Legal Framework
The constitution provides for freedom of religion on the condition that the practice of a religion does not violate public morality, decency, or public order. A 1964 concordat governs relations between the government and the Holy See and provides for government funding for Catholic Church-run schools. In 2017, the now-dissolved National Constituent Assembly (ANC), considered illegitimate by the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly, the Guaido-led interim government, and much of the international community, passed an antihate law criminalizing acts of incitement to hatred or violence. Individuals who violate the law face 10 to 20 years in prison. The antihate law includes 25 articles stipulating a wide array of directives, restrictions, and penalties, and criminalizes political party activities promoting “fascism, intolerance, or hatred.” It also criminalizes individual acts promoting violence or hatred, the publication or transmission of any messages promoting violence or hatred by any media outlet, and the publication of messages promoting violence or hatred on social media. The law does not make exceptions for religious speech. The criminal code establishes that any actions that impede or disturb the exercise of licit religious ceremonies will be punished with imprisonment from five to 45 days. If the act is accompanied by threats, violence, or assaults, imprisonment increases to 15 months.
The Directorate of Justice and Religion (DJR) in the Maduro-controlled Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace maintains a registry of religious groups, disburses funds to religious organizations, and conducts liaison with religious communities. Each religious group must register with the DJR to acquire legal status as a religious organization. Registration requires the declaration of property belonging to the religious group, identification of any religious authorities working directly for it, and articles of incorporation. Religious groups are required to demonstrate how they will provide social services to their communities and to receive a letter of acceptance from the regime-controlled community council in the neighborhood(s) where the group will work. The ministry reviews applications and may delay approval indefinitely. Religious groups must register any new statutes with the DJR.
The law neither prohibits nor promotes religious education in public schools. An agreement between the CEV and the state allows catechists to teach Catholic and sacramental values in public schools in preparation for First Communion, but the regime does not consistently honor this agreement.
The law provides for Catholic chaplains to minister to the spiritual needs of Catholics serving in the military. There are no known similar provisions for other religious groups.
The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Regime Practices
At times, the regime applied the antihate law that criminalizes political party activities promoting “fascism, intolerance, or hatred” to religious actors. In other instances, the regime targeted religious leaders with the penal code. In May, Carabobo State governor Rafael Lacava from the PSUV party sued Father Alfredo Infante, Superior of the Jesuits in Venezuela and the human rights coordinator of Centro Gumilla, an NGO run by the Society of Jesus in Venezuela, for defamation following the release of PROVEA’s annual human rights report, to which Centro Gumilla contributed information. According to the annual report released on March 14, there were 221 extrajudicial killings in Carabobo in 2021, the highest rate in the country. In a press briefing for the report rollout, Father Infante and PROVEA director Marino Alvarado called for an investigation of the National Police’s role in the extrajudicial killings. In June, Father Infante’s lawyer reached an agreement with pro-Maduro lawmakers, under which the priest publicly clarified that the intention of the report and the activists’ statements was not to accuse Lacava directly or indirectly for the extrajudicial killings, but rather to encourage investigation of the cases so that victims would have access to truth, justice, and effective protection.
The Catholic Church continued to express concerns regarding the political and social state of the country. On February 21, Archbishop Jesus Gonzalez de Zarate, President of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference of Catholic Bishops, issued a statement expressing concern for the growing migration flows due to the economic and humanitarian crisis in the country. On June 15, the Apostolic Administrator of the Archdiocese of Caracas and Metropolitan Archbishop of Merida, Cardinal Baltazar Porras, said during a press interview that the country’s political leadership “does not value Venezuelan society” and “lacks the criteria to generate proposals and seek solutions for the current situation in the country.” The Cardinal noted that contact with citizens was inadequate on the part of both the regime and the opposition. Porras said the church had promoted numerous rapprochement efforts between the political, academic, business, and union sectors, while making clear that the responsibility for seeking solutions and generating proposals ultimately rested with political leaders.
According to a Catholic Church representative, the regime paused or completely stopped funding some Catholic schools, which are typically located in impoverished areas. The representatives described this as part of the regime’s attempt to limit the actions and influence of the church.
