



# Functional Bureau Strategy

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## Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

**FOR PUBLIC RELEASE**

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## 1. Executive Statement

As pointed out in Goal 1 of the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, the “gravest threats to U.S. national security are the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.”

The principal mission of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is to deter, contain, limit, and roll back the threats presented by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials and technologies, and increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, and to limit or prevent the spread of destabilizing conventional weapons to state or non-state actors. In keeping with the imperative of preserving and promoting U.S. national security interests in the face of the reemergence of great power rivalry, and the challenges posed by revisionist powers on the Eurasian landmass, moreover, ISN also has the important responsibility of implementing statutory sanctions authorities against entities involved in significant transactions with the defense or intelligence sectors of the Russian government (Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanction Act, or CAATSA).

In these regards, ISN represents in many respects the cutting edge of State Department and broader U.S. Government efforts against grave threats to U.S. national security and international peace and security more broadly – threats explicitly emphasized in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and the State Department-USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2017-2022.

While ISN’s baseline nonproliferation responsibilities remain both constant and urgent, they have been overwhelmed by the even more urgent need to address WMD- and proliferation-related challenges in the international arena. Goal 1 of this Strategy, “Shape the Security Environment to Advance U.S. Interests,” reflects our new focus on the “international security” half of the Bureau’s title. ISN has been a leader in USG efforts to maximize pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and now in preparing to conduct threat program elimination in the event that the DPRK agrees to implement denuclearization. ISN’s expertise, experience, and security assistance programs will also be in great demand as we carry out the President’s injunction to develop a more effective framework for ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and constraining its weapons proliferation and malign activities.

In response to the National Security Strategy’s call to “upgrade our diplomatic capabilities to compete in the current environment and to embrace a competitive mindset,” ISN is also focusing more directly on ways to promote the United States’ national security innovation base, prevent damaging technology transfers to geopolitical adversaries, and protect America’s technological edge – even while we ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of our nonproliferation institutions. This Goal also highlights ISN’s objectives in strategic and regional stability, especially in South Asia and Northeast Asia, where states possess nuclear weapons.

ISN’s second Goal, to “Strengthen Global Nonproliferation Norms and Regimes,” reflects the longstanding but increasingly urgent need to reinforce norms against WMD proliferation and use, which are being undermined by chemical weapons use by the Syrian regime, terrorists’ use of chemical weapons and pursuit of other forms of WMD, and by Russia’s attempted assassination in Salisbury. As we approach the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the entry into force of the

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Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2020, ISN is leading an intense and energetic diplomatic campaign to get all NPT States Party to recommit to the continued need for, and viability of, the Treaty, and to recognize that success in meeting nonproliferation challenges is indispensable to creating the conditions that would facilitate nuclear disarmament and ensure continued availability to all states of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. ISN is also responsible for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and the four multilateral export control regimes (covering nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, and dual-use weapons, materials, and components) that provide the frameworks for countering WMD and missile proliferation. This Goal thus also provides the foundation for our third Goal, “Impede Proliferation of WMD, Delivery Systems, and Sensitive Non-WMD Technologies,” in which we outline our objectives for strengthening other states’ capabilities to counter proliferation, and to stop proliferation-related transfers.

Our fourth Goal, “Counter WMD and Nonconventional Terrorism,” reflects the work that ISN undertakes to prevent terrorist access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, expertise, and equipment, and strengthen international capabilities to combat and respond to WMD terrorism. ISN’s security assistance programs have also helped Iraq and other countries neighboring Syria to counter and respond to chemical weapons threats, and we are also focusing attention on ways to address the threat posed by foreign fighters who return from Syria with chemical weapons and other WMD-related expertise and battlefield experience. This Goal also identifies the need to improve capabilities for responding to incidents or attacks involving biological agents, and to determine ways to meet new and emerging threats posed by the use of nonconventional means of attack, such as unmanned aerial vehicles.

