a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media
While the constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, the government increasingly restricted this right. Federal, regional, and local authorities used procedural violations and restrictive or vague legislation to detain, harass, or prosecute persons who criticized the government or institutions it favored. The government exercised editorial control over media, creating a media landscape in which most citizens were exposed to predominantly government-approved narratives. Significant government pressure on independent media constrained coverage of numerous topics, especially Russia’s war against Ukraine; political prisoners; treatment of LGBTQI+ persons; problems involving the environment, elections, COVID-19, and corruption; and criticism of local or federal leadership, as well as secessionism or federalism. The government used direct ownership or ownership by large private companies with government links to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. Censorship and self-censorship in television and print media and on the internet was widespread, particularly regarding points of view critical of the government or its policies.
Freedom of Expression: On March 5, President Putin signed into effect laws that criminalize independent war reporting and “spreading false information” about Russia’s war in Ukraine, which provides for sentences of up to 15 years in prison. On March 23, the Duma adopted amendments to the laws, effectively expanding the ban on criticizing the armed forces to banning criticism of all government actions. Authorities used the new laws widely and indiscriminately to severely suppress freedom of expression, including by members of the press. Independent rights group OVD-Info reported that following the enactment of new censorship laws in March, as of December 20, authorities initiated 379 criminal cases for antiwar speech, including charges of spreading “false information” and “discrediting the military.” For example, journalist for the RusNews website Maria Ponomarenko was arrested in April for “discrediting” the Russian armed forces with “fake” social media posts. Ponomarenko was held in pretrial detention following her arrest until November 14, when she was placed under house arrest. She faced up to 10 years in prison for a Telegram post concerning the March 16 Russian air strike on a theater in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol that killed hundreds of civilians.
Authorities continued to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism, under which citizens may be punished for certain types of peaceful protests, affiliation with certain religious denominations, and even certain social media posts, as a tool to stifle dissent. According to the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, in 2020 authorities “inappropriately initiated” 145 new cases against individuals under antiextremism laws, including for exercising free speech on social media and elsewhere or for their religious beliefs.
The law prohibits the dissemination of false “socially significant information” online, in mass media, or during protests or public events, as well as the dissemination of “incorrect socially meaningful information, distributed under the guise of correct information, which creates the threat of damage to the lives and health of citizens or property, the threat of mass disruption of public order and public security, or the threat of the creation of an impediment to the functioning of life support facilities, transport infrastructure, banking, energy, industry, or communications.”
The law criminalizes “offending the religious feelings of believers” (blasphemy). Actions in public “demonstrating clear disrespect for society and committed with the intent to insult the religious feelings of believers” are subject to fines, compulsory labor for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to one year. If these actions are committed in places of worship, the punishment is a fine, compulsory labor for up to three years, or a prison sentence of up to three years.
The law prohibits showing “disrespect” online for the state, authorities, the public, flag, or constitution.
The government continued to enact new restrictions on the content that could be shared on the internet. Amendments adopted in 2020 allow Roskomnadzor, the country’s media oversight agency, to block websites that “violate the rights of [Russian citizens],” including by restricting the “dissemination of socially significant information.” Experts characterized the law as restricting “Russophobic” content and noted that it was adopted during a government public relations campaign against YouTube after it blocked content posted by progovernment media personality Vladimir Solovyov. A 2020 law prohibits journalists and websites from publishing the personal data of law enforcement officers and certain other state employees affiliated with the country’s security services. Expanding the definition of sensitive data, the FSB published in 2021 a list of topics that could be “used against the security” of Russia, including information and assessments of the country’s military, security sector, and space agency, Roscosmos. Individuals who collect information in the specified categories could be subject to designation as “foreign agents” (see section 2.b.).
During the year authorities invoked laws prohibiting “inciting minors to participate in dangerous activities” or “violations to the established procedure for organizing or holding a public event” to charge individuals who published material online related to demonstrations.
