Countries: Europe
Albania
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Denmark
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Italy
Kosovo
North Macedonia
The Netherlands
Norway
Russia
Serbia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
ALBANIA
Overview: Albania continued its strong support of international counterterrorism efforts in 2018 and its participation in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The terrorism threat in Albania consists of FTFs returning from Iraq and Syria and attempts to radicalize Albanian youth to violence. In December, Albania expelled two Iranian officials, including the Iranian Ambassador to Albania, in response to an Iran-sponsored plot to carry out a terrorist attack in Albania.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Albania in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Albania criminalizes terrorist acts, financing of terrorism, conducting transactions with persons on UN sanctions lists, recruiting and training people to commit terrorist acts, incitement of terrorist acts, and establishing, leading, and participating in terrorist organizations. Albania is sustaining a port security oversight system to more fully comply with requirements under the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.
Albanian law enforcement increased efforts to counter potential terrorist threats. The Albanian State Police Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) worked closely with U.S. agencies to match Albanian government requirements for equipment and training with U.S. expertise and resources. Through participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, the CTU received further training on investigations ranging from the dark web to managing complex terrorism cases. Despite a scarcity of resources, the CTU also participated in several successful interdictions of known or suspected terrorists. The Albanian government has developed, in conjunction with international partners, contingency plans and capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets.
U.S.-funded efforts continued to provide mentorship, assistance, and training to prosecutors, law enforcement officials, financial investigators, intelligence analysts, and judges from Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. These officials work on FTFs and terrorism-related cases through the Balkan Regional Counterterrorism program based in Tirana.
Corruption and barriers to information sharing among government agencies, insufficient intra-agency coordination, and a poorly functioning judicial system continued to hinder Albania’s law enforcement efforts at all levels. Constitutional and legal reforms to the judiciary are underway, beginning with the vetting of Albania’s 800 judges and prosecutors for corruption, proficiency, and ties to organized crime. As of December 2018, the vetting commission and the international monitoring operation had dismissed 30 judges, confirmed 31 new judges, and noted 16 judicial resignations that preempted the vetting process. Additionally, in December, Albania established the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) and the High Judicial Council: bodies that will serve as pillars of an independent, quality judicial system. The HPC enables the creation of the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the election of a Prosecutor General.
Albania is in the process of implementing PISCES, which will enhance Albanian border management and traveler screening, and complement Albania’s broader Total Information Management System to better secure its borders from terrorist entry. Law enforcement services cooperate extensively with INTERPOL and other international law enforcement bodies. Albania is seeking to implement UNSCR 2396 regarding API and PNR data, a process that is ongoing and will improve screening of air passengers entering the country.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Albania is a member of the Council of Europe’s MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body. Albania’s FIU, the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group. Albania’s FIU works proactively to prevent and combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. Albania continued to work with FATF and MONEYVAL to address identified weaknesses in its AML/CFT regime. A July 2018 MONEYVAL evaluation reported that Albania had “low effectiveness” in three immediate outcome areas: confiscation, terrorist finance investigation and prosecution, and proliferation finance sanctions. Albania’s FIU drafted an action plan to address the deficiencies.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Government of Albania established its National CVE Center in January 2018, which is active in coordinating CVE programming among international donors and seeks to ensure all ministries cooperate effectively and avoid duplication of effort. The Albanian cities of Cerrik, Elbasan, Librazhd, and Tirana are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Albania is a member of the Adriatic Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, and the UN. Albanian criminal justice actors participated regularly in various regional associations, conferences, and other counterterrorism information-sharing exchanges.
AUSTRIA
Overview: U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation remained strong. Austria prioritized counterterrorism measures and continued to assess that “Islamist extremism” remains the primary terrorism threat to Austria. Austria’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT) – the key counterterrorism agency within the Ministry of the Interior – reported decreased radicalization to violence by terrorist groups in 2018. Corruption allegations against the BVT led to a parliamentary probe in 2018, which was ongoing at year’s end.
According to a September 2018 study by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Austria ranks second in Europe for the number of FTFs per capita. The BVT estimated the number of Austrian FTFs fighting in Syria and Iraq, or wanting to travel to the conflict zone for terrorist purposes, at 313 between 2014 and 2018. During this period, authorities prevented 59 persons, including 22 women, from leaving the country to travel to conflict zones. Fifty men who had traveled from Austria to Syria and Iraq are presumed dead. The BVT reported that “a handful” of Austrian FTFs are currently in jail in Syria and Iraq. The BVT monitors an estimated 94 persons who returned to Austria, and officials estimate an additional 110 could still return. Overall, the BVT noted that terrorist mobilization substantially declined after 2015.
Austria is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and a member of the Coalition’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Stabilization working groups. Throughout 2018, the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Foreign Affairs increased efforts to counter radicalization to violence and to address the problem of FTFs. Law enforcement agencies focused on intelligence gathering and investigations, as well as sharing information with international partners.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Austria in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Austria has an extensive legal structure to counter terrorism. Relevant statutes criminalize training in terrorist camps abroad and allow wiretapping of individual suspects or small groups with the permission of an independent judge or ombudsman. Specific regulations prohibit the use and distribution of symbols attributable to ISIS or al-Qa’ida. A 2018 amendment also criminalizes the display of symbols related to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Grey Wolves, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Croatian Ustasha, effective January 1, 2019.
Austrian law enforcement and BVT officials routinely cooperated with U.S. law enforcement in a range of investigative areas, including joint, multilateral investigative projects and enforcement operations. Border security forces made effective use of security measures, including biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry and information sharing internally and with other EU countries. Border security officials at ports of entry have discretion when determining which documents and passengers will be subject to screening on arrival.
Austria has taken a whole-of-government approach to implement UNSCRs related to counterterrorism as well as the GCTF’s Good Practices on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.
Austria extended the 2016 implementation of its temporary border checks with its Schengen neighbor countries and continued to deploy more than 800 soldiers at its eastern borders. Regulations allow border authorities to prevent minors from leaving Austria upon suspicion they will participate in fighting activities abroad. Authorities are allowed to withdraw citizenship from an Austrian dual national citizen who voluntarily and actively participates in fighting in a terrorism-related armed conflict.
A legislative amendment passed in September 2018 criminalizes “travel for terrorism purposes” with sentences from six months up to five years in prison, extends domestic jurisdiction over individuals in Austria who committed a crime abroad, and ensures legal counsel for victims of terrorism. The new law is part of Austria’s implementation of the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism and the UN’s International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Austria has rigorous processes in place to register and screen individuals applying for asylum, lawful residence, and citizenship. A 2018 amendment further tightened these processes. The amendment allows authorities to confiscate up to 840 euros from asylum seekers to cover costs related to the asylum proceedings and to analyze their phones and storage devices to obtain data on the routes traveled. Applicants’ fingerprints are checked against the EU’s asylum fingerprint database (Eurodac), and in select cases, against criminal databases as well. Individuals are again screened against national and international law enforcement databases before citizenship is approved.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Austria is a member of the FATF. Austria’s FIU, located in the Federal Criminal Police Office, is a member of the Egmont Group. Austria has a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework for AML/CFT.
Austria criminalizes the financing of terrorism in line with international standards and freezes terrorist assets in accordance with UNSCRs implemented through EU legislation. Austria has a national listing mechanism for terrorist financing, which operates more quickly than the EU mechanism. Money or Value Transfer Services, dealers in precious stones and metals, real estate agents, and exchange houses are monitored and regulated in Austria. The number of terrorist financing cases successfully prosecuted in Austria has increased due to improved monitoring and prosecution capabilities.
Austria implements the collection of know your customer data for wire transfers through implementation of the Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive. This requires identification of clients who want to establish a business relationship with a financial institution or conduct a transaction of 15,000 euros (US $18,300) or more, or where there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.
While Austria has taken measures to require closer monitoring of non-profit organizations (NPOs), they are still not required by law to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs). Consequently, STRs from NPOs are rare.
Countering Violent Extremism: Austria continued its CVE efforts largely in response to the FTF phenomenon. In addition, the Austrian government undertook or continued several other initiatives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in cooperation with the Islamic Faith Community, continued its information campaign in mosques, Islamic organizations, community centers, and prisons. The initiative included education outreach to encourage Austrians to differentiate between Islam and extremism. In an effort to counter radicalization and improve integration in the newly arrived refugee population, the Integration Office within the MFA developed an educational program focused on German language acquisition and education on Austrian values, such as equality and democratic principles. In addition, in 2018 the Austrian government drafted an action plan that seeks to implement terrorist prevention policies laid out in a national strategy. This includes a comprehensive “exit program” for youth who have been radicalized, which Austria claims is thus far unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. The Austrian government maintained a counseling center and a de-radicalization hotline aimed at friends and family members of potential terrorists.
International and Regional Cooperation: Austria is a member of various international and regional security platforms, including the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, OSCE, the Salzburg Forum, and the Central European Initiative. Austria is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and its FTF and Stabilization Working Groups. Austria remained active in the Western Balkans Counter Terrorism Initiative, a platform it initiated in 2015 to help fight terrorism in the Western Balkans.
Austria made the fight against terrorism a key priority of its July-December 2018 EU Council Presidency within its broader goal of “security and border protection.” This was exemplified by a November 2018 conference on terrorism, political Islam, and anti-Semitism held in Washington, DC. Austria’s interior minister led an EU-delegation to discuss terrorism, cybercrime, migration, and narcotics issues with senior U.S. government officials for the U.S.-EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial.
AZERBAIJAN
Overview: In 2018, the Azerbaijani government actively worked to deter, detect, and defeat terrorist efforts to move people, money, and materials across its land and maritime borders and within the South Caucasus. Azerbaijani law enforcement and security services conducted operations to disrupt and prevent terror attacks, arrested and prosecuted suspected terrorists, and prosecuted returning Azerbaijanis suspected of joining or financing terrorist groups fighting outside Azerbaijan.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Azerbaijan in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2018, Azerbaijan passed an amendment to expand law enforcement agencies’ legal authorities to monitor and control financial transaction mechanisms that the government perceives could be used to finance terrorism.
Azerbaijani law enforcement and security services have demonstrated adequate capacity to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism in Azerbaijan’s territory. Responsibility for counterterrorism is vested in several government agencies. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) is Azerbaijan’s primary law enforcement agency, and its Organized Crime Unit is tasked with leading the Ministry’s counterterrorism efforts. In July, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture reported that torture and other forms of physical mistreatment by police and other law enforcement agencies, corruption in the entire law enforcement system, and impunity remained systemic and endemic. The MIA cooperates closely with the State Security Service (SSS), Azerbaijan’s domestic intelligence and counterterrorism service. The SSS is responsible for identifying and preventing criminal activities by terrorist groups and countering international terrorism and transnational crimes. NGOs reported that both the MIA and SSS detained individuals who exercised their rights to fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression.
The Special State Protection Service is a security agency under the Presidential Administration tasked with protecting the Azerbaijani president, visiting foreign heads of state and government, and critical infrastructure and strategic state resources, such as oil and gas pipelines. The State Border Service (SBS) and State Customs Committee jointly manage border security, and interdict terrorist efforts to move people, money, and materials – including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – across Azerbaijan’s land and maritime borders. The SBS is also responsible for defending oil platforms against terrorism. The Prosecutor General’s Office is responsible for prosecuting suspects accused of terrorism, conspiracy to commit terrorism, conspiracy to aid terrorism, and other terrorism-related crimes. The government continued to use terrorism charges against religious activists involved in political activities and others they alleged were religious extremists.
Azerbaijan used terrorist and criminal watchlists and biographic/biometric screening at ports of entry. Azerbaijan’s law enforcement and security services share information among themselves, and with regional and international partners.
In 2018, Azerbaijani law enforcement and security services reported preventing several potential terrorist attacks, including:
- On November 14, the SSS reported that five individuals were killed and more than 60 arrested while resisting the police in operations following the July 3 attack on the former mayor of Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second largest city. Two police officers in subsequent demonstrations were also killed. The government alleged the attacks were part of a Shia “extremist conspiracy,” however human rights defenders claim authorities took advantage of criminal acts that were unrelated to religion to kill and detain religious activists.
- On November 23, according to press reports, the SSS reported the arrest of three individuals – Ilgar Agayev, Sahil Ibrahimov, and Namig Mammadov – suspected of financing terrorists in Syria.
- On December 9, the Baku Grave Crimes Court convicted Emin Guliyev, Asim Bakhishov, and Teyfur Aliverdiyev of fighting for al-Nusrah Front in Syria, and sentenced them to imprisonment of 13 years, nine years, and nine years, respectively.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Azerbaijan is a member of MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body. Azerbaijan’s FIU, the Financial Monitoring Service, is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2018, Azerbaijan continued implementing its “National Action Plan for 2017-2019 on combatting criminally acquired money, legalization of other properties, and financing of terrorism.”
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: Azerbaijan made no significant changes to its CVE efforts in 2018.
International and Regional Cooperation: Azerbaijan maintained membership in the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other international bodies. Azerbaijan supports NATO counterterrorism initiatives as one of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace countries. Azerbaijan participated in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, where Azerbaijan deployed 120 peacekeeping troops, and contributed to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. In June 2018, Azerbaijan hosted the International Contact Group conference to promote peace and security in Afghanistan.
BELGIUM
Overview: Belgium continues to make incremental improvements to counterterrorism-related policy, information-sharing practices, and resource allotments, which have enhanced authorities’ abilities to investigate and prevent terrorist attacks. In June, Belgian authorities arrested two nationals of Iranian descent for their suspected involvement in a planned terrorist attack on a rally organized by an Iranian opposition group outside Paris. In October, Germany extradited an Iranian official to Belgium for his involvement in the same failed terrorist attack outside Paris.
