History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State
History of the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
of the
United States Department of State
# Chiefs of Security at the U.S. Department of State 1917 - 2011

## Office of the Chief Special Agent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph M. “Bill” Nye</td>
<td>1917 – 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert C. Bannerman</td>
<td>1920 – 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas F. Fitch</td>
<td>1940 – 1947</td>
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## Security Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Robert L. Bannerman</td>
<td>1945 – 1947</td>
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## Division of Security

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald L. Nicholson</td>
<td>1948 – 1952</td>
</tr>
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<td>John W. Ford</td>
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## Office of Security (SY)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>John W. Ford</td>
<td>1952 – 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis A. Flinn</td>
<td>1953 – 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Tomlin Bailey</td>
<td>1956 – 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William O. Boswell</td>
<td>1958 – 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Reilly</td>
<td>1962 – 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Marvin Gentile</td>
<td>1964 – 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl D. Ackerman</td>
<td>1978 – 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marvin L. Garrett, Jr.</td>
<td>1982 – 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David C. Fields</td>
<td>1984 – 1985</td>
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## Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)

### Assistant Secretary of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David G. Carpenter</td>
<td>1998 – 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis X. Taylor</td>
<td>2002 – 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard J. Griffin</td>
<td>2005 – 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory B. Starr (Acting)</td>
<td>2007 – 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric J. Boswell</td>
<td>2008 –</td>
</tr>
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### Director, Diplomatic Security Service

#### Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>David C. Fields</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis E. Schwartz, Jr.</td>
<td>1986 – 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark M. Dittmer</td>
<td>1988 – 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark E. Mulvey</td>
<td>1993 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter E. Bergin</td>
<td>1998 – 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gregory B. Starr</td>
<td>2007 – 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Donovan</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeffrey W. Culver</td>
<td>2009 – 2011</td>
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SERVICE BADGES

Service Badges used by Special Agents (1917-present), and by DS Diplomatic Couriers and DS Security Engineers (present)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief Special Agent (1917-1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Bureau of Diplomatic Security (1985 - Present)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Foreign Buildings Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBCO</td>
<td>Moscow Embassy Building Control Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Marine Security Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>New Office Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York City Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Office of Communications</td>
</tr>
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<td>OC/S</td>
<td>Office of Communications’ Division of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>OSAC</td>
<td>Overseas Security Advisory Council</td>
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<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Officer</td>
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<td>S/CT</td>
<td>Office of Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEO</td>
<td>Security Engineering Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO(T)</td>
<td>Security Officer (Technical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SY</td>
<td>Office of Security (1947-1985)</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan  Adolph Dubs was commuting from his residence to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on February 14, 1979, when four men abducted him. A man dressed as a policeman stopped the Ambassador’s car and said that he had orders to search it. Aiming a gun at the chauffeur’s head, the “policeman” ordered the chauffeur to remain still while he and three men got into the car. At gunpoint, the chauffeur drove to the Kabul Hotel, arriving at about 8:50 a.m. The kidnappers ordered Dubs out of the car and took him to a second floor room. The chauffeur was instructed to go to the U.S. Embassy and inform the Americans of the situation. A large number of Afghan police, military, and fire department personnel quickly surrounded the hotel. Three Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) from the U.S. Embassy arrived, as did four Soviet officials. During the next four hours, U.S. officials repeatedly urged Afghan officials to exercise restraint to ensure the Ambassador’s safety. According to FSOs on site, the four Soviet officials held repeated discussions with Afghan authorities and appeared to serve as advisors. At 12:50 p.m. Afghan forces stormed the second-floor room, and Ambassador Dubs was killed during the ensuing gunfire.¹

Figure 1: Special Agent Frank Madden (center, white suit) looks on as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson waves to well-wishers in front of the U.S. Embassy in Vienna on June 30, 1952. Source: U.S. Information Service.
The abduction and death of Ambassador Dubs highlighted the importance of diplomatic security and prompted U.S. Department of State officials to reexamine the security measures that they had in place. The United States has always had some form of diplomatic security, yet the threats to U.S. diplomacy and the measures that the Department of State has employed to counter them have changed considerably over time. This history explores how diplomatic security at the Department of State has evolved from the American Revolution to the post-Cold War era.

Broadly defined, diplomatic security is the set of measures enacted to ensure that the diplomatic representatives of a nation-state, kingdom, or other political entity are able to conduct that entity’s foreign affairs in a confidential, safe manner. Security is a basic function of diplomacy, and specific components of diplomatic security include preserving the confidentiality of diplomatic documents and communications, protecting diplomatic personnel, ensuring the integrity of diplomatic personnel through background investigations, and safeguarding diplomatic posts overseas and diplomatic facilities at home.

This history focuses on how the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and each of its predecessors (the Office of Security, the Security Office, and the Office of the Chief Special Agent) emerged and changed over the course of nearly a century. The work also describes how and why several security-related functions became centralized into a security office. Until recently, the personnel and resources devoted to the Department’s security office have been small in relation to the enormous task confronting the Department’s security professionals. As a result, individuals figure prominently in this history and their contributions are highlighted when possible.
Practices, procedures, and responsibilities often arise well before a bureaucracy designates a person or office to specialize in that task. Historians of cryptology have shown that rulers and diplomats used codes and ciphers in communications long before a national, city-state, or royal government devoted an entity or person exclusively to the creation of codes or the encryption/decryption of communications. Past generations of U.S. diplomats, including the first diplomat Benjamin Franklin, gave serious consideration to diplomatic security, yet, how they conceived the threats they faced and the countermeasures they devised were determined by the available technology and the milieu in which they lived. Some measures have changed so markedly that they now seem minimally related to security, yet the contribution of such “forgotten” measures to the history of diplomatic security is unmistakable. For example, from 1800 to 1916, Despatch Agents were the Department’s foremost security personnel, but their work has changed significantly so that they are no longer viewed as security personnel.

Rather than trying to discuss each of the many security-related measures enacted by the Department of State, this history concentrates upon the broader context of threats and crises confronting the Department during a particular era, as well as the measures that fell eventually under the purview of DS. The work examines such measures as codes, couriers, espionage countermeasures, physical security, and protective details. Other measures are discussed when they are relevant for a particular era. Investigation of passport and visa fraud, for example, was critical during World War I, World War II, and the 1990s.
but is discussed little beyond those junctures despite remaining a key responsibility for DS and its predecessors throughout the twentieth century.

The chapters are organized chronologically and by what might be described as “security frameworks.” Each chapter details how a unique set of diplomatic threats upset the existing security framework and how Department officials devised new countermeasures to respond to the new threats, often building upon existing measures or innovating new ones. The rise of a new framework frequently resulted from a specific event. In chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the events respectively are World War I, World War II, the Amerasia affair, McCarthyism, public disclosure of a “bug” network in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and the 1983 suicide bomber attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. In other chapters, the new frameworks resulted from broader national or international developments. For chapters 6, 8, and 9, the developments respectively are the rise of terrorism, the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the resurgence of terrorism as the predominant threat to U.S. diplomacy. Also discussed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, the computer revolution of the late twentieth century fostered new threats and new facets of diplomatic security. The conclusion offers several observations about the nature of diplomatic security and, along with the epilogue, examines diplomatic security since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center.

Finally, the history of diplomatic security offers a unique window into U.S. diplomacy and the Department of State. Often overlooked by many histories of U.S. diplomacy, the functional operations and organizational structure of the Department have profoundly affected the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. For example, an aging communications network hampered U.S. diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This history also
offers new insights to familiar episodes. For example, contrary to popular understanding, U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy did not fabricate his figures about the number of Communists in the Department of State. McCarthy derived his numbers from materials presented to Congress by the Office of Security (SY); however, McCarthy repackaged the information in such a way that it took SY officials weeks to determine the source.

**Acknowledgments**


The Office of the Historian has accrued many other debts during the process of researching and writing this history and expresses its gratitude to those individuals. Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Francis X. Taylor merits special thanks because he proposed and commissioned
this history. The Office of the Historian thanks the staffs of the Ralph J. Bunche Library, the Office of Information Programs and Services, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress for their assistance in locating relevant materials. In the Office of the Historian, Amy Garrett, Mark Hove, and Jennifer O’Neal conducted the initial research and wrote the first drafts on topics that appear in the chapters. Mark Hove is the author of this book, other than the Epilogue. He conducted a second round of research, organized and wrote the chapters, completed multiple revisions and supplemental research, and selected the illustrations. Eric Boswell, Greg Bujac, Jeffrey Culver, Robert Downen, David Nickles, Greg Starr, and Susan Tully read the entire work and offered many valuable comments and suggestions. Others who contributed in ways large and small include Bill Armor, Jim Bacigalupo, Paul Claussen, Evan Duncan, George Herrmann, Doug Kraft, and Chris Tudda. Grace Moe and Robert Downen of the DS Public Affairs Office merit special thanks for their invaluable help in writing the 2001-2010 Epilogue, as well as in editing the entire text, locating additional illustrations, and bringing this work to final book form.

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Statement by the White House on the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986:
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Diplomatic security is as old as diplomacy itself. Initially, diplomatic security was primarily the secure conveyance of government communications using couriers and codes. The Persian, Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, Aztec, and Incan empires developed courier services to carry imperial messages. The Greeks and Romans also developed ciphers to preserve confidentiality of diplomatic messages.1 By the Renaissance (1500s), codes had emerged, and Spanish, French, English, Vatican, and Venetian foreign ministers routinely used ciphers and codes when writing to their diplomats abroad. The European monarchies also developed courier networks to carry messages. Courier work was seen as a training ground for diplomats because couriers had to exercise discretion, know the local language, and employ disguises to avoid detection.2

Colonial-era leaders in North America were acutely aware of the need to protect their correspondence. As tensions escalated between Great Britain and its American colonies in the 1760s, the Sons of Liberty communicated with each other by dropping letters at secretly designated coffee houses or taverns, where sympathetic postmen or ship captains would pick up and deliver the letters. During the American Revolution, the small fleet of sympathetic

Figure 1: Henry Laurens, U.S. Commissioner to the Netherlands. Laurens and his papers were captured by the British while en route to Europe. His papers provided evidence of Dutch aid to the American Revolution and led Great Britain to declare war on the Netherlands. Portrait by Pierre Eugène du Simitière, 1783. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.
captains evolved into a proto-courier system, carrying U.S. diplomats or their correspondence across the Atlantic Ocean. The perils of trans-oceanic travel (bad weather, shipwreck, espionage, loss at sea) often delayed the delivery of diplomatic letters. Even in good weather, a letter took six to eight weeks to cross the Atlantic.³

One of the most serious breaches of diplomatic security during the Revolution occurred in 1780 when the British captured Henry Laurens, U.S. commissioner to the Netherlands. Before his capture, Laurens burned and sank many of his papers, but he did not sufficiently weigh down the final pouch. A British captain retrieved the pouch from the water and forwarded the papers to the British Cabinet. One of the documents was a draft treaty between the American colonies and the Netherlands. As a result, England declared war on the Netherlands, which then allied with France and the United States. Laurens, meanwhile, was imprisoned in the Tower of London.⁴

Revolutionary diplomats regularly used ciphers and codes, many of which were their own creations. From 1776 to 1789, U.S. diplomats used 17 ciphers, 10 cipher-codes, and 23 codes. A common code involved two correspondents using the same book to encode a message in which each word was replaced by a number. The first digit(s) was for the page of the book, the second for the line of the page, and the third digit(s) for the position of the word in the line.⁵

Espionage plagued American Revolutionary diplomats. In 1776, the British planted Dr. Edward Bancroft as a spy on the staff of Benjamin Franklin, the U.S. Minister to France, and Bancroft operated undetected for years. The French Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes, acquired the ciphers for several U.S. diplomats. In 1777, British Minister to Prussia Hugh Elliot learned that the American emissary to Prussia, Arthur Lee, kept a journal locked in his desk. While Elliot dined with Lee one evening, Elliot’s men stole Lee’s journal and copied it.⁶

**Diplomatic Security and the Early Republic (1783-1840)**

After the Revolution, serving under the Articles of Confederation, Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay (1784-1789) instituted the first formal diplomatic security measures for the new American government. As head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jay organized documents and segregated “confidential” and “non-confidential” papers with the assistance of two clerks. He also insisted that all correspondence
go to his office before being presented to the Congress of the Confederation. Jay complained to Thomas Jefferson that “little secrecy is to be expected” from Congress because members talked freely to the public about confidential matters.\(^7\)

After the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Jay asserted in Federalist Paper #64 that diplomatic security was a key reason to ratify the draft Constitution of the United States. Writing as “Publius,” Jay said that diplomatic negotiations required “perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch” and many foreign diplomats would be uneasy about disclosing sensitive information to a large body such as Congress. By placing the conduct of foreign affairs with the President (in the executive branch), the Constitution allowed diplomats to confide sensitive matters to the President and his representatives, such as the Secretary of State.\(^8\)

After ratification of the Constitution in 1789, the new United States Department of State used several ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes. During the 1790s, it received more than 5,000 lines of code from its diplomats overseas. Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and James Monroe each developed a 1,600- or 1,700-element cipher-code for the Department’s use. Monroe’s 1,700-element cipher-code, known as the Monroe cipher, was first employed during 1803 negotiations for the Louisiana Purchase. By 1815, the Monroe cipher was the Department’s standard code.\(^9\)

During the Early Republic period (1789-1840), the Department of State developed two methods for secure overseas transport for its correspondence: bearers of dispatch and forwarding agents. Used for a single, one-way trip, bearers of dispatch were often lawyers or merchants who carried letters or documents to or from Washington. Bearers—they were not called “couriers”—received a special passport and were reimbursed for expenses. The Department most often relied on forwarding agents. Starting in 1794, the Collectors of Customs in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia served as the Department’s forwarding agents. Forwarding agents learned of arriving
and departing ships, spoke with ship captains and officers, and sent letters and packages on appropriate ships. The captain stored the letters in his cabin in a locked chest. When the ship arrived at its destination, the captain would send word, and a legation or consulate officer would pick up the item. Letters or packages from posts overseas were relayed by the forwarding agent to the Department. By 1801, the New York Collector of Customs was the Department’s primary forwarding agent.\textsuperscript{10}

During the Quasi War between revolutionary France and the United States (1798-1800), George Logan, a Pennsylvania Quaker, prompted passage of the first diplomatic security statute. Distressed by the war, Logan travelled to Paris and personally negotiated with French officials. After his return, Logan met with President John Adams, and Adams admitted that Logan’s information encouraged him to send a diplomat to France, leading to a peace treaty. Despite Logan’s success and good intentions, officials asked whether U.S. diplomacy would be secure if U.S. citizens, on their own initiative, conducted negotiations on behalf of the United States. Adams proposed that U.S. diplomacy be reserved to persons designated by the President. Congress agreed and passed the 1799 Logan Act, which made unauthorized diplomatic initiatives by private citizens a “high misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment.”\textsuperscript{11}

One of the more serious security threats to the Department occurred during the War of 1812. As British troops neared Washington in August 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe ordered all Department records and other important government documents (including the Declaration of Independence) removed from the city. Department of State Commission Clerk Stephen Pleasanton hid the records in a gristmill two miles upstream from Georgetown and later moved them to a vacant house in Leesburg, Virginia. The records remained in Leesburg for several weeks until the British left Chesapeake Bay.\textsuperscript{12}

After the War of 1812, the Department expanded its diplomatic security measures. By 1815, Secretary Monroe differentiated between clerks who did “confidential” tasks and those who did “non-confidential” work. By 1820, the Department locked its doors at night and employed two night watchmen. In 1819, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams fired a Department employee for failing to observe security procedures, the first time an employee was dismissed for such an offense. Adams did so after President Monroe warned him that clerk John B. Colvin could not be trusted and that he (Monroe) had kept Colvin on “non-confidential” work during his term as Secretary. Later, Secretary of State Louis

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{The Northeast Executive Office Building, home of the Department of State from 1819 to 1866. After the War of 1812, the Department employed two night watchmen to lock the building and guard the premises during the evening. Drawn by C. Burton. Source: National Archives and Records Administration.}
\end{figure}
McLane (1833-1834) instructed Department staff that they should consider all Departmental business and documents strictly confidential. In 1830, the Department hired “despatch agents,” who assumed the forwarding agent’s duties and several other security-related tasks. The first despatch agent was William B. Taylor, who had his office in New York, the leading U.S. port. In 1832, the Department appointed John Miller, a book dealer in London, as its second despatch agent. Each man received an annual salary of $500.

A brief explanation of the workings of the Department’s mail system reveals the critical security role of despatch agents. The Chief Clerk collected all outgoing mail and ensured that the proper amount of postage was affixed (governments required postage for diplomatic letters). The U.S. Post Office hauled the canvas bags of Department letters by horse-drawn wagon to the New York Despatch Agent’s office. For packages, the U.S. Government contracted U.S. Express and, after 1847, the Adams Express Company to transport parcels at least once, often twice a week. In New York, the despatch agent sorted the correspondence by geographic region and re-bagged it in bags labeled “U.S. Government.” Correspondence marked “confidential” was placed in leather pouches or carpetbags. After routing bags and pouches onto appropriate ships, the despatch agent logged each letter and parcel, gave it a number, and noted its arrival date, departure date, the ship, and the captain. Most Department mail headed to Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America went to Liverpool, where the London Despatch Agent sorted it by geographic sub-region, re-bagged it, and routed it on U.S. or British ships. Despatch agents forwarded incoming items to Washington and investigated problems such as lost pouches.

In retrospect, the despatch agent system offered an innovative, secure, effective means to transport diplomatic mail within a relatively closed system, separate from regular mail. Unlike the Europeans who could rely upon couriers because their countries were in close proximity to each other, U.S. officials relied on trans-oceanic transport for nearly all diplomatic correspondence. Only despatch agents, ship captains, and authorized legation or consulate staff handled correspondence between Washington and its posts. At sea, diplomatic mail was often locked in a chest in the captain’s quarters. The system also saved money; expenses for a bearer of dispatch ranged from $294 for a trip to Paris, to $3630 to travel to Lima; but expenses for...
6 months of postage for the despatch agent system ranged from $6 to $60. The despatch agent system's effectiveness and economy delayed creation of a U.S. courier network for another century.18

Security Imperatives from Steam Power

During the 1840s and 1850s, three innovations—steamships, railroads, and the Panama route—prompted the Department to add several security procedures. Steamships regularized shipping schedules and cut the time for Atlantic crossings from five weeks to two, fostering more frequent exchanges of diplomatic correspondence between Washington and its 31 legations and 282 consulates.19 Despatch agents entrusted diplomatic pouches to the purser instead of the captain because the purser managed the steamship's “secure room” or “strong room,” in which the pouches were stored and locked.20 With the 1848 acquisition of California and Oregon, the Department used the Panama route for diplomatic mail to Asia and South America's west coast.21 By 1858, the Department was using locks on pouches and lead seals on bags, and the Post Office, U.S. Express, and Adams Express were hauling pouches and parcels by railroad. A lead seal was a length of two, intertwined iron wires wrapped in a loop around the top of the canvas mailbag and secured with lead solder.22

Loyalty and Security during the Civil War

The Civil War presented new diplomatic security issues. During the war's first days, the few Union troops in Washington could not protect the foreign diplomatic corps. Diplomats scrambled to obtain their national flags to fly over their legations for protection from military attack. Few diplomats possessed their nations' flags; in fact, the Prussian Minister resorted to painting “The Prussian Legation” in large letters over his mission's doorway. Secretary of State William H. Seward worried about the loyalty of Department employees. He asked all employees one question: Did they favor Union or Secession? Those who favored secession were dismissed, and those who professed loyalty to the Union were retained.23 In April 1865, as the Confederacy's surrender neared, John Wilkes Booth and his conspirators plotted to kill Secretary of State Seward in addition to President Abraham Lincoln. While Booth went to Ford’s Theater and fatally shot Lincoln, former Confederate soldier Lewis Powell forced his
way into Seward’s home and slashed the Secretary several times with a Bowie knife. Seward was recovering from a carriage accident, and the braces and bandages on his head and neck saved his life. Powell was captured two days later, tried, and hanged; meanwhile, an Army detail protected Seward. 

**Post-Civil War Technological Imperatives**

After the Civil War, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish upgraded diplomatic security at the Department. Four watchmen, instead of two, guarded the Department after business hours. Pouches and mailbags were routinely secured with padlocks and lead seals. Secretary Fish issued foreign affairs manuals that outlined security practices and mandated adherence. Papers of a “reserved or secret character” had to be “conspicuously marked” as “Confidential,” correspondence had to be numbered, and all drafts and extra copies had to be destroyed. Fish made the Chief of Mission at every U.S. diplomatic post responsible for any security failures.

The Department adopted the telegraph for communications but struggled with telegraphic security. On November 23, 1866, to inaugurate the first sustainable, trans-Atlantic line, Secretary of State Seward sent the first coded U.S. diplomatic telegram, using the Monroe cipher. Telegraph companies stipulated that a coded message using number groups (as Monroe’s cipher did) had to spell out the numbers (e.g. 387 was “three eight seven”), so Seward’s 780-word cable expanded to 3,772 words. Also, the Anglo-American Telegraph Company, which owned the line, charged double ($5 per word) for coded messages. Seward’s telegram cost $19,540.40, more than three times his salary. Seward then compounded the fiasco by sending his message to Paris in code and releasing it to the press. This enabled the French, if they were so inclined, to break the U.S. code. Moreover, the Department had used Monroe’s cipher for so long (60 years) that the British already had broken it, lost their key, and retraced most of their work.

The “first telegram” fiasco led the Department to improve telegraphic security. Seward ordered a replacement code for the Monroe cipher, and the new
code was in use six months later. Several cables in the new code, however, arrived as one, long string of letters, and the “conundrums,” as they were called, took weeks to decode. In the 1870s, the adoption of the five letter/digit group as the telegraph industry’s standard “word” provided the basis for the Red Code, which was introduced in February 1876. Designed by John H. Haswell, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, the Red Code favored economy over security. Its codebook—the cover of which was red—had nearly 1,200 pages. Secretary of State Fish mandated that every codebook be numbered and the person to whom a codebook was assigned be held responsible for its security and return.

In 1898, Secretary of State John Sherman offered Haswell $3000 to develop a new code; and a year later, Haswell produced the “Blue Code,” again named for the codebook’s cover. Haswell added nearly 2,600 words and phrases to the codebook; and in 1900, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee appended a one- and two-letter coding for dates. Two copies of the Blue Code, however, were soon stolen from U.S. posts in St. Petersburg (1905) and Bucharest (1907). As a result, the Department issued the Green Code in 1910 and demoted the Blue Code to unclassified messages.

**Security on the Eve of World War I**

The United States’ growing wealth and power expanded the extent of its diplomatic relations, which increased the Department’s need for diplomatic security. The United States began assigning military attachés to posts in the 1880s, raising its legations to
embassies in 1893, and doubled Department staff (80 to 178) between 1896 and 1909. The amount of diplomatic mail and classified documents grew exponentially. The Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives reported in 1897 that handling and sorting of mail, as well as coding and decoding of telegrams, kept him and ten clerks so busy that they could do little else. The London despatch agent and his staff picked up and sent off pouches and parcels multiple times per week at four ports: Liverpool, Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth. By 1906, chiefs of mission and consuls pleaded with Washington to hire qualified clerks to handle the growing cable traffic, and several admitted to assigning code work to their wives or foreign national employees.

The Department enhanced security measures to address the situation. By 1909, Department employees presented cards issued by the Chief Clerk or their bureau chief to gain access to the building. Between 1900 and 1909, the United States negotiated bilateral agreements with 26 countries for free exchange of diplomatic pouches without interference. Department officials separated the pouch room from the mailroom and restricted access to it. Pouch workers registered each pouch and recorded its contents. In an early tracking system, the Chief Mail Clerk cabled the New York despatch agent about arriving pouches, and the despatch agent, in turn, notified the post of a forthcoming pouch. A missing pouch prompted an immediate inquiry, as did instances of missing items. The Chief Mail Clerk locked the pouch room at day’s end and gave the key to the night watchman. Only those with written authorization from the Chief Clerk or division chief could obtain the key.
The physical structure of telegraph networks undercut U.S. security efforts. Coded U.S. messages to and from Europe passed over British lines, and Department code clerks long knew that the British intercepted cables and had a bureau for breaking codes. The White House and the Department shared the same telegraph line, enabling a curious code clerk to monitor the President’s cables. Department code clerk Herbert O. Yardley did just that, claiming that he broke the President’s code in two hours.37 Between 1905 and 1912, the Department doubled its number of code clerks from three to six, and its new telegraph office operated 24 hours every day. Department code clerks handled 1,000 telegrams per month, one-half of which were coded. The clerks worked with multiple codes, including the Secretary of State’s code, because not all posts had received the Green Code or even the Blue Code.38

**Conclusion**

The United States has always had some form of diplomatic security. Although no single office or person was designated to enforce security before World War I, early U.S. diplomats like John Jay were acutely aware of the need to protect U.S. diplomacy. They drew upon past precedents to devise practices that laid the foundations of diplomatic security in the U.S. Department of State. Although diplomatic security was associated mostly with communications security (correspondence and telegrams), Department officials prior to the twentieth century created early forms of document classification and conducted employee clearances and counter-espionage efforts. Technological innovations like the steamship and telegraph, events like World War I, and the emerging
U.S. presence in international affairs pushed the Department to enact more security procedures and also regularized security as a function of Department operations. By the start of the First World War, Department officials had better security measures in place than their predecessors but felt less secure.

**Endnotes**

1. Ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes have notable differences. For a cipher, a person substitutes each letter of the text with a different letter. For example, each letter might be replaced by the letter three positions earlier in the alphabet; therefore, “qorzb” would equal “truce.” For a code, groups of letters, numbers, and/or symbols replace words or phrases; hence, “36” might equal “King Phillip II of Spain.” A cipher-code combines the two systems.


Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, Volumes I and II: passim, RG 59 – Entry 285. Entries for 16 April 1858, 2 November 1858, and 2 April 1860, Daybook of Contingent Expenses, 1833-1889, I: 107, 115, 133. Staff, The Transatlantic Mail, 59-61, 72, 78, 86-90. Francis E. Hyde, Cunard and
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20 Letter, James A. Hill, New York Despatch Agent, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, 12 May 1856; Memorandum “Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded by Nathaniel D. Hubbard, Despatch Agent in Boston for One Quarter ending July 31, 1857,” attached to Note, Hubbard to John Appleton, Assistant Secretary of State, 31 July 1857; Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded… Quarter ending 30 June 1859; and Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded… Quarter ending 30 June 1860; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York and Boston, 1840-1860, Office of Budget and Planning and Its Predecessors, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA.


22 For locks and lead seals, see Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, 2 volumes, I and II: passim. Entries for 2 November 1858 and 2 April 1860, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, I: 115, 133. For use of railroad, see Letter, Samuel R. Glen, U.S. Despatch Agent Boston, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, 6 December 1855; Letter, Glen to Marcy, 2 March 1856; and Letter, James A. Hill, U.S. Despatch Agent New York, to Marcy, 13 June 1856; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York and Boston, 1840-1860, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA.

23 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State: A Memoir of his Life, with Selections from His Letters, 1846-1861, 2 volumes, (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), II: 553, 520. Stuart, The Department of State, 131.


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31 Letter, Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State, to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 27 November 1908, File #16682, MA 862, Microfilm Roll #971; Letter, Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. Minister to Colombia, to Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 15 December 1908, MA 862, Roll #9761; and Letter, Root to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 16 January 1909, File #17530, MA 826, Roll #997; all Numerical Files 1906-10, RG 59, NA.

32 Rachel West, O.S.F., *The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978), 75. Memorandum, Wilbur J. Carr, Chief Clerk, to Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant III, Superintendent of the State, War, Navy Building, 17 November 1909; and Memorandum, Acting Chief Clerk to Grant III, 4 September 1909; both Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

33 The 26 countries were Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Russia, and Venezuela. The Department would soon add Costa Rica, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire to the list. Memorandum, Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, to William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 31 August 1909, Folder – Unmarked [#4], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

34 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips, 9 September 1909, attached to Memorandum, Phillips to Carr, 13 October 1909, Folder – Unmarked [#14]; and Departmental Notice “Register of Pouches,” William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States having Pouch Service with the Department of State, 7 February 1914, 051.01/26a, Folder – Unmarked [#3]; both Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 June 1912, 051.01/20c; and Instruction, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States Having an Official Pouch Service, 14 June 1912, 051.01/20e; both Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA.

35 Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 June 1912; Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1912; Telegram, Robert Bacon, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 20 January 1912; Roosa to McNeir, 24 January 1912; all Folder 2, Box 361, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, James F. Stutesman, U.S. Minister to Bolivia, to Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, 8 November 1909; Memorandum, McNeir, to Roosa, 9 December 1909; Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1910; and Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 16 December 1910; all Folder – Unmarked [#3], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

36 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips 9 September 1909; and Memorandum, Carr [?] to Captain John H. Poole, Superintendent of the State, War, and Navy Building, 29 May 1909; both Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

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CHAPTER 1

SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS
Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

World War I created a diplomatic security crisis for the United States. Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew afterwards would describe the era before the war as “diplomatic serenity – a fool’s paradise.” In retrospect, Grew’s observation indicates more the degree to which World War I altered how U.S. officials perceived diplomatic security than the actual state of pre-war security. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Department had developed an effective set of security measures; however, those measures were developed during a long era of trans-Atlantic peace (there had been no major multi-national wars since Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1814). Moreover, those measures were developed for a nation that was a regional power, not a world power exercising influence in multiple parts of the world. World War I fundamentally altered international politics, global economics, and diplomatic relations and thrust the United States onto the world stage as a key world power. Consequently, U.S. policymakers and diplomats developed a profound sense of insecurity regarding the content of U.S. Government information. The sharp contrast between the pre- and post-World War I eras led U.S. diplomats like Grew to cast the pre-war era in near-idyllic, carefree terms, when in fact the Department had developed several diplomatic security measures to counter acknowledged threats.

The Department’s growing anxiety about diplomatic security resulted more from its recognition that U.S. communications, documents, and diplomats had become more alluring targets for intelligence and espionage by rivals, not a loss of naiveté. This recognition stemmed from three changes to U.S. diplomacy. First, U.S. officials recognized that the United States had become a world power instead of just a strong regional power. Second, because the United States was more extensively involved in world affairs, U.S. officials realized that they were generating much more classified information than they had previously; moreover, information that they had previously deemed unclassified now seemed “confidential.” Third, as a world power, the United States was expanding its diplomatic representation across the globe, creating a greater need for improved communications and greater opportunities for security breaches. This transformation was so extensive that it led some to assert mistakenly that diplomatic security did not exist in the Department before World War I, or to underrate the Department’s pre-war security measures.
During the war, Department officials grew anxious about the threats to U.S. diplomacy. Espionage and subversion were common, and nations did not always observe diplomatic immunities and privileges. To meet this challenge, the Department created Special Agents, the Department’s first formal security officers. Led first by Chief Special Agent Joseph M. “Bill” Nye, and afterwards by his successor Robert C. Bannerman, the Special Agents built upon existing security measures and enabled the Department to undertake several new security initiatives such as passport fraud investigations.

As the urgency of war faded into the peace of the 1920s, the Department followed competing impulses regarding security. Still concerned about the diplomatic threats, Department officials wanted to retain, even enact stricter security measures; yet, they also wanted to cut expenses and revert (somewhat nostalgically) to pre-war practices. For example, the Department retained its war-time creations of Special Agents and couriers, but both suffered extensive reductions during the 1920s. Despite the competing impulses, senior Department officials generally pursued greater security efforts.

**A Crisis of Diplomatic Security**

The diplomatic security crisis that the Department of State confronted with the onset of World War I resulted from two inter-related but distinct sources: the belligerents’ lack of observance of customary diplomatic immunities, and their aggressive espionage and sabotage efforts. German officials required that all outgoing international telegrams and telephone calls (including diplomatic ones) be in German, and many outgoing telegraphic messages were censored by German authorities. Censorship of coded telegrams, however, was a global phenomenon; British cable companies, as well as the South American Telegraph Company, refused to carry coded messages. U.S. diplomatic pouches faced similar troubles. The First Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Belgium had to cross enemy lines to go to Antwerp so he could communicate with Washington, and the U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg had to address its pouches to the U.S. Embassy in London because Russian authorities refused to permit the transportation of pouches addressed directly to the Department of State. The U.S. Consul in Bremen reported that German authorities were opening and inspecting all sealed envelopes at the border, forcing him to ship his official correspondence to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin for safe transmittal to Washington.

In the first days of war, U.S. and other foreign diplomats in Germany feared for their personal safety. Joseph C. Grew, who was Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin at that time, recalled that British, Russian, French and neutral U.S. diplomats (the latter were mistaken for being British), were verbally threatened, spat upon, and assaulted by German mobs, who targeted the diplomats of nations that had declared war and allied against Germany. A “big and hostile crowd” of Germans broke the windows of the British Embassy in Berlin and then kept a threatening vigil outside the Embassy. German mobs also attacked trains carrying foreign diplomats, forcing some diplomats to travel with the curtains drawn to avoid detection and shootings. When American diplomats were harassed, the Kaiser and other senior German officials made significant efforts to demonstrate German-U.S.
friendship in an effort to prevent further attacks on U.S. diplomats and consuls, which might cause the United States to end its neutrality and join the Allied nations against Germany. German newspapers published “long and prominent appeals” to the public not to confuse the Americans with the British, who had declared war against Germany. 

The war prompted U.S. posts in Europe to implement new measures to ensure the security of U.S. personnel and diplomatic pouches. As a result of German attacks against British citizens, U.S. diplomats and citizens in Germany wore American flags on their lapels to avoid any confusion that they might be British. The U.S. Embassy in London employed two couriers, Thomas Smith and Henry Eustis, clerks at the U.S. Embassies in London and Berlin respectively, to serve as couriers for U.S. diplomatic pouches between U.S. Embassy London and the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Vienna. As clerk-couriers, Smith and Eustis made regular trips for the first year or so of the war, although their usage tapered to an irregular, “as necessary” basis by 1916. The U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg employed bearers of dispatch when it could, to transport confidential correspondence to Washington. In Belgium, the U.S., Spanish, and Dutch Embassies joined together and paid a Dutch courier to take their pouches to Amsterdam in order to get them to their respective governments. In London, U.S. Despatch Agent office clerks escorted all incoming and outgoing pouches to and from the ports of Liverpool, Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth. Between 1914 and 1920, U.S. Despatch Agent Office clerk Frank Gurney escorted 8,860 pouches and traveled more than 176,577 miles.

In several ways, the Department of State was unprepared for the exigencies of a world war. For example, the barrage of telegraphic communications created confusion in the Department’s telegraph office. The Department quickly insisted that U.S. posts had to number and date all telegrams to the Department. U.S. posts overseas compounded the confusion by using whatever encryption code they had available. As a result, the Department
received telegrams in a variety of encryption codes, including Red, Special Red, Blue, Green, and Special Green, as well as an array of commercial codes.\textsuperscript{10}

President Woodrow Wilson declared that the United States would remain neutral in the war, but the German Embassy in Washington did not observe U.S. neutrality and carried out several propaganda and sabotage efforts against Allied targets. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin discovered vouchers showing that the German Embassy in Washington was funding several propaganda efforts in the United States. Military Attaché Captain Franz von Papen helped organize a ring to provide false passports for German- and Austrian-Americans wishing to go to Europe to fight for the Central Powers, as well as for German spies conducting espionage in Great Britain, France, and Russia. With the involvement of von Papen and Naval Attaché Captain Karl Boy-Ed, German sabotage efforts between March and September 1915 led to explosions in ten U.S. factories that produced munitions for the Allied powers. During nearly the same period, thirteen ships (mostly British) that departed U.S. ports with supplies exploded en route. The German military attachés were also involved in plots to blow up the international railway bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, and the Welland Canal linking Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. The United States demanded von Papen’s recall in 1915, but Boy-Ed continued organizing such activities until his recall in 1917.\textsuperscript{11}

The espionage and propaganda activities of Austrian Ambassador Dr. Constantin Theodore Dumba prompted the United States to demand his recall in 1915 as well. In August 1915, British agents arrested U.S. war correspondent James F. J. Archibald and found papers in his possession that revealed that he was a bearer of dispatch for the German and Austrian Governments. Archibald also possessed documents showing that Ambassador Dumba had actively funded propaganda efforts for the Central Powers in the United States, and had incited labor unrest in U.S. factories. U.S. officials were angry about not only Dumba’s espionage, but also the fact that he had employed a U.S. citizen. Employing an American as a bearer of dispatch implicitly made that U.S. citizen an agent of a foreign government and a target for the enemies of that government. It threatened to make other U.S. citizens combatants in the war, and cast doubt upon U.S. neutrality. Secretary of State Robert Lansing confronted Dumba, charging that “you have cast suspicion on every American going to Germany.” Lansing immediately demanded Dumba’s recall in an effort to deter other foreign diplomats in Washington from employing Americans as secret couriers.\textsuperscript{12}
The magnitude of the sabotage, espionage, and diplomatic security activities overwhelmed U.S. Government agencies, and many German and Austrian activities were discovered with British assistance or by sheer luck. U.S. Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard mistakenly opened a package that arrived by diplomatic pouch and discovered the vouchers documenting German funding of propaganda efforts in the United States. One German agent turned himself in to the British secret service, and his confession exposed the Welland Canal plot and the passport fraud ring. British agents arrested James Archibald, leading to Dumba’s demise; and British and French agents assisted with uncovering the plot to sabotage the Vanceboro Bridge. The New York City bomb squad decided to check out a person who was acting suspiciously and uncovered several sabotage plots. The U.S. Secret Service uncovered other German sabotage plans when the German Commercial Attaché absent-mindedly left his briefcase on a New York elevated train (the attaché managed the German Embassy’s finances).13

The German Embassy’s success in exploiting passport fraud resulted in part because mandatory use of passports was a new phenomenon. Prior to 1914, U.S. citizens did not need to carry passports for travel to most European countries. With the outbreak of war in 1914, U.S. chiefs of mission in Europe issued emergency passports upon request, and passports were soon limited to U.S. citizens and to those declaring their intent to become U.S. citizens.14 On December 21, 1914, the Department tightened passport application requirements, compelling applicants to provide three photographs, as well as a birth certificate, certificate of naturalization, or an old passport. Passport applicants also needed to declare which countries they intended to visit and the general purpose of their travels; moreover, the passport was valid only for the countries declared.15

The 1915 discovery of the passport fraud ring and the German Embassy’s ties to it prompted U.S. officials to impose further passport restrictions. Passports could no longer be issued to those who declared their intent to become a U.S. citizen if their country of origin was at war or if the person was planning to visit a belligerent country. President Wilson, through Executive Order No. 2285, required all U.S. citizens to apply for a U.S. passport at a court of record near their residence, and applicants had to swear an oath of allegiance to the United States. Wilson also required that all foreigners leaving the United States must have passports issued by the governments of their respective countries. The Department of State then requested the chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions in Washington to supply blank or expired passports to the Department so that U.S. officials could recognize valid passports from their countries.16

Creating a Diplomatic “Secret Service”

Secretary of State Robert Lansing recognized the security crisis confronting the Department and instituted several measures to address it. He implemented a strict building pass system that applied to all Department visitors, including Congressmen, reporters, and delivery and service personnel. Lansing and other senior officials believed that some regular visitors to the Department (notably reporters) were paid by the Germans, were “too indiscreet,” or were “too indifferent” to national security considerations to merit access to the building. While the
earlier pass system consisted of a written authorization by the Chief Clerk or a division chief, Lansing's new system required a photograph to be affixed to the pass. Visitors were not allowed beyond the guard or watchman’s station unless they received verbal permission from the person whom the visitor requested to see. Moreover, persons unfamiliar to the Department officials were escorted to and from the specified office, and refused access to other parts of the building.17

Lansing also moved to create an inter-agency “secret service” located in the Department of State. Many German and Austrian acts of fraud, propaganda, sabotage, and espionage cut across or fell between the jurisdictions of various U.S. law enforcement agencies. Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo admitted that the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Post Office Inspection Service were often “crossing wires with [one] another in running down crimes and conducting investigations” of espionage, fraud, and sabotage. To rectify this, Lansing proposed creating an office under the Department of State’s Office of the Counselor to review investigation reports from several law enforcement agencies. In proposing this to President Wilson, Lansing contended that given the serious diplomatic consequences involved with both the act and the investigation, the Department of State should oversee the response and actions of other agencies. Lansing envisioned the proposed office to be a clearinghouse of information, and he hoped that the Departments of Justice and Treasury, and the Postal Service would detail agents to this Bureau of Secret Intelligence to gather information on belligerent activity in the United States.18

Lansing’s proposal drew a mixed response, and he later admitted that inter-agency rivalries and “mutual jealousies” undermined it. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo strongly supported Lansing’s
intelligence bureau, and sent a letter endorsing it to the President, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster
General. Postmaster General Albert Burleson was reluctant to release any of his investigators for the new project, but later agreed to send some men to the Department of State on a temporary assignment. Attorney General Thomas Gregory outright refused to contribute any resources to the effort. In mid-1917, McAdoo pleaded with Wilson to endorse Lansing’s intelligence office, but Wilson stalled.

Frustrated by the delay, Lansing created the “Secret Intelligence Bureau” on April 4, 1916. He pulled Leland Harrison from the Latin American Division, where Harrison was serving as Deputy Chief of Division, and tasked him with the “collection and examination of all information of a secret nature.” Admitting that the new bureau was “extra-legal,” Lansing placed Harrison under the direction of Frank L. Polk, Counselor of the Department of State. Harrison submitted regular reports to Lansing on intelligence he had received during the previous 24 hours. He obtained that information from the War and Navy intelligence offices, the Secret Service, and other U.S. Government agencies, as well as Allied intelligence agents, most notably the British. Harrison and Edward Bell, who was Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in London, regularly corresponded and shared information, and Bell appears to have maintained regular contacts with British intelligence and secret services.