During the year authorities invoked a 2013 law prohibiting the distribution of “propaganda on nontraditional sexual relations” to minors to punish the exercise of free speech by LGBTQI+ persons and their supporters. On November 24, the Duma passed, and on December 5, President Putin signed, a law significantly expanding the scope of the prohibition on such speech (see section 6).
The law bans the display of Nazi symbols and the symbols of groups placed on the government’s list of “extremist” organizations. There was no official register or list of banned symbols, although a 2021 law prohibits displaying images of individuals found guilty of committing crimes in accordance with the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal. During the year authorities enforced a law prohibiting the “propaganda of narcotics” to prosecute or threaten to block independent outlets and journalists.
During the year authorities used a law banning cooperation with “undesirable foreign organizations” to restrict free expression (see section 2.b.). For example, in July, investigative news outlets Bellingcat and The Insider, which had previously published multiple exposes on abuses or malfeasance by government officials, were added to the list of “undesirable organizations.”
Government-controlled media frequently used derogatory terms such as “traitor,” “foreign agent,” and “fifth column” to describe individuals expressing views critical of or different from government policy, leading to a societal climate intolerant of dissent.
Virtually all independent or opposition-leaning media outlets were blocked within the country or shut down, along with many independent NGOs. The Kremlin intensified efforts to block access to information that contradicts official narratives. Immediately following the February 24 invasion of Ukraine, the government cracked down on independent media in Russia, closing flagship liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and independent daily Novaya Gazeta.
Violence and Harassment: Journalists continued to be subjected to arrest, imprisonment, physical attack, harassment, and intimidation as a result of their reporting. For example, on April 7, editor in chief of Novaya Gazeta and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dmitriy Muratov was attacked while on a train from Moscow to Samara. Two attackers threw red paint laced with acetone at Muratov and shouted, “this is for our boys!” while filming the incident. Journalists and bloggers who uncovered government malfeasance or who criticized the government often faced harassment, either in the form of direct threats to their physical safety or threats to their livelihood, frequently through legal prosecution.
There were reports of attacks on journalists by government officials and police and of police detaining journalists to interfere with or punish them for their reporting. For example, Amnesty International reported that RusNews journalist Matvey Golovanov was arrested on February 26, while he was live-streaming from a peaceful antiwar rally in Yekaterinburg, despite showing his press credentials. He served a 28-day sentence on charges of repeated violation of the rules of public assemblies.
There were reports of police framing journalists for serious crimes to interfere with or punish them for their reporting. For example, on September 5, a court sentenced Ivan Safronov, a former national security journalist for major national daily newspapers Kommersant and Vedomosti, to 22 years in prison for treason and divulging classified information. Safronov was arrested by the FSB in 2020. According to media, Safronov’s case itself was classified, and the FSB declined to disclose what information he allegedly shared with Czech intelligence in 2012. Observers speculated the charges might be related to a 2017 Kommersant article coauthored by Safronov, detailing the potential sale of Russian military aircraft to Egypt. Safronov also provoked a strong reaction from the government for a 2019 article in Kommersant speculating on a shakeup of the leadership in the Federation Council. Safronov’s legal team said it would appeal the verdict.
There were reports of police raids on the offices of independent media outlets that observers believed were designed to punish or pressure the outlets. For example, on March 5 in Pskov, riot police broke into the office of local media outlet Pskovskaya Guberniya, confiscating computers, mobile phones, and other equipment. The search was conducted under a law on discrediting the Russian Armed Forces that was introduced only one day earlier.
There was no progress during the year in establishing accountability in several high-profile killings of journalists, including the 2004 killing of Paul Klebnikov, the 2006 killing of Anna Politkovskaya, and the 2009 killing of Natalia Estemirova.
Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government directly and indirectly censored media, much of which occurred online (also see Internet Freedom and Academic Freedom and Cultural Events, below).
There were reports that the government retaliated against those who produced or published content it disliked. For example, in April, numerous independent media outlets – including Mediazona, Republic, Taiga.Info, and Lentachel – were blocked for their coverage of the war in Ukraine amid broader sweeping martial censorship measures.
Self-censorship in independent media was also reportedly widespread.
