Integrated Country Strategy

Libya

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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Seven years after the uprising that toppled a repressive, authoritarian regime, the Libyan people face a decisive moment in their country's democratic transition. Since July 2014, ongoing political divisions and fighting between armed groups have served as a reminder of the many ways in which Libya's revolution remains unfinished. Since the internationally-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli in March 2016, it has been a reliable U.S. partner, but lacks the capacity to deliver vital public services to its population and to govern and secure the country's territory. One of our key priorities is to support the establishment of a unified, legitimate, democratically elected government. Our other Chief of Mission Priorities include: promoting political reconciliation, countering terrorism, preventing civil conflict, promoting economic reform and stability, and creating new opportunities for U.S. businesses in Libya.

We should not underestimate the challenges in helping Libya to emerge as a viable democratic state capable of contributing to regional stability and prosperity. The legacy of a forty-year dictatorship include a dearth of leadership and effective institutions, widespread corruption, and deep regional and tribal divisions. The ensuing vacuum in governance and security created a permissive environment for the Islamic State (ISIS in Libya), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other extremist groups to take root. In 2016 GNA-aligned forces, supported by U.S. airstrikes, drove ISIS from its stronghold in Sirte, but the weakness of the national security and defense structures have created openings for ISIS and other extremist groups to relocate, regroup, and reemerge. Civil conflict is ongoing and rule of law is weak. In the midst of this chaotic environment, the lack of U.S. Embassy operations in Tripoli challenges our ability to understand and shape the situation on the ground.

In spite of the conditions, with strong U.S. and international support, Libyans are working to rebuild national institutions and successfully complete the transition to a democratic government that is accountable to its people and capable of meeting its international commitments. In early 2018, Libya’s High National Elections Commission (HNEC), with support from the UN and United States, registered more than 50% of eligible Libyans to vote. Also with U.S. support, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly produced a draft Constitution for Libya, and Libya’s House of Representatives is currently in the process of adopting a referendum law to give Libyans the opportunity to vote on the constitutional draft. U.S.-funded polling reflects hat Libyan public support is building for a constitution and an end to interim political arrangements. On the economic side, Libyan oil production and revenues are rising compared to 2016. In 2018 the GNA produced its first consolidated budget since 2014 which takes into account both western and eastern expenditures. Those we talk to on all sides of the current divide agree that dialogue is the only way forward, and the United States continues to facilitate the economic reforms process through the Economic Dialogue forum and a variety of USAID-led economic stabilization and development projects.
Strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Africa and the Middle East and endowed with vast natural resources, Libya has the potential to serve as a major hub for trade and investment as well as an economic anchor for Libya’s less affluent neighbors. A stable, democratic Libyan government will find eager partners in the international community and private sector.

Whether based in Tunis or Tripoli, the U.S. Mission to Libya will continue to be deeply engaged in supporting reconciliation, stabilization, and transition in Libya. In the near term, we will focus our efforts on support for the UN-led political process, including elections and national reconciliation, while working to strengthen Libya’s justice and security institutions through training, capacity building and technical assistance. To ensure the long-term durability of Libyan democracy, we are continuing programs to educate the next generation of Libyan civil servants, activists, journalists, and entrepreneurs. We will also continue to pursue programs to strengthen public financial management and enhance transparency and rule of law.
2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Libya is governed by a single, internationally recognized authority capable of representing Libyan citizens and partnering with the international community on common security, economic and political interests.

Mission Objective 1.1: Libya successfully advances its democratic transition with national and local institutions of governance becoming more legitimate and accountable to its citizens.

Mission Objective 1.2: A broadly inclusive political process secures the buy-in of Libya’s diverse stakeholders for key principles to govern Libya’s transition, including the need for transitional justice and national reconciliation.

Mission Objective 1.3: Libyan communities have enhanced ability to address drivers of instability and conflict.

