property damage, displacement of residents, and other abuses. The security situation remained a problem due to insurgent attacks. Terrorist groups caused the vast majority of civilian deaths.
Killings: UNAMA counted 2,563 civilian deaths due to conflict during the first nine months of the year, compared with 2,870 during the same period in 2018. UNAMA documented 1,779 civilian casualties resulting from suicide improvised explosive device (IED) attacks perpetrated by antigovernment forces (300 deaths and 1,479 injured). UNAMA attributed 62 percent of civilian casualties in the first nine months of the year to antigovernment forces, including the Taliban and ISIS, and 28 percent to progovernment forces. UNAMA documented 885 civilian casualties from airstrikes in the first nine months of the year, a 28 percent increase over the same period in 2018.
In October the AIHRC reported 1,611 civilians lost their lives and 4,876 suffered injuries in between April and September. The AIHRC attributed 11 percent of civilian casualties to progovernment forces. Differences in statistics between UNAMA and AIHRC reporting are likely due to reporting methodology, including varying reporting periods.
On March 25, the Afghan National Army conducted a nighttime search operation for a local Taliban commander in Surobi District, Kabul Province, according to UNAMA. Airstrikes caused five civilian deaths (three women, one man, and a boy) as well as four more injured. On May 23, in Farah Province a progovernment airstrike killed two male NGO employees, destroyed an NGO compound, and damaged a project vehicle.
UNAMA documented a 42 percent increase in civilian casualties from July to September in comparison with the same period in 2018. In July, moreover, UNAMA documented the highest number of civilian casualties ever recorded in a single month since the United Nations began its systematic documentation of civilian casualties in the country in 2009. The increase was mostly attributable to a sharp rise in civilian casualties caused by antigovernment elements. Observers attributed the summer’s increase in violence to numerous high-profile suicide attacks such as a July 28 attack on the Green Trend offices in Kabul where 21 civilians were killed and 50 others injured, the August 7 Taliban car bomb at a Kabul police station that killed at least 14 and wounded more than 140, and the August 17 ISIS-K bombing of a wedding in Kabul that killed 91 and injured 143.
During the year antigovernment forces carried out a number of deadly attacks against religious leaders, particularly those who spoke out against the Taliban. On June 28 in Samangan Province, the Taliban detonated a remote-controlled IED inside a mosque during Friday prayers, wounding 14 civilians. According to sources, the Taliban were targeting the mullah, who had praised the Afghan national security forces in previous services. Also many progovernment Islamic scholars were killed in attacks during the year for which no group claimed responsibility. For instance, on May 24, a bomb exploded inside Kabul’s al-Taqva Mosque, killing Mawlawi Samiullah Raihan, a prominent progovernment religious leader who frequently appeared on television. Two days later, also in Kabul, unknown gunmen shot and killed Mawlawi Shabir Ahmad Hashem Kamawal, a well-known religious scholar who had, in a number of speeches, called on antigovernment forces to stop waging war. On June 24, in the Nangarhar community of Qalatak, unknown gunmen shot and killed Mawlawi Safiullah Hanafi, the imam of Qalatak’s central mosque, a teacher at an Islamic school, and a progovernment figure.
Antigovernment elements continued to attack civilian targets, including NGOs offices and facilities. On May 8, for instance, the Taliban carried out a complex attack using a vehicle-borne IED, small arms fire, and mortars against Counterpart International, a NGO, resulting in eight civilian deaths and 27 injuries. While no Counterpart International staff were killed, three staff members of the neighboring CARE International NGO were among the dead. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting that the organization “promoted intermixing between men and women” and “groomed Kabul administration security and other personnel in implementing pro-Western objectives.” On December 4, militants killed six individuals, including Japanese doctor Tetsu Nakamura who shortly before his death had been granted honorary Afghan citizenship for his humanitarian efforts. Afghan police suggested Nakamura was targeted for his aid work. Afghans expressed mass dismay and condemnation for the attack on social media. No group claimed responsibility.
Antigovernment elements also continued to target government officials and entities, as well as political candidates and election-related activities, throughout the country. On July 29, vice presidential candidate Amrullah Saleh’s Kabul office was targeted by a suicide bombing and gun battle, where at least 20 civilians were killed and 50 were injured. In Ghazni Province, where voter registration took place for the presidential elections, UNAMA recorded five election-related incidents, all attributed to Taliban. On June 19, in Ghazni City, an IED detonated in the yard of a school that was being used as a voter registration center, injuring three ANP officers who were serving as guards. The Taliban threatened to increase election-related violence ahead of the September 28 elections.
Abductions: The UN secretary-general’s 2018 Children and Armed Conflict Report, released in May, cites 19 verified incidents of child abduction affecting 41 boys and two girls. Thirty-two child abductions were attributed to the Taliban, six to ISIS-K, one to a progovernment militia, and four to unknown perpetrators. Media reports stated that kidnapping was more frequent during the year and targeted persons of all income levels. On March 10, a girl was abducted in Kabul for a $300,000 ransom and was killed when the ransom was not paid. Businesswomen claimed they faced a constant threat of seeing their children abducted and held for ransom.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: An April report by UNAMA documented a reduction in the number of cases of conflict-related torture since 2016 but noted a continuing concern at the high number of detainees who reported torture and ill-treatment. The report cites nearly one-third of conflict-related detainees interviewed provided credible and reliable reports of having been subject to torture or ill-treatment. Police custody in Kandahar continued to carry the highest levels of torture, with a rate of 77 percent, down from 91 percent in 2017, including allegations of suffocation, electric shocks, pulling of genitals and suspension from ceilings. NDS treatment of conflict-related detainees in Kabul, Khost, and Samangan Provinces, as well as in the NDS counterterrorism department, remained of concern.