The vast majority of the country’s mass media was funded by the government or progovernment actors. Government-friendly oligarchs owned most other outlets, which are permitted to determine what they publish within formal or informal boundaries set by the government. In the regions, each governor controlled regional media through direct or indirect funding or through affiliated structures. The federal government or progovernment individuals completely or partially owned all so-called federal television channels, the only stations with nationwide reach. The 29 most-watched stations together commanded 86 percent of television viewership; all were owned at least in part by the federal or local governments or by progovernment individuals. Government-owned media outlets often received preferential benefits, such as rent-free occupancy of government-owned buildings, and a preferential tax rate.
On a regional level, state-owned and progovernment television channels received subsidies from the Ministry of Finance for broadcasting in cities with a population of less than 100,000 and for the creation and production of content. At many government-owned or controlled outlets, the state increasingly dictated editorial policy. While the law restricts foreign ownership of media outlets to no more than 20 percent, another provision of the ambiguously worded law apparently bans foreign ownership entirely. The government used these provisions to consolidate ownership of independent outlets under progovernment oligarchs and to exert pressure on outlets that retained foreign backers.
By law the Ministry of Justice is required to maintain a list of media outlets that are designated “foreign agents.” The decision to designate media outlets or individual journalists as foreign agents may be made outside of court by other government bodies, including law enforcement agencies. The law allows authorities to label individuals (both Russian and foreign citizens) as “foreign agents” if they disseminate foreign media to an unspecified number of persons, receive funding from abroad, or, after a 2020 amendment, “carry out the interests of a foreign state.” The amendment specifies that a foreign journalist “performing the functions of a foreign agent, incompatible with his professional activities as a journalist” could be declared an individual foreign agent.
Human rights defenders expressed concern that the “foreign agent” law was being used to restrict further the activities of or selectively punish journalists, bloggers, and social media users. Individuals labeled a “foreign agent” are required to register with the Ministry of Justice, and those living abroad also must create and register a legal entity inside the country to publish materials inside the country. All information published by the “foreign agent” individual must be marked as having been produced by a “foreign agent.” Failure to comply with the law may result in heavy fines.
As of December 20, there were 53 outlets and 147 individuals designated as “media foreign agents,” the majority of whom were journalists. Several of those designated as “foreign agents” tried unsuccessfully to reverse their designation.
In 2020, the government imposed new onerous labeling requirements for media outlets designated as foreign agents, which at the time only included Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and its affiliated outlets, and a news site run by Medium-Orient, based in the Czech Republic. In 2021, new amendments introduced fines for the dissemination of information or media content about or belonging to a “foreign agent” without specifying this “foreign agent” status; failure to comply may result in a fine.
During the year authorities vigorously implemented the law to impose fines or noncompliance of labeling requirements. During the year the government further intensified its campaign against “media foreign agents” in the context of its broader crackdown on independent media.
By law authorities were able to close any organization a court determines to be extremist, including media outlets and websites. Roskomnadzor routinely issued warnings to newspapers and internet outlets it suspected of publishing extremist materials. Three warnings in one year sufficed to initiate a closure lawsuit. A 2021 law requires Roskomnadzor to block without a court decision websites that are deemed to justify extremism or terrorism, if the prosecutor general or his deputy submit a request.
Libel/Slander Laws: Officials at all levels used their authority to restrict the work of and to retaliate against journalists and bloggers who criticized them, including taking legal action for alleged slander or libel, which are criminal offenses. The law prescribes criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment for slander or libel “using information and telecommunications networks, including the internet.” Authorities continued to use these laws to target human rights defenders and civil society activists in criminal investigations, most recently by accusing them of spreading “fake news” about the war in Ukraine, unreliable information related to the COVID-19 pandemic, or libelously criticizing public officials.
National Security: Authorities cited laws against terrorism or protecting national security to arrest or punish critics of the government or deter criticism of government policies or officials. There were reports that critics of the government’s counterterrorism policies were themselves charged with “justifying terrorism.” In October authorities charged opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza with treason, apparently on the basis of his criticism of Kremlin policies in public remarks.