Harrison worked most closely with the Secret Service and oversaw the clandestine surveillance of the German Embassy, located near Thomas Circle in Washington DC. On May 14, 1915, through an executive order, President Wilson authorized the Secret Service to conduct surveillance on German diplomatic personnel at the German Embassy and at the German consulate office in New York City. This surveillance, as well as passport investigations, prompted the Secret Service to detail a squad of agents to the Department of State, and the squad reported to Harrison. In 1916, Lansing ordered the Secret Service to tap the German Embassy’s telephone and telegraph lines.
and the squad set up its listening post a couple of blocks from the German Embassy. At 8 o’clock each morning, the Secret Service squad leader, Joseph M. Nye, submitted--probably through Harrison--a daily memorandum to the Secretary of State, which detailed the squad’s findings for the previous 24 hours. Harrison’s group also had obtained several German codebooks, which made deciphering the German codes a “simple matter.” Early on January 31, 1917, as a result of the Secret Service squad’s wire-tapping of German Embassy line, Nye informed Lansing that during his (Lansing’s) 4 p.m. meeting with German Ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the Ambassador would tell him that Germany had renewed unrestricted submarine warfare. Bernstorff did, and unrestricted submarine warfare was one of the actions that would lead the United States to declare war on Germany a couple of months later.25

Just after Nye’s intelligence report, Lansing appointed Nye as “Special Assistant to the Secretary” in February 1917, making Nye the Department of State’s first formal security officer.26 Having collaborated with Nye for several months, Harrison recruited him to be the Department’s first “special agent.” Good-natured and extroverted, Nye had previously served on the protective details for Presidents Taft and Wilson, and had conducted several counterfeiting and forgery investigations.27

Gaining the title Chief Special Agent a few weeks after his appointment, Nye spent most of his first year at the Department as Special Assistant to the Secretary protecting foreign dignitaries. His first duty assignment was to escort the German Ambassador Count von Bernstorff everywhere until the diplomat’s departure several weeks later. Nye and the Special Agents he hired spent much of the remainder of 1917 making travel arrangements for and protecting the Belgian, French, British, Italian, Japanese, Russian, and Serbian War Missions that visited the United States. The Special Agents also protected the Governor-General

Figure 6: Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States. As a Secret Service Agent, Joseph M. Nye headed the squad that tapped into Bernstorff’s telegraph and telephone line. Nye’s first task as Chief Special Agent was to escort Bernstorff everywhere until he departed for Germany after the United States entered World War I in 1917. Source: Library of Congress, George Grantham Bain Collection.
of Canada and several members of British, Danish, and Japanese royal families when they visited in 1918.28

When Nye recruited men for his Special Agent force, he turned to Post Office Inspectors, who were among the nation’s leading, most broadly trained security professionals in the country. Nye’s first three recruits—James O’Connell, Robert S. Sharp, and Robert C. Bannerman—were all former Postal Inspectors. Postal Inspectors already possessed the flexibility and investigative skills that Nye, Lansing, and the Department of State sought.29 Postal Inspectors investigated cases of fraud, theft, and transportation of illegal items (including explosives, weapons, banned substances), as well as internal investigations of malfeasance or corruption against Postmasters and other senior postal officials. Inspectors had to determine whether the culprit was an insider or someone manipulating the system from outside. They interviewed and determined the credibility of witnesses, suspects, and perpetrators, as well as conducted reference and background checks of employees and applicants to the federal government. They inspected facilities, enforced procedures and regulations, and handled both “confidential” and public information. The Postal Inspector background undoubtedly helped set the foundational orientation and jack-of-all-trades flexibility that characterized the Department of State’s Special Agents for several decades.30

Nye and the Special Agents soon organized and opened two offices: one in the Department, and one in New York City. Nye, his secretary Nettie Bagby, and an assistant staffed the main office in the Department. Meanwhile, the New York Field Office comprised most of the staff (the other seven agents) and was under the supervision of Special Agent Robert Sharp. Nye drew his operating funds from a confidential account of the
Secretary of State’s office. A few agents were “dollar-a-year” men (lawyers, businessmen, and other professionals) who volunteered for the job; however, most had Postal Inspector backgrounds. The Chief Special Agent operated in a public manner, with Department personnel openly referring to Special Agents as “the force;” and the Chief Special Agent and his secretary were listed under the Office of the Under Secretary of State Frank Polk in the Department’s published register.31

Security during World War I

Lansing created the Special Agent force just as the Wilson Administration was moving to declare war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it was one of several wartime measures that Lansing implemented to improve diplomatic security. Lansing also ended the practice of Department officials speaking independently to reporters, and made such potential breaches of confidentiality punishable offenses. He limited press interviews to himself and other senior Department staff, and created the Bureau of Information to handle press inquiries. To distinguish confidential telegrams from unclassified messages, all telegrams that arrived in code were printed out on paper that had a yellow bar running down the right edge of the paper. The Department began to place invoices in pouches to indicate when items were missing or lost. The Department also instructed posts to use two seals on envelopes, one center-left and one center-right, instead of placing a single seal in the center.32

In March 1918, the Department issued the new Grey Code to replace the Green Code; however, communications security did not necessarily improve. Less than a year later, the Department received word that at least one British Legation had a copy of the Grey Code. Also, as had occurred with previous codes, the Department’s distribution of the code was uneven. Some posts had not received the Grey Code, others still had only the Blue Code, and others did not even have the Red Code, prompting this last group to turn to commercial codes. With multiple
codes as well as special holocryptic variations in use, it was not uncommon for a post to receive a message that it could not decode. The Department resorted to noting on the plain-text copy of the telegram which code had been used to encipher it, in part so they knew which code to use when responding to post.33

The United States’ entry into World War I led the Department to add couriers to its mail and pouch system. Upon the suggestion of Harrison and Commander Edward McCauley, Jr. of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Department of State asked the Department of the Navy to assign nine Marines for courier duty in October 1917. The Marines received special passports and wore civilian clothes. They were split between three routes in Europe, with the Navy and State Departments later adding a fourth route for East Asia (Manila, Tokyo, Tientsin, Peking, and Shanghai). For the three European routes, five Marines operated the route from Bergen, Norway, to Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsingfors (Helsinki), Petrograd (St. Petersburg), and Jassy (Iasi, Romania). Three Marines carried pouches between London and The Hague, and one Marine carried pouches between Paris and Rome. On February 26, 1918, the Departments of State and Navy agreed to add six more Marines to the courier routes.34 In August 1918, the Department of State initiated regular courier service between Mexico City and Laredo, Texas, primarily due to the theft of a Spanish diplomatic pouch and other issues that resulted from the Mexican Revolution, which had begun in 1910.35

The Marine couriers supplemented the Despatch Agent network; they were never viewed as a replacement for it. Secretary of State Elihu Root had suggested such an enhancement of the Despatch Agent network ten years earlier (in 1907); however, the 25-plus bilateral agreements for reciprocal exchange of diplomatic pouches (negotiated between 1900 and 1912) apparently postponed the need to pursue the suggestion further.36 With the war creating a more urgent need in 1917, the Marine couriers were conceived strictly as a means of moving...
dipломатических конвертов до точки, где конверты могли эффективно и безопасно войти в сеть Despatch Agent. Например, по маршруту Скандинавия-Россия, Лондонский офис Despatch Agent переносил конверты в Абердин, Шотландию, где английский пароход *Vulture* переносил конверты в Берген, Норвегию. В Бергене, американский консул получил и назначил конверты курьерам по скандинавскому-российскому маршруту, а также организовал возврат конвертов в Лондон. По другим маршрутам, морские курьеры доставляли конверты в Лондон или Париж, где они попадали в сеть Despatch Agent.

37. Дополнительная роль морских курьеров указывает на “запятую” в следовании за происхождением американской дипломатической системы. Система курьеров имела множество предшественников. Кроме того, она возникла в значительной степени из двух источников: технологического инновации и изменений в восприятии обработки конфиденциальной информации. Пересылка большинства конвертов через океан в XIX веке делала их нецелесообразными для переноса, приводя департамент к созданию сети Despatch Agent. Переговоры конца XIX века о свободном, незатрудненном обмене дипломатических конвертов еще больше осложнили создание американской системы курьеров, несмотря на существенное сокращение стоимости пересылки через Атлантику. Для экономически осведомленных чиновников департамента, которые работали в эпоху, когда многие, включая Конгресс, смотрели на дипломатов как на роскошь, стоимость отправления человека с конвертом казалась роскошью.

38. Итоговые инновации в области энергии и конструирования пароходов уменьшили стоимость пересылки через Атлантику, но Первая мировая война изменила, как американские чиновники воспринимали классифицированную информацию, что привело к созданию системы курьеров. С первых выстрелов войны в августе 1914 года, прерывание транспортных (дорожных, железнодорожных и морских) сетей привело департамент к использованию двух консульских служащих, которые стали курьерами между Лондоном и Берлином. Вступление в войну в 1917 году — и сопровождавший этот процесс страх перед интервентированием в конфиденциальные документы, чтобы выявить уязвимости или предоставить преимущество противникам или соперникам — привело департамент к добавлению морских курьеров, чтобы ускорить пересылку конвертов через зоны военного конфликта.


Figure 11: Ambassador Amos J. Peaslee. As a U.S. Army Captain, Peaslee, at the direction of General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing, formed a courier service for the U.S. Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I. The military couriers later served President Wilson and the U.S. delegation at the Versailles peace negotiations during 1919 but was then disbanded. The U.S. Army courier service was one of several entities that served as forerunners of the Department’s courier service. Peaslee later joined the Department and served as U.S. Ambassador to Australia (1953-1956). Source: Department of State Records National Archives and Records Administration.

Дипломатические конверты до точки, где конверты могли эффективно и безопасно войти в сеть Despatch Agent. Например, по маршруту Скандинавия-Россия, Лондонский офис Despatch Agent переносил конверты в Абердин, Шотландию, где английский пароход *Vulture* переносил конверты в Берген, Норвегию. В Бергене, американский консул получил и назначил конверты курьерам по скандинавскому-российскому маршруту, а также организовал возврат конвертов в Лондон. По другим маршрутам, морские курьеры доставляли конверты в Лондон или Париж, где они попадали в сеть Despatch Agent.

The supplementary nature of the Marine couriers indicates a “dotted line” in tracing the origins of the U.S. diplomatic courier service. The courier service had multiple predecessors. Moreover, it arose largely from two sources: technological innovation and altered perceptions regarding classified information. The trans-oceanic shipment of the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic correspondence had made bearers of dispatch cost-prohibitive during the nineteenth century, leading the Department to create the Despatch Agent network. The turn-of-the-century negotiation of bilateral agreements for the free, unimpeded exchange of diplomatic pouches further obstructed the creation of a U.S. courier service, even though steamships had substantially reduced the costs of trans-Atlantic transport. For economy-minded Department officials who operated in an era when many, including Congress, viewed diplomats as an extravagance, the cost of having a person accompany diplomatic pouches seemed a luxury.

While innovations in steam power and ship design reduced the costs of trans-Atlantic shipments, World War I transformed how U.S. officials perceived the classified nature of U.S. Government information, setting the stage for a courier system. With the war’s first shots in August 1914, the interruption of transportation (road, rail, and shipping) networks prompted the Department of State to employ two embassy clerks to serve as couriers between London and Berlin. The U.S. entry into the war in 1917—and the accompanying concern that interception of confidential U.S. documents threatened to reveal U.S. or Allied vulnerabilities, or bestow advantages to U.S. enemies or rivals—led the Department to add Marine couriers to facilitate the transport of U.S. pouches through war zones.
The arrival of large numbers of U.S. troops on French soil in 1918 only intensified concerns about the disclosure of U.S. Government and military information, which in turn, demanded quick, reliable, and secure communications. U.S. Army officials created their own courier service. In March 1918, General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing, frustrated by the slow transit of correspondence between Paris and Washington, authorized U.S. Army Captain Amos Jenkins Peaslee to organize a military courier service. Separate from the Marine couriers used by the Department of State, Peaslee’s courier service was staffed with seven U.S. Army officers and four enlisted men, and used the Hotel Crillon in Paris as its headquarters. Within three weeks, transit times for U.S. correspondence between Paris and Washington dropped from roughly five weeks to less than two weeks. How much the U.S. Embassy in Paris or other Department posts used the military courier service is unclear; however, Peaslee’s service was very successful.

The duties of Nye and the Special Agents expanded during the war. Besides protection of visiting foreign dignitaries, Nye made the travel arrangements (rail, hotel, and car reservations) for the Secretary of State. Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman accompanied Colonel Edward M. House, who served as President Wilson’s special envoy, on many trips. Special Agents in New York and Washington conducted surveillance on domestic groups deemed “disloyal,” such as the Non Partisan League, and investigated the activities of two groups in particular: Hindu nationalists and Irish revolutionaries. In an effort to weaken the British, the Germans funded and encouraged nationalist groups in India and Ireland to overthrow British colonial rule. In the case of Hindu groups, Nye and his Special Agents helped to build a case against thirty Hindus who were charged with “fomenting a revolution against a friendly power” (Great Britain). The Hindus were accused of distributing provocative literature, trafficking arms to India, and inciting colonial subjects from Asia and Africa to rise against British rule. In regard to Irish revolutionaries, Department of State Special Agents learned that German agents stationed in Mexico had recruited and paid Irishmen to conduct sabotage in the United States. The Chief Special Agent’s office determined that the Irish saboteurs had devised plots to burn parts of Seattle, as well as ammunitions stores, elevators, wood-yards, shipyards, and airplane factories in other U.S. cities.

**Security after the Great War**

When the armistice went into effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month (November 11, 1918), World War I ended;
however, the Department of State's war-time anxieties about security did not. The Department's persistent concerns resulted from three changes: an intensified recognition among Department officials of the need for security, the United States’ shift from an emerging power to a world power, and the expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation abroad. Although the Department had implemented many security measures before the war, those measures were applied to the diplomacy of a nation that viewed itself as an emerging power. After the war, U.S. officials perceived their nation as a world power, whose diplomats needed to maintain security and discretion concerning the serious issues, discussions, and negotiations in which the United States was now engaged. Moreover, this new status, plus the expansion of U.S. diplomatic posts abroad, required U.S. diplomats to handle and transmit much more classified information than they had done previously.

This dramatic shift led some Department officers to deprecate pre-war security measures; however, they overlooked the fact that the post-war espionage threat was much greater because the United States had now become a more appealing target. For example, humorist James Thurber, who served as a code clerk for the U.S. peace mission in France, dismissed the Department's pre-war telegraphic codes as “quaint transparencies … intended to save words and cut costs, not to fool anybody.”

Thurber’s dismissal of pre-war codes mistakenly presumed that pre-war U.S. diplomatic messages contained confidential information roughly equivalent in scope, degree, and amount to postwar telegraphic messages. This was not the case because the United States was not then involved in the range of issues and discussions that it was afterwards, nor was it considered within the

Figure 13: Illustration for Deciphering a Joint Department of State-Navy Code, likely Code A-1 or B-1. After World War I, the Department of State worked jointly with the U.S. Navy to develop better telegraph codes. Perhaps more important, the Department began to change its codes quarterly to deter espionage. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
inner circle of great powers. The U.S. telegraphic code did not have to be unbreakable; it only had to serve as a deterrent sufficient to exceed the value of return, and the value of return from U.S. diplomacy before World War I was generally small.

The United States' changed status and Department officials' continuing security anxieties led the Department to maintain, even expand security during the 1920s. After the war, Department officials insisted upon maintaining security at a war-time level. For example, they mandated the use of lock boxes to transport confidential documents between offices in the Department. However, Department officials were also concerned about the cost and effectiveness of security measures. In the early 1920s, Department officials made budget cuts to security-related programs; yet they reinstated the programs within a year or two because it became clear that Departmental security was being compromised.\textsuperscript{46}

The Department of State gave extensive attention to security in 1919 when President Wilson and the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace joined the Allies at Versailles, France, to negotiate postwar arrangements. With the assistance of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, the Department erected a special telegraph cable devoted exclusively to U.S. diplomatic messages from the U.S. Embassy in Paris to the port of Le Havre, where it connected to the transatlantic cable system. U.S. Navy personnel staffed the telegraph office at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and the Navy was responsible for providing special codes for the President and U.S. officials at the peace conference. In addition, Wilson and the Commission used Major Peaslee's 14 Army couriers,\textsuperscript{47} and the Department of State assigned them diplomatic passports.\textsuperscript{48}

The Department also strove to improve its telegraphic codes and enhance the security of its telegraphic messages. Shortly after the introduction of the Grey Code, the Department worked with the Departments of Navy and War to create a common telegraph code.

During the decade of the 1920s, the Department, with Navy assistance, issued four new codes: A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1, each replacing its predecessor after two to three years. Department officials regularly altered each code, sending new code tables to its posts quarterly. The Department used separate codes for each of the various peace conferences, such as the 1922 Lausanne conference. Posts also declared their code rooms “restricted,” limiting access to U.S. diplomatic officers and barring access by foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{49} The Red and Blue Codes were declared obsolete, and the Green Code was acknowledged to be known to several governments. In fact, as an indication of changed expectations of code security, one Chief of Mission in 1925 considered the Grey Code (issued in 1918) too old to be safe for confidential messages.\textsuperscript{50}

The Departments of State and War further cooperated to create the United States’ own signal intelligence office, commonly referred to as the “Black Chamber.” In 1918, at the end of the War, Secretary Lansing and Special Assistant Harrison decided to retain a cryptology office that focused upon solving other governments’ telegraphic codes. They turned to Herbert O. Yardley, who as a Department of State code clerk had broken President Wilson's code in less than 2 hours. During the war, Yardley had worked at the U.S. Army's MI-8
(Military Intelligence) office, which had solved approximately 50 codes of 8 different governments. In 1919, Yardley set up the office in New York City. The office immediately proved its value by deciphering the Japanese diplomatic code and reading that Government's messages to its delegation at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. Yardley's code breakers informed U.S. negotiators that the Japanese Government would accept a 10 to 6 ratio of U.S. and Japanese battleships, enabling U.S. diplomats to continue pressing for that ratio when Japanese representatives rejected it and tried to stall.51

After the war, the Department cut its courier service only to revive it again, an action which exemplified the Department's conflicted mindset over seeking greater security and ensuring fiscal economy. During 1919, the Department utilized two courier services: the Army couriers for the U.S. delegation at the Versailles peace conference, and the Department's Marine Corps couriers for the other posts in Europe. When negotiations in Versailles concluded in August 1919, the Department of War disbanded the Army courier service; meanwhile, the Department moved its three Marine couriers and their headquarters from London to Paris. Given that the Marine couriers supplemented the Despatch Agent system, the Department reexamined the necessity of the couriers because the Marine courier service was “very much confused.” At an approximate cost of $146,000 per year, the service was deemed rather expensive.52 On June 30, 1921, under the new Republican administration of President Warren G. Harding, the Department discontinued courier service in Europe because its cost exceeded reduced appropriations. The courier service for East Asia survived eight months longer, but it too was cut for budgetary reasons.53

The Department revived the courier service one year later (1922), and its revival resulted from security concerns about the diplomatic correspondence from the new U.S. Legations in Eastern Europe. By 1922, U.S. diplomats were complaining about the lack of security when using the postal systems of Central and Eastern Europe, and the problem resulted because Department officials had not made a key postwar adjustment.54 Prior to the war, the United States had trusted the German and Austrian imperial postal services (the British postal service was the only other system the Americans trusted). After the war, with the creation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from the collapsed Austria-Hungarian and Russian Empires, U.S. diplomats reverted to pre-war practice and tried to use the nascent postal systems of the new nation-states. Compounding the problem was the fact that the United States had upgraded its Consulates in the new capital cities to Legations. The upgrade, combined with the United States’ changed status as a world power, generated a very different set of correspondence from the posts, usually involving more classified information. The subsequent complaints of tampered mail and pouches created a new, postwar security dilemma that the Department resolved by reviving the courier service.

The Department of State retained the Chief Special Agent and his staff. Nye continued to make domestic travel arrangements for the Secretary of State. Moreover, the number of foreign dignitaries visiting the United States increased after the war, with visits by Edward, the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VIII) and then King Albert I and Queen Elisabeth of Belgium in 1919. Chief Special Agent Nye logged 8,837 railroad miles
escorting the King Albert I and Queen Elizabeth on their tour of the United States. King Albert not only referred to Nye as “Beel,” but also awarded him the Order of Leopold. Nye also organized and headed the protective details for such dignitaries as Prime Minister Robert Borden of Canada, President Epitácio Pessoa of Brazil, President Baltasar Brum of Uruguay, Prince Axel of Denmark, and Prince Ferdinand of Savoy. In 1921, the Chief Special Agent’s office provided protective security for the delegations to the Washington Naval Conference. During this assignment, Special Agents ushered the distinguished foreign diplomats through customs, arranged their transportation and schedule, and at times, provided appropriate entertainment. If threats to the visiting foreign dignitaries required it, the Chief Special Agent would create aliases for them. For example, Prince and Princess Asaka of Japan traveled as Count and Countess Asa during their 1925 visit to America.

Special Agents also navigated between the barriers imposed by Jim Crow segregation and the diplomatic privileges and courtesies required for diplomats and foreign dignitaries when diplomats from Liberia and other African nations visited the United States. Special Agents recognized that black diplomats would visit, attend, and patronize black venues, and that they might have to explain the status of and required courtesies for black diplomats to white officials and businessmen. Evidence suggests that despite having to accommodate for Jim Crow laws, Special Agents provided protection and services for visiting Liberian diplomats equivalent to that for European and Asian diplomats.

To protect foreign dignitaries, the Chief Special Agent often enlisted the assistance of local law enforcement, Post Office Inspectors, and/or the Secret Service. For the 1919 visit of the Prince of Wales, Nye called upon Post Office Inspectors to help. When Prince Chichibu, second son of the Japanese Emperor, visited Chicago, the Chief Special Agent requested a police escort, citing a potential threat from the large local Korean population. Similarly, when the Cuban President visited in 1927, he received local police protection while in Miami.
During the immediate two years after the war, the Chief Special Agent’s office followed a trajectory similar to the courier service: it endured budget and personnel cuts, but gained responsibilities. In 1920, Nye resigned as Chief Special Agent and accepted a position as executive assistant to the president of Guaranty Trust Company, one of the major banks in New York, where he worked to improve measures to deter fraud. Robert C. Bannerman replaced Nye as Chief Special Agent in 1920. In the same year, the Department cut its personnel, and eight of the ten Special Agents lost their commissions, including Robert Sharp, head of the New York Field Office. On August 30, 1921, the Secretary of State issued Department Order No. 223 which moved the Chief Special Agent from the Secretary of State’s office to the Under Secretary of State’s office, receiving the designation “U-3.” As Assistant to the Under Secretary, Bannerman maintained liaisons with the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Secret Service, the Shipping Board, and the Departments of Navy, War, Justice, and Labor.59

The Chief Special Agent office’s rapidly growing responsibilities forced the Department to rehire many of its Special Agents in 1921, just one year after cutting their positions. Sharp returned as Special Agent-in-Charge in New York; and with a staff numbering 25 people, several Special Agents were again tracking radicals and suspected foreign agents. Special Agents also conducted internal affairs investigations of Department employees who may have leaked information to the press or engaged in criminal activity. Chief Special Agent Bannerman investigated the disappearance of several thousand dollars from diplomatic pouches, and determined that the Chief Clerk of the Mail Room was committing the thefts.60 Special Agents conducted background investigations for new Department of State employees. While some travel was involved in the investigations, the Special Agents worked closely with Post Office Inspectors, who completed the background investigations in the various hometowns and former cities of residence of the prospective Department employees.61

One of the Chief Special Agent’s more unusual investigations involved the illicit importation of liquor by the British Embassy, just after Congress and the states had passed Prohibition. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or Volstead Act (effective in January 1920), forbade the manufacture, sale, transportation, and importation of “intoxicating liquors” in and into the United States. In 1921, British diplomats in Washington arranged for the British shipping company Joseph Travers & Sons to send 83 cases of liquor, on the pretext that the spirits would be used for official embassy functions. Although alcohol technically could still be consumed within foreign embassies or legations in the United States, private consumption outside of embassy premises was subject to the Volstead Act. Based upon his office’s investigation, Bannerman concluded that the 83 cases were imported by British Embassy for personal use by Embassy staff. Intercepted correspondence revealed that 18 British Embassy employees had pooled their money for payment, and that the staff hoped to place bigger orders in the future. Some employees even wanted to place standing monthly orders, and the Embassy staff patted themselves on the back for their ingenuity. The Chief Special Agent’s office concluded that this was a clear attempt to circumvent the laws of the United States, but despite the incriminating evidence, the Department decided not to prosecute the British in the interest of maintaining good bilateral relations.62
The Office of the Chief Special Agent also investigated passport and visa fraud. Bannerman and his Special Agents devoted particular attention to anarchists, Bolsheviks, and other radical Left groups that used fraudulent passports to enter the United States. During World War I, Congress made it a felony to knowingly assist anarchists entering the United States, and later banned and required the deportation of anarchists and persons who promoted anarchism. After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, U.S. officials denied passports to U.S. Communists who wished to travel to Russia for instruction or training (Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson relaxed this proscription in 1931). With the new visa and passport laws, the Chief Special Agent’s office gained a tool to deport foreign agents engaged in espionage, sabotage, or other illegal activities, and as a result, passport and visa fraud investigations became a cornerstone responsibility for the Chief Special Agent’s office throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

During their investigations of Bolsheviks, Special Agents paid particular attention to the activities of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, which they strongly suspected was a cover for Soviet espionage. Created in 1924 by the Soviet Union, Amtorg Trading ostensibly promoted trade between that country and the United States. The Department issued a visa to Amtorg employee Boris I. Kraevaky, but the Chief Special Agent later sought to revoke it because Kraevaky appeared to be involved in activities other than international trade. Special Agents tracked Amtorg’s exports to the Soviet Union, particularly metals such as copper, zinc, aluminum, and manganese, as well as the company’s purchases of Ford tractors, John Deere agricultural implements, and wheat (more than $13 million between May and December 1924 alone). Special Agents also investigated Amtorg’s contacts within U.S. companies such as Chase National Bank, and took interest in Amtorg’s unusually large budget for “employee education,” which was likely for indoctrination of Communist ideology and Soviet activities.

By 1924, Chief Special Agent Bannerman’s scope of security-related duties extended to restructuring the Department’s struggling courier service, which was now manned by civilians rather than Marines. European posts complained of not receiving pouches or receiving pouches less often than they had before the war with the Despatch Agent system. For European posts served by the couriers, it took a minimum of 42 days for a post to send a despatch and receive a reply. Some posts such as the U.S. Embassy at The Hague asked if they could opt out of the courier service and return to the Despatch Agent system. They argued that they could receive mail and Department instructions far more quickly and frequently from the Despatch Agents than they could from the couriers. Occasionally a pouch went into a foreign postal service, which prompted one exasperated Chief of Mission to scold the Department: “After all of the proofs and experiences and knowledge we have gained” during the war, “for our pouches to pass through [foreign] hands – one is struck almost speechless. What is the matter with us?”

The Department’s small three-person courier service was overwhelmed and overworked. The couriers carried an average of 50 pouches, with the number and size of the pouches continually increasing. Couriers many times faced angry rail conductors and station officials who feared the many pouches would damage
compartments, or the couriers had to bribe customs officials to let them cross a border. At times, the couriers had their compartments so stuffed with pouches that they had no place to sleep during the train trip to the next stop. By January 1925, European railroad officials refused to allow couriers to carry more than one pouch into their compartment, which meant that the other pouches were stored unattended and unsecured with baggage.66

The fact that Department couriers carried pouches for Army and Naval Attachés, as well as the Department of Commerce, compounded the problem. Department of Commerce mails comprised 35 percent of all pouches; whereas, the War and Navy Departments constituted 11 percent and 9 percent respectively. When Department of State officials asked the Department of Commerce to pay $17,500 for their share of courier expenses, Commerce officials replied (as did their Navy and War Department counterparts) that they had no funds for such an expense.67

The three couriers spent extended time on the road. Each courier traveled the entire circuit: Paris-Zurich-Vienna-Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople-Sofia-Bucharest-Sofia-Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna-Prague-Berlin-Warsaw-Riga-Berlin-Prague-Vienna-Zurich-Paris. The circuit was two routes: the Southern route took 20 days (Paris to Constantinople and back) and the Northern route took 11 days (Vienna to Riga and back). The courier then had two days of rest in Paris before making the Paris-London-The Hague-Brussels-Paris route. He rested four days, only to begin the circuit again. All three couriers met in Vienna to exchange pouches – one returning from Riga on the Northern Route, one returning from Constantinople on the Southern route, and the third arriving from Paris. Carrying pouches destined for posts on both routes, the Paris courier gave the Constantinople courier the pouches for Northern route posts and then headed south with the remaining pouches. The Constantinople courier took his newly received pouches and headed north, giving the Washington-bound pouches that he had collected on the Southern route to the Riga courier. The Riga courier, now having all pouches destined for Washington from the North and South portions of the route, headed for Paris to place the pouches in the Despatch Agent system.68

Figure 15: Department of State Diplomatic Courier Bill Croasdale hands pouch to Vice Consul I. Raymond Baine, who is on the Orient Express railcar, in Milan, Italy, in 1957. With the creation of several new nations in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I, the Department needed couriers to supplement the Despatch Agent network. The Orient Express was one of the rail lines that the three-man courier service used. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
Perhaps due to Bannerman’s Postal Inspector background, Department officials asked him to study the courier service and then make recommendations, most of which the Department later adopted. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent Bannerman to Europe to inspect the courier service in 1925, and Bannerman traveled the entire circuit, observing travel and rail station conditions, size and weight of pouches, rail connections, and possibilities for delays. He decided to separate the two routes, which ended the Vienna exchange and ultimately reduced the despatch/reply time by nearly two weeks. The Northern route became Paris-Brussels-The Hague-Berlin-Riga-Warsaw-Prague-Berlin-Copenhagen-Hamburg-Amsterdam-The Hague-Brussels-Paris. The Southern Route remained much the same, but Bannerman suggested different rail lines and sequence, reducing travel time and possibilities for delays. Bannerman also made clear that the Commerce Department had “confused” the courier service for a “fast freight service;” Department officials successfully pressed Commerce officials to limit their pouches to strictly confidential materials, a change that reduced the volume and weight of pouches substantially. Bannerman additionally recommended creating an “Aegean” route, which would operate between Paris, Rome, Tirana and Athens, as well as courier service for Mexico City, although neither apparently was implemented. Bannerman continued to review and fine-tune the courier service in the years after his recommendations were adopted in October 1925.

Bannerman’s reforms of the courier service symbolized two important developments in U.S. diplomatic security. First, the Department of State’s approach to security was increasingly characterized by specialization, which contrasted with the British Foreign Office’s tendency toward flexibility. The British employed a “hub and spokes” courier system, with a few courier routes to major cities (e.g. Paris and Berlin) and several, short “feeder” routes transited by local couriers (likely post officers or clerks) to broaden the coverage of the service. When British couriers were not on their routes, they did code work for the Foreign Office. The Department of State, meanwhile, compartmentalized the courier function, incorporating more posts into large courier routes, and avoiding the use of local couriers. Furthermore, U.S. couriers were a separate entity from the code clerks and Special Agents.

The second development was the expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation overseas, which tilted the Department’s struggle to balance security with cost efficiency strongly toward security. The Department focused upon improving its communications with its posts, which included increasing security and reducing transit time for correspondence. Bannerman expanded the Despatch Agent network by negotiating a contract with the Dollar Steamship Company to provide pouch services for U.S. Embassies and Consulates in Asia. Managed by the Despatch Agent in San Francisco, the new pouch service connected posts in Tokyo, Yokohama, Peking, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Penang, and Colombo. The Department also worked to improve mail service to U.S. Consulates in Suva, Nairobi, and Cairo. The U.S. Post Office also gave the Department free airmail service for small confidential pouches to and from some Latin American posts. The Department further expanded the Despatch Agent network by adding weekly pouch service for the new U.S. Legations in Ottawa and Dublin.
Bannerman, however, did express concern about the security of the Despatch Agent network; specifically, he questioned the employment of British citizens at the London Despatch Agent office. In fact, many of the London office’s employees, including Despatch Agent Charles J. Petherick, were British citizens. Bannerman admitted in 1928 that as “a matter of principle, our most confidential mail to London should be handled by none but Americans.” He acknowledged Petherick’s faithful service (Petherick had 60 years of service to the Department), and confessed that Petherick was “the best informed and most efficient transportation officer of any I met abroad.” However, Bannerman recommended that an American should be appointed as Despatch Agent in London upon Petherick’s resignation or death. Petherick died in 1929, just eight weeks after Bannerman made his recommendation, and the Department appointed U.S. Consular officer John H. E. McAndrews as the U.S. Despatch Agent in London.76

The 1929 Stock Market Crash and the subsequent Great Depression forced the Department of State to slash budgets, which significantly affected its correspondence, communications, and security. The Depression prompted the Department to cut some couriers; and in 1933, it abolished most of the few remaining overseas courier services, despite protests from its overseas posts. With a note of nostalgia, Leslie Weisenberg of the U.S. Embassy in Paris lamented that “the swan song has been sung and the curtain rung down on the courier service.” The Department’s financial crunch was so severe that even when the French Government offered to transport diplomatic pouches free of charge from Le Havre to Paris, the U.S. Embassy could not afford the taxi fare needed to retrieve the pouches at the railroad station where the French promised to hold them. U.S. posts in Germany experienced similar cutbacks.77

Yardley’s “Black Chamber” also came to a grinding halt because of Depression-era budget cuts, despite deciphering more than 45,000 telegrams between 1917 and 1929. In 1929, the Department of State withdrew
its funding of Yardley’s office. Unable to survive on Department of War funding alone, Yardley and his colleagues closed their office. Finding the whole enterprise of the Black Chamber distasteful, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson either saw little need for counterintelligence, or perhaps believed that the Department of State should not become involved in counterintelligence lest it might compromise its fundamental mission of diplomacy. Stimson viewed himself “dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen,” and it was on this occasion that Stimson issued his oft-repeated pronouncement: “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”

Yardley, struggling to support his family during the Depression, wrote his book *The American Black Chamber* and had it published in 1931. He described the clandestine work of the Department’s now defunct cryptographic office, and revealed that gentlemen did read each other’s mail. His book was an instant success around the world. In Japan, *The American Black Chamber* created a controversy as well as an embarrassing situation for the United States because Yardley exposed the extent to which the United States had intercepted and deciphered confidential Japanese Government messages. Yardley proposed writing a second book, focusing exclusively upon his work with Japanese codes. The Departments of State, Justice, and War worked to block this second work, and attorneys from the Department of Justice pressured Yardley’s publisher to stop the project. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other State Department officials urged Congress in 1933 to pass a law to prevent future disclosures. Congress moved quickly and passed Public Law (P.L.) 37. Signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in June 1933, P.L. 37 made it a felony for a former U.S. Government employee to publish or to share confidential information pertaining to past or present diplomatic codes and confidential diplomatic correspondence. Effectively blacklisted from future U.S. Government work involving confidential material, Yardley worked for foreign governments during the remainder of the Depression. He trained and organized cryptological bureaus for the Chinese from 1938 to 1940, and the Canadians from 1940 to 1941; the latter job ended when the Canadians and the British discovered his true identity. Returning to the United States, Yardley joined the Office of Price Administration in 1942, but never did code work again.

**Conclusion**

Yardley’s book, in some ways, was the most significant security breach of the era, and the Department of State’s reaction demonstrates how sensitive Department officials had become to security since the start of World War I. Combined with the United States’ rise as a world power, the expansion of the number of U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as an increase in the quantity, quality, and frequency of information considered confidential, World War I had transformed the Department’s perception and approach to security. The question for Department officials throughout the period was not whether to employ security, but rather how much security they should employ. The immediate postwar desire to return to pre-war practices was fleeting, and senior Department officers implemented additional security measures and procedures throughout the 1920s. Although the Great Depression forced the Department to make cuts in security-oriented programs, those cuts reflected the depth of the Depression, not the
Department's indifference to security. By 1933, the balance between security and cost efficiency tilted clearly in favor of security. World War II would further press Department of State officials to expand the number of security measures, and extend security to other aspects of U.S. diplomacy as well.

Endnotes


4 Diary entries for 1 and 3 August 1914, in Grew, *Turbulent Era*, 133, 135.


6 Jack Grover asserts that the two couriers in 1914 were the foundation of the Department of State’s courier service and operated continuously until 1917. The two clerks, however, only operated as couriers temporarily and probably ceased carrying pouches in 1915 or 1916. By early 1917, with pouch service erratic, the U.S. Embassy in Vienna requested a permanent weekly courier, but this did not occur until late 1917. Telegram 1717, Frederic Courtland Penfield, U.S. Ambassador to Austria-Hungary (Pleasant A. Stovall, U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland), to Secretary of State, 21 February 1917, 051.51/25, Folder 2, Box 361, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. See Jack Grover, “None is Swifter Than These,” *Foreign Service Journal* 31/2 (February 1954): 25-26; and “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” *Foreign Service Newsletter* Number 80 (October 1953): 15-16.

7 Diary entry 5 August 1914, in Grew, *Turbulent Era*, 138. Telegram 954, Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, to Secretary of State, 31 October 1914, 121.67/5, and Telegram, Lansing to U.S. Embassy London, 3 November 1914, 121.67/5, both attached to Memorandum, William Walker Smith, Acting Chief for Division of Western European Affairs, to William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 2 November 1914, Folder 3, Box 1164, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Letter, Brand Whitlock, U.S. Minister to Belgium, to Henry van Dyke, U.S. Minister to
the Netherlands, 17 January 1916, enclosed with Despatch #437, Marshall Langhorne, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to the Netherlands, to Secretary of State, 21 March 1916, 121.67/55, Folder 3, Box 1164, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Telegram 3732, James W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, to Secretary of State, 10 April 1916, 051.62/32; and Memorandum, Roosa to Ben G. Davis, Chief Clerk, 19 September 1916, 051.61/32; both Folder 3, Box 363, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.


10 The use of the term “Special” with the encryption code suggests that there was a variation to the code or perhaps a rule from the codebook’s Holocryptic appendix had been used. Instruction, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to U.S. Embassy in Constantinople, 5 November 1914, 119.2/123a; and Telegram 100 “Telegrams,” E. Carleton Baker, U.S. Consul at Chungking, China, to Secretary of State, 18 September 1914, 119.2/121, attached to Memorandum, Clarence E. Sisler, Clerk, to Herbert C. Hengstler, Chief of Consular Bureau, 6 November 1914; both Folder 1, Box 1077, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.


14 Circular Telegram, William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, to Ambassadors and Ministers in European Countries, 1 August 1914, 300.11/8a; Robert Lansing, Acting Secretary of State, to Ambassadors and Ministers in European Countries, 12 September 1914, 138.4/27a; both FRUS 1914 Supplement, 722-723. President Wilson formalized passport regulations in a November 1914 executive order. See Executive Order (unnumbered) “Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports in the United States,” President Woodrow Wilson, 13 November 1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 724-727.


16 Executive Order No. 2285, Wilson, 15 December 1915; Executive Order No. 2286-A, Wilson, 17 December 1915; and Memorandum, Lansing to the Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Governments, 23 December 1915; all FRUS 1915 Supplement, 911, 912-913, and 913-914.
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19 Lansing, War Memoirs, 84. Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 16 April 1917, Folder – McAdoo to W. Wilson, April 16, 1917, Box 522, McAdoo Papers, LOC.

20 Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 5 July 1917; Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 17 April 1917; McAdoo to Wilson 6 July 1917; McAdoo to Wilson 9 July 1917; Wilson to McAdoo, 19 November 1917; and McAdoo to Wilson 22 November 1917; all Boxes 522-523, Woodrow Wilson Correspondence, McAdoo Papers, LOC. Folder titles correspond to date of letter.


22 Lansing, War Memoirs, 318-319, 325. There are numerous letters between Harrison and Bell on security-related matters. See Correspondence of Leland Harrison with Edward Bell, 14 December 1916 – 8 July 1918, RG 59 – Entry 348; Leland Harrison’s General Correspondence, 1915-1918, RG 59-Entry 346; and the Classified Case Files of Edward Bell, 1917-1919, RG 59 – Entry 350; all NA.

23 Agent Frank Burke led the ten-man team in New York City. See NCIX, A Counterintelligence Reader, I: 94. In Washington, the German Embassy was located at 1439 Massachusetts Avenue NW, and the Ambassador’s residence was next door at 1435 Massachusetts. Register of the Department of State, December 15, 1916, 182.

24 Although Lansing called it the “Bureau of Secret Intelligence,” Harrison’s group was never a formal bureau. It, instead, comprised a few people in the Office of the Counselor.


26 Robert L. Bannerman claims that it was the Chief Special Agent who tapped the German Embassy’s lines; however, Bannerman may have blurred Nye’s time as a Secret Service Agent working at the Department of State and Nye’s tenure as the Chief Special Agent. The fact that Leland Harrison recruited and recommended Nye to Secretary Lansing suggests that Nye, as head of the Secret Service squad, reported to Harrison and Polk during the squad’s temporary detail to the Department of State during 1916 and early 1917. See “Robert L. Bannerman,” State Magazine 391: 46; and Lansing, War Memoirs, 84.


29 The War Department also turned to Post Office Inspectors to build an investigative unit. See Telegram, Nye to S. H. Morse, Post Office Inspector, San Francisco, n.d. [1918?], Folder – M, Box 1, Special Agent Nye’s Personal File, General Correspondence of the Chief Special Agent, 1918-1920, Records of the Office of the Counselor/Under Secretary/Chief Special Agent, RG 59 – Entry 545, NA. Hereafter cited as Nye’s Personal File. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s Secret Service,” SY Focus III/4: 5.


32 Letter, Lansing to Edward Smith, May 14, 1917, Volume 27, Papers of Robert Lansing, LOC. For coded telegrams with the yellow bar, see passim, Folders 3 and 4, Box 1044, and Folder 1, Box 1045, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For pouch invoices, see Despatch, George A. Bricklin, U.S. Consul, Bordeaux, France, to Secretary of State, 15 July 1918, 116.4/67, Folder 2, Box 1075, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For the change in placement of seals, see Despatch 310, Bricklin to Secretary of State, 17 April 1918, 116.4/49, Folder 2, Box 1075, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA.

33 Ralph E. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 1775-1938 (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1979), 247. For an example of uneven distribution of codes, see Telegram, Russell, U.S. Legation in Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 3 July 1918, 119.2/455, Folder 2, Box 1078, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For telegrams in a multiple codes, see passim, Folders 1 and 2, Box 1078, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Telegram 3594, Osborne, Chargé d’Affaires to Denmark, to Secretary of State, 8 February 1919, Folder 1, Box 1079, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA.

34 The creation of the “Diplomatic Courier Service” and its expansion in February 1918 pre-dates the origins as described by Jack Grover. Neither General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing nor Captain Amos Jenkins Peaslee, said by some to be the founder of the courier service, appears to have been involved in the formation of this courier service. Memorandum, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, 22 October 1917, 121.67/112; Telegram, Lansing (Frederick A. Sterling, Chief of Division of Western European Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Rome, 27 September 1917, 121.67/106, attached to Telegram 1097, Thomas Nelson Page, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 24 September 1917, 121.67/106; Telegram, Lansing to U.S. Embassy London, 24 October 1917, 121.67/109a; and Memorandum, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, 20 February 1918, 121.67/135; all Folder 4, Box 1164, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty III, USMCR, “These Fine Smart Detachments’: A History of the United States Marine Corps and the Department

35 Telegram 1353, Henry P. Fletcher, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, to Leland Harrison, 7 August 1918, 121.67/174; Telegram 1467, Fletcher to Secretary of State, 31 August 1918, 121.67/179; and Telegram 1651, Fletcher to Harrison, 30 October 1918, 121.67/200; all Folder 1, Box 1165, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For the East Asia route, see Memorandum, Edward Bell, Chief of Division of Current Information, 9 March 1922 (memorandum seen by Fred Morris Dearing, Assistant Secretary of State, and Margaret M. Hanna, Assistant to the Second Assistant Secretary of State), 121.67/512, Folder 2, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.


37 The Department instructed the U.S. Despatch Agent’s Office to use only U.S. vessels in transporting U.S. diplomatic pouches; however, Despatch Agent R. Newton Crane made clear that such an instruction was impractical given the Department’s desire for speedy receipt of information. For the question of using only U.S. vessels for pouches, see Telegram, Lansing (Sterling) to U.S. Embassy London, 22 October 1917, 051.41/48a; and Letter, Crane to Secretary of State, 18 April 1918, 051.41/64; both Folder 1, Box 360, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Henry S. Waterman, “The American Courier,” American Foreign Service Journal 13 (March 1931): 120-121. Memorandum, Roosevelt to Secretary of State, 22 October 1917, 121.67/112. Telegram, Lansing (Sterling) to U.S. Embassy London, 24 October 1917, 121.67/109a. Memorandum, Daniels to Secretary of State, 20 February 1918, 121.67/135.

