a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings
There were numerous reports government security agencies and their informal allies committed arbitrary or unlawful killings in connection with the government directed campaign against illegal drugs. Killings of activists, judicial officials, local government leaders, and journalists by government allies, antigovernment insurgents, and unknown assailants also continued. The number of extrajudicial killings of all types in the country since 2016 may approach 30,000, according to some human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The approximately 30,000 antidrug operations conducted from September 2018 to June 2019 resulted in the deaths of over 600 civilians, according to government data. The Central Luzon region emerged as the new epicenter for drug-related killings, accounting for 29.6 percent of drug-related killings in 2018. Media reported that some police officials allegedly involved in previous drug war killings in Metro Manila were transferred to Central Luzon, including the former Caloocan City police chief, during whose tenure teenager Kian delos Santos was killed in 2017.
The reported number of extrajudicial killings varied widely, since government and NGOs used different definitions. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent government agency responsible for investigating possible human rights violations, investigated 914 new complaints of alleged extrajudicial or politically motivated killings involving 1,098 victims as of August, of which 782 were cases of drug-related extrajudicial killings involving 876 victims. The CHR suspected PNP or Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency involvement in 550 of these new complaints and AFP or paramilitary personnel in two cases. The CHR attributed the higher number of extrajudicial killing investigations in the reporting period to an increase in investigations initiated on its own authority based on monitoring news reports, reports to the CHR in social media, staffing, or information received following CHR outreach efforts.
Killings were not limited to antidrug operations. Media quoted a member of congress claiming in June that 134 human rights defenders have been killed since President Duterte took office in 2016. In July some 20 killings on the island of Negros were attributed to political causes. Four police died in Ayungon town, allegedly killed by New People’s Army rebels. A former leftist mayor also from Ayungon and two other leftist politicians from Canlaon City were killed; some alleged they died because of their opposition to President Duterte, although no suspects have been identified. Legal advocacy groups also expressed concern about attacks on judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and other legal professionals, alleging that dozens of legal professionals have been killed since the beginning of the Duterte administration and documenting lethal attacks against eight since January.
There was a widespread belief that police enjoyed impunity for killings. Many cases from previous years remained open. Of police officers involved in killings in the antidrug war since 2016, only three have been convicted of murder, in November 2018 for the 2017 murder of juvenile Kian delos Santos.
President Duterte continued his anticrime campaign, specifically targeting the trafficking and abuse of illegal narcotics. Fatalities fell following a three-month suspension of the campaign in late 2017, but increased again beginning in 2018, although at a lower level than prior to the suspension, and continued at that level during the year.
Civil society organizations accused police of planting evidence, tampering with crime scenes, unlawfully disposing of the bodies of drug suspects, and other actions to cover up extrajudicial killings. The CHR reported that the PNP refused to share information on investigations into police and vigilante killings, as required by the constitution and despite a 2018 Supreme Court ruling that the PNP must turn over the documents. In May the PNP stated it turned over 95 percent of the required records to the solicitor general. Most of the documents, however, did not contain information related to drug-related deaths. In September the Center for International Law, the legal group representing relatives of alleged drug war victims, filed a motion to place the Office of Solicitor General and PNP in contempt of court for failing to turn over the requested documents.
President Duterte continued to maintain lists of persons he claimed were suspected drug criminals, including government, police, military, and judicial officials. Many viewed the list as an implied threat, particularly as he released the list in the run-up to the May elections. Reports suggested the list has grown to include 164 names as of March.
b. Disappearance
The AFP Human Rights Office reported no cases of forced disappearance attributed to or implicating the AFP from January to July. The CHR, however, reported 10 cases of abduction and forced disappearance from January to August involving government personnel. In June a young man traveling to Lourdes Sur East to attend church failed to return home. Family members reported receiving information that he was arrested by local officials in the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. His whereabouts as of September remained unknown, and a CHR investigation was pending.
Kidnappings during the year were common and predominantly for criminal purposes (i.e., ransom); in the past they have been carried out for both pro- and anti-government political motives as well. According to the PNP, 38 kidnapping cases (55 percent of total cases in 2018) occurred in Mindanao, which has been under martial law since 2017. Terrorist groups are implicated in many Mindanao kidnappings.
