

The seal of the U.S. Department of State is centered in the background. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. The eagle's chest is covered by a shield with a blue chief and red and white stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The seal is encircled by a blue ring with the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

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Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (ISN/CPI)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

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This Brief is Classified: UNCLASSIFIED



Role of Interdiction...

- Interdictions are:
 - Consistent with national laws and international legal frameworks.
 - Information driven—focused on suspect shipments—not random checks.
 - Broadly defined—diplomatic, military, customs, industry outreach.
 - Frequently involve dual-use equipment.
 - Limited in participation (typically 1-4 countries).

Goal is to impede or stop individual shipments that leak through export and border controls.



...Impact on Global Security


- Stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, & related items to/from states & non-state actors of proliferation concern.
- Send a strong message about the willingness and ability of PSI participating states to act against WMD proliferation.
- Make proliferation more costly, difficult, and uncertain for the proliferators.
- Combat covert proliferation behavior and networks.
- Build partner nation capacity to interdict.



President Bush and Polish President Kwaśniewski
(Krakow, Poland May 2003)



PSI Endorsers



Operational Experts Group

- Argentina
- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Italy
- Japan
- The Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Republic of Korea
- Russia
- Singapore
- Spain
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States



Exercises and Activities

PSI Gaming Exercises

- Sep 04: *Maritime* (US)
- Oct 05: *Air/Maritime* (Norway)
- Jun 07: *Air/Maritime/Ground* (US)

Western Hemisphere

- Nov 04: *Chokepoint* (US)
- Sep 07: *Panamax* (Panama)
- Aug 08: *Panamax* (Panama)
- Sep 09: *Panamax* (Panama)
- Aug 11: *Panamax* (Suffolk)

Europe

- Apr 04: *Safe Border* (Poland)
- Mar 04: *Hawkeye* (Germany)
- Jun 05: *Bohemian Guard* (Pol, CZ)
- Jun 05: *Blue Action* (Spain)
- Jun 06: *Hades* (France)
- Apr 07: *Smart Raven* (Lithuania)
- Apr 06: *Top Port* (Netherlands)
- Sep 06: *Amber Sunrise* (Poland)
- May 07: *Adriatic Gate* (Slovenia)
- Oct 07: *Eastern Shield* (Ukraine)
- Apr 08: *Phoenix Express* (US)

Arabian Gulf

- Oct 06: *Leading Edge* (US)
- Jan 10: *Leading Edge* (UAE)
- TBD 13: *Leading Edge* (UAE)

Mediterranean & Africa

- Oct 03: *Sanso* (Spain)
- Nov 03: *Asilac* (France)
- Apr 04: *Clever Sentinel* (Italy)
- May 05: *Ninfa* (Portugal)
- Mar 08: *Guistir* (Djibouti)
- May 08: *Adriatic Shield* (Croatia)
- Oct 03: *Air CPX TTX* (UK)
- Feb 04: *Air Brake* (Italy)
- Jun 04: *Aspe* (France)
- May 06: *Anatolian Sun* (Turkey)
- May 09: *Phoenix Express* (US)
- May 12: *Phoenix Express* (US)

Pacific

- Sep 03: *Pacific Protector* (Australia)
- Oct 04: *Team Samurai* (Japan)
- Aug 05: *Deep Sabre* (Singapore)
- Apr 06: *Pacific Protector* (Australia)
- Mar 07: *Pacific Shield* (Japan)
- Sep 08: *Maru* (New Zealand)
- Oct 09: *Deep Sabre* (Singapore)
- Sep 10: *Pacific Protector* (Australia)
- Oct 10: *Eastern Endeavor* (S. Korea)
- Jul 12: *Pacific Shield* (Japan)

Indian Ocean

- Jan 04: *Sea Saber* (US)
- Nov 05: *Exploring Themis* (UK)





Next Steps For PSI

- Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) Effort
 - Focus area of OEG in coming years...
- Continue PSI outreach to encourage endorsement by more states
 - Focus area through 2013...
- Continued focus on regional PSI activities and finding synergies with existing non-proliferation programs



Building Interdiction Capacity

- Capacity Building Focus:
 - Preventing Proliferation Related Conduct
 - Inspection and Identification
 - Seizure and Disposition
 - Rapid Decision Making
- Implementation:
 - Workshops
 - Experts Meetings/Information Sharing
 - Exercises



Questions?

<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>



Back-Up Slides



Typical PSI Exercise Elements

- Live Exercise (LIVEX)
 - Maritime Interdiction Exercise
 - Easily incorporated into maritime interoperability exercises
 - Focus: Tactical Capabilities and C2 interoperability
- Port Exercise (PORTEX)
 - Customs and Law Enforcement Agencies
 - Multinational Interagency Exchange or Demonstration
 - Focus: Customs Capabilities and Legal Authorities
- Table-Top Exercise (TTX)
 - Typically a Fictional Interdiction Scenario
 - Facilitated Multinational Interagency Seminar
 - Focus: Policy Priorities and Rapid Decision Making Processes






PSI: Common Misperceptions

MISPERCEPTIONS	FACTS
<p><i>PSI is primarily a military activity.</i></p> 	<p>Effective implementation of PSI requires collaboration among diplomatic, law enforcement, military, intelligence, and legal professionals.</p>
 <p><i>PSI is only about interdicting ships on the high seas.</i></p>	<p>The most effective interdiction activity occurs in ports using domestic customs and export control laws.</p>
 <p><i>PSI is not consistent with international law.</i></p>	<p>The PSI Statement of Principles states that efforts to stop WMD proliferation will be consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.</p>




PSI: Common Misperceptions

MISPERCEPTIONS	FACTS
<p><i>The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles is a binding treaty.</i></p>	<p>PSI is a voluntary activity with no permanent structure or secretariat. The strength of PSI is based on participating countries' commitment and willingness to work together to stop WMD proliferation.</p>
<p><i>PSI is solely about interdictions.</i></p> 	<p>Cooperating internationally to interdict shipments of WMD and related materials is a primary focus of PSI. A practical benefit of PSI is that partners examine, understand, apply, and, if necessary, amend their own domestic legislation to strengthen nonproliferation mechanisms within their jurisdictions.</p>



PSI: Common Misperceptions

MISPERCEPTIONS	FACTS
<p><i>PSI negatively impacts commerce.</i></p>	<p>Trafficking of <u>WMD and related materials</u> negatively impacts commerce. PSI provides a forum within which all actors in international ocean commerce (and increasingly air) can explore issues of mutual interest.</p>
<p><i>PSI negatively impacts United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maritime issues.</i></p> 	<p>The U.S. respects the provisions of the UNCLOS, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage. PSI states have no authority to act in contravention to the UNCLOS. The U.S. Senate is now considering giving its advice and consent to U.S. accession to UNCLOS.</p>



Born Out of Failure...

"SO SAN"

- Operator: DPRK
- Flag: Cambodia
- Cargo: SCUD Components
- Destination: Yemen

"SO SAN"

- Boarding: Spain & U.S.
- Location: Arabian Sea



The Statement of Interdiction Principles

PSI Endorsing Nations Agree to:

- interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities;
- develop procedures to facilitate exchange of information with other countries;
- strengthen national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction; and
- take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts.

*See: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm>





Legal Frameworks...

- **International Law:**

- UNSCRs : 1540, 1695, 1718, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1874, 1929
- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
- Global Protocols to Criminalize WMD Transport:
 - By Sea: 2005 SUA Protocol
 - By Air: 2010 Beijing Convention

- **Domestic Law:**

- Strong export control laws
- Strong transit/trans-shipment, inspection, seizure, and disposition provisions