38 In 1899, Samuel Clemens, under the pen name Mark Twain, wrote an essay that sought to convince U.S. leaders that diplomatic expenses were a necessity for a rising power such as the United States. See Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens), “Diplomatic Pay and Clothes,” Forum, March 1899, pp. 24-32. See also The Complete Works of Mark Twain, http://www.mtwain.com/Diplomatic_Pay_And_Clothes/0.html, accessed 14 August 2009.


41 Memorandum, Bannerman, Acting Chief Special Agent, to Polk, 9 January 1919, Fold – (P) [1], Box 2, Special Agent Nye’s Personal File, General Correspondence of the Chief Special Agent, 1918-1920, Records of the Counselor / Under Secretary / and Chief Special Agent, RG 59 – Entry 545, NA (hereafter cited as Nye’s Personal File). Letter, Sharp to Bannerman, 29 May 1918, attached to Confidential Memorandum, Sharp to Bannerman, 27 May 1918, Folder – Sharp, Robert S., Special Agent [2], Box 2, Files of CSA Bannerman.

42 For example, see Letter, Edward Bell, U.S. Embassy London, to Harrison, 1 January 1918; Letter “Decypher,” Department of State to ZNG Officers, Sloterdyk, near Amsterdam, 26 July 1916; Letter #275 “Decypher,” Department of State to ZNG Officers, Sloterdyk, 16 May 1916; Letter “Decypher,” Department of State to H. Eisenhuth, Copenhagen, 9 May 1916; Telegram 5887, Lansing (Harrison) to Bell, 23 November 1916; all Folder – #110 [2], Box 4, Classified Case Files of Edward Bell, 1917-1919, RG 59-Entry 350, NA.
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44 Letter, Harrison to Department of Justice, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Military Intelligence Section (MIS) [Army], October 31, 1917, Folder – Gehrman, Delmar, etc. including Espionage [2]. Box 4, Harrison’s General Correspondence.


48 Telegram 51, Gordon Auchincloss, Assistant to the Counselor, to Frank L. Polk, Counselor of the Department, 5 November 1918, 119.2/807, Folder 1, Box 1080; Telegram 6186, Sharp to Secretary of State, 7 December 1918, 121.67/210, Folder 1, Box 1165; and Telegram 6594, Pole to U.S. Embassy Paris, 11 December 1918, attached to Telegram 6186, William G. Sharp, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 7 December 1918, 121.67/210, Folder 1, Box 1165; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Grover, “None is Swifter Than These,” Foreign Service Journal, 31/2: 26. Grover, “A Brief history of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” Foreign Service Newsletter 80 (October 1953): 16.

49 Memorandum “Instructions for Navy-State Department Cipher,” n.d. (March 1921), enclosed with Memorandum, Henry P. Fletcher, Acting Secretary of State, n.d. (March 1921), Folder 4, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 247-251. For the quarterly change in code tables, see Despatch 2468, Edwin V. Morgan, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, to Secretary of State, 12 December 1925, 119.25, Folder 4, Box 1093; and Memorandum, Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, to E. J. Ayers, Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant, 5 December 1928, 051.41/607 ½, Folder 4, Box 360; both DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For separate codes, see Note “Codes for Lausanne Conference,” Department of State to U.S. Legation Switzerland, 16 December 1922, 119.25/542, Folder 3, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, David A Salmon, Chief of Bureau of Indexes and Archives, to Fred Morris Dearing, Assistant Secretary of State, 4 November 1921, 119.25/485, attached to Note, Dearing to Salmon, 4 November 1921, Folder 5, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Despatch 194, Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, United States High Commissioner at Constantinople, to Secretary of State, 11 May 1921, 119.25/449, Folder 5, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

50 Instruction, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State (Henry P. Fletcher, Under Secretary of State), to Elbridge Gerry Greene, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Bulgaria, 7 September 1921, 119.25/359; and Despatch 928, C. Van H. Engert, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to El Salvador, to Secretary of State, 7 September 1925, 119.25/630; both Folder 4, Box 1092, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

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52 Telegram 1239, Hugh Campbell Wallace, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 7 August 1919, 121.67/286; and Telegram 9039, Lansing (Albert B. Ruddock, Bureau of Western European Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Paris, 18 August 1919, 121.67/286; both Folder 3, Box 1165, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Statement of William R. Sands, Gunnery Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps,” Sands, attached to Memorandum, Theodore Roosevelt, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, 26 March 1921, 121.67/435; and Memorandum, Ward A. Fitzsimmons, Assistant Chief of Bureau of Accounts, to Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Service, 18 November 1919, and Memorandum, Carr to William Phillips, Second Assistant Secretary of State, 19 November 1919, both attached to Memorandum, Phillips to Clinton E. MacEachran, Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, 20 November 1919, 121.67/434; all Folder 1, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

53 For discontinuing the courier service, see Instruction #859, Robert Woods Bliss, Third Assistant Secretary of State, to Hugh C. Wallace, U.S. Ambassador to France, 3 June 1921, attached to Despatch 2347, Wallace to Secretary of State, 15 April 1921, 121.67/441, Folder 1; and Memorandum, Edward Bell, Chief of Division of Current Information, 9 March 1922, 121.67/512, Folder 2; both Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

54 For reviving the courier service, see Despatch 2470, Myron T. Herrick, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 20 October 1922, 121.67/551; attached to Memorandum, William McNeir, Chief of Bureau of Accounts, to Worthington E. Stewart, Acting Chief of Bureau of Diplomatic Bureau, 4 November 1922, Folder 2; and Memorandum, Stewart to Bliss, 16 January 1923, 121.67/569, Folder 3; both Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For complaints about the national mail services in Central and Eastern Europe, see Telegram 586, Hugh Robert Wilson, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Berlin, to Secretary of State, 16 June 1921, 051.62/69; and Telegram 601, Wilson to Secretary of State, 27 June 1921, 051.62/70; both Folder 4, Box 363, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Despatch 1316, H. Percival Dodge, Minister to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes [Yugoslavia], to Secretary of State, 17 April 1922, 121.67/518, Folder 2, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.


57 For Special Agent protection and services for black diplomats, see documents related to the visit of Liberian diplomat Edwin Barclay in 1925, passim, Folder – Barclay, Edwin, Secretary of State of Liberia, Visit of 1925, Box 2, Box 2, Files of Chief Special Agent Bannerman, RG 59 – Entry 546, NA.


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TAB 2 “History of Security Organization” of Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949. Letter, Sharp to Bannerman, 28 December 1923, Folder #209, Box 12, Classified Records of the Office of the Counselor, RG 59-Entry 344, NA. For leaks to the press, see Memorandum, Bannerman to William H. Beck, Assistant to the Secretary of State, 25 April 1922, 116.8/40, Folder 3, Box 1076, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For the theft investigation centered upon Robert S. Clayton, Chief Clerk of the Mail Room, see Memorandum, Bannerman, n.d. [June 1925], 111.36; Memorandum “Real Estate Transactions of Robert S. Clayton,” Bannerman, n.d. [June 1925; Memorandum “Report of Clayton Case,” Bannerman to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State, 17 June 1925, 111.36, attached to Memorandum, Wright to Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State, 13 June 1925; all Folder 1, Box 1044, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

For examples, see Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster, Yankton, South Dakota, 21 June 1926; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman), to Postmaster, San Antonio, Texas, 8 March 1926; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster, Portland, Maine, 5 October 1926; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster Mobile Alabama, 22 August 1927; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman), to Postmaster, Austin, Minnesota, 28 October 1927; all Folder #208, Box 12, Classified Records of the Office of the Counselor, RG 59-Entry 344, NA.

Report, Robert C. Bannerman, 5 December 1921; and Letter, S. C. Lawrence, British Embassy Washington, 14 October 1921; both Folder #207 [1], Box 10, Classified Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1916-1927 RG 59-Entry 344, NA.


Report on the Courier Service, Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603, Folder 3, Box 1166; Telegram 14, Johnson, U.S. Minister to Bulgaria, to Secretary of State, 4 May 1923, 121.67/567, Folder 3, Box 1166; Telegram 10, Louis A. Sussdorff, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to The Netherlands, to Secretary of State, 1 February 1923, Folder 2, Box 1166; Despatch 150, William Phillips, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, 24 October 1922, 121.67/553, Folder 2, Box 1166; Telegram 181, Henry P. Fletcher, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 28 December 1925, 051.65/26, Folder 2, Box 364; and Memorandum “Excerpt from Letter of Mr. Grant-Smith to Mr. Harrison, dated 22 October 1924,” n.d. [November? 1924], 121.67/615, Folder 3, Box 1166; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 4662, Whitehouse to Secretary of State, 12 December 1924, 051.51/88, Folder 3, Box 361; Memorandum, J. W. Janicki, Department of State Courier, to G. Harlan Miller, Secretary of U.S. Embassy Paris, 28 November 1924, enclosed with Despatch 4662, Whitehouse to Secretary of State, 12 December 1924, 051.51/88; Memorandum, F. R. Eldridge, Liaison Officer of Department of Commerce, to Carr and Bannerman, 15 January 1925, 051.51/89, Folder 3, Box 361; and Memorandum, Belin to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 January 1925, attached to Telegram 7, Fletcher to Secretary of State, 6 January 1925, 121.67/611, Folder 3, Box 1166; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, Hengstler to Carr, 12 March 1926, FW 121.67/644, Folder 4; Memorandum, Edwin C. Wilson, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, 22 July 1925, 121.67/651, Folder 4; and Letter, G. Harlan Miller, Second Secretary at U.S. Embassy Paris, to F. Lamott “Mott” Belin, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 26 December 1924, 121.67/616, Folder 3; all Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Comments on Mr. Bannerman’s Two Memoranda,” Sheldon Whitehouse, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy Paris, n.d. [May 1924], enclosed with Letter, Whitehouse to F. Lamott Belin, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State,
24 May 1924, 121.67/605; and Report on the Courier Service, Bannerman, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603. Memorandum, Bannerman to Wright, 23 April 1924, 121.67/604; both Folder 3, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

Letter, Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, to Bannerman, 8 July 1925, 121.67/645f; Letter, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 8 July 1925, 121.67/645a ½; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 25 September 1925, 121.67/645a; all Folder 4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

For Bannerman’s changes to the courier service, see Memorandum, Bannerman to Belin, 19 June 1924, 121.67/606, Folder 3; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 25 September 1925, 121.67/654a, Folder 4; both Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Bannerman to Wright, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603. Memorandum, Bannerman to Wright, 23 April 1924, 121.67/604. For the Department of Commerce reducing mails, see Memorandum, Hengstler to Carr, 12 March 1926, FW 121.67/644, folder 4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, Bannerman to Belin, 5 December 1924, 121.67/614, Folder 3, Box 1166; Memorandum, Bannerman to Edwin C. Wilson, 1 December 1925, 121.67/674, Folder 4, Box 1166; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Hengstler, 7 February 1927, 051.60c/14, Folder 1, Box 363; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA.

For the British courier system, see Despatch 1160, Frederick A. Sterling, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Great Britain, to Secretary of State, 7 April 1925, 121.67/630, Folder 4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 7.

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CHAPTER 2

THE VITAL FUNCTION
World War II and Diplomatic Security

The experiences of the World War II era (1933-1945) expanded and solidified diplomatic security as a vital function of the Department of State. From the first days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, the Department faced grave threats to U.S. diplomacy, primarily from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. As a result, the Department broadened its definition of security and expanded the number of entities monitoring and enforcing security. The Department’s new, expanded security apparatus under President Roosevelt, however, was disjointed. Security responsibilities were dispersed across multiple offices with overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, which had handled security since World War I, often was not involved in many of the new security measures. By the end of World War II, the Department was implementing security in a more extensive, formalized manner that touched and altered every level of the Department’s operations. In fact, many security measures first implemented during World War II—such as coded ID badges, formal document classification procedures, and a courier network—are today accepted as part of the Department’s normal, daily routine.

Moscow and Berlin

When Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the Presidency in March 1933, the Department of State faced diplomatic security threats from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, the regimes of both nations respectively targeted the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Moscow for espionage. Security problems at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow began immediately after Roosevelt signed the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement of November 16, 1933, which established formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. officials opened the Embassy in Moscow in December, but as diplomat George F. Kennan later recalled, they lacked basic security necessities such as codes and safes during the first few months. The Embassy’s communications with Washington were sent across open telegraph lines. Ambassador William C. Bullitt requested and obtained a group of Marines to serve as guards, but the Soviet NKVD (the Soviet intelligence service that was
the forerunner of the KGB) soon provided “girlfriends” for the Marines. One of the Embassy’s code clerks, Tyler G. Kent, had a Russian mistress, and the chauffeur for the U.S. military attaché was discovered to be a NKVD officer.

U.S. Embassy officers knew of the Soviet espionage but did little to stop it. Sergei, the caretaker of Spaso House (the Ambassador’s residence), kept his basement apartment in the residence locked, and apparently no one obtained a key from him until 1952. During that time, Sergei had assisted in “bugging” (installing listening devices) the U.S. Embassy from his apartment. In July 1937, when the Embassy’s electrician discovered a microphone in the ceiling above the Ambassador’s desk, several junior Embassy officers were upset and tried to locate other bugs. Ambassador Joseph Davies, who had succeeded William Bullitt, dismissed the affair: “I cooled off [‘the youngsters’] and ‘ kidded’ them about their ‘international sleuthing’. “ My position was,” he wrote in his diary, that “ if the Soviets had a Dictaphone installed so much the better – the sooner they would find that we were friends, not enemies.”

When Military Attaché Major Ivan D. Yeaton arrived in Moscow in 1939, he was “ appalled” by the extent to which security at the Embassy had been compromised. Two or three ballerinas from the Moscow Ballet had free run of the Embassy, and the NKVD “ generously provided” female companions for parties at the Embassy. In 1940, Yeaton, who knew that the Department was preparing to change its telegraph codes, quietly asked the FBI to send an agent to run a security inspection. Disguised as a courier, the FBI agent arrived, recorded his findings, and submitted his report. Besides the many Soviet employees and visitors that freely roamed throughout the Embassy, the FBI agent found that the code room was left unattended with the door propped open for 45 minutes one evening. He also found he code room’s safes left open and codebooks and classified messages left setting on the table. The agent’s inspection and report prompted a quick upgrade of security, and some embassy officers were brought back to Washington. Not until 1944, did an electrician undertake a comprehensive search for listening devices, and then he discovered 120 hidden microphones during his first sweep of the building. One Embassy officer confessed that Soviet microphones “kept turning up…any and everywhere.”
Nazi Germany proved equally effective in their espionage against the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. One German secret agent remarked, “Routine security precautions in the [U.S.] Embassy [in Berlin] were very poorly observed by U.S. personnel.” Long-time employees Rudolf Kranz (a.k.a. “Karl”) and Heinz Prause were covert German agents who worked in the Naval Attaché’s office. They obtained the Attaché’s codebook and exact details of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. U.S. Embassy personnel left their safes open and left classified documents on their desks during lunch, enabling German agents to steal documents, make copies or photographs, and then return them. The typewriter carbons of classified documents were simply tossed into the trash, providing another source of information for German agents. In addition, the Naval Attaché’s conference room was bugged just before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Since at least 1936, Nazi intelligence had tapped the telephone lines of the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Warsaw, the U.S. residences in Berlin, and the apartments of U.S. news correspondents. One German telephone eavesdropper was “amazed that U.S. embassy staff spoke so openly on the telephone” and that U.S. correspondents “freely talked about…what they had learned from officials and colleagues.” Much of Germany’s espionage was not discovered until 1945, when Department officials asked Security Officer Robert L. Bannerman, the son of Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman, to investigate the matter. After much analysis and investigation, Bannerman identified Kranz as an espionage agent, leading to Kranz’s arrest. Bannerman also pointed to others as possible suspects, which U.S. authorities in Germany found to be “for the most part correct.”

Nazi censors, as well as Nazi enforcement of German mail regulations that prompted the opening of U.S. diplomatic mail on occasion, aggravated an already difficult situation for the transport of U.S. diplomatic pouches. The Department initially reverted to using the Despatch Agent network in 1919; however, the opening of many new U.S. diplomatic posts after World War I, combined with the Department’s efforts to maintain fiscal economy during the 1920s and early 1930s, created a more haphazard, less secure system than had existed prior to World War I. As a means to improve security, the Department added couriers to carry diplomatic pouches to and from the new posts in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Department undercut that security when it began shipping pouches directly to Le Havre, France – bypassing the London Despatch

Figure 2: President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) confers with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary from 1933 to 1944. Unhappy that the Department had cut the courier service, Roosevelt supported an appropriation to fund three couriers in Europe. During World War II, couriers became the Department’s primary carriers of diplomatic pouches. Source: Library of Congress, New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection.
Office – and having the French postal service carry them to Paris. Due to budget constraints caused by the Great Depression, the Department shut down its courier service, but, the volume of mail handled annually by the Department’s Mail Section had grown considerably. By 1936, the Mail Section handled more than 2000 pouches containing military and naval intelligence alone, in addition to the nearly 6000 other diplomatic pouches, quantities that exceeded the capabilities of the Despatch Agent network. Other U.S. posts overseas also relied upon trusted foreign postal services, which were the British and German services.6

During the 1930s, security of U.S. diplomatic correspondence declined, and several Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Department employees echoed complaints that Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman had sought to correct in the mid-1920s. The personnel at U.S. posts confused the revived courier service with a “freight hauling” service. There was “no distinction” being made between “Confidential” and non-confidential materials, and some posts sent local national employees to the train station to pick up the diplomatic pouches. There were thefts of pouches containing confidential U.S. documents. Courier Warren M. Hamilton noted that even the most sensitive U.S. diplomatic letters (those containing the Department’s telegraph codes) were left unattended in a French post office for several hours, and then shipped across the Atlantic on ships of foreign registry. The U.S. Legation to Belgrade complained that sending U.S. diplomatic correspondence through the Yugoslav postal service meant that it was subject to search by Yugoslav authorities at all times.7

With security of U.S. diplomatic mail in doubt, President Roosevelt worked to restart the Department of State’s courier service. He was displeased when he learned that the Department had cut the courier service, and he told Congress that he supported renewed funding for couriers. In 1935, Congress appropriated $24,000 to the Department, permitting the operation of three couriers out of Paris and a limited service in Asia. For fiscal year 1939, Congress raised the appropriation to $35,000.8

The reinitiating of the courier service led to changes in the routes. The Department created a new route in northeast Asia; from its base in Peiping (now Beijing), the route ran between Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai, with Tokyo added later. In Europe, the Southern Route added Rome and Athens to its destinations, and the circuit consisted of Paris-Rome-Athens-Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna, then stopping at Zurich or Geneva before returning to Paris. The U.S. Legation in Bucharest sent a Foreign Service Officer or trusted American clerk to carry its pouch and meet the courier in Sofia. Meanwhile, an FSO or clerk travelled from Tirana and met the courier at the Hotel Oriente in Bari, Bulgaria, in order to exchange that Legation’s pouches. When Austria was absorbed into Germany in the 1938 Anschluss, Vienna was dropped from the route. An Iberian Route was added, which travelled from Paris to Barcelona to Madrid to Lisbon, and back to Paris. The courier handling this route was likely the same courier who made the Paris to London trip. The Northern Route appears to have remained largely the same, following the circuit of Paris-Berlin-Riga-Moscow-Tallinn-Helsinki-Paris.9


Neutrality Legislation and New Duties

As tensions escalated in Europe and Asia, the United States strove to remain neutral, and the 1934 book Merchants of Death intensified the U.S. public’s desire for neutrality. The work claimed that arms manufacturers and dealers had unduly influenced the U.S. Government’s decision to enter World War I. A Congressional committee led by Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND) investigated the book’s claims but found little evidence to support them. The “merchants of death” thesis, however, became popular just as Italy was preparing to wage war against Ethiopia in 1935. Public sentiment pressed Congress to ensure that the United States remained neutral, and Congress responded by passing the Neutrality Act of 1935, which imposed an embargo upon the sale of arms to nations at war. Congress strengthened the Neutrality Act in 1936 by banning U.S. citizens from making loans or extending credit to belligerents. President Roosevelt, in his 1937 “Quarantine” speech, then declared that the United States should use its “moral influence” to stop war.

The Department of State became the cabinet agency tasked to enforce and secure U.S. neutrality. As Spain descended into civil war in 1936, with German Führer Adolph Hitler and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini aiding the Spanish Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco, the Department created the Office of Arms and Munitions Control to enforce the Neutrality Acts. The office was charged with registering manufacturers, exporters, and importers of arms, ammunition, and war materiel, as well as licensing the exportation and importation of war...
materiel. The Secretary of State also chaired the National Munitions Control Board. The control of munitions was conceived in terms similar to the control of passports and visas. Like persons who provided false passports to saboteurs and spies, foreign agents and U.S. subversives engaged in the arms trade could subvert U.S. diplomacy and jeopardize U.S. internal security. Arms traders, therefore, were seen to pose a security risk to the United States, much like German saboteurs, anarchists, and Communist agents had done a generation earlier during World War I.

The Office of the Chief Special Agent was pulled into the neutrality debates when Americans ignored or flouted the U.S. ban on travel to belligerent countries. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Americans volunteered for the Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, and Loyalist International Brigades in order to aid the Republicans in their struggle against Franco and the Fascists. Prohibited by the Neutrality Acts from travelling to Spain, U.S. volunteers applied for passports saying that they were travelling to France, Belgium, England, or other countries, even though their true destination was Spain. By 1937, the Department of State required that young men of military age present affidavits attesting that they were not going to Spain.

Passport fraud resulting from U.S. citizens fighting in Spain prompted the Department of State to change the design of U.S. passports in 1937. When U.S. volunteers arrived in Spain, they were told to give their passports to their regiment leaders “for safekeeping.” As a result, more than 2,000 U.S. passports were shipped to Moscow because some regiment leaders who had joined the Republican cause were Soviet agents or collaborators. U.S. officials soon learned of the thefts and redesigned the U.S. passport. The Department issued free replacements to U.S. citizens as a means of identifying fraud and catching Communist agents. However, U.S. volunteers who had lost their passports returned to the United States with only certificates of identity. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman, who worked in the New York Field Office, recalled staying up until 4 a.m. three times a week interviewing the returning volunteers in order to determine if they were truly U.S. citizens.

False U.S. passports appeared in Denmark, Brazil, and the Soviet Union, and investigations by the Chief Special Agent’s office exposed a Soviet spy network. Department of State Special Agents learned that many U.S.
volunteers for the Spanish Civil War had made their travel arrangements through World Tourists, Inc., a Communist front company (all of its corporate officers were Communist Party members). World Tourists had also provided travel arrangements for the Amtorg Corporation, a Communist front organization that the Chief Special Agent’s office had investigated a decade earlier. In 1939, U.S. authorities seized the records of World Tourists. The Department of Justice indicted the company and its head, Jacob Golos, for passport fraud, and issued a second indictment against Golos for failing to register as a foreign agent. Earl Browder, leader of the U.S. Communist Party, was also indicted and convicted of passport fraud as a result of the World Tourist investigation. Browder served fourteen months in jail before Roosevelt pardoned him as a gesture of wartime friendship to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{16}

Another set of passport fraud investigations conducted by the Chief Special Agent’s Office exposed Nazi espionage in the United States. Guenther Gustave Rumrich called the U.S. Passport Bureau in Manhattan, identified himself as “Mr. Weston, Under Secretary of State,” and requested that 50 blank passports be delivered to his hotel. As Sumner Welles was Under Secretary of State at the time, Special Agents and FBI agents trailed the delivery of the blank passports and arrested Rumrich. A deserter from the U.S. Army, Rumrich had received $290 from the Nazi German government, and in exchange, he sent U.S. Government weather reports, the Army-Navy Register (a periodical), and a list of Army and Navy publications to the Germans. All of these items, however, were publicly available, free of charge, and could have been easily obtained by German Embassy officers. Rumrich may not have been the most effective spy, but the investigation of his activities uncovered three other German agents—Erich Glaser, Otto Herman Voss, and Johanna Hoffman. All four were tried in 1938, and received prison terms of two years (Rumrich and Hoffman), four years (Glaser), and six years (Voss).\textsuperscript{17}

With only six Special Agents in 1939, the Office of the Chief Special Agent achieved an impressive track record in passport fraud cases. Each Special Agent juggled between 30 and 40 cases at once. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman recalled that even under the severely limited budget, he conducted passport and visa fraud
investigations, personnel case investigations, special inquiries made on behalf of consular officers abroad, liaisons with all federal agencies in New York, and arrangements and protection for visiting dignitaries and heads of state.  

Other diplomatic security threats remained undetected. The NKVD, the Soviet intelligence service, had 221 agents operating in the United States. Within the upper ranks of the U.S. Government, these agents included Alger Hiss; Laurence Duggan, Chief of the Division of American Republics at the Department of State; Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President; and Duncan Chaplin Lee, personal assistant to General William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1939, Whittaker Chambers, an editor for Time magazine and a former Soviet agent, told FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover and Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle about the Soviets’ espionage efforts, and even gave them the names of Hiss, White, and Currie. Berle wrote a memorandum about Chambers’ allegations to an uninterested President Roosevelt, but then set the matter aside.

Communications Security in Wartime

The escalating hostilities in Asia and Europe during the late 1930s emphasized the need for greater security. The July 1937 clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing quickly expanded to war in East Asia. In 1938, Hitler moved German forces into Austria and created a crisis over the Sudetenland, which led to the 1939 occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. Then, after signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1939, Hitler launched an air and land attack on Poland on September 1, prompting Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany. While the United States operated under the Neutrality Acts, Hitler’s armies stormed through Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in the spring of 1940. The rapid fall of France in June 1940 shocked the American public and pushed the United States toward active assistance of the Allied cause (Britain, France, and other West European countries) against the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. President Roosevelt began rearming U.S. military forces, and convinced Congress to amend neutrality legislation in order to allow a “cash and carry” program to supply Great Britain. The U.S. Government authorized the sale of U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for base leases in the western Atlantic, and, in the spring of 1941, provided wholesale economic assistance to the Allied cause through the Lend Lease Act.

With the onset of war in Europe and Asia, the Department’s patchwork diplomatic pouch system collapsed, forcing Department officials to adopt alternatives. The rise of German and Japanese submarine attacks on commercial shipping, and the problems created by wartime hostilities in Europe and Asia (e.g. detention of two U.S. couriers in German-occupied Norway) wrecked pouch transport system. The Department expanded its courier staff in Paris and created a courier office in Berlin. After the fall of France, the Department considered shifting the port of entry for its European pouches to Genoa, but since Italy was an Axis power, this probably did not occur. The Department still used Despatch Agents but as the war progressed, more and more of the
pouches moved to military transports and airplanes. President Roosevelt approved the use of military officers as couriers where and when necessary, and the Department frequently depended upon the Army’s Courier Service, as well as U.S. military transports and airplanes. The Department opened regional courier centers in Cairo, Algiers, and Naples, and where possible, rebuilt the courier network in Asia.  

Department officials also instituted new wartime procedures for diplomatic correspondence. The Department began requiring all materials intended for the diplomatic pouch to be submitted unsealed, and addressed to a career officer of the Foreign Service or a commissioned attaché. Pouches could be opened or closed only by a Chief of Mission or an officially designated career officer. Couriers also bore increased responsibility for safeguarding their pouches; the Foreign Service Administration instructed them “to keep their pouches always in their possession, at table, on deck, in bed, in the bath.”

With the increased speed, capacity, and reliability of airmail service, the Department of State began utilizing airplanes for the transport of its diplomatic correspondence on a large scale. In cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Authorities and Pan American Airways, the Department arranged for airmail pouch service. In June 1941, using Miami as a hub, Department officials developed three airmail routes to Latin American posts, and within a year the number of routes was expanded to five. With weight and space being key factors in air transport, the Department turned to 35mm or 16mm microfilm as a means to reduce the volume of its reports, newspapers, periodicals, and correspondence.
With regular airmail transport, the Department pioneered the use of airgrams. Airgrams were prepared on standard forms in a telegraphic style but were transported by airplanes. More extensive in content than telegrams, airgrams arrived at their destination faster than ocean transport; moreover, they significantly reduced traffic on telegraph and telephone lines. Airgrams also cut departmental costs (telegraph and telephone charges) and ensured a more secure transmission of classified correspondence. Using the Department’s new airmail routes, Washington could send an airgram as late as 8:30 p.m., and it would reach Mexico City, Havana, Guatemala City, Port-au-Prince, Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo), or any part of Canada by the next day. An airgram sent from Washington could reach the rest of Central America, Caracas, Bogotá, or Lima within 48 hours; Santiago or Rio de Janeiro in 72 hours; and Buenos Aires in 96 hours. In all cases, the pace of diplomatic communications accelerated.  

However, trans-Atlantic air transport raised new security considerations. The Office of Naval Intelligence expressed concern when several Department of State pouches were found floating off the coast of Lisbon, following the crash of a Pan American flight. Upon an internal review, the Foreign Service Administration proposed that couriers be required to carry knives in order to cut small holes in canvas pouches if they needed to ditch their load in deep water.
Communications between the Department and U.S. posts in Axis and Axis-occupied territories posed special security challenges. When France fell to the invading Nazi German armies in June 1940, U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt telegraphed Washington that he could no longer receive coded messages because the Embassy, following emergency procedures, had destroyed its codes and equipment. He asked the Department to use commercial radio channels to send confidential messages, and to cloak the information within a common and seemingly innocuous personal message from a girl to a family member that would be repeated several times during a day.\textsuperscript{27} The Embassy had local telephone and mail service, but lacked telephone, telegraph, or mail service to places outside German-occupied areas. German officials initially refused to permit courier service, but later allowed it to Lisbon, Portugal, only to block the Paris-to-Lisbon courier route in October 1940. The German chargé to the
United States explained that this restriction should not be considered punitive because it applied to all diplomats, neutral or otherwise, in areas experiencing military operations. By October 1940, the Nazis relented amid numerous complaints about the lack of courier service and inaugurated daily courier service from Paris to Vichy. U.S. officials refused to use the new service because Nazi officials demanded that all messages carried by courier be written in German or French. U.S. diplomats chose to “stick to our own devices,” which meant using private individuals to smuggle correspondence out of German-controlled France. By November 1940, Nazi German officials had banned all diplomatic correspondence from crossing French frontiers, unless it was sent through the daily courier service. In February 1941, the Nazis enforced this prohibition, which led the Department to strongly discourage the use of private messengers, citing the risk they faced of possible arrest by Nazi authorities. In retaliation, U.S. officials considered blocking German courier service from the United States and Latin America, but the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) argued that this would have the desired effect, and the idea was tabled. The Department decided to move the U.S. Embassy to Vichy, closing the Embassy in Paris in 1941. However, even the closed Embassy created problems, because the U.S. diplomatic staff at Vichy sent “interzone cards” to the custodian of the Embassy, inquiring about official and personal matters. The First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy at Vichy strictly forbade sending interzone cards, citing “serious personal risk” to the custodian and his possible “internment” by German authorities.

The security problems encountered by U.S. diplomats in Paris were not unique. U.S. diplomats in Oslo, Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, and Luxembourg also faced delays and restrictions. The Department warned diplomatic and consular officers that telephone lines should be used with “very great caution,” and in January...
1943, it curtailed long-distance calls, except when the matter was especially urgent. Every post had concerns about wiretapping, and Admiral François Darlan, head of the Vichy Government, warned the U.S. Embassy that its telephones were under close surveillance. Chief Electrician’s Mate Albert E. Dunn of the U.S. Navy spent much of the early 1940s traveling from post to post, checking telephone and telegraph lines to ensure that the Nazis or their agents had not wiretapped U.S. embassy lines.

Compared with France and Western Europe, the experience of U.S. diplomats in Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini was relatively trouble-free. Although U.S. Consuls in Italy reported that Italian authorities occasionally impeded their correspondence, the U.S. Embassy usually could send its messages without difficulty, regardless of whether the communications were in code or not. U.S. investigators also did not uncover any wiretaps in Rome. The difference between Rome and the occupied capitals of Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg was how German officials defined the city: by the Nazis’ reckoning, Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg were combat zones; whereas, Rome was an Axis capital.

Securing Codes and Code Rooms

The amount of telegraph traffic and the number of messages requiring coding and decoding constituted a serious concern for Department officials, particularly after British officials discovered a spy at the U.S. Embassy in London. In the spring of 1940, Tyler Kent, a U.S. code clerk, passed embassy telegrams to a British fascist group, which in turn relayed them to Germany. British officials arrested Kent’s British contacts on May 20. After obtaining Department of State approval, British police searched Kent’s rooms and found copies of over 1,500 documents, as well as keys to the index bureau and code room. The Department fired Kent and stripped him of his diplomatic immunity. The British government tried Kent for violating the Official Secrets Act and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. Kent’s espionage disrupted U.S. diplomatic communications for nearly six weeks until special U.S. couriers were able to distribute new codes.
Likely prompted by the Tyler Kent case, the Department of State surveyed the security of its communications and codes in early 1941. It asked each post to report how many officers were involved in code work, and how many hours they spent doing it. The Department also wanted to know what security measures its posts took to protect coded messages and codes. The results surprised Washington officials. Posts such as Athens, Cairo, and Berlin handled their traffic easily, while London, Bucharest, Vichy, and Tangiers were overwhelmed, with numerous overtime hours and in the case of London, code clerks working “trying” shifts.\(^35\)

U.S. embassies and legations in Europe generally implemented effective security measures for their codes and coded messages. Except for U.S. posts in Spain, most embassies and legations had a separate, locked room for communications equipment, and only the code clerks, the Chief of Mission, and the Deputy Chief of Mission had access. Guards or night watchmen guarded the code rooms.\(^36\) Coded messages did not leave the room, officers had to read them there, and papers were burned immediately after use. The codes—Brown Code for Strictly Confidential messages and Grey Code for the Confidential messages—were kept in safes in the code room. The Chief of Mission and one code clerk were the only members of the post who had access to the combination or key to the safe in the code room.\(^37\)

\textbf{Physical and Personnel Security at Embassies}

The heightened danger of espionage prompted U.S. officials to increase post security and impose stricter measures at U.S. missions overseas. Posts employed embassy guards and night watchmen primarily to prevent theft and ensure the security of the post’s records and the code room. In Latin America, embassy guards were usually private U.S. citizens hired by the Department and assigned to a particular embassy.\(^38\) Their salary (about $1200 plus $500 for housing) was one-half that of Foreign Service Officers and less than most foreign national clerks. Most often, U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates relied upon locally employed nationals as guards and night watchmen. Depending on location, local guards received compensation that was one-tenth to one-quarter the pay received by U.S. citizen guards, making local guards and night watchmen among the lowest paid employees at
the embassy. High turnover was common, and many held the position as a second job.\footnote{39}

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the demographics of U.S. embassy guards changed significantly. In Latin America, due to the draft and the personnel demands of the War Department, U.S. citizen guards generally were retired Coast Guardsmen or retired law enforcement. Many embassies and legations also made arrangements with local police or military forces to provide 24-hour or evening and weekend security.\footnote{40} Outside the Western Hemisphere, depending upon location, U.S. embassies frequently depended upon U.S. military personnel for guards. Marines assumed guard duty at the U.S. Embassy in London; meanwhile, the Army provided guards for the U.S. Embassies in Tehran, Cairo, and Rome. In some cases, such as Rome, the shortage of guards sometimes required Foreign Service Officers to cover guard shifts in the evening.\footnote{41}

The Department’s shift to U.S. military personnel as guards was partly the result of Department officials’ concerns regarding their reliance on local nationals as guards and employees, and the pressure Axis agents may place on local nationals. In the final months of 1939, the Department learned of at least three instances of “espionage activities” at U.S. consulates. In Italy, the Department was aware that the Gestapo and other German government agents had increased their activities, and that U.S. diplomats were under surveillance. The Department therefore insisted that all U.S. officials should refrain from carrying secret or confidential documents when crossing international borders, and that they should “never (repeat never) carry” documents that were received or sent in code. Other Department concerns ranged from the physical protection of post employees to foreign national employees issuing fraudulent visas. The Department took preventative measures, prosecuted employees committing security breaches when they could, and released or transferred questionable employees.\footnote{42}

The actions taken by the U.S. Embassy in France reveals some of the preventative measures that U.S. posts took regarding foreign national employees. In October 1940, the First Secretary of the Embassy, H. Freeman Matthews, reported that an embassy code clerk had taken a “keen interest in the contents of my telegrams.”
The clerk also had a friendship with a French Foreign Office official who had worked in the French military's censorship office before German occupation. Matthews requested Washington to send another code clerk so that he could transfer the suspected clerk to Vichy or Marseilles where he would work on less sensitive materials. Later, after the U.S. Embassy was moved to Vichy, Matthews strongly warned Embassy staff that the Germans might send agents provocateur disguised as Gaullist or British sympathizers into the Embassy. He explained that the Germans and the Vichy French might try to build a case against the U.S. Embassy by showing that the Embassy was aiding British subjects or French men of military age to escape France and join the Allied forces. Such a case, Matthews feared, could lead to the arrest, detention, or expulsion of Embassy personnel. One local member of the Embassy's staff, Nicolas Goliewsky, who had been a Consulate employee for 19 years, had already been interned at a concentration camp in Compiègne on such charges.

Visa fraud also merited serious concern within the Department. Amidst heightened security threats, U.S. Embassies in Europe faced an escalating workload in visa cases as thousands of people, particularly those of Jewish descent, sought entrance into the United States to escape Nazi persecution. U.S. immigration laws were tight, and efforts to pressure U.S. visa office employees were not unusual. One such case involved Tatiana Stcherbina, a foreign national clerk for 16 years in the U.S. Embassy in Paris. After the war began in Europe in 1939, the U.S. Embassy in Paris transferred its visa office to the U.S. Consulate in Bordeaux. Stcherbina later reported that after being transferred to Bordeaux, Jewish refugees began approaching her at work, on the street, and even at home “with all kinds of offers.” Although she initially refused their entreaties, Stcherbina relented when Maxmiliano Birnbaum offered her several thousand French francs to falsify documents to move twelve people to the top of the visa wait list. The visas would enable twelve Polish and Russian Jews, four of whom were children, to travel to the United States and avoid being sent to German concentration camps. Between March 1939 and February 1940, she forged log entries, allowing the twelve to move to the head of the queue.

In April 1940, when U.S. Consulate officials confronted Stcherbina with the forged entries, she cited several reasons for her actions. As the head of household and sole breadwinner, Stcherbina faced financial difficulties, partially as a result of high medical bills incurred by her mother and her only son, and partially due to low wages the U.S. Foreign Service paid its foreign-born employees. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy had contributed to Stcherbina’s difficulties when it transferred its visa section to Bordeaux on four days notice, but refused to provide financial assistance to Stcherbina and other Foreign Service nationals for the move. When Stcherbina complained, the lead U.S. official said the short notice and moving expenses were her own affair. To relieve her extreme indebtedness, Stcherbina had accepted Birnbaum’s entreaties and money, but insisted that this was the first time she had forged entries and documents.

Department officials brought the case to a close and summarily fired Stcherbina. Despite her nearly two decades of loyal service to the United States, the Department’s case review officer remarked that “a person of her background must have had a natural sympathy for aliens of the refugee class and it is not inconceivable that she
could have been prevailed upon to enter the conspiracy.” The review officer, however, omitted from his report Stcherbina’s claim that Birnbaum was trying to get a visa for a young boy in order to prevent him from being sent to a concentration camp.47 “If this affair teaches us anything,” the officer insisted, “it should be that immigrant waiting lists should be carefully maintained under the close supervision of an American consular officer of career at each office.” His superior concurred, and the Department sent out warning notices on the twelve fraudulent visas, which meant that the twelve would be denied entry into the United States and deported back to Europe. Washington officials also determined that Stcherbina’s supervisors, Consul Henry S. Waterman and Vice Consul Taylor W. Gannett, shared the responsibility for the fraudulent visas, and a notation was likely made in their personnel files.48

Security Developments in Washington

The Chief Special Agent’s office underwent changes in leadership and personnel during the period as well. On February 27, 1940, Robert C. Bannerman, who had served as the Chief Special Agent for nearly 20 years, died. Thomas F. Fitch, a former Post Office Inspector and the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office, assumed leadership of the office. The workload of the office had increased considerably during the 1930s, largely due to the sharp increase in passport and visa fraud cases. During his first year as Chief Special Agent, Fitch doubled his staff from 7 to 17, and then doubled it again during his second year. Fitch posted five agents in the Washington D.C. office for the first time since 1927.49

Between 1938 and 1941, the Department also increased security at the State, War, and Navy Building, near the White House. General Service Administration security guards manned the watches and controlled access to buildings on evenings, weekends, and holidays. The rapid increase in Department personnel after 1939 prompted the Department officials to institute a building pass...
system in August 1941. The color-coded passes had a black-and-white photograph and were laminated to prevent tampering or alteration. Gold passes, printed by the Wilson Magazine Camera Company of Philadelphia, granted unlimited access to any building and allowed holders to transport official papers between buildings. Second-level passes admitted bearers to all buildings during regular business hours only. A third group of passes were largely for visitors. The visitor’s pass was restricted to prescribed hours and locations, and had to be surrendered upon leaving the building. Department employees and FSOs also had to surrender their pass when they left Department employment, and one’s final paycheck was not disbursed until the pass was surrendered.\footnote{50}

During these same years, three developments expanded the scope of security concerns and increased the number of U.S. Government entities involved in security. First, the Roosevelt Administration tried to prevent the confused, overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions that had occurred during World War I. In June 1939, shortly before the war began in Europe, President Roosevelt directed that all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage be “controlled and handled” by the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID). The three entities had reached agreement on a definition and delineation of their areas of responsibility. The FBI would handle domestic investigations of U.S. civilians, which included Department of State employees. ONI would oversee personnel, property, and areas under the Navy’s control, and MID would do the personnel, property, and areas under control of the War Department.\footnote{51}

President Roosevelt’s directive further defined the FBI’s responsibilities to include investigations of foreign agents and activities at U.S. posts overseas. The FBI was tasked to monitor and investigate subversive and covert agents operating within the United States, and was required to keep the Department of State informed. The FBI also would assume responsibility for an investigation if the Department requested it, which included munitions trafficking cases. In addition, the FBI’s authority included investigations of activities that occurred

Figure 16: Martin Dies, U.S. Congressional Representative from Texas. Dies chaired the Dies Committee, which investigated ties of U.S. Government employees to Communist-front organizations. The Dies Committee investigation led to the 1939 Hatch Act. The Hatch Act forbade any U.S. Government employee from being a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government. Source: Library of Congress, Congressional Portrait Collection.
at U.S. posts overseas. Since the buildings and compounds of U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates are considered U.S. soil, most investigations involving activities or crimes by Department of State employees were to be referred to the FBI.

