Condition (5)(C) Report: Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Prepared by the U.S. Department of State
REPORT ON TREATY COMPLIANCE
This Report on Compliance (hereinafter referred to as the “Report”) with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) is submitted pursuant to Condition (5)(C) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the May 31, 1996, Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, (“the CFE Flank Document”) and covers January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012.
This Report lists unresolved compliance issues reported in earlier condition (5)(C) reports. Issues noted in earlier Reports that have not been repeated are no longer considered to be active discrepancies. Reviewed in detail are new compliance issues and new information for 2012 on the unresolved issues.
A. STATES PARTIES CERTIFIED TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY
The States Parties certified to be in compliance with the Treaty and its associated documents for 2012 are: Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
One previously reported compliance issue regarding problems with inspection site access and declared site diagrams is now deemed to be resolved. In addition, see the Collective Obligations section.
Compliance Issues With New Information in 2012
Problems with inspection site access and declared site diagrams: A review of allied inspection reporting showed no NATO ally reported a problem related to inspection site access or to the completeness and accuracy of site diagrams. This includes a German inspection at the site where a U.S. inspection in 2006 and an allied inspection in 2009 identified this compliance issue.
Steps the United States Has Taken and Belarusian Response in 2012: In 2012, the United States did not conduct any inspections of Belarusian forces. NATO allies conducted five quota inspections, of which one included a U.S. inspector, and five above-quota, paid inspections, of which one included a U.S. inspector.
The United States conducted a review of inspection reporting related to site access and site diagram issues. The United States also discussed these issues with Belarusian verification officials and was satisfied with the outcome of the discussions.
Two previously reported compliance issues are now deemed to be resolved: (1) exceeding some of its limits on holdings of equipment in active units; and (2) an unfulfilled obligation for naval infantry/coastal defense (NI/CD)-related reductions. In addition, see the Collective Obligations section.
Compliance Issues With New Information in 2012
Exceeding some of its limits on holdings of equipment in active units: According to its data as of January 1, 2012, and all other available information, Ukraine is now below all limits.
An unfulfilled obligation for naval infantry/coastal defense (NI/CD)-related reductions: An examination of evidence provided by Ukraine shows that Ukraine has destroyed a large amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE), albeit not by using Treaty modalities. We judge that Ukraine destroyed a sufficient amount of TLE to fulfill this obligation.
Steps the United States Has Taken and Ukrainian Response in 2012: In 2012, the United States conducted one quota inspection, two supplementary inspections, and four above-quota, paid inspections of Ukrainian forces. NATO allies conducted eleven quota inspections in Ukraine, of which five included a U.S. inspector. NATO allies also conducted seven above-quota, paid inspections in Ukraine, of which three included a U.S. inspector.
B. COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND STEPS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO STATES PARTIES NOT CERTIFIED
The States Parties not certified to be in compliance with the Treaty and its associated documents for 2012 are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
Although Armenia has expressed its full support for the Treaty, Armenia has not fulfilled some of its Treaty obligations. Compliance issues, all previously reported, include: (1) declared reduction liabilities that are not in accord with Treaty requirements, with consequent failure to complete necessary reductions; (2) reported stationing of forces on the territory of Azerbaijan without Azerbaijani consent; (3) apparent failure to declare all MT-LBu variant armored personnel carrier (APC) look-alikes; (4) possible unreported holdings of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty; and (5) possible failure to report BTR-80 armored vehicles as APCs or APC look-alikes. It is unclear whether progress can be made on the first two issues outside the context of a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) conflict, which is the focus of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s mediation efforts. In addition, see the Collective Obligations section.
New Compliance Issue in 2012
Possible failure to declare Conventional Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty: An inspection conducted by Denmark at Yeghvard, Armenia, June 4-7, 2012, observed TLE – almost 60 battle tanks, over 50 armored infantry fighting vehicles, and about 120 APCs – not assigned to this site, some of which had Russian markings. The Armenian escort team said the equipment belonged to Russian forces stationed at the 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia, and that Armenian experts were assessing its condition to determine whether to refurbish and return it to service or to scrap or cannibalize it. The Danish inspection team said it was not possible to determine the ownership of the equipment. It is unclear if Armenia is conducting maintenance on this equipment and whether it will be returned to Russia, destroyed, or transferred to Armenia.