Mission Goal 2: Libya develops unified national, civilian-led security and justice institutions better able to protect civilians, counter terrorism and violent conflict within its own borders, control the flow of irregular migration, and act as a partner in bilateral, regional and international counterterrorism efforts.

Mission Objective 2.1: Libya develops more professional and effective civilian-led security and justice institutions, capable of securing the country’s territory and borders, containing terrorist networks, and maintaining rule of law and human rights.

Mission Objective 2.2: State security institutions regain a monopoly on force as members of militias and other armed groups are gradually and effectively demobilized or integrated into state security structures accountable to civilian authority.

Mission Goal 3: An improved security, governance, and economic environment creates new opportunities for foreign investment, trade and development.

Mission Objective 3.1: Opportunities for licit economic growth and participation increase across Libya

Mission Objective 3.2: Libya's ability to access, secure and develop its natural resources is improved, resulting in more stable revenues and increased supply to world markets.

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Management Objective 1: Mission facilities, infrastructure, and staffing resources support secure diplomatic engagement in Libya and from the Libya External Office in Tunis.

Management Objective 2: Increased service delivery capacity commensurate with growing diplomatic engagement.
3. Management Objectives

Mission Goal 1 Libya is governed by a single, internationally recognized authority capable of representing Libyan citizens and partnering with the international community on common security, economic and political interests.

Description and Linkages: As the United Nations-brokered process of political negotiation continues to unfold, the United States will continue to support national-level institutions to govern Libya. This same commitment to representative, effective governance should also be reflected at the local level and U.S. policy will continue to support stability and citizen participation at the municipal and community level.

This goal links to the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) for FY 2018-2022, specifically JSP Objective 1.3: “Counter instability, transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

Mission Objective 1.1 Libya successfully advances its democratic transition, through the adoption of a constitutional framework that supports the growth of legitimate, accountable government institutions that represent the interests of citizens.

Justification: Libya’s government institutions must be capable of responding to the needs of its citizens, through public service delivery, adopting a constitution, executing credible elections, implementing sound budget planning and transparent budget execution, reliably and transparently transferring funds from central to local governments, providing for national defense and domestic security, and articulating citizen priorities. This is fundamental to political reconciliation and the achievement of all other Mission priorities.

Mission Objective 1.2 A broadly inclusive political process secures the buy-in of Libya’s diverse stakeholders for key principles to govern Libya’s transition, including the need for transitional justice and national reconciliation.

Justification: Libyan society is fractured, and intense suspicion and competition exists among cities, tribes, civil society, and within current dueling government institutions. U.S. support must be active in many different regional and functional areas, working to create linkages and instill confidence as Libya works towards durable solutions for national unity.

Mission Objective 1.3 Libyan local stakeholders and communities have enhanced ability to address drivers of instability and conflict.
**Justification:** If communities have more skills and resources to address the drivers and impacts of conflict, then grievances will be less severe and less exploitable by spoilers, improving prospects for national unity and stability. Political will to resume normal life exists for most Libyans, and investments in community stabilization can mobilize recovery momentum in other sectors or areas.

**Mission Goal 2** Libya develops unified national, civilian-led security and justice institutions better able to protect civilians, counter terrorist groups and violent conflict within its own borders, control the flow of irregular migration, and act as a partner in bilateral, regional and international counterterrorism efforts.

**Description and Linkages:** Libya remains at the center of U.S. efforts to defeat ISIS and protect U.S. security and economic interests. Security, both short term and long term, remains a critical national security priority for the United States in Libya and the region as well as in support of our governance and transition goals. Currently, a lack of unified Libyan security and defense bodies and proliferation of localized armed groups are undermining the political reconciliation process, providing ungoverned space for bad actors to both hide and operate.

This goal links to the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, specifically:

JSP Objective 1.2: Defeat ISIS, al-Qa’ida and other transnational terrorist organizations, and counter state sponsored, regional, and local terrorist groups that threaten U.S. national security interests; and

JSP Objective 1.4: Increase capacity and strengthen resilience of our partners and allies to deter aggression, coercion, and malign influence by state and non-state actors.