Belgium actively shares threat information with the United States. However, Belgium’s complex, highly decentralized government structure continues to be a challenge for internal information sharing and cooperation. The greatest terrorism threat in Belgium comes from homegrown terrorism, often inspired by ISIS or al-Qa’ida. The large number of Belgian FTFs in Syria and Iraq led to concern about attacks by returned fighters, although fewer have returned than anticipated. Belgium is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and contributed troops and airstrike capabilities to the Defeat-ISIS military campaign.
2018 Terrorist Incidents:
- On May 29, a man on conditional parole stabbed, shot, and killed two Belgian police officers and a bystander in Liege, and wounded four additional police officers before being shot and killed by the police. Belgian authorities assessed that the attacker was a radicalized lone offender inspired by ISIS.
- On June 30, Belgian authorities arrested two Belgian citizens of Iranian descent near Brussels and charged them with “attempt at terrorist murder and preparing a terrorist crime.” The couple was suspected of supporting a planned – albeit foiled – terrorist attack on a rally organized by an Iranian opposition group outside Paris. Belgian authorities extradited two additional individuals involved in the covert plot, including Iranian official Assadollah Assadi, who was arrested in Germany.
- On November 20, a man with a knife attacked and injured a police officer in Brussels. Police shot and arrested the assailant, who was charged with “attempted murder in a terrorist context” and awaits trial.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Belgium amended its criminal code to permit plea bargaining, a potentially useful tool in future terrorism-related prosecutions. In November, Belgian prosecutors negotiated the first plea bargain, albeit in a corruption case unrelated to terrorism. However, Belgium’s comparatively short prison sentences reduce plea bargaining’s potential efficacy. Belgium further amended its criminal code to grant law enforcement the authority to use and task civil informants, including in terrorism-related and organized crime-related investigations. The federal government initiated a working group to develop implementation rules and regulations that could potentially facilitate Belgium’s use of civil informants in 2019.
The primary actors in Belgian law enforcement are the Belgian Federal Police and its multiple counterterrorism units, the Civilian and Military Intelligence Services, Office of the Federal Prosecutor, and the Crisis Center. The interagency Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis expanded its analytic threat assessment role and now maintains Belgium’s database of FTFs, “hate preachers,” and homegrown terrorists. Belgium’s National Security Council also plays a significant role in the intelligence and security structure. Belgium’s complex, highly decentralized government structure presents challenges to internal communication and cooperation between Belgium’s numerous law enforcement and criminal justice entities. Although Belgium is a strong counterterrorism partner to the United States, government-wide resource constraints and weak sentencing guidelines impair Belgium’s ability to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism.
Belgium fully implemented the EU PNR Directive. In January, Belgium established a Passenger Information Unit, which hosts representatives from Belgium’s Ministry of Interior, the federal police, and military and civilian security services. Belgium plans to collect PNR data on land (rail and bus) and sea (ferry) cross-border traffic as well. The Belgian government approved a trial of rail and bus passenger data exchange with the United Kingdom.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Belgium is a member of the FATF. Belgium’s FIU, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financieres, is a member of the Egmont Group.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: Belgium’s federal, regional, and local governments remained engaged in CVE efforts despite ongoing institutional and resource constraints. In April, the federal government approved a proposal requiring mayors to appoint local task forces to address at-risk individuals in their cities suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. The proposal would implement a key recommendation of the Parliamentary Investigative Commission’s final report on the March 22, 2016, Brussels terrorist attacks. In January, Belgium’s State Security Service published brochures on “Salafism and violent extremism” in Belgium.
Antwerp’s law enforcement community created a private-sector engagement program named SHIELD that was modeled after the New York Police Department’s similar “NYPD SHIELD” counterterrorism program.
Prisoners charged or convicted with terrorism-related offenses are transferred to prisons with segregated sections for radicalized inmates, though many become eligible for parole upon completing one- to two-thirds of a typical five-year sentence. Prisoner rehabilitation resources remained minimal. In Flanders and Wallonia, the Flemish regional government and French Linguistic Community government struggled to fill vacancies in departments tasked with carrying out their respective CVE action plans. In December, a hate preacher convicted of recruiting would-be jihadists held a press conference on the day of his release from prison and criticized Belgium’s de-radicalization programs.
In September, Belgian officials from Liege and Verviers hosted a delegation from Chattanooga and Nashville, Tennessee, to exchange best practices on CVE through the City Pair CVE Partnership Program.
The Belgian cities of Antwerp and Vilvoorde are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Belgium participates in EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe’s counterterrorism efforts. Belgium is a member of the advisory board of the UN Counterterrorism Center, and Belgium’s Michèle Coninsx remained Executive Director of the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate in 2018.
Belgium participated in all EU efforts to interdict FTF travel across land and maritime borders, encouraged efforts to strengthen Schengen zone external borders, and maintained a leading role in the European Strategic Communication Network. Belgium is leading EU Member States’ efforts to expand the exchange of PNR data to cross-border rail and bus traffic, including through a trial project with the United Kingdom.
Belgium contributed troops to the EU Training Mission in Mali and led the mission (on a rotating basis) until January 31. Belgium also contributed troops to the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and Belgium’s Major General Jean-Paul Deconinck commanded MINUSMA until October 2.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner and continued to increase its counterterrorism capacity in 2018. Few BiH citizens attempted to travel to foreign battlefields in 2018, although dozens remain in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine. BiH closed some legislative loopholes through amendments to terrorism provisions in its criminal code, although lenient sentencing remained a challenge. Some operational domestic coordination exists, but interpersonal and interagency infighting and stovepiping undermined effective cooperation. Extremist ideology and regional nationalist groups remained potential sources of terrorism in BiH. While little progress was made on rehabilitation and de-radicalization, the BiH Ministry of Security and the Interreligious Council made notable efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. BiH is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, the BiH Parliament adopted amendments to the criminal code to increase the minimum sentence for certain terrorist-related crimes from five to eight years, eliminate the ability of convicted terrorists to pay fines rather than serving time, and prohibit terrorists from securing provisional release (parole). Although the legislation increases the minimum sentence for the recruitment and training of FTFs from five to eight years, judges can still liberally apply mitigating circumstances, which allows them to reduce a five- or eight-year minimum sentence to just one year. Before this amendment, FTFs frequently received sentences below the minimum prescribed by the BiH criminal code, a result of judges taking mitigating circumstances into account. If sentenced to one year or less of incarceration, a convicted terrorist could opt to pay a fine and benefit from release on parole rather than serve time in custody. The May 2018 amendments foreclosed these two routes for convicted terrorists. If a judge finds mitigating factors, a one-year sentence cannot be converted into a fine or parole.
The Ministry of Security also convened a working group to draft further amendments to the criminal code. The draft amendments further align BiH law with EU directives on the suppression of terrorism and introduce three new crimes to the BiH criminal code: traveling and residing abroad for terrorism, misusing information technology or cyber technology for terrorist purposes, and forging documents for the purposes of terrorism. The draft amendments also strengthen an existing criminal code provision on training for terrorist activities. Statewide elections in early October and subsequent government formation make it unlikely that the amendments will be adopted swiftly, but there is political will to continue to strengthen these provisions.
The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) is the lead law enforcement unit performing counterterrorism functions. With approximately 25 officers working on counterterrorism cases, its effectiveness is limited. A 2017 draft law to increase the number of counterterrorism-focused SIPA officers to approximately 50 by upgrading the relevant unit to a department is still pending adoption in parliament. Slow government formation after the October 2018 elections continues to delay the measure’s adoption. SIPA continues to receive training funded by the U.S. Department of State to ensure that key units can effectively investigate terrorism-related crimes.
Law enforcement cooperation continued to suffer from interpersonal and institutional infighting. A BiH Prosecutor’s Office-led task force met only once in 2018. At the operational level, however, law enforcement and prosecutors meet and work jointly on certain cases. However, shortages of counterterrorism investigators and interagency cooperation often led to investigative disruptions.
In March, the Ministry of Security’s signed a Memorandum of Intent to install PISCES at BiH airports and select land border crossings to enhance existing traveler screening processes. The Government of BiH is also considering use of API and PNR data as part of its integrated border management and in line with UNSCR 2396.
BiH continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activity in 2018 through arrests and indictments:
- In April, SIPA arrested Maksim Božić and Edin Hastor in Sarajevo for suspected connections to ISIS. During the search conducted at Hastor’s home, SIPA seized a large cache of weapons, ammunitions, and hand grenades. In July, Božić and Hastor were indicted for allegedly planning terrorist attacks against SIPA and the Ministry of Interior of Tuzla Canton (in northeast BiH).
- In November, SIPA arrested a suspect at Sarajevo Airport on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity. The suspect remained in custody at year’s end. Media outlets report the suspect is connected to the 2011 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.
- In December, sub-state entity Republika Srpska (RS) officials arrested a 48-year old FTF returnee on suspicion of forming and training groups to join a foreign terrorist organization. While this case was initially charged in RS, it is still possible the case will be transferred to the Sarajevo Prosecutor’s Office where terrorism cases have been prosecuted to date.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: BiH is a member of MONEYVAL. BiH’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence Department, is a member of the Egmont Group. BiH completed its FATF Action Plan and in February, was removed from the FATF “grey list,” and will no longer be subject to the FATF’s monitoring under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: In 2018, the main religious communities in BiH (Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, and Orthodox) worked together through the Interreligious Council to promote tolerance and confront acts of bigotry or violence directed at any of these communities. The Interreligious Council also increased its coordination and activities with its 15 regional chapters, with a focus on increasing engagement with women and youth.
The BiH Ministry of Security, led by its coordinator for international and domestic efforts to prevent violent extremism, partnered with the international community on numerous CVE programs in BiH, including a project to create the first CVE referral mechanism, which was made possible through international assistance to the Government of BiH. Working in close partnership with the International Organization for Migration and other international organizations, BiH supported efforts to strengthen resiliencies within identified at-risk communities, developed the capacity of religious leaders and civil society actors to counter expressions of intolerance, and piloted comprehensive community-led intervention procedures at the local and municipal levels.
The BiH cities of Bihać, Bijeljina, Doboj, Jablanica, Prijedor, Srebrenik, and Tuzla Canton – and the municipality of Centar (Sarajevo) – are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: The State Prosecutor’s Office works frequently with counterparts in Serbia and Montenegro, and EU countries such as Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom on counterterrorism investigations. BiH is a member of the UN, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, and the Council of Europe.
BULGARIA
Overview: The Bulgarian government assumed the European Council Presidency in the first half of 2018, during which the country prioritized security, including counterterrorism, CVE, and preventing terrorist radicalization. Bulgaria is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Bulgaria in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Bulgaria prosecutes terrorism under several general provisions of the penal code, which has been amended multiple times since it was first enacted in 1968. The bill defines three levels of terrorist threats and four levels of response readiness. The bill also regulates the role of the military forces in counterterrorism activities and delineates the cooperation between the central and local governments.
The Ministry of the Interior has operational units responsible for deterring, detecting, and responding to terrorist incidents, including the Specialized Unit for Combating Terrorism, Security Police, and Special Police Forces, which successfully completed a multi-year training mission with the U.S. Special Operations Liaison Element. The State Agency for National Security (DANS) has intelligence-gathering units responsible for counterterrorism. DANS also houses the National Counterterrorism Center, which was designed as an interagency body during crisis incidents. Specialized law enforcement units are generally well-equipped and supported with relevant training, but their focus has been primarily on Sofia, while other regional centers lack resources. In 2015, the specialized court for organized crime and its prosecutors’ office received jurisdiction to prosecute and try all terrorist cases in the country. As of November, the court is again hearing the case against two suspected accomplices in Hizballah’s 2012 Burgas airport bombing, following procedural issues that have cause multiple delays in the trial.
After the migrant crisis in 2014-15 and the spate of terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years, Bulgaria tightened its border control rules and began screening all travelers at its border crossings. Within the EU, Bulgaria shares API appearing on the biographical data page of passports. Based on bilateral police cooperation agreements, Bulgaria also shares this type of information with non-EU countries for law enforcement purposes on an as-needed basis. U.S. government agencies continued to work closely with Bulgarian counterparts through a variety of counterterrorism programs aimed at enhancing Bulgaria’s capacity and capabilities. The Department of State partnered with Bulgaria to implement key programs in the areas of border security, aviation security, and interagency cooperation.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Bulgaria is a member of MONEYVAL. Bulgaria’s FIU, Financial Intelligence Directorate of the State Agency for National Security, is a member of the Egmont Group.
Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in 2018.
International and Regional Cooperation: Bulgaria is a member of and active contributor to counterterrorism initiatives at the UN, EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation.
CYPRUS
Overview: The Republic of Cyprus collaborated closely with the United States, the EU, and other countries – bilaterally and multilaterally – in international counterterrorism efforts in 2018. Cyprus’s counterterrorism partnership with the United States included participation in a Department of Justice regional program focused on countering Hizballah, which was funded by the Department of State. The program strengthened Cyprus’s understanding of Hizballah and stressed the importance of interagency cooperation in countering all types of terrorism.
Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus government-controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and the northern third not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus, which is administered by the Turkish Cypriots. The UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus patrols the UN buffer zone, also called “the Green Line,” which separates the two sides. The buffer zone is largely open to civilian traffic and remains a significant route for the illicit transit of people, narcotics, and other contraband.
The division of the island has impeded counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities and between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, which do not maintain diplomatic relations.
