a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings
There were unconfirmed reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the security forces were accused of executing persons believed to be fighting for extremist groups in both the Diffa and Tillaberi Regions rather than holding them in detention. The governmental National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) receives complaints regarding arbitrary and unlawful killings attributed to security forces. The CNDH had limited ability to investigate those complaints. The Ministries of Justice and Defense also investigate killings by security forces.
The armed forces reportedly killed 26 detainees in the Tillaberi Region early in the year. The Ministry of Justice and military prosecutors began investigations of these killings, as well as continuing the investigation of security force complicity in the deaths of 71 civilians in northern Tillaberi Region in early 2020.
In cross-border operations on April 27, Nigerien armed forces allegedly executed at least 19 civilian men in the Menaka Region of Mali (see section 1.g., Killings).
Armed terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), attacked and killed civilians and security forces (see section 1.g., Killings).
b. Disappearance
In contrast with 2020, there were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, there were reports by domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that security forces beat and abused civilians, especially in the context of the fight against terrorism in the Diffa and Tillaberi Regions. Security forces, including a battalion of Chadian soldiers operating in the country under the G5 Sahel Joint Force, were also accused of rape and sexual abuse, matters the government continued to investigate (see section 1.g., Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture).
There were indications that security officials were sometimes involved in abusing or harming detainees, especially members of the Fulani minority or those accused of affiliation with Boko Haram or other extremist groups. There were allegations that security forces and local leaders in the Diffa Region harassed or detained citizens they accused of collusion with Boko Haram, forcing the citizens to pay a ransom to end the harassment.
In September 2020 the CNDH implicated security forces in human rights abuses in the Tillaberi Region in March and April 2020. The Ministry of Justice and military prosecutors continued to investigate these allegations.
According to the Conduct in UN Field Missions online portal, as of October there were eight open allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by the country’s peacekeepers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions, in cases from 2018, 2016, and 2015. The United Nations substantiated the allegations and repatriated the perpetrators in five cases: two from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, two from the UN Operation in Cote D’Ivoire, and one from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. As of October the government had not explained what actions if any it had taken regarding the five substantiated cases, which allegedly involved transactional sex with one or more adults, an exploitative relationship with an adult, and rape of children. The United Nations found the allegations in one of the eight cases to be unsubstantiated, and in the other two cases, the United Nations had completed the investigations and was awaiting information from the government.
Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces, particularly among the army and police, due to lack of effective oversight of military investigative and prosecutorial processes. The Office of the Inspector General of Security Services is responsible for the investigation of police, national guard, and fire department abuses. The inspector general of the army and gendarmerie is tasked with investigating any abuses related to the gendarmerie and military forces. The armed forces conduct annual human rights training. Additionally, all peacekeeping battalions receive human rights and law of war training prior to deployment.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in the prisons were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, and attacks by violent extremist organizations.
Physical Conditions: Human rights observers stated overcrowding remained a widespread problem. The government reported in 2019 there were 10,723 prisoners in 41 prisons designed to hold 10,555 persons, perhaps indicating significant underreporting by the government, according to observers. The prisons of Niamey and Diffa were respectively designed to hold 445 and 100 persons, but in 2020 held 1,451 and 432 inmates, respectively. Other observers found several prisons to be 300 percent above capacity. Prisoners continued to sleep outside in the courtyard of Kollo Prison due to lack of space inside the wards.
Prison officials held female inmates in separate quarters, which were less crowded and relatively cleaner than men’s quarters. They generally held juveniles separately in special rehabilitation centers or in judicially supervised homes. Terrorist and high-threat offenders were separated from other criminal offenders. The prison system made no provision for special services for detainees with disabilities. Authorities held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners.
Prison deaths occurred regularly, some from malaria, meningitis, tuberculosis, and COVID-19, but no statistics were available. Heavy rains and flash floods exacerbated a nationwide cholera outbreak suspected of causing a number of prison deaths.
Nutrition, sanitation, potable water, and medical care were poor, although officials allowed inmates to receive supplemental food, medicine, and other items from their families. Basic health care was available, and authorities referred patients with serious illness to public health-care centers. Observers noted judicial inefficiency in assessing conditions; dilapidated prison premises (except at the Tillaberi prison); insufficient prison staff; poor food, health care, and maintenance of facilities; and inadequate postrelease reintegration systems.
The government operated a detention facility in Goudoumaria that holds defectors from violent extremist organizations while they undergo rehabilitation. Families were kept together and separated from single men. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided the majority of services to the facility, including potable water, food, and medical care. Funding for many of the services lapsed in 2020, resulting in reduced access to basic services. Children in the camp suffered from malaria, and pregnant women lacked adequate access to emergency care.
