Additional Details on FY 2003 Performance Results - Strategic Goal 1: Regional Stability

FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003
Report

Performance Goal 1: Close Ties with Allies and Friends

Initiative/Program #1: Enhanced and Expanded Euro-Atlantic Relationship.

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #1: STATUS OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings

1. Resolution of questions regarding ESDP, including participation of non-EU countries.

1. To enhance NATO's military capabilities in line with NATO Prague Summit agenda: "New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships.

1. Agreement reached with Allies to reform NATO's command structure. European partners committed themselves to boosting European capabilities. NATO Response Force in process of development.

On Target
2. Maintain NATO's Open Door policy through MAP and other engagement with aspirants. 2. To enlarge NATO in line with NATO Prague Summit agenda: "New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships. 2. Seven new members invited to join Alliance. Ratifications by Allies on track to welcome new members by May 2004. On Target
3. Continued progress on the NRC to broaden cooperation on specific projects. 3. To increase cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and outreach to Partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia in line with NATO Prague Summit agenda: "New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships. 3. Progress made on NATO-Russia projects, including military to military cooperation. Retooling Partnership for Peace to better meet the needs of the Central Asia/Caucasus partners. NATO-Ukraine Action Plan launched in which Ukraine, with NATO's assistance, agreed to undertake necessary reforms. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revisions: The goals for the transatlantic relations are now encapsulated within the context of the follow up to NATO's Prague Summit agenda: "new capabilities, new members, new relationships."
  • Data Reliability: Data is based on Mission and embassy reporting.
  • Data Validation: In most instances, data validity established through clear targets established at NATO ministerial and summits.
  • Partners: OSD, NSC, JCS.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #2: IMPLEMENTATION OF ADAPTED CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Russia fulfills all Istanbul commitments (troop withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova), allowing for U.S. ratification and entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty. N/A
  • The situation in Moldova, which had been improving earlier in 2003, then stalled at mid-year, is now again proceeding toward resolution; however, the trains moving ammunition and equipment out of Moldova are running only on a modest schedule.
  • Russia will not meet the December 31, 2003, deadline to withdraw forces from Moldova.
  • Progress on Georgia has been stalled for most of 2003, though there are now indications that Georgia and Russia will meet soon to resume discussions on implementing the commitment on Georgia.
  • Russia remains in compliance with Adapted CFE Treaty Flank Limits.
Significantly Below Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Significant Performance Target Shortfall: Russia has not made the difficult political decisions necessary to fulfill its commitments regarding Georgia and Moldova.
  • Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance: The U.S. and NATO will continue to maintain pressure on Russia to do so. The U.S. will increase the level of pressure on Russia by making this a topic for senior exchanges.
  • Data Reliability: Information regarding Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova and the status of negotiations regarding Russian withdrawal comes directly from the countries involved and is reliable. In the final analysis, determination of whether Russia has or has not met its Istanbul commitments is a political decision.
  • Data Validation: The U.S. and its NATO allies have made Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments a precondition for ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Therefore, it is directly relevant to keep track of progress regarding Russian withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova.

 

Initiative/Program #2: Regional Stability in East Asia and the Pacific

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #3: STATUS OF U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Complete Phase II of Joint Study on Future of U.S.-South Korean alliance. Complete Joint Study of Phase II Military CBMs and Arms Control Measures. Complete Joint Study of North Korea's WMD. Begin reconfiguration of U.S. Forces in South Korea; Negotiations on the future of U.S.-South Korean alliance. Talks between the U.S. and ROK on the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) produced a timetable and division of costs for the reconfiguration of U.S. Forces in Korea during 2004 - 2008. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revision: There was some discussion of the U.S. and ROK working on CBMs with North Korea, but these proposals were never fully developed. Reconfiguration of U.S. forces in Korea is a much better measure of the closeness of the U.S-South Korean Relationship.
  • Data Reliability: Data is based on Embassy and FOTA reporting.
  • Data Validation: While the ROK is still hesitant with U.S. plans, the Koreans are moving forward with cooperation on reconfiguration plans.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #4: STATUS OF CHINESE COOPERATION ON REGIONAL STABILITY
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
China increases diplomatic efforts to urge India and Pakistan to resolve differences peacefully. China increases dialogue with United States on North Korea and urges North Korea to reform and to remove sources of tension. China increases coordination on security issues related to the Korean Peninsula and South Asia with the United States and the international community. China discussed its bilateral border disputes with South Asian officials. China played a crucial role in facilitating multilateral talks with North Korea on maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revision: This revision expands China's coordination on security issues to the international community rather than limiting it to specific geographic regions.
  • Data Reliability: Data is based on Embassy reporting.
  • Data Validation: Demonstrates that Chinese are moving forward with cooperation of regional security issues.
  • Partners: OSD, NSC.