The second development that expanded the scope of security concerns was the Department's monitoring the activities of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens. The monitoring had begun as an effort to control the sale and trafficking of munitions. In 1938, the Office of Arms and Munitions Control was renamed the Office of Controls, but in October 1941, it was incorporated into the Office of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC). Focused upon intelligence and surveillance, FC monitored several groups: arms traffickers, Nazi and Fascist agents, Nazi and Fascist party members, Germans and Austrians travelling and relocating to Latin America, foreign military attachés, Japanese immigrants, and Nisei, who were U.S.-born children of Japanese immigrants. FC also monitored U.S. citizens travelling to the Soviet Union, as well as those deemed subversives, saboteurs, or disloyal. In addition, FC monitored the transfer and movement of German, Austrian, and Japanese finances, capital, and patents. FC worked closely with the Passport, Visa, Chief Special Agent, and Commercial Affairs Offices of the Department, as well as the FBI, ONI, MID, the Treasury Department, Immigration, and the Office of Censorship. FC devoted much of its efforts to maintaining information on Germans and to creating a readily accessible information register for other agencies and offices.\(^\text{32}\)

The third development that broadened the range of security concerns was institution of loyalty tests and programs. During the 1930s, Congressional queries about the loyalty of federal employees prompted the House of Representatives, in 1938, to create the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the Dies Committee. Named after Representative Martin Dies of Texas, the Dies Committee revealed that several federal employees had ties to Communist front organizations. Consequently, Congress passed the 1939 Hatch Act, which forbade any federal employee from being a member of a group or organization that advocated the overthrow of the U.S. Government.\(^\text{53}\) In 1940, the Civil Service Commission excluded members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any other communist or Nazi organization from U.S. Government employment. Then, in 1941, Congress appropriated $100,000 to the FBI for investigations of federal employees alleged to be members of such organizations, and required that the heads of relevant agencies be notified of the investigators’ findings. In April 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle created an interdepartmental committee to review the reports and address any security concerns.\(^\text{54}\)

FBI investigators determined that many complaints and charges raised during the Congressional inquiries were false, but criticism of the FBI's investigations emerged. Biddle's interdepartmental committee determined that the FBI's efforts were “utterly disproportionate to the resources expended.” Of the nearly 44,000 people ruled ineligible for federal employment between July 1, 1940, and March 31, 1947, 714 individuals (or 1.6 percent) were deemed Communists and 599 persons (1.4 percent) were members of Nazi, Fascist, or Japanese groups (the latter likely referring to ultra-militaristic Japanese groups). Biddle's committee also found that the whole process
was too susceptible to causing “broad personal injury” on false grounds. The committee concluded that future loyalty investigations should be restricted to issues “clearly pertinent to the vital problem of internal security.” Although Biddle’s committee raised important questions, it was only the opening round of a larger, longer debate over the backgrounds and past associations of U.S. Government employees, particularly those employed at the Department of State.⁵⁵

**Diplomatic Detentions during Wartime**

When the United States entered World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Department of State implemented new protective security measures that accentuated its move toward greater security. On December 8, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull requested that Chief Special Agent Fitch assign a protective detail to him (Hull). Although Hull’s protective detail consisted of one Special Agent, it marked the beginning of the Secretary of State’s protective detail that continues to this day. In early 1942, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration was formally designated and assumed the responsibilities as the Department’s Security Officer.⁶⁶

As the German and Japanese armies invaded and occupied several nations, the United States had to close diplomatic and consular posts, and the closing procedure involved several security measures. Department regulations governed this contingency, yet many procedures required time, advance notice, and respect for diplomatic immunities and privileges. If time and travel routes permitted, U.S. Embassy officers were to ship confidential files to Washington or, if conditions permitted, seal and store files in a commercial storage facility. If neither option was possible, files were to be burned. As a post neared its final hours, U.S. officers had to destroy, burn, or damage beyond repair, all seals, stamps, codes, cryptographic devices, confidential files, passports, visas, certificates of naturalization, and certificates of registration and identity. Officers also had to ship the first pages of all blank passports to Washington, as well as a list of all documents they had destroyed. Diplomatic officers were to hand-carry the sensitive
Grey Code and M-138 coding devices home. The Department gave all locally employed nationals 30 days leave and terminated employment at the end of the period. Departing U.S. officials would then transfer embassy or consulate affairs, and any sealed items, to the diplomatic representative of the nation that had agreed to serve as the protecting power for the United States. During World War II, that nation was Switzerland.\(^{57}\)

Time was the critical element in closing a post, and the case of the U.S. Legation in Bangkok, Thailand, is an example of what can occur when a post lacked adequate notice and time. Legation officials had anticipated a Japanese attack on Bangkok, but the rapid capitulation of Thailand to Japanese forces caught the Legation off-guard. When the Japanese occupied Bangkok, diplomatic protocol and privileges faded. On December 8, 1941, the Thai Foreign Minister informed the U.S. Minister that Thailand had signed an agreement with the Japanese, allowing Japanese forces to pass through the country to attack the British in the latter’s colonies of Burma and Malaysia. That day, U.S. Legation, Consulate, and military attaché personnel raced to burn all codes and confidential documents, and destroy all seals, stamps, and coding equipment.\(^{58}\) This proved fortuitous because the following day, Japanese soldiers appeared at the gates of the U.S. Legation compound and denied entry and exit of all persons and communications. On December 10, Japanese soldiers cut the Legation’s telephone lines, entered the compound, pulled out all telephones and the central switchboard, and removed the radios.\(^{59}\) Japanese officials then confined Legation personnel, as well as the U.S. citizens who had gathered there, to the compound; however, three American clerks were taken to an internment camp. Japanese officials allowed the U.S. Minister to communicate and conduct affairs through the Swiss Consul, but Japanese and Thai officials closely scrutinized all correspondence. After 6 months, the Japanese repatriated U.S. officials, and Japanese and Thai authorities seized the U.S. compound for military purposes. The Swiss Consul, meanwhile, took custody of the Legation’s and Consulate’s archives.\(^{60}\)
In the United States, responsibility for the detention of Axis diplomats fell upon the Office of the Chief Special Agent. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman recalled that the Department of State “had no precedents to work from;” indeed, the 1941 detention of Axis diplomats differed sharply from what had occurred during World War I, when Chief Special Agent Joseph Nye personally escorted the German Ambassador until his departure. In the months preceding U.S. entry into the war, the Department began preparing for the scenario of detaining Axis diplomats. In April 1941, the Division of European Affairs determined that the U.S. Government would take custody of German diplomats in order to protect them from local authorities and harsh treatment. Germany’s diplomats would be guarded in their home or interned at a hotel, the German Embassy would be closed, and its interests turned over to a protecting power, namely Switzerland. At the end of May 1941, Department officials instructed the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to tell German officials that in the event of breaking of relations, German diplomats in the United States would be protected and allowed “every reasonable facility in order to liquidate their personal affairs.” A similar instruction was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Rome a few days later.\(^\text{64}\)

After Pearl Harbor, U.S. officials initially allowed Axis diplomats to stay in their homes and have unrestrained access to the Swiss Legation, but later transferred them to resorts in the Appalachian Mountains until the Department of State could arrange for an exchange of diplomats between the United States and the Axis powers. The Germans had transferred U.S. diplomats to a hotel at Bad Nauheim, yet, reports of Japan’s less than hospitable treatment of U.S. diplomats soon reached the Department. Although “his patience was sorely tried,” Secretary Cordell Hull declared that he would not “be drawn into a contest in which he would have to out stink a skunk;” and “there was a limit below which the United States Government would not stoop” in its treatment of enemy diplomats. The Secret Service objected to Axis diplomats staying in Washington,

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**Figure 19:** The Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Government interned the German and Italian diplomats, and the diplomats of their allies, the Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Hungarians, at the Greenbrier Hotel. The Office of the Chief Special Agent oversaw the detention of Axis diplomats. Source: Library of Congress, Detroit Publishing Company Photograph Collection.

**Figure 20:** The Homestead Hotel, Hot Springs, West Virginia. Japanese diplomats were detained in the Homestead Hotel. The Office of the Chief Special Agent oversaw the detention until the Japanese diplomats were exchanged in 1942. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.
particularly when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was scheduled to arrive on December 22. President Roosevelt ordered the Department to “get the Germans out of Washington.” Special Agent Bannerman, working with Stanley Woodward of the Division of Protocol, moved the Germans to the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and the Japanese to the Homestead Hotel in Hot Springs, Virginia. The hotels were chosen because they were large, accessible, secluded, possessed full services, and were largely empty due to the winter off-season. Diplomats from Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were allowed to stay in Washington, even though their countries had allied with Germany. On January 9, 1942, the U.S. Attorney General objected to their continued presence in the nation’s capital, and they were then taken to the Greenbrier Hotel to join their German counterparts.\

The Department paid all expenses for the detainees and the Chief Special Agent’s office, namely Bannerman, assumed management and coordination of the detention effort, which numbered about 1,000 Axis diplomats and their families. At the Homestead and Greenbrier Hotels, the Chief Special Agent’s office arranged for the Immigration Border Patrol to guard the hotels. In early 1942, Axis diplomats in Central and northern South America were transported to New Orleans. The Chief Special Agent’s office obtained hotels in Virginia, North Carolina, and Ohio, as well as two Immigration Service camps in Texas and one camp in New Mexico, to house Axis diplomats from Latin America until arrangements were made for transport to their home countries. Ultimately, the Department of State arrange for an exchange of Axis diplomats for U.S. diplomats. The exchanges occurred in Portugal (for U.S. diplomats in Europe) and Mozambique (for U.S. diplomats in Asia).\

The Chief Special Agent’s office also participated in internment some individuals of Japanese ancestry who had been taken into custody in Hawaii, bringing the total number of persons for whom the Chief Special Agent’s office oversaw custody to about 25,000 people. In 1942, the Office of the Chief Special Agent received word that the Navy was bringing all the official Japanese from Honolulu to San Diego, and the office was to detain them in an “isolated” location. Bannerman arranged for the Japanese internees to stay at a dude ranch, located 30 miles north of Dragoon, Arizona, and he placed Special Agent Wells Bailey in charge. While holding the Japanese officials there for a period...
of seven months, Arizona state officials inquired—without success—about who was being held at the dude ranch. Although Bannerman did not specifically identify the individuals, they may have been consular, government, and business officials assigned to Honolulu.⁶⁴

**Stricter Information Controls: Classification, Clearances, and Security Procedures**

During World War II, the U.S. Government standardized the classification of documents and information to ensure control of sensitive material. On September 28, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) instituted a new classification system that had three categories: “Secret,” “Confidential,” and “Restricted.” Documents classified as “Secret” had information that “might endanger national security” or “cause serious injury to the Nation or any government activity.” A “Confidential” marking prevented disclosure of information that “would impair the effectiveness of governmental activity in the prosecution of the war.” “Restricted” had a more amorphous definition. It applied to documents that did not meet the requirements for Secret and Confidential, but contained information that, if disclosed, would affect “the expeditious accomplishment of a particular project.”

The “Restricted” classification also reflected the need for certain documents to have a wider distribution in order to accomplish the task required. With the new classification system, OWI warned against over-classifying materials. The OWI did not want to restrict unduly the dissemination of information to the public and Congress, because both required information to participate actively and effectively in the prosecution of the war and the democratic process. The OWI strongly implied that U.S. Government officials should err on the side of dissemination rather than restriction.⁶⁵

The Department of State also employed supplemental special handling terms beyond the OWI’s classification levels. Airgrams, which the Department introduced on a widespread basis in 1942, employed the terms “Plain” (unclassified), “Confidential,” and “Strictly Confidential” for classification of their content. In April 1943, the Department substituted “Secret” for “Strictly Confidential,” bringing its classifications in line with the OWI system.⁶⁶
During the war, the United States and Great Britain shared significant amounts of information, prompting the British and Americans to conclude the Combined Security Classification Agreement of March 13, 1944. Titled “Change No. 1,” this agreement amended the earlier classification system by adding a fourth level of classification known as “Top Secret.” Information placed in this category was to be considered “paramount” to national security, and it was to be used only in cases when “unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation.” The OWI once again cautioned against over-classifying documents, insisting that “Top Secret” documents “will be kept to a minimum.”

Within eight weeks, the joint British-American information control system fell into disarray. Department and Foreign Service officers (“old hands” as well as newcomers) applied multiple standards in classifying documents. Some officers implemented a less stringent standard, resulting in secret information being disseminated to the public. Meanwhile, other officers classified too liberally, overburdening the couriers. Secretary of State Hull responded by reorganizing the classification system. He delineated five categories of document classification: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, and Unrestricted, and then defined the handling requirements of each. “Top Secret” and “Secret” documents required transport by diplomatic courier, and under no circumstances could they be sent by registered mail. “Confidential” marked items were to be sent via mail sacks on Army or Navy planes or American commercial airplanes. The final two classifications, “Restricted” and “Unrestricted,” could be transmitted like “Confidential” materials, or in mail sacks carried by U.S. or foreign postal services.

Four months later, the Department supplemented this reorganized classification system by formally incorporating several informal handling restrictions. These included “For the Secretary,” “For the Ambassador,” and “For the Chief of Mission,” as well as “For Department Use Only.” Again Foreign Service Officers too eagerly employed the latter restriction, making it difficult to share needed information with other departments and agencies. Secretary Hull then created the term “For Limited Distribution” as a substitute for the great majority of instances in which Foreign Service Officers were using “For Department Use Only.”

The new classification system supplemented the procedures for the processing and transmission of documents already in existence. Ordinarily, a telegram had to receive at least three signatures, and many times five, in order to clear it for transmission. Former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot admitted that it generally took the better part of a day to get the necessary clearances on a telegram. For many, the process of obtaining clearances may have seemed burdensome, particularly when the telegram addressed a mundane, unclassified topic, and/or if the message had to be sent quickly. After retirement, Cabot confessed how he resolved this situation: “I would wait till almost five o’clock, when everyone was frantically rushing to clear his desk, and then barge into the necessary offices, telegram in hand. No one under these circumstances was in a mood to argue, and it was amazing how many initials I could get on a telegram in fifteen minutes.”
The transport and handling of documents abroad continued to be a serious security concern for Department officials. The Department admonished overseas posts to take every precaution to safeguard classified information and to report immediately and in detail any suspicious activity, which was promptly investigated. In 1943, the Embassy in Tehran received four Department letters as “loose mail,” each containing “highly confidential” material. One had confidential codes, and another held a highly classified memorandum that detailed U.S. policy toward Iran and discussed potential threats to the region. More worrisome, the letter containing the policy memorandum had been opened and resealed. Since the Army Courier Service transported the Department’s mail to Tehran (via airplane), the Department of State asked the War Department to investigate. The ensuing investigation suggested poor handling rather than espionage.

The Department’s anxieties over security also applied to telephone conversations. The Department received a report that the Germans had implanted listening devices in many hotel bedrooms in Spain and Portugal. In another instance, Department officials learned that the Argentine Government was well informed about the U.S. Embassy’s communications with Washington. After an investigation of mail transport to and from Buenos Aires, officials determined that the Argentines were “listening in” on the U.S. Embassy’s telephone lines.

By 1944, the Department of State believed that German and Japanese agents in neutral countries had intensified their efforts to obtain Allied information. It instructed posts to review their security measures, and investigate the associations of all post personnel “down to the lowliest members.” Shortly after the instruction, the U.S. Vice Consul in Arica, Chile, discovered that his janitor was selling the Consulate’s trash to the local chief of Investigaciones (Chile’s counterpart to the FBI), who was known to have contacts with German and Japanese agents. One document in the trash identified U.S. Navy codes but did not contain enough information to permit decoding of messages. The 17-year-old janitor was promptly fired. The Consulate later learned that the chief probably gave the documents to his superiors in order to improve his chances for promotion, rather than passing them to Axis agents.
Liberation and Security Problems

As the number of Allied military victories increased during 1944, U.S. and Allied forces began to liberate nations held by the Axis powers. U.S. and British forces occupied Italy in 1944; and following the June 1944 D-Day invasion of continental Europe, they liberated Paris in August. On the eastern front, Soviet forces moved into Poland in July 1944 and began to occupy other countries in Eastern Europe as well.

In the wake of advancing Allied armies, the Department of State reopened posts that had been under the care of local custodians. During the war, the premises of U.S. posts were entrusted to one or two custodians selected by Department officials at the time of closure. Washington generally preferred a Foreign Service Officer; however, neither the Germans nor the Italians would allow a U.S. citizen to remain. The custodian’s task, therefore, passed to trusted local employees. Technically the custodians were employees of the protecting country (primarily Switzerland in Europe), but the custodians often lived on the property and received a salary from the Department of State (transferred through the protecting power). Custodial duties included care and maintenance of the property, as well as ensuring that local authorities did not enter the premises, use the facilities, or remove U.S. Government property. Custodians could not conduct any embassy or consular activity, nor allow use of the building as a meeting place for Americans or other persons. U.S. officials did not expect custodians to sacrifice their lives in fulfilling these duties.  

The task of reopening a U.S. Embassy was not an easy one. In the case of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, even though the Germans had not damaged the building or its contents, the tasks remained difficult. Foreign Service Officers re-supplied the post with stamps, seals, blank passports and certificates, and other items ordered from temporary stocks at U.S. posts in Lisbon or Naples. All safe combinations had to be changed, and Washington required the embassy to reinvestigate local employees before
rehirng them. The Department declared the Grey Code obsolete, and restricted use of the Brown Code to unclassified messages. Meanwhile, at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, the volume of telegram traffic overwhelmed the skeletal code room staff. Code work, except for messages designated as “Urgent,” fell more than a week behind, and Embassy officers pleaded for additional code clerks.  

The problems involved in reopening a post were more acute in Eastern Europe and Berlin, particularly after the collapse of Germany in May 1945. Invading Soviet officials refused to recognize the custodian status of the United States’ 18 custodian in eastern Germany and Poland, and summarily arrested them. Ambassador Averell Harriman and Deputy Chief of Mission George F. Kennan of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow determined that the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) suspected the 18 custodians of being U.S. spies and had sent them and their families to Soviet work camps. Soviet refusal to recognize standard diplomatic practices or even to acknowledge the issue infuriated U.S. officials. Kennan insisted that the United States had a moral responsibility to obtain the custodians’ release; meanwhile, others insisted that the Department had a moral obligation to reemploy those who had so faithfully served the United States at their own sacrifice and degradation. U.S. and Swiss diplomats in Moscow pressed Kremlin officials to release the 18 custodians and their families. The Swiss believed they had a moral responsibility to do so because Switzerland had served as the protecting power for U.S. interests during the war. The Soviets released the custodians, but only after many had labored in the work camps for periods of one to four years. While in Soviet captivity, one former custodian died, one was raped, and another taken away and not heard from again. The custodian of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw was repatriated to Poland. U.S. officials brought him to the United States, but the Embassy lost contact with his wife and daughter when Polish Communist officials moved them to another city.  

**Toward a Postwar Security Program**  

As World War II drew to a close, many senior U.S. officials, including those at the Department of State, wanted to continue wartime security measures after the war. The Bureau of the Budget (BoB)—predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget—proposed creating an interdepartmental entity to coordinate government security. Reviewing the interagency cooperation agreement between the FBI, ONI, and MID, BoB officials concluded that coordination between the three was “inadequate.” The three agencies had not created a coordinating committee, had not appointed a chairman to oversee coordination, nor had they delegated authority to coordinate efforts. The BoB found “frequent triplication, overlap, friction, and some interference with the proper development of certain cases,” and that the three simply defined spheres “to minimize actual conflict.” The BoB refused to call the inter-agency entity a “committee,” arguing that the committee approach did not work, and claimed that a “security czar” was “impracticable” because he would encounter “insurmountable problems” with what some would view as infringements upon their authority. The Bureau of the Budget insisted that the U.S. Government needed a group to develop a government-wide security plan, and that the group should be given proper authority and responsibility to undertake such a task. In essence, the BoB-
proposed group anticipated the outlines of a bureau of government security. In 1944, at the suggestion of Secretary Hull, the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SNWCC) was formed to coordinate postwar diplomatic and defense issues. As part of its efforts, SNWCC developed a comprehensive security program for the Department of State. SNWCC proposed publishing departmental security rules, written in the style of U.S. Army and Navy regulations, and appointing “Division Security Officers” to enforce regulations. The committee believed that this would institutionalize security measures. The SNWCC also recommended that Department employees internalize security awareness and modify their daily behavior so that personal censorship became “habitual for the majority of people.” SNWCC envisioned a publicity campaign that included memoranda, instructions, cartoons, and slogans in order to encourage Department employees to follow security procedures. The committee also supported the Department’s decision to create the Division of Cryptology within the Office of Communications. Department officials hoped that an in-house, specialized group of cryptographers could develop more complex, less vulnerable codes.

**Conclusion**

As World War II approached its final stages in late 1944, security was “on everyone’s lips.” The Department of State, and the U.S. Government as a whole, was considering how to improve security further. While significant strides had been made in security during the war, U.S. officials found that security as a function was scattered across multiple offices and divisions; moreover, there had been little coordination among the various entities. Department officials favored centralizing diplomatic security responsibilities into a single entity. That single entity would appear in 1945, and it would be done through the efforts of Robert L. Bannerman, not Thomas Fitch and the Office of the Chief Special Agent.
Endnotes

1 NKVD stands for Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrennih Del, and KGB for Komitet Gosudarstvennnoy Bezopasnosti.


13. Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 155-156. Departmental Announcement 115 “Assignment of Responsibility for Intelligence and Security Functions,” 27 August 1948; and Memorandum “Distribution of FC Functions,” Fischer Howe, Deputy Director for the Office of Intelligence and Research, to Charles M. Hulten, Director of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Stanley T. Orear, Chief of Division of Organization and Budget, and Samuel D. Boykin, Director of Office of Controls, 3 September 1948; both Folder – Survey of Office of Foreign Activity Correlation, Box 13, SF 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA.


20. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 144-268.
For detention of U.S. Couriers in Nazi-occupied Norway, see Despatch 656 “Attack at Kristiansand, Norway on Legation's Couriers,” Raymond E. Cox, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. Legation Oslo, to Department of State, 27 May 1940, FW 121.67/1352, Folder – 121.65, Box 280, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 ½.

Confidential Memorandum, Davis to Long, 12 December 1940, 121.67/1531, Folder 121.67, Box 281, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 ½. Department Serial No. 3069 “Pouch Service,” George S. Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State (Administration) to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 24 May 1939, 121.67, Folder – 121.67, Box 337, DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA.


Memorandum Regarding Microfilms, n.d. [early December 1942], enclosed with Circular, G. Howland Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 8 December 1942, attached to Memorandum, David A. Salmon to James B. Pilcher, 19 April 1943, Folder – 124.0064/221 – 12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Notice to United States Government Agencies Forwarding Telegram through the Department of State,” Department of State, 16 September 1942.

Letter, Capt. A.D. Struble, US Navy, to Secretary of State, 23 March 1943; and Letter, Davis, Foreign Service Administration, to U-L, 29 April 1943, 051, Box 34, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NARA. According to courier lore, couriers were physically handcuffed to their road bags until the Lisbon crash. Since the aircraft crashed at sea, the pouch dragged the courier under water because he was unable to release the handcuff quick enough. Carl E. Lovett, Jr., “The Diplomatic Courier Service,” SY Focus, 3/1 (February 1977): 14.

Telegram 711, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 16 May 1940, 124.512/1050, Folder – 124.512/1049 – 7-644, Box 723; Telegram 1108, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 9 June 1940, 124.516/274, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1138, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 10 June 1940, 124.516/275, Folder – 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Despatch 6711 “Further Destruction of Codes and Cipher Tables,” Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 8 July 1940, 124.516/319, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1142, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 11 June 1940, 124.516/277, attached to Memorandum, de Wolf (unreadable) to PA/D, EU, SD, and A-L, 12 June 1940, Folder – 124.516/263 – 330, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 17, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 4 July 1940, 124.51/154; Telegram 992, Matthews to Secretary of State, 1 October 1940; and Memorandum of Conversation, James Clement Dunn with Herr Hans Thomsen, Chargé d’Affaires, 8 October 1940, 124.51/178; all Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 1384, Barnes (Paris) to Secretary of State, 24 October 1940, 124.516/334; and Telegram 818, Matthews (Vichy) to Secretary of State, 25 October 1940, 124.516/335; Telegram 579, Leahy (Paris via Vichy) to Secretary of State, 20 February 1941, 124.516/345; and Memorandum, Reber to Atherton and Summers[?] (M. P. Davis), 21 February 1940, FW 124.516/345, attached to Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy France, 21 February 1940, 124.516/345; all Folder – 124.516/331-386, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, Beam, 10 April 1941, FW 124.516/356; and Memorandum, Philip W. Bonsal to Lawrence Duggan, 14 April 1941, both attached to Telegram 1266, Morris (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1941, 124.516/356, Folder – 124.516/331-368, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 4283, Kirk (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 10 October 1940, 124.51/177, Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722; Instruction, Breckinridge Long to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 14 June 1940, 124.02/1321A, attached to
Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis to C. R., 15 June 1940, Folder – 124.02/664 – 1406B, Box 649; Instruction “International Telephone Conversations,” Shaw to American Diplomatic Officers, 8 September 1942, 124.06/330A, Folder – 124.06/300-350D, Box 659; and Instruction, Shaw to All Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 January 1943, 124.06/359B, Folder – 124.06/351 – 399½, Box 660; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

For Darlan’s comment, see Despatch 264 “Transmitting Copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning the Utmost Discretion in Conversations,” H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Vichy, to Department of State, 27 June 1941, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727, D 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For concerns about wiretapping, see Despatch 8693 “Steps Taken to Prevent Wiretapping American Embassy, Paris,” Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Paris, to Department of State, 9 September 1940, 124.512/1076, Folder 124.512/1049–7–644, Box 723; and Telegram 294 Phillips, U.S. Embassy Rome, to Secretary of State, 1 March 1941, 124.65/95, Folder 124.65/79–12–444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Dunn’s work, see Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 7 November 1941, 124.65/99, Folder – 124.65/79–12–444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 1961 “Censorship of Correspondence of Embassy and of Consulates in Italy,” Edward L. Reed, Chargé ad Interim, to Secretary of State, 14 August 1940, 124.656/115, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 766; and Despatch 1960 “Censorship of Correspondence of Embassy and Consulates in Italy,” 10 August 1940, 124.656/117, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 766; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis to Atherton, 24 February 1940, FW 124.516/34; and Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 21 February 1940, 124.516/1049–7–644, Box 723; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Circular Telegram, Secretary of State (B.L.) to U.S. Legation Bern, 4 February 1941, 1214.06/215B, Folder – 124.06/195A–253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Report, W. E. DeCourcy to Shaw, Davis, Erhardt, and Salmon, 23 May 1941, 124.06/267, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For specific embassies and consulates, see Telegram 586, Johnson (London) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/232, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; and Despatch 4539, Leland Morris, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Berlin), to Secretary of State, 27 February 1941, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; and Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Files at Embassy, Vichy,” 1 March 1941, enclosed with Despatch 62 “Maintenance of Codes and Confidential Files at Vichy and Lyon,” 1 March 1941, 124.06/251, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; Telegram 120, Gunther (Bucharest) to Secretary of State, 7 February 1941, 124.06/222, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum, DeCourcy, 23 July 1941, FW 124.06/244, Folder 12406/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Codes and Correspondence,” n.d., enclosed with Despatch 4539, Leland Morris, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Berlin), to Secretary of State, 27 February 1941, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; and Despatch 4788 “Work on Codes and Confidential Files at Athens and Salonika,” Lincoln MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249, Folder – 124.06/195A–253, Box 659; Despatch 2348 “Submitting Information on Manner of Handling Codes and Confidential Files,” Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

N.B. These guards and watchmen were not Marine Security Guards or military personnel. The Marine Security Guard program did not begin until 1948, and military personnel were not used. Most guards were either contracted U.S. citizens (largely male) or trusted local nationals. The night watchmen were usually trusted local nationals.

Report, W. E. DeCourcy to Shaw, Davis, Erhardt, and Salmon, 23 May 1941, 124.06/267, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For specific embassies and consulates, see Telegram 586, Johnson (London) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/232, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; and Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Files at Embassy, Vichy,” 1 March 1941, enclosed with Despatch 62 “Maintenance of Codes and Confidential Files at Vichy and Lyon,” 1 March 1941, 124.06/251, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; and Telegram 120, Gunther (Bucharest) to Secretary of State, 7 February 1941, 124.06/222, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; and Despatch 2348 “Submitting Information on Manner of Handling Codes and Confidential Files,” Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, G. Howland Shaw to Jeff Bridges, 3 February 1942, 124.163/143A, Folder – 124.163/118 – 196; Memorandum, Shaw to John Williams Hunter, 7 August 1942, 124.163, Folder – 124.163/118 196; and Travel Order 5-2349, Shaw to William F. Ellis, 24 November 1944, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544; all Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 276 “Personnel of the Legation (Combined Office) at San Salvador,” Walter Thurston, U.S. Ambassador, to Secretary of State, 13 April 1943, 124.163/202, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669; and Telegram 1024, Dreyfus (Tehran) to Secretary of State, 26 October 1943, 124.911/233, Folder – 124.911/233 – 255B, Box 780; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Shaw to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 26 December 1941, 124.018/8A; and Knox to Secretary of State, 8 January 1942, 124.018/9; both Folder –124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. The Navy investigated retired Coast Guardsmen interested in serving as guards and provided the Department with a list of 114 names. Knox to Hull, 18 February 1942, 124.018/10, Folder 124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For local police arrangements, see Despatch 847 “Reclassification of Government Employee in Ambassador’s Leased Official Residence,” Thurston to Secretary of State, 12 October 1943, 124.163/229, Folder – 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Circular Instruction “Investigational Activities of Alien Clerks,” [Indecipherable] to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 4 January 1940, 124.06/195A, Folder 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Italy, see Hull to Knox, 15 March 1941, 124.65/96A, Folder 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; and Telegram, Secretary of State (Adolf A. Berle, Jr.) to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 788, H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of Embassy (Paris) to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, 124.513/1426, Folder – 124.513/1425—1452, Box 724, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 264 “Transmitting copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning the Utmost Discretion in Conversations,” Matthews, 27 June 1941, 124.516/376, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727; and Telegram 737, Secretary of State (Shaw) to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 29 September 1941, 124.513/1638A, Folder – 124.513/1621—1644, Box 724; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Goliewsky, after four years at the Compiegne concentration camp, was released, and even though he was 67 years old and “to a large extent broken physically,” the U.S. Consulate recommended re-employing him in order to provide him a “small pension.” See Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-1444, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy (Paris) to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940, 124.513/1323, Folder – 124.513/1304 – 1363, Box 723, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA2. Affidavit, Tatiana Shtcherbina, 17 April 1940, enclosed with Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940. Also enclosed with Despatch 6368 was a summary of each of the twelve who obtained fraudulent visas.
This suggests that Stcherbina knew more about events than she is letting on in her affidavit.


Memorandum, The President to the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Commerce, 26 June 1939; and Memorandum of Understanding between the War Department, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 June 1940; both attached to Draft of Interdepartmental Agreement on Security, 23 October 1944, Bureau of the Budget, 23 October 1944, Folder – Post-War Intelligence Plans I, Box 1, Intelligence Files 1942-1951, Records of the Bureau of Administration/Office of Security, RG 59-Lot, NA. For inviolability of diplomatic premises, see Eileen Denza, *Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, Second edition (New York: Oxford University Press for Clarendon Press, 1998), 113-117.


Instruction 102, G. Howland Shaw to Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., U.S. Minister to Iran, 21 May 1942, 124.91/87A, Folder – 124.91/80 – 12-2144, Box 780; Telegram 602, Shaw to U.S. Legation Cairo, 23 June 1942, 124.83/86A, Folder –
124.83/85 – 12-1544, Box 773; Telegram 419, Shaw to U.S. Embassy Rome, 17 June 1941, 124.65/100A, Folder – 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.


“Narrative Account,” U.S. Legation Bangkok, 19 August 1942, pp. 7-10. Telegram 3161, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of State, 7 July 1942, 124.92/225; and Telegram 3696, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of State, 11 August 1942, 124.921/231; both Folder – 124.921/186½ – 234, Box 783, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.


Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” 3.

Memorandum, Elmer Davis (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 28 September 1942; and Memorandum “OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 28 September 1942; both enclosed with Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, Department of State, 16 September 1942, enclosed with Memorandum, “Use of Airgrams by Representatives of Other Government Departments and Agencies Abroad,” Long to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 23 October 1942, 124.066 Airgrams/10A; and Airgram, Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 April 1943, 124.066/34A; both Folder – 124.066/Airgrams, Box 661, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Capitalization in the original. Memorandum, Edward Klauber (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 13 March 1944; and Memorandum “Change No. 1 to OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 15 March 1944; both enclosed with Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944.

Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Use of Modifying Phrases with Security Classifications,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 4 August 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Use of Phrase ‘For Department Use Only’,” Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 27 December 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

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72  Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to Kildroy P. Aldrich, Chief Post Office Inspector, 4 June 1940, 124.06/205B, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Telegram 328, Dreyfus to Secretary of State, 30 March 1943, 124.916/154; and Memorandum “Delivery of Material from Department of State Air Pouch No. 2199,” David McK. Key, Assistant Liaison Officer, to Major Julius A Pate, Department of War, 14 April 1943, 124.916/154; both Folder – 124.916/126—12-244, Box 782, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

73  For listening devices, see Telegram, Secretary of State (Berle) to all Diplomatic Officers, May 25, 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. For the Argentine incident, see J. P. Tuck to Laurence Duggan, Chief of Division of the American Republics, 20 February 1940, 124.06/207, Folder – 124.06/195A-253; Memorandum, L. C. Frank to Long, 10 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, to Long, 6 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; and J. M Clarke to Frank, 22 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; all Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

74  Circular telegram, Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A; and Telegram 169, Secretary of State (Berle) to Chief of Mission Stockholm, 27 January 1944, 124.06/408A, attached to Memorandum, George A. Gordon to Berle and Dunn, 27 January 1944; both Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

75  Despatch 10360 “Dismissal of Abel D. Solano, Messenger-Janitor in the Consulate at Arica,” Bowers to Secretary of State, 1 August 1944, 124.253/8-144; and Report of the Legal Attaché “César Gacitua Vergara alias ‘Cafaz,’” R.L.M., 26 July 1944, enclosed with Despatch 10360, Folder – 124.253/8-144, Box 686, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

76  Memorandum “To Custodians of American Government Property in Germany and Occupied Territories,” George F. Kennan, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy Berlin, 20 October 1941, enclosed with Despatch 5940, Kennan to Secretary of State, 22 October 1941, 124.01/971, Folder – 124.01/954 – 12-2744, Box 648; Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber) to Dunn, 7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 – 12-2744, Box 723; Telegram 1915, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 8 December 1941, 124.65/106, Folder – 124.65/79 – 12-444; Telegram 24, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 17 January 1942, 124.653/538, Folder – 124.653/535 – 570, Box 765; Telegram, Leahy (Vichy) to Secretary of State, 8 July 1941, 124.513/1555, Folder – 124.513/1549 – 1579, Box 724; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

77  Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber), U.S. Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 – 12-2744, Box 723; Instruction “Reopening in Liberated Areas of Offices Closed on Account of the War,” 9 June 1944, 124/74A, Folder 124/61 – 8-144, Box 648; Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Embassy requests for more code clerks, see Telegram 212, Chapin to Secretary of State, 10 October 1944, 124.513/10-1044, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; Telegram 43, Caffery to Secretary of State, 19 October 1944, 124.513/10-1944, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; and Telegram 288, Caffery to Secretary of State, 2 November 1944, 124.513/11-244, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

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79 Telegram 3233, W. Averill Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Secretary of State, 11 September 1945, 124.623/9-1145, Folder [4], Box 1165; Despatch 2359 “Regarding Former Alien Employees of American Embassy, Berlin…,” Kennan to Secretary of State, 11 January 1946, 124.623/1-1146, Folder [1], Box 1166; and Aide Memoire, U.S. Legation Bern to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, n.d. [December 1946], attached to Memorandum, Francis B. Stevens, Division of Eastern European Affairs, to Miss Wolberg, 7 May 1948, FW 124.683/7[?]-1648,Folder [2], Box 1166; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

80 Airgram A-241, Kennan to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.623/9-2145, Folder [2], Box 1166; Airgram A-278, Kennan to Secretary of State, 8 October 1945, Folder [4], Box 1165; Despatch 77 “Release by Soviets of German Employees of Former American Embassy, Berlin,” F. A. Lane to Department of State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], box 1165; and Telegram 70, Murphy to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.623/1-1249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


82 Aide Memoire 3053, C. H. Owsley, U.S. Minister to Switzerland, to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, 14 June 1948, attached to Telegram 1455, Smith, to Secretary of State, 29 June 1948, Folder [3], Box 1166; Airgram A-241, Kennan to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.623/9-2145, Folder [2], Box 1166; and “Report of Our Arrest by the Soviets and Our Internment in Russia,” Willy Strube, 13 January 1949, enclosed with Despatch 77 “Release by Soviets of German Employees…,” Lane to Department of State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Telegram 671, Kennan to Secretary of State, 5 March 1946, 124.623/3-546; and Telegram 250, Acheson (Stevens) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 28 March 1946, 1240623/3-546; both Folder [1], Box 1166, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


84 Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Records of the War Histories Branch, Box 2, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA. Cryptographic experts Commander Lee W. Parke of the U.S. Navy and Major James Moak of the U.S. Army had been detailed to the State Department at the Secretary’s request and were assigned to Assistant Secretary Shaw’s office to assist in the organization and management of the cryptographic unit and the general security program.

85 Memorandum, Commander Parke to Mr. Shaw, 13 May 1944, Samuel Boykin Files, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 53D223, NA. Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Box 2, Records of the War Histories Branch, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA.

After World War II, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually escalated into the Cold War. A global rivalry, the Cold War played out across the political, military, economic, and cultural relations between the world's nation-states. Even though the two superpowers did not engage in direct military hostilities, several proxy wars occurred in the developing world, most notably in Korea and Vietnam. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry reinforced and elevated the Department of State's concerns regarding diplomatic security. As a result, the Department created a formal office to devise, execute, and enforce diplomatic security practices.

The Department of State's Security Office was the creation of Robert L. Bannerman. It would be logical to assume that Bannerman's efforts occurred within the Office of the Chief Special Agent (CSA) because Bannerman worked as a Special Agent in the CSA during the war; however, Bannerman actually left the CSA and formed a new office devoted to security. Department officials opted to create a new office rather than restructure the CSA because they believed that the CSA did not have the experience for “the approaching new concept of security” needed in the post-World War II era. The catalyst for hiring Bannerman to build the Security Office was the 1945 Amerasia spy case. Soon other charges of espionage and disloyalty intensified the demand for an effective security program within the Department. Also, challenges faced by U.S. Embassies in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and the newly partitioned Palestine pressed the Department to expand its diplomatic security efforts.

Neither Bannerman's Security Office nor the Chief Special Agent's Office survived the first years of the Cold War. Security problems, Congressional pressure, and Department reorganization led to the merger of the Security Office and the CSA, and Bannerman left the Department. The new Division of Security (SY) assumed responsibilities of both offices, but it adopted Bannerman's program and vision. Within five years (1945-1950), the office that Bannerman initiated had grown from one person to 111 people, and became the foundation of the present-day Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Stettinius’s Reorganization and Security

By December 1944, with World War II nearing an end, U.S. officials had begun planning for the postwar world. The Department of State stood poised to play an extensive role; however, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., recognized that “outstanding defects” had arisen in the Department’s operations. The defects were largely due to a reorganization of the Department that occurred earlier that year, on January 15. The rapid wartime expansion of the Department (from 763 personnel in 1936 to 7623 personnel in 1946) and the creation of several wartime offices and divisions generated a certain amount of disorganization in the Department’s bureaucracy. The January reorganization, also enacted by Stettinius, sought to group together offices and divisions engaged in similar function. The regroupings would improve operations and administration of the Department, and better incorporate new aspects of U.S. diplomacy, such as informational and cultural diplomacy. The January reorganization was not fully effective, in part because some offices and divisions, like the Office of the Chief Special Agent and the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO), were omitted. In order to correct such errors, centralize responsibility, and improve management functions, Stettinius undertook a second large-scale reorganization of the Department. The December 20, 1944 reorganization created six new Assistant Secretary positions to centralize responsibility for specific geographic and functional areas.²

The Office of the Chief Special Agent remained untouched by both reorganizations, but subtle changes in security did occur. The CSA still reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, who had been the Department’s Security Officer since 1942. In order to help the Assistant Secretary for Administration enforce security, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew increased the number of Assistant Security Officers from one to four. The new Assistant Security Officers focused upon particular aspects of security: cryptography, distribution of telegrams, security overseas, and physical security of the State Department building. In addition, it was proposed that each office and division designate one person to serve as the unit’s security officer, but that did not occur.³
Despite the wartime emphasis upon security, adherence to security procedures by Department employees had been rather lax. Classified documents were not placed in envelopes when sent around the building, “Top Secret” documents were not being double-wrapped, and safes were being left open overnight, practices that all had developed during the war. The greater frequency of security incidents was likely a product of the rapid growth of the Department during the war, the lack of training, and the greater amount of classified material being generated.\(^4\)

Shortly after the December 1944 reorganization, Secretary Stettinius asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct a security survey of the Department, and the FBI submitted its report to the Secretary on March 8, 1945. The FBI recommended creating a security program that included a security manual and training for Department officers and employees. The FBI also urged the Secretary to remove security responsibilities from the Assistant Secretary for Administration and create a separate “Security Officer” who had authority over security procedures, the ability to conduct security inspections, and jurisdiction over the Office of the Chief Special Agent. Senior Department officials, however, took no action on the FBI’s recommendations for several weeks. Part of the reason was that Stettinius, like most officers in the Department, viewed security as a broad-based responsibility affecting every office and division, one that constituted a basic element of the Department’s daily operations rather than an issue that required its own bureaucratic structure.\(^5\)

**The Amerasia Catalyst**

In June 1945, news outlets reported that Department of State officers had leaked highly classified documents to the journal *Amerasia*, edited by Philip Jaffe. Classified information had first appeared in a January 26, 1945, article on British policy in Asia in *Amerasia*. Kenneth Wells, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) chief for Southern Asia, read the section on Thailand and “found himself reading his own words” on U.S. and British policy toward that nation. Soon afterwards, a team of OSS and Office of Naval Intelligence agents raided *Amerasia*’s offices and discovered dozens of classified documents, including some classified as “Top Secret.” The documents had originated from the Department of State, as well as from the Army, the Navy, and British intelligence services. A subsequent FBI investigation discovered that Foreign Service Officer John Stewart Service and Department of State employee Emmanuel Larsen, among others, had leaked classified documents to Jaffe.\(^6\)

Public uproar over the *Amerasia* case occurred, in part, for two reasons. First, there had been little news about espionage during the war because the FBI had refrained from publicizing espionage cases in order to prevent “spy hysteria.” Second, the *Amerasia* case involved ties to an ally (the Soviet Union) rather than Nazi German espionage. *Amerasia* editor Jaffe was a Soviet sympathizer who had been actively collecting documents with the intention of passing them to Soviet officials. Some newspaper commentators charged that the espionage resulted from Communist agents in the Department of State. John Stewart Service and Emanuel Larsen, however, had leaked the classified documents to promote their position in an on-going dispute over U.S. China policy within the Department, and their personal conflict with U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley.\(^7\)
On June 6, 1945, the day the FBI arrested Service, Larsen, Jaffe, and three others, the Department of State tried to dampen public interest in the case. In a press statement, the Department announced that it had learned that “information of a secret character was reaching unauthorized persons,” and that two Department employees had been arrested. The Department assured the public that it was working with the FBI and that it had “been giving special attention to the security of secret and confidential information.”