**Mission Objective 2.1** Libya develops more professional and effective civilian-led security and justice institutions, capable of securing the country’s territory and borders, containing terrorist networks, and maintaining rule of law and human rights.

**Justification:** If security and justice institutions increase their professionalism and capacity to carry out critical functions, then they will be better able to counter internal and external threats and reduce the threat of violent escalation of conflict. In addition to ensuring security and accountability, consolidated security and justice institutions under civilian authority will also create an enabling environment for elections, stabilization, and formation of a unified, inclusive government capable of partnering with the United States in countering terrorism.

**Mission Objective 2.2** State security institutions are unified and members of militias and other armed groups are gradually and effectively demobilized or integrated into state security structures accountable to civilian authority.
Justification: Unification of military actors across Libya and government control over non-state armed actors will decrease risks of violent conflict and instability and enable political stabilization. Without militia competition, an empowered Libyan security sector will contribute to long-term stability and the development of effective governance institutions, capable of partnering with the United States and the international community in combatting terrorism. Likewise, eventual disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating (DDR) programs will enable former members of non-state armed actors to transition into formal security positions or normal civilian life.

Mission Goal 3 An improved security, governance and economic environment creates new opportunities for foreign investment, trade and development.

Description and Linkages: This goal links to the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, particularly

JSP Objective 2.1: Promote American prosperity by advancing bilateral relationships and leveraging international institutions and agreements to open markets, secure commercial opportunities, and foster investment and innovation to contribute to U.S. job creation; and

JSP Objective 2.3: Advance U.S. economic security by ensuring energy security, combating corruption, and promoting market-oriented economic and governance reforms.

Mission Objective 3.1 Opportunities for licit economic growth and participation increase across Libya.

Justification: If economic participation improves, if economic reforms advance, and if key institutions, including local governments, have more revenue, self-reliance of Libyan institutions and citizens will improve, as will national stability.

Mission Objective 3.2 Libya’s ability to access, secure, and develop its natural resources is improved, resulting in more stable revenues and increased supply to world markets.

Justification: The overwhelming majority of Libya’s revenue derives from hydrocarbons. If this resource can be harnessed effectively to power the country’s development, Libya will move closer to stability and self-sufficiency.
4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 Mission facilities and infrastructure support secure diplomatic engagement

Justification: Our needs for facilities and infrastructure are complex as we operate as a tenant in the US Embassy in Tunisia while planning for the safe return of U.S. diplomats to Libya, when conditions allow.

The USG continues to pay $3.6 million in leases for the old embassy compound in Tripoli based in the Sidi Sleem Airport Road area. We lack specific information about the security at this location or reliability of infrastructure to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The compound remains largely intact and guarded by militias. There are no LE Staff caretakers on-site. An inventory of property and other items left at the compound after the 2014 evacuation has required the renewal of these leases. Most of the armored vehicles are inoperable and the remaining property (valued around $6 million) should be prepared for disposal by auction, destruction, or abandonment.

LEO Mission operations will require additional staff in Tunis that will deflate eventually as operations reestablish in Libya. As the Tunis office requirements evolve; the management team must work closely with the Embassy Tunis service providers to ensure adequate workspace for staff during all phases.

Management Objective 2 Increased service delivery capacity commensurate with growing diplomatic engagement.

Justification: As the Mission pushes to reestablish a diplomatic presence in Libya, capacity to carry out services in support of engagement activities must also grow. The Mission has 60 Tripoli LE Staff reemployed as caretakers and a cap of 25 USDHs in place. LEO officers work with limited or no support staff and without back-up coverage despite intensifying requirements to meet White House priorities. Over the next five years, management must continuously review and adjust the organizational requirements as the operations ebb and flow in and out of Libya. The Mission expects to increase planning for further engagement activities in Libya, requiring human resources to establish secure locations for meetings and eventual overnight shelter. Engaging on two fronts at times will require more management and support staff.