National Guard troops were assigned rotationally as prison guards for six months at a time but had little or no prison-specific training. The law creates a specialized cadre of prison guards and transfers management of the prisons to the Ministry of Justice, but authorities did little to affect this transition.
Administration: Judicial authorities and the CNDH investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions and followed up on credible allegations of mistreatment. Prison management generally permitted prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship.
Independent Monitoring: Authorities generally granted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the CNDH, and human rights groups access to most prisons and detention centers, including police station jails, and these groups conducted monitoring visits. The government continued its prohibition of monitoring visits to the Kokutoukale prison, ostensibly to halt the spread of COVID-19.
Improvements: The ICRC worked with several prisons to reduce malnutrition.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution and law require arrest warrants, prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, prohibit detention without charge for more than 48 hours, and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention, with some exceptions.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Reports indicated that authorities sometimes held detainees implicated in sensitive cases longer than legally permitted. An investigator can request a waiver for an additional 48 hours before charging an individual. If the prosecutor receives a case from an investigator without a charge made within the initial or additional 48 hours, the case must be dismissed. The law allows individuals accused of terror-related crimes to be detained without charge for 15 days, which can be extended only once, for an additional 15 days. The 15-day detention period begins once suspects reach the Niamey Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (SCLCT/CTO); terror suspects apprehended in the rural Diffa Region at times spent days or weeks in either regional civilian or military custody before transport to Niamey. Authorities must notify those arrested of their right to a lawyer within 24 hours of being transferred to SCLCT/CTO.
Security forces usually informed detainees promptly of the charges against them. There was a functioning bail system for crimes carrying a sentence of less than 10 years. The constitution calls for the government to provide a lawyer for indigents in civil and criminal cases, although this did not always occur. Widespread ignorance of the law and an insufficient number of lawyers prevented many defendants from exercising their rights to bail and an attorney. Except for detainees suspected of terrorism, authorities did not detain suspects incommunicado.
Arbitrary Arrest: Police occasionally conducted warrantless sweeps to detain suspected criminals. Police and other security force members on occasion rounded up persons accused of being members of or supporting terrorist groups, based on circumstantial evidence, subsequently holding them for months or even years.
Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. The law provides for maximum pretrial confinement of 48 months for terrorism offenses where the prison sentence could be 10 years, and 24 months for less serious offenses. While the NGO World Prison Brief, citing 2019 data largely from official sources, reported 56 percent of the prison population were pretrial detainees, local observers believed the vast majority of prisoners were awaiting trial. According to statistics provided by the government, approximately 80 percent of prisoners facing terrorism charges were in pretrial detention, and authorities held many beyond the 24- or 48-month maximum term. Reports indicated judicial inefficiency, limited investigative capacity, and staff shortages contributed to lengthy pretrial detention periods for terrorism offenses. Regarding other offenses, civil society activists and members of opposition political parties appeared to be especially subject to abuse of their due process rights, including prolonging of pretrial detention to allow prosecutors time to assemble evidence. By contrast, some high-profile detainees benefited from extended provisional release.
Defectors from terrorist groups who meet the government’s legal criteria for conditional amnesty are supposed to be released after receiving three to six months of deradicalization, rehabilitation, and vocational training. The chief prosecutor is responsible for reviewing defector case files and working with the Ministry of Interior to make decisions regarding the defectors’ eligibility for reintegration. Due to bureaucratic and logistical challenges associated with establishing and implementing this program, defectors and family members remained in the Regional Stabilization Center facility in Diffa for prolonged periods, some up to three years.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the executive branch sometimes interfered with the judicial process. The government reassigned some judges to low-profile positions after they asserted independence in handling high-profile cases or rendered decisions unfavorable to the government. There were allegations the government interfered or attempted to interfere in high-profile court cases involving opposition leaders. Judicial corruption, exacerbated by low salaries, inadequate training, and inefficiency, remained a problem. There were reports that family and business ties influenced lower-court decisions in civil matters. Judges granted provisional release pending trial to some high-profile defendants, who were seldom called back for trial and had complete freedom of movement, including departing the country, and could run as candidates in elections. Authorities generally respected court orders.
Traditional mediation did not provide the same legal protections as the formal court system. Traditional chiefs may act as mediators and counselors. They have authority to arbitrate many customary law matters, including marriage, inheritance, land, and community disputes, but not all civil topics. Chiefs received government stipends but had no police or judicial powers.