Armenia has approached NATO and in October 2012, discussed support options for destroying excess equipment at Yeghvard.
Steps the United States Has Taken and Armenian Response in 2012: In 2012, the United States did not conduct any inspections of Armenian forces. NATO allies conducted four inspections, three of which included a U.S. inspector. Additionally, Germany conducted a bilateral training inspection in Armenia.
During informal discussions at NATO in the autumn of 2012, a U.S. representative raised with an Armenian representative the issue of the number of BTR-80s in Armenia’s holdings, recounting what had been observed at the September 2011 military parade in Yerevan. The U.S. representative also raised concern about the equipment in Yeghvard recently inspected by Denmark.
The United States and NATO allies have continued to raise compliance issues in the Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group (JCG) as well as in bilateral discussions. The N-K conflict appears to be a major influence affecting most of Armenia’s compliance issues, as well as an important factor in the issue of uncontrolled and unaccounted for equipment limited by the Treaty. See the OSCE Minsk Group Activity section for further discussion of the N-K conflict.
Although Azerbaijan has expressed its full support for the Treaty, Azerbaijan has not fulfilled some of its Treaty obligations and has repeatedly stated that security issues continue to affect Azerbaijan’s implementation. Azerbaijan continues to maintain that it cannot carry out some Treaty obligations so long as the N-K conflict is unresolved and part of Azerbaijan’s territory is occupied by Armenia. Compliance issues, all previously reported, include: (1) exceeding its TLE limits from January 1, 2007, continuing through 2012; (2) unilateral suspension of certain Treaty notifications and failure to report correctly certain objects of verification; and (3) failure to notify and complete a reduction obligation. In addition, see the Collective Obligations section.
New Compliance Issue in 2012
Possible failure to declare equipment limited by the Treaty: Previously declared equipment totals that exceeded Azerbaijan’s overall limits of TLE continued through 2012. In its data as of January 1, 2013, Azerbaijan declared equipment totals that exceeded its overall limits by over 390 pieces of TLE (over 160 tanks and about 230 artillery pieces in excess of Azerbaijan’s limits). In addition, Azerbaijan has not reported as being in service with its conventional armed forces the Lynx long-range rocket artillery systems publicly observed at a military parade in Baku in June 2011. If the number of Lynx long-range rocket systems that were observed are included in the total of accountable artillery pieces (in the sub-category of Multiple Launched Rocket Systems), it would cause Azerbaijan’s overage in artillery to increase even further.
Steps the United States Has Taken and Azerbaijani Response in 2012: In 2012, the United States conducted one inspection in Azerbaijan. NATO allies conducted three inspections, of which none included a U.S. inspector.
During informal discussions at NATO in the autumn of 2012, a U.S. representative spoke with an Azerbaijan representative about the Lynx MLRS observed in the June 2011 military parade.
The United States and NATO allies have continued to raise compliance issues in the JCG as well as in bilateral discussions. Azerbaijan has continued to insist that security concerns limit its ability to implement Treaty provisions, until the N-K conflict is resolved. See the OSCE Minsk Group Activity section for further discussion of the N-K conflict.
OSCE Minsk Group Activity
The OSCE Minsk Group is the only format agreed upon by Armenia and Azerbaijan to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the N-K conflict. On June 18, 2012, at the Los Cabos Summit, the presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group’s Co-Chair countries – France, Russia, and the United States – called upon the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfill the commitment in their January 23, 2012, joint statement at Sochi to “accelerate” reaching agreement on the “Basic Principles for a Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” On March 22, 2012, the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the formal request to convene a conference on the N-K conflict, the foreign ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, called upon the sides to demonstrate the political will needed to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement. After the so-called “presidential” elections held in N-K on July 19, 2012, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs stated that the procedures of July 19 in no way prejudge the final legal status of N-K or the outcome of the ongoing negotiations to bring a lasting and peaceful settlement to the N-K conflict. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs met separately with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on September 26-27, 2012, and October 27, 2012, to express concern over the lack of tangible progress in recent months and to present their ideas on a working proposal to advance the peace process. The co-chairs traveled to the region November 19-26, 2012, to meet with the presidents in Yerevan and Baku, and with the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The presidents and foreign ministers reiterated their determination to continue working with the co-chairs to reach a peaceful settlement. At the Dublin OSCE Ministerial meeting in December 2012, Minsk Group co-chairs issued a statement reiterating their call for the parties to “demonstrate the political will needed to reach a peaceful settlement” and to “take decisive steps to reach a peaceful settlement.”