Internet Freedom
The government monitored all internet communications (see also section 1.f.).
The law requires internet providers to install equipment to route web traffic through servers in the country. The government continued to employ its longstanding use of the System for Operative Investigative Activities, which requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install, at their own expense, a device that routes all customer traffic to an FSB terminal. The system enables police to track private email communications, identify internet users, and monitor their internet activity. Internet freedom advocates asserted the measure allows for surveillance by intelligence agencies and enables state authorities to control information and block content.
A 2021 law allows authorities to impose significant fines for internet providers and social media companies that became repeat violators of the “sovereign internet” law by failing to install and operate state-controlled software on their systems.
The “sovereign internet” law also prescribed the creation of an independent domain name system (DNS) for the country, separate from the global DNS, which would allow the country to isolate itself from the global internet, further restricting the free flow of information.
The law requires domestic and foreign businesses to store citizens’ personal data on servers physically located in the country. Companies refusing to localize Russian users’ data may be fined, with heavier fines or being blocked from operating in the country for repeat offenses. In July, courts fined WhatsApp, Snapchat, Tinder, Spotify, and Hotels.com for refusing to keep data on Russian servers.
Telecommunications companies are required to temporarily retain user data and make it available to law enforcement bodies. Regulatory requirements specify users’ voice records must be stored for a period of six months, and electronic correspondence (audio, images, and video) for three months. Observers believed the country’s security services were able to intercept and decode encrypted messages on at least some messaging platforms. The law also requires telecommunications companies to provide authorities with “backdoors” around encryption technologies. Companies may be fined if they refuse to provide the FSB with decryption keys that would allow it to read users’ correspondence.
A 2021 law required foreign tech companies with a daily audience larger than 500,000 users in the country to open official representative offices in the country by the end of the year. Local representation affords authorities leverage to enforce fines and regulations through pressure on domestically located employees. If tech companies do not comply, Roskomnadzor is authorized to block their access to Russian users’ personal data. The preliminary list contained 20 companies, including social media networks, instant messenger platforms, search engines and mail services, hosting providers, and online stores.
The government blocked access to content and otherwise censored the internet. Roskomnadzor maintained a federal blacklist of internet sites and required ISPs to block access to web pages that the agency deemed offensive or illegal, including information that was already prohibited, such as items on the Federal List of Extremist Materials. The law gives the prosecutor general and Roskomnadzor authority to demand that ISPs block websites that promote extremist information and “mass public events that are conducted in violation of appropriate procedures.” A law requiring social media companies to independently block and remove “obscene language” or other prohibited content went into effect in 2021.
There was a growing trend of authorities seeking to pressure social media platforms to censor posts and remove content deemed objectionable. This was especially the case with posts and content related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to the internet freedom NGO Roskomsvoboda, as of December nearly 640,000 websites were unjustly blocked in the country, and authorities blocked an additional 7,000 websites due to military censorship measures following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Prosecutor General’s Office claimed it had removed or blocked more than 130,000 web resources since February 24.
According to Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom on the Net report, there were approximately 400,000 cases of the government interfering with internet freedom, a significant increase from the previous year. Freedom House noted that criminal prosecutions for violations of unauthorized online activity increased dramatically during the year primarily due to the new law on spreading “false information” about the Russian Armed Forces. Websites, news outlets, and journalists that refuse to comply with government censorship requests face the greatest risk of prosecution. The law requires owners of internet search engines (news aggregators) with more than one million daily users to be accountable for the truthfulness of “publicly important” information before its dissemination. Authorities may demand that content deemed in violation be removed and impose increasingly heavy fines for noncompliance.
Roskomnadzor also sought to pressure social media companies into unblocking certain progovernment sites or individuals.
A 2015 law on the “right to be forgotten” allows individuals in the country to request that search engine companies block search results that contain information about them. According to Freedom House’s 2021 Freedom on the Net report, the law was “routinely applied to require search engines to delete links to websites that contain personal information about an individual if it is no longer considered relevant.” The law fails to limit the “right to be forgotten” when the information requested for removal is in the public interest or concerns public figures impeding freedom of expression.