Antigovernment groups regularly targeted civilians, including using indiscriminate IEDs to kill and maim them. Land mines, unexploded ordnance, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to cause deaths and injuries. UNAMA reported 446 civilian casualties caused by unlawful pressure-plate IEDs by antigovernment elements, mostly attributed to the Taliban, during the first nine months of the year. On June 11, a car traveling in Dand District, Kandahar, hit a roadside pressure-plate IED planted by the Taliban, resulting in the deaths of two adult civilians and four children. The state minister for disaster management and humanitarian affairs reported that approximately 120 civilians were killed or wounded by unexploded ordnance per month, and 660 square miles still needed to be cleared. Media regularly reported cases of children killed and injured after finding unexploded ordinance.
In the first six months of the year, civilian casualties from ERW accounted for 7 percent of all civilian casualties and caused 264 civilian casualties with 80 deaths and 184 injured. Children comprise 84 percent of civilian casualties from ERWs. In one incident on April 14, near a high school in Laghman Province, an ERW killed seven boys and maimed eight others when they began to play with it.
Child Soldiers: There were reports the ANDSF, primarily the ANP and ALP, and progovernment militias, recruited children. The AIHRC reported that government security forces in Kandahar Province used child recruits. UNAMA verified the recruitment and use of 26 boys between ages 12 and 17 by security forces during the first six months of the year. Three boys were recruited and used by progovernment armed groups and security forces to act as bodyguards, to carry weapons, to patrol, for sexual purposes, or for all four purposes.
The ANP took steps that included training staff on age-assessment procedures, launching an awareness campaign on underage recruitment, investigating alleged cases of underage recruitment, and establishing centers in some provincial recruitment centers to document cases of attempted child enlistment. The government expanded child protection units (CPUs) to all 34 provinces; however, some NGOs reported these units were not sufficiently equipped, staffed, or trained to provide adequate oversight. Additionally, the challenging security environment in most rural areas prevented oversight at the district level, and CPUs do not oversee ALP recruitment. Recruits underwent an identity check, including an affidavit from at least two community elders that the recruit was at least 18 years old and eligible to join the ANDSF. The Ministries of Interior and Defense also issued directives meant to prevent the recruitment and sexual abuse of children by the ANDSF. Media reported that in some cases ANDSF units used children as personal servants, support staff, or for sexual purposes. Afghan security forces, primarily the ANP and ALP, reportedly recruited boys specifically for use in bacha bazi in every province of the country. In some instances Afghan National Army (ANA) officials reportedly used promises of food and money to entice boys into bacha bazi.
According to UNAMA, the Taliban and ISIS-K continued to use children for front-line fighting and setting IEDs. While the law protects trafficking victims from prosecution for crimes committed as a result of being subjected to trafficking, it was unclear if the government would treat child former combatants as trafficking victims or penalize them as combatants.
UNAMA verified or documented credible allegations of the recruitment of twenty-three 12- to 17-year-old boys by antigovernment elements in the first six months of the year. In some cases the Taliban and other antigovernment elements used children as suicide bombers, human shields, and to emplace IEDs, particularly in southern provinces. Media, NGOs, and UN agencies reported the Taliban tricked children, promised them money, used false religious pretexts, or forced them to become suicide bombers. See also the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: The security environment continued to have a negative effect on the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate freely in many parts of the country. Violence and instability hampered development, relief, and reconstruction efforts. Insurgents deliberately targeted government employees and aid workers. NGOs reported insurgents, powerful local individuals, and militia leaders demanded bribes to allow groups to bring relief supplies into the country and distribute them. Antigovernment elements continued their targeting of hospitals and aid workers. In the first six months of the year, UNAMA documented 38 incidents affecting health-care facilities and personnel, the majority of which were carried out in the first quarter, particularly in the eastern, southern, and northern regions. UNAMA attributed 25 incidents to the Taliban, four to other antigovernment elements, and seven to Afghan national security forces. On April 20, the Taliban forced the closure of 13 clinics in Nuristan Province. The clinics remained closed until May 24, when they were reopened through community elder mediation. On May 12, the Taliban forced the closure of another 11 clinics in four districts of Baghlan Province. They reopened in the same week. In July the Taliban forced 42 Swedish-run health clinics in Wardak Province to close.
On May 5, in Zabul Province, ANP officers injured two hospital staff members for not opening the gate to the hospital quickly enough when they were trying to gain access. One man was shot and the other beaten by the ANP. The ANP used small-arms fire inside the facility and arrested one of the patients on suspicion of being a Taliban member. Following mediation by elders, he was released the following day. On April 11, the Taliban banned activities of the World Health Organization and the ICRC throughout the country, which effectively brought all polio vaccination campaigns to a halt. Although the organizations’ activities were later able to resume, no campaigns were carried out in the second quarter of the year. Routine immunization services at health facilities were not interrupted, and more than one million children were vaccinated against polio via other means (such as vaccination by permanent transit teams around inaccessible areas and vaccination of travelers leaving the country).
The Taliban also attacked schools, radio stations, and government offices. During the year the Taliban continued to threaten and shut down hundreds of schools, often in an attempt to extort revenue from Ministry of Education payrolls, according to media reports. In the first six months of the year, UNAMA documented 25 incidents affecting education, mostly in western, eastern, northeastern, and central regions. Sixteen incidents were attributed to the Taliban, including six incidents of Taliban attacks on girls’ schools in Farah Province between January and April. On April 14, Taliban entered a Farah Province high school and detonated explosives, causing extensive damage and hampering education for approximately 1,000 students. It was the second time in 12 months that the school was attacked by Taliban. Two incidents affecting education were attributed to ISIS-K and three to ANDSF.