The Republic of Cyprus is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Cyprus in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Republic of Cyprus passed but has not fully implemented a law regulating undercover activities by police officers, and it is still determining the details surrounding new training required by the legislation. The House of Representatives has been considering a draft law regulating the use of surveillance of private communications by law enforcement since 2017.
In December, the Republic of Cyprus approved a law pertaining to the EU PNR Directive and continued its preparations for implementation. As of the end of 2018, however, the Republic of Cyprus did not have an API contract and consequently was not receiving API on arrivals from most non-EU states. Cyprus also continued the process to implement EU directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism, which will require amendments to national counterterrorism laws. At the end of 2018, these amendments were pending in the House of Representatives.
Cyprus continued to monitor entry through its airports, seaports, and across the UN buffer zone, but it is unclear how effectively and uniformly watchlist data was employed across all points of entry. Cyprus began using biometric data to screen some travelers at peak travel times at Larnaca and Paphos international airports through the installation of kiosks that collect traveler biometric data and analyze it against watchlist data. The program for the biometric kiosks became permanent after a trial period ended in 2018.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Republic of Cyprus is a member of MONEYVAL and is undergoing a mutual evaluation report by MONEYVAL in 2018-19. The Republic of Cyprus’s FIU, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS), is a member of the Egmont Group.
In 2018, the Republic of Cyprus published its first National Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NRA). Utilizing the World Bank’s money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment tool, the Central Bank of Cyprus and MOKAS engaged relevant stakeholders to produce the NRA, an extensive analysis and self-assessment of the risks and vulnerabilities posed by ML/TF in the Republic of Cyprus. The NRA recommended amendments to the Combating of Terrorism Law of 2010 and the AML/CFT law to incorporate the definition of terrorist financing required by the Fourth EU AML Directive, and highlighted the need for capacity building and training of all reporting entities on terrorist financing techniques, methods, and trends.
In 2018, the Central Bank of Cyprus issued circulars to compliance officers in AML/CFT regulated entities setting out risk-based enhanced due diligence requirements with regard to shell companies/entities and identities of ultimate beneficial owners. As a result, thousands of noncompliant bank accounts and companies have been closed. While many of the closed accounts likely were associated with illicit financial activities, data is not available as to whether any were associated with terrorism.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in Cyprus’s CVE efforts in 2018.
International and Regional Cooperation: There were no changes in 2018.
DENMARK
Overview: The Kingdom of Denmark (which includes the autonomous constituent countries of Greenland and the Faroe Islands) devoted significant assets to counterterrorism programs and CVE initiatives, domestically and abroad. Denmark cooperates closely with the United States, the UN, and the EU on counterterrorism initiatives, including within the GCTF and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
According to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), at least 150 Danish citizens and residents voluntarily left Denmark to fight in Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2012. PET remained concerns that Danish fighters returning to Denmark with terrorist training would seek to radicalize others. According to the PET-administered Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), the primary terrorist threat to Denmark is small, simple attacks perpetrated by radicalized members of the Islamic community. CTA also assesses a limited but increasing threat from other terrorist actors who target Denmark’s asylum centers, religious minorities, and migrants.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: On February 17, Mohamed Abdelkader Salem Al-Tamimi, a Danish citizen of Iraqi descent, attacked a young couple with an ax at a convenience store near Copenhagen. Their injuries were not life-threatening. Police arrested Al-Tamimi after an armed robbery two days later. PET assessed that Al-Tamimi may have been radicalized while serving a series of prison sentences beginning in 2009.
On March 19, four men between the ages of 19 and 23 connected to Kurdish organizations in Syria threw Molotov cocktails at the Turkish Embassy. No injuries were reported and the embassy only suffered cosmetic damage. PET arrested the four men, who now face trial for the most serious form of arson under Danish law.
On September 26, PET arrested three Danish residents of Kurdish origin accused of sending drone equipment to ISIS. In total, at least six people were part of the suspected terrorist cell led by Basil Hassan, a reportedly deceased Danish-Lebanese citizen, who played a crucial role in ISIS’s drone program.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In July, the Danish Parliament passed legislation implementing the revised EU fingerprint database regulations, which allow law enforcement officials to search EU fingerprint databases of asylum seekers. In September, the Danish Directorate for Correctional Services released revised guidelines allowing police greater discretion in controlling the terms of probation for people convicted of terrorism-related offenses. In 2018, Denmark banned seven religious figures, including two U.S. citizens Hamza Sodagar and Khalifah At-Thahabi, from entering the country for two years for being deemed a threat to public order due to their alleged roles in promoting “hate speech.”
Denmark continued to use its 2006 terrorism legislation that allows information sharing between its agencies responsible for counterterrorism and FTFs – the PET and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS). Efforts to counter terrorism are also shared among the Danish National Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Danish security and law enforcement agencies share information through the CTA, which – as the Danish government’s intelligence fusion center – constitutes the focal point for reporting from the Danish National Police, PET, DDIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The Danish police and the Danish defense forces share responsibility for preventing terrorist attacks in Copenhagen and on the borders.
Counterterrorism-related actions by law enforcement included:
- On September 28, Danish intelligence disrupted an Iranian plot to assassinate expatriate leaders of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of al-Ahwaz (ASMLA) living in Denmark.
- On October 30, in a highly publicized news conference, PET Chief Finn Borch Andersen and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anders Samuelsen announced a Norwegian national of Iranian descent was arrested in Sweden in connection with the plot and extradited to Denmark for trial. Denmark later charged three ASMLA members of Iranian origin with violating the Danish law that prohibits condoning terrorism for publicly praising a September terrorist attack on a military parade in Ashvaz, Iran.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Denmark is a member of the FATF. Its FIU, the Money Laundering Secretariat, is a member of the Egmont Group. Denmark has a robust legal framework to combat the financing of terrorism.
In May, Denmark amended its money laundering laws to address a loophole and criminalize “self-laundering,” which Denmark defines as a “crime committed by the person who uses, substitutes or transfers money, goods or other benefits in or to economic, financial, speculative or entrepreneurial activities deriving from a crime committed by himself in order to hide their criminal origin.” In October, Denmark released updated guidance for AML/CFT. In November, the FATF noted that Denmark made significant improvements in 10 out of 12 areas since its 2017 review.
Countering Violent Extremism: In February, Denmark’s National Center for the Prevention of Extremism (National Center) developed a handbook for municipalities to effectively engage civil society actors to prevent radicalization to violence and to develop their own action plans. The National Center also partnered with universities to fund two PhD scholarships and funded the development of university courses on prevention of radicalization to violence. In June, the U.S. Embassy sponsored a CVE-focused TechCamp for at-risk youth in the digital space, focused on countering malign influence, and positively influencing Danish CVE efforts. In August, the National Center, the Media Council for Children and PET began publishing an online magazine helping youth identify terrorist ideology and online propaganda. In September, the National Center launched a mentorship corps with 140 employees from 27 municipalities to prevent violent extremism in their local communities. VINK, Copenhagen City’s anti-radicalization unit, is launching a new project that reaches out to the mosques in the area, offering guidance to congregation members who serve on mosque boards of directors. In November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would spend an additional US $18.2 million to prevent radicalization to violence and terrorism.
International and Regional Cooperation: The Danish government is committed to working within the UN framework, through the EU, and with other international and regional organizations. Denmark actively participates in the GCTF, the Council of Europe, NATO, the OSCE, INTERPOL, the Bern Club, and the European Counterterrorism Center.
FRANCE
Overview: France remained an important counterterrorism partner of the United States in 2018. It is a longstanding and important member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the GCTF. France continued to conduct counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Mali, the Sahel region, and the Lake Chad region.
The terrorist threat in France remained significant, but diminished from its height in 2015. Terrorists inspired by or affiliated with ISIS perpetrated at least two small-scale attacks in 2018. The profile of realized attacks remains consistent with those seen in 2017, which were generally smaller-scale, opportunistic, and perpetrated by solitary local actors with little, if any, direct guidance from established terrorist organizations. Multiple violent incidents shared similarities to terrorist attacks but were determined by French authorities to have no formal connection to terrorism.
French law enforcement and intelligence agencies thwarted at least six attacks in 2018 and arrested multiple individuals on terrorism-related charges. French authorities arrested individuals from racially or ethnically motivated extremist groups and Iran-backed terrorist organizations, in addition to those affiliated with ISIS and other terrorist organizations. The government announced it would create a national counterterrorism prosecutor position and identified the internal security and intelligence agency General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) as the lead agency in all domestic counterterrorism efforts.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: Three small-scale suspected terrorist attacks took place in 2018:
- On March 23, a 25-year-old French citizen born in Morocco killed four and injured 15 in the southern cities of Carcassonne and Trèbes before being shot and killed by gendarmes. After hijacking a car in Carcassonne, the attacker opened fire on police and then drove to Trèbes, where he opened fire in a supermarket, took hostages, and demanded the release of Salah Abdeslam, one of the alleged perpetrators of the November 13, 2015, attacks in Paris. Security forces stormed the supermarket and killed the attacker, who reportedly claimed allegiance to ISIS during the attack. One gendarme was killed in the attack.
- On May 12, a 21-year-old Chechnya-born French citizen stabbed five pedestrians near Opera Garnier in Paris, killing one. Police responding to the attack attempted to subdue the assailant using a stun-gun, but after the device’s failure, shot and killed him. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On December 11, a 29-year-old French citizen armed with a handgun and knife attacked the Strasbourg Christmas market, killing five and injuring 11. The attacker was shot and killed by police in Strasbourg on December 13. The Paris Prosecutor’s counterterrorism office opened an investigation into the attack and an ISIS propaganda outlet described the attacker as one of its “soldiers” shortly after his death.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In July, the French government unveiled a new counterterrorism plan of action to build on previous efforts and address issues related to inter-ministerial coordination, resource allocation, and surveillance of suspected terrorists. The plan identified the DGSI as the lead agency on all domestic counterterrorism efforts and called for the creation of a national counterterrorism prosecutor’s office. Pending legislation would require the office to operational by the end of 2019. The plan also created two new specialized units within the Interior Ministry, one to track terrorist prisoners upon their release from detention and another to identify key factors driving radicalized individuals to act, the latter unit intended to help allocate surveillance resources more efficiently.
The French armed forces continued Operation Sentinelle, a domestic deployment of up to 7,000 soldiers to enhance security at sensitive sites and large events throughout the country. While French officials and many independent observers view it as an effective deterrent, Operation Sentinelle complicates resource allocation challenges faced by a French military active in several overseas theaters. France maintained border controls with its Schengen neighbors in place since November 2015.
Most terrorism-related arrests were made by DGSI and involved individuals and groups suspected of having links to ISIS, but authorities also pursued Iran-backed and racially or ethnically motivated terrorists. On June 30, French and Belgian authorities arrested several individuals – including an Iranian official based in Austria – suspected of planning to attack an event organized by the Mujahedin-e-Khalq in Villepinte. In October, France imposed sanctions on two Iranian operatives and the internal directorate of the Iranian intelligence agency (MOIS) in connection with the covert terrorist plot. Authorities separately arrested 11 people during an October raid of the Iranian government-funded organization Zahra France, which the government suspected of supporting and defending the terrorist organizations Hamas and Hizballah. In June, French security agencies arrested 10 terrorists in Corsica over an alleged plot to attack Muslims. In November, French authorities arrested six individuals who the French government characterized as “ultra-right extremists” for allegedly plotting to attack President Macron.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: France is a member of the FATF and its FIU, Tracfin, is a member of the Egmont Group. On April 25-26, France hosted an international conference to discuss CFT. Over 70 delegations attended the conference. President Macron highlighted France’s CFT priorities, including improved intelligence sharing, greater transparency on financial transactions, better monitoring of charities in order to prevent their abuse by terrorism financiers, and new regulations on financial technology. France continued its efforts to investigate and prosecute the financing of terrorism. In addition to multiple prosecutions of individuals charged with providing financial support to terrorist organizations, the government also indicted French-Swiss construction materials firm Lafarge in June for financing a terrorist enterprise and complicity in crimes against humanity for allegedly making payments to ISIS in order to keep its Jalabiya, Syria, cement plant running in 2013-14.
Countering Violent Extremism: In February, the French government released its “Prevent to Protect” CVE plan, whose 60 measures outline a strategy focused on education, youth engagement, detection, and professionalization and standardization of re-integration programs, particularly for minors returning from Iraq and Syria and for radicalized prisoners. For returned minors, the plan calls for long-term, locally driven counseling and support programs run out of prefectures in coordination with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health. On radicalized prisoners, the government formalized an approach based on a four-month evaluation of prisoners followed either by restricted isolation (for extreme cases) or placement in dedicated units with multidisciplinary counseling (for lower risk cases). The government also decided to expand from Paris to three additional cities a pilot “day center” program to disengage and reintegrate radicalized individuals on probation or recently released from prison.
Bordeaux, Montreuil, Paris, and Sarcelles are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: France is an active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the GCTF. France also plays a strong role on the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qai’da Sanctions Committee. The French government undertook joint counterterrorism operations with several EU partners and played an active role in counterterrorism capacity-building in other countries, particularly in the Sahel region, both bilaterally and through the EU. France has sent technical experts to various EU member states to assist in their implementation of PNR programs pursuant to a 2016 EU directive.