There was a growing trend of social media users being prosecuted for the political, religious, or other ideological content of posts, shares, and “likes,” especially content related to Ukraine, which resulted in fines or prison sentences (see section 2.a., Freedom of Expression for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media).
The government prohibited online anonymity. The law requires commercial virtual private network (VPN) services and internet anonymizers to block access to websites and internet content prohibited in the country. The law also authorizes law enforcement agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, to identify VPN services that do not comply with the ban. By law Roskomnadzor may also block sites that provide instructions on how to circumvent government blocking.
The law prohibits companies registered as “organizers of information dissemination,” including online messaging applications, from allowing anonymous users. Messaging applications and platforms that fail to comply with the requirements to restrict anonymous accounts may be blocked.
There were reports of politically motivated cyberattacks. For example, the Novaya Gazeta website was targeted in distributed denial of service attacks throughout the year.
Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government took further steps during the year to restrict academic freedom and cultural events. In 2021, President Putin signed controversial amendments to the law on education that would potentially subject any educational activity, including informal training sessions, YouTube lectures, and peer-to-peer tutoring, to government regulation and oversight. The amendments also grant the government authority to approve or disapprove all elements of international educational cooperation. The explanatory note that accompanied the draft submitted to the Duma stated that the law’s goal was to protect schoolchildren from “anti-Russian propaganda submitted under the guise of educational activities.” Prominent academics warned that the law would stifle intellectual freedom and creativity. There were reports that the government sanctioned academic personnel for their teachings, writing, research, or political views. Amnesty International noted in a May 12 report that dozens of schoolteachers faced harsh reprisals for speaking out against Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some were forced to serve so-called administrative arrests or paid substantial fines for expressing their opinions either publicly or in the classroom. Others were dismissed or otherwise reprimanded. For example, Roman Melnichenko, associate professor at Volgograd State University, was dismissed on April 19 for an “immoral disciplinary offense” that “violated ethical and moral norms” when he reposted an antiwar message on social media. Melnichenko was dismissed from the university after the local Prosecutor’s Office informed the university that he faced administrative proceedings.
There were also reports that the government penalized students for their activism or political views. According to human rights organizations, hundreds of university students were expelled during the year for their political views. For example, on March 9, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reportedly ordered Saint Petersburg State University to expel 13 students who participated in antiwar protests. Additionally, students at many schools and kindergartens have been forced to participate in state-orchestrated, war-themed “flash mobs” or assemblies in support of the “special peacekeeping operation.” Universities reported that authorities asked them to take down website pages that indicated cooperation with or announced a program partially funded by the U.S. government.
There were reports that authorities forced the cancellation of concerts by musicians who had been critical of the government or dealt with subjects considered unacceptable to authorities, especially Russia’s war against Ukraine. In most cases the FSB or other security forces visited the music venues and “highly recommended” cancellation of the concerts, which the owners and managers understood as a veiled threat against the venue if they did not comply. For example, media reported that authorities cancelled the August 26 concert by popular band Splean because lead singer Aleksandr Vasilyev previously dedicated a song to all artists who fled Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine.
b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The government severely restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The law provides for freedom of assembly, but local authorities restricted this right. The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, or marches by more than one person to notify the government, although authorities maintained that protest organizers must receive government permission, not just provide notification. Failure to obtain official permission to hold a protest resulted in the demonstration being viewed as unlawful by law enforcement officials, who routinely dispersed such protests. While some public demonstrations took place, on many occasions local officials selectively denied groups permission to assemble or offered alternate venues that were inconveniently or remotely located. Many public demonstrations were restricted or banned due to COVID-19 measures. Each region enforced its own restrictions.