The law allows family members of alleged victims of disappearances to compel government agencies to provide statements in court about what they know regarding the circumstances surrounding a disappearance (or extrajudicial killing) and the victim’s status. Evidence of a kidnapping or killing requires the filing of charges, but in many past cases evidence and documentation were unavailable or not collected. Investigative and judicial action on disappearance cases was insufficient; a small number of previously reported cases were prosecuted.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The constitution and law prohibit torture, and evidence obtained through its use is inadmissible in court. According to the CHR, however, members of the security forces and police were accused of routinely abusing and sometimes torturing suspects and detainees. Common forms of abuse during arrest and interrogation reportedly included electric shock, cigarette burns, and suffocation.
As of August the CHR had investigated 29 cases of alleged torture involving 35 victims; it suspected police involvement in 21 of the cases. In April three police officers were charged with violating laws against torture after beating two civilians in a gaming shop in Cebu, recorded in widely viewed closed-circuit television footage.
NGOs and media reported psychological abuse, including shaming frequently occurred, especially in alleged drug cases. Under the torture statutes, the public parading or shaming of a person is illegal when used to undermine a person’s dignity and morale. In an August press conference, Manila Mayor Isko Moreno paraded 35 individuals charged with drug-related crimes in front of press, thus undermining their rights to due process, a presumption of innocence, and privacy. The PNP banned the public parading of suspects in June 2018, noting the practice violated a person’s human rights.
As part of the antidrug campaign, authorities called on drug criminals to turn themselves in to police to avoid more severe consequences. As of June, the PNP reported 1,283,409 surrenders facilitated since July 2016, with 9,261 of those between June 2018 and June 2019. Civil society actors questioned the official figures and claimed a climate of fear led many persons associated with drugs to surrender.
Human rights groups continued to express concern about abuses committed by the PNP and other security forces and noted little progress in reforms aimed at improving investigations and prosecutions of suspected human rights violations. The AFP Human Rights Office monitored and reviewed alleged human rights abuses involving members of the military. From January through July, no extrajudicial killings or murders, or forced disappearances were identified or investigated by the office.
Reports of rape and sexual abuse of women in police or protective custody continued. The Center for Women’s Resources noted that many of the rapes occurred in connection with police antidrug operations; however, updated data for 2018-19 has yet to be released.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were often harsh and life threatening and included gross overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions, physical abuse, and a chronic lack of resources including medical care and food.
NGOs reported abuse by prison guards and other inmates were common, but they stated that prisoners, fearing retaliation, generally declined to lodge formal complaints.
The juvenile justice law exempts minors from criminal liability. Drug syndicates often used minors as runners, traffickers, cultivators, or drug den employees. Rescued minors are turned over to the custody of Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Police stations had youth relations officers to ensure that authorities treated minor suspects appropriately, but in some cases they ignored procedural safeguards and facilities were not child friendly. The law mandates that the Social Welfare Department provide shelter, treatment, and rehabilitation services to these children. From January to July, the department assisted 1,521 children in conflict with the law (that is, alleged as, accused of, or judged as having committed an offense) in 16 rehabilitation centers (called Bahay Pag-asa–Houses of Hope) nationwide. Additionally, several local governments established and managed youth centers that provided protection, care, training, and rehabilitation for these children and other at-risk youth.
Physical Conditions: The Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), under the Department of Justice, administered seven prisons and penal farms nationwide for individuals sentenced to prison terms exceeding three years. BuCor facilities operated at more than three times their operating capacity of 12,299, holding 46,272 prisoners. During the year, BuCor updated its standards to include a greater distance between inmates, resulting in a decrease of operating capacity and nominally greater overcrowding.
The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), under the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the PNP, controlled 512 city, district, municipal, and provincial jails that held pretrial detainees, persons awaiting final judgment, and convicts serving sentences of three years or less. The BJMP reported its jails operated at almost 400 percent over designated capacity. The CHR reported, however, that BJMP jails were more than 1,100 percent over capacity. Neither calculation met accepted international standards. The Malolos city jail, located in a region with one of the highest levels of drug war-related arrests and killings, had an official capacity of seven inmates, yet as of July held 201 detainees. Likewise, as of September, the Manila city jail’s prison guard to prisoner ratio was one guard per 200 prisoners. Several NGOs and media reports observed that overcrowding also contributed to violence among inmates and promoted gang rivalries.
There were 82 female dormitories across all BJMP facilities as of July, a net increase of three facilities in 2018 as a result of the construction of 29 new jail facilities and the closing of 26 old facilities.
As of early 2018 the prison system was one of the most overcrowded in the world. The Birkbeck University of London’s World Prison Brief noted that in many cases, understaffing led to de facto control of prisons by gangs, which imposed disciplinary penalties and provided medical care and food.