ISN is responding robustly to these challenges and new responsibilities. We are continuing to shift our focus and resources to the highest national security threats and priorities, which are extremely complex in nature and require expertise from across the bureau. We have created informal, innovative task forces and “tiger teams” to concentrate on specific issues, such as CAATSA, Iran, and the DPRK, and will pursue other ways to innovate. We are reforming and restructuring our security assistance and capacity-building programs to ensure they are being applied to the highest threats and priorities and with greatest impact, and are sufficiently flexible to respond to emerging threats and needs. Of most consequence to the rest of the Department, we are working to restore all of our bilateral funding under our Export Control and Related Border Security Program to a global, centrally-managed account able to respond with agility to shifting global challenges on a threat-prioritized basis.

#### Risks

Much of our ability to meet our nonproliferation and international security objectives and responsibilities depend on the actions and behavior of other states. If, despite all our diplomatic efforts and pressure, other states do not take action to counter proliferation threats, or if Iran, the DPRK, Russia, or China remain averse to changing their most destabilizing behaviors, then U.S. national security will be at much greater risk than it is today. That is why it is so essential for ISN to engage, as it does, in intensive and extensive bilateral and multilateral consultations, dialogues, and meetings – to educate other governments and partner entities

about our policies and about proliferation threats and ways to address them, to persuade them to support U.S. initiatives, and to build coalitions of likeminded states to take action. It is also imperative to exercise leadership in multilateral fora: as the National Security Strategy recognizes, “[i]f the United States cedes leadership of these bodies to adversaries, opportunities to shape developments that are positive for the United States will be lost.” We have identified several high-level risks to achieving our objectives under “Threats” in the Context section of this strategy, *e.g.*, emerging technologies.

Our success in fulfilling these weighty responsibilities, achieving nonproliferation and international security objectives, and meeting national security threats would be put at serious risk if budget cuts jeopardize programming, travel, and operations – or if we are unable to hire, retain, and advance the right people for ISN positions.

#### Implementation Review

ISN will conduct an annual assessment of progress made toward meeting the objectives of this strategy and identify new issues or trends that might affect our objectives or how we work to achieve them.

## 2. Bureau Strategic Framework

### Strategy Outline

#### Goal 1 – Shape the Security Environment to Advance U.S. Interests

- Objective 1.1 - Change the Strategic Calculus of Problem Actors
- Objective 1.2 - Promote Regional Security and Strategic Stability
- Objective 1.3 - Counter Great Power Competitive and Destabilizing Behavior
- Objective 1.4 - Protect and Advance U.S. Strategic Interests and Technologies

#### Goal 2 – Strengthen Global Nonproliferation Norms and Regimes

- Objective 2.1 - Strengthen the NPT, the IAEA, and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
- Objective 2.2 - Strengthen Prohibition Regimes for Non-Nuclear WMD
- Objective 2.3 - Strengthen International Norms Against Proliferation

#### Goal 3 – Impede Proliferation of WMD, Delivery Systems, and Sensitive Non-WMD Technologies

- Objective 3.1 - Strengthen Other States' Capabilities and Commitments to Counter Proliferation
- Objective 3.2 - Stop Proliferation-Related Transfers and Networks

#### Goal 4 – Counter WMD and Nonconventional Terrorism

- Objective 4.1 - Prevent Terrorist Access to WMD Materials, Expertise, and Equipment
- Objective 4.2 - Strengthen International Responses to Combat WMD Terrorism
- Objective 4.3 - Prevent Terrorist Access to, or Nonconventional Use of, Non-WMD Goods and Technologies

### 3. Goals, Objectives and Sub-Objectives

#### Bureau Goal 1: Shape the Security Environment to Advance U.S. Interests

##### Description and Linkages

The 2017 National Security Strategy directs us to upgrade our political and economic instruments in order to respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions the United States faces around the world. These challenges and risks are many. China and Russia challenge American influence, interests, and technological edge. The DPRK and Iran have developed threatening WMD and missile programs, and engage in proliferation and other malign and destabilizing behavior. China acquires advanced technology from the United States through employment by U.S. companies, education in U.S. universities, acquisition of U.S. companies, and outright theft, even while its regional behaviors create potentially destabilizing proliferation pressures upon other states. Russia and China are assisting states with peaceful nuclear programs without proliferation protections. Russia threatens its neighbors with sometimes remarkable directness, even while using transfers of advanced weaponry to establish strategic relationships and spread asymmetric military capabilities that can threaten U.S. interests in dangerous ways. Russia, China, Iran, and the DPRK have each spent many years honing competitive strategies designed to undermine and displace U.S. influence in large regions of the world.

