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Strategic Goal 10: Humanitarian Response - Performance Results for Performance Goal 1

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FY 2005 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
November 2005
Report

VII. Performance Results

 

PERFORMANCE GOAL 1

EFFECTIVE PROTECTION, ASSISTANCE, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES,
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, AND CONFLICT VICTIMS

 

INITIATIVE/PROGRAM (I/P) #1: REFUGEE ASSISTANCE


Indicator #1: Crude Mortality Rates (CMR)
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): The crude mortality rate is the mortality rate from all causes of death for a defined population. It is an accepted indicator of the extent to which the international community is meeting minimum standards of care (see www.sphereproject.org) and by extension the overall impact and performance of the international relief system (www.smartindicators.org). Criteria developed by UNHCR and the Sphere Project establish regional CMR thresholds for emergency response based on long-term CMR data in these areas.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target Complex humanitarian emergencies do not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people/day. Support efforts to improve data collection, e.g., expand pilot data collection effort to other countries and partner organizations, and to take other measures to address any problems of excess mortality.
Results
  1. Where data are available, CMR does not exceed regional emergency thresholds in over 98% of targeted refugee sites. In FY 2005, CMR was reported above the regional emergency threshold in four sites (three in Chad and one in Kenya) out of over 225 refugee camps and settlements worldwide. There has been a decline in CMR among Sudanese refugees from Darfur, although it remains an issue of concern in selected sites in Chad.
  2. The Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) is operational and contains data on mortality, nutritional status, morbidity and vaccination coverage for sixteen pilot countries. It is expanding data coverage and improving its online interface.
Rating On Target
Impact The Department's contributions to international humanitarian efforts saved refugee lives, as indicated by CMR below emergency thresholds. In a few cases, CMR exceeded emergency thresholds. In complex humanitarian crises, this is typically due to high rates of malnutrition, outbreaks of disease, and in some cases, insecurity in refugee camps and settlements. In some Sudanese refugee camps in Chad, for example, severe acute malnutrition (including Kwashiorkor) and outbreaks of Hepatitis E caused deaths at a rate that exceeded acceptable levels. In these cases, the Department will target funding and programming to address these major causes of death and bolster health and nutrition services.
Performance Data Data Source Reports from Complex Emergencies Database, WHO, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), WFP, UNHCR, and non-governmental organizations. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) program officers in Washington and refugee coordinators in the field collect data from these sources.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The Department actively monitors Crude Mortality Rates reported by UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other international and non-governmental organizations. Refugee coordinators and program specialists monitor performance in the field and through regular consultations with partners in Washington and Geneva. The Complex Emergencies Database provides accessible, high quality data in an increasing number of countries, as well as information regarding the methodology, accuracy and reliability of the data reported.
Past
Performance		 2004 In June 2004, CMR exceeded 2/10,000/day among Sudanese refugees in Chad. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters has created an online Complex Emergencies Database to track data on CMR and nutritional status.
2003 Available data from partners and refugee coordinators shows that CMR did not exceed 1/10,000 people/day in refugee populations targeted by PRM.
2002 Where data were available, refugee crisis did not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people/day. State/PRM and USAID developed tools and conducted a training workshop to measure and track CMR and under-five child nutritional status under the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions initiative.

 