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council, an agency supervised by the Department of Justice, reported conditions in youth rehabilitation centers were worse than in jails, citing the lack of furniture such as beds and cabinets in some centers. For example, the official capacity of the Tanglaw Pag-asa Rehabilitation Center in Malolos, Bulacan, was 60, but the facility held 144 juveniles with an inadequate food budget of 33 pesos ($0.65) per head per day. There are 58 Bahay Pag-asa centers in the country, 55 run by local government units and three by NGOs.
Prison authorities did not uniformly enforce BJMP and BuCor regulations that require holding male and female inmates in separate facilities, and, in national prisons, overseeing them with guards of the same sex. In some facilities, authorities did not fully segregate juveniles from adults. The BJMP and BuCor reported insufficient custodial and escort personnel, especially in large jails, with a national average of about 57 prisoners assigned to each custodial staff member. In larger prisons the ratio was higher; for example in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), one prison guard oversaw 94 prisoners.
Poor sanitation, inadequate ventilation, poor access to natural lighting, and a lack of potable water were chronic problems in correctional facilities and contributed to health problems. From January to July, BuCor and the BJMP reported 914 total inmate deaths. Prison authorities reported that most deaths resulted from illness. Authorities provided BuCor inmates with medical care; however, some medical services and treatments were not available. In such cases, authorities referred inmates to an outside hospital. Inmates received a medicine allowance of 15 pesos ($0.28) per day. Before the Senate Committee on Justice on October 3, NBP Hospital Director Ernesto Tamayo testified that approximately 20 percent of prisoners at NBP die annually, attributing most deaths to highly infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. Following the hearing, BuCor’s Public Information Office refuted the director’s claims, indicating that from January 2014-September 2019 the prison’s average mortality rate was about 1.5 percent. The NBP’s new hospital director as of mid-October, Henry Fabro, publicly stated that the mortality rate was 0.5 percent, blaming the high figure on the lack of medical personnel and supplies. He stated that BuCor employed only 13 doctors nationwide who provide care for 47,000 prisoners. The BJMP’s medical officer, Paul Borlongan, stated the bureau has 12 physicians and two psychiatrists for its 478 facilities. The law establishes 1:80 health personnel to inmate ratio as a legal requirement.
Juveniles younger than 18 years were typically released by court order or following a petition by the Public Attorney’s Office, the inmate’s private lawyer, or through NGO-led appeals. As of July juveniles made up less than 1 percent of the prison population.
Opportunities for prisoner recreation, learning, and self-improvement remained scarce.
Administration: Prisoners, their families, and lawyers may submit complaints to constitutionally established independent government agencies, and the CHR referred complaints it received to the appropriate agency.
Authorities generally allowed prisoners and detainees to receive visitors, but local NGOs reported that authorities periodically restricted family visits for some detainees accused of insurgency-related crimes. Prison officials noted that security concerns and space limitations at times also restricted prisoner access to visitors.
Muslim officials reported that while Muslim detainees were allowed to observe their religion, Roman Catholic mass was often broadcast by loudspeaker to prison populations of both Roman Catholic and non-Roman Catholic prisoners and detainees.
Independent Monitoring: Authorities permitted international monitoring groups, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, free and timely access to jails and prisons. The constitution grants the CHR authority to visit jails, prisons, or detention facilities to monitor the government’s compliance with international treaty obligations. The CHR reported some detention facilities still lacked an understanding of the CHR’s mandate and continued to deny their representatives access to detention facilities. For example, in 2018 the Caloocan Yakap Center, a youth detention home in Metro Manila, required a CHR team to ask the head of the facility for permission to monitor compliance by submitting a letter prior to the visit.
Improvements: To reduce overcrowding, the government began to encourage plea bargaining in drug offense cases, resulting in dismissal of 20,509 cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. As of July the Office of the Ombudsman, an independent agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting charges of public abuse and impropriety, reported three arbitrary detention violations committed by law enforcement agencies or the AFP.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by an authorized official are required for an arrest unless 1) the suspect is observed attempting to commit, in the act of committing, or just after committing an offense; 2) there is probable cause based on personal knowledge that the suspect just committed an offense; or 3) the suspect is an escaped prisoner. Authorities are required to file charges within 12 to 36 hours for arrests made without warrants, depending on the seriousness of the crime. In terrorism cases, the law permits warrantless arrests and detention without charges for up to three days.