ISN has important missions in support of the broader U.S. competitive strategy in response to these challenges and to mitigate these risks. While working to ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of export control regimes and other nonproliferation institutions, ISN also seeks to protect and promote the United States' national security innovation base, as called for in the National Security Strategy. ISN seeks to ensure that U.S. companies continue to flourish and can extend their competitive advantages, within the constraints set by nonproliferation regimes, in order to create and maintain the innovation backbone that will support American jobs today and provide for U.S. competitive advantage in the future. The Nuclear Posture Review declares that the United States, in continuing support of nuclear nonproliferation, will work to increase transparency and predictability, where appropriate, to avoid potential miscalculation among nuclear weapons states and other possessor states through strategic dialogues, risk-reduction communication channels, and the sharing of best practices related to nuclear weapons safety and security. ISN answers this mandate with its work to promote strategic and regional stability in South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.

While ISN's work contributes most directly to Strategic Objective 1.1 of the Joint Strategic Plan, our international security work also supports Strategic Objectives 1.4, 2.2, and 3.2.

## **Bureau Objective 1.1 : Change the Strategic Calculus of Problem Actors**

### **Justification**

It is of paramount importance to:

- persuade the DPRK to implement final and fully-verified denuclearization by abandoning its WMD and ballistic missile programs and swiftly and effectively implementing threat program elimination there;
- deny Iran all pathways to acquiring nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles that can deliver them; and
- prevent Pakistan's development and deployment of nuclear systems that could destabilize its region and lead to nuclear war.

ISN, along with others in the Department and the interagency, will use the full range of diplomatic tools available to persuade these countries' leaderships that it is in their interest to avoid the costs and risks of pursuing destabilizing capabilities, while at the same time helping to foster a security environment that makes such capabilities unnecessary to protect their security interests. U.S. unilateral and UN Security Council (UNSC)-imposed sanctions, aimed at increasing the costs and difficulty for the DPRK and Iran to continue their programs, are key tools. ISN invests significant energy and resources into persuading countries to enforce these sanctions, our security assistance programs help countries improve their capabilities for doing so, and our work to interdict dangerous transfers and impede progress on threat systems buys time in which sanctions pressures can work to drive comprehensive and enduring negotiated solutions.

We will work with our diplomatic partners to design and implement pressures on Iran to return Iran to the bargaining table to negotiate a better deal that addresses a broader spectrum of concerns – including fissile material production, nuclear weapons development, missile development, and missile proliferation – in an enduring manner. We will sustain the pressure campaign on the DPRK until such time as it agrees to denuclearization, we will continue planning for the swift and effective implementation of threat program elimination there, and we will be ready to help implement such work in the event of an agreement.

## **Bureau Objective 1.2 : Promote Regional Security and Strategic Stability**

### **Justification**

As the Joint Strategic Plan observes, “[t]he threat of nuclear war remains a grim reality and must be countered.” In regions where there are states possessing nuclear weapons, it is especially important to reduce risks of miscalculation and nuclear use. In South Asia, ISN addresses each of the three components of strategic stability – crisis stability, escalation stability, and arms race stability – in order to assist regional actors to not misunderstand their adversary's capabilities and, more importantly, their intentions in peacetime and during crises.

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ISN uses dialogues and workshops with regional stakeholders to promote a shared understanding of such critical issues as escalation dynamics, and to develop and implement measures that build trust and confidence that could help defuse crises. ISN also works with the interagency to persuade regional powers, especially Pakistan, to cease destabilizing activities, such as cross-border provocations, which pose such a serious potential for escalation.