Indicator #2: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 Years of Age
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): Nutritional status is a basic indicator for assessing the severity of humanitarian crisis, together with Crude Mortality Rate. In emergencies, weight loss among children 6-59 months is used as a proxy indicator for the general health and well being of the entire community. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) is the term used to include all malnourished children whether they have moderate wasting, severe wasting or edema, or some combination of these conditions. GAM is defined as weight-for-height ratios that are less than 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of less than -2), or less than 80% median weight-for-height, or the presence of nutritional edema. (See www.sphereproject.org)
FY 2005
Performance		 Target In complex humanitarian emergencies, less than 10 percent of children under five suffer from global acute malnutrition.
Results In 7% of targeted sites (16 sites out of over 225 refugee camps and settlements worldwide), more than 10% of children under age five suffered from global acute malnutrition. During FY 2005, GAM rates exceeded 10 percent in eleven camps in Chad, seven camps in Ethiopia, and one camp in the Central African Republic. For example, GAM rates among Sudanese refugees in Chad have declined since FY 2004; however, they remain at serious levels (around 15%), according to May 2005 surveys. The Department is working with UNHCR and other international and nongovernmental organizations to ensure that less than 10% of children under age five suffer from global acute malnutrition in refugee camps.
Rating Below Target
Impact Elevated rates of GAM directly contribute to increased rates of morbidity and mortality in children under five years of age. Malnutrition may also threaten refugee protection in terms of camp security, vulnerability to exploitation, and in extreme cases, involuntary return.
Reason for Shortfall
  1. Inadequate resources for the World Food Program's (WFP) refugee feeding operations frequently result in reduced food rations or pipeline breaks.
  2. Malnutrition may be endemic in refugee hosting communities, where food security, water, sanitation and health conditions are poor; an influx of refugees may strain existing coping mechanisms and resources.
  3. The natural/environmental conditions of refugee sites may pose logistical challenges to relief agencies in providing food and other basic services (as in Chad).
Steps to Improve
  1. Work with WFP, UNHCR, and non-governmental partners to develop an urgent and coordinated emergency response to reduce GAM to below 10 percent in all refugee sites.
  2. Prioritize funding therapeutic and supplementary feeding, as well as other health and nutrition programs in refugee sites where GAM exceeds acceptable levels.
  3. Address urgent food pipeline breaks through cash contributions to WFP's refugee operations.
  4. Work with other donors to increase support to WFP and address the global food shortfall.
  5. Work with host governments and development actors to improve food security over the long-term.
Performance Data Data Source Reports from CE-DAT, WHO, UNOCHA, WFP, UNHCR, and nongovernmental organizations.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 CE-DAT provides information regarding the methodology, accuracy and reliability of the data reported. PRM routinely monitors the nutrition surveillance and feeding programs of international and non-governmental organizations through refugee coordinators in the field and specialists based in Washington and Geneva.
Past
Performance		 2004 In 8% of targeted sites (20 sites out of over 225 refugee camps and settlements worldwide), more than 10% of children under age five suffered from global acute malnutrition. For example, in June 2004, surveys conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that 36-39% of children under age five, among Sudanese refugees in Chad, suffered from global acute malnutrition. The Department and USAID continued supporting new tools/measures to improve data collection and reporting on nutritional status.
2003

Baseline:

  1. In humanitarian crises where Department funds were provided, at least 90% of children under age five had weight-for-height ratios that were greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to ?2), or greater than 80 percent median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema.
  2. Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya was one exception where slightly less than 90% of children under age five had weight-for-height ratios that were greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to ?2), or greater than 80 percent median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema. An anthropometric survey of Kakuma camp by the International Rescue Committee in January 2003 found that 12.5 percent of Somali Bantu children and 14.3 percent of other children under age five suffered from acute malnutrition.
  3. PRM and USAID continued to support the development of tools and measures to improve data collection and reporting on nutritional status.
2002 N/A

 

I/P #2: PROTECTION


Indicator #3: Percentage of Partners Receiving Funding That Have Adopted a Code of Conduct That Contains All of the
Internationally Accepted "Common Elements" To Protect Against Exploitation of Beneficiaries
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): Adoption of standard codes of conduct for protection represents partners' commitment to eradicate exploitation, and can help spur awareness of protection issues among all staff. The U.S. Government believes that implementing codes of conduct is an important step toward promoting a universal protection mandate for refugees and vulnerable populations.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target 100% of all overseas partners have instituted codes of conduct, 100% have developed awareness training, 100% have implemented reporting and follow-up mechanisms, and 90% of investigations are launched within 60 days of a case report of exploitation.
Results 100% of all overseas partners have instituted codes of conduct, 100% have developed awareness training, 100% have implemented reporting and follow up mechanisms and corrective actions are taken in response to case reports.
Rating On Target
Impact Humanitarian partner organizations improve institutional efforts to prevent and respond to exploitation. Protection of refugees and other vulnerable populations is improved as the threat of exploitation in humanitarian operations is reduced.
Performance Data Data Source Codes of Conduct and reporting on anti-exploitation mechanisms submitted to PRM by NGO partners and shared by international organizations.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 PRM tracks codes of conduct and their implementation by partner organizations through monitoring at headquarters and in the field.
Past
Performance		 2004 All of PRM's NGO partners operating overseas are required to sign codes of conduct in order to receive funding. All international organizations have adopted the Inter Agency Standing Committee common elements in developing codes of conduct.
2003 All of PRM's NGO partners operating overseas are required to sign codes of conduct in order to receive funding. All international organizations have adopted the Inter Agency Standing Committee common elements in developing codes of conduct.
2002 PRM did not have monitoring mechanisms in place in FY 2002. This indicator was established to take effect in FY 2003.