Detainees have the right to bail, except when held for capital offenses or those punishable by a life sentence. The bail system largely functioned as intended, and suspects were allowed to appeal a judge’s decision to deny bail. The law provides an accused or detained person the right to choose a lawyer and, if the suspect cannot afford one, to have the state provide one. An underresourced Public Attorney’s Office, however, limited access of indigent persons to public defenders.
Arbitrary Arrest: Security forces continued to detain individuals, including juveniles, arbitrarily and without warrants on charges other than terrorism, especially in areas of armed conflict. In July a journalist filed multiple complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman against PNP officials for arbitrary arrest and detention over mistaken identity. The complainant linked the arrest to the government’s targeting of individuals linked to communist rebels.
Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem due largely to the slow and ineffectual justice system. Approximately 98 percent of prisoners in BJMP/PNP jails were pretrial detainees; the balance were convicted criminals serving less than three-year sentences. According to the Supreme Court, there were almost 704,000 pending cases reported by first- and second-level courts nationwide, of which approximately 554,000 were criminal cases. Pending cases were not evenly distributed among the courts, which resulted in some severely overburdened courts. Large jails employed paralegals to monitor inmates’ cases, prevent detention beyond the maximum sentence, and assist with decongestion efforts. The BJMP helped expedite court cases to promote speedy disposition of inmates’ cases. Through this program, authorities released 53,751 inmates from BJMP jails from January to July. Nonetheless, pretrial detention in excess of the possible maximum sentence was common, often extending over many years.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary; although the government generally respected judicial independence, pressure, threats, and intimidation directed at the judiciary from various sources were reported by NGOs during the year. Approximately 40 judicial staff, including five judges, have been murdered since 2016. Corruption through nepotism, personal connections, and sometimes bribery continued to result in relative impunity for wealthy or influential offenders. Insufficient personnel, inefficient processes, and long procedural delays also hindered the judicial system. These factors contributed to widespread skepticism that the criminal justice system delivered due process and equal justice.
Trials took place as a series of separate hearings, often months apart, as witnesses and court time became available, contributing to lengthy delays. There was a widely recognized need for more prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms. As of June 30, approximately one-third of authorized bench positions (563 positions) were unfilled. Sharia (Islamic law) court positions continued to be particularly difficult to fill because applicants must be members of both the Sharia Bar and the Integrated Bar. The 56 authorized district and circuit Sharia courts do not have criminal jurisdiction. Training for sharia court prosecutors was brief and considered inadequate.
The Supreme Court continued efforts to provide speedier trials, reduce judicial malfeasance, increase judicial branch efficiency, and raise public confidence in the judiciary. It continued to implement guidelines to accelerate resolution of cases in which the maximum penalty would not exceed six years in prison. On August 30, the legislature signed Republic Act 11459 into law, creating 150 new judge-at-large positions to help ease the backlog of cases.
Trial Procedures
The constitution provides for the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. Trials were generally public, but not timely, and judicial impartiality was widely questioned. The law requires that all persons accused of crimes be informed of the charges against them and grants rights to counsel, adequate time to prepare a defense, and a speedy and public trial before a judge. No criminal proceeding goes forward against a defendant without the presence of a lawyer. The law presumes defendants are innocent. They have the right to confront witnesses against them, be present at their trial, present evidence in their favor, appeal convictions, and not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The court may appoint an interpreter if necessary. If the court’s interpreter makes serious mistakes, a party can challenge the interpretation. The government generally implemented these requirements, except for the right to a speedy trial.
Although the law provides that cases should be resolved within three months to two years, depending on the court, trials effectively had no time limits. Government officials estimated it took an average of five to six years to obtain a decision. In November 2018 a court found former first lady Imelda Marcos guilty of graft from cases dating back to 1991.
Authorities respected a defendant’s right to representation by a lawyer, but poverty often inhibited access to effective legal counsel. The Public Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Department of Justice, did not have the necessary resources to fulfill its constitutional mandate and used its limited resources to represent indigent defendants at trial rather than during arraignments or pretrial hearings. During pretrial hearings courts may appoint any lawyer present in the courtroom to provide on-the-spot counsel to the accused.
Sentencing decisions were not always consistent with legal guidelines, and judicial decisions sometimes appeared arbitrary.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Under a 1945 law, the government defines political prisoners as those who may be accused of any crime against national security. Using this definition, BuCor reported 160 political prisoners in its facilities as of June. The BJMP does not track political prisoners and defines prisoners based only on security risk.
Various human rights NGOs maintained lists of incarcerated persons they considered political prisoners. Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, an NGO, tracked political detainees, most of whom were in pretrial detention. The task force noted that in the majority of cases, authorities mixed political prisoners with the general inmate population, except in the New Bilibid Prison, where they held most political prisoners in maximum security facilities.