GEORGIA
Overview: In 2018, Georgia, a longstanding member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, continued its robust engagement with the United States across a range of counterterrorism-related issues. The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG), Georgia’s lead agency regarding terrorism-related incidents and investigations, reported a decline of support for ISIS among Georgian citizens in 2018. The SSSG arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced eight individuals for supporting ISIS member Akhmet Chataev, who was killed in a counterterrorism operation in Tbilisi in 2017. The SSSG estimates that approximately 14 Georgian nationals are in Syria or Iraq supporting terrorist groups. In addition to implementing several amendments aimed at strengthening counterterrorism legislation, Georgia established a Permanent Interagency Commission, which is working on Georgia’s national counterterrorism strategy and action plan.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Georgia in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Georgia continued to enhance its counterterrorism legislation in 2018 through amendments to its criminal code, which granted government officials greater authorities for cases with connections to foreign jurisdictions. Under the new amendments, investigators and prosecutors are entitled to interview witnesses remotely or those registered in a foreign state using technical means, obtain computer data under the control of a foreign jurisdiction, and conduct investigations and examinations in a foreign jurisdiction with its agreement.
Georgia is generally capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorism incidents. The SSSG has the lead in handling terrorism-related incidents and investigations, and is generally well equipped and well trained. The SSSG’s Counterterrorism Unit continues to receive regular training and equipment. Recognizing the need for a whole-of-government response to the challenges of terrorism, in September 2018, Georgia established its SSSG-chaired Permanent Interagency Commission, an interagency group responsible for drafting and monitoring the implementation of Georgia’s national counterterrorism strategy and action plan. In 2018, Georgia also carried out exercises to enhance interoperability and cooperation between agencies with counterterrorism-related mandates.
Georgia took steps in 2018 to improve its border, maritime, and aviation security through legislation and infrastructure improvement. In April, Georgia passed Government Decree N174, which enhances the legal procedures related to the development of Georgia’s API and PNR systems, in line with UNSCR 2396. In May, Georgia integrated INTERPOL databases into its national border databases. Throughout 2018, Georgia improved infrastructure on four land border sectors bordering Armenia and Turkey. Georgia’s Border Police installed surveillance and monitoring systems at three land border sectors on its border with Armenia. In October, the United States transferred two Island class patrol boats to Georgia’s Coast Guard, and the Georgian government approved a new statute for the Joint Maritime Operations Center, updating its rules and procedures regarding information exchange. In 2018, Georgia’s Civil Aviation Agency conducted 23 quality control activities, including inspections, audits, and covert tests.
In 2018, Georgia detained, prosecuted, and sentenced several Georgian nationals affiliated with Chechen ISIS member Akhmet Chataev, following his death in a SSSG-led counterterrorism operation in November 2017. SSSG-led operations in Tbilisi and Pankisi Gorge led to the detention of eight individuals. All eight were found guilty of terrorism charges. The SSSG also investigated three cases of false notifications of terrorism, one case of public incitement to terrorism and illegal purchase and storage of firearms and ammunition, and two cases of preparation of an act of terrorism.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Georgia is a member of MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body. Georgia’s FIU, the Financial Monitoring Service (FMS), is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2018, the FMS drafted a new AML/CFT law and submitted it to the government for approval. In addition, in 2018 the Interagency Commission on Implementation of UNSCRs also submitted 15 motions requesting to freeze the assets of 130 individuals and 30 entities and seize the frozen assets of one individual and 19 entities. The Commission also implemented several UNSCRs related to asset freezing, travel bans, and arms embargoes on individuals and legal entities suspected of involvement in terrorism.
The FMS reported that the SSSG launched investigations into two cases of terrorism financing. The National Bank of Georgia carried out on-site inspections of 25 financial institutions to assess the efficiency of risk management processes relating to money laundering and terrorism financing. The Government of Georgia charged six individuals associated with Chechen ISIS member Akhmet Chataev with financing terrorism and/or providing other material support to terrorist activities. Georgia also conducted trainings, seminars, and workshops on AML/CFT involving approximately 120 participants from across the Georgian government.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: In 2018, the Georgian government continued its CVE efforts in vulnerable populations by focusing on initiatives in education, civic and political participation, media and access to information, gender issues, preserving minority culture and identity, justice and law-enforcement activities, and social and regional integration.
In cooperation with the Council of Europe, Georgia implemented the “Reference Framework of Competencies for Democratic Culture” project, which aims in part to prevent radicalization to terrorism in schools. Georgia also held a series of CVE trainings and conferences promoting religious tolerance and antidiscrimination.
In 2018, Georgia developed several initiatives aimed at addressing the perceived underlying drivers of terrorist radicalization in vulnerable communities, including the implementation of small grants programs, under which Georgia issued seven grants in the Pankisi Gorge in 2018. Georgia also received targeted training funded by the Department of State and conducted by the Department of Justice on CVE topics including effective law enforcement techniques, prosecutorial strategies, benefits of community outreach programs, digital investigation and analysis, effective electronic and other covert surveillance techniques, threats emanating from al-Qa’ida, ISIS, ISIS-Yemen, or al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula propaganda, FTFs, battlefield evidence, and returning ISIS fighters.
International and Regional Cooperation: Georgia is actively engaged on counterterrorism issues at the international, regional, and bilateral levels. Georgia also cooperates closely with NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.
In 2018, Georgia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on secure communication lines and a liaison agreement in March with Europol, enabling the use of Europol’s secure channels for communication. Adding to existing agreements with 23 countries and the EU, Georgia also signed agreements on the exchange and mutual protection of classified information with Albania, Moldova, and Italy, and concluded similar agreements with Germany and Belarus.
GERMANY
Overview: Germany continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and the international community as a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the GCTF. Germany continued to process significantly increased numbers of terrorism–related investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. Law enforcement targeted a range of suspects, including Islamist terrorists (the most significant number of cases and the greatest threat, according to German officials). Law enforcement also targeted violent threats and other crimes carried out by racially, ethnically, ideologically, or politically motivated actors (an increasing trend). The government monitored approximately 800 Gefährder (i.e., dangerous persons who have not been accused of crimes but have come to the attention of law enforcement), accelerated deportations of foreign terror suspects, and actively investigated returning FTFs. The “Pact for the Rule of Law” set forth the March 2018 coalition agreement, commits, among other things, to create 15,000 new jobs in federal and state-level law enforcement agencies, and 2,000 new judiciary positions.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: On June 12, police arrested a 42-year-old Tunisian suspected of planning an attack using explosives and ricin. German police subsequently arrested his wife as an accomplice and Tunisian authorities arrested two Tunisian men connected to the plot.
On October 15, a 55-year old Syrian injured four people in an arson attack and hostage-taking at Cologne’s main train station. Federal prosecutors assumed control over the investigation of the suspected terrorist incident, citing “indications of a radical Islamist background.”
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Germany bolstered its counterterrorism tools in 2018 through amendments to the Residence Act and the Alien Act, which increase the maximum time of pre-deportation detention (from four to 10 days) and permit extensions of up to 12 months for persons formally determined to pose potential security threats (Gefährder) and are awaiting travel documents needed for deportation. New legislation allows the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to read and evaluate data from mobile phones belonging to asylum applicants without identity documents in order to confirm their identity. In May 2018, the Federal High Court ruled that overt acts in support of terrorism are required to prosecute spouses or family members of FTFs in Syria and Iraq, and that a spousal relationship with a terrorist or mere participation in family life in the conflict area is insufficient grounds for prosecution.
Counterterrorism investigations are conducted by both federal- and state-level law enforcement agencies, and coordinated through the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center, which comprises 40 internal law enforcement and security agencies. In 2018, new terrorism investigations rose significantly for the second year in a row. Approximately 500 cases opened in previous years were transferred from federal to state prosecutors in 2018, and approximately 500 carryover cases from previous years were dropped. Some counterterrorism cases are offshoots of refugee processing (for example, asylum seekers who claim to be threatened by “Islamist extremists” or falsely claim membership in ISIS or al-Qa’ida in order to increase their chances for asylum, knowing that Germany prohibits deportation to countries that impose the death penalty). Law enforcement agencies significantly increased the number of Gefährder deported in 2018, but federal officials did not supply a figure.
Germany continued to participate in international efforts to enhance border security. It has established the legislation needed to collect and analyze PNR data as required by the EU. Germany continued to participate in multilateral counterterrorism operational efforts in Africa and the Middle East. Through the GCTF, Germany co-sponsored the “Initiative to Counter Unmanned Arial System Threats” with the United States.
Significant law enforcement actions in 2018 included:
- On October 9, German authorities extradited Iranian official Assadollah Assadi to Belgium, following a legal battle in which he unsuccessfully claimed diplomatic status following his June 30 arrest while on what he claimed was personal travel in Germany. Assadi was arrested in Germany pursuant to a European arrest warrant alleging espionage and a covert plot to attack Iranian opposition activists at a rally in France.
- On October 15, over U.S. objections, Germany deported to Morocco Mounir el Motassadeq, a member of the Hamburg-based terrorist cell that supported the logistical planning efforts of 9/11 pilot Mohammed Atta in connection with the 9/11 attacks.
- On May 7, the Constitutional Court re-authorized deportations to Tunisia. While German law forbids deportations when the deportee faces mistreatment in the receiving country, Germany deported Tunisian Sami Aidoudi (suspected former bodyguard of Osama bin Laden) to Tunisia on July 13, citing the country’s long-standing moratorium on enforcing the death penalty. Germany denied an appeal to overturn the deportation on humanitarian grounds on November 31.
Germany continued to examine the December 19, 2016 Christmas Market terror attack. The Bundestag and two state parliaments (North-Rhine Westphalia and Berlin) conducted hearings to evaluate law enforcement’s performance in the case, including law enforcement coordination among different agencies and states, and police practices.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Germany is a member of the FATF and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Germany completed the transfer of its FIU to the Customs Office and hired a new FIU chief in July 2018. The FIU is working to eliminate a backlog of cases and will undergo a regularly scheduled FATF Mutual Evaluation Report in 2020. No new counterterrorism financing legislation was enacted in 2018. Germany remained a strong advocate of the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime.
Countering Violent Extremism: In 2018, Germany maintained funding for existing CVE programs and earmarked a total of US $255 million for programs that target all types of terrorism, including an US $118 million National Prevention Strategy Against Islamist Extremism and special programs concerning returning FTFs and their families. The majority of programs are federally funded, led jointly by the Federal Interior and Family Ministries, and implemented locally through the States and NGOs. The program focuses on local communities, schools, and refugee integration centers; the program gives special attention to prevention and de-radicalization through the internet, refugee integration, and prisons. These programs have mandatory evaluation requirements and local research institutions have begun to engage in CVE-related research.
Augsburg, Berlin, Dresden, and Dusseldorf are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: The United States and Germany are co-leading the GCTF “Initiative to Counter Unmanned Aerial System Threats,” announced in September 2018. Germany hosted the launch event and first regional workshop of the initiative in Berlin in December 2018. Germany remains an active participant in other GCTF initiatives and hosted a regional workshop on a terrorist travel initiative in December 2018.
GREECE
Overview: The Greek government remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner in 2018, and enhanced tools and information exchange to vet undocumented migrants who continue to arrive in significant numbers. Greece passed legislation permitting collection and analysis of PNR data in implementation of European law and international best practices. U.S. and Greek forces participated in a large-scale joint counterterrorism training exercise. There were no major terrorist incidents in Greece in 2018. However, domestic groups carried out intermittent small-scale attacks. Greece is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: Several terrorist incidents occurred in 2018:
- On December 13, a bomb exploded outside private television station SKAI TV in Athens causing extensive damage but no injuries. An anonymous call to a news website provided advance warning and the police evacuated the area before the bomb detonated. The militant group known by the acronym OLA (often called Popular Fighters Group or Group of People’s Fighters) later claimed responsibility for the incident in an online statement.
- On December 27, a small explosive device detonated outside an Athens church, causing minor injuries to a police officer and church employee. A group called the Iconoclastic Sect later claimed responsibility in an online statement that indicated the objective of the explosion was to kill people inside the church.
- Greece also experienced a number of small-scale attacks conducted primarily by domestic anarchists often acting in solidarity with incarcerated terrorists, protesting what they view as corrupt acts by government or private individuals, or opposing foreign policy decisions. Examples of these attacks included exploding incendiary devices targeting academics, firebombing police vehicles and stations while officers were inside, and targeting government buildings and foreign missions.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On November 28, the Greek Parliament approved into law the EU PNR Directive for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime, bringing Greece in line with Visa Waiver Program requirements, European law, and international standards. Greece’s law enforcement and border security officials make use of watch lists, databases, and biometrics to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism. The porous nature of Greece’s borders remained a concern; migrants continued to arrive in Greece, though the number of arrivals has decreased significantly from the peak of the migrant crisis in 2015. Greece’s national identification card remained extremely vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution; it has not incorporated security features, such as a digitized photo and biometrics. The Greek government has committed to address this vulnerability through the introduction of a biometric national identification card in the near future.
Greek authorities took action against terrorists in several high-profile arrests and convictions:
- On January 27, Greek officials detained an Afghan national caught carrying dozens of detonators and charged him with illegal possession of explosives.
- On March 19, a Greek court convicted a 33-year-old Syrian man, who first came to Greece as a refugee in 2016, on murder and explosives charges related to his time with ISIS in Syria.
- On May 8, Hellenic National Police arrested 14 people in a single operation on charges of terrorist financing and money laundering in connection with the 2017 parcel bombings by Konstantinos Giatzoglou, which targeted European institutions and wounded former Prime Minister Lucas Papademos.
- On June 11, a criminal appeals court sentenced convicted terrorist Paula Roupa to life in prison plus 25 years for her leadership role in the April 2014 bomb explosion in front of the Bank of Greece claimed by the terrorist group Revolutionary Struggle. The court found Roupa guilty of a series of charges including forming a terrorist organization and supplying, possession, and use of explosives.