 

I/P #3: REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE U.S.
(PART PROGRAM)


Indicator #4: Refugees Resettled in the U.S., as a Percentage of the CeilingRead Footnote 11
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): This indicator measures the effectiveness of the refugee admissions program overall. To the extent that the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) has control of the process, it also measures PRM's performance in managing the program.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target 100% of the regionally allocated ceiling of 50,000 refugees. This number is set by the President for each fiscal year.
Results 107% of the regionally allocated ceiling of 50,000 refugees (53,813) have been resettled to the U.S. as of September 30, 2005.
Rating Above Target
Impact Refugees and their families achieved a durable solution and started new lives in communities across the United States.
Performance Data Data Source The Department's Refugee Processing Center collects data on refugee arrivals in the U.S.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The Department's Refugee Processing Center collects, records, and analyzes data on refugee admissions to the United States using the Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).
Past
Performance		 2004 106%. 52,868 refugees were resettled in the U.S., surpassing the allocated ceiling of 50,000.
2003 Out of a ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 28,422 (or 41%) were resettled.
2002 Out of an allocated ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 27,113 were resettled. This number was significantly affected by developments since the events of 9/11.
1 The ceiling is established by Presidential determination each year through consultations with voluntary agencies, Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services. (back to text)

 

Indicator #5: Square meters of Land Cleared in U.S. Program Countries
(PART PROGRAM)
NOTE: This indicator has been deleted. Please see Appendix for details.

 

I/P #4: HUMANITARIAN DEMINING


Indicator #6: Countries Reaching Sustainment of End State/Cumulative Budget Authority
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): The Department oversees bilateral humanitarian mine action programs worldwide by supporting national programs through strategic planning, capacity development, mine action training, victim's assistance and mine risk education. This indicator captures the total level of national programs that have been assisted and graduated to either self-sustainment or attainment of mine impact-free status compared against the total mine action budget of the U.S. Department of State Humanitarian Mine Action program.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target
  1. 15 countries/$442 million.
  2. Measure: 3.4 .

This target has been revised. Please see Appendix for details.

Results
  1. 16 countries/$442 million.
  2. Measure: 3.6.
Rating Above Target
Impact Accelerates strategic objective to graduate mine-affected countries to either self-sustainment or attainment of mine impact-free status.
Performance Data Data Source Department reporting from nation-partners, implementing partners, and U.S. Embassies of the successful completion of host-nation strategic and national objectives.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The Department of State oversees humanitarian mine action programs worldwide and works with national partners and implementing partners to track levels of self-sustainment and the attainment of mine impact-free status.
Past
Performance		 2004
  1. 14 countries/$373 million.
  2. Measure: 3.8.
2003
  1. 12 countries/$328 million.
  2. Measure: 3.7.
2002
  1. 9 countries/$258 million.
  2. Measure: 3.4.

 

 

Burundi Repatriation

Photo showing Burundi refugee women loading luggage onto transport trucks in preparation for a convoy to depart for their home country, May 2005.The Department continues to support the voluntary repatriation of Burundi refugees, who fled to surrounding countries during sporadic violence over the past 35 years. More than 250,000 Burundi refugees have returned since the UN's voluntary repatriation program started from Tanzania in March 2002, and the UN plans to help another 50,000 more return before the end of 2005. Repatriation assistance includes transport from refugee camps to refugees' home villages, as well as three months of food rations, and basic supplies like plastic sheeting, buckets, pots, tools, and soap. Some 238,000 Burundi refugees remain in Tanzanian camps.