In Northeast Asia, ISN will initiate bilateral and multilateral dialogues with key stakeholders such as Japan, South Korea, and China to achieve shared understandings and approaches to nonproliferation and regional security measures. In the Middle East, we will energetically promote adoption of the IAEA's Additional Protocol and work to prevent the spread of fissile material production capabilities. We will promote dialogue on regional security issues in order to build trust and confidence and establish conditions conducive to the ultimate establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

### **Bureau Objective 1.3: Counter Great Power Competitive and Destabilizing Behavior**

#### **Justification**

In 2016, Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) that aimed to pressure Russia to cease its malign behavior in Ukraine, in cyberspace, and U.S. politics. ISN is responsible for implementing Section 231 of the Act, which mandates sanctions against entities that engage in significant transactions with the defense and intelligence sectors of the Russian Government. This provides the United States a means to reduce revenue flows to Russia's defense and intelligence agencies, and undermine the destabilizing overseas relationships that support Moscow's own competitive strategy. Delicate diplomacy is required because implementing these sanctions could affect our friends and partners; therefore, we must demonstrate how such sanctions are of mutual benefit and craft alternatives that mitigate undesirable effects.

Another area of great power rivalry relevant to ISN involves civil nuclear competition. The United States engages in commerce in sensitive nuclear technology only with countries with which we have a peaceful nuclear cooperation ("123") agreement. Such agreements include strong proliferation and security protections so that U.S. technology is not used for malign purposes. Russia and China, on the other hand, sell state-subsidized sensitive nuclear technology with sub-standard protections for competitive advantage as a marketing tool. This practice is shrinking the U.S. share in the world marketplace for nuclear reactors and other sensitive equipment and components, and also undermines our ability to maintain our technological edge. ISN will undertake a major diplomatic campaign to demonstrate to potential customers the technical, operational, and cost advantages of purchasing U.S. nuclear technology, while highlighting the disadvantages of deepening their civil nuclear (and military as well) dependency on China or Russia. ISN will also advocate adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol by all nuclear suppliers, both to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology, and to help level the playing field by preventing other suppliers from using nonproliferation irresponsibility as a tool of competitive advantage in the nuclear marketplace.

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## **Bureau Objective 1.4: Protect and Advance U.S. Strategic Interests and Technologies**

### **Justification**

U.S. technological advantages have been eroded over past decades through theft, direct foreign investment in U.S. firms, technology-sharing agreements (particularly for U.S. firms doing business in China), and through university faculty hiring and foreign student exchange programs. U.S. national security, economic growth, and technical leadership demand an aggressive program to protect our technological intellectual capital and security-related technology. These efforts seek to sustain or re-establish U.S. technological advantages while at the same time not hindering international growth and cooperation.

## **Bureau Goal 2: Strengthen Global Nonproliferation Norms and Regimes**

### **Description and Linkages**

The NPT has been the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime for fifty years, largely meeting its promise to limit the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons while ensuring that all countries that comply with this nonproliferation pledge enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and technologies. But the NPT and the WMD nonproliferation regime as a whole are under significant threat, primarily due to North Korean and Iranian overt and covert nuclear weapons programs, but also due to the continued resistance of some countries to improving nuclear safeguards, and by the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria and by Russia and the DPRK in assassination attempts in the United Kingdom and Malaysia, respectively. The next Review Conference of the NPT will be held in 2020, and it is our task to remind the world how profoundly beneficial the global nonproliferation regime, and its cornerstone in the NPT, has been for all States Party. ISN will lead U.S. efforts to shore up the nonproliferation regime – strengthening its norms, buttressing its verification institutions and authorities, and tightening its rules. We will highlight challenges presented by clandestine WMD programs. We will emphasize the central role of nonproliferation in the NPT and reinforce the message that an effective nonproliferation regime is key to establishing the conditions for further progress on nuclear disarmament and expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime depends critically on a capable and sufficiently resourced IAEA, the nuclear safeguards programs of which monitor member states' nuclear activities to verify they are not used for military purposes and to detect and deter undeclared nuclear activities and facilities. We will urge all states to adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the standard Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as the *de facto* standard for verifying that states are meeting their NPT safeguards obligations. We will continue to support the IAEA's programs in nuclear safety and security, and its assistance with peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, in keeping with our NPT commitments.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is another fundamental element of the global WMD nonproliferation regime – the first instrument to ban an entire category of WMD by prohibiting possession, development, or transfer of such weapons – and a key locus of ISN leadership in the U.S. interagency. BWC States Party meet annually, as do various experts groups, and a Review Conference is held every five years. The United States has long been advocating an intensification of the BWC’s work program, to focus on practical issues of biological weapons proliferation and terrorism as well as strengthening national implementation of the BWC. Although the 2016 BWC Review Conference deadlocked over proposals to strengthen the BWC, after a year of intensive diplomatic engagement, we succeeded in gaining agreement in 2017 on an ambitious three-year work program that addresses high U.S. priority issues.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation (‘123’) agreements support proliferation norms and standards. We negotiate these agreements with partners to ensure the peaceful use of sensitive nuclear exports from the United States; they contain the highest nonproliferation requirements in the world. For example, these agreements provide the United States with consent rights over nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material, as well as prescribing the conditions under which partners can store, retransfer, and physically protect it. We will continue to seek to conclude 123 agreements with new partners, and to ensure that such agreements contain the strongest nonproliferation protections available, in order to raise overall global nonproliferation standards, and we will also urge other nuclear suppliers to provide material and equipment only to partners who have adopted the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.