Greek judges and prosecutors are professional, experienced, and well-equipped to confront domestic terrorism. However, Greece is less experienced in the prosecution of international terrorism. Greece has not implemented all aspects of UNSCR 2396 that could help strengthen the legal framework to prosecute FTFs.
Despite objections from the U.S. government and others, Greek officials granted convicted terrorist Dimitris Koufontinas five furloughs from prison in 2018. Koufontinas is serving 11 life sentences plus 25 years for the murder of 11 people and his leadership role in November 17, the terrorist group that targeted and assassinated members of the U.S. Mission to Greece, as well as British and Turkish diplomats, Greek politicians, and Greek citizens. On August 3, prison authorities transferred Koufontinas from Greece’s highest-security prison to an agricultural prison where inmates live in open conditions and participate in farm work resulting in a net reduction of their sentences.
Prison authorities also transferred fellow November 17 member and convicted terrorist Christodoulos Xiros from Greece’s highest-security prison to a lower-security prison on August 6. On December 10, a court of appeals rejected convicted terrorist Savvas Xiros’ request for conditional release from prison for health reasons on the grounds that he should spend 25 years in prison before he is able to apply for conditional release. Xiros is serving five life sentences for his key role in the November 17 terrorist group as a bomb maker.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Greece is a member of FATF and its FIU, the Hellenic Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Commission (HAMLC), is a member of the Egmont Group. Greece is currently undergoing its fourth FATF Mutual Evaluation Review. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit ensured that Greece met its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The HAMLC inspected more than 2,000 suspicious transactions in 2018 but did not report evidence of terrorist financing in Greece. Greece freezes terrorist assets until completion of judicial proceedings and requires banks to report suspicious transactions of any kind, regardless of the type of entity (for- or not-for-profit). The Greek government directly monitors such entities if necessary.
Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in Greece’s CVE efforts since the 2017 report.
International and Regional Cooperation: U.S. and Greek forces collaborated in a large-scale, interagency joint counterterrorism exercise in 2018.
ITALY
Overview: Italy collaborated closely with the United States, the EU, and the UN in its international counterterrorism efforts. Italy is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the GCTF. As part of the Coalition, Italy was the second largest contributor of troops in Iraq, after the United States, heads the Coalition’s police training sub-group, and leads efforts to train Iraqi police and security forces. Italy continued to co-chair the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-Finance working group with the United States and Saudi Arabia. Italy is the fourth largest troop contributor to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and hosts NATO’s Hub for the South.
Domestically, Italy investigated and prosecuted terrorist suspects within its borders, and deported 117 individuals for terrorism-related reasons. Criminal and low-level terrorist acts, such as those involving small IEDs, remained a threat. Italy has identified approximately 100 FTFs that traveled to Iraq or Syria. Italian authorities are concerned about the risk posed by returning fighters, as well as fighters dislodged from areas formerly under ISIS control in Libya who may try to use migrant flows to reach Italy. In addition, Italian officials are concerned fighters from the Western Balkans returning to Europe could also pass through Italian territory, given the significant Balkan origin communities in Italy.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: On October 13, a small IED concealed in an envelope exploded in front of the Lega political party office in Ala, in the province of Trento, ahead of a visit of Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Interior and Lega leader Matteo Salvini. No injuries were reported. Police identified two suspects who were members of an anarchist group.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In November, Parliament passed the so-called “Salvini Decree,” a package of law enforcement and migration measures containing provisions making it easier to strip citizenship from naturalized migrants convicted of terrorism. In addition, the decree requires automobile rental companies to share information on van and truck rentals with police to allow for terrorism-related screening. Italian authorities continue to work with the U.S. government on building Italy’s capacity to screen arriving migrants for known and suspected terrorists. The Italian government continued to make use of 2005 legislation facilitating the detention of terrorist suspects and expedited procedures for expelling non-citizens suspected of endangering national security. In 2018, Italy deported 117 individuals on security grounds, up from 105 in 2017.
Prominent arrests and expulsions in 2018 included the following:
- In January, police deactivated a small IED in front of the Rome office of the political party Brothers of Italy. No suspects were named, but a few weeks later the same office was vandalized and spray-painted with anarchist symbols.
- On April 20, police arrested a Gambian migrant in Naples suspected of preparing an attack. The suspect had reportedly been radicalized to violence in Libya before crossing to Italy by sea. He had been in contact with ISIS supporters, who sent him €1,500 (US $1,705) and instructions on how to execute an attack.
- In May and October, police expelled an Albanian citizen and his sister, both residents in the province of Grosseto, for having engaged in recruitment for ISIS. The two were identified as part of a larger investigation dating from 2015, which led to the arrest of 10 other suspects in Italy and to the identification of a number of FTFs of Italian origin who traveled to Syria.
- On May 10, police arrested in Lombardy and Sardinia 11 Syrian and three Moroccan suspects accused of raising US $2.3 million for al-Nusrah Front in Syria. The funds were mainly generated by profits from migrant smuggling through the Balkans and into Italy.
- On August 17, two Moroccan citizens were expelled for espousing violence and spreading pro-ISIS propaganda. One had recently completed a drug-related sentence in a prison in Calabria where he had become radicalized to violence. Both were deported to Morocco on direct flights, accompanied by police escort.
- On November 2, police expelled a 23-year-old Kosovo citizen who returned to Milan despite having been expelled in 2015 for circulating jihadist propaganda online. His earlier deportation banned him from reentering Italy for 10 years.
- On November 12, police expelled a 29-year-old Tunisian citizen, resident in Ravenna, who had been detained for drug-related charges. During a previous incarceration, he showed signs of radicalization to violence, celebrating the news of the 2016 terror attacks in Brussels and making statements in support of ISIS.
- On November 28, police arrested a Palestinian, Amin al Haj, in Macomer, Sardinia. He was suspected of planning a chemical attack and being member of ISIS. According to press reporting, his cousin Mohamed Hassad told Lebanese police that Amin, who proclaimed loyalty to ISIS, participated in a failed terror attack against the Lebanese army several years ago. In Sardinia, he purchased substances that he intended to use in an attack on the water supply of a local military barracks.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Italy is a member of FATF, and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Italy remained a co-lead of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group, along with the United States and Saudi Arabia.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in Italy’s CVE efforts since the 2017 report.
International and Regional Cooperation: Italy continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including NATO, the OSCE, and the GCTF. In its capacity as 2018 OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Italy hosted a conference on counterterrorism in May entitled “The Reverse Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Challenges for the OSCE Area and Beyond.” At the conference, OSCE subject matter experts exchanged best practices on tracing FTFs and strengthening counterterrorism cooperation. Italy strengthened its counterterrorism capacity building efforts in Libya, focusing on coast guard cooperation, investigative training for law enforcement, and border security measures. In 2018, the Italian military commenced training activities in Niger with local security forces in support of the efforts of Nigerien authorities and G5 Sahel Member States to strengthen border security, counter illicit trafficking, and combat threats to regional security.
KOSOVO
Overview: Kosovo continued to fight the threat of terrorism through close cooperation with the United States. Kosovo is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. More than 400 Kosovar men, women, and children are known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups, of which approximately 70 are deceased. An estimated 130 individuals have returned to Kosovo, while about 200 remain in the conflict zone. In 2018, the Government of Kosovo continued to implement its comprehensive CVE strategy and updated its action plan. In 2018, the government approved its third counterterrorism strategy and action plan for 2018-22.
The security and political situation in northern Kosovo continued to limit the government’s ability to exercise its authority in that region, although the government successfully integrated Serbian judges, prosecutors, and staff into Kosovo’s judicial institutions in October 2017, extending the country’s judicial authority and access to justice for citizens. The NATO Kosovo Force and EU Rule of Law Mission continued to work with the Kosovo Police (KP) to maintain a safe and secure environment and strengthen the rule of law, including at the borders.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Kosovo in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kosovo’s legislative framework is sufficient to prosecute individuals suspected of committing or supporting terrorist activities, but there are challenges in implementation. Kosovo officials recognize the need to improve interagency cooperation.
On November 23, the Kosovo Assembly passed amendments to the criminal code, which include a variety of changes to assist in the fight against terrorism and implement the latest regional conventions and protocols, including the Council of Europe 2017 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism. The amendments cover all aspects of terrorism financing, encompassing the concept of crypto-currencies within the amended definition of funds as they represent digital value. Kosovo introduced two new laws to deal with terrorists who steal or use another person’s identity or use the account information of another person, and terrorists who travel in or out of Kosovo for terrorist activities. The latter will allow Kosovo to prosecute terrorists using Kosovo as a transit point and assist foreign countries in pursuit of terrorists.
The Government of Kosovo strengthened its existing counterterrorism provisions and approved a new counterterrorism strategy for 2018-22. The new counterterrorism strategy provides a comprehensive approach to preventing and combating terrorism and is one of the government’s strategic priorities. On March 30, the Assembly passed the Law on Critical Infrastructure, which aims to identify, preserve, and protect national and European critical infrastructure.
Law enforcement authorities demonstrated adequate capacity to detect and prevent several terrorist plots in Kosovo and abroad. The KP Counterterrorism Directorate (KPCT), which is responsible for counterterrorism investigations, increased their investigative capacities by increasing personnel and developing a cyber-counterterrorism unit. The Department of State supported these efforts through the Antiterrorism Assistance program.
The Kosovo Border Police regularly updated their watchlist of persons suspected of connections to terrorism or criminal activities; they had 33 hits in 2018. Kosovo is dedicated to full implementation of UNSCR 2396.
In June, KPCT arrested five persons suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Western European countries. Another person of Kosovo origin was arrested simultaneously in Germany, based on a Kosovo-issued international arrest warrant, and then extradited to Kosovo. KP units responsible for these actions benefited from significant U.S. capacity-building assistance.
In 2018, trials and investigations continued for 29 suspects and nine cases. Kosovo imams previously arrested on terrorism-related charges were acquitted. Kosovo authorities arrested six additional individuals on terrorism-related charges and courts issued 20 guilty verdicts for terrorism-related criminal offenses. Authorities issued four new indictments on terrorism charges involving 11 individuals.
On July 17, the Pristina Basic Court convicted seven defendants and acquitted one person on terrorism and weapons charges related to their participation in the Syrian conflict as ISIS members. Those convicted received sentences from 28 months to four years imprisonment.
On May 18, the Pristina Basic Court convicted eight defendants for planning an attack in Albania against the Israeli national soccer team and various Kosovo targets in November 2016. Sentences ranged from 18 months to 10 years. On September 17, the Appellate Court reduced the sentence for each defendant.
The Government of Kosovo continued to demonstrate political will to address threats related to terrorism through law enforcement and border security with significant U.S. capacity building assistance. Although national institutions continued to strengthen their capacities, limited resources and experience continue to hinder their ability to handle terrorism cases effectively.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kosovo’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group.
Countering Violent Extremism: Kosovo’s CVE strategy and action plan provides a five-year roadmap for stemming the growing threat of terrorism through a whole-of-government approach, emphasizing the critical role of local stakeholders and civil society. Implementation has been uneven across government ministries and challenges continue due to lack of capacity and inadequate resources. In September, the Kosovo government updated its CVE action plan by adding several new activities on reintegration and rehabilitation.
The Kosovo Justice Ministry continued its implementation of a corrections program aimed at enhancing the management of terrorists in prison, and setting up frameworks for the rehabilitation and eventual reintegration of convicted terrorists. On May 23, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the establishment of a Prevention and Reintegration Division. The aim of this division is to reintegrate individuals who served time in prison on terrorism charges, FTF returnees, and family members.
Kosovo’s CVE strategy includes the preparation and promotion of counter narratives to delegitimize terrorists’ messages. In 2018, the Government of Kosovo began working with Hedayah and Embassy Pristina to develop a national CVE communications strategy.
Kosovo organizations continued cooperative activities through the Country Support Mechanism under GCERF, a public-private global fund to support local, grassroots CVE efforts in at-risk communities.
Ferizaj, Gjakova, Gjilan, Gračanica, Hani i Elezit, Kaçanik, Mitrovica South, Peja, Prishtina, Prizen, Viti, Vushtrri, and Zvečan are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: The Government of Kosovo worked closely with officials in Albania and North Macedonia to support counterterrorism capacity building and cooperation.
NORTH MACEDONIA
Overview: North Macedonia cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and was a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. With no terrorist attacks in 2018 and no reported departures to join ISIS, the main terrorism threat North Macedonia faced consisted of returning FTFs and the potential for radicalization to violence. In March, the government adopted the 2018-22 National Counterterrorism Strategy and a standalone 2018-2022 National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, both accompanied by national action plans.
North Macedonia’s authorities assessed that ISIS members and sympathizers maintained a presence in North Macedonia. The National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (NCCVECT), the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and the Department of Security and Counterintelligence estimated that at least 156 citizens of North Macedonia have traveled to join terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. Of that number, 35 were killed, approximately 38 remain, and 83 returned to North Macedonia. In August, North Macedonia repatriated and detained for investigation seven of its citizens from Syrian Democratic Forces’ custody, becoming one of the first countries to successfully do so and setting an example for the rest of the world to follow.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in North Macedonia in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: North Macedonia’s legislative framework is adequate to prosecute individuals and groups suspected of committing or aiding terrorist activities or participating in foreign wars. On March 6, the government adopted separate national strategies on counterterrorism and CVE, accompanied by respective action plans, which were drafted with U.S. support and input from civil society.
North Macedonian law enforcement’s capacity to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism improved as a result of numerous trainings and the development of operational plans to prevent and respond to possible terrorist attacks. The MOI’s Anti-Terrorism Unit takes the lead in performing counterterrorism functions.