Nearly three years after her arrest, during which prosecutors used a variety of legal tactics to delay arraignment, including filing new and amending previous charges, opposition Senator Leila de Lima remained in police detention on a charge of conspiracy to commit drug trading. In February a CHR statement raised concerns about de Lima’s treatment by the PNP. Her case began in 2016 after she opened hearings into killings related to the antidrug campaign. Although in detention, de Lima had access to media and some visitors. Her case attracted widespread domestic and international attention, with many observers denouncing the charges as politically motivated.
The government permitted regular access to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Most analysts regarded the judiciary as independent in civil matters. Complainants have access to local trial courts to seek civil damages for, or cessation of, human rights abuses. There are administrative as well as judicial remedies for civil complaints, although overburdened local courts often dismissed these cases. There were no regional human rights tribunals that could hear an appeal from the country.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The government generally respected citizens’ privacy, although leaders of communist and leftist organizations and rural-based NGOs complained of routine surveillance and harassment. Authorities routinely relied on informant systems to obtain information on terrorist suspects. Regarding the antidrug campaign, the reliability of information gained from these sources remained highly questionable. Although the government generally respected restrictions on search and seizure within private homes, searches without warrants continued. Judges generally declared evidence obtained illegally to be inadmissible.
g. Abuses in Internal Conflicts
For decades the country has contended with armed Muslim separatist movements represented by groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front; a communist insurgency supported by a nationwide New People’s Army (NPA) presence; and violence by smaller, transnational terrorist organizations, such as the ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and other terrorist groups and criminal syndicates. Additionally, interclan rido (feuds) violence continued in Mindanao, causing civilian deaths and displacement.
Martial law in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, imposed after the 2017 attack on Marawi City by members of the Maute Group, was extended again in December 2018 to the end of the year.
Killings: NGO Global Witness documented 30 killings of environmental and land rights activists in 2018 and alleged security force involvement in some of the killings. The AFP’s Human Rights Office asserted there were no deaths in 2018 of civilians used by insurgent groups as human shields, in contrast to the 44 such deaths reported in 2017. The AFP, however, attributed 20 civilian deaths to its operations during the year.
Antigovernment groups attacked security force units, causing deaths. For example, two CAFGU members died when an alleged NPA unit attacked their unit in Sallapadan, Abra, northern Luzon on August 15. These groups were also responsible for numerous civilian deaths. The NPA, ISIS-P, ASG, the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa, the BIFF, and other violent extremist groups used roadside bombs, ambushes, suicide bombings, and other means to kill political figures and other civilians, including persons suspected of being military and police informers. On January 27, 20 persons died (and 102 were injured) when two suicide attackers detonated explosives during mass in the Roman Catholic cathedral in Jolo, Mindanao. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks.
The NPA also menaced government offices and attacked or threatened businesses, power stations, farms, and private communication facilities to enforce collection of extortion payments, or so-called revolutionary taxes.
Abductions: Armed criminal and terrorist groups kidnapped civilians for ransom. The NPA and some separatist groups were also responsible for a number of arbitrary detentions and kidnappings. Through unofficial channels, authorities reportedly facilitated ransom payments on behalf of victims’ families and employers. The security forces at times attempted to rescue victims. A Dutch man held by the ASG in Sulu Province since 2012, died on May 31 during an army-led rescue attempt.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Leftist and human rights activists continued to report harassment by local security forces, including abuse of detainees by police and prison officials. Rape was not generally used as a weapon of war, but the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict identified three cases of rape by the Maute Group in 2018.
Child Soldiers: The use of child soldiers, particularly by terrorist and antigovernment organizations, remained a problem, especially in some parts of Mindanao affected by low-intensity conflict. There was no evidence of use or recruitment of child soldiers by government units. In 2018 the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict verified the recruitment and use of 19 children by armed groups, including the ASG, the BIFF, and the NPA. UNICEF monitored the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts and the release of child soldiers. Government reporting mechanisms on child soldiers provided inconsistent data across agencies and regions, especially in conflict-affected areas, which made it difficult to evaluate the problem’s scale. The NPA continued to claim it did not recruit children as combatants but admitted that it recruited, trained, and used them for noncombat purposes, such as cooking.
In February President Duterte signed into law the Special Protection of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Act, mandating the appropriate government agencies to prevent the recruitment of children in armed conflict and imposing heavy punishments for violators.
Also see the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.