Performance Goal 2: Resolution of Regional Conflicts

Initiative/Program #3: Conflict Management and Resolution

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #1: NUMBER OF AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICTS RESOLVED
AND PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS CONCLUDED
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. One conflict resolved (Burundi). 1. N/A

1. Conflicts Resolved:

  • Democratic Republic of Congo: Large-scale conflict resolved with inauguration of a transitional Government of National Unity in July 2003.
  • Burundi: Conflict partially resolved, fighting continues. Ceasefire reached with the largest rebel group, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD); implementation negotiations ongoing at year-end; prospects fair for agreement in FY 2004.
  • Liberia: The Liberian civil war deteriorated starting in May 2003. Peace talks began in Ghana in June 2003 and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in August. The U.S. provided nearly $26 million in logistics support to enable the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeeping forces.
On Target
2. One peace support mission withdrawn (Angola). 2. N/A 2. Peace Support Missions Concluded: Angola: One peace support mission withdrawn. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Validation: In most instances, data are quantifiable and clearly illustrate progress to date.
  • Partners: UN and specialized agencies, USAID, The African Union, regional states, NGOs, and interested European allies.

 

Initiative/Program #4: Indo-Pakistani Relations / Kashmir

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #2: STATUS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA ON KASHMIR
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Infiltration is substantially reduced; number of terrorist attacks declines significantly from 2000-2002 average. 1. N/A 1. Infiltration continued throughout the year. Slightly Below Target
2. Militant training camps and related infrastructures in Pakistan are substantially dismantled. 2. N/A 2. Militant training camps and related infrastructures in Pakistan were not substantially disbanded although some were deactivated for periods over the summer. Militant groups in Pakistan have been and remain proscribed. Slightly Below Target
3. Military forces on both sides return to pre-crisis locations and readiness levels. 3. N/A 3. Military forces on both sides returned to pre-crisis locations and readiness levels. Slightly Below Target
4. India resumes dialogue with Pakistan. 4. India and Pakistan resume diplomatic contact. 4. India and Pakistan renewed diplomatic contact. Indian PM Vajpayee launched a major new peace initiative in April, which Pakistani PM Jamali welcomed. India and Pakistan returned High Commissioners, restored some transportation links, and engaged in numerous people to people - including legislative - exchange. However, official talks have not yet started. Slightly Below Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target #4 Revision: India and Pakistan have embarked on a gradual normalization of relations, beginning with renewed diplomatic contact.
  • Data Reliability: Infiltration of militants across the Line of Control is difficult to detect and extremely difficult to quantify, although trends are detectable. Figures for violent deaths in Kashmir are easier to obtain, but can be misleading because they do not account for which side initiated combat, which side prevailed, or whether the deaths were militant, army or civilian.
  • Data Validation: Cross-border infiltration is a serious source of tension between India and Pakistan; tracking its variations is essential to reducing tension between the two countries.

 

Initiative/Program #5: Peacekeeping Participation

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #3: NUMBER OF U.S. PKO-TRAINED COUNTRIES
THAT PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL PKO
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Twenty N/A Twenty-eight Significantly Above Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Exceeding Performance Target: From 2001 to the present there has been a significant global increase in the demand for peacekeepers, not only for new and existing UN-sponsored missions, but for non-UN international peace support operations sponsored by coalitions and lead-nations. In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. provided PKO training to more new countries than had been anticipated when this performance target was first established, and countries provided with assistance were more actively sought out to participate in the range of operations on-going.
  • Data Reliability: Fiscal documents and files maintained by State and OSD/DSCA are accountable, accurate and subject to audit. UN documents and files reflecting countries' participation in peacekeeping operations are a matter of public record.
  • Data Validation: 28 of the 29 countries that have received EIPC funding have participated in international peacekeeping operations since receiving funding. In addition to being a reflection of the global impact that a small amount of resources carefully targeted can achieve, this is a means by which the pool of quality force contributions is increased, offering greater latitude to the UN and U.S., when seeking participants in global peacekeeping operations.
  • Partners: State coordinates closely with OSD/DSCA as well as with the UN. OSD is able to provide critical information with regard to a country's capability to absorb EIPC-funded training as well as its military readiness to participate in peacekeeping operations. Many countries that have benefited from EIPC training provide troops to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.

 

Initiative/Program #6: Restrict Advanced Conventional Weapons Transfers

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #4: EFFECTIVENESS OF WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT (WA) CONTROL LISTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Prompt reporting of arms transfers on the WAIS. Reporting of denials of arms transfers, and notification before undercutting a previous dual-use denial. Have 122 states participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers. Sharing of "best practices" papers on effective export control practices within the WA. N/A Within WA control lists, certain categories of weapons are being expanded, some widely available (and thus uncontrollable); dual-use items were dropped, and MANPADS has made considerable progress with energetic cooperation from Russia, the UK, and other countries. Over the past ten years, the value of shipments of conventional weapons to state sponsors of terrorism has fallen by nine-tenths, and illicit shipments to other destinations have fallen also. Tools include bilateral demarches and intelligence liaison, strengthening of norms in the Wassenaar Arrangement and other international fora, sanctions, law enforcement, and (potentially) direct interdiction. Results have been better than expected, especially since Iraq is no longer importing conventional weapons. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: Data reported by member states through Wassenaar is reliable, but often late and highly aggregated, limiting usefulness. Intelligence information by its nature is fragmentary and varies widely in credibility. Only occasionally can data be validated, such as by capturing weapons or finding documents, as happened in Iraq.
  • Partners: Intelligence Community, DoD, Commerce, Customs, FBI.