Although they do not require official approval, authorities restricted single-person pickets and required that there be at least 164 feet separating protesters from each other. By law police officers may stop a single-person picket to protect the health and safety of the picketer. The law imposes financial reporting requirements, prohibits protests or public demonstrations near agencies that perform “emergency operational services” (such as law enforcement agencies), and imposes restrictions on journalists covering these events. In addition, the law prohibits “foreign sources of funding” financing public demonstrations and treats single-person pickets, if held in the general vicinity of other picketers, as “mass demonstrations without a permit,” which are banned. Authorities regularly detained single-person picketers.
Peaceful protest activity related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and its associated military mobilization was severely restricted. According to OVD-Info, from February 24 to December 20, authorities conducted at least 19,442 detentions for protest activity opposing the war.
The law requires that “motor rallies” and “tent city” gatherings in public places receive official permission. It requires gatherings that would interfere with pedestrian or vehicle traffic to receive official agreement 10 days prior to the event; those that do not affect traffic require three days’ notice. The law prohibits “mass rioting,” which includes teaching and learning about the organization of and participation in “mass riots.” The law allows authorities to prohibit nighttime demonstrations and meetings and to levy fines for violating protest regulations and rules on holding public events.
The law imposes a fine for destroying infrastructure facilities and blocking roads and a 10-year prison sentence in the case of death of more than one person.
The law provides heavy penalties for engaging in unsanctioned protests and other violations of public assembly law. Protesters convicted of multiple violations within six months may be fined substantially or imprisoned for up to five years. The law prohibits “involving a minor in participation in an unsanctioned gathering,” which is punishable by fines, 100 hours of community service, or arrest for up to 15 days.
Arrests or detentions for organizing or taking part in unsanctioned protests were common.
Police often broke up protests that were not officially sanctioned, at times using disproportionate force. For example, OVD-Info registered around 5,000 detentions in 69 cities during antiwar protests on March 6, and 34 cases of police brutality. There were reports that the government penalized employees for their participation in or support of unsanctioned assemblies. Media reported several instances in which authorities charged individuals for their alleged participation in or other support of the demonstrations even when the individual charged was already detained or the statute of limitations for that particular charge had expired.
The courts rarely acknowledged violations of citizens’ rights to assemble.
Freedom of Association
The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not respect it. Public organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry of Justice. The finances of registered organizations are subject to investigation by tax authorities, and foreign grants must be registered.
The government continued to use the “foreign agents” law, which requires NGOs that receive foreign funding and engage in “political activity” to register as “foreign agents,” to harass, stigmatize, and, in some cases, halt their operation, although fewer organizations were registered than in previous years. On July 14, President Putin signed into law a bill expanding the definition of “foreign agents” to include anyone who is “under foreign influence,” a change that critics said would make it even easier for the state to target its domestic critics. The law entered into force on December 1. Under the legislation, it also became possible for the first time for authorities to designate a for-profit entity as a “foreign agent.” As of December 20, the Ministry of Justice’s registry of organizations designated as “foreign agents” included 228 NGOs. On December 1, the Ministry of Justice combined the several existing “foreign agent” registers into a single unified list with uniform regulatory requirements. NGOs designated as “foreign agents” are banned by law from observing elections and face other restrictions on their activity.
For the purposes of implementing the “foreign agents” law, the government considered “political activities” to include: organizing public events, rallies, demonstrations, marches, and pickets; organizing and conducting public debates, discussions, or presentations; participating in election activities aimed at influencing the result, including election observation and forming commissions; public calls to influence local and state government bodies, including calling for changes to legislation; disseminating opinions and decisions of state bodies by technology; and attempting to shape public political views, including public opinion polls or other sociological research.
To be delisted, an NGO must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice proving that it did not receive any foreign funding or engage in any political activity within the previous 12 months. If the NGO received any foreign funding, it must have returned the money within three months. The ministry would then initiate an unscheduled inspection of the NGO to determine whether it qualified for removal from the list.
The law requires that NGOs on the foreign agents list identify themselves as “foreign agents” in all their public materials. Authorities fined NGOs for failing to disclose their “foreign agent” status on websites or printed materials.