North Macedonia’s criminal justice leaders cooperated with the United States on terrorism-related matters. On December 27, North Macedonia’s Public Prosecution Office filed indictments in court against the seven FTFs repatriated from Syria in August under Articles 394 and 322 of the criminal code, which criminalize membership and participation in a terrorist organization, respectively.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: North Macedonia is a member of MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body. North Macedonia’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence Office (FIO), is a member of the Egmont Group. North Macedonia’s AML/CFT legal framework remains largely in compliance with international standards. In 2018, North Macedonia agreed to join the Group of Seven (G-7) 24/7 Network to combat cybercrime and counterterrorism networks.
In 2018, the Government of North Macedonia continued to address deficiencies noted in MONEYVAL’s 2014 Fourth Round Evaluation Report by drafting a new law on restrictive measures. Following approval in parliament on June 26, the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing harmonized domestic legislation with UNSCR 1373 as well as with FATF recommendations on targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism. The law defined the FIO’s scope of work, as well as the obligations of government authorities and other entities to identify and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, and to conduct a national risk assessment. This law supplemented the criminal code to address terrorism and expanded criminal liability of those who finance terrorist activities or are involved in terrorist offences. As of October, North Macedonia’s FIO received two suspicious transaction reports for terrorist financing. One report was dismissed, and the second report is currently being processed.
Countering Violent Extremism: In March, the government adopted national counterterrorism and CVE strategies and accompanying action plans. The NCCVECT oversees implementation. The number of activities anticipated in the action plans was not sufficiently supported by the NCCVECT’s budget. The Committee therefore heavily relied on the international donor community for funding and program implementation. The Committee focused on CVE prevention and counter-messaging, developing local community resilience, and prison reform. The Department of State supported a Mothers School Program and a regional counter-messaging program that aimed to stem terrorist recruitment online. Additionally, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE implemented a range of CVE projects in North Macedonia.
The municipalities of Aracinovo, Cair (Skopje), Gostivar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Struga, and Tetovo in North Macedonia are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: North Macedonia is a willing international and regional counterterrorism partner. Since the NCCVECT was established in 2017, it has focused on increasing regional cooperation with similar counterterrorism and CVE coordination bodies in neighboring countries. The NCCVECT signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Albania in December 2017 and anticipates signing an MOU with Kosovo to cement counterterrorism and CVE cooperation. North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania also began drafting a trilateral CVE Action Plan, and are working on harmonizing it with the Joint Action Plans for CVE between the Western Balkans Six and the EU, which was signed in October. NCCVECT members actively participated in various regional and international CVE conferences.
THE NETHERLANDS
Overview: The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in the areas of border and transportation security, counterterrorist financing, CVE, and bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Since March 2013, the Dutch national threat level has been “substantial” (the second-highest ranking). The main threat is Islamist terrorism, with risks posed by both networks and lone actors. The Netherlands has a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy in which policies are implemented at the local level through multidisciplinary interagency cooperation.
The Netherlands is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, participates in all Coalition working groups, and is co-chair, with Turkey and Kuwait, of the Coalition’s FTF Working Group. The Netherlands has liaisons embedded at various operational command center, conducted air strikes against terrorist targets in Iraq and Syria, provided force protection, and contributed military personnel and trainers in Iraq. The Netherlands is also a member of the GCTF and co-chairs the GCTF with Morocco.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: On August 31, an Afghan asylum seeker living in Germany stabbed two U.S. citizens at Amsterdam Central Station. Authorities believe the perpetrator did not specifically target the U.S. citizens. Both victims survived the attack. The suspect acted alone and had terrorist intent. The first hearing for the suspect took place on December 11, and he remained in Dutch custody at year’s end.
On May 5, a Syrian asylum seeker stabbed three people in The Hague. All three survived the attack. Dutch law enforcement considers it very likely that the suspect acted with terrorist intent. The suspect has a history as a psychiatric patient. The suspect remained in Dutch custody at year’s end.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Netherlands implemented counterterrorism legislation in line with relevant UNSCRs. Within the EU, the Netherlands continued to push for implementation of the EU’s “Road Map to Improve Information Exchange,” first proposed by the Netherlands during its EU Presidency in 2016. There were no significant changes in law enforcement structures, capacity, international cooperation, or border security legislation in 2018. On May 1, a new Law on the Intelligence Services entered into force. This law governs the authorities and mandates of the Dutch intelligence services. Updates from the previous version of the law include changes to the mandate to intercept online data.
On October 16, various new counterterrorism measures entered into force. The measures include extending the period authorities can hold a terrorist suspect in pre-trial detention, making it easier to draw DNA material from terrorist suspects, making it mandatory for citizens to report terrorist crimes to authorities, and withdrawing voting rights from convicted terrorists.
In support of UNSCR 2396, the Netherlands developed Travel Information Portal (TRIP) software to enable passenger screening, and signed over the intellectual property rights to the UN so that other countries can use it.
Significant law enforcement and judicial actions related to counterterrorism included:
- Following the August 31 attack at Amsterdam Central Station, Dutch authorities cooperated with U.S. agencies. The local government in Amsterdam is developing ways to improve cooperation with embassies from relevant countries during an emergency, including quicker and more complete information sharing.
- During a large, coordinated operation on September 27, authorities arrested seven suspects on suspicion of planning a major terrorist attack in the Netherlands. The group was in the process of acquiring AK-47s, small arms, hand grenades, bomb vests, and precursors for building explosive devices. Upon their arrest, four suspects were allegedly training to attack a major event. At year’s end, one suspect had been released pending the conclusion of the investigation; the others remained in custody.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Netherlands is a member of the FATF and is one of the Cooperating and Supporting Nations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, a FATF-style regional body. The Netherlands’ FIU is a member of the Egmont Group and has the rotating chair for 2017-19. The government effectively enforced terrorist finance laws. At least five persons were arrested in 2018 for financing FTFs in Syria. Their cases remained pending at year’s end.
The Dutch framework for countering the financing of terrorism applies to all EU-designated terrorist organizations and the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime. As of December 2018, the government’s national terrorist watch lists include 135 individuals and three organizations whose assets were frozen.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Netherlands’ 2016-2020 National Counterterrorism Strategy contains measures to strengthen communities, build resilience to terrorist radicalization, and prevent persons from becoming FTFs. The government prioritizes prevention, among other themes, within its strategy. The government uses a local, multi-disciplinary approach for prevention and develops tailored plans of action to intervene with individuals suspected of radicalization.
Community police officers are the cornerstone of the local approach to prevention. Other stakeholders include local governments, with the support of the Office of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, the public prosecutor’s office, social workers, child protective services, educators, and community leaders. This approach prioritizes the use of preventive measures, including mentoring, counseling, and access to job-training programs and other social services. Similar programs also rehabilitate former terrorists. To counter terrorist messaging, local governments use outreach efforts with community and religious leaders to amplify credible voices. Returned FTFs undergo a threat assessment by the government; some returnees are prosecuted.
The Dutch cities of The Hague, Rotterdam, and Utrecht are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: The Netherlands participates in the UN, GCTF, the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and NATO. As co-chair of the GCTF, the Netherlands hosts and has seconded staff to the GCTF Administrative Unit. In 2018, the Netherlands led a GCTF initiative on the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, and with the United States an initiative on returning FTFs and their families. The Netherlands is on the governing board of the three GCTF-inspired institutions: the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (Hedayah), the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), and GCERF. The Netherlands also participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
The Netherlands continued to finance a wide variety of capacity-building projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed regional security coordinators at six embassies who are dedicated to capacity building to identify terrorist radicalization. The Netherlands is an active participant in the Counter Terrorism Group (the intelligence services of all EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland) to improve cooperation and information exchange between European counterterrorism services.
NORWAY
Overview: Norway and the United States maintained good collaboration on counterterrorism. Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) continued to assess that individuals and groups inspired by “extreme Islamist groups” represented the most significant terrorist threat to Norway. Norway saw an increased level of mobilization and recruitment among certain racially or ethnically motivated extremist groups, although they did not conduct any attacks in 2018. An estimated 100 individuals have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight on behalf of ISIS and 30 Norwegian-affiliated FTFs remain in Syria and Iraq. In 2018, no known individuals left Norway to join ISIS. Authorities convicted two Norwegians for providing support to ISIS and participation in ISIS operations.
Norway is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The government co-sponsored UNSCRs 2178 and 2396 and contributed to the Coalition’s five lines of effort, including military personnel support to a capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces in Anbar, Iraq. In 2018, Norway provided approximately US $310 million to address the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Syria.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: Norway reported no terrorist incidents in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Terrorism is a criminal offense in Norway, and it is illegal to conduct or plan to conduct a terrorist attack, receive terrorism-related training, or provide material support to a terrorist organization. In addition, it is a criminal offense to travel or intend to travel to fight on behalf of a terrorist organization. The maximum prison sentence for serious terrorism offenses is 30 years.
Norway continued to prosecute individuals for terrorism-related offenses in 2018. The most significant convictions in 2018 were of two Norwegian citizens found to have been ISIS members and to have fought on behalf of ISIS in Syria. One convicted terrorist received a prison sentence of seven years and three months and the other received six years and six months.
The PST is responsible for domestic security, including counterterrorism activities. The Joint Counter Terrorism Center, a joint analysis cell, includes participants from the PST and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), the external security service. Both PST and NIS have devoted significant resources to identifying, tracking, and taking action against Norwegian citizens intending to travel to and from Syria or Iraq to fight for terrorist groups.
Norway shares fingerprint information in criminal investigations with the EU and the parties to the Prüm Convention. Norway continued to explore an agreement on sharing PNR data with the EU and is simultaneously developing a national PNR system, which remained in the pilot phase at the end of 2018. Immigration to Norway is facilitated and regulated by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, which processes all applications for asylum, visas, family immigration, work and study permits, permanent residence, and travel documents. The Norwegian Immigration Database serves as a central repository for immigration authorities and contains biographic data and facial photos for all applicants for admission. The Norwegian police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issue passports that, since 2005, have contained biometric data accessible for review by border security officials. Norway coordinates with INTERPOL and Europol to enhance its vetting processes and has access to the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System to share and receive information regarding suspected terrorists.
Security measures to protect soft targets in the capital, Oslo, include physical barriers in the streets of one of the city’s main pedestrian thoroughfares and directly outside the neighboring buildings. Police at Oslo’s Gardermoen Airport are now armed on a permanent basis. Norway altered the police training regime to better address the risk of attacks in public places. The National Auditor reported that the government had failed to secure certain elements of public infrastructure sufficiently, such as government and defense facilities, against potential terrorist attacks. The government acknowledged the need for more progress, attributing delays to the complexity of the proposed measures.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Norway is a member of the FATF. Norway’s FIU, which operates within the National Authority for the Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, is a member of the Egmont Group. Norwegian law incorporates FATF standards and recommendations. Norway is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group. The government operates a domestic interagency group, which included the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Countering Violent Extremism: Norway continued to implement its National Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent Extremism, published in 2014, which is a whole-of-government CVE approach. Priorities include strengthening CVE research, improving national and local cooperation on counter-radicalization efforts, promoting the reintegration of former terrorists, and preventing online recruitment and radicalization to violence.
Norway continued to improve coordination among authorities responsible for managing the release from prison and reintegration of those convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Municipalities considered home to populations and individuals most vulnerable to radicalization have created action plans and increased budgets for prevention activities. The national government hosts an annual conference on terrorist radicalization, which in 2018 focused on best practices and collaborative efforts between the police and local governments and agencies in preventing radicalization to violence.
Norway continued to support the Youth Civil Activism Network. Oslo and Kristiansand are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Norway is active in multilateral fora in efforts to counter terrorism, including NATO, the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network, and the OSCE. Norway participated in, and provided financial support to, the GCTF Working Group on Capacity-Building in East Africa, supported INTERPOL’s capacity-building programs on border security and rule of law in North Africa and the Sahel, and funded counter-radicalization programs in prisons in Morocco, Kenya, and Indonesia. Norway continued to support implementation of the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and is co-chair with Jordan of the Group of Friends at the UN on preventing violent extremism. In 2018, Norway hosted the UNDP conference “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism” and announced it will contribute US $1.2 million to the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism for the 2018-21 period, in partnership with UNDP. Norway supports the GCERF.
RUSSIA
Overview: The Russian Federation continued to prioritize counterterrorism efforts in 2018 and remained a target of international terrorist groups, particularly ISIS. Low-level militant terrorist activity remained a problem in Russia’s northern Caucasus region despite increases to counterterrorism activities and political consolidation efforts.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: On August 20, a series of attacks in and around Grozny, the capital of the Russian republic of Chechnya, killed one police officer and injured three other officers and a civilian. ISIS claimed credit for the attacks, which stand out in that the perpetrators split up and struck several targets simultaneously in the Grozny region. The outcome of the attacks is in line with typical terrorist activity in the North Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Additional attacks included:
- On February 19, a terrorist opened fire on worshippers with a hunting rifle before being killed by security forces outside a Christian Orthodox Church in Kizlyar City, Dagestan. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack that left five worshippers dead and five wounded, including two security personnel.
- On May 9, ISIS claimed credit for an attack on a Sufi shrine in Dagestan.
- On May 19, four teenage militants claiming ties to ISIS attempted to storm a church in Grozny, killing one churchgoer and two police officers. Church members blocked the attackers from entering and security forces killed all four in a brief shootout.