The next day, Under Secretary of State Grew declared that the arrests were “one result of a comprehensive security program which is to be continued unrelentingly in order to stop completely the illegal and disloyal conveyance of confidential information to unauthorized persons.” Some newspapers took Grew’s comment to mean that there might be more spies in the Federal Government. FBI agents added to the uproar by telling the New York Times that the leak of classified information was “overwhelming.”

With a storm of criticism bursting over the Amerasia affair and the Department’s acknowledgement that it had not prosecuted earlier leaks of classified documents, Secretary Stettinius moved quickly to enact several security reforms. On June 18, he issued Departmental Order No. 1324, which created the position of Security Officer for the Department of State; this officer would also serve as Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Controls. On June 20, the Department announced that Robert L. Bannerman would assume the position of Security Officer, and Frederick B. Lyon, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, would be Acting Director of the Office of Controls.

Bannerman recalled later that “time was of the essence,” in assuming his new job and creating a Security Office; indeed, it was because neither the Department’s June 6 press release nor Grew’s June 7 comments were accurate. The Department did not have “a comprehensive security program,” nor had it given “special attention” to the security of classified information. Also, the Amerasia case had resulted from OSS chief Kenneth Wells’ discovery, not the Department’s “comprehensive security program,” as Grew had claimed.
**Bannerman’s Three Point Security Program**

Pushed by the Amerasia case, Bannerman and the Department rushed to create the Security Office. Starting literally with nothing, Bannerman later remarked that he and Lyon “had no funds, no office space, no slots for personnel, [and] no clear statement of authority;” furthermore, the wording of Departmental Order 1324 was “vague.” He was able to obtain space and staff from several divisions in the Office of Controls. He obtained four rooms from the Visa and Special War Programs Divisions; and acquired seven people from Visa, Passport, the Special Programs divisions, and the Chief Special Agent’s office. Bannerman and his new staff then spent several days determining how “the Department actually operated, what [security and] office systems were in effect, what was considered sensitive information, and how information circulated through the Department.”

When Bannerman developed a program that exceeded the terms of Department Order 1324, he obtained permission from Assistant Secretary for Administration Julius Holmes to depart from the order’s restrictions.\(^{11}\)

Bannerman’s security program consisted of three parts. Directed by Paul Cooper, the first part of the program focused on “Documentary and Physical Security,” specifically developing Department-wide security procedures for classified information, devising measures to protect the Department’s buildings in Washington, and training Department employees on security procedures. The second part of Bannerman’s program addressed personnel security. Even though the Office of the Chief Special Agent conducted a background investigation on each applicant (which consisted largely of checking references and verifying information), Bannerman proposed and received approval of a requirement that Department applicants obtain a “security determination” before employment. He set up a Security Evaluations staff and selected Morse Allen as its head. The third part of the program was to place Security Officers in several selected embassies around the world, and this effort was delayed for a year.\(^{12}\)
Bannerman’s requirement that each new Department employee obtain a security determination soon overwhelmed the work of the new Security Office. Beginning on August 31, 1945, shortly after Bannerman gained approval of the requirement, several special war agencies, including the Office of War Information (OWI), were abolished, and their employees transferred to the Department of State, with approximately 4,000 new employees transferred in the month of October alone. The number of new employees was very large, but two unanticipated difficulties made security determinations an overwhelming task. First, when Bannerman sought to obtain individuals’ security files from their previous agency, the soon-to-be-defunct agencies were reluctant to hand over the records. When the OWI refused to release its security files, Bannerman, with senior officer approval, took a work crew and a truck late one evening and seized them. Once having control of the files, Bannerman encountered the second difficulty: he had assumed that OWI and the other agencies had completed a background review similar to what the Chief Special Agent’s office had done for Department of State hires. Instead, Bannerman and his staff found that other agencies’ files were “limited in scope, poorly organized, and many were missing or non-existent.” Facing a far larger task than he had initially envisioned, Bannerman now was forced to send the cases of many transferred employees to the Chief Special Agent’s office for further investigation and various checks. In addition, Bannerman initiated the practice of checking new hires against the security files of the FBI, House Un-American Activities Committee (the Dies Committee), and the Department of State.

Bannerman and the new Security Office confronted multiple pressures that threatened to subvert the security check process. The sheer number of transfers and employees prompted Bannerman to form a Security Committee to review files in which questionable information had arisen. The committee comprised six people: Bannerman, and one person each from the Divisions of Departmental Personnel, Foreign Service Personnel, Passport, Foreign Activities Correlation, and the Chief Special Agent’s office. The Department also insisted that security reviews be completed by November 30, 1945, a deadline which Bannerman later confessed was “impossible.”

Further revelations of Soviet espionage in the Department of State and the U.S. Government led Bannerman to expand the use of security checks for other Department employees. In September 1945, the defection of Soviet agent Igor Gouzenko to Canadian...
officials in Ottawa led to the exposure of a Soviet espionage network in Canada and of that network’s strong links to the Soviet network in the United States, disclosures which further implicated Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White in Soviet espionage. Then in November 1945, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier for the Soviet intelligence agency, NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh del—People’s Commissariat for State Security), went to the FBI and confessed her involvement with Soviet espionage, implicating several people including Hiss. Bentley’s information, in turn, led FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover to reexamine the revelations that Whittaker Chambers had offered in 1939. The FBI then prepared a two-volume report that detailed Soviet espionage in the United States that was distributed to Bannerman, among others. Bannerman developed a “highly confidential” liaison with the FBI, and in the process uncovered several “serious security cases.” Meanwhile, the revelations and sensation created by the Canadian spy ring, Bentley’s confession, and the FBI’s two-volume report prompted Congress again to raise questions about security at the Department of State. In January 1946, Bannerman expanded the requirement for security checks to include all employees joining the Department or Foreign Service.

By July 1946, Bannerman’s Security Office was “devoting practically all of its effort to the personnel problem.” Bannerman requested that his office be granted an additional 12 officers, 10 clerks, and 3 stenographers. He also reported that of the personnel transferred from the five now-abolished agencies, the Security Committee had disapproved the employment of 285 people and had terminated 79 others. There were other cases where the Security Office wanted action taken against the individuals, but action was not taken for reasons unknown. Adding to the difficulties, the Security Office and the Security Committee had to determine what criteria constituted grounds for termination, because they had not received a statement of policy guidance from senior Department officers that detailed grounds for dismissal, standards for loyalty, or procedures to follow.

Bannerman and the Office of the Chief Special Agent (CSA) partially resolved the back-ground investigation problem by creating Field Offices in 1946. Prior to World War II, Post Office Inspectors conducted many of the background investigations for the Department. The CSA sent a request to the Post Office citing the applicant’s hometown or previous city of residence, and the Post Office Inspector made inquiries and conducted interviews, sending the results back to CSA. By early 1943, wartime demands
on the workforce required the Post Office to stop doing investigations for the Department. Although the New York Field Office had existed since 1917, Chief Special Agent Thomas A. Fitch added Special Agents in Washington to undertake investigations. In August 1945, the CSA had 47 agents, and they formed the core of the Washington Field Office that emerged in early 1946. Several other Field Offices were opened; and by early 1947, there were Field Offices in Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Omaha, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and St. Paul. In 1948, the Cleveland and Greensboro Field Offices were added. Of these, New York, Washington, Boston, and San Francisco were the largest (10-20 Special Agents each), with Chicago, St. Louis, and Los Angeles following (4-6 Special Agents each). The remaining Field Offices were generally staffed by a single Special Agent with a clerk. 

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Figure 6: Chart showing the Procedure of a Security Investigation. Bannerman’s procedure for security investigations and evaluations closely resembled the above chart. The differences were that the Division of Investigations (the old Chief Special Agent’s office) conducted the investigation, the Security Office evaluated the results, and the Security Committee chaired by Bannerman reviewed the case. As the chart’s arrows show, very few faced difficulties before the Security Committee. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
CHAPTER 3  CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Bannerman’s Security Committee Draws Fire

Congress’s demands that the Department of State remove “disloyal” employees—what Director of Policy Planning Paul Nitze called “the elimination of the faithless”—continued. In July 1946, Congress attached the McCarran Rider to the Department’s appropriations bill. The rider gave the Secretary of State “absolute discretion” to terminate any Department employee if it was deemed “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” This meant an employee could not appeal the Secretary’s decision to the Civil Service Commission. Congress continued its pressure by adding the McCarran Rider to every Department of State appropriations bill for the next seven years.21

While Congressional pressure to remove subversives increased, some Foreign Service Officers criticized the manner in which Bannerman’s Security Office and the Security Committee was handling personnel cases. Bannerman learned on May 15, 1946, that a senior Department official had recommended that the “security control of personnel” be “decentralized.” The recommendation meant that the investigation, evaluation, and security risk determination stages would be in separate bureaucratic entities rather than centralized in one office. The criticism, combined with the passage of the McCarran Rider, prompted Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Joseph A. Panuch to ask Samuel E. Klaus on July 10 to conduct a survey on how the Security Office, the Chief Special Agent’s office, and the Office of Controls pursued and completed personnel investigations.22

In his report, Klaus strongly criticized not only the process, but also the personnel performing the work. Klaus questioned the Special Agents’ abilities and qualifications, asserting that few had a “superior education” and that the average agent did not know “the differences among the various schools of so-called liberal and radical thought.” He charged that when a case was referred to the Chief Special Agent’s office, Special Agents conducted a cursory review of the person, did not verify “derogatory” information, and tended to rely upon local Postmaster reports for distant locales. Klaus also asserted that the FBI supplied information to the Security Office that it would not provide to the Office of the Chief Special Agent upon a similar request, and that the FBI often did not provide evidence for its claims, including membership in the Communist Party.23 Klaus additionally objected to the centralized procedure by which all cases involving “doubt” were forwarded to the Security Committee. The committee members, he said, did not review the files before rendering their decision, and instead relied upon the Security Office’s recommendations. In the majority of instances, Klaus asserted that “doubt” led to disapproval, and no minutes or records were kept of the committee’s meetings.24

The Klaus Report had the hallmarks of a pre-determined conclusion before the research was conducted, and several items cast doubt on his charges. First, Klaus received his assignment on July 10, and completed a report numbering more than 100 pages by August 3. Klaus admitted that he did not travel to the Chief Special Agent’s field offices, and according to Bannerman, Klaus completed his survey in just 4 days. The report’s length and the time spent on it strongly indicate that Klaus could not have conducted a sufficient survey to make several of his claims. Klaus seems not to have recognized that the investigations conducted by the Chief Special Agent’s and Security Offices in 1946 were more extensive than at any previous time. Moreover,
Klaus dismissed out of hand the many years of law enforcement and investigative experience that Special Agents possessed. He also admitted that he had no knowledge of background investigation procedure. If he had, he would have known that sending a request to the local Postmaster had been standard practice since 1920, and that the local investigations, particularly in larger cities, were conducted by the local Post Office Inspectors, who were not mere mailmen, as Klaus tried to suggest. Furthermore, if the Carl Marzani case was an indication, the Security Office and the Chief Special Agent’s office conducted better investigations than Klaus had portrayed. The two offices gathered enough evidence to indict Marzani for perjury (Marzani had not fully disclosed his work for the U.S. Communist Party). The Marzani indictment infuriated FBI Director Hoover, who lamented, “It is rather humiliating that a case like [Marzani’s] was made by the State Dept and not the FBI.”

Deputy Assistant Secretary Panuch also tasked a second survey to be completed in July 1946 on physical security within the Department of State, and that report favored expanding Bannerman’s office. Undertaken by S. R. Goodrich of the Bureau of Administration’s Management Planning Division, the second survey found that security breaches in the Department were “too numerous to mention” and that the Department’s security deficiencies “prevent[ed] even a reasonable degree of security.” Goodrich advocated that the Security Office be expanded and made into its own separate division within the Office of Controls. Another recommendation was to develop an “aggressive security indoctrination program,” and a third was to appoint security officers for every office and division, an idea that the FBI had recommended the previous year but one the Department of State had not implemented. Goodrich’s report essentially advocated Bannerman’s broad three-part security plan and urged a large expansion of the Security Office.

On July 25, 1946, Assistant Secretary State for Administration Donald S. Russell disbanded Bannerman’s Security Committee and created a new committee, formally titled the Advisory Committee on Personnel Security (ACOPS). Russell appointed Klaus to chair the committee, and Klaus chose the committee’s membership. Bannerman was not consulted about the composition of the new committee; indeed, he only learned that a new committee would be replacing the old security committee after the deed had occurred. Despite the obvious slight to Bannerman, the Security Office continued to investigate personnel and submit reports to Klaus’s committee.

The case statistics of ACOPS indicate that Klaus’s charges against background investigations and the Security Committee were a means to discourage disapprovals and terminations for security reasons. Whereas Bannerman’s Security Committee had rendered decisions of disapproval or termination in 341 cases in 10 months of existence, Klaus’s ACOPS committee dealt with just 28 cases total in 10 months and terminated 2 people, one of whom was Carl Marzani, a case which Bannerman’s committee had already developed. Of the remaining 26 cases, Klaus’s committee allowed 12 cases to be withdrawn (due to resignation or other reasons), dismissed another 8 cases (for lack of evidence or other reasons), and gave approvals to the remaining 6 cases. Moreover, Klaus refused to accept any FBI information unless the FBI revealed its sources, which the FBI refused to do. Then, on
November 9, 1946, Panuch announced that all security cases had to be resolved by December 1. In intention, Klaus, Russell, Panuch, and Department officials were moving in a direction opposite of what the McCarran Rider had demanded.  

**Security Training, Overseas Security, and the Creation of SY**

While personnel security evaluations dominated the work of the Security Office, Bannerman moved forward on the two other parts of his program. During the summer of 1945, Bannerman and Robert Freeman developed the overseas security program, which assigned specially selected and trained Security Officers to 25 U.S. embassies abroad. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes approved the program in August 1945, and the Security Office soon developed a list of well-qualified candidates. However, the program was delayed for more than a year because the Department did not have any open slots available in which to place the new overseas Security Officers. In the fall of 1946, Bannerman learned that the Department had allotted hundreds of slots for media officers at overseas posts. He convinced the head of the Information Office to loan him 30 positions, but it still took several months for the loan to be approved.

For the third part of the Security Office’s program, Bannerman and Paul Cooper developed much of the Department’s training program for handling classified information. Bannerman was serving as the Department’s representative on the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which was charged with developing security-training and awareness programs, and establishing postwar rules for accessing classified information, including new standards for handling and transmitting government information and definitions for categories of classification. Bannerman and Cooper worked with the Training Services and Management Planning divisions to create a reference manual of...
security regulations, a “security handbook,” a poster series for the Department, “open” signs for safes, and other security related materials. Cooper and Bannerman, with the Presentation Division, produced the film *Security of Information*, which “starred” Near Eastern Affairs officer Clare H. Timberlake as the Foreign Service Officer who prepared a “Top Secret” memorandum, the contents of which were compromised.  

In January 1947, the Security Office, in conjunction with the Training Services and Management Planning Divisions, launched the first formal, Department-wide security-training program. Between January 14 and 21, the Security Office and the Office of Controls conducted security-training sessions for all 7,000 Department of State employees. In the hour-long sessions, the program sought “to impress upon all employees...the essential part which good security practices must play in their daily operations.” Employees viewed the film *Security of Information*, and were issued a standard security reference book as they left the presentation. After the week of training sessions, the Security Office reported that the effect of its security program “upon Departmental employees has been gratifying.”

The security training program emphasized the individual responsibility of each employee. It advised participants that “the maintenance of security is a chain” and that “YOUR watchfulness in enforcing security regulations becomes a link in that chain.” Department personnel received instruction on how to classify documents according to defined categories; how to send classified information through officially designated message centers; and how to follow strict procedures for the reproduction, destruction, and storage of classified materials. In the case of storage of materials, employees were instructed that all classified documents had to be stored in safes or cabinets secured with a three-number combination lock. The Security Office also demanded that Department employees and officers adhere to building security measures, including displaying identification badges for entry. Furthermore, each office or division was required to designate a Security Officer to implement and oversee conformity with new security policies, and to maintain security check systems for the unit.

While the training materials assured staff that Department officials did not believe there was “an espionage agent under every desk eagerly waiting to pounce,” the materials stressed the utmost necessity of good security practices and the dire consequences of security breaches. The security program strove to promote a new consciousness of security by continuously linking employee security requirements to the very survival of the United States. Materials repeatedly reminded personnel “the way you enforce security today, tomorrow and in the more distant future may well mean the difference between preserving and undermining the strength and prestige of our Nation.” Security promotional materials frequently warned staff members not to be “the weak link,” with the ultimate message that true security could only be attained if each employee conscientiously and continuously monitored his or her own activities, and if employees remained vigilant of their surroundings, including the actions of others.

After the January sessions, Bannerman and the Security Office continued security awareness training for Department and Foreign Service employees, and their training extended to other agencies in the Federal Government. The Security Office offered training for each entering class at the Foreign Service Institute, had
regular participation in Foreign Service training, held talks with all Department personnel in Washington and New York, and conducted briefings for each new Foreign Service Officer and each Foreign Service Officer returning from overseas duty. Whether due to its popularity or the fact that the Security of Information was the first and/or only training film, the White House, Coast Guard, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Secret Service, and Department of the Treasury all used the Security Office’s film as a security-training tool for their personnel.\footnote{36}

Despite the success of his training program, Bannerman learned on February 11, 1947, that the Security Office would be merged into the Division of Investigations, which was a part of the Office of Controls. Eight months earlier, the Department created the Division of Investigations, by moving the Office of the Chief Special Agent with its staff of 124 people into the Office of Controls and renaming it. On February 24, the Department transferred the Security Office into Investigations, creating the Division of Security and Investigations. Bannerman had been assured that any personnel actions would be made with “joint approval,” but Bannerman and his two deputies, Morse Allen and Henry Thomas, received their new assignments at 6 p.m. on March 11, 1947. Allen, head of Evaluations, was transferred to the New York Field Office, and Thomas, Bannerman’s right hand man, was moved to the Miami Field Office. Bannerman was named section chief and received a 50 percent cut in responsibilities and in pay.\footnote{37}

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Figure 8: Organizational Chart of the Division of Security, 1948. After the Security Office and Division of Investigations (old Chief Special Agent’s Office) merged, the new Division of Security resembled Bannerman’s vision for an expanded Security Office. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
The decision to merge the Security Office into the Division of Investigations arose from several factors. The Division of Management Planning, influenced by Goodrich’s report, urged Panuch to separate the security function into its own division, so that the director of the Office of Controls (CON) could focus upon the managing CON’s multiple divisions. Also, Department managers wanted to improve the efficiency and performance of CON. Then, on January 22, 1947, Panuch left, and John E. Peurifoy replaced him as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. One of the first memoranda Peurifoy received discussed the 2,000 case backlog in employee investigations.38

Although the new Division of Security and Investigations kept the Chief Special Agent’s acronym CSA, it adopted the Security Office’s three-part program and effectively became the large Security Office that Bannerman had envisioned. As suggested by the name change, the 124-person Division of Investigations had grown largely due to background investigations; other duties such as protecting the Secretary of State and investigating passport or visa fraud required few people. Bannerman’s Security Office not only had a broader vision, but his three-part program expanded the office’s responsibilities. In essence, the small Security Office swallowed the much larger Division of Investigations, and the new entity’s structure replicated the Security Office’s operation. The Investigations Division performed investigations of employees, and the concluded investigations were forwarded to the Security Office’s Evaluations branch for review and evaluation, a process which in a way brought the old Chief Special Agent’s office under Bannerman’s umbrella. The new Division of Investigations and Security still retained the duties of protecting the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries; however, Bannerman’s three tasks: security investigations, the security training program, and the overseas security program provided the focus and structure for the new division.

After being integrated into the Division of Security and Investigations, Bannerman remained long enough to finish creating the overseas security program. With the loan of 30 positions from the Information Office finally approved, Bannerman began training overseas security officers in late spring or early summer 1947. The training program lasted two weeks and included physical security, personnel security, and organization of the Department. The Security Office
held instruction at the U.S. Army's Camp Holabird, near Baltimore. Bannerman admitted that he conducted a large part of the informal training himself because he believed that he “was the only one who had the concept of how a Security Officer should operate at an Embassy.” The program soon became more formalized, with classes in loyalty investigations, fingerprinting, “informants and informant exposure,” physical security, and technical security.39

On July 21, 1947, the Department issued a circular airgram to all posts describing the Foreign Service Security Corps, its responsibilities and duties, and the aims of the program. The trainees departed for their assignments shortly afterwards. These overseas security officers were given the title of Assistant Attaché rather than Security Officer, because it was feared that the latter might encourage the idea among foreign governments that the officers were engaged in intelligence activities.40 Bannerman recalled that most officers were “well received and many were effective immediately.” Some embassies were less enthused. New security officer Paul Green, assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, had the worst experience--the Ambassador refused to allow Green to communicate with Washington, and would not even acknowledge that he had arrived at post. After the initial responses, Bannerman transferred to the new Central Intelligence Agency in November 1947 to help to create that agency’s security program.41

Bannerman’s departure was just one of several personnel and bureaucratic changes taking place in the security area. At the start of 1948, Donald L. Nicholson, a former FBI Special Agent, replaced Thomas Fitch as Chief of the Division of Security and Investigations, and Fitch become Special Advisor to the Director of the Office of Controls. Fitch, who retired in early 1950, focused upon protecting the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, and handled issues related to foreign embassies in Washington. The “portal-to-portal” method was in practice, meaning that the agent met the Secretary at his home in the morning and escorted him throughout the day until returning home in the evening. There was no overnight security.42

In November 1947, the Department’s postwar drive for efficiency and economy targeted the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC), in part because of the running question within the Department: “Just what do all those people do in FC?” With 69 staff members, FC, in liaison with the FBI, the OSS, and the War and Navy Departments reviewed security and intelligence information about individuals, groups, and incidents that threatened the security of the United States. The Department’s January 1948 survey of FC found that it duplicated or completed work similar to that of the Division of Security and Investigation.43 By February 1948, the Bureau of Administration decided to dissolve FC and transfer most of its duties and staff to the Security and Investigations Division. This occurred on August 27.44 With the addition of FC’s functions, the Division of Investigation and Security was renamed the Division of Security, and it received a new acronym, SY. The Division of Security, numbering 197 people, continued to organize itself around Bannerman’s three-part security program. SY focused primarily on personnel investigations, but it also operated an overseas security program and conducted the security-training program for the Department and the Foreign Service. Additional responsibilities included physical security of Department of State buildings, advice on Department security programs, recommendations on visas and passports, and protection of the Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries.45
As Bannerman strove to build the Security Office and make security determinations for Department employees, Congressional and public pressure to remove alleged subversives from federal employment became even more intense. On November 25, 1946, after the Republicans had taken control of Congress in the off-year elections, President Truman signed Executive Order 9806, which established the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. An attempt to ward off a more aggressive Congressional investigation, Truman’s Temporary Commission studied the issue of Communist “infiltration” within the Executive branch, but commission members disagreed on the extent or seriousness of the problem. After approximately 10 weeks of study, the Commission’s findings resulted in Executive Order 9835, issued on March 12, 1947. This order created an employee loyalty program for the Executive branch designed to affirm “that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States.” The order permitted federal agencies and offices to check current employee names against FBI records, and new applicant names against FBI, Dies Committee, and other records. If any derogatory information arose during a check, Executive Order 9835 allowed federal agencies to request a full field investigation on that employee or applicant. Launched in October 1947, the government-wide employee loyalty program was generally executed through the FBI, and a Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, known as the President’s Loyalty Board, reviewed cases.

Figure 10: Chart of Loyalty Security Board in the Department of State. Chaired by Conrad E. Snow, the Personnel Security Board replaced Samuel Klaus’ ACOPS committee in reviewing loyalty cases. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
With the new loyalty program slated to start in October, Secretary of State George C. Marshall abolished the Advisory Committee on Personnel Security, headed by Samuel Klaus in June 1947. On July 9, despite the fact that there would soon be a government-wide loyalty review board, Marshall replaced the now defunct ACOPS with a three-person committee called the Personnel Security Board. The Department of State retained its own security review committee for three reasons. First, as a result of the McCarran Rider passed the previous year, the Department still had a number of security cases under investigation and review. Second, the Department noted a dual requirement relating to personnel security. The President’s Executive Order 9835 focused upon an individual employee’s possible disloyalty; however, the McCarran Rider focused on whether an individual employee posed a “security risk,” which was a much broader set of considerations. As the Department noted in a press release explaining the new committee, “a poor security risk may be judged because of sexual peculiarities, alcoholism or because of an indiscreet and chronically wagging tongue; without any question of the individual’s loyalty to this country.” Third, the Department argued that it needed a separate review board because of its unique status. Because the Department was a target for espionage and possessed a large number of highly classified communications, Department officials insisted that it needed to retain its independent power to investigate and to dismiss employees as outlined in the McCarran Rider. The Department, in truth, did not like or want the McCarran Rider, but it was now using it to avoid bringing its employees under the broader loyalty board program.
Chaired by Conrad E. Snow, the Personnel Security Board received criticism from the Left and the Right. From the Left, reporter Bert Andrews published a series of articles in the *New York Herald-Tribune* that decried the Department of State’s “witch hunt,” charging that the security checks, investigations, and hearings placed civil liberties under serious threat. The articles earned Andrews a Pulitzer Prize for Journalism and were revised into a book titled *Washington Witch Hunt*. From the Right, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Appropriations charged that the Department of State was not aggressive enough in removing Communists and other persons deemed to be security risks from Department employment. The Committee sent a team to the Office of Controls and the Division of Security and Investigations in September 1947 to investigate the issue. After a struggle over access, the House investigators gained unlimited access to all files. After about six weeks, the investigators, led by Harris Huston, charged that there were 108 cases of persons of questionable security still working for the Department of State. Although one House member drafted a resolution calling for a special committee to investigate disloyalty in the Department of State, no legislative action was taken. On June 8, 1948, the Personnel Security Board was renamed the Loyalty Security Board, and it continued to process and make determinations for both loyalty and security cases.
Congressional debate and public discussion of the 108 cases continued through the first half of 1948, and it prompted Congress to pass the Smith-Mundt Act on January 27, 1948. The Smith-Mundt Act required an FBI check of all U.S. Government employees within 6 months. Although the law exempted Foreign Service Officers, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Congress, it did cover foreign nationals and non-Foreign Service U.S. citizens working at U.S. embassies abroad. Under the act, each post had to submit to the Department personal information, a set of fingerprints, and a photograph for each of these employees, as well as conduct a security investigation. Nearly every post completed the investigations and submitted materials in the mandated 6 months.\(^{51}\) Several embassies requested expedited investigations, or asked to have the person assume his/her duties before the investigation was completed, but the Department denied these requests.\(^{52}\)

The Department of State had already developed a clearly defined process for determining loyalty and security risk by the time the Loyalty Security Board was created. The Secretary of State delegated the responsibility, oversight, and decisions of this process to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. For existing Department employees, the procedure for security and loyalty cases was similar. If there was no derogatory information found during the name check with FBI records or in one’s file, the person was cleared. If such information did appear, the Division of Security undertook a full investigation. Special Agents would complete the investigation and turn their findings over to SY’s Evaluations branch, which would then render a recommendation. If the derogatory information was false or unsubstantiated, the person was cleared. If the information merited further review, it was sent to the Department’s Loyalty Security Board. The Board, which consisted of three Department officers, held a hearing with the following individuals present: the accused, the counsel for the accused, a court reporter, and witnesses for and against the accused. After the hearing, the Board would make its recommendation, and forward it to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. The Deputy Under Secretary would then take action, either clearing the accused or terminating their Department employment. In cases in which termination resulted from issues related to loyalty, the Civil Service Commission could conduct a post-audit of the case. However, if termination resulted for security reasons, as stipulated by the McCarran Rider, the employee could not appeal the decision to the Civil Service Commission.\(^{53}\)
For those applying for Department employment, the process was nearly the same. For security screening, SY conducted an investigation of the applicant, and turned over the finding to the Evaluations Branch, which rendered a decision. As defined by the McCarran Rider, disapprovals could not be appealed. Loyalty screenings followed the same procedure as employee screening, with the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration taking action. As was the case for employees, applicants’ cases regarding loyalty could be appealed and post-audited by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.54

Many Department employees, the great majority of whom were never accused of anything, found accusations of disloyalty and the introduction of security background checks to be discomforting. Most Foreign Service Officers at the time had come from well-to-do backgrounds and had attended prestigious universities. They thought of themselves as members of an elite service, and found it difficult to accept the idea that treasonous conduct could be found among their ranks. Accusations tended to be exaggerated and inflamed by the press, and fears that scurrilous and untrue accusations would wreck an Foreign Service Officer’s career were not uncommon. In March 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall sought to allay these concerns by sending a message to employees that he was “confident” of the loyalty of Department personnel. Marshall insisted that any doubt of an employee’s loyalty “must be based upon reliable evidence,” not “on spiteful, unsupported, or irresponsible allegations.”55

Charges of disloyalty and of security risks still on the payroll continued to haunt the Department. In July and August 1948, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Chambers’ testimony soon led to Alger Hiss and his wife being called to testify before the Committee (Mrs. Hiss was charged with typing up classified documents that Hiss brought home). Hiss denied Chambers and Bentley’s accusations. The charges spilled over into the 1948 Presidential campaign, when Republican candidate Thomas Dewey charged President Truman with assisting “the enemies of the American system;” Truman won reelection anyway. Just after the election, Chambers was invited to appear on Meet the Press, where he again charged Hiss with being a Communist. Hiss promptly sued Chambers for libel. Chambers then presented new evidence in the pre-trial examination, which caught the attention of Bert Andrews, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the New York Herald-Tribune, and Richard M. Nixon, a young Representative from California. On December 2, 1948, Andrews joined Nixon on a trip to Chambers’ farm near Westminster, Maryland. From his pumpkin patch near the house, Chambers pulled three microfilm reels from a pumpkin that had been cut and hollowed out. The microfilm reels contained images of classified State Department documents taken by Soviet agents during the late 1930s; the documents on the reels became known as the Pumpkin Papers. Chambers’ microfilm created a media bombshell, and at the end of 1948, questions regarding security, loyalty, Soviet agents, and stolen classified documents swirled even more intensely around the State Department.56
CHAPTER 3  CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

**Overseas Security**

The introduction of Bannerman’s overseas security officers, or “assistant attachés,” as they were called, led to the development of several new security practices at U.S. posts abroad. One was a requirement that each embassy, legation, and consulate submit an emergency plan describing how it would respond in the case of natural disaster or human-instigated emergencies. These plans detailed the various aspects of the post’s response, including the destruction of files, codes, stamps, and equipment; evacuation procedures and routes; announcements to U.S. citizens in country; and operation of post communications during the event. Some emergency plans, such as those of the U.S. Embassies in Santiago and San Salvador, had to consider several scenarios including earthquakes, volcanoes, civil disorder, or war. The U.S. Legation in Beirut focused on public disorder and civil war; meanwhile, the U.S. Legations in Warsaw and Bucharest planned only for a World War III scenario.

Improvements in embassy security, however, were hampered by a shortage of trained professionals. During the war, the Department had halted recruitment of new Foreign Service Officers, and created the Foreign Service Auxiliary to meet its personnel needs. As a result, the Department suffered a 10 percent decline in career officers by the mid-1940s. The expansion of U.S. activities overseas and greater involvement of the United States in world affairs exceeded the Department’s capacity, particularly in relief work and reconstruction of war-torn areas. As one indicator of the Department’s expansion, the Department received and took action on 246 airgrams and telegrams in January 1942; in January 1944, the number was 4397. In another example, incoming communications traffic at the U.S. post in Tangiers rose 40 percent in the years immediately following the war, while its outgoing traffic increased by 70 percent, with the post constantly asking for more code clerks. The U.S. Congress, however, was in a budget-cutting mood, imposing additional difficulties for Department officers who were trying to balance their mandated and expanding tasks with the shortage of personnel.
U.S. posts overseas felt the personnel shortages acutely. In January 1947, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Laurence Steinhardt complained that despite reopening the U.S. Embassy in Prague nearly two years earlier, the Department had still not sent a trained code clerk to the Embassy. Steinhardt’s complaint was not unusual; several posts faced a severe shortage of code clerks, guards, stenographers, and other personnel, and sought to resolve the shortage by hiring men from the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. Embassy in Paris “requisitioned” six enlisted men from the U.S. Army, and the Embassy in Vienna hired eleven. The U.S. Mission in Berlin hired eight Army cryptographers and, a month later, asked for six more. In Tehran, the shortage of personnel prompted the Chief of Mission to assign an embassy guard to the task of distributing “confidential and unclassified mail, preparing diplomatic pouches, and other duties ordinarily performed by a…security clerk.” Other posts, such as the U.S. Consulates in Berlin, Bremen, and Frankfurt, as well as the Political Advisor to Germany, turned to locals to serve as clerks, receptionists, stenographers, and charwomen. In fact, the commanding general of Allied-occupied Germany encouraged the hiring of non-Nazi Germans for clerical positions; however, the foreign nationals were not authorized to handle classified material. The post in Tangiers moved one stenographer to code work, only then to have its remaining stenographers resign in protest, leaving Tangiers begging for replacements and facing a future when it would not be able to communicate with Washington. Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, considered the Tangiers situation typical. The post’s plea for more staff, he said, would be “helpful” in the Department’s talks with the Bureau of the Budget and members of Congress. However, most posts that requested additional personnel, such as the Embassies in Santiago and San Salvador and the U.S. Consulate in Saigon, merely received a polite “No.”

Despite the shortage of personnel, the Department still needed to give consideration to the personal safety of FSOs and U.S. citizen employees overseas. The Tehran Embassy desperately needed code clerks; however, it specifically requested two male code clerks. When the Department assigned two women to Tehran, Embassy officers reminded Foggy Bottom that women occupied “a position of inferiority and inequality” in Muslim countries. “Even beggars, who cringe before a feeble youth,” wired the Embassy, “feel themselves licensed to take liberties with unescorted women in broad daylight.”

Marriages overseas generated another security challenge for the Department— the specter of espionage. Shortly after the war, the Theater Commander in Germany informed U.S. Consulates in Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bremen Hamburg, and Berlin that all prospective U.S. employees must be told that they could not marry a German, Hungarian, Rumanian, or Bulgarian citizen, and to do so “will result in immediate termination and repatriation.” This was a more stringent policy than that defined by Department of State regulations. Department regulations required employees to request permission to marry, and submit a letter of resignation that would go into effect if the request was denied. While the marriage request was under review, Department regulations stipulated that the employee was to be denied access to classified codes and papers. If the Department approved the marriage, the couple was transferred to another post away from the foreign national spouse’s country of origin.
The Department’s policy regarding marriage to foreign nationals, combined with the personnel shortage of the immediate post-war period, led some to question the policy. For example, in Prague, the U.S. Embassy had only one code clerk, who requested permission to marry a Czech. The situation confronted the Embassy with a situation of possibly not having someone able to do code work. By 1949, however, the issue was open for discussion, since many people were not satisfied with a policy that either dismissed a good Foreign Service employee or took away a Foreign Service Officer’s security clearances because of whom they chose to marry.66

Eastern Europe and Embassy Security

As an Iron Curtain fell over Eastern Europe, embassy security, as one Foreign Service Officer noted, required far greater “vigilance than would normally be expected.”67 In this sense, Bannerman’s overseas security officer program proved exceedingly well timed, because the U.S. Embassies in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, and Bucharest found themselves on diplomatic security’s front lines.

Difficulties with Iron Curtain governments began in early 1946, and the Embassies’ local employees were among the first caught up in the emerging Cold War hostilities. Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Bulgarian secret police and plain-clothes agents began arresting and questioning the local nationals hired by U.S. Embassies to serve as chauffeurs, clerks, charwomen, and other positions. They also detained and questioned people who visited the Embassies. Authorities particularly targeted those individuals who had worked for U.S. posts before World War II and had continued to do so afterwards. Many arrests occurred just after work or at night, with relatives and friends not knowing the reasons for the arrest.68 Eastern European secret police questioned them about U.S. Embassy activities and routines, and about the information to which they had access. Many of those arrested or detained endured several hours of interrogation; others were jailed for several weeks, and a few were tried for “anti-state activities.” However, Eastern Bloc agents and secret police were more interested in forcing the employees to spy on U.S. Legations and Embassies. By 1948, U.S. posts in Eastern Europe noted that the secret police were “framing” local employees; meanwhile, the employees feared U.S. officials would fire them because the local Communist governments were forcing their spouses to join the Communist party.69

The harassment and intimidation by Communist authorities transformed routine security measures, such as fingerprinting, into an ordeal of fear and propaganda. Although the Department encouraged

Figure 15: SY technical engineers found this listening device in the U.S. Embassy in Prague in 1954. During the early years of the Cold War, SY found many listening devices in U.S. Embassies in Soviet bloc countries. In fact, between 1948 and 1961, SY engineers discovered more than 95 percent of all listening devices found by all U.S. Government agencies. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to explain to its local employees that fingerprinting was required of all U.S. Government employees and “represent[ed] no special treatment or discrimination,” the explanations likely offered little reassurance to Polish employees who were “already under constant pressure from the Polish secret police.” Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw expressed concern to the Department that the Polish Communist press would publish stories about the fingerprinting requirement that had the “facts so twisted so as to instill…fear.” Besides, asked the Embassy, why fingerprint employees who had never travelled to the United States, and faced little likelihood of ever obtaining a passport from the local Communist government?70

U.S. diplomats in Eastern Bloc countries strongly objected to the host governments’ harassment and intimidation, and the United States formally protested the poor treatment accorded its employees.71 On the occasion that local authorities detained an employee, the Embassy assisted the employee by keeping them on the payroll, placing him/her on authorized leave, or paying the employee’s salary to the spouse so that the family could survive during the employee’s detention.72 In 1948, the Department formalized its policy for protecting its Iron Curtain local national employees who were in extreme danger. The policy amounted to smuggling the employee, as well as his or her spouse and dependents, out of the country and paying the family’s expenses.73

Harassment and detention of local employees contributed heavily to the break in U.S.-Bulgarian relations in 1950. In Sofia, U.S. Legation officers strove to ensure the security of the Legation’s local employees. The suspicious deaths of three of Legation’s local employees while in detention; the arrest, detention, and intimidation of many others; and restrictions placed upon the U.S. Legation by the Bulgarian Communist government irritated the already prickly bilateral relations between the two countries. The U.S. Legation’s senior local employee, Mikhail Shipkov, was arrested and brutally interrogated by the Bulgarian security police. Beginning in October 1949, in an effort to protect Shipkov, U.S. officials hid him in the Legation for more than three months. John C. Campbell, the Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, told Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins that he was willing to break relations with Bulgaria’s Communist government if it meant getting Shipkov out of the country. Campbell believed that an aggressive, steadfast course of action regarding treatment of U.S. post employees would not only “enhance the prestige” of the United States, but the act of breaking relations with Bulgaria might “indirectly bring about better treatment of [U.S.] missions in other satellite states.”74 After the Bulgarians accused U.S. Minister Donald R. Heath of trying to overthrow the Bulgarian Government and declared him persona non grata, the United States broke relations with Bulgaria in February 1950. However, the United States could not get Shipkov out of the country. Despite a Department of State affidavit, formally presented to the Bulgarian Government, citing Shipkov’s innocence, he was arrested and tried for espionage, then sentenced to 15 years in prison.75 The Department’s press release about the break in relations cited only the accusation of conspiracy against Heath, but, as Minister Heath made clear in a radio address on Washington DC’s CBS affiliate WTOP, the treatment of Embassy employees such as Shipkov played a central role in the break of U.S.-Bulgarian relations.76
U.S. citizens were not immune to similar treatment by East European police. U.S. diplomatic officials reported receiving increased attention from the Polish secret police (UB), which included being followed, receiving police escorts to and from engagements, and having their chauffeurs questioned and subjected to surveillance. The Polish secret police also arrested and questioned two U.S. citizens, both women who served as translators, and held one of them for several months.\(^7\) The UB also visited Julian Nowakowski, a U.S. citizen living in Warsaw and employed by the U.S. Embassy. They pressured him to become an informant, and warned him that “he should consider the safety of his wife and child” before declining the assignment. U.S. officials quickly transferred Nowakowski and his family out of Poland. By 1949, the hostile surveillance and treatment of U.S. Embassy personnel had increased to the point where Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman anticipated that a member of the Embassy staff would soon be accused of espionage, and that the Department should prepare countermeasures.\(^7\)

In Eastern Europe, espionage was pervasive. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw terminated the employment of one Polish employee due to suspicions of his honesty and reliability. Another Polish employee admitted that his main job was to compromise individual Americans and the Embassy itself, in order to force the withdrawal of the U.S. Mission from Poland. The head of the American Section of Poland’s Foreign Ministry conceded that his Government not only had planted agents among Embassy employees, but also obtained copies of Embassy documents. “You would be surprised to learn what comes out of wastepaper baskets everywhere,” he told U.S. officials.\(^7\) The Czech police had charwomen collect the contents of the wastepaper baskets of the U.S. Embassy in Prague. In what was perhaps not a judicious choice, Embassy officers helped one elderly charwoman by giving her papers of no worth. U.S. officials in Prague also planned to expose the waste paper operation, but Washington discouraged this, fearing it would antagonize Czechoslovak officials, encourage retaliation against employees, and drive such activities further underground.\(^8\)

Espionage and other hostile activities intensified against U.S. posts in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. Local newspapers accused U.S. missions and personnel of “systematically plot[ting] against the governments” of the “people’s democracies.” The U.S. Legation in Budapest feared that additional

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Figure 16: Special Agents Protect Secretary of State George C. Marshall during a 1948 trip to Athens, Greece. After World War II, U.S. Secretaries of State began travelling abroad often, and the security detail for the Secretary was extended to overseas travel as well. In this photograph, Regional Security Officer Ralph True (standing, second from left) looks on as Secretary of State and Mrs. Marshall prepare to depart Athens. Source: Department of State.
attacks from the Hungarian press would soon lead the Hungarian government to order U.S. Embassy personnel to leave.\textsuperscript{81} FSOs found microphones hidden in the U.S. Embassy in Prague and searched for similar “bugs” in Budapest. Several listening devices were discovered in other Eastern Bloc countries over the next few years.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Partition of Palestine: A Portent of the Future}

The United Nations’ partition of Palestine in November 1947 brought security threats to U.S. posts overseas into high relief and foreshadowed the future of diplomatic security. With partition, tensions between Jews and Arabs threatened Department of State personnel and facilities. The tensions and subsequent hostilities resulted in the bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, the murder of the U.S. Consul General, the kidnapping of a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, and the murder of one United Nations diplomat. The incidents in turn prompted the introduction of several security measures now common at U.S. posts abroad.