Since its “suspension” of implementation of the Treaty at the end of 2007, Russia has made clear that it will not return to compliance with the original Treaty. Russia did state in 2007 that it did not anticipate increases of its forces in the Area of Application (AoA) above 2007 levels. Since December 12, 2007, Russia has failed to comply with its reporting obligations under the Treaty and related commitments and has declined all inspections of Russian forces or on Russian territory. The United States and all NATO allies have made clear that Russia’s “suspension” was a unilateral measure not provided for under the terms of the Treaty.
Russia’s decision in August 2008 to introduce additional military forces into Georgia without host state consent and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states were inconsistent with the obligation of the States Parties recalled in the Treaty’s Preamble, “to refrain in their mutual relations,...from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”
Compliance issues, all previously reported, are: (1) Russian “suspension” of its implementation of the Treaty; (2) stationing forces without the consent of the host state; (3) exceeding flank limits; (4) improper designation of armored combat vehicles as “ambulances”; (5) failure to declare look-alikes that are accountable under the Treaty’s Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment; (6) exceeding overall limits for holdings in active units; and (7) improperly reporting some armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) as AIFV look-alikes and subsequently failing to report them at all. See earlier condition (5)(C) reports for compliance issues related to inspections prior to the Russian “suspension.” In light of the Russian “suspension,” it is not possible to determine whether any of the issues noted here have been resolved. In addition, see the Collective Obligations section.
Compliance Issues With New Information in 2012
Russian “Suspension” of Its Implementation of the Treaty: Since December 12, 2007, and continuing through 2012, Russia has failed to provide Treaty-required annual data and all other Treaty-required information and has rejected all inspections (that were notified through 2011).Also, see the Armenia section regarding equipment at Yeghvard.
Stationing Forces without Consent of the Host State: The presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova without host state consent continued through 2012 and continued to raise important concerns. 
Steps the United States Has Taken and Russian Response in 2012: The United States and NATO allies have responded to Russia’s decision to “suspend” implementation of the Treaty with diplomatic engagement at the most senior levels. While U.S.-Russia discussions have been professional and comprehensive, Russian authorities remained inflexible on key issues.
There has been no change in Russia’s position since the United States announced in Vienna, Austria, on November 22, 2011, that it was ceasing implementation of certain obligations under the Treaty with regard to Russia. This was followed by similar announcements from the other 21 NATO States Parties to the Treaty as well as Georgia and Moldova that they would also cease implementation of the Treaty “vis-à-vis the Russian Federation.” Since then and through 2012, the United States and NATO allies have not attempted to inspect Russian forces in the Russian Federation or stationed elsewhere in the AoA. The United States continues to implement all of its obligations under the Treaty with respect to all States Parties other than Russia, and is prepared to resume full Treaty implementation regarding Russia if Russia resumes implementation of its Treaty obligations.
During 2012 the United States held a number of bilateral meetings with Russia, as well as with NATO allies and other States Parties, in an attempt to revitalize Treaty implementation and to consider how conventional arms control could contribute to European security in the future.
On November 15, 2012, Russia’s envoy to NATO, Alexander Grushko, said at a press briefing that Russia is ready to start in-depth discussion on a new CFE Treaty, if there is no linkage to “political issues,” which is understood within the CFE Treaty to mean that Russia is not prepared to discuss issues related to host nation consent.
The Annual Exchange of Military Information for the Treaty with data effective as of January 1, 2013, was held in Vienna, Austria, on December 15, 2012. Russia again did not provide its annual data and required notifications, nor did it volunteer a one-page summary of its TLE in the AoA as it did annually from December 2007 through December 2010.