- On October 31, a teenager blew himself up at a Federal Security Service (FSB) building in the northern Russian city of Arkhangelsk. Evidence suggests that the bombing was linked to anarchism, which has a long history in Russia but is typically connected to vandalism or arson attacks rather than bombings. The FSB has long been a target of anarchists in Russia for its role in repressing political groups in the country.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Russia increasingly used anti-terrorism legislation against the political opposition, independent media, and certain religious organizations to criminalize the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression or association. For further information, see the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
In May, Russia amended the federal law pertaining to procedures of exit from and entry into the country. If the Russian Interdepartmental Commission on Combating the Financing of Terrorism has frozen funds of a foreign citizen, or the court has suspended operations on a person’s bank accounts, that person may be banned from entering the Russian Federation. Additionally, if a person participates in the financing of terrorism and extremism, that person may be banned from entering the Russian Federation.
On November 8, Russia’s FSB Director General Alexander Bortnikov said that in 2018 the FSB and its international partners identified 70 terrorist cells, 38 of which were affiliated with ISIS, across 24 regions of the country. He stated that Russian law enforcement detained 777 “supporters.” Russian authorities also detected and prevented potential terrorist attacks. For example, from June 14 to July 15, the Russian Federation held the FIFA World Cup in various cities across the western provinces. Despite multitudes of threats in a torrent of online postings from ISIS and lone offenders who may have been mobilized by online propaganda, Russia safeguarded millions of attendees who presented numerous soft target opportunities.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Russia is a member of the FATF and two FATF-style regional bodies: MONEYVAL and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Russia’s FIU, the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) is a member of the Egmont Group.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in 2018.
International and Regional Cooperation: Russia participated in several joint counterterrorism exercises, including the Defenders of Friendship in October with the Egyptian Air Force. In 2018, Russia increased its counterterrorism cooperation efforts with China, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia also promoted the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a forum for international counterterrorism cooperation. Russia is a member of the GCTF and an active participant in several multilateral organizations, including the OSCE, East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. In 2018, Russia proposed an EAS Statement on FTFs that was endorsed in November.
SERBIA
Overview: With no terrorist attacks in 2018 and low levels of ISIS recruitment activities, the main terrorism threats in Serbia remained the potential movement of money and weapons through the region, recruitment and return of FTFs, revitalization of terrorist ideologies, and opportunities for self-radicalization to violence. Serbia has built on its efforts to counter terrorism and continued cooperation with international partners. Serbia is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. However, inexperience as a donor and internal bureaucratic challenges have limited Serbia’s support to the Coalition.
Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Serbia in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In March, Serbia’s Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of State Authorities Combatting Organized Crime, Terrorism and Corruption went into effect. The law mandates that each state body have a liaison officer to assist in criminal investigations and establishes four specialized anti-corruption prosecutorial units and judicial courts. Under the law, the Belgrade Higher Court’s Special Department for Organized Crime hears terrorism-related offenses and the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) prosecutes them. The Appellate Court’s Special Department for Organized Crime hears appeals.
Serbia’s law enforcement capacities need improvement, but are progressing. The Criminal Police Directorate’s Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism (TES) works on terrorism detection, deterrence, and prevention. Serbia’s Operational Working Group consists of TES, the Security Information Agency (BIA), and the Prosecutor’s Office. Soft targets are required to have terrorism contingency plans, with TES officers providing consultation and oversight. In 2018, TES organized a specialized unit devoted to terrorists’ use of the internet and, for the first time, used an online undercover agent in a counterterrorism case.
The Serbian Border Police’s System to Check Persons and Vehicles (SZPLIV) screens passengers and vehicles at all border crossings and other ports of entry. SZPLIV verifies the validity of travel documents through basic indicative security elements, collects biographic and biometric data, checks visa status, searches national and international databases, and stores the information. However, data transmission to the central system can take days. Serbia used U.S. training and equipment to develop its security document screening and fraudulent document detection capabilities.
Serbia’s criminal code outlaws unauthorized participation in a war or armed conflict in a foreign country consistent with UNSCR 2178 and prescribes incarceration from six months to eight years, with penalties increased to 10 years for citizens who organize, train, or fund a foreign armed conflict. Although UNSCR 2396 mandates that member states develop systems to screen PNR data, API and PNR programs are not yet legally authorized in Serbia. Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate is integrating with the European Common Aviation Area and cooperates with international partners to enhance capacities in accordance with UNSCR 2309.
In April, Belgrade High Court’s Special Department for Organized Crime convicted seven individuals of terrorism, recruiting and training others in the commission of terrorist acts, and terrorism financing. OCPO prosecuted the case, which began in 2014. The convicted defendants supported ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front in Syria, recruited others to do so, and sent money to those organizations. Three defendants were convicted in absentia. Their seven individual sentences range from seven years and six months, to 11 years.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Serbia is a member of MONEYVAL and has observer status in the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Serbia’s FIU, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group and participates in international trainings.
Serbia has a National Strategy for the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Funding and existing laws to implement UNSCRs 1267, 1373, 2178, and 2199. In February, the Law on Freezing of Assets with the Aim of Preventing Terrorism went into effect, in accordance with MONEYVAL recommendations and international standards. In April, the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism went into effect, which harmonizes Serbia’s regime with international requirements and standards. However, Serbia has yet to demonstrate effective implementation of these laws, and was placed on FATF’s “grey list” in 2018.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: Serbia is implementing its National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for the Period 2017-2021 and accompanying Action Plan, which seeks to identify early factors leading to radicalization to violence, enhance the security culture of citizens, and intercept threats from social media activities. Serbia has not appointed a national CVE coordinator.
Bujanovac, Novi Pazar, Preševo, and Tutin are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Serbia is engaged in some regional and international cooperation on counterterrorism issues. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Security Information Agency cooperate with INTERPOL and Europol on counterterrorism activities, including watchlists. In 2018, the MOI responded to approximately 20 counterterrorism requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In April, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training held a workshop for OCPO prosecutors, TES investigators, and judges who handle terrorism and terrorism-financing cases. Training focused on counterterrorism and counter terrorism financing investigations, including the use of cyber investigations and U.S. legal assistance. Serbia, a NATO Partnership for Peace member, assisted in NATO training of Iraqi military medical personnel as part of anti-terrorism efforts and routinely participates in international law enforcement training.
Serbia has well-developed bilateral border security cooperation programs with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and a Tri-Border partnership with Bosnia and Croatia. Serbian agencies routinely engage with Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. In March, Serbia ceased all bilateral border security cooperation with Kosovo.
SPAIN
Overview: Spain’s terrorism alert level remained at four (high) on a five-point scale throughout 2018. Spanish authorities continued to arrest individuals suspected of planning terror attacks; facilitating terrorist financing; and engaging in ISIS- and al-Qai’da-related recruitment and radicalization, both online and in their communities. Spanish counterterrorism cooperation with the United States was excellent. Spain maintained its contribution to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, with roughly 500 personnel deployed to Iraq throughout the year for military and police training missions. Spain continued to exercise leadership in regional and global counterterrorism fora, including the GCTF and the 5+5 Defense Initiative. In a significant step forward for counterterrorism information sharing, the Catalonia region’s autonomous police force formally joined the central government’s Intelligence Center for Countering Terrorism and Organized Crime. On May 3, Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) announced its dissolution. ETA observed a unilateral ceasefire beginning in 2011, following a decades-long campaign of violence that claimed more than 800 victims. Spanish officials vowed to continue seeking prosecution for individuals involved in past ETA operations.
Terrorist Incidents: On August 20, a 29-year-old man of Algerian origin brandished a knife in a police station in Cornellàde Llobregat, a town near Barcelona, reportedly shouting “Allahu akbar” before being fatally shot by a police officer. Local authorities described the incident as a terrorist attack because the suspect had reportedly previously accessed ISIS material online. However, a lawyer retained by the assailant’s family denied any terrorist sympathies or affiliation, insisting that his actions reflected a “grave personal crisis” stemming from his recent divorce.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Spain’s criminal code punishes any act of “collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist organization,” including glorification of terrorism on social media, self-radicalization to violence on the internet, training remotely, operating without clear affiliation, or traveling in support of non-state terrorist actors. As of November 2018, Spanish authorities reported that there were 252 individuals detained in Spain on terrorism-related charges.
Significant law enforcement actions related to counterterrorism included:
- On May 8, the Spanish National Police arrested two terror suspects in Murcia and the Basque Country, and Moroccan authorities arrested three individuals allegedly belonging to the same terrorist cell. The five detainees were in contact with ISIS affiliates in Syria, exchanged pro-ISIS messaging online, attempted to recruit others, and incited attacks against Western targets.
- On October 23, Spanish National Police arrested two men in Valencia and Alicante for allegedly disseminating “jihadist” propaganda through social networks, “inciting hate and violence” against Westerners, and spreading images of the Syrian armed conflict. The suspects were Syrian nationals aged 55 and 58 with connections to ISIS and al-Qa’ida. One of the suspects allegedly held a high-profile role in the “information structure” of ISIS, distributing ISIS propaganda via instant messaging.
- On December 3, Spanish National Police arrested a 46-year-old Moroccan national in Valencia for “extremist indoctrination” and “promoting terrorist propaganda.” The suspect allegedly expressed a desire to travel to fight in Syria, had been in contact with al-Nusrah Front, and had been selling narcotics to finance terrorist activities.
- On April 10, three leaders of a Catalonia-based terrorist cell dismantled in April 2015 received 12-year jail sentences, while seven other individuals associated with the cell received eight-year sentences. The Spanish court determined that the cell was formed “with the sole purpose of carrying out the declared principles of Daesh” and sought to encourage Spaniards to travel to Syria and Iraq. The cell allegedly planned to attack emblematic locations in Barcelona and to kidnap and behead an individual. The cell included Moroccan, Spanish, and Brazilian nationals.
- On October 2, the Spanish Ministry of Interior carried out a groundbreaking operation to counter radicalization in prisons, identifying 25 ISIS-affiliated inmates across 17 Spanish jails who were working to radicalize and recruit other inmates to terrorism.
- On December 7, the Council of Ministers approved a proposal for a new law implementing the EU PNR Directive to track suspected terrorists and other travelers of concern.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Spain is a member of the FATF and has observer or cooperating status in the following FATF-style regional bodies: the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Spain maintained funding levels for its FIU, the Executive Service for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses, which is a member of the Egmont Group. Spain is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group. On December 11, Spanish National Police broke up an alleged terrorist financing ring operated by four Syrian nationals incarcerated in Spanish prisons, who used their illicit proceeds from Mediterranean drug trafficking and people smuggling to fund terrorist activities in Syria.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: Spain continued implementation of its national CVE plan, developed in 2015 and led by the Intelligence Center for Countering Terrorism and Organized Crime. It seeks to build partnerships at the local level between civil society leaders from vulnerable communities and representatives of law enforcement and other public services. On October 25, Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska announced that Spain would revise the plan, which “needs an important revamp.”
The Spanish cities of Fuenlabrada and Malaga are both members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Spain is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the GCTF, and supports counterterrorism initiatives in the UN, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE. Spain maintained forces in EU training missions in Mali and Somalia. Spanish officials participated in meetings of the Law Enforcement Coordination Group on disrupting Hizballah’s activities. Spain continues to support the 5+5 Defense Initiative bringing together European (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain) and North African (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) countries to build capacity on counterterrorism, maritime and aviation security, and disaster management. Spain cooperated with regional partners on counterterrorism investigations and arrests. For example, on May 17 Spanish National Police arrested a 27-year-old Moroccan national with a European arrest warrant issued by Germany, and on May 29, authorities in the Basque Country arrested a 21-year-old French escaped criminal flagged on a French watch list for “radicalization.”
SWEDEN
Overview: According to the Swedish Security Services annual assessment in February 2018, Sweden faces “a new normal,” with an estimated 2,000 “Islamist extremists” and 1,000 “white supremacist and leftist violent extremists” present in the country. In 2018, Sweden strengthened its counterterrorism legal framework to improve interdiction, surveillance, and prosecution of terrorists. In September 2018, Sweden ratified the EU’s 2017 Anti-Terrorism Directive and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism; this included 12 legislative amendments to criminal, commercial, immigration, and other statutory codes that entered into effect on September 1, and seven additional proposals that are on the legislative calendar for 2019. At the end of 2018, the national alert level was a three (elevated threat, no evidence of planning) on a scale of five (attack imminent, evidence of planning).
Sweden is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. In addition to being a leader in providing humanitarian support to ISIS-affected communities, Sweden deployed 70 military trainers to Iraq in support of Defeat-ISIS efforts. Sweden is signatory to two bilateral information-sharing arrangements under the Visa Waiver Program.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Sweden in 2018.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: During 2018, amendments to 12 different laws entered into force to implement the EU’s Anti-Terrorism Directive and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The most significant of these amendments were:
- It is now a criminal offense to conduct research or receive training with the intent to commit a terrorist offense.
- The definition of a terrorist offense was updated to include computer hacking connected to terrorism.
- The definition of terrorism-related travel was updated to include terrorist travel to an individual’s own country of citizenship. Previously, persons holding dual citizenship could not be punished for travelling to their own country of citizenship to conduct terrorist activities. The only exception to the new law is for Swedish citizens traveling to Sweden.
- The definition and applicability of terrorism financing was broadened and made more comprehensive. For example, it is now punishable for an individual to fund anything related to terrorism, including financing a person’s education on terrorism-related subjects, such as bomb making or document fraud.
- The jurisdiction of Swedish courts was expanded to cover terrorism-related crimes committed abroad.
The Swedish government increased the Security Service’s budget for countering terrorism threats and persons radicalized to violence by US $20.2 million for 2018, US $23.7 million for 2019, and US $23.7 million for 2020.