Catholic Church representatives also cited difficulties in securing religious visas for priests. They said many international Catholic Church personnel were unable to obtain religious visas and had to enter the country with tourist visas, which require renewal fees that represented a financial burden for the church.
In June, the Washington Post published an article that said that at least half of the priests in the country who were convicted of sexual abuse of children or adolescents from 2001 to 2022 did not serve their full sentences or served no prison time, and that in at least three cases, convicted priests returned to work in churches and continued to exercise their ministry. According to the children’s rights NGO Cecodap, these cases reflected a high level of impunity in the country. On June 19, PSUV vice president Cabello said this was the sole responsibility of the Catholic Church, and the justice system was not to blame.
Some members of the Jewish community again stated the regime and those sympathetic to it, including some regime-affiliated media outlets, used anti-Zionist rhetoric to mask antisemitism, saying they avoided accusations of antisemitism by replacing the word “Jewish” with “Zionist.” For example, on January 27, during a broadcast of his weekly television show in which he showed “wanted” posters of various opposition leaders, PSUV vice president Diosdado Cabello called David Smolanky, OAS Commissioner for the Venezuelan Migrants and Refugee Crisis, a “Zionist” and a “fascist.” Following backlash for his comments, Cabello denied his statements were related to Smolansky’s Jewish roots but instead concerned the “Zionist mafia he represented.”
In August, the regime’s Ministry of Communication and Information released a series of videos calling for the return of an Emtrasur airplane belonging to state-owned airline Conviasa and grounded in Argentina in June by a court order for alleged links to terrorism. In one video, the regime labeled the 1994 terrorist attack in Buenos Aires against the AMIA Jewish Center a “false positive,” suggesting it was not actually a terrorist attack. In response to the video, which was also broadcast on the regime-owned television channel VTV, the Simon Wiesenthal Center issued a statement calling the characterization of the attack an “unspeakable outrage.”
In August, during a podcast interview, Esteban Trapiello, president of regime-linked regional Telearagua television stations and the Aragueña radio station, questioned the “tale” of the Holocaust and expressed a desire to meet Adolf Hitler and ask him why he did not “finish everything he started.” CAIV issued a statement on August 22 condemning Trapiello’s comments as “delusional antisemitism.”
According to the Simon Wiesenthal Center, in February, the cities of Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo, all in Miranda State, issued a “Joint Manifesto against Anti-Semitism,” which included approval of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism. The manifesto also urged Holocaust education in primary schools.
In October, the National Union of Press Workers reported CONATEL ordered the closure of at least four Christian radio stations: Renuevo, Celestial, Jerusalen, and Gilgal Estereo. All four stations were in the opposition-led municipality of Cabimas in Zulia State.
The Maduro regime continued to promote the National Religious Council that it created in 2020. As part of this effort, members of the regime helped organize meetings throughout the year with the Evangelical Christian Movement for Venezuela (MOCEV), a pro-Maduro organization. On January 20, Maduro met with MOCEV in commemoration of “National Pastor Day.”
In March, the regime announced its “Good Pastor” Plan, to begin registering evangelical Protestant churches through the Government Pastoral Councils that the regime expanded in 2019 in cooperation with MOCEV. These nationwide councils are made up of evangelical Protestant pastors designated by local authorities to collaborate with the regime on social projects. Under the Good Pastor Plan, participating pastors would receive a bonus if they registered in the Homeland System, a regime-controlled virtual platform on which many individuals must register to collect their salary and receive economic assistance. On April 21, the ECV issued a statement expressing concern over the “control and inspection” carried out by the regime through the pastoral councils and clarified the councils were not representative of most evangelical Christians in the country. Specifically, the ECV expressed concern that pastoral councils were performing census work, an activity that the ECV said should be limited to government institutions.
A law that the regime’s National Assembly proposed in 2021 requiring NGOs and other nonprofit groups, including religious organizations, to register within a regime-controlled registry to receive financial contributions from abroad did not pass by year’s end.
On July 23, Nicolas Maduro Guerra, Maduro’s son, was appointed vice president of religious issues for the PSUV political party. Representatives from the Catholic Church stated since his appointment, Maduro Guerra did not make significant statements related to religion and said his appointment was limited to the PSUV party.