As Great Britain, the United States, Arab states, and Zionist groups debated the future of Palestine after the war, tensions and isolated incidents between Arabs and Jews in the British colony increased. In October 1947, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem Robert B. Macatee, reported, “Arab bitterness at Americans is apparent on all sides.” On October 13, unknown assailants bombed the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem. Although the bombing appears to have been more frightening than damaging, by December 1947, Macatee noted that for reasons of personal safety, U.S. personnel “were virtually confined in security zones maintained by British” forces. Even the routine matter of meeting the diplomatic courier had become “hazardous,” “require[d] a police escort,” and threatened to “become impractical [at] any time.” Macatee also said that travel by rail was no longer possible, and that continued service by Arab messengers, chauffeurs, and servants was increasingly “problematical.”\textsuperscript{83}

With Great Britain preparing to end its mandate over Palestine and pull out its troops in 1948, the U.S. Consulate, like other foreign posts in Jerusalem, began seriously considering protection for its personnel and facilities. Consul General Macatee acknowledged that after the October bombing, the British Palestine Government had “generously singled out [the] American Consul General…for special treatment by giving us guards while refusing [guards to] others.” Insecurity, however, remained. Many local guards deserted their posts; meanwhile, British authorities struggled to maintain some semblance of general security. Since the Consulates of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan had private guards, Macatee proposed that the Department send 290 U.S. Marines to Jerusalem. That number could provide details of 8 men during the day and 12 at night, along with escorts for Consulate officials as they moved about the city. The Department responded that it had “no intention of recommending the use of Marines,” but Macatee’s proposal was leaked to the press by the British office and provoked a “strong reaction” from the Jerusalem public.\textsuperscript{84}

Macatee’s proposal for 290 Marines prompted a series of discussions by Department officials regarding the protection of U.S. personnel, and the type and number of diplomatic and consular activities to provide in Palestine. The Department proposed sending a dozen civilian guards to Jerusalem. The limits of the civilian
guard program became apparent, however, when one newly assigned guard arrived lacking experience and any knowledge of firearms. On February 6, 1948, Macatee urged the Department to “send [a] security expert to analyze [the] situation and make recommendations,” because the imminent departure of British troops would leave the Consulate in a “no-man’s land” between the Jewish and Arab quarters. With Macatee casting profound doubts upon the Consulate’s ability to operate after the British withdrawal, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Loy Henderson recommended to Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett that the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem reduce its activities rather than close its doors. Conceding that the situation was “deteriorating,” the Department ordered that the Consulate move most of its operations to Haifa. By mid-April 1948, Consulate personnel had transferred much of its activities, personnel, and files to the Mediterranean port. The murder of Macatee’s successor, U.S. Consul General Thomas C. Wasson, by a sniper on May 22, 1948, and the subsequent kidnapping of a U.S. Consular official in August ended the debate over guards. Shortly afterwards, 42 Marines arrived to protect the Consulate in Jerusalem. Ultimately, that number was reduced to 15 Marines, with 2 Marines on duty 24 hours a day in 1949, after a truce ended the fighting.

The task of guarding the new U.S. Embassy to Israel, located in Tel Aviv, proved to be a logistical headache. In May 1948, Britain withdrew its troops from Palestine, Israel declared itself a nation-state, and Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan then attacked Israel, starting the first Arab-Israeli war. The extremely high demand for housing and office space in Tel Aviv forced the mission to accept a house for the Ambassador’s residence that was 12 kilometers away from the chancery, and Chief of Mission James G. McDonald commuted the distance daily. The 12 kilometers forced the post’s Security Officer to divide his 12-man civilian guard force between the chancery and the residence. Depending on the state of tensions, Tel Aviv security officials assigned one to three Israeli police officers to enhance security. In addition, the guards’ housing (located several blocks from the chancery) did not have a telephone, and “irregular” and “in some cases non-existent” telephone service plagued both the chancery and residence. Guards used SCR-300 radios to ensure communications among themselves, and ordered walkie-talkies to maintain contact with Israeli police. When U.S. Marines took over guard duties in 1949, the guard detail still did not have a jeep. The mission’s severe shortage of cars raised the possibility that guards might need to hire taxis for transportation in the most
dire or routine circumstances. Mission officers had already employed taxis to transport classified documents and themselves between the chancery and the residence when McDonald moved his office to the residence for security reasons. Ultimately, the Security Officer admitted that, in an emergency, “the safety of both the Embassy and the residence . . . [was] dependent on the ability and resourcefulness of the one Marine stationed at each place.”

The murder of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, by a Jewish extremist group in September 1948 forced significant changes to the Tel Aviv post’s security procedures. The costly Chief of Mission’s residence now proved its worth. Located on a hill surrounded by a fence, the residence, said the security officer, was “comparatively ideal for protection.” With a “blanket threat” issued against all Americans, Israeli police placed three officers on constant duty outside the chancery. Mission officers were told to remain at mission offices “as much as possible,” and Israeli police and mission guards escorted Chief of Mission McDonald to and from the chancery. After a short time, at the security officer’s insistence, McDonald stopped commuting and set up his office in his residence. Other post officers spent nights at the residence so “their insecure abodes would not be identified.”

Post communications proved an easier problem for the Department of State to resolve. Like many posts, the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem had utilized commercial telegraph facilities; however, with the May 1948 withdrawal of British forces, officials deemed a disruption in commercial wire services “very likely.” One week before British troops left, the U.S. Navy flew in 30,000 pounds of radio equipment, including two radio transmitters and a gasoline-powered generator, as well as a team of 12 naval communications personnel. The Consulate housed the naval communications office next door in the Convent of the Rosary, and made agreements with the Mother Superior to house and feed the Navy technicians.

The U.S. Mission Tel Aviv faced a similar situation. Shortly after opening, it wired Washington, stating that its only means of safe communication was the RCA (Radio Corporation of America) office. It also reported that its mail was “censored” and that it had no pouch or courier service. Within a week, Tel Aviv was incorporated into the courier route from Cairo, and soon afterwards the mission obtained radio equipment and a code room.

Despite the killings of Bernadotte and Wasson, the kidnapping of a U.S. consular official, and the bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, Department officials sought to cut the Tel Aviv mission’s security expenses in order to meet “drastic budget restrictions.” Just a few weeks after the Bernadotte murder, Under Secretary Lovett asked the Tel Aviv mission how much longer it needed the “special temporary guard detachment;” McDonald informed him that the continued emergency still demanded the guards. The Department of State later proposed renting out part of the chancery as a means of offsetting costs, but the mission shot back that the proposal “defeats the entire objective [of] security.” When the Department balked at approving the lease for the Chief of Mission’s residence on the hill, McDonald informed Washington that if the Department rejected the lease, “I risk being forced [to] live in a tent.” The post Security Officer put it more bluntly, “it is imperative that the present residence be maintained. There is no other comparative house in the Tel Aviv-area that offers a similar degree of security.”
Fiscal economies in Washington still created diplomatic security problems at the U.S. mission in Israel. For more than a year, Tel Aviv mission officers warned the Department that they had only two people who could handle classified material, and that both were working long hours and seven days a week. One was McDonald’s daughter, who served as his personal secretary. The other person, Bernard Piatek, marked, typed, and filed all of the mission’s classified materials, which made up 85 percent of the mission’s correspondence. He also prepared diplomatic pouches.\(^97\) The mission, on numerous occasions, pleaded with Washington for another secretary and file clerk who could handle classified materials, but the Department either denied the request due to budgetary constraints or failed to send the people.\(^98\) Mission officers soon began venting their frustration to Washington. McDonald bluntly asked Joseph Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, how Washington could expect reports if they sent no one to write them. The post’s Counselor, Charles Knox, sardonically wondered if “the Department [was] under a misapprehension regarding the clerical utility of the 12 guards and the Post Security Officer.” By September 1949, a security survey revealed that not only had the problem remained unresolved, but that the Tel Aviv mission, out of sheer necessity, allowed alien employees to handle and/or type classified materials.\(^99\)

In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, U.S. officials also faced the problem of espionage. One member of the Navy communications team in Jerusalem reported that his girlfriend had “requested him to give her copies [of] all messages (coded and clear) received by the Consul General.” Microphones were found at U.N. headquarters in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and Israeli government agents approached one local employee of the Tel Aviv mission. The Department of State warned the Consul General in Jerusalem that two Polish consulate officials were possibly intelligence agents. When the Department requested the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Cairo to travel to Tel Aviv and survey the mission for security breaches, the RSO found that a workman had installed an extra telephone in the Military Attaché’s office, and that a local tenant had installed a private radio antenna on the roof of the attaché’s office.\(^100\)

**Marine Corps Guards: Resolving a Problem, Creating a Tradition**

Embassy guards constituted perhaps one of the most troubling and persistent problems for the Department of State during the immediate aftermath of World War II. Even though diplomatic protocol dictated that the host government bore “the ultimate responsibility” for the protection of all diplomats accredited to their nation, U.S. Embassies, Legations, and Consulates generally hired U.S. private citizens as embassy guards and local foreign nationals as night watchmen to provide basic security from theft, vandalism, espionage, and other crimes.\(^101\) Practice, however, varied from region to region. For example, in Chile and Iran, the local governments provided guards for U.S. Embassies.\(^102\) In and near theaters of war, U.S. Army soldiers assumed the responsibility, or in the case of London, the Marines did.\(^103\)
The problems mounted as the Department reopened Embassies, Legations, and Consulates in liberated areas and newly emergent nations after the war. One problem was a shortage of civilian guards. In Rome and Berlin, the U.S. Army, at the Department’s request, continued to provide soldiers as guards. Amid the rising tensions of the Cold War and decolonization, distrust of local guards and night watchmen grew. One SY official admitted that local guards “were subject to political pressure;” meanwhile, another said that night watchmen prevented theft but probably would stop few security breaches. One Foreign Service Officer confessed that his post’s gatekeepers and guards were a security problem because they were generally “uneducated” and “badly paid.”

The characteristics of U.S. citizens serving as embassy guards raised other issues. Many were “older persons of limited education, experience, and physical endurance,” and the younger guards “usually lacked interest in their assignment and quite often accepted such employment for ulterior purposes.” Few were willing to relocate to any

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**Figure 18:** The Organizational Chart for the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. Under “Miscellaneous,” John Hunter, the “Night Guard” (a U.S. civilian guard), is listed as overseeing the work of five messengers, two houseboys, two gardeners, and two charwomen, in addition to his guard duties. Civilian guards were among the lowest-paid U.S. citizens positions at an embassy. Difficulties and higher expectations after World War II led to the Marine Security Guard detail. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
post in the world, particularly given the low salary that they received (their pay was less than most Embassy clerks). Common private sector issues such as overtime, drunkenness, and poor performance compounded the situation. Despite Departmental instructions that guards receive overtime pay for all work in excess of 40 hours per week, some post and department officers complained when guards requested it, and in at least one instance, a guard resigned over the issue. Since many post budgets permitted only minimal overtime, officers-in-charge granted compensatory time (losing the guard’s services at a later date) or simply did without the security. Moreover, with postwar demobilization and the occupation of Germany, Army officials wanted to move their troops to other assignments.

By 1947, it became evident that existing arrangements for embassy guards did not meet the minimal needs of the Department, and Department officials decided to “overhaul” the embassy guard system. As one official remarked, “the proper protection required for our sensitive operations abroad” necessitated “a group of physically fit, well-trained and disciplined, smart appearing” guards. The Foreign Service Act of 1946, in Section 562, authorized the Secretary of the Navy to provide enlisted men from the Navy and Marine Corps “to serve as custodians…at an Embassy, Legation or Consulate” upon the Secretary of State’s request. Section 562 was intended for emergencies; however, when the Army needed to pull troops from guard duty in Rome, the Department of State drew upon Section 562 and asked the Navy to provide Marines to replace the soldiers.

In early 1947, Department of State officials turned to the U.S. Army to create a formal embassy guard program and said that they were willing to split the costs with the War Department. The Army was the first choice, partially due to the Department’s experience during World War II, but also because Secretary of State George Marshall (a retired General and former Army Chief of Staff) and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Carlyle Humelsine (a former Colonel) had Army backgrounds. Army officials were interested, and talks were progressing well by late 1947. However, the Secretary of State’s Legal Advisor reminded Secretary Marshall that the 1946 act required the Department to consult with the Navy for security guards, which forestalled an agreement with the Army.

The Marine Corps was very interested in the embassy guard program and accepted; however, it did so for reasons of inter-service politics and institutional survival, not from a “tradition” of protecting U.S. diplomatic posts. USMC Lieutenant Colonel Wade Jackson, who with his friend Humelsine negotiated the Department of State-Marine Corps agreement, later admitted that the Marines had accepted embassy guard duty principally as “a political expediency, back-scratching thing to enlist [Secretary] Marshall’s support.” In 1947 and 1948, the Marine Corps saw itself in an unfavorable position. The Truman Administration was reorganizing the military and created the new Department of Defense. Amid reorganization, inter-service competition for positions, roles, and resources intensified, as did a debate over whether to include the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There were also proposals to cut the Marine Corps sharply, or even end it altogether. The Corps’ forces had declined from nearly 500,000 men in 1945 to 83,000 in 1948, and declined further before the Korean War broke out in 1950. Congress and the public were also concerned about the federal budget and inflation, and budget cuts were common. When the Department offered the “high profile” task, the
Marine Corps jumped at it. Jackson and Humelsine completed most of the negotiations in private conversations. On June 22, 1948, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett formally requested 300 Marines to serve as embassy guards, and the Secretary of the Navy authorized it a month later. The understanding on both sides was that this was a short-term task, not a permanent program.\[114\]

Anticipated as only temporary, the Marine Security Guard program placed 300 Marines at 26 embassies, but it did not end the need for civilian guards. Marines appeared—in civilian clothes, not dress blues—only at major posts in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, with posts in South Korea, Thailand, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Tangiers rounding out the list. Most posts had five Marines, with larger contingents at major U.S. embassies in Europe.\[115\] With the arrival of the Marines, civilian guards stationed at those posts faced a number of possible futures. Some were transferred to posts where Marines were not assigned; others assumed new tasks such as supervisor of messengers or administrative assistant. The Legation in Beirut kept one civilian guard to serve as translator because none of the Marines spoke French.\[116\] Several embassies that obtained Marine guards continued to employ local nationals as guards because Marine Security Guards only stood watch when the embassy’s offices were closed. During working hours, U.S. embassies still relied upon locals or had no guards on duty.\[117\]

All parties quickly came to appreciate the benefits of the Marine Security Guard program. Within seven years, an SY official acknowledged that Marine Security Guards had become “accepted as a normal personnel practice” and that a U.S. tourist “now expects to find a capable young Marine” when contacting the mission “outside normal work hours.” Moreover, the Marine Corps took “great pride” in their contribution to the Department of State, not to mention recognizing the advantages that the increased visibility offered for the service’s prestige and recruiting. For Marines, embassy work was popular duty. The Department also appreciated that the Marine Corps paid the administration, salaries, health care, leave, and other expenses, reducing a post’s guard expenses by 50 percent or more.\[118\]
Some posts, however, opposed using the Marines as guards, particularly those in the Near East and South Asia. In 1950, the Regional Security Officer in Cairo admitted that most Chiefs of Mission in the region strongly preferred “middle-aged, married, civilian guards.” In South Asia (India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), posts expressed concern that “the memory of the British uniform still rankles.” Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and other Muslim nations, as well as Yugoslavia, opposed the presence of foreign military personnel in their territory. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Department told its Embassy that in negotiating with Saudi officials, it should “minimize” the men’s status as Marines and “emphasize” them as “civilian guards” who will be unarmed and “attired in civilian clothes at all times.” The Department issued special passports to Marine guards heading to Saudi Arabia, stating simply that they were on “official business for the Department of State,” and displaying photographs of the Marines in civilian clothes.119

Figure 20: A Diplomatic Courier (left) waits in the Department of State’s mail room in 1948 as diplomatic pouch contents are sorted and logged. After World War II, couriers replaced Despatch Agents as the Department’s primary carriers of important documents. The courier system resulted, in part, because air transport had developed so significantly. Source: Department of State.

Couriers Replace Despatch Agents

After World War II, the Department of State’s courier system replaced the Despatch Agent system as the primary carrier of the Department’s diplomatic correspondence. Following the passage of the Truman Act of 1946, the Courier Service was moved into the division of Documents and Communications under the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. Regional centers created during wartime in Cairo, Algiers, and Naples remained in place, while new courier centers were established in Panamá, Paris, Shanghai, and Manila. The courier service was comprised of 77 trained, full-time diplomatic couriers, and transported about 100,000 pounds of materials each year, through the early 1950s.120

As part of its information security campaign, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee for Security Control set forth uniform practices for the transmission of classified materials through the Department’s pouch system. All diplomatic pouches required a routing certificate to be displayed prominently on the outside of each pouch. Methods of transmission varied depending on the level of classification of the contents.121 Airborne pouches bearing higher classifications had to be stored securely (in a safe) in the post’s mailroom, and then
accompanied to the airport by a courier, who personally had to witness the loading of the pouches on the plane. Upon a pouch’s arrival at its destination city, a courier would meet it on the landing strip and enter the plane’s cargo compartment to collect it. The courier would then walk the pouch through customs and escort it to the safe mailroom of its destination post.  

### The Hoover Commission

In January 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, commonly known as the Hoover Commission, issued its first report. Created in 1947 and headed by former President Herbert Hoover, the Commission extensively examined the organization and operations of the Executive Branch, including the Department of State. As part of the Hoover Commission, the Department set up a task force to study the Division of Security, and the resultant study, released on March 23, 1949, constituted the first extensive examination of the security function within the Department. The Security Task Force (which contained several members from SY) urged Department officials to centralize security tasks and responsibilities within the Division of Security, declaring that the Department “must have an effective security program.”
Task Force also pressed the Division of Security to manage more actively its overseas security program. The Department promptly created five Regional Security Officers located in London, Cairo, Manila, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro. The U.S. High Commissioner of Germany had its own Regional Security office. The Regional Security Officers were tasked to assist overseas security officers and the posts with improving security, implementing new measures, assisting with investigations, and submitting monthly security surveys of the missions in their areas.\(^{124}\)

Although the Hoover Commission prompted significant reorganization in other bureaus of the Department, SY was little affected. The Divisions of Security, Visa, Passport, and Protective Services were grouped together into a new Office of Consular Services that replaced the Office of Controls, but retained the old acronym CON.\(^{125}\)

The Office of Security did gain one new task: Department identification cards. The pass system instituted during the war had broken down, and procedures such as surrendering visitor passes upon departure were not implemented uniformly. Also, there was no accountability, even if a pass became mutilated, illegible, lost, or was retained by a departing employee.\(^{126}\) Shortly after the Hoover Commission, SY instituted a standardized identification card. The ID card contained a black-and-white photograph of the person, as well as their name, and other information. When entering the building after hours, employees presented their ID cards to the guard and signed the register book. SY maintained a record of the cards issued, and employees and officers had to return them when leaving or retiring from the Department.\(^{127}\)

**Bannerman’s Legacy**

By 1949, SY had achieved the basic organizational structure that it would have for the next two decades. The division consisted of three branches: Investigations, which conducted background investigations of Department employees and maintained liaisons with other agencies; Evaluations, which evaluated the results of the investigations; and Physical Security, which managed protective security of Department personnel and property in Washington and overseas. Physical Security also drafted and administered Department security regulations, and trained Department employees in these procedures. The branches and functions reflected the three-part program...
developed by Bannerman in June 1945. Like Bannerman’s Security Office, the Division of Security (SY) handled all security and loyalty screenings for the Department, conducting more than 7,200 investigations in Fiscal Years 1948 and 1949, and rendering evaluations for each screening, and making recommendations. SY also retained the Office of the Chief Special Agent’s responsibilities for protecting the Secretary and foreign dignitaries and investigating passport and visa fraud cases.128

Bannerman’s small Security Office transformed the much larger Office of the Chief Special Agent, and that transformation resulted, in part, from Bannerman’s fortuitous timing. The Amerasia case, Congress’ questions about loyalty and Soviet espionage in the Department of State, the United States’ rise as a superpower, and the emergence of the Cold War combined to force the Department to create and implement a formal security program. As the Klaus Report and subsequent Klaus Committee reveal, Departmental resistance to a comprehensive security program was strong, and the merger of Bannerman’s office with the Division of Investigations, and Bannerman’s move to the CIA resulted from it. Moreover, intense Congressional and public pressure pushed a reluctant Department of State to continually upgrade, expand, and professionalize its security program. Bannerman’s three-part program (screenings, overseas security program, and training) provided the foundation for the security program – and Security office—that the Department needed in 1945 and would need for the Cold War. The Division of Security (SY) with its multiple objectives was the expanded Security Office that Robert L. Bannerman had hoped to create. It was his legacy; and it is upon this foundation that later developments in diplomatic security, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, were built.

Endnotes


3 Tab 2 “A History of Security Organization,” in “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, [No Folder], Box 13, Security Files 1932-1963, Records of the Division of A/SY/Evaluations, Record Group 59 - Lot 96D584, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park Maryland (hereafter cited as Security
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4 Memorandum “Security,” Ross to Raymond Geist, Chief of Division of Central Services, and William D. Wright, Associate Chief of Division of Central Services, 15 January 1945, attached to Memorandum “Security,” Ross to Boykin,” 15 January 1945; and Memorandum, Ross to Wright, 3 February 1945; both Folder – Security, Box 9, Boykin Reading Files.


13 In addition to the Office of War Information (OWI), President Truman abolished the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission, and the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). The Office of Inter-American Affairs was a wartime agency created to promote and increase inter-American solidarity and cooperation during World War II, through public and cultural diplomacy, commercial relations, and educational exchanges. OIAA was separate from the Division of American Republics (ARA), which managed U.S. bilateral diplomatic relationships with Latin American nations.


Memorandum “Possible Improvements in Security Procedures,” Paul H. Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State, 19 July 1951, 115/7-1951, Box 487, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. McCarran Rider quoted in Memorandum, Department of State to President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 9 December 1946, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files.

Memorandum “Security Control,” Bannerman to Lyon and Panuch, 20 May 1946, Folder – Reorganization (Security Office); and “Klaus Report,” Samuel E. Klaus, Special Assistant to Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence, 3 August 1946, Folder – Security Program - “Klaus Report” 1946; both Box 18, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations.

“Klaus Report,” Klaus, 3 August 1946, pp. 10-11, 15-16.


Proposed Budget Statement, February 2, 1947, Box 4; and Program of Security Indoctrination Meetings, Box 10; both Boykin Reading Files.

Emphasis in original. Dos and Don’ts of Security, pamphlet created by Department of State for distribution to employees, Box 1, Program Administration Files, 1954-56, RG 59-Lot 58D368, NA. Memorandum “Office and Division Security Officers,” Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Directors of Offices and Chiefs of Divisions, 3 January 1947, Box 10, Boykin Reading Files.

Department of State Security Handbook, Box 1, Program Administration Files, 1954-56.


Memorandum “Physical Security in the Department of State,” Goodrich to Panuch, 15 August 1945. Memorandum, George H. Steurt, Jr., Executive Officer, Office of Controls, and Just Lunning, Chief of Division of Management Planning,
History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State


40 Bannerman says that the first overseas security officers departed in 1946; however, documents show that it was July 1947. Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 3-4. Airgram A-81, Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State (Bannerman) to U.S. Consul, Port of Spain, Trinidad, British West Indies, 21 August 1947; and Memorandum, Hamilton Robinson, Director of Office of Controls, to Fitch, 28 April 1947; both Folder – Foreign Service Security Program, Box 9, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. For embassies assigned a security officer, the Ambassador received a letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration Peurifoy about 10 days before the circular instruction. See Letter, Peurifoy to John C. Wiley, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, 10 July 1947, Folder – Foreign Service Security Program, Box 9, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations.


45 Memorandum “Division of Security, Department of State,” n.d. [1948], Folder – Miscellaneous 1961-1963, Box 2; and Memorandum “Division of Security (SY),” n.d. [1948], Folder – FC and CSA Merger, Box 6; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations.
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49 Department of State Press Release 804, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files Departmental Announcement 765, “Security Principles of the Department of State, and Hearing Procedure of the Personnel Security Board,” 17 September 1947, Box 9, Boykin Reading Files. Memorandum “President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,” Peurifoy to Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, 21 February 1947, Box 4, Boykin Reading Files.


51 Telegram 725, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, to John C. Wiley, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, 30 July 1948, 124.916/7-3048, Folder [4], Box 1226; Despatch 146 “Loyalty and Security Programs: Transmitting Required Data concerning Mrs. Frances Juanita Milam, Locally-hired American Employee,” Albert F. Nufer, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador (Dubreuil) to Secretary of State, 5 April 1949, 124.163/4-549, Folder [5], Box 1014; Telegram 4204, McCloy to Secretary of State, 22 November 1949, 124.62/11-2249, Folder [1], Box 1164; and Telegram 3076, Acheson (J. A. Bush) to High Command of Germany (HICOG), 1 December 1949, 124.62/11-2249, Folder [1], Box 1164; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

52 For expedited investigations and immediate employment during investigation, see Telegram 1198, Wiley to Secretary of State, 26 September 1949, 124.913/9-2449; and Telegram 1422, Wiley to Secretary of State, 4 November 1949, 124.913/11-449; both Folder [3], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For denials by department, see Instruction A-19, Acheson (G. deLong) to U.S. Representative Tel Aviv, 8 February 1949, 124.67n3/2-149, Folder [4], Box 1187; Instruction A-106, Acheson (M Rule) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 29 June 1949, 124.163/6-2949, Folder [5], Box 1014; and Telegram 1049, Acheson (R. Bright) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 21 November 1949, 124.913/11-2149, Folder [3], Box 1225; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


As an example, see Despatch 979 “Plans for Emergency Action, Berlin,” Robert Murphy (A. McIver) to Secretary of State, 23 June 1948, 124.626/6-2348, Folder [5], Box 1167; Despatch 1238 “Emergency Security Plan, U.S. Embassy, Paris,” Jefferson Caffery, U.S. Ambassador to France (P. J. Hoyle) to Secretary of State, 7 October 1948, 124.516/10-748; and Despatch 1063 “Emergency Plan for Paris,” Caffery to Secretary of State, 3 August 1948, 124.516/8-348; both Folder [5], Box 1109, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 574 “Plans for Emergency Action of American Embassy at Santiago, Chile,” Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador to Chile (E. T. Long) to Secretary of State, 1 September 1948, 124.256/9-148, Folder [5], Box 1036; Despatch 312 “Plans for Emergency Action,” Nufer (M. W. Williams and L. A. Squires) to Secretary of State, 22 July 1948, 124.166/7-2248, Folder [2], Box 1015; Despatch 136 “Emergency Plan for Public Disorder and Civil War,” Lowell C. Pinkerton, U.S. Minister to Lebanon (J. M. Bowie) to Secretary of State, 18 May 1948, 124.906/5-1848, folder [1], Box 1215; Airgram A-652, Edward S. Crocker, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Warsaw, to Secretary of State, 24 May 1948, 124.60c6/5-1348, Folder [3], Box 1147; Despatch 320 “Preliminary Observations on the Problems Involved in Formulating a Plan for Emergency Action,” Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, U.S. Minister to Romania (J.C. Hill) to Secretary of State, 3 June 1948, 124.646/6-294, Folder [1], Box 1175; and Airgram A-294, Selden Chapin, U.S. Minister to Hungary, to Secretary of State, 10 May 1948, 124.646/4-2948, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Telegram 2692, Caffery (Murphy) to Secretary of State, 16 May 1945, 124.623/5-1645, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 295, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (H. B. Day) to U. S. Political Advisor for Germany (USPOLAD) in Berlin, 13 August 1945, 124.623/7-1645, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 501, Acheson (H. B. Day) to USPOLAD Berlin, 18 September 1945, 124.623/9-845, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 214, Byrnes (H. B. Day) to AUSPOLAD Vienna, 17 October 1945, 124.623/10-545, Folder [4], Box 1165; and Airgram A62, George V. Allen, U.S. Ambassador to Iran (Docher) to Secretary of State, 26 March 1947, 124.913/3-2648, Folder [2], Box 1225; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 2224, Murphy (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 21 September 1946, 124.623/9-2146, Folder [1], Box 1166; Telegram 424, Acheson (Tewell) to U.S. Consulate Berlin, 8 September 1945, 124.623/8-3145, Folder [4], Box 1165; Airgram A-218, Murphy to Secretary of State, 10 October 1945, 124.623/10-1045, Folder [4], Box 1166; Personnel Bulletin B-12, Brigadier General Bryan L. Milburn, Chief of Staff, Office of the Military Government for Germany, 14 December 1945, enclosed with Despatch 1633, Shults (USPOLAD) to Department of State, 8 January 1946, 124.623/1-
846, Folder [1], Box 1166; and “Security Survey of Alien Employees of the Consular Branch of the Office of the Political Advisor on German Affairs, Berlin,” [W. B. Lockling], 2 March 1948, enclosed with Despatch 371 “Transmission of Security Survey…,” Lockling to Department of State, 9 March 1948, 124.623 / 3-948, Folder [2], Box 1166; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Airgram A-21, Murray (Ward and Spivack) to Secretary of State, 19 January 1946, 124.913/1-1946, Folder [2], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, W. M. Chase to U.S. Consular Offices at Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin, 31 August 1946, enclosed with Despatch 6490 “Transmitting Memorandum on European Theater Policy….,” 3 September 1946, 124.623/1-3046, Folder [1], Box 1166; and Memorandum, Hildegard Holstein, U.S. Foreign Service Clerk, U.S. Embassy Prague, to Christian M. Ravnal, Director General of the Foreign Service, 13 February 1948, enclosed with Despatch 129 “Request of Hildegard Holstein,” John H. Bruins, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 13 February 1948, 124.60f3/2-1348, Folder [4], Box 1151; and Despatch 393 “Request to Marry a Czechoslovak National Made by Miss Hildegard Holstein,” Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 3 June 1948, 124.60f3/6-348, Folder [4], Box 1151; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 1606, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 4 September 1946, 124.60f3/9-446, Folder [3], Box 1151; and Telegram 37, Acheson (Day) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 16 January 1946, 124.913/1-746, Folder [1], Box 1225; both DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Proposed Circular on Marriages of American Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service to Aliens,” 22 July 1949, Folder – S.E.A. U.S. Missions 1949-1950, Box 1, Records of the Philippine and Southeast Asia Division, Regional Affairs, Subject Files, 1929-1953, RG 59-Lot, NA.

Despatch 181 “Administrative Staffing Standards,” H. A. Buffalo, U.S. Legation Budapest, to Department of State, 14 March 1949, 124.646/3-1449, Folder [2], Box 1175, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 166, Arthur Bliss Lane, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 31 January 1947, 124.60c/1-3047, Folder [3], Box 1145; Telegram 628, Schoenfeld, U.S. Embassy Bucharest, to Secretary of State, 124.713/8-2449, Folder [1], Box 1153; Telegram 482, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 26 March 1948, 124.60f3/3-2548, Folder [4], Box 1151; Telegram 1567, Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 28 November 1949, 124.60f3/11-2849, Folder [5], Box 1145; Airgram A-724, Ellis O. Briggs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Department of State, 3 December 1949, 124.60f6/12-349, Folder [1], Box 1153; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For harassment of persons working for U.S. posts before and after the war, see Telegram 1639, James K. Penfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. Embassy Prague, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1948, 124.60f3/10-2548; and Despatch 737 “Departure from Praha of Vendelin Kalenda,” Penfield to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-3048; both Folder [4], Box 1152, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 550 “Intimidation by the Security Police of Polish Employees of the Embassy for Purpose of Obtaining Information,” Lane to Secretary of State, 25 June 1946, 124.60c/6-2546, Folder [1], Box 1142; Airgram A-265, Lane to Secretary of State, 15 April 1947, 124.60c/3/4-1547, Folder [3], Box 1145; and Telegram 225, Jacobs, U.S. Embassy Prague, to Secretary of State, 17 February 1949, 124.60f3/2-1649, Folder [1], Box 1152; Telegram 1512, Chapin, U.S. Embassy Budapest, to Secretary of State, 22 September 1948, 124.646/9-2148, Folder [2], Box 1175; and Operations Memorandum “Secret Police Activity re: Penetration of Legation and….,” 14 June 1948, Chapin to Department of State, 124.646/6-1448, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.
70 Airgram A-476, Acheson (Dodger) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 13 August 1949, 124.60c3/8-849; and Despatch 465 “Fingerprinting of Local Employees,” William P. McEneaney, Attaché, U.S. Embassy Warsaw, to Department of State, 8 July 1949, 124.60c3/7-849; both Folder [5], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

71 Telegram 557, Acheson (C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 20 June 1946, 124.60c/6-446, enclosed with Memorandum, Elbrick to Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr. Chief of Division of Eastern European Affairs, 15 June 1946, Folder [1], Box 1142; and Telegram 964, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

72 Airgram A-10, James K. Penfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.60f3/1-449; and Telegram 77, Lovett (Leon L. Cowles, Division of Foreign Service Personnel) to U.S. Embassy Prague, 18 January 1949, 124.60f3/1-449, Folder [1], Box 1152, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

73 Instruction 1534, Peurifoy (Charles E. Hulick, Jr., Division of Foreign Service Planning) to Steinhardt, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 26 December 1947, 124.60f3/12-2647, Folder [2], Box 1151; Airgram A-841, Penfield to Secretary of State, 17 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-1748, Folder [4], Box 1151; Despatch 737 “Departure from Praha of Vendelin Kalenda,” Penfield to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-3048, Folder [4], Box 1152; and Telegram 1417, Lovett (Cowles) to U.S. Embassy Prague, 27 October 1948, 124.60f3/10-2548; and Despatch 535 “Protection of Loyal Non-American Employees: Armand Lyask,” McEneaney to Department of State, 11 August 1949, 124.60c3/12-1147, Folder [5], Box 1145; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


77 Telegram 397, Stanton Griffis, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948, 124.60c/3-1848, Folder [2], Box 1142; Telegram 1705, Griffis to Secretary of State, 21 October 1947, 124.60c3/10-2047, Folder [3], Box 1145; Despatch 1413, “Statement of Mrs. Irene Dmochowska concerning Treatment during Imprisonment,” Gerald Keith, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 2 April 1947, 124.60c3/4-247, Folder [3], Box 1145; Despatch 1518 “Status of Application for Exit Permit for Irene Dmochowska,” Edmund J. Dorsz, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Warsaw, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1947, 124.60c3/4-2947, Folder [3], Box 1145; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

78 Telegram 1040, Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 21 July 1949, 124.60c3/7-2149, Folder [5], Box 1145; Telegram 456, Acheson (Fred K. Salter, Officer in Charge, Polish, Baltic and Czechoslovak Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 21 July 1949, 124.60c3/7-2149, Folder [5], Box 1145; and Telegram 1559, Gallman to Secretary of State, 28 November 1949, 124.60c/11-2849, Folder [2], Box 1142; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

79 Despatch 260 “Activities of Joseph Tomaszek, Former Polish Employee of Embassy,” [Edward S. Crocker], Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Department of State, 21 April 1948, 124.60c3/4-2148; Telegram 429, Griffis, to Secretary of State, 23 March 1948, 124.60c3/3-2348; and Airgram A-911, Crocker (Salter) to Secretary of State, 25 June 1948, 124.60c3/6-2548; all Folder [4], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.
Telegram 321, Joseph E. Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Secretary of State, 11 March 1949, 124.60f3/3-1149; and Telegram 333, Acheson (Harold C. Vedeler, Acting Assistant Chief of Division of Austrian Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Prague, 19 March 1949, 124.60f3/3-1149; both Folder [1], Box 1152, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 399 “Rumanian Press Article Charging American Diplomatic Missions in Eastern Europe with Having Directed Plots against ‘People’s Democratic Regimes,’” Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, U.S. Ambassador to Romania, to Secretary of State, 13 October 1949, 124.646/10-1349; and Airgram A-469 “Potential Attacks Against Personnel of U.S. Legation,” William P. Cochran, Jr., Counselor, U.S. Embassy Budapest, to Secretary of State, 24 June 1949, 124.646/6-2449; both Folder [2], Box 1175, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Despatch, Joseph E., Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to G. Frederick Reinhardt, Chief of Division of Eastern European Affairs, 7 May 1949, 124.60f3/5-749, Folder [1], Box 1152; Memorandum “Discovery of Sound Pick-Up Equipment,” Rollin H. White, Jr., Area Security Officer, to Merrill M. Blevins, Chief of Foreign Service and Domestic Security, 20 May 1949, enclosed with Despatch 343 “Transmittal of Report…,” White to Department of State, 20 May 1949, 124.60f6/5-2049, Folder [1], Box 1153; Telegram 185, George C. Marshall, Secretary of State (Charles M. Dulin, Division of Security) to U.S. Legation Budapest, 20 February 1948, 124.646/2-1348, folder [1], Box 1175; Telegram 413, Chapin to Secretary of State, 17 March 1948, 124.646/3-1648, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For discoveries of other listening devices in Eastern bloc nations over the next few years, see photographs from U.S. Embassies in Bucharest, Warsaw, and Prague, Folder – Hidden Microphones, Box Archives H – N, DS TRACEN.

Telegram 455, Robert B. Macatee, U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 19 October 1947, FRUS, 1947, V: 1188, 1188n.. Telegram 589, Macatee to Secretary of State, 10 December 1947, 125.4916/12-1047, Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 21, Macatee to Secretary of State, 7 January 1948, 125.4916/1-748; Telegram 45, Macatee to Secretary of State, 13 January 1948, 125.4916/1-1348; Telegram 31, Marshall (Loy Henderson) to Macatee, 14 January 1948, 125.4916/1-1348; and Telegram 59, Macatee to Secretary of State, 16 January 1948, 125.4916/1-1548; all Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Airgram A-274, Macatee to Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, FRUS 1947, V: 1326-1327. Memorandum “Reduction in Activities of Consulate General Jerusalem,” Henderson to Lovett, 12 January 1948, FW 125.4916/1-748, attached to Telegram, Lovett to Macatee, 23 January 1948, 125.4916/1-748; and Telegram 145, Macatee to Secretary of State, 6 February 1948, 125.4916/2-548; both Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Reduction in Activities…,” Henderson to Lovett, 12 January 1948, FW125.4916/1-748. Telegram 444, Thomas C. Wasson, U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem (John M. Bowie, Attaché, U.S. Consulate Jerusalem) to John Doerr, Division of Security, 17 April 1948, 125.4916/4-1648; Telegram 106, Marshall (Loy Henderson) to Macatee, 2 February 1948, 125.4916/2-548; Telegram 339, Macatee to Secretary of State, 22 March 1948, 125.4916/3-2248; all Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 144. Telegram 1233, James G. MacDonald, U.S. Special Representative to Israel, to Secretary of State, 28 August 1948, 125.4916/8-2848, Folder [5], Box 1340; Airgram A-106, MacDonald (William C. Burdett, Jr., Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate Jerusalem) to Secretary of State, 30 August 1948, 125.4916/8-3048, Folder [5], Box 1340; Telegram 275, McDonald, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, to Secretary of State, 12 April 1949, 124.67n6/4-1249, Folder [1], Box 1188; and Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey of the American Consulate General, Jerusalem,” William C. Burdett, Consul, U.S. Consulate Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, Folder [5], Box 1340, p. 10; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 93 “Difficulties in Securing Office Space, Facilities, and Personnel at Tel-Aviv,” Charles F. Knox, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Department of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248, Folder [1], Box 1188; Airgram
A-38, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 25 September 1948, 124.67n1/9-2548, Folder [2], Box 1187; and Telegram, McDonald to Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 24 February 1949, 124.67n1/2-2449, Folder [2], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

89 Memorandum “Physical Security Survey of the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv,” Eugene L. Padberg, Jr., Post Security Officer, 30 September 1949, p. 11, attached to Despatch “Physical Security Survey of the American Embassy, Tel Aviv,” Richard Ford, Chargé ad interim, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Secretary of State, 30 September 1949, 125.67n6/9-3049, Folder [1], Box 1188; Memorandum, Eugene F. McMahon, Post Security Officer, to Knox, 29 September 1948, enclosed with Despatch 70 “Transmission of a Security Report…,” McMahon to Secretary of State, 2 October 1948, 124.67n6/10-248, Folder [1], Box 1188; and Despatch 122 “Present Status of Physical Security of Mission,” John J. McMahon, Jr. Assistant Chief of Building Projects Branch, Foreign Buildings Office, to Secretary of State, 6 December 1948, 124.67n6/12-648, Folder [1], Box 1188; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

90 Airgram A-30, McDonald (McMahon), to Neal, Office of Security (SY), 13 September 1948, 124.67n6/9-1348, Folder [1], Box 1188; and Telegram 72, U.S. Mission Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 4 February 1949, 124.67n6/2-449, Folder [3], Box 1187; both DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 122 “Present Status Physical Security of Mission,” McMahon to Secretary of State, 6 December 1948, 124.67n6/12-648.

91 Telegram 437, McDonald to Secretary of State, 8 June 1948, 124.67n2/6-849, Folder [3], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 93 “Difficulties in Securing Office Space…,” Knox to Department of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248. “Physical Security Survey …Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949, p. 11.


93 Telegram 589, Macatee to Secretary of State, 10 December 1948, 125.4916/12-1047. Airgram A-274, Macatee to Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, *FRUS 1947*, V: 1327. Telegram 372, Marshall (Satterthwaite) to Wasson, 7 May 1948, 125.4916/5-348; and Telegram 568, Wasson to Secretary of State, 10 May 1948, 125.4916/5-1048; Telegram 528, Wasson to Secretary of State, 3 May 1948, 125.4916/5-348; and Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey … Jerusalem,” Burdett to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, p. 10.

94 Telegram 10, Knox to Secretary of State, 15 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-1548; Telegram 1036, Jefferson Patterson, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Cairo, to Secretary of State, 24 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-2448; Telegram 1130, McDonald to Secretary of State, 28 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-2848; all Folder [1], Box 1188, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 93 “Difficulties in Securing Office Space…,” Knox to Secretary of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248.

95 Telegram 257, Lovett to U.S. Mission Tel Aviv, 17 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-1748, Folder [4]; Telegram 32, McDonald to Neal, 11 January 1949, 124.67n3/11-1149, Folder [4]; and Telegram 232, McDonald to Secretary of State, 3 November 1948, 124.67n1/11-348, Folder [2]; all Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

96 Underlining in original. Airgram A-38, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 25 September 1948, 124.67n1/9-2548, Folder [2], Box 1187; and Telegram, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 24 February 1949, 124.67n1/2-2449; both DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


98 For post pleas for additional personnel, see Airgram A-50, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 31 October 1948, 124.67n3/10-1348, Folder [4], Box 1187; Telegram 341, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 28 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-2848, Folder [4], Box 1187; Airgram A-19, McDonald to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.67n3/1-1249, Folder [4], Box 1187; and Telegram 275, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 14 April 1949, 124.67n6/4-1249, Folder [1], Box 1188;
CHAPTER 3  CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For departmental denials, see Airgram A-34, Lovett to McDonald, 22 September 1948, 124.67n3/8-2248; and Airgram A-88, Lovett to McDonald, 23 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-648; both Folder [4], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. On this last denial, the Department authorized and promised to send a new secretary and a file clerk, but by September 1949, neither had arrived. See “Physical Security Survey…Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949, p. 11-12, 14-15.