On June 7, Stockholm District Court sentenced Rakhmat Akilov, a citizen of Uzbekistan illegally in Sweden after having his asylum request denied, to life in prison following his terrorist truck attack in Stockholm on April 7, 2017, which killed five and injured a dozen more. If he is released from prison early, Akilov will be expelled from Sweden. The court found Akilov guilty of five murders, 119 counts of attempted murder, and 24 counts of causing danger to others. Akilov had expressed sympathy for ISIS before the attack.
Sweden is party to identity verification and border management tools such as API, the Schengen Information System, and the Visa Information System, exchanging information with other Members States on irregular immigration and border control. The EU PNR Directive came into force on August 1, 2018.
Sweden used the “serious threat to public policy or internal security” justification permitted under the Schengen Border Code to unilaterally prolong until February 2019 the temporary border controls first introduced in 2015 in response to the massive influx of asylum seekers.
Sweden implemented UNSCR 2178 to counter FTFs and UNSCR 2309 to improve aviation security, and is undertaking the necessary measures to implement UNSCR 2396 to deter terrorist travel.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Sweden has been a member of FATF since 1990. In order to comply with the EU’s Anti-Terrorism Directive, Sweden’s Parliament broadened the definition and applicability of terrorism financing and made them more comprehensive. For example, it is now punishable for an individual to fund anything related to terrorism, including financing a person’s education on terrorism-related subjects, such as bomb making or document fraud.
Countering Violent Extremism: In January 2018, the government opened a permanent National Center for Preventing Violent Extremism at the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande Rådet or BRÅ for short) under the Ministry of Justice. This CVE Center, which replaced a temporary center that had been located under the Ministry of Culture, is tasked with coordinating efforts among government ministries, local municipalities, and civil society organizations. The new CVE Center provides national-level support, focused risk assessments, and action plans to local municipalities.
Malmo and Stockholm are members of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Sweden is a member of the EU and supports counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the European Commission’s Radicalization Awareness Network, the EU-9 (focusing on FTFs), the Counter-Terrorism Group, the Police Working Group on Terrorism, and Europol.
Sweden continued counterterrorism capacity building projects through development assistance carried out by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and also via funding to the OSCE and UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch. Sweden supported the EU’s work with capacity-building projects in prioritized countries and regions, such as Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. Sweden provided trainers to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Sweden also participates in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan with 25 service members and recently extended the mission through 2019. Sweden is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and made humanitarian contributions to ISIS-impacted populations in Iraq (US $22 million for 2018) in addition to development aid funding to Iraq (US $15 million for 2018). Sweden extended its deployment of 70 military trainers in Iraq in support of Coalition efforts until the end of 2019.
TURKEY
Overview: Turkey continued its efforts to defeat terrorist organizations both inside and outside its borders, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and ISIS. Turkey remained an active contributor in international counterterrorism fora, including the GCTF.
Turkey is a source and transit country for FTFs seeking to join ISIS and other terrorist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. Turkey is an active member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, co-chairs the Defeat-ISIS Coalition FTF Working Group, and continued to provide access to its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. According to public data, as of October 23, Turkey’s “Banned from Entry List” included approximately 70,000 individuals. Turkey deported approximately 6,000 individuals for suspected terrorism ties.
The PKK continued to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkey and against Turkish interests outside of Turkey. Turkey’s security forces conducted operations domestically, along with airstrikes in northern Iraq and operations in Syria. The Ministry of National Defense claimed that, as of November 15, the government had killed, wounded, or captured more than 1,289 PKK terrorists to date in 2018. Detentions and arrests of individuals suspected of aiding the PKK continued in 2018.
According to interior ministry data, law enforcement forces detained more than 11,421 suspects for allegedly aiding and abetting the PKK for the year up to December 10. Two Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilatı, or MIT) officers who were kidnapped in 2017 by the PKK in northern Iraq remained missing at year’s end. As a counterterrorism partner of the United States, Turkey continued to receive U.S. assistance to address the terrorist threat posed by the PKK in 2018. The United States listed three senior PKK leaders under the Rewards for Justice program in November, offering up to US $12 million in exchange for information leading to the three leaders.
In the aftermath of the July 2016 coup attempt, the government labeled the movement of self-exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen as the “Fethullah Terrorist Organization” (FETO). FETO is not a designated terrorist organization in the United States. This resulted in continued detentions and arrests of Turkish citizens as well as foreign citizens resident in Turkey – including U.S. citizens and locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission to Turkey – for alleged FETO or terrorism-related links, often on the basis of scant evidence and minimal due process. According to the Presidency, the government had detained 47,778 individuals by December 11. In addition, the government continued to dismiss military, security, and civil servants from public office in 2018. By year’s end, the government had dismissed or suspended more than 130,000 civil servants from public office, arrested or imprisoned more than 80,000 citizens, and closed more than 1,500 NGOs for alleged FETO links since the 2016 coup attempt.
2018 Terrorist Incidents: Several terrorist incidents occurred in 2018:
- On February 1, three Turkish soldiers were killed and seven wounded by the PKK in cross-border rocket attacks from Iraq into the Turkish province of Hakkari.
- On March 30, six Turkish village guards and one Turkish soldier were killed, and six guards and soldiers injured, in a PKK shooting in Siirt province.
- On July 31, a PKK roadside bomb killed two civilians, including an infant, in Hakkari province.
- On October 4, a PKK bomb killed eight soldiers and wounded two more in Batman province.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Turkey has a broad definition of terrorism that includes crimes against constitutional order and internal and external security of the state, which the government regularly used to criminalize the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and assembly. According to the Ministry of Interior, authorities referred more than 7,000 social media accounts to judicial authorities for alleged terrorist-related propaganda. Turkey has advanced law enforcement capacity to combat terrorism, and efforts continue to streamline interagency information sharing. According to the Presidency, until December 11 the government carried out 1,206 operations against ISIS and arrested 854 suspected ISIS members. Turkey will sometimes deport suspected foreign terrorist fighters without providing advance notice to the destination countries.
Turkey continued construction of security walls along its land borders with Syria and Iran. By October, 91 out of 144 kilometers of walls on the Iranian border and 805 of 828 kilometers of planned walls along the Syrian border had been completed. According to government data, from January to July, Turkish security forces apprehended more than 127,776 irregular migrants attempting to illegally cross Turkey’s borders.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Turkey is a member of the FATF, and its FIU, the Financial Crimes Investigation Board, is a member of the Egmont Group. There have been no significant changes to the country’s counterterrorism financing regime since 2016. FATF will complete a new full assessment of Turkey’s counter terrorist financing regime in 2019.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Turkish National Police (TNP) undertakes social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers. Programs prepare medical, community, and religious officials to intervene to undermine terrorist messaging and to prevent recruitment. The Ministry of Justice implements some rehabilitation and reintegration programs for convicts and former criminals.
Turkey’s Religious Affairs Presidency (Diyanet), which reports to the Presidency following a governmental reorganization, reports that it works to undermine terrorist messaging by promoting its inclusive version of Islam. All Sunni imams in Turkey officially must be employees of the Diyanet.
Turkey hosted the third Regional Coordination Conference for Counter-Terrorism and Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism in South East Europe in December.
The city of Antalya is a member of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Turkey is a member of the UN, NATO, the Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe, and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-chairs, with Kuwait and the Netherlands, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition FTF Working Group. Turkey regularly participates in GCTF meetings and initiatives. Turkey also contributes to the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, a GCTF-inspired institution, and provides expert support to assist training for judges and prosecutors handling terrorism cases. Turkey participates in the OSCE expert meetings on the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism organized by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Secretariat.
Turkey has bilateral security cooperation agreements with more than 70 countries. The TNP contributes to counterterrorism capacity-building programs of partner countries and offers specialized international law enforcement training in a variety of sectors, including counterterrorism.
UNITED KINGDOM
Overview: The United Kingdom remains one of the strongest and most able U.S. partners in the global fight against terrorism, and cooperation with the United Kingdom on efforts to counter terrorism is excellent. The UK suffered no major terrorist attacks in 2018, though the country’s counterterrorism posture continues to be heavily influenced by the five major attacks in 2017. Throughout 2018, the terrorism threat level in the United Kingdom has been at the second-highest rating (severe), which means UK officials believe that an attack is highly likely. UK officials categorize Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to national security, though both policy and operational officials say there is a rising threat from racially or ethnically motivated extremists. Since March 2017, police and security services have disrupted 13 Islamist and four racially or ethnically motivated plots.
In June 2018, the United Kingdom released its updated counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was its first update since 2011. While the new CONTEST is currently cost-neutral, the document highlights new and ongoing pilot projects, including:
- Three multi-agency centers to review dormant terrorism investigations and support local-level interventions, as warranted.
- Expanding public-private partnerships to better protect economic infrastructure.
- Expanding the Desistance and Disengagement Programme, for individuals who are already engaging in terrorist related activity, with the aim of reintegrating them safely back into society.
- Enhancing the ability at the border to target individuals and goods of concern, including better data and analytics.
- Enhancing capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives material and their precursors, and to control and safeguard these materials.
The threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism within Northern Ireland, set separately for Northern Ireland and Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland), remains severe. In October 2018, the four-member Independent Reporting Commission published the first of four annual reports assessing that paramilitarism remains “a stark reality of life” in Northern Ireland and noted that the “absence of political decision making” since the collapse of Northern Ireland’s devolved government in January 2017 has had a “major adverse impact” on efforts to end paramilitarism.
As a partner in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the United Kingdom continued to contribute to stabilization efforts in Iraq and northeastern Syria. The United Kingdom is also working with regional partners to develop border infrastructure, watchlists, and biometric capabilities to counter FTF movement. The United Kingdom reports that approximately 900 individuals traveled from the United Kingdom to engage in the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Of these, approximately 20 percent are believed dead, 40 percent have returned to the United Kingdom, and 40 percent remain in the conflict zone or unaccounted for.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Accompanying CONTEST, the UK government introduced the Counterterrorism and Border Security Bill 2018, which was debated throughout the second half of 2018 and is expected to pass in 2019.
The United Kingdom structures counterterrorism policing efforts around a network of regional counterterrorism units and counterterrorism intelligence units comprised of MI5 and regional police forces such as the Metropolitan Police. Counterterrorism efforts are managed through National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, which is responsible for unified counterterrorism policy and strategy. The central operational command for regional counterterrorism units is the National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Center, which consists of specialized teams responsible for all ports, intelligence, and operational coordination. According to Home Office figures, the United Kingdom made 351 arrests for terrorism-related activity from January through June 2018. While senior officials cite this as a 22 percent drop from the previous year, the Metropolitan police do not assess this as a diminishing threat level, and say there are approximately 700 active investigations, involving about 3,000 individuals. From June 2017 through June 2018, the United Kingdom convicted 90 people of terrorism-related offenses, and currently have over 200 people in custody on allegations of the same types of offenses.
The United Kingdom has advanced biometric screening capabilities at some points of entry, and utilizes biometrics for vetting during the visa process and identity verification; some ports of entry, such as ferry ports, have no biometric screening. All major airports in the United Kingdom use e-gate technology for passengers presenting UK, EU, European Economic Area, or Swiss passports, and the United Kingdom has announced plans to expand to include all Five Eyes travelers (Australia, Canada, United States, and New Zealand). E-gate incorporates facial recognition technology to match travelers with data recorded in the e-chip of eligible passports.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The United Kingdom is a member of the FATF and has observer or cooperating status in the following FATF-style regional bodies: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG); the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG); and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). The UK FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. The UK 2018 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report found that they are “highly effective” in the terrorist financing elements of the assessment.
In May, the UK Parliament passed the 2018 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act. Under the Act, the government can impose sanctions, for the purposes of furthering the prevention of terrorism, on a person or group if there are reasonable grounds to suspect they have been involved in a terrorist activity. The United Kingdom shares terrorist financing information between the financial sector, law enforcement, and regulators through the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Task Force. The United Kingdom implements the EU Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The EU Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive entered into force in July 2018, with a transposition deadline during January 2020.
The United Kingdom actively prosecutes those involved in terrorist financing. Since 2001, at least 70 individuals have been charged under “fundraising”-related sections of the Terrorism Act 2000, and of those, at least 32 individuals were convicted. Additionally, individuals suspected (but not charged) of funding terrorism were convicted of related offenses, such as training for terrorism, fraud, and money laundering.
The United Kingdom complies with its obligations under the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime. As of June 2018, the United Kingdom had US $89,334 of terrorist assets frozen under EU Regulation 881/2002, which implements the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime, and an additional US $11,482 frozen under the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010.
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
Countering Violent Extremism: In January 2018, the Home Secretary appointed former campaigner and charity leader Sara Khan to lead the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE), a non-statutory expert committee of the Home Office. The CCE operates independently from CONTEST (which covers integration policy) and covers the UK Counter Extremist Strategy. The CCE is currently conducting a broad study of “Far Right and Islamist extremism” and its deep impact on individuals, communities, and wider British society.
Regarding the Strong Cities Network, Luton joined Birmingham and London as members in 2018, with Manchester, Leeds, Leicester, and Cardiff in the process of joining. During 2017-18, 67 city-level officials and civil society partners from London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Luton participated in exchange programs with U.S. counterparts in Los Angeles, Denver, Boston, Seattle, and Portland, sharing lessons learned and best practice for preventing identity-based violence, safeguarding vulnerable populations, and building social cohesion and community resilience to terrorist radicalization.
International and Regional Cooperation: The United Kingdom continued to strongly support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, as well as through the GCTF and an international task force assisting countries develop CVE plans. In September 2018, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia announced a joint GCTF initiative to develop a toolkit on preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism online, and hosted the launch event of a GCTF initiative on returning families of FTFs.