Organizations the government listed as “foreign agents” reported experiencing the social effects of stigmatization, such as being targeted by vandals and online criticism, in addition to losing partners and funding sources and being subjected to smear campaigns in the state-controlled press. At the same time, the “foreign agent” label did not necessarily exclude organizations from receiving state-sponsored support.
The law requires the Ministry of Justice to maintain a list of “undesirable foreign organizations.” The list expanded during the year to 72 organizations as of December 20.
By law a foreign organization may be found “undesirable” if it is deemed “dangerous to the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, its national security, and defense.” Authorities did not clarify what specific threats these “undesirable” NGOs posed to the country. Any foreign organization deemed “undesirable” must cease its activities. Any money or assets found by authorities may be seized, and any citizens found guilty of continuing to work with the organization in contravention of the law may face up to seven years in prison. A 2021 law prohibits Russian citizens in any country from taking part in the work of NGOs designated as undesirable in Russia and from transferring money to Russia from certain countries under monitoring by the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, regardless of the transferred amount.
Authorities imposed criminal penalties for purported violations of the law on “undesirable foreign organizations.” For example, on July 15, opposition activist and former head of the NGO Open Russia Andrey Pivovarov was sentenced to four years in prison for “directing an undesirable organization.” Pivovarov was arrested in 2021 when security forces removed him from a plane in St. Petersburg immediately before takeoff. Memorial considered Pivovarov a political prisoner.
NGOs engaged in political activities or activities that purportedly “pose a threat to the country” or that received support from U.S. citizens or organizations are subject to suspension under the 2012 “Dima Yakovlev” law, which prohibits NGOs from having members with dual Russian-U.S. citizenship.
In 2021, the Ministry of Justice announced the creation of a further category of “foreign agents” comprising unregistered NGOs or loosely defined “public associations” that purportedly receive funding from foreign sources and are engaged in political activity in Russia. Under the law, individuals and NGOs who meet the criteria of a “foreign agent” are obliged to register or face criminal liability, with penalties of a fine, compulsory labor for up to 480 hours, or up to two years of correctional labor or prison. Under the law the Ministry of Justice may also assign the “foreign agent” status directly to individuals or associations. In 2021, the election monitoring group Golos became the first association to be included in the list of unregistered public associations.
Authorities continued to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism to stifle freedom of association. A 2021 law prohibits members of “extremist” organizations from participating in elections at all levels, municipal, regional, and federal. An organization’s founders and leaders are barred from running for elected office for five years from the date of the organization’s ban, while members and others “involved in its work” are barred for three years. In addition to direct membership, a person may be considered by the courts to be “involved” in the organization if that individual makes a statement of support for the group, including on social media, transfers money to it, or offers any other form of “assistance.” The ban may also be applied retroactively, barring individuals from running for office if they were involved with the group up to three years prior to the extremist designation. Experts and both “systemic opposition” (effectively progovernment) and independent politicians decried the law as politically motivated and unconstitutional, citing the law’s retroactive nature and ability to disenfranchise thousands of individuals as evident violations of the constitution.
In multiple cases authorities arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted civil society activists in political retaliation for their work (see section 1.e.).
There were reports authorities targeted NGOs and activists representing the LGBTQI+ community for retaliation (see section 6).
Authorities misused antiterrorism and antiextremism laws, as well as other measures, to label wrongfully peaceful religious groups and their practices “terrorist,” “extremist,” and “undesirable.” Among those designated without any credible evidence of violent actions or intentions were two foreign-based Church of Scientology organizations, four Protestant groups from Latvia and Ukraine, a regional branch of Falun Gong and seven Falun Gong-associated NGOs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Fayzrakhmani Islamic community, Tablighi Jamaat, followers of the Muslim theologian Said Nursi, and Hizb ut-Tahrir. These designations effectively banned their worship and activities, and members were subject to prolonged imprisonment, harsh detention conditions, house arrest and house raids, discrimination, harassment, and criminal investigation for participating in the activities of a banned organization (see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/).