100  Telegram 293, Burdett to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949, attached to Telegram 125, McDonald to Secretary of State, 15 February 1949, 125.4916/2-1549, Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. “Physical Security Survey…Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949, 124.67n6/9-3049. Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey of the American Consulate General, Jerusalem,” Burdett to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, Folder [5], Box 1340; Instruction, E. D. Lott to Macatee, 7 August 1947, 125.4916/8-747, Folder [5], Box 1340; and Airgram A-401, Acheson (John P. Mulligan) to U.S. Embassy Cairo, 9 July 1949, 124.836/7-949, Folder [3], Box 1209; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

101  Telegram 70, Ford, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Arthur R. Day, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 14 October 1949, 124.67n10-1449, Folder [1], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For U.S. civilians as guards and locals as night watchmen, see Airgram A-34, Lowell C. Pinkerton, U.S. Minister to Lebanon, to Secretary of State, 19 January 1948, 124.90e2/1-1948], Folder [2], Box 1214; Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard Facilities at American Embassy, New Delhi,” Howard Donovan, Counselor, U.S. Embassy New Delhi, 12 June 1948, enclosed with Despatch 674, Donovan to Secretary of State, 12 June 1948, 124.456/6-1248, Folder [2], Box 1079; and Airgram A-114, Wallace Murray, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, to Secretary of State, 21 May 1946, 124.912, Folder [3], Box 1224; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

102  For night watchmen, see “Guard Survey,” McEneaney, Embassy Security Officer, n.d., enclosed with Despatch 266 “Transmitting Guard Survey of the Chancery [Warsaw],” McEneaney to Department of State, 22 April 1948, 124.660c3/4-2248, Folder [4], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For local government providing guards, see Telegram A-151, Murray to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.913-2145; and Telegram 891, Murray to Secretary of State, 29 October 1945, 124.913/10-2945; both Folder [1], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows.

103  Telegram 346, James C. Dunn, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 26 January 1948, 124.653/1-2648, Folder [3], Box 1180, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Leo J. Daugherty III, “‘These Fine Smart Detachments’: A History of the United States Marine Corps and the Department of State, 1799-2004,” manuscript, Part 1, p. 137.

104  Telegram 457, Murray to Secretary of State, 5 July 1945, 124.913/7-545, Folder [1], Box 1225; Memorandum, Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, 10 January 1947, 124.655/1-1047, Folder [1], Box 1180; Telegram 457, Murray to Secretary of State, 5 July 1945, 124.913/7-545, Folder [1], Box 1225; and Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard Facilities of the Office of the Political Advisor for Germany, Berlin,” John F. Rieger, 5 December 1947, enclosed with Despatch 11460 “Transmittal of Security Survey at the Office of the Political Advisor on German Affairs,” Rieger[?] to Department of State, 18 December 1947, 124.626/12-1847, Folder [5], Box 1167; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Airgram A-243, Byrnes (Marshall S. Berry, Assistant to the Secretary of State) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 31 October 1945, 124.163/10-1945, Folder [4], Box 1014, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956. The case of Guard William Ellis at San Salvador was particularly ugly since embassy staff and the other guard demonstrated that Ellis had worked more than 50 hours per week for an extended period of time. The department ultimately granted him 9 days and 2 hours compensation but only after he had resigned. See Despatch 786 “Overtime asked by Guard William Ellis between February 12, 1945 and June 30, 1945,” John F. Simmons, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, to Department of State, 29 March 1946, 124.163/3-2946; Letter of Resignation, William E. Ellis to Secretary of State, 9 January 1946, 124.163/1-946; William E. DeCourcy, Chief of Division of Foreign Service Personnel, to Ellis, 23 April 1946, 124.163/2-1446; all three Folder [4], Box 1014, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For an example of drunkenness, see Despatch 310 “Thomas L. Been, FS-15 – Suspension,” Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 30 April 1948, 124.60f3/4.3048, Folder [4], Box 1151, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956. Telegram 36, Murphy to Secretary of State, 3 January 1947, 124.623/1-347, Folder [2], Box 1166; Telegram 649, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 23 April 1948, 124.60f3/4-2348, Folder [4], Box 1151; Telegram 203 “Assignment of American Guards to Legation at Beirut,” Bertel E. Kuniholm, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 20 July 1948, 124.90e3/7-2048, Folder [3], Box 1214; Telegram 1151, Dunn to Secretary of State, 16 March 1948, 124.653/3-1648, Folder [3], Box 1180; Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard Facilities at American Embassy, New Delhi,” Donovan, 12 June 1948, enclosed with Despatch 674, Donovan to Secretary of State, 12 June 1948, 124.456/6-1248, Folder [2], Box 1079; “Guard Survey,” McEneaney, Embassy Security Officer, n.d., enclosed with Despatch 266 “Transmitting Guard Survey of the Chancery [Warsaw],” McEneaney to Department of State, 22 April 1948, 124.60c3/4-2248, Folder [4], Box 1145; and Airgram A-2, Byrnes (Beall) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 3 January 1947, 124.253/12-646, Folder [5], Box 1035; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Daugherty, “These Fine Smart Detachments,” 139-140. Memorandum, Russell to Forrestal, 10 January 1947, 124.653/1-1047.

The Armed Forces were reorganized in 1947, but the Department of Defense did not emerge until 1949. Its immediate predecessor was the National Military Establishment.


House Committee on Armed Services, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic Missions Abroad, 38.


Airgram A-326, Acheson (R. Bright) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 22 December 1949, 124.913/12-2249, Folder [3], Box 1225; Airgram A-153, Acheson (G. E. Bland) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 28 February 1949, 124.60c3/2-2849, Folder [5], Box 1145; Telegram 88, Acheson (R. G. Brooks) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 1 December 1949, 124.163/11-1449, Folder [5], Box 1014; Airgram A-286, G. P. Shaw to Secretary of State, 16 November 1949, 124.163/11-1449, Folder [5], Box 1014; and Airgram A-91, Pinkerton to Secretary of State, 14 March 1949, 124.90e3/3-1449, Folder [3], Box 1214; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Despatch 116 “Assignment of Marine Guards to Posts within Security Region II, Middle East and Africa,” Rollin H. White to Department of State, 30 January 1950, 121.1/1-3050; Airgram A-54, Webb (G. W. Rose) to U.S. Embassy Jidda, 26 October 1951, 121.1/10-2651; Despatch 998 “Security: Uniforms and Arms for Marine Guards,” Jacob D. Beam, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Department of State, 23 April 1952, 121.1/4-2352; all Folder [1], Box 543, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA.


Foreign Service Serial No. 768 “Transmission via Diplomatic Pouch of State, War, and Navy Material,” Department of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 25 September 1947, Box 142, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for Security Control, Security Advisory Board, RG 353-Entry 540, NA.

Memorandum “Operation of the 604 Procedure at Cairo,” Harris Ball to Rollie White, Regional Security Supervisor, 24 December 1949, Box 500, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA.

One was a Special Agent, and another was Robert Freeman, who represented the Foreign Service Institute.  Freeman had worked for Bannerman in the Security Office and helped to develop the overseas security program.  Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, [No Folder], Box 13, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, p. 113.


The Division of Security (SY) no sooner had gained its organizational structure than Joseph McCarthy, the junior Senator from Wisconsin, asserted that Communists had infiltrated the Department of State. Behind McCarthy’s February 1950 charges and the support he received was the Republicans’ anger over the Truman Administration’s handling of the intensifying Cold War and domestic loyalty issues. During 1949, China fell to the Communists, and the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb; meanwhile, in early 1950 new revelations emerged about Soviet espionage in the United States.

McCarthy’s accusations triggered a series of events that defined the Division of Security’s course for the next decade. Three consequences resulted from McCarthy’s charges. First, as Congressional committees called several current and former Department of State officers and advisers to testify and answer charges about their loyalty, the Department redoubled its efforts on background investigations of employees. Second, one Department official’s reluctant admission inadvertently triggered a purge of homosexuals from the Department. Third, a Congressional subcommittee studied physical security at U.S. posts overseas, and the subcommittee’s highly favorable report led to increased resources for SY and overseas security.

While McCarthy focused public and Congressional attention on Department personnel, U.S. Government officials increasingly worried about the potential threats posed by basic diplomatic customs. U.S. officials feared that the Soviets and their allies might exploit diplomatic immunities in order to undertake espionage or gain an advantage over the United States. The Department of State and other federal agencies reexamined many diplomatic practices, including the routes of foreign couriers and the contents of diplomatic baggage. U.S. officials worried that Soviet Bloc diplomats would acquire advanced U.S. technology and gather public information about the United States and its facilities, information that U.S. officials could not reciprocally obtain in the Soviet Union. As the decade of the 1950s drew to a close, Cold War diplomatic security concerns were pervading all aspects of diplomatic practice, and in the process, SY became entrenched as a necessary office in the Department.
McCarthy’s Charges

On February 9, 1950, fears that Communists had penetrated the U.S. Government crystallized when Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) announced that he possessed a list of 205 members of the Communist Party who were “working and shaping policy” in the Department of State. Speaking before the Ohio County Women’s Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy accused Alger Hiss of having “sold out the Nation” and revived old charges against John Stewart Service, who had been arrested in the Amerasia case. Linking both men to the fall of China to the Communists, McCarthy said that although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had arrested Service for passing “secret State Department information” to the Communists, Service had not been dismissed from the Department. Instead, the Department of State named Service as the next U.S. Consul General in Calcutta, which McCarthy described as “the most important listening post in the Far East.” (McCarthy omitted the fact that a grand jury had unanimously rejected an indictment against Service.)

McCarthy continued to level his accusations in a series of speeches, but the number of Communists in the Department of State often changed. On February 10, in Salt Lake City, he declared that “57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party” worked in the Department, an accusation he repeated in Reno on February 11. Also on that day, McCarthy sent a telegram to President Truman, citing the 57 Communists (whom he did not name), and demanded that Truman address the issue or risk having the Democratic Party labeled as a “bedfellow of International Communism.” Then on February 20, on the Senate floor, McCarthy declared that there were “81 loyalty risks” in the Department of State, and proceeded to describe each case.

McCarthy’s numbers—205, 57, and 81—were inconsistent, but not fictitious. The numbers were derived from testimony by Department of State officials and Division of Security files. An SY memorandum admitted in April that the “81” figure that McCarthy presented to the Senate was drawn from the “108 Cases,” which had been derived from SY files by a team of House of Representatives researchers in 1947. That group found 108 employees of questionable loyalty working for the Department. The “57” figure was
also from the 108 cases; Deputy Under Secretary for Administration John E. Peurifoy had testified to Congress in March 1948 that 57 of the 108 still worked for the Department. The number “205” was also derived from SY figures. In 1946, Robert L. Bannerman’s Security Office and the Department’s Screening Committee had flagged 284 “security risks.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reported this to Congress in July 1946, noting that the Department had dismissed 79 of the 284, leaving 205 possible risks. As the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations emphasized, McCarthy’s “information was beyond all reasonable doubt…a ‘dressed up’ version of material” previously presented to Congress. Yet McCarthy had so effectively re-packaged the numbers that it was several weeks before Department of State officials determined their origins. By then, the Department and several prominent Foreign Service Officers were on the defensive, trying to prove their innocence. As McCarthy asserted, “I don’t answer accusations. I make them.”

The context, not the accuracy of his numbers, gave McCarthy’s charges traction and credibility. In late 1949, six months before McCarthy’s speech at Wheeling, China fell to Mao Zedong’s Communist forces. Also, in the autumn of 1949, the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb, several years ahead of what U.S. officials anticipated. Alger Hiss’s libel suit against Whittaker Chambers had evolved into a trial over whether Hiss committed perjury. Two weeks before McCarthy’s speech, a jury convicted Hiss of the perjury charge. Also, on February 11—the same day that McCarthy wired Truman—U.S. newspapers reported that Manhattan Project scientist Klaus Fuchs had confessed to leaking atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets. McCarthy’s charges connected the “loss” of China and the Soviet atomic bomb with “subversion” in the Department of State, giving his accusations credibility despite the ever-changing numbers.

The first consequence of McCarthy’s accusations, which received extensive press coverage, was Senate Resolution 231. On February 22, two days after McCarthy offered an extended exposition on each of the 81 “security risk” cases, the Senate resolved to create a subcommittee that would “conduct a full and complete study and investigation as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been, employed by the Department of State.” Department of State principals traveled to Capitol Hill to rebut McCarthy’s charges. Secretary Acheson and Deputy Under Secretary Peurifoy explained how an individual was determined to be a...
“security risk,” the process of removing security risks from the Department, and the effects of the 1946 McCarran Rider. They noted that the Department had dismissed 202 individuals deemed to be security risks since 1947. Chief of the Division of Security Donald L. Nicholson also testified before Congress, and thoroughly described the process for determining the loyalty and security risk of each Department of State employee and applicant. Nicholson supplemented his testimony with charts that graphically detailed all of the processes.

Despite his charges, McCarthy faced initial embarrassments. In a Senate Committee meeting on March 8, McCarthy referred to Case #14 of the 81 cases, and said the person was a security risk.
because he was “a flagrant homosexual.” Committee chair Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) asked McCarthy to name the person, knowing full well that Case #14 was Joseph Panuch, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, and that McCarthy had praised Panuch’s work just two weeks earlier. McCarthy stammered, the Committee descended into partisan arguing, and the meeting ended. McCarthy then raised the accusation of “Red” against Dorothy Kenyon, an honorary delegate to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, but this proved to be a bad choice. Kenyon conducted herself extremely well before the Committee, and McCarthy did not even show up for the hearing. McCarthy then took aim at Ambassador-at-Large Phillip C. Jessup, and this also proved embarrassing. Jessup, a highly respected diplomat, showed up with two letters testifying to his anti-Communism and loyalty to the United States—one from former Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and one from General Dwight D. Eisenhower.10

Despite the initial embarrassments, McCarthy benefitted from the Korean War and the discovery of further Soviet espionage. On June 24, the North Koreans crossed the demarcation line, starting the Korean War, and indirectly resurrected the “loss” of China issue in U.S. politics. The war led to the implementation of National Security Council Report NSC-68, written largely by Paul Nitze. NSC-68 cast the U.S.-Soviet struggle as “a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin.” NSC-68 also asserted that the Kremlin would use “whatever means are expedient” in its effort “to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war.” In addition, Klaus Fuchs’s confession and subsequent cooperation enabled the FBI to uncover other Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project. Fuchs led the FBI to his handler, Harry Gold, who in turn incriminated Sergeant David Greenglass and his wife. The Greenglasses, in turn, led the FBI to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Gold and the Greenglasses cooperated with the FBI, but the Rosenbergs did not and were arrested in the summer of 1950. While Korea revived the “Who lost China?” debate, the Fuchs-Gold-Greenglass-Rosenberg revelations explained how the Soviets had attained the atomic bomb so quickly.11

McCarthy continued to level accusations at Department of State employees, but not all of those he accused were as able as Kenyon and Jessup in countering his charges. McCarthy accused Gustavo Duran of having “rabid Communist beliefs” and taking part in “secret Soviet operations in the Spanish Republican Army.” A Spaniard, Duran had fought for the Spanish Republican Army during the Spanish

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Figure 5: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The arrest, conviction, and execution of the Rosenbergs for treason (giving government secrets to the Soviets) helped to lend credibility to McCarthy’s charges against the Department of State. Source: © Associated Press.
Civil War (1936-39) before becoming a U.S. citizen. He had worked for the Department from 1943 to 1946, but had moved to the United Nations Survey, Research, and Development Branch. Duran discredited each of McCarthy’s charges in a letter to Committee Chairman Tydings, and showed that some accusations were drawn from Spanish government propaganda, written to punish Spanish Republicans for exposing Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s connections to the Nazis. It took five years for Duran to clear his name.12

McCarthy accused eminent Asian scholar and Department of State and United Nations adviser Owen Lattimore of being “the top espionage agent in the United States, the boss of Alger Hiss.” Lattimore initially rebutted McCarthy’s charges, but McCarthy and his staff, which included Roy Cohn, pursued the case. They employed false documents, a fraudulent affidavit, and false witnesses. McCarthy even leaked one witness’s testimony to the press before the man gave it, so that the claims would appear in the newspapers before they were easily disproved. The Senator also brought forward an ex-Communist informant, who during 3,000 hours of questioning by the FBI did not once mention Lattimore, but now, before the Senate Committee, he suddenly remembered that Lattimore was an important Soviet operative.13

Behind the accusations was the “Who lost China?” debate. Lattimore, John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent were members of the “China hands,” who had opposed U.S. policy supporting Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. The anger over the loss of China was soon directed against former Secretary of State Marshall, whom McCarthy accused of aiding the policy of Stalin and the Soviet Union, but most Republicans quickly rejected the accusations against Marshall. Chaired by Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV), the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) investigated charges in 1951 and 1952 that Communists were trying to influence U.S. foreign policy. The SISS’s final report concluded that the Department of State had “lost” China, Lattimore was “a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy,” and Vincent and Lattimore were “influential” in altering U.S. policy in 1945 in directions that aided Mao and the Chinese Communists. Vincent was forced out of the Department. Lattimore was indicted for perjury, and 3 years later, when the charges were dismissed, accepted a professorship at Leeds University in England. Service faced a grand jury that voted unanimously against indicting him for leaking classified documents to Amerasia, and he endured loyalty investigations in 1946, 1947, and 1949 which cleared him each time. In 1951, the Loyalty Review Board determined that Service was a security risk, and he was subsequently dismissed from the Department. Of the three, only Vincent had been on McCarthy’s list of 81 security risks.14

Even though a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report accused McCarthy of twisting, misrepresenting, and mischaracterizing information in case files, his charges precipitated an inquiry into who were the security risks in the Department of State, not whether there were security risks. In September 1952, Senator Hiram Bingham, chair of the President’s Loyalty Review Board, declared that the Department had “the worst record of any department” regarding employee loyalty investigations.15 Bingham justified his allegation by pointing to the fact that during his tenure on the Board, the Department of State had found no employees to be disloyal.
Already aware of the allegation, the Department countered that it had found no disloyal employees because it had already implemented a stringent screening system that caught disloyal potential employees before they were hired. In truth, the Department, under heavy scrutiny since the 1945 Amerasia revelations, had begun screening and dismissing employees and applicants two years before President Truman set up the loyalty boards for the executive branch. Amid the height of McCarthy’s power and credibility, however, the litmus test for any loyalty program was its propensity to unearth “communist” infiltrators, not its competence in screening and rejecting potentially disloyal employees through a screening process. The Division of Security attempted to point this out and to explain its effective screening program, but at the time, this reassured neither Congress nor the American public.16

By 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became President, McCarthy had turned his attention and efforts away from the Department of State and toward the U.S. Army. An armistice was declared in Korea, and the Rosenbergs, who were found guilty of treason in March 1951, were executed in June 1953. By 1954, anti-Communist hysteria had abated slightly, and the Senate condemned McCarthy. One lasting result of the experience was that investigations and evaluations were entrenched as key components of the Department’s security program.17
The second consequence of McCarthy’s accusations was a purge of homosexuals from the Department of State. On February 28, 1950, in testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration John Peurifoy tried to avoid discussing the subject of homosexuals. While replying to a question on dismissals, Peurifoy noted that 91 employees in the “shady category” had been dismissed since January 1, 1947. When pressed to define this category, Peurifoy alluded to “moral weakness.” He seemed too hesitant to offer specifics, and the number of dismissals was too large for the matter to be easily dropped. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) pressed Peurifoy further, and the Deputy Under Secretary finally admitted that the category referred to homosexuals.18

The Department was already on the defensive from McCarthy’s accusations, but Peurifoy’s admission that gays and lesbians were among the Department’s workforce doubled its difficulties. During the 1950s, gays and lesbians were viewed as having questionable morals; moreover, revelations of homosexuals in the Department encouraged unfavorable stereotypes of diplomats as “cookie pushers in striped pants” and effete graduates of elite Eastern schools. The Department tried to counter perceptions that Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Department employees were “pinks, snobs, and worse,” but such efforts proved largely ineffective. For the next few years, suspected homosexuals were purged from the Department’s ranks, sometimes on spurious evidence, because many conflated what they viewed as questionable morals with Communist tendencies, or feared that such people would be more vulnerable to Communist pressures.19

In 1950, the Department’s Office of Personnel warned Samuel D. Boykin, Director of the Office of Controls, to make “every effort...to prevent the [Foreign] Service from getting the impression that the Department is conducting a ‘witch hunt’” for homosexual employees. However, SY statistics reveal the extent of the purge. The Department fired 54 people it considered to be homosexuals in 1950, 119 in 1951, and 134 in 1952. The figures dwarf the number of dismissals for more
straightforward security concerns during the same years: 12 in 1950, 35 in 1951, and 70 in 1952. The trend continued, as 74 of the Department’s 107 dismissals resulted from homosexuality alone in the first months of 1953.20

The Department insisted that its decision to classify gays and lesbians as extreme security risks was made “entirely apart from any moral judgment.” Department officials said that “such individuals are susceptible to blackmail and are exposed to other pressures because of the highly unconventional character of their personal relationships.” Even those perceived as homosexual were deemed security risks. The Office of Personnel believed that “latent tendencies can remain dormant for long periods of time – and then break through the surface without prior warning.” This belief, in essence, demanded that SY be more aware of an individual’s personal tendencies and potential future behavior than the individual was.21

SY created the “M” (Miscellaneous) Unit to investigate charges of homosexuality. The M Unit consulted police and vice squad records, and briefed chiefs of mission on how to recognize homosexuality. Staffed by two full-time agents and several part-time staff, the M Unit primarily used personal interviews and an occasional polygraph test (legal at the Department since 1950). In 1953, the M Unit claimed responsibility for 99 separations, and eliminated 27 employees in the first quarter of 1954.22

Department officials promised that they would only investigate individuals suspected of homosexuality after a strong case had been developed against them, but many findings were based on highly subjective information. Security instructions required the M Unit to interview all male applicants and note “any unusual traits of speech, appearance or mannerisms” that might indicate sexual deviance. The mere act of frequenting a restaurant or bar known to be frequented by gays and lesbians, or of associating with known homosexuals, was enough to demand a more thorough investigation. One SY official argued that a close review of the ranks was necessary, due to the inadequate investigations and higher levels of tolerance toward homosexuality during the war. As one veteran courier recalled, during the McCarthy Era, “everyone was presumed to be a little light on his feet until proved otherwise.”23

Department employees began to accuse their colleagues of being gay or lesbian--sometimes anonymously--and the flimsiest of claims could lead to investigations. For example, one female employee accused her supervisor of lesbian tendencies based upon her physical appearance, and the fact that her lunch companions included a woman with “a mannish voice” and another woman who seemed “peculiar.” When SY interviewed the accuser, the only corroborating evidence she could muster was that her supervisor gave her “a nauseous feeling.” When pressed, the employee confessed, “she really had nothing factual” to offer, it was merely “a suspicion.” Having identified one potential homosexual security risk, the employee soon implicated dozens more, basing her accusations on little other than her “feminine intuition,” as well as “the effeminate mannerisms of hand” and the “jelly hand shake” of some male colleagues. Although no record of SY’s findings on the female employee’s accusations was found, her “evidence” was far from credible. It
was learned that her supervisor (whom she accused of lesbianism) had placed the employee on 90-days probation for unsatisfactory job performance. The fact that the employee could press her accusations so far, and that SY dedicated time investigating them, is indicative of the atmosphere in the Department.\textsuperscript{24}

SY also investigated individuals who fell under the broader category of exhibiting “moral turpitude,” “weaknesses of character,” or “immorality.” The Civil Service Commission insisted that such persons did not merit holding “positions of public trust.” In a letter addressed to the U.S. Senate and SY, one anonymous writer claimed to have discovered “a situation among government employees” that was “worse than homosexuality,” and “part of the communist plot to crack American home morale.” The accuser contended that one Department of State employee had carried on an affair with her superior, broken up his marriage, then filed a claim against her paramour and gone on to carry out liaisons with other married men in London and New York.\textsuperscript{25} The Office of Security even debated how to classify an unwed mother, and whether she should be considered a security risk based on the “immorality” of her condition. Otto Otepka, SY’s Chief of Evaluations, argued that such situations did not warrant any attention. If determined to be security risks, he wrote, pregnant women would tarnish the image of the Department’s security apparatus by making it appear “as a court of last resort to pass on the public morals.” The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) R. W. Scott McLeod disagreed. If left unaddressed, he said, the issue of the uninvestigated, unwed mother might elicit “public criticism...that we were not adhering to the laws of society which have been in effect since time immemorial.” McLeod insisted that each case of single motherhood or other moral infractions be investigated and judged on its own merits.\textsuperscript{26}
The third consequence of McCarthy’s charges against the Department was a greater emphasis upon security at U.S. posts overseas. The Senate subcommittee formed in February 1950 to investigate loyalty and security risks in the Department of State created the Subcommittee of Two. Consisting of Senators Theodore F. Green (D-RI) and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-MA), the Subcommittee of Two was tasked with examining “the practical operations, enforcement, and day-to-day policing of the security program.”

Senators Green and Lodge conducted the first Congressional study of overseas physical security and travelled overseas to inspect select posts. The Senators took their task seriously; in fact, Senator Green took “an extremely keen personal interest in the security program.” Green and Lodge interviewed every leading officer and division head in SY, several agents in the Washington and New York Field Offices, and most Regional Security Officers in Europe and the Middle East. The Senators flew to Paris and Bonn to meet with RSOs, and SY brought in RSOs from Cairo to meet with the Senators. Green and Lodge also dined with the U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy, and discussed security concerns at U.S. posts in occupied Germany. Green and Lodge completed their research within 5 weeks, submitting their report to Congress and the press on June 15, 1950.

Green and Lodge returned most favorably impressed with the Division of Security, its overseas security program, and particularly Regional Security Officers. They recommended expanding SY, and increasing its resources and personnel to prevent Communist infiltration and espionage at U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. Green and Lodge also requested that the Department give the Division of Security a higher profile: namely, SY should report directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, instead of the Director of the Office of Controls. They asserted that given the “increasing importance of security,” the requirement of having SY report to an official who answered directly to the
Secretary would provide “first hand encouragement from the top,” and “this is where [SY] belongs.” The Senators also advocated placing a trained, professional security officer at every major U.S. diplomatic post overseas, expanding the Marine Security Guard program by 200 Marines, and increasing the staff at the Washington and New York Field Offices. Green and Lodge further proposed increasing the number of RSOs so that the RSOs could conduct more post security inspections and make additional follow up visits. The Senators also cited the security risks that local national employees presented to U.S. posts. Noting that the Soviets did not rely on local national employees at their embassies, Green and Lodge suggested that the Department replace all local nationals with U.S. citizens.

Implicitly contained in the two Senators’ recommendations was a vision of a radically larger, more prominent Division of Security than the Department, or even SY leaders imagined. Had the Department enacted Green and Lodge’s recommendations in their entirety in 1950, it would have expanded SY to a Bureau of Security that reported directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State. In their report, Lodge and Green envisioned Marine Security Guards at every embassy, and full-time security officers at most posts. (Their numbers were estimates of what they anticipated it would take to achieve this.) Expanded Regional Security Offices would have conducted and implemented regular security inspections and upgrades, with a technical security cohort working to defend posts against technical espionage and to maintain continued U.S. technological superiority in countermeasures.

Department officials grasped neither the magnitude of what Lodge and Green recommended nor the depth of the Senators’ enthusiasm and commitment to the improvement of SY and overseas security. They overlooked how supportive Green and Lodge were of the Division of Security and its efforts, and did not recognize that Green and Lodge were willing to add the positions and money needed to implement their proposals. In August 1950, two
months after the report’s release, Senator Lodge told Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Carlisle H. Humelsine that he was “a trifle put out” that the Department had failed to implement the report’s recommendations. Humelsine admitted that he had to do some quick talking to satisfy the Senator. As an immediate step, Humelsine offered to change his title to Deputy Under Secretary for Security and Administration, and change the name of the Office of Consular Affairs to the Office of Security and Consular Affairs. Lodge was pleased; however, Humelsine only changed the name of the office, not his title. Department officials, instead, fixated on one recommendation, which they found to be nearly impossible to implement: replacing all FSNs with U.S. citizen employees. SY and Consular Affairs drew up a 24-page study on why replacing FSNs with U.S. citizens could not be done.  

Lodge’s admonishment of Humelsine prodded the Bureau of Administration and the Division of Security to act on the Senators’ report, albeit not on the scale that the Senators had recommended. After his meeting with Lodge, Humelsine asked Boykin for a presentation detailing how the Department was going to address each recommendation for Senator Lodge, either before the current Congressional session ended or, at the latest, by the start of the new session in January 1951. SY sent the presentation to Humelsine on February 21, 1951, and in it, SY officials requested an additional 47 people, and $405,000. Congress, however, had already appropriated an advanced authorization of $193,000, allowing SY to hire another 42 people, and the Department had obtained 300 more Marine Security Guards from the Pentagon.  

Green and Lodge recognized that the Department had not grasped their earnest support for improving security and had been sidetracked by their suggestion to replace local nationals. In April 1951, they sent Humelsine a letter, restating their recommendations and re-emphasizing their desire to provide more training to security officers and increase the number of RSOs and Special Agents. Green and Lodge notably pushed
replacing local nationals with U.S. citizens to the very bottom of their recommendations, qualifying it with the phrase “insofar as possible.” Upon receipt, Humelsine went down the rearranged recommendations list and noted on one-third of them that the Department lacked the funds to implement them. Humelsine seemed to view the recommendations as “faults,” and did not recognize nor take advantage of the Senators’ support for and willingness to provide additional funding.32

A year after the release of Lodge-Green Report, Humelsine thanked the two Senators for their support of the Department’s security program, and to an extent, Humelsine’s “thank you note” was needed. The two Senators had added nearly 100 people to the Division of Security, increasing it by nearly 50 percent, and provided supplemental appropriations that funded numerous security improvements at posts across the world. Green and Lodge greatly expanded the overseas security program, entrenching it as a “pillar” of SY.33

Division to Office

The attention that McCarthy drew to employee security at the Department and the efforts of Senators Green and Lodge to improve overseas security led to the elevation of the Division of Security to an Office. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, also called the McCarran-Walter Act, denied entrance to and called for the deportation of immigrants and naturalized citizens engaged in “subversive activities,” primarily current or former Communist Party members and sympathizers. The McCarran-Walter Act gave expanded powers to the Visa and Passport divisions, elevated them to offices, and raised the Office of Consular Affairs to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.34 The changes, the Act’s many references to security, and attention to Departmental security provided SY strong backing for its request to be raised to office level. When Samuel Boykin, head of the Office of Consular Affairs, recommended elevating SY, Humelsine agreed. On December 23, 1952, the Department established the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), and appointed Boykin as Acting Director.35
Figure 13: Organizational chart for the Office of Security, ca. 1952. Headed by John W. Ford, SY in 1952 spent most of its effort upon investigations and evaluations; and Senator Joseph McCarthy's charges placed further pressure upon SY to conduct more thorough background investigations. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
While Green and Lodge pressed the Department to improve overseas security, the discovery of the Great Seal “bug” brought technical security at U.S. posts to the forefront. In their report, Green and Lodge were confident that the United States had not been surpassed in listening device technology. Although bugs had been found in U.S. Embassies in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s, none had been found in Moscow since World War II. Long-time diplomat George F. Kennan noted, “We had long since taught ourselves to assume that in Moscow most walls – at least in rooms that diplomats were apt to frequent – had ears.”

U.S. suspicions increased in the fall of 1951, when a British military officer overheard a conversation between two British diplomats in another room of the British Embassy on his radio receiver. A U.S. military officer had the same experience at the U.S. Embassy. Upon investigation, neither British technical security nor SY’s technical security team of Joseph Bezjian and John W. Ford found anything. In early 1952, the U.S. Embassy used Soviet workers to remodel Spaso House (the Ambassador’s residence) for the new Ambassador, George Kennan, who believed that this remodeling provided the Soviets with an opportunity to plant listening devices; however, several technical security inspections found nothing.

Joseph Bezjian returned to the Moscow Embassy in September 1952 to conduct a more extensive search for listening devices. Bezjian, fondly nicknamed “the Rug Merchant,” was one of three SO(T)s assigned to the Regional Security Office in Paris under the direction of Alex Prengel (the other two SO(T)s were Fred C. Snider and Hillman “Hank” S. Ford). Believing that the Soviets had removed the bugs before the previous technical teams had arrived, Bezjian had his equipment shipped in separately, and posed as a “house guest” for 3 days. On September 12, in a pre-arranged plan with Ambassador Kennan, Bezjian listened for a signal frequency as Kennan dictated from a previously sent unclassified despatch, printed in a volume of the Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States series. Hearing a signal, Bezjian went to the Ambassador’s study, and isolated the bug in a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States.
States, which had been presented to the Ambassador several years earlier as a gift from the Soviet people. The carving consisted of front and back pieces sealed together by plaster. Bezjian opened the carving and discovered a listening device known as a cavity resonator. Operating on a principle similar to a soprano singing a high pitch and breaking a glass, human voices activate the cavity resonator, and the resonator then transmits the voices on a radio frequency. Bezjian removed the cavity resonator from the Great Seal, and that night, he slept with it under his pillow (to prevent theft), then shipped it to Washington the next day. Secretary Acheson showed the device to President Truman, who then directed the Naval Research Laboratory to develop equipment for detecting cavity resonators.39

The Great Seal’s cavity resonator was not new technology, and in this sense, Senators Green and Lodge were correct when they said that U.S. technology had not been surpassed. However, Western technical security officers had not yet seen cavity resonators employed as espionage devices. Also, the cavity resonator required no electrical current, and therefore no wires. It also did not contain any ferrous materials, and therefore had eluded metal detectors. Bezjian actually found two cavities in the Great Seal. The smaller cavity held the resonator, while the larger cavity, the FBI later determined, had previously housed an older, battery-powered listening device.40

Security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow increased after discovery of the Great Seal bug, but the effectiveness of the increase was probably limited. Shortly afterwards, Kennan was declared persona non grata. When Ambassador Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen arrived, he demanded that Sergei, the Soviet caretaker of Spaso House, give him a key to his (Sergei’s) apartment. After several weeks, Sergei gave Bohlen the key (it is unclear why U.S. officials allowed Sergei to take so long). Embassy officers found an empty room when they opened the apartment, but it was later determined that Sergei had “helped to organize the bugging of the embassy” from his apartment since the 1930s. In early 1953, the top two floors of the chancery were renovated. Although the now-suspicious U.S. officials posted guards on Soviet workers during the day, Bohlen confessed that they did not post a night watch out of “carelessness and to save money.” Discoveries of technical penetration in Eastern bloc nations continued. This led SY officials to believe there were more bugs in the Moscow Embassy, but they continued to find none.41

Adjusting the Marine Security Guard Program

Even though the Department of State and the Marine Corps initially anticipated that the Marines’ guard duty at U.S. posts overseas would be temporary, the Marine Security Guard (MSG) program instead had expanded rapidly. The Lodge-
Green Report, as well as the 1950 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, required the Department to increase the number of Marine guards at its missions with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Asia and the expanding number of military attachés across the world prompted additional demands for Marine guards, largely because overseas military attachés and officials were generating significant amounts of classified documents. By the end of 1953, the initial assignment of 300 Marines had more than doubled, to 676.42

As the program expanded, the MSG program suffered a number of “kinks.” Doubts about the Marines’ diplomatic immunity arose, but the Department determined that Marine guards merited the same immunity as the Ambassador and other post members. SY recognized that Marine Security Guards might have to handle Top Secret material during security violations, and soon upgraded the Marines’ security clearance to that level.43 Worried that discipline would decline among the Marines, the Marine Corps created four regional Officers in Charge to oversee them, locating the regional centers in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, and Manila. The Department found that some posts used the Marine guards improperly. After an inspection of the Embassy in Paris, Department inspectors advised cutting the Marine Security Guard detail by 19 men because Embassy officers were using them for messengers, couriers, auto pool drivers, and receptionists.44

Despite the benefits that all sides appreciated, the MSG program almost did not survive. Administration of the program was initially scattered across several Department offices, including the Offices of Personnel and Security, and no office wanted full responsibility for it. When Department officials met in 1951 to discuss how to improve the program’s management, the Division of Security was “convinced” that it should not “handle the administrative details.” SY reluctantly accepted the responsibility “for the sake of the program.”45

Another reason for the MSG program’s near-disbanding emerged 3 years later, when the Department of State, and SY in particular, expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of training that the Marines were receiving for guard duty. In 1954, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Thruston Morton told the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the training of Marine Security Guards “leaves much to be desired.” SY’s Physical Security division proposed adding an on-the-job component, which would be conducted at the Department of State’s main building (Main State) in order to improve training. Commandant General Lemuel Shepherd dismissed on-the-job training as “impracticable,” but promised to revise the training program. Under Secretary of State for Administration Charles K. Saltzman, Morton’s superior, then sought to “clarify” Morton’s letter. He described the Marines’ training as “inadequate” and insisted upon including an on-the-job component in the training.46

Apparently, the Marine Corps’ response was not what the Office of Security and the Bureau of Administration had hoped, and in early 1956, SY and SCA gave serious consideration to switching back to civilian guards. Ultimately, the Department’s decision turned on the fact that the Marine Corps was absorbing part of the program’s cost. An SY memorandum extensively comparing civilian and Marine guard programs suggests that had costs been more equal, the Department might have reverted to civilian guards.47
The Department of State's explicit dissatisfaction with MSG training led to revisions to the training program in 1956. An on-the-job component was added, and the first Marine Security Guard Handbook was developed. Only single men were chosen to attend the Marine Security Guard School at Company F Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Upon arrival, Marine Corps and SY officers screened each candidate for “suitability.” Candidates were given four weeks of intensive training, with courses on Foreign Service organization and regulations, “Communist methods and techniques,” protection of dignitaries, international conferences, counterterrorism, U.S. history, “cranks and emergencies,” and etiquette (including table manners and seating arrangements). A comprehensive written examination followed, then a second screening of the candidates. The on-the-job component followed. Candidates manned shifts as guards-in-training (under supervision) at the Department of State’s main building, enabling instructors to disqualify unsuitable candidates and provide a “better security trained” guard for the field. The rigorous training program had a 25 to 30 percent disqualification rate. By 1956, there were over 730 Marine Security Guards, at more than 90 U.S. missions around the world.48

“Getting Tough” under McLeod

In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the Presidency with a commitment to achieving greater security in the federal government. During the campaign, he had vowed to deal directly and expediently with the issue of employee loyalty, and to this end, Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450 on April 27, 1953. The order stated that affirming loyalty to the United States was not sufficient in itself to qualify a candidate as suitable for federal employment. The federal government’s loyalty program now required that “all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character,” and they should demonstrate an “unswerving loyalty to the United States.” E.O. 10450 opened all government employees for re-investigation, not just those who had committed a security breach. It also appeared to expand the grounds upon which an individual could be disqualified for government service, but, in truth, it summarized the developments in loyalty and security investigations that had occurred since 1950, namely allowing the inclusion of “character” as a disqualifier.49
The Eisenhower Administration named R. W. Scott McLeod to head the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in March 1953. A political appointee from the staff of Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), McLeod had served as an FBI agent from 1942 to 1949. He was also a confidant of Senator McCarthy, and kept an autographed picture of him on his desk.

The new SCA Administrator immediately drew attention to his efforts by announcing publicly that he had fired 16 “moral deviates [sic]” and 5 “security risks” just 10 days after taking office. McLeod’s announcement gave the impression that the Truman Administration had been protecting some employees while the Eisenhower Administration was “getting tough” with such security risks.

Under McLeod, the process of investigations and evaluations operated much the same as it had for the past eight years. Security reports flowed into SY from the FBI and other agencies. Based on these reports and its own investigative work, SY had the final authority to reject prospective Department employees by refusing or withdrawing security clearances. Yet SY did not have the power to terminate for disloyalty or unethical security practices persons who were already employed. The Loyalty Security Board, which functioned outside of SY, continued to hold the authority to terminate employees under the President’s Loyalty Program.

The new approach to security risks, as defined by E.O. 10450 and pursued by McLeod, allowed the Department of State to redeem itself in the public eye. Statistics from McLeod’s tenure as Administrator of SCA give the impression that the Department of State implemented a more effective security and loyalty evaluation program than it had previously.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that 306 employees had been separated from the Department for security reasons between January 20 (when Eisenhower took office) and September 30, 1953. Of that total, 147 Department employees were terminated after E.O. 10450 went into effect. Although E.O. 10450 did not technically apply to foreign nationals employed by U.S. posts overseas, 178 FSNs were also dismissed for security concerns.  

Not everyone in the Eisenhower Administration or the Department of State embraced McLeod’s enthusiasm. Less than a month after McLeod assumed leadership of SCA, McLeod, Senator McCarthy, and Senator Bridges clashed with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles over the nomination of Charles Bohlen as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. McLeod brought forward that Bohlen had “close associations with three State Department employees suspected of homosexuality,” one of whom was Bohlen’s brother-in-law Charles Thayer. Eisenhower strongly supported Bohlen’s nomination, and McLeod threatened to resign when the White House refused to withdraw the nomination. Dulles worried that McLeod would testify on television before the Senate committee, and McCarthy had approached McLeod about doing so, hence Dulles tried to smooth things over. Republican Senator Robert Taft read Bohlen’s file, but rejected the charge of “security risk.” The Senate confirmed Bohlen, and Dulles promised the Senate that the Department would keep a close watch on McLeod.  