Customary courts, based largely on Islamic law, try only civil law cases. A legal practitioner with basic legal training, advised by an assessor with knowledge of Islamic traditions, heads these courts. The law does not regulate the judicial actions of chiefs and customary courts, although defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal court system. In contrast with the formal court system, women do not have equal legal status with men in customary courts and traditional mediation, nor do they enjoy the same access to legal redress.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial. Defendants have the right to counsel, at public expense for minors and indigent defendants charged with crimes carrying a sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment. Officials provided defendants adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The law also provides free interpretation for defendants who do not speak French, the official language, from the moment charged through all appeals. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf either to the investigative judge or at the trial stage of proceedings. Defendants are not compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants may appeal verdicts, first to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.
Widespread ignorance of the law prevented many defendants from taking advantage of these rights. Judicial delays due to the limited number of courts and staff shortages were common.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Three prisoners remained incarcerated without trial after being charged with “fomenting riots” following the February presidential elections. A number of civil society activists remained in detention after their arrests early in the year during postelection protests (see section 2.b, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly). They generally received the same protections as other prisoners.
Saidou Bakari, a member of the leading opposition party, remained jailed since 2016 on corruption charges dating back to 2005, although a gendarmerie investigation found no proof of wrongdoing. According to the chief investigative judge of the Niamey court, the case remained under investigation by the office for financial crimes.
Authorities generally granted the ICRC, the CNDH, and human rights groups access to political prisoners, and these groups conducted visits during the year.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights abuses. Individuals and organizations may appeal adverse domestic court decisions to regional human rights bodies, such as the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The constitution and law generally prohibit such actions, but there were exceptions. Police may conduct searches without warrants when they have a strong suspicion a house shelters criminals or stolen property. Under state of emergency provisions in the Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillaberi Regions, authorities may search houses at any time and for any reason. The communications intercept law permits interception of telephone calls and internet connections to facilitate terrorism and organized crime investigations, but the cybercrime act was more commonly invoked by the government (see section 2.a., Violence and Harassment).
g. Conflict-related Abuses
The regional fight against the terrorist groups Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued in the east, while extremist groups linked to the conflict in Mali terrorized the west of the country. Several groups with links to al-Qa’ida and ISIS were active in the country.
Killings: A UN secretary-general report alleged that on April 27, Nigerien armed forces summarily executed at least 19 civilian men during a cross-border operation in the Menaka Region of Mali.
Criminals and extremist groups conducted terrorist attacks throughout the country, primarily in Diffa Region and portions of the Tillaberi Region and southern Tahoua Region. Many killings, especially in Diffa and Tillaberi Regions, specifically targeted government authorities, including killing or abducting canton chiefs, or private individuals seen as informants for the government. This practice also extended to village chiefs, who were attacked, killed, or subjected to repeated threats in Torodi and other locations near the border with Burkina Faso and particularly Mali. Observers noted these attacks significantly disrupted government efforts to protect communities and led to substantial internal displacements, bringing insecurity into previously safer areas.
Abductions: Terrorist groups and criminals kidnapped dozens of citizens and several citizens of western countries. Armed groups in the Diffa Region, including Boko Haram and criminal gangs, abducted civilians. Analysts suggested these kidnappings fueled increasing displacements across the region.
Armed groups in northern Tillaberi Region also abducted several persons, including government officials and civilians. Observers believed the abductions were used to raise funds through ransom, increase recruitment, and exact retribution.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: In April members of a Chadian battalion deployed in Tera in the Tillaberi Region as part of a G5 Sahel Joint Force operation allegedly raped a girl, age 11, and two women. Chadian military authorities arrested the alleged perpetrators and pledged an inquiry and “necessary sanctions.”
Boko Haram militants and, to a lesser extent, ISIS affiliates targeted noncombatants, including women and children, and used violence, intimidation, theft, and kidnapping to terrorize communities and sustain their ranks.
Child Soldiers: Boko Haram recruited and used children in both combatant and noncombatant roles. There were reports of forced marriages to Boko Haram militants.
Authorities continued to provide services at the defectors’ rehabilitation facility in Goudoumaria to alleged child soldiers captured in battle in 2019, with the government focusing on transitioning juveniles back into their communities.
Also see the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: Boko Haram and ISIS-related violence displaced civilians. Humanitarian organizations in the Diffa Region were sometimes unable to obtain the required security escorts and clearances required to travel outside of the town of Diffa to distribute aid. Humanitarian organizations reported similar problems of escorts and clearances in the Maradi and Zinder Regions. Criminality also appeared to continue with reported cases of extortion, kidnappings, and home invasions.
ISIS-GS and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin affiliates in northern Tillaberi Region reportedly continued charging local villagers taxes, while extremists in western Tillaberi Region reportedly burned government-funded schools, telling villagers their children should not attend such schools.