There were reports civil society activists were beaten or attacked in retaliation for their professional activities and that in most cases law enforcement officials did not adequately investigate the incidents.
e. Protection of Refugees
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported it had a working relationship with the government on asylum, refugee, and stateless persons problems. The Civic Assistance Committee reported, however, that the government failed to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, or other persons of concern. A 2021 law adopted the charter of the International Organization for Migration, which promotes the organized movement of migrants and refugees.
Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. NGOs reported applicants commonly paid informal “facilitation fees” of approximately 33,000 rubles ($445) to General Administration for Migration Issues adjudicators to have their application reviewed. Applicants who did not speak Russian often had to pay for a private interpreter. Human rights organizations noted that nearly all newly arrived asylum seekers in large cities, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, were forced to apply in other regions, allegedly due to full quotas. NGOs also noted difficulty in applying for asylum due to long queues and lack of clear application procedures. The General Administration for Migration Issues approved only a small percentage of applications for refugee status and temporary asylum, with the exception of applications from Ukrainians, who had a much higher chance of approval.
Human rights organizations noted the government’s issuance of refugee and temporary asylum status decreased over the previous few years, pointing to the government’s systematic and arbitrary refusal to grant asylum. NGOs reported authorities encouraged applicants to return to their countries of origin.
Authorities reportedly also had blanket authority to grant temporary asylum to Syrians, but local migration experts noted a decrease in the number of Syrians afforded temporary asylum, suggesting that the General Administration for Migration Issues had not renewed the temporary asylum of hundreds of Syrians and, in some cases, encouraged applicants to return to Syria.
Refoulement: The concept of nonrefoulement is not explicitly stated in the law. The government provided some protection against the expulsion or return of persons to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The responsible agency, the General Administration for Migration Issues, did not maintain a presence at airports or other border points and did not adequately publicize that asylum seekers may request access to the agency. Asylum seekers had to rely on the goodwill of border guards and airline personnel to call immigration officials. Otherwise, they faced immediate deportation to neighboring countries or return to their countries of origin, including in some cases to countries where they may have had reasonable grounds to fear persecution.
Human rights groups continued to allege that authorities made improper use of international agreements that permit them to detain, and possibly repatriate, persons with outstanding arrest warrants from other former Soviet states. This system, enforced by informal ties among senior law enforcement officials of the countries concerned, permitted authorities to detain individuals for up to one month while the Prosecutor General’s Office investigated the nature of the warrants. For example, Belarusian human rights activist Yana Pinchuk was extradited to Belarus in August after he was arrested in St. Petersburg in November 2021 at the request of the Lukashenka regime. The Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Pinchuk as a political prisoner.
Employment: Employers frequently refused to hire applicants who lacked residential registration. UNHCR reported that employers frequently were not familiar with laws permitting employment for refugees and asylum seekers without work permits and refused to hire them. NGOs reported that refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants were vulnerable to exploitation in the form of forced labor because of the lack of proper documents and insufficient Russian language skills.
Access to Basic Services: By law successful temporary asylum seekers and persons whose applications were being processed have the right to work, to receive medical care, and to attend school. The government considered Ukrainian asylum seekers to be separate from asylum seekers from other countries, such as Afghanistan, Georgia, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. NGOs reported authorities provided some services to Ukrainian asylum seekers, but there were instances in which applicants from other countries were denied the same service, including access to medical care and food banks.
While federal law provides for education for all children, regional authorities occasionally denied access to schools to children of temporary asylum and refugee applicants who lacked residential registration or who did not speak Russian. The Civic Assistance Committee reported that approximately one-third of the children of refugees were enrolled in schools. When parents encountered difficulties enrolling their children in school, authorities generally cooperated with UNHCR to resolve the problem.
Temporary Protection: The government also provided temporary protection to individuals who may not qualify as refugees. As of October 3, a total of 93,724 persons held a certificate of temporary asylum in the country. A person who does not satisfy the criteria for refugee status, but who for humanitarian reasons could not be expelled or deported, may receive temporary asylum after submitting a separate application. There were reports, however, of authorities not upholding the principle of temporary protection.