The success of global nonproliferation efforts also depends significantly on the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the control lists of the four multilateral export control regimes:

- The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which regulates transfer of key equipment and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation;
- The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies;
- The Australia Group (AG) which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons; and
- The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which regulates transfer of nuclear and nuclear dual-use technologies and improves safeguards on, and protection of, existing materials.

Development of illicit WMD programs continues to rely on acquisition of necessary equipment, components, and expertise from abroad, and relies on networks of unscrupulous individuals or companies (scientists, engineers, businessmen, shippers, and brokers) located in multiple countries. Rapid diffusion of manufacturing capabilities means there are now more suppliers of sophisticated commercial technologies that may have weapons applications and more dual-use technologies that could be used in weapons applications. Adding to the complexity is the speed and volume of the international trade environment, in which illicit cargo can be concealed among legitimate shipments. ISN therefore devotes significant energy to ensure that the

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guidelines and control lists of these multilateral export control regimes keep pace with new technologies and proliferation trends. By tightening controls among the world's best sources of technologies and equipment, we help close the proliferation spigot and slow the pace, drive up the costs, and reduce the quality of illicit acquisitions. Strengthening these regimes is critical because they help establish international nonproliferation norms, particularly in the missile area, where there is no global treaty.

Strengthening global nonproliferation norms requires not only strengthening nonproliferation agreements and regimes, but also building international consensus against WMD and delivery system proliferation and securing the political commitment of states to be responsible nonproliferation partners. Therefore, much of ISN's work is devoted to diplomatic engagement with foreign governments, to educate them on proliferation and international security challenges, inform them of U.S. policies and objectives, try to expand consensus on ways to address these challenges, and, as appropriate, foster participation in related capacity-building efforts. This engagement occurs through both informal means as well as regular bilateral and potentially multilateral talks that go by many different names, including "regional security dialogues," "strategic dialogues," "nonproliferation dialogues," and "counterproliferation dialogues."

This Goal supports Goal 1 of the Joint Strategic Plan, and specifically its Strategic Objective 1.1.

### **Bureau Objective 2.1 : Strengthen the NPT, the IAEA, and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation**

#### **Justification**

At the 2020 NPT Review Conference, we want other States Party to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT, commit to resolving threats to the credibility of the Treaty, and recognize the foundational role of nonproliferation in achieving the full benefits of the Treaty. We aim to redirect discussions on nuclear disarmament into the "creating the conditions for nuclear disarmament" terms promoted by USG officials since October 2017; promote adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol; and highlight the importance of the shared benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The IAEA must have the resources appropriate to its growing role in monitoring and verifying nuclear safeguards worldwide, including in Iran and the DPRK as applicable, and including state-of-the-art verification technology and methodologies, a world-class cadre of experts, and extensive and effective inspection authorities.