Burundi refugee women load luggage onto transport trucks in preparation for a convoy to depart for their home country, May 2005. State Department Photo

 

I/P #5: WORLD FOOD PROGRAM DONOR BASE


Indicator #7: Percentage of Non-U.S. Donors to the World Food Program (WFP)
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): The effectiveness of multilateral organizations can be compromised by over-reliance on contributions from a single donor. More contributors and greater contributions from existing contributors are needed to keep WFP's crisis response capacity at its current level. WFP operates on a calendar year, while the U.S. Government operates on a fiscal year.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target
  1. WFP has sufficient funds to carry out its work, with contributions from many donor countries and the private sector.
  2. Number of donors to WFP increased by three, and non-U.S. contributions increased to more than 50% of total.
Results As of September 26, 2005, there were four new donors: Azerbaijan, Liechtenstein, Namibia, and Trinidad and Tobago. As of September 26, 2005, WFP had received $2.08 billion in contributions, of which $934 million were from the United States. Non-U.S. Government contributions were 55% of total contributions.
Rating Above Target
Impact Contributions to WFP enable it to provide both emergency and development food aid to people in need.
Performance Data Data Source Documents prepared by WFP for the Executive Board's annual session and available on WFP's website.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The performance indicator can be easily tracked and verified through WFP's accounting, which is available to the Department.
Past
Performance		 2004 As of October 4, 2004, there were seven new donors: Madagascar, Guatemala, Ecuador, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. As of October 4, 2004, WFP had received $1.562 billion in contributions, of which $718 million were from the United States. Non-U.S. Government contributions were 54% of total contributions.
2003 As of September 22, 2003, WFP had nine new donors: Cameroon, El Salvador, Greece, Kuwait, Malta, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Russia, and Vietnam. As of September 22, 2003, non-U.S. Government contributions to WFP totaled $877 million, compared to $871 million as of December 31, 2002 (an increase of 0.7%).
2002 Baseline: Of the $1.8 billion, U.S. contributions were 52% and non-U.S. Government contributions were 48%.

 

Humanitarian Mine Actions

Photo showing U.S Ambassador William Wood watching two soldiers test mine detectors donated by the U.S. Government during a ceremony in Bogota, Colombia, October, 2004.In FY 2005, approximately 22 mine-affected countries in the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program received assistance to clear land and infrastructure of dangerous mines. This assistance helped restore food production, livelihoods, key transportation corridors, and most importantly, a sense of public safety. These countries also witnessed the safe return of tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. In many countries, mine action also served as a vital tool of engagement, supporting peace-building initiatives and demonstrating U.S. resolve to protect victims of conflict. In 2005, thousands of victims of landmines and other war-associated injuries continued to regain their ability to participate in social and economic activities as a result of physical rehabilitation and other forms of assistance in many countries, including Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

U.S Ambassador William Wood watches two soldiers test mine detectors donated by the U.S. Government during a ceremony in Bogota, Colombia, October, 2004. AP/Wide World Photo

 

I/P #6: PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY


Indicator #8: Percentage of International Organization and NGO Partners That Take Corrective Action
Within One Year of Receiving "Critical Recommendations" in Financial Audits
Indicator revised. Please see Appendix for details.
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): Financial transparency is essential to ensuring responsible programming and effective oversight.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target 95% of PRM's overseas partners have taken corrective action in response to any "critical recommendations" in financial audits conducted of their organizations.
Results 95% of PRM's overseas partners have taken corrective action in response to any "critical recommendations" in financial audits conducted of their organizations.
Rating On Target
Impact Partner organizations demonstrate a commitment to accountability and to improving their financial performance on behalf of beneficiaries and taxpayers. The U.S. Government has confidence that its resources for humanitarian response are being used wisely and responsibly.
Performance Data Data Source Financial audit reports of the Department's partner organizations.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 Periodic external audits are conducted on all PRM's NGO and non-UN international partners (e.g., ICRC and IOM). Data on states, local governments, and non-profit organizations comes from OMB A-133 audits. UN organizations are audited by the UN Board of Auditors.
Past
Performance		 2004 95% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any "critical recommendations" in financial audits conducted of their organizations.
2003 95% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any "critical recommendations" in financial audits conducted of their organizations.
2002 N/A

 

UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
(PART PROGRAM EFFICIENCY MEASURE)