The continuing presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain issues of concern.
The United States and NATO allies have raised longstanding compliance issues bilaterally and in a variety of multilateral fora, including: the JCG (including in detail at the CFE Review Conferences in 2001, 2006, 2007, and 2011); OSCE, NATO, and NATO-Russia Ministerial meetings; and in the NATO-Russia Council and committees. Russian responses to questions on compliance have varied, but they generally have tried to deflect U.S. concerns. From 2007 through 2012, other longstanding issues were not pursued, as discussions focused on those related to Russia’s “suspension.”
The eight USSR successor states that became Treaty States Parties assumed a collective obligation, agreed to in the 1992 Tashkent Agreement and reaffirmed at the Extraordinary Conference in Oslo in 1992, that has not yet been fulfilled. The obligation was to declare reduction liabilities and to complete reductions that will, in the aggregate, be no less than what the USSR would have had to declare and to complete. This translated into a certain reduction obligation for each State Party. See earlier condition (5)(C) reports for discussion of these obligations. Since 1992, the majority of these States Parties have carried out reductions to reduce their holdings and have abided by their individual limits. Compliance concerns are being reported by State Party and this Collective Obligations section will no longer appear in this Report.
C. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND BROADER SECURITY RISKS OF
None of the compliance concerns identified and discussed in this Report are militarily significant to the United States or to NATO as a whole. However, Russia’s “suspension” of implementation has seriously eroded the Treaty’s verifiability, diminished the exchange of data and notifications, and undermined the cooperative approach to security that have been core elements of the NATO-Russia relationship and European security for more than two decades. The action taken by the United States and 23 other States Parties in late 2011 to cease implementing certain obligations under the Treaty with regard to Russia only, as a necessary response to the 2007 unilateral Russian “suspension” of its Treaty obligations, is fully reversible if Russia resumes implementation of the Treaty.
The questions of Armenian unreported equipment holdings and Azerbaijani reported overages and failure to provide required notifications may be militarily significant to those two states, especially in the context of the N-K conflict, and to the sub-region. Also of note, any Russian forces stationed without the consent of the host State Party have political and military significance to the state in which those forces are stationed. While not a direct military threat to the United States or NATO, the Russian military presence in Georgia and Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia undermine conventional arms control treaties and agreements and erode the security situation generally within the AoA.
Notwithstanding military significance, it is the policy of the United States that all violations of arms control agreements should be challenged and corrected, lest governments subject to such obligations conclude that they may be disregarded at will.
 Belarus allows other States Parties to conduct additional inspections, using Treaty procedures, above the quota it is required to accept, as long as the inspecting country pays the entire cost of inspection.
 Ukraine allows other States Parties to conduct additional inspections, using Treaty procedures, above the quota it is required to accept, as long as the inspecting country pays the entire cost of the inspection.
 The remaining text in this Report refers to Russia’s action as a suspension of implementation of the Treaty, as a decision to suspend observation of Russia’s Treaty obligations, or as a “suspension” in quotation marks, since the Russian action is not viewed as a legally available option under the Treaty.
 The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (referred to as the “Adapted Treaty” is not yet in force and its provisions do not apply to the States Parties. Reference is made in parts of this Report to Adapted Treaty flank numerical limits due to political commitments that Russian forces adhere to those future, but not yet legally applicable, limits..
 Information required but not provided from December 2007 through December 2012 includes Russia’s annual Treaty data as of January 1, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, and associated annual notifications; flank data as of July 1 each year; quarterly notifications regarding equipment holdings at the Kushchevskaya armor maintenance facility; and periodic notifications of permanent changes in the organizational structure of Russia’s conventional armed forces, or of changes of 10 percent or more in TLE assigned to units.
 Under the Treaty’s Protocol on Inspection, no State Party has the right to refuse a declared site inspection (unless it would result in too many inspections on the territory of one State Party at the same time), and declared site inspections can only be delayed in cases of force majeure.
 While the Treaty establishes numerical limits on TLE and not on military personnel, the Article IV, paragraph 5 prohibition on stationing without host state consent applies to conventional armed forces in general.