### **Bureau Objective 2.2 : Strengthen Prohibition Regimes for Non-Nuclear WMD**

#### **Justification**

We will work with other BWC States Party to ensure effective functioning of the new work program and to resolve debilitating funding and support issues. ISN will also be working, both within and outside of the BWC meetings, to strengthen the operational capabilities of the UN

Secretary General's Investigative Mechanism for biological events, and to improving existing, or establishing new, policies related to oversight of dual-use biological research of concern. Given recent repeated use of chemical weapons, and past incidents of anthrax use, it is likely only a matter of time before the world sees some use of biological weapons in a terrorist or other attack. Another avenue of work, both within and outside of the BWC, is to strengthen international response capabilities to a deliberately-caused disease outbreak.

Norms against proliferation and use of WMD are eroded by the continued existence of clandestine and unreported WMD programs. The Assad regime in Syria has used chemical weapons in its civil war, notwithstanding the much-vaunted elimination of Syria's declared chemical weapons stocks under international supervision several years ago. Russia's use of a military-grade nerve agent, novichok, against UK citizens in Salisbury reveals that there are clandestine, undeclared, stocks of that nerve agent, and the DPRK's use of another nerve agent in an assassination in Kuala Lumpur highlights the problem. The United States has long been unable to certify that Iran is in compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. ISN will raise these issues at all appropriate fora, and seek to raise public awareness of, and policy community discourse about, the challenge of undeclared clandestine chemical and biological programs.

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) provides the United States the means to impose sanctions against countries or entities using chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or that have used lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals, as well as cases of proliferation to chemical/biological weapons programs. In 2018, the United States determined under this Act that the Government of North Korea used the chemical warfare agent VX to assassinate a North Korean national. ISN will lead efforts to enforce the CBW Act in the months and years ahead.

### **Bureau Objective 2.3 : Strengthen International Norms and Institutions Against Proliferation**

#### **Justification**

The United States cannot effectively combat WMD proliferation alone; success requires international cooperation. While most states understand proliferation threats, some do not, and many countries may not be able or be willing to put resources into combating such threats. It is ISN's responsibility to educate foreign governments on the threats and U.S. policies to combat them, and also to achieve buy-in from other countries – for example, to get them to commit to enforcing UN Security Council-imposed sanctions, or to commit to increasing their own capacities to thwart illicit procurement attempts or to ensure WMD security. ISN does this through regular and specialized dialogues and by exerting policy leadership in multilateral fora.

The four export control regimes identified in this Goal's Description develop control lists and international export control standards. These lists are also used to inform UN sanctions regimes. ISN's Export Control and Related Border Control assistance program uses the lists

when helping countries establish national export control systems. ISN urges all countries to align their national export controls with the guidelines and control lists of these regimes.

### **Bureau Goal 3: Impede Proliferation of WMD, Delivery Systems, and Sensitive Non-WMD Technologies**

#### **Description and Linkages**

ISN's work under this Goal follows naturally from the export control regime norms described in Goal 2 above. The regimes develop control lists, guidelines, and best practices that form a strong basis for UN Security Council sanctions resolutions and various countries' unilateral and multilateral initiatives. When UN Security Council mandates are combined with effective national export control systems, the international community is equipped with the legal and regulatory authorities for impeding and interdicting illicit transfers of proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies. ISN's diplomatic work encourages countries to find the political will to take action and assist such innovation.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, legally binding under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, requires all UN member states to establish national controls and policies to counter WMD proliferation, including export controls and border security mechanisms. It has become a key instrument in getting countries, which might decline to follow U.S. policy or urgings alone, to devote the political will and resources necessary to comply with the Resolution. The 1540 Committee at the UN oversees international implementation of the Resolution and assists states with implementation.

ISN leads U.S. Government interdiction efforts globally. Through the administration of NSC-chartered interdiction working groups, we review and direct interdiction actions through diplomatic efforts, law enforcement action, economic, and other means to deter the transfer of controlled or dual-use material, equipment, and technology, or to stop the shipment of such items before any potential diversion to a program of concern. Success in this endeavor depends on bilateral and multilateral information-sharing and capacity-building, strong ISN leadership within the multilateral export control regimes, and USG leadership at the UN Security Council.