Indicator #9: Ratio of Total Value of Non-Expendable Items Procured by Headquarters in One Year to Total Value of
Recorded Non-Expendable Property Procured by Headquarters in that Year (Inventory Control)
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): This indicator measures the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) efficiency of tracking procurements through implementation of its Management Systems Renewal Project (MSRP).
FY 2005
Performance		 Target Tracking items procured at headquarters, the ratio is 1.5:1.
Results Continuing its 2004 performance, UNHCR is on track to achieve its 2005 target; final results will be available after the close of the calendar year.
Rating On Target
Impact Equipment and supplies (e.g., computers, telecommunications equipment, office supplies) essential for UNHCR's humanitarian response are procured efficiently, increasing the timeliness and performance of response efforts, and generating cost savings that allow greater resources to be spent directly on refugee programs.
Performance Data Data Source UNHCR calendar year financial statements.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The Department monitors UNHCR's implementation of the Management Systems Renewal Project and tracks its results (including efficiency) as part of the U.S. Government-UNHCR Framework for Cooperation.
Past
Performance		 2004 1.5:1 (Ratio A:B, where A=$2.3m and B=$1.5m).
2003 1.8:1 (Ratio A:B, where A=$38.7m and B=$21.8m).
2002 2.4:1 (Ratio A:B, where A=$36.2m and B=$14.8m).

 

REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE U.S.
(PART PROGRAM EFFICIENCY MEASURE)


Indicator #10: Total Average Cost per Refugee Arrival in the U.S.
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): This indicator measures the efficiency of the U.S. Refugee Program overall. Declining per capita costs reflect the Department's efforts to manage the program effectively and in the interests of U.S. taxpayers.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target $3,700.
Results $3,568.
Rating On Target
Impact Relevant U.S. Government agencies and partner organizations used available resources efficiently to maximize benefits to refugees.
Performance Data Data Source The Department tracks program costs; the Department's Refugee Processing Center collects data on refugee arrivals in the U.S.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 The Bureau's Admissions Office and Comptroller track financial reports from implementing partners. Partners are audited in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 to verify compliance with U.S. Government requirements.
Past
Performance		 2004 $3,500.
2003 $4,428.
2002 Baseline: $4,445 per refugee in the U.S.

 

A Look to History: Humanitarian Response

Photo showing civilian war refugees from occupied Europe at Fort Ontario, Oswego, NY., August 5, 1944.In 1975, a Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs was established with a small staff in the Deputy Secretary of State's office. By 1977, the function was upgraded to the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs , an office that grew in stature and influence under the Carter Administration. On March 5, 1977, President Carter nominated Patricia M. Derian to be Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. Overall, the bureau improved policy coordination on humanitarian issues such as human rights, refugees, and prisoners of war.

Civilian war refugees from occupied Europe are shown at Fort Ontario, Oswego, NY., August 5, 1944. AP Photo

 

HUMANITARIAN MIGRANTS TO ISRAEL
(PART PROGRAM EFFICIENCY MEASURE)


Indicator #11: Reduction in Time Migrants from the Former Soviet Union Stay at Absorption Centers, Thereby Reducing Cost
JUSTIFICATION (VALIDATION): Humanitarian migrants leave absorption centers when able to secure permanent housing. Leaving absorption centers reflects their ability to make this critical step toward achieving self-sufficiency and integration into Israeli society. Reduction in the amount of time spent in absorption centers represents efficiency in reaching this goal.
FY 2005
Performance		 Target 2% reduction in average cost .
Target Average Cost: $6,123.
Results The United Israel Appeal reports on a calendar year basis; its report for 2005 is pending.
Rating On Target
Impact Humanitarian Migrants from the former Soviet Union secure housing and take steps to become self-sufficient in a timely way, resulting in time and cost savings. The United Israel Appeal demonstrates program efficiency.
Performance Data Data Source Reports from the United Israel Appeal, as well as reporting from the Department's staff monitoring visits.
Data Quality
(Verification)		 Grant-specific site visits are conducted at least once a year by PRM/Washington staff. PRM's refugee coordinator in Amman also conducts site visits.
Past
Performance		 2004 467 days or $6,248 (a 25% reduction).
2003 Baseline: Average stay is 601 days or $8,041.
2002 N/A

 

Indicator #12: Countries Reaching Sustainment of End State/Cumulative Budget Authority
NOTE: This indicator has been combined with Indicator #6 in this section (I/P #5). Please see Appendix for details.

 

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