#### **Bureau Objective 3.1: Strengthen Other States' Capabilities and Commitment to Counter Proliferation**

##### **Justification**

Through its Export Control and Related Border Security assistance program, ISN helps countries establish legal frameworks and indigenous institutional capabilities to regulate trade in proliferation-sensitive items, build a country's national industries' capabilities to distinguish between legitimate and illicit trade, and provide equipment and training to enable effective

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interdiction of suspicious shipments and prosecution of violators. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires countries to submit a national action plan outlining how they are, or will, implement the Resolution. Periodically, the UN 1540 Committee undertakes a Comprehensive Review of these plans and implementation generally, and makes recommendations for improvements. ISN works closely with the 1540 Committee throughout this process, and uses the findings of the Comprehensive Review in our consultations with other governments to encourage improved implementation.

### **Bureau Objective 3.2: Stop Proliferation-Related Transfers and Networks**

#### **Justification**

ISN engages in a multi-pronged approach to stop proliferation-related transfers and disrupt proliferators' networks. We encourage all states to strengthen implementation of nonproliferation-related obligations, such as UN sanctions. We provide countries with tools and training to inspect outbound shipments and to analyze and act on enforcement information in order to quickly identify and interdict problematic transfers. We support multilateral initiatives to improve the international community's ability to detect and impede transnational proliferation activities. These include initiatives to improve targeting and interdiction efforts at sea and at individual ports of entry, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Container Control Program of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In addition, ISN leverages efforts of international and intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Customs Organization and the Financial Action Task Force, to advance adoption of modern enforcement and financial regulation practices to combat the exploitation of the global commercial system by proliferators and to bring perpetrators to justice.

### **Bureau Goal 4: Counter WMD and Nonconventional Terrorism**

#### **Description and Linkages**

The threat landscape for terrorist pursuit and use of WMD has transformed, as terrorists and other entities of concern actively seek the materials, expertise, and technology for developing and using WMD – along with the unconventional use of uncontrolled goods and technologies such as commercial Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – and as advancing technology in both the military and commercial arenas makes such capabilities ever easier to acquire. For the first time since World War I, chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield, with ISIS deploying chemical weapons against Coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. The steady stream of reports of nuclear and other radioactive material outside regulatory control further highlights the risk that terrorists could acquire these materials. Also, the insecure storage of nuclear and other radioactive materials continues to be an exploitation risk for terrorists and criminal networks. Harmful biological agents, such as Ebola, are naturally occurring, and both biological

and chemical agents are widely used for legitimate purposes in vulnerable facilities. Biotechnology is expanding rapidly to produce new capabilities and even new organisms, and the number of high-containment laboratories that store dangerous pathogens is expanding.

ISN is responsible for a number of programs and political initiatives specifically designed to reduce risks of terrorist access to WMD materials. We help improve nuclear safety and security standards and best practices through the IAEA and by managing the U.S. co-chair role of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). We help secure vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the world and promote new approaches to address nuclear smuggling threats. We help prevent insider threats at vulnerable nuclear facilities by strengthening security practices and human reliability programs. We engage law enforcement, security sectors, and scientists to prevent the deliberate use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents as weapons, and to map illicit financing and trafficking networks that are used to transfer WMD-related equipment, materials, and other supplies. ISN works with facilities and suppliers to assess potential risks and to secure or minimize chemicals to prevent their diversion for purposes of weaponization. Particularly in countries with ISIS affiliates and returning fighters, ISN is training law enforcement to prevent, detect, and respond to WMD attack plots, including those using readily available materials.

The National Security Strategy notes that biological threats to the U.S. homeland are increasing, and the U.S. government is in the final stages of preparing a U.S. National Biodefense Strategy. ISN works to reduce risks of bioterrorism by enhancing the international community's ability to attribute biological weapons use to the responsible entity, and we work towards improving the identification, evaluation, and management of dual-use life science research that poses significant biological weapons risk.

ISN works closely with the Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau on efforts to respond to terrorist groups using WMD, as well as to prevent or restrict terrorists and other entities of concern from acquiring goods and technologies that these entities could use to threaten the United States and our allies. We provide support to the CT-led Foreign Emergency Support Team in responding to terrorist incidents involving WMD and work closely with CT on the White House initiative to counter unmanned systems.

#### **Bureau Objective 4.1: Prevent Terrorist Access to WMD Materials, Expertise, and Equipment**

##### **Justification**

Ensuring that nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities around the globe are protected requires ongoing engagement. Through its Global Threat Reduction assistance program, ISN engages partners through multilateral and bilateral channels to encourage states to strengthen their domestic systems of control, adopt a culture of nuclear security, and to make commitments to follow the relevant international conventions and guidelines for protecting these materials and facilities. For internal program management, every year we conduct a program-wide assessment that measures (via scores) a partner country's chemical,



biological, and nuclear security at the national, institutional, and professional-society levels. To prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear material, or radioactive material that could be fashioned into a “dirty bomb,” ISN works with countries to strengthen the security of facilities housing nuclear or radioactive materials. ISN also works with BWC States Party and others to promote best practices and practical tools to identify, evaluate, and manage dual-use life science research, which involves possible applications for biological weapons.

#### **Bureau Objective 4.2: Strengthen International Responses to WMD Terrorism**

##### **Justification**

Terrorists are seeking the full spectrum of WMD materials – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. Reducing risks of WMD terrorism requires that we continue to raise awareness among international partners of existing and emerging threats, encourage the sharing of information and intelligence, and work with multilateral organizations to promulgate international standards and best practices. To prevent terrorist acquisition of smuggled nuclear or other radioactive materials, ISN coordinates the U.S. response to incidents of such materials out of regulatory control overseas. ISN proactively engages foreign partners to investigate, locate, and secure nuclear and radioactive material in illegal circulation, and uses security assistance programming to improve the capabilities of those foreign partners most at risk to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radioactive material smuggling, including through the formation of special Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) teams or task forces that identify smuggling networks and recover material out of regulatory control. ISN works through the GICNT and other multilateral groups to promote sustained engagement on nuclear security issues. ISN engages in efforts to enhance the international community’s ability to attribute nuclear and biological weapons use to the responsible actor. We seek to strengthen the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism’s biological weapons investigation capacity, to ensure that when called up, the Mechanism will be effective and internationally credible.

#### **Bureau Objective 4.3: Prevent terrorist access to, or nonconventional use of, non-WMD goods and technologies**

##### **Justification**

Terrorist groups and other entities of concern are seeking to utilize advances in currently uncontrolled technologies to enhance and advance their capabilities to plan attacks. ISN is identifying the dual-use nature of these goods and technologies and pursuing a range of regulatory and other control measures to restrict them to their lawful use.

## 4. Cross-Cutting Management Objectives and Sub-Objectives

**Management Objective : Restructure ISN resources to create a more agile workforce for addressing high priority issues**

### **Justification**

In addition to its baseline nonproliferation duties and responsibilities that have spanned decades, ISN has become a leader in U.S. government efforts to reshape the international security environment to better protect U.S. national security interests, as outlined in Goal 1 of this Strategy. Our highest priority objectives, such as those relating to the DPRK, Iran, and Russian arms transactions, are complex and cross over bureaucratic lines. They require an all-of-bureau operation, since they have aspects that span multiple technical specialties and many offices thus have responsibilities for meeting them. ISN has already set up one Task Force that brings in staff from various offices to focus efforts on implementing Section 231 of CAATSA. We have also organized two “tiger teams,” one to focus on DPRK denuclearization and the other on addressing Iranian proliferation threats in the post-JCPOA era. While there are legal and bureaucratic limits to restructuring, now more than ever we need to entrench greater cooperation, coordination, and interoperability among personnel, among offices, and between policy and program offices. Our programming offices are also being reformed in order to ensure that they focus most effectively upon the greatest threats and highest priority objectives. ISN must become – and is now becoming – a more agile, adaptive, resilient, and “expeditionary” bureau, able to respond vigorously to emerging threats or unanticipated challenges.