The Office of Security came under heavy scrutiny again in early 1953 when John C. Montgomery, the Desk Officer for Finland, was found dead at his Georgetown home. Although the police determined Montgomery had committed suicide, circumstances surrounding his death remained mysterious. When the Department admitted that Montgomery suffered from mental and emotional instability, Congressman Fred E. Busbey of Illinois initiated hearings into the administrative practices, employee investigations, and personnel policies of the Department. SY Director John W. Ford and SCA Administrator McLeod testified at Busbey’s behest. Ford admitted that the full field investigation standard, implemented in 1948, had not reached its full working capacity until January 1953, and that the Department’s investigative unit was under pressure to complete a large number of cases. SY encouraged quick investigations, and it was customary for investigators to perform only
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a spot check on those at a GS-5 equivalent or below. Ford’s admissions raised a furor on Capitol Hill, and cost him his job (he was reassigned as Regional Security Officer for Central America). McLeod meanwhile was instructed to centralize the filing system for investigations and impose tighter control over all SY operations.\(^4\)

**Embassy Security and Reorganizing SY**

When Dennis Flinn replaced Ford as Director of SY in October 1953, he pressed for a greater emphasis on overseas security. Formerly a Deputy Director of the Office of Controls, Flinn recognized that, operationally, SY verged on a “monoculture” of security investigations. Despite the emphasis that Senators Green and Lodge had placed on embassy security, Flinn noted that personnel investigations were overwhelming overseas security officers, and making them essentially the overseas investigative arm of the U.S. Government. In fact, during the previous fiscal year, SY had handled 1,641 cases, involving 3,018 overseas investigations.\(^5\) Overseas security officers, Flinn asserted, were “not able to give even a minimum degree of attention to their basic responsibilities” of raising physical security standards at U.S. missions abroad. Furthermore, of SY’s four divisions—Administration, Investigations, Evaluations, and Foreign Operations—only Foreign Operations addressed overseas security. However, Foreign Operations performed little physical security work, and could have easily been renamed Overseas Investigations. In addition, Foreign Operations supervised the New York Regional Office, which did background investigations of U.S. employees to the United Nations.\(^6\)

Flinn considered this state of affairs “bad management and bad administration,” and with McLeod’s concurrence, Flinn reorganized SY. He separated physical security into its own division, with William Uanna as its division chief. He also requested and obtained 11 additional positions to improve the implementation of physical security overseas. Recognizing that technical security required a “professional level” of skills and years of specialized experience, technical security officers were designated as Security Officers (Technical), or SO(T)s. In early 1956, McLeod, on behalf of SY, requested another 15 SO(T)s to better inspect and maintain technical and physical security for U.S. posts. Flinn also improved physical security at the Main State building. He oversaw the installation of a new centrally controlled alarm system for the restricted areas of the building, and implemented procedures ensuring that incoming and outgoing communications were screened for appropriate classification. As Flinn told McLeod,
“purely investigative people never quite understand or appreciate the importance of physical security,” and “they almost always relegate security to a secondary role.” This, he believed, created “false security” because it resulted in an “over-emphasis being placed on investigating individuals” while physical security languished.57

Additional factors influenced the shift towards physical security and a lessening focus on investigations. The Democrats’ success in the 1954 Congressional elections prompted a review of the personnel security program. The media, intellectuals, and wider U.S. public expressed concern that the aggressive personnel security program had pushed several qualified people out of government, and discouraged talented individuals from applying. Furthermore, several cases related to the federal employee loyalty program had made their way to the Supreme Court. Although some of the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions had favored a more stringent security policy, the Supreme Court now shifted toward favoring the civil and individual rights of U.S. Government employees. In addition, McCarthy’s influence effectively ended in December 1954, when his Senate colleagues censured him for “conduct unbecoming” a Senator.58

Figure 21: Organizational chart for the Office of Security, 1954. The chart reflects SY Director Flinn’s reorganization, which sought to place more emphasis on physical security and prevent SY from being merely an investigative office. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
McLeod continued to call for more stringent reviews and investigations of Department of State personnel; however, he inadvertently undermined his ability to undertake “constant vigilance” and “continuing action” when he announced, in 1955, that full field investigations had been completed on all 11,000 employees of the Department of State. Since Congress had earmarked special funds for this task, and the Civil Service Commission had loaned several evaluators to SY for this undertaking, McLeod’s funding and staff levels decreased. The SCA Administrator found himself in the awkward position of having to scramble for permanent staff and appropriations to continue his work at the same level he had mustered in earlier years. McLeod then faced strong criticism from one survey group that charged that personnel security had siphoned resources away from other security responsibilities, such as protection, training, management, and physical security. Facing an increasingly critical Congress and U.S. public, he soon left SCA, and in 1957, he accepted assignment as Ambassador to Ireland.99

Courier, Hero, Smuggler, Spy

While McCarthyism focused public attention upon the internal affairs of the Department of State, the Cold War prompted U.S. officials to worry that the Communists and their allies might exploit diplomatic immunities and customs to engage in espionage or gain an advantage over the United States. The Department of State and other federal agencies extensively reviewed courier routes, diplomatic baggage, and the ease with which Soviet bloc diplomats bought American technology and obtained U.S. Government publications. Cold War fears enveloped basic diplomatic courtesies and fostered anxieties as U.S. officials became aware of the multiple avenues that the Soviets could exploit and of how few security measures actually existed in the United States.

Although the U.S. courier system was largely a post-World War II development, diplomatic couriers emerged as Cold War spies and Cold War security threats. In the 1950s, couriers gained something of a heroic mystique. Actor Cesar Romero played Steve McQuinn, a suave, resourceful U.S. diplomatic courier in a short-lived television series Passport to Danger. In episodes exotically titled “Tangiers,” “Monte Carlo,”
and “Prague,” McQuinn experienced harrowing adventures and fended off enemy agents while delivering important documents to U.S. allies. Reality occasionally proved just as dramatic. In 1955, courier Frank Irwin was aboard a Yugoslav airliner that crashed outside Vienna. Irwin survived, but suffered internal injuries and third degree burns over a large portion of his body. Despite his injuries, Irwin refused to relinquish control of his diplomatic pouches and declined painkillers until a U.S. Embassy officer arrived on the scene to take control of the classified materials.60

In 1955, SY Director Dennis Flinn learned that Department officials had allowed the U.S. Army to use the Department’s Iron Curtain courier routes as a training ground for its intelligence officers. In 1947, the Department and the Army had negotiated an agreement that allowed six intelligence officers from the Army’s intelligence school in Regensburg, West Germany, to serve as diplomatic couriers on the Paris-Moscow route. Under the program, an intelligence officer was paired with a courier for the June through January “run.” The purpose was to give intelligence officers specializing in the Soviet Union an opportunity to see the country, observe conditions, and use the language. U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow agreed; however, the Department insisted that Regensburg couriers refrain from conducting intelligence activities, and that the Army brief its officers accordingly. After just two months (October 1947), the program worked so well that it was expanded to encompass courier routes in all Iron Curtain nations, and the program continued until February 1955.61

Figure 23: Actor Cesar Romero with Actress Betty Furness, 1950. Romero played “Steve McQuinn,” a diplomatic courier, in the short-lived 1950s television series, Passport to Danger. Each week Romero’s character McQuinn fended off enemy agents in exotic locales as he delivered classified documents to U.S. posts overseas. Source: © Associated Press.

Figure 24: Diplomatic Courier Ray Irwin (on stretcher) is brought back to the United States for medical attention. Irwin was on an airplane that crashed in 1955. Despite his injuries, Irwin kept control of his pouches and refused painkillers until a U.S. Embassy officer arrived to take possession of the pouches. Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian Files.
The State-Army courier arrangement fell apart over security clearances. Flinn learned that unlike official Department of State couriers, the Army intelligence officers serving as couriers did not obtain their clearances from SY. SY officials investigated the program and discovered that Army intelligence officers had committed several courier violations, including photographing Soviet installations, recording serial numbers of Soviet naval vessels, writing down license plate numbers of official Soviet vehicles, and entering “lengthy and heated discussions” with foreign officials and military officers. As a result of SY’s investigation, Department officials became convinced that the Army trainees would never divorce themselves from intelligence activities, and feared that the United States could lose its pouch services behind the Iron Curtain if the program became known. The Department of State terminated the program, and staffed all courier routes with Department-appointed and supervised couriers.62

U.S. officials meanwhile imposed restrictions upon Soviet couriers. The Eisenhower Administration insisted that Soviet couriers make travel arrangements in advance and follow predetermined routes cleared by U.S. officials. In 1954, Soviet bloc couriers bearing passports were restricted to New York City; Dallas, Texas (air travel only); Syracuse, New York (air only); Laredo, Texas (rail only); and St. Albans, Vermont (rail only). Customs officials strongly preferred that the Soviets send unaccompanied pouches to the U.S. Government’s receiving facilities in New York or Georgetown. U.S. officials admitted that the pouch’s consignee could “intercept the shipment to him anywhere en route and take possession of it,” but U.S. Customs officials insisted that requiring Soviet pouches to be shipped in bond to New York or Georgetown would increase security.63

U.S. officials also worried about the baggage of Communist bloc diplomats. Diplomatic courtesy dictated that diplomatic pouches and a diplomat’s baggage were not to be inspected upon entering or departing the nation to which he or she was assigned. Diplomatic custom further stipulated that there was no weight limit on a diplomat’s baggage, effects, or pouches. A diplomat’s bag could be a small suitcase, or large containers weighing thousands of pounds. Similarly, a diplomatic pouch could consist of a single paper envelope, a leather canvas bag, or a gigantic crate. Neither U.S. Customs nor the Department of State officials tracked the size, weight, or number of pouches or pieces of diplomatic baggage entering the country.64
Concerns over transfers of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union generated new worries regarding diplomatic pouches, parcels, and baggage. SY raised concerns when Rumanian diplomatic officials purchased fifty two-way radios and one master radio station. The Hungarians also made several purchases of electronic equipment. The National Security Council (NSC) took up the matter in November 1953. The Department of State’s Bureau of Administration soon developed specific regulations for the handling and inspection of the baggage for each Iron Curtain nation. For example, there would be no inspection of the baggage for Soviet diplomats, a “pro forma” inspection of Czech bags, and a “thorough” search of the Rumanians’ baggage. Procedures varied for diplomatic baggage arriving in the United States unaccompanied, and all regulations and procedures were subject to change.

U.S. officials also became concerned that Communist couriers and diplomats might smuggle atomic materials into the United States, perhaps even detonate an atomic bomb within U.S. borders. The Government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) in 1952 pointed directly to the inviolability of diplomatic pouches as a potential security hazard, and suggested modifying diplomatic immunity regarding pouches and baggage, much to the opposition of the Department of State. Amidst Cold War tensions, the Department had sought to maintain a balance between ensuring security and preserving diplomatic immunities, customs and conventions. The Department determined that international law did not strictly prohibit the inspection of diplomatic baggage and pouches if suspicion of illegal activity existed. The Department’s Legal Adviser admitted that there was little legal precedent on the issue, but suggested that if U.S. officials suspected a pouch contained illegal materials, the recommended course would be to request that the person accompanying the shipment (or if the shipment was unaccompanied, an appropriate officer of the pertinent embassy) open the container in the presence of U.S. Customs officials. The Legal Adviser did caution against this, noting that there were tangible, mutual advantages for the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain the
existing practice. If the United States curbed a specific immunity enjoyed by foreign diplomats on U.S. soil, U.S. diplomats risked losing that same immunity abroad. Moreover, compromising diplomatic immunity might interfere with U.S. diplomatic efforts overseas.68

Despite the Department’s cautions, ICIS continued to press for a program to screen incoming diplomatic pouches for radioactive material. ICIS Subcommittee members rationalized that if U.S. officials could inspect diplomatic luggage or pouches without the international community’s knowledge, U.S. security would be protected and diplomatic relations preserved. By 1954, ICIS had obtained detection equipment and soon afterwards implemented a screening program. The AEC developed devices to detect sheathed plutonium and unsheathed uranium in baggage and shipments. The ICIS planned their first test run of the new technology at New York’s Idlewild Airport, where specially trained inspectors would direct the baggage of Soviet diplomats through a designated passageway. Despite its dislike of, even opposition to, the program, the Department did obtain assurance that it would be consulted should such an event occur. SCA also asked the Bureau of European Affairs for advice on appropriate courses of action should fissionable material be found. In previous encounters, Soviet, Czech, and Polish delegations to the United Nations had strongly protested the inspection of their luggage, lodged formal complaints, and threatened to rescind the principle of reciprocity for U.S. diplomats. Further impetus for inspection occurred in October 1955, when detectors discovered a Czech courier carrying radioactive material. By 1957, U.S. Customs officers regularly searched diplomats and their effects covertly at specified test sites outfitted with fluoroscopic equipment.69

On March 3, 1958, President Eisenhower signed NSC Action 1868, approving a pilot inspection program. NSC Action 1868 required the Secretary of State to devise procedures for U.S. personnel to follow when substantial radioactivity was detected in a diplomatic pouch or shipment. Department representatives on the ICIS, however, learned that the detection devices could not confirm whether the item in a diplomatic pouch was dangerous or innocuous. Certain luminous clocks, for example, could give out a substantial radioactive reading, but a properly shielded fissionable item might generate a negligible reading. Without a more solid guarantee of the presence of fissionable material in pouches or luggage, senior Department officials hesitated to support an action that might jeopardize diplomatic relations. By the end of 1958, the NSC had to reexamine and refine its definition of what constituted substantial radioactivity.70

The Eisenhower Administration placed restrictions upon Soviet bloc diplomats. U.S. officials required that Communist diplomats request and obtain authorization before travelling in the United States, and in 1956, the requirement was modified to 24-hour advance notice. Such requests had to include destinations, routes, and overnight stays. Some areas of the United States were closed to Soviet bloc travellers altogether. As Department officials made clear to Rumanian diplomats, such restrictions were largely retaliatory, and only occurred because U.S. diplomats faced similar restrictions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.71 For example, when the Rumanian Government denied travel by U.S. diplomats outside of the capital city (Bucharest), the Department imposed a similar ban upon Rumanian diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations in New York.72
Perhaps one of the most vexing security issues regarding Iron Curtain diplomats involved not classified, but unclassified materials. SY and other U.S. Government security officials were keenly aware of the ease with which a Soviet diplomat could obtain U.S. maps, diagrams, and information. U.S. Government publications, nautical charts, topographical maps, aerial photographs, and detailed city and industry plans were readily available upon request to any interested foreign national. Equally troubling to U.S. officials was that Communist diplomats often did not identify themselves, evaded questions about their identity, or offered misleading statements when obtaining information from federal, state, local government sources. Moreover, U.S. diplomats did not have comparable access to such charts, maps, publications, and photographs from their Communist host governments. The Kremlin even distributed a pamphlet to the Soviet public titled “Preservation of State Secrets,” in order to encourage Soviet citizens to deny unclassified information to the Americans.\textsuperscript{73}

In October 1956, the NSC issued NSC-5427, titled “Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection with Strategic Intelligence.” NSC-5427 banned the photographing or sketching of numerous facilities, such as military equipment, power plants, tunnels, seaports, hydroelectric dams, and radio stations. It also barred the Soviets from purchasing aerial photographs, navigational or hydrographic maps, development plans of industrial cities, or maps or charts with a scale larger than 1:250,000. Publicly released, the regulations sought to enlist the American public in helping to keep “strategic intelligence” out of Communist hands. Upon the NSC’s recommendation, the Office of Strategic Information in the Department of Commerce coordinated Soviet bloc requests for unclassified information from U.S. Government agencies. As Department of State officials admitted in a Departmental circular, they sought to ensure that exchanges of information and intelligence with the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations were “reciprocal in character and…result in an advantageous return to the United States.”\textsuperscript{74}
Protecting Diplomats and Dignitaries

A long-observed diplomatic custom stipulated that host governments were required to take appropriate action to protect foreign diplomats and visiting heads of state. The U.S. Congress formalized this host duty in Title 18, Section 112 of the U.S. Code. The laws imposed strict fines, even imprisonment, on those found guilty of assaulting a visiting official, and tasked SY with the responsibility to protect heads of state and the Secretary of State. The Division of Physical Security initially performed the protective duties, but, in 1953, they were transferred to the new Division of Protective Security. The division worked closely with the Protocol staff who organized the logistics of foreign dignitary visits.

The law, however, did not grant SY Special Agents the authority to carry firearms. The Department tried to remedy the discrepancy in 1954 by petitioning Congress, arguing that dignitaries were “entitled to special protection, something more than is normally accorded to private individuals.” Department officials also noted that while Congress had criminalized the assault of a public official, it had not conferred on SY Special Agents any authority or special powers to protect diplomatic officials. SY Agents regarded the authority to carry firearms as crucial to carrying out their protective assignments, and they pointed out that the law permitted the agents of other agencies to do so (e.g. the Secret Service). By 1953, SY Agents often carried their own weapons during protective assignments, despite the lack of liability protection.

On June 28, 1955, Congress rectified the discrepancy and approved Public Law 104. The law stated that Department of State employees specially designated by the Secretary of State could “carry firearms for the purpose of protecting heads of foreign states, high officials of foreign government and other distinguished visitors to the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State, and official representatives of foreign governments and of the United States attending international conferences, or performing special missions.” By extension, the law granted official immunity to Special Agents should they accidentally shoot or otherwise injure an innocent bystander in the course of executing their protective duties.
Obtaining legal permission to carry firearms was representative of SY’s efforts in the 1950s to formalize its protective details, most notably the Secretary of State’s protective detail. SY’s Division of Physical Security protected the Secretary, and Special Agents assigned to the Secretary’s detail attended Secret Service classes on dignitary protection in order to ensure adherence to standard procedures. SY initially assigned two agents to the Secretary, but Secretaries Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Christian A. Herter, and Dean Rusk often determined the size and extent of their protective details. Although SY Agents escorted the Secretary to and from home each day (called “portal to portal” coverage), SY’s protective detail did not offer 24-hour protection. Once the Secretary left the Department for the day, he did not necessarily receive protection if he made public appearances at night.  

The Secretary’s travels, however, were another matter. In 1953, before Secretary Dulles arrived in New York City to deliver his address to the UN General Assembly, Special Agents from SY’s New York City Field Office conducted a technical search of Dulles’s quarters at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. They ensured that the suite contained appropriate equipment for storing classified material and contained no listening devices, and then upon his arrival, guarded the Secretary throughout his visit to New York. A uniformed police officer, assigned by SY, guarded the entrance to the Secretary’s suite around the clock. Standard procedure for Secretary Dulles’s overseas travels included one SY agent travelling with the Secretary, and one flying ahead to ensure that rooms and security were ready for him when he arrived.
After four Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire in the House of Representatives on March 1, 1954, SY reassessed its protective measures for the Secretary. It heightened security at the Secretary’s office, because almost anyone could walk right into the Secretary of State’s office with little, if any, interference. SY limited access to the Secretary’s office to a single entrance, placed a security guard there to monitor individuals, and installed an alarm button for the guard to push at any sign of trouble. The alarm button automatically closed the door to the Secretary’s office. SY explored obtaining a vehicle with armor plating and bulletproof glass for the Secretary, elevating security at the Secretary’s residence, and adding an overnight police foot patrol outside the Secretary’s home. SY also maintained a two-man security detail at all of the Secretary’s appearances and public meetings. When SY learned that Puerto Rican nationalists might target Dulles during his visit to that island, it recommended that agents guard Dulles at all public appearances and accompany him home. SY temporarily increased security for the Secretary to 24-hour protection in November 1956 when Dulles was hospitalized for cancer treatment. Because of an expressed threat of poison, SY required the nurse on duty to test all food 30 minutes prior to serving it to the Secretary.

Conclusion

McCarthyism and the Cold War defined diplomatic security and set the course of the Office of Security throughout the decade of the 1950s. McCarthy’s Wheeling, West Virginia speech triggered a series of hearings, investigations, and reports of Communists infiltrating the Department of State. Department officials testified before Congress to rebut McCarthy’s accusations, but one official’s testimony prompted a purge of homosexuals from the Department. McCarthyism also initiated greater attention to overseas security. The same Congressional committee that conducted hearings on Communists in the Department also appointed the Subcommittee of Two to study physical security at U.S. Embassies overseas. Senators Green and Lodge issued a report that strongly urged the Department to improve and expand overseas security, and they were also willing to provide positions and funds to do so. Department officials, long criticized by Congress for a lack of
security, did not fully recognize the Senators’ willingness to provide additional resources for security. Director Dennis Flinn restructured SY in order to provide better management and attention to overseas security. The discovery of the Great Seal bug in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the revamping of the Marine Security Guard program were further developments in a shift toward better security at U.S. posts abroad.

The Cold War also shaped diplomatic security during the 1950s. Concerns about Soviet bloc espionage and exploitation of diplomatic courtesies led U.S. officials to reexamine diplomatic customs and immunities. U.S. Government officials studied and debated the threats posed by diplomatic pouches and baggage, and took measures to prevent the transfer of U.S. technology and information to the Soviet Union. Department officials increased and formalized protection of the Secretary of State. By the end of the decade, diplomatic security was viewed as vital, and SY had emerged as an essential office in the Department. The 1960s, however, would reveal that the Department’s improvement and expansion of measures to promote security were insufficient for the threats they faced.

Endnotes


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21 Memorandum “Establishment of Loyalty Security Appeals Board” John W. Sipes, Security Counsel, to Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 26 June 1951 attached to Memorandum, Donald L. Nicholson, Chief of Division of Security, to Boykin 27 June 1951, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files, 1931-53.


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55 N.B. Not all investigations result in a case, hence the discrepancy in numbers.


58 Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes, 294-295.


61 Memorandum “Documentation of Army Intelligence Officers for State Department Courier Duty,” Flinn to McLeod, 8 July 1955; Staff Study “Special Courier Arrangement with Army” Estes (A/OPR), Beam (EE), and Clare (SY), 26 September 1955; Memorandum “Regensburg Couriers,” Fisher Howe, 23 August 1955; all Folder –116.3, Box 496, DF 1955-59, RG 59, NA.

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64 Report to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack on the Defensive Measures to be Provided by the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department against the Clandestine Introduction of Unconventional War Weapons, 4 December 1952, Box 19/998, Files of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee RG353-Lot 98D468, NA. Hereafter cited as ICIS Files.


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The early 1960s proved to be a difficult time for the Office of Security (SY) because it faced new challenges and expanded responsibilities. Cold War security threats and Congress’s concern about security risks in the Department of State continued. The discovery of two networks of microphones in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw manifested the growing impact technology was exerting on U.S. diplomatic security. The sharp rise in official visits to the United States by foreign heads of state forced SY to reconsider how it conducted protective security details—particularly after the adoption of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which stated that the host country bore responsibility “to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack.”

SY also suffered public embarrassment by an internal struggle over security clearances (the Otto Otepka case); but it garnered praise for its efforts in coordinating the protection of more than 20 heads of state for President John F. Kennedy’s funeral.

The amalgam of spies, leaks, bugs, and protective details stretched and challenged SY and Departmental resources in ensuring diplomatic security. The Irvin Scarbeck case demonstrated the Communist bloc’s commitment to recruiting U.S. citizens as spies. The Otto F. Otepka case found a senior SY officer leaking documents to a Congressional committee, but it brought an end to the debate over security risks that had plagued the Department since the 1945 Amerasia case. Discoveries of networks of “bugs” (listening devices) in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw manifested the growing impact technology was exerting on U.S. diplomatic security.
Warsaw, as well as shortcomings in the Department of State’s communications system during the Cuban Missile Crisis, forced the Department to explore and use new technologies. The Department introduced computers to its communications system, and drew upon British counterintelligence technology. Moreover, it added a detail of Navy Seabees to find existing listening devices and prevent Soviet bloc workmen from installing them in U.S. embassies. By 1964, beset by several challenges to diplomatic security, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration William Crockett recruited G. Marvin Gentile to reorganize and guide SY so that it could fulfill the Department’s expanding demands for security.²

Security in the Spotlight


Tired of the Soviets’ bluster and accusations, Ambassador Lodge unveiled to the Security Council (and the press) the Great Seal listening device that SY’s Joseph Bezjian had found in 1952. Lodge explained how the Soviets had hidden the listening device in a woodcarving, gifted to U.S. Ambassador Harriman in 1945 by the Soviets. Lodge also presented the bug and described how it operated. Moreover, Lodge announced that the United States had found “more than 100 concealed listening devices in [U.S.] embassies and residences” in recent years in Soviet bloc nations. Although the Soviets later denied Lodge’s charges as having “complete groundlessness,” the embarrassment and damage were done. The Soviet resolution against the United States was defeated seven votes to two, with only Poland voting with the Soviets.⁴
The public unveiling of the Great Seal device highlighted SY’s impressive success in technical security. Between 1948 and 1961, SY engineers discovered more than 95 percent of all listening devices found by all U.S. Government agencies. While SY had one technical engineer in 1948, by 1961 it had 15. During the fall of 1960, the intelligence community briefed Director of Security William O. Boswell and several senior SY officers on technical threats that SY engineers would face in the future. What was shown to Boswell and the others is not clear, but the briefing left SY officials stunned and unnerved. Immediately afterwards, Boswell sought and obtained approval from the Department and the Bureau of the Budget to request an additional 44 technical engineers and $500,000 for the research and development of technical equipment in SY’s fiscal year 1962 budget. Congress increased the research and development funding to $1 million, but approved only about 20 technical engineer positions. Nonetheless, the one briefing led to a doubling of the number of technical engineers and dramatically increased SY’s funding.

Less than a year after Ambassador Lodge displayed the Great Seal, SY discovered a spy at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. Irvin C. Scarbeck managed travel arrangements, living quarters, and property for the Embassy. Married with three children, Scarbeck had an affair with a young Polish woman, and Polish intelligence blackmailed him into providing them with information about U.S. policy. The Embassy’s security officer, Special Agent Victor Dikeos, discovered Scarbeck’s activities. While SY and the FBI developed the case against Scarbeck, the Department extended Scarbeck’s tour in Warsaw. The Department then recalled him to Washington, and upon his arrival, Scarbeck was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

Also in 1961, the United Nations’ Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed, resolving several issues regarding diplomatic privileges that had emerged during the 1950s, most notably involving diplomatic pouches and baggage. Diplomatic legal scholar Eileen Denza describes the 1961 Convention as the first “comprehensive formulation of the rules of modern diplomatic
law” in nearly 200 years. Among other facets of diplomatic representation and relations, the Convention defined what constituted a diplomatic bag, what that bag might carry, and how to proceed with a suspect bag. The Vienna Convention also defined diplomatic immunities for diplomats and couriers, the inviolability of mission premises, and the responsibilities of the host state to the mission. The Convention not only helped to improve diplomatic security, but also provided a basis for reconciling diplomatic disagreements over security. As the Convention’s preamble states, the purpose of such privileges and immunities (and of the Convention itself) was “not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.”

Also, in 1961, the Department of State instituted a new identification card system that coincided with the opening of the new wing of the Department’s building. The new ID cards were intended to help resolve the problem of nearly 2,000 ID cards that had been lost, misplaced, or destroyed since SY had begun issuing them in 1949. The new ID cards differed from the older ID card in that they had a color photograph of the officer or employee and were laminated with a thin plastic film.

**Administrative Reforms**

During the 1960s, SY experienced several administrative reforms. Perhaps the most significant was the rotation of SY personnel between domestic and overseas assignments. William Boswell, who became Director of SY in August 1958, found SY divided between those who continually served
overseas and those who constantly remained in Washington. Boswell erased the division by initiating the rotation of SY agents between overseas and domestic posts.10

Also, SY’s Intelligence Reporting Branch (IRB), which had emerged in the 1950s, faced an increasing workload. Working with other agencies, the IRB gathered information on threats or illegal activity. The information included threats to the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, passport and visa fraud, activities of diplomatic representatives or aliens in the United States, covert or illegal activities of Department personnel, crank calls, and threats to the Department’s main building (Main State) or Department annexes. Although 90 percent of reports received came from the FBI regarding domestic threats, the IRB also worked with the Department’s Area Desks on intelligence or threats to U.S. posts or diplomatic personnel. By 1961, IRB processed about 30,000 reports per year.11

In 1961, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett initiated a series of reforms to modernize the organization and administration of the Department of State. Popularly known as the “Crockett Reforms,” these recommendations drew upon innovations in corporate organization, and sought to reduce the Department’s “highly structured, multi-layered bureaucracy.” Crockett later recalled that he wanted to create “independent operators” who “really had the authority to run an operation,” and “make that operation more effective.” One of Crockett’s recommendations was moving SY from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) to the Bureau of Administration. In his opinion, SY’s activities “more closely resembled” those of Administration offices such as Personnel, and “good management” suggested bringing similar offices together. Implementation of this recommendation, however, was delayed.12

In the meantime, the new Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), Salvatore Bontempo, proposed a major reorganization of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, which involved turning over several SY responsibilities to other agencies. His proposal included transferring personnel investigations and evaluations to the

Figure 6: William J. Crockett, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. Drawing upon corporate models, Crockett modernized the Department through the “Crockett reforms.” He sought to make a Department that had grown significantly since World War II operate in a more efficient manner. One of his reforms was to move SY from the Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Bureau of Administration. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
Civil Service Commission, technical security counter-measures to the FBI, and moving IRB to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Whether Bontempo sought to streamline SY; concentrate the office upon protecting the Secretary, foreign dignitaries, and embassies; or simply to dismantle SY as a means to achieve bureaucratic efficiency is not clear. In November 1961, shortly after Bontempo put forward his reorganization plan, SCA announced that it would eliminate 25 positions from its personnel because of Congressional budget cuts.\textsuperscript{13}

Bontempo had little support for his proposed reorganization, and the announced personnel cuts prompted uproar from Congress and the public.\textsuperscript{14} Many viewed the personnel cuts as a threat to national security because it targeted personnel who conducted background checks and guarded embassies abroad.\textsuperscript{15} Several newspaper articles and editorials decried the “gutting” or “emasculating” of SY. In addition, SY’s Deputy Director, Otto Otepka, testified before Congress that the cuts would harm security. In the face of opposition, the Department held a press conference to defend the cuts and explain how they would affect security. SY Director Boswell assured the public that if the cuts endangered national security, he would resign in protest.\textsuperscript{16} The controversy doomed Bontempo’s proposal, he resigned, no personnel cuts occurred, and the Department shifted the budget cuts to other offices.\textsuperscript{17}

With Bontempo’s departure, Boswell undertook his own reorganization of SY in January 1962. Boswell took few, if any, of Bontempo’s ideas; instead, he reorganized SY in a way that reflected the office’s expanding overseas and protective duties. The Divisions of Investigations and Evaluations remained intact, while the Division of Physical Security was divided into three. The Division of Foreign Operations focused upon overseas security, namely Regional Security Officers, post security, and the Marine Security Guard program. The Division of Technical Services concentrated upon technical threats (such as listening devices) and countermeasures, research and development, and training of SY officers. Finally, the Division of Domestic Operations centered upon

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Salvatore Bontempo, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Bontempo tried to give several SY responsibilities to other agencies and offices. His plan was shelved after intense public and Congressional criticism, and he quickly resigned. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.}
\end{figure}
protecting the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, as well as security at the Main State building and its annexes. In another change, Boswell abolished the IRB and re-constituted it as the Intelligence Processing Section (IPS) under SY’s Records and Services Branch. He required IPS to liaise with other agencies, passing on items of interest, but also cut its staff from eleven to five.18

Just after Boswell’s reorganization, Crockett’s idea of moving SY to the Bureau of Administration became a reality. On August 8, 1962, SY was transferred to Administration, and its director elevated to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. John F. Reilly became the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and he reported directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William H. Orrick, Jr. As Crockett told the Senate’s Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), the move demonstrated the increased importance with which the Department regarded the security function.19
Communications Security

While Crockett and Boswell were reorganizing the Bureau of Administration and the Office of Security, the Kennedy Administration discovered a weakness in the United States’ diplomatic communications systems. In contrast to the pre-World War II situation, the weakness was not U.S. codes. In November 1952, President Truman created the National Security Agency in an effort to centralize the U.S. Government’s coded-communications and to improve U.S. cryptography. Although the agency officially resided within the Department of Defense, it operated independently and oversaw cryptography used by all government agencies, including the Department of State. The NSA also provided cryptographic intelligence to the Department. While NSA’s Office of Communications Security provided the Department of State with cryptographic equipment and the code itself, the Department employed its own personnel (numbering 31 in 1961) to manage its enciphering and day-to-day cryptographic functions.  

In the fall of 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed that the flaw in U.S. diplomatic communications was aging equipment and technology. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated over the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy White House learned that it could not communicate directly with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Department of State had their own system and code for communications; meanwhile, the Department and the White House had a separate, different communications system and codes. During the crisis, cable messages from Moscow to Washington took several hours to reach the White House because telegrams from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow arrived at the Department and were decoded. However, to pass the cable on the White House’s separate communications system, the telegrams were then encoded in different code, sent to the White House, and then decoded again. As a result, the White House learned about some key Soviet messages from Russian radio broadcasts hours before the Department of State delivered them.  

The Department’s burgeoning telegraphic traffic and its aging equipment compounded the problem. In 1930, Departmental telegraphic communications amounted to approximately 2.2 million words for the entire year. By January 1960, the Department was sending that quantity every two weeks. Moreover,
the post-WWII increases in the volume had not been matched by the adoption of improved technologies; the Department of State was still using World War II-era technology. This slowed the Department’s incoming and outgoing cable traffic. When President Kennedy announced the embargo on Cuba, several governments were “caught flat-footed” because the Department was unable to notify them in advance. At the same time, innovations in radio, television, and air travel spread news and information more quickly, exacerbating the Department’s problems of high volume and slow transmittal speeds.  

The Orrick Committee also prompted the Department to upgrade its communications. Department officials created the Office of Communications on March 21, 1963. With John W. Coffey as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications, the office had a Division of Communications Security and oversight of the pouch and courier service. Department officials also automated its communications, introducing “high-speed” computers to the Department. International Telephone and Telegraph received a 2-year contract to install the Automated Terminal

Figure 10: William Orrick, Under Secretary of State for Administration. Orrick chaired the Orrick Committee, which was formed after the U.S. Government’s communications systems problems during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under the Orrick Committee’s oversight, U.S. Government communications systems were overhauled. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
Station system in a new communications facility on the fifth floor of Main State, one floor below the old “comms” center. As “cutting edge” technology, the computer installed was an 18-bit computer, operating at 40 kilohertz, with 52 kilobytes core storage. Such specifications may seem “ancient” compared to a 2006 personal computer, which has a 32-bit computer operating at 3.19 gigahertz with 512 megabytes physical memory with 1.69 gigabytes virtual memory. Yet, in comparison, Wall Street of the 1960s was still employing ticker tape machines and just introducing the same computers as the Department to process stock transactions. The Department’s new Communications Center was a “state of the art” facility for the federal government, and drew numerous visitors from many other agencies.

Black Eye: The Case of Otto Otepka

While the new communications center brought praise to the Department, the case of Otto Otepka brought a partisan fight over security clearances within the Department, and embarrassed the Office of Security. The Kennedy Administration entered office in 1961 amidst ongoing debate between Congress and the Executive branch over security risks in the Department of State, a debate first sparked by the 1945 Amerasia case. Congress had dominated the debate, particularly Congressional Republicans led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who had largely defined the terms and parameters for loyalty and risk among Department employees. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, meanwhile, had determined and refined clearance and evaluation procedures. The Republicans had effectively used the “Who lost China?” question against the Democrats of the Truman Administration, and the discovery of leaks and spies at the Department had done little to quell the uproar. The incoming Democratic Kennedy Administration sought to prove it was not “soft” on Communism, but it also believed that many people (namely Democrats) had been unfairly targeted by the partisan charges of disloyalty and security risks. All of these tensions came together in the Otepka case.

In December 1960, Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate Robert Kennedy met with Otepka, the Chief of SY’s Division of Evaluations, to discuss security clearances for the new Administration’s political appointees. Of particular concern was Walt W. Rostow, whom President John Kennedy
wanted to serve as his chief foreign policy planner. Rostow had been denied a security clearance three times during Eisenhower’s Administration. Otpeka explained that it would require a full field investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Rostow to get a clearance, and that according to E.O. 10450, if there were even “reasonable doubt,” the clearance would be denied.28

The Kennedy White House proceeded to circumvent Otpeka, whom it perceived as a “hard-line McCarthy disciple.”29 Kennedy appointed Rostow to his staff as Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Since the White House had its own clearance system, Rostow was able to start work immediately. In November 1961, Kennedy moved Rostow to the Department of State as counselor and chair of the Policy Planning Council, forcing the Department to honor Rostow’s White House security clearance. Then, in a departure from usual practice, Secretary Rusk signed 152 emergency security waivers for presidential and political appointees at the Department of State.30

In many ways, Otto Fred Otpeka seemed an unlikely candidate for a scandal. He began his career with the Civil Service Commission and moved to the Office of Security on July 15, 1953, as a personnel security officer under Director Scott McLeod. A year later, McLeod promoted Otpeka to Chief of the Division of Evaluations, rapid advancement for one who had only worked in SY for a year. As division chief, Otpeka improved evaluation techniques and became well known for following protocol on clearances and investigations. In April 1957, Otpeka was appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Security, and over the next four years, he assumed greater responsibility and generally ran the daily business of SY. For his dedication, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles presented him with the Meritorious Service Award in 1958. McLeod later stated that, “If I did not do anything else down there [at the Department of State], I did get the man I think is the best [security] evaluator in the government today.”31

Perhaps it was Otpeka’s image as a “hard-line McCarthy disciple” that worked against him, because he increasingly was marginalized from security evaluations and determinations of risk. Although Otpeka retained his title, SY Director Boswell took over the responsibility for processing “sensitive cases,” and moved Otpeka and his team to new offices on a different floor, away from the agents investigating and evaluating the high-profile appointees. Also, Otpeka’s position was among the 25 that SCA proposed to eliminate after Bontempo released his reorganization proposal in late 1961. When the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) summoned Otpeka to testify about the proposed cutbacks and changes at SY, Otpeka said that the reduction in forces would be detrimental to the country’s internal security.32

At the same time, the SISS was investigating a set of security clearances that SY had granted to Kennedy Administration appointees. Boswell testified before the Senate subcommittee on the issue on March 8, 1962, and afterwards ordered Otpeka to review the 152 officials who had received clearances. Otpeka reported that 32 clearances had been backdated, that is, waivers were issued before background investigations had been completed. Boswell turned the matter over to the Foreign Service Inspection Corps. Due to regular rotation,
Boswell accepted and was posted as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. 33

John Reilly, a former Department of Justice attorney, succeeded Boswell as the head of SY on the recommendation of the Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Reilly and Otepka soon clashed. Some Senators speculated that Reilly’s main responsibility was to get rid of Otepka, but Reilly denied this. Just after becoming Director, Reilly offered Otepka a 10-month stint to study at the National War College. However, when Otepka learned that he would not be able to return to SY after his studies, he declined the offer. In the weeks afterwards, Reilly and his special assistant overrode several of Otepka’s decisions regarding security clearances, and eventually Reilly denied Otepka access to SY’s central files. 34

In February 1963, Reilly and Otepka testified before the SISS, and the experience led Reilly to suspect that Otepka was assisting the SISS counsel, Julian G. Sourwine. As result, Reilly ordered surveillance of Otepka. With the assistance of Elmer Hill, Chief of the Division of Technical Security, Reilly briefly wiretapped Otepka’s telephone, but failed to produce any incriminating evidence. After searching Otepka’s burn bag (used for discarding classified papers or drafts), SY agents under Reilly’s direction found a carbon paper of a list of questions Otepka had prepared for Sourwine to ask Reilly. The discovery proved that Otepka was working with Sourwine to some degree. It was also more than a little unusual that Otepka would develop questions for the SISS to ask his own supervisor, without Reilly’s knowledge, particularly questions that may have put Reilly on the spot. Moreover, the fact that Reilly suspected Otepka immediately after appearing before the SISS suggests that the subcommittee had asked Reilly questions that only an SY insider would know, and/or had information that Reilly knew had not been released to the subcommittee. Reilly continued to monitor Otepka’s burn bag until June 18, 1963, when its contents produced evidence that allowed him to charge Otepka with improper declassification and mutilation of classified documents. 35

Reilly and Otepka continued to clash over Otepka’s security evaluations, resulting in Otepka’s removal from duties. In one case, Reilly asked Otepka to disqualify himself from a case, noting that he (Otepka) had “strong feelings” about the case. Otepka remained adamant in his refusal. 36 In June 1963, Otepka learned that a colleague
was working on the security file of a case that Reilly had taken from him. Otepka looked through the file, and had his secretary copy a chronology of his earlier handling of the case. Reilly confronted Otepka about this, and took away not only the document, but also the copy machine from the Evaluations Division. On June 27, Reilly relieved Otepka of his duties as Chief of the Division of Evaluations, and assigned him to revising the Office of Security handbook, essentially a demotion. Otepka was locked out of his office and denied access to his personal and office files. Nine other people, including SY evaluators and investigators associated with Otepka, also were transferred or demoted. 37

While Reilly conducted surveillance on Otepka, Department officials learned in late 1962 or early 1963 that someone was leaking information to the SISS. The Department asked the FBI to investigate, and the FBI found that Otepka was the leak, although he was not indicted. Crockett recalled that when confronted with this finding, Otepka responded that he believed the Administration was creating security risks for the U.S. Government, and that he therefore had a duty to reveal these risks, even if it meant breaking the law and sacrificing his career. 38

In signed testimony to the FBI dated August 15, Otepka acknowledged that he met with Sourwine and provided him documents. After Reilly had testified before the SISS in May 1963, Sourwine had called and asked Otepka to come to his office after working hours. During their meeting, Sourwine showed Otepka a transcript of Reilly’s testimony, asked him to review it, and submit his evaluation in a memorandum. Otepka wrote a 39-page memorandum, with multiple accompanying documents. Otepka told the FBI that he had done this to refute the statements that Reilly made regarding Otepka’s “personal character and performance.” 39

The SISS held hearings in early August regarding Otepka’s demotion. Reilly’s men denied their involvement in the surveillance operation, and Reilly denied that he had ordered a wiretap on Otepka’s telephone. After the Congressional August recess, Otepka appeared before the SISS, and admitted to turning over to Sourwine two documents on the appointment of members of a State Advisory Committee on the staffing of international organizations. 40 Otepka’s testimony revealed discrepancies in Reilly’s testimony to the SISS earlier that month.

Otepka returned to the Department in September, and received an official letter notifying him that the Department had leveled 13 charges against him and was seeking disciplinary action. Five
counts consisted of conduct “unbecoming” a Department officer, for providing documents to Sourwine. The Department also claimed that Otepka had violated Truman’s 1948 directive that ordered all files regarding loyalty cases to be kept confidential. The other eight counts charged that Otepka had “mutilated” or “declassified” official papers (the documents in his burn bag). Otepka admitted giving Sourwine documents, acknowledging the legitimacy of five charges, but he refuted charges that he had altered classified documents. He claimed that Reilly and his surveillance team had planted the burn bag items. Otepka faced dismissal, and on October 2, Otepka’s lawyer went public with the Department’s letter.\(^41\)

The SISS sent a 10-page memorandum to Secretary Rusk protesting Otepka’s dismissal, and asking Rusk to appear before the subcommittee. Rusk did so, and upheld Otepka’s dismissal. Several Senators warned against proceeding with the charges against Otepka, and two believed that Otepka had been charged for giving information to the committee. Rusk assured them that “the charges were not brought in retaliation . . . nor were they motivated by a departmental attempt to interfere with the work of the subcommittee.”\(^42\)

In a September 1963 speech to the American Foreign Legion, Rusk invited the Legionnaires to “come in and look us over in great detail.” The American Legion accepted, and formed the Special Liaison Committee. Emphasizing security and security risks, the committee reported that the Department had done “a credible job…in a conscientious effort to weed out security risks and to prohibit the entry of new ones.” The committee remained convinced that a few who should not have received clearances did, but the report was largely complimentary.\(^43\)

By November, Otepka and Reilly faced hearings and possible removal from the Department. On November 6, Reilly sent a letter to the SISS revising his testimony and confessing to wire-tapping Otepka’s telephone.\(^44\) He was placed on administrative leave pending further investigation.\(^45\) Otepka had petitioned for an appeal as soon as the Department filed charges against him, and a four-year legal struggle ensued. Secretary Rusk met with Senator James Eastland (D-MS) about the Otepka case in July 1964; they agreed that Otepka should follow the Departmental hearings process. During the meeting, Eastland called Otepka’s lawyer to ask if Otepka would accept reassignment, but was told that Otepka insisted on being restored to his old job. While awaiting his hearing, Otepka continued to work at the Department, but was ostracized. He retained his title and salary, but had a bare desk and did not receive Departmental instructions and reports, or even regular mail. He was given a telephone, but it never rang. It was common knowledge among Department personnel that no one was to speak to Otepka.\(^46\)

Otepka received his hearing in June 1967 and was found guilty. The hearing officer advised Rusk to consider Otepka’s claim that no standard of conduct existed for federal employees in such matters, but Rusk upheld the verdict. Otepka was demoted in pay grade and reassigned to the Management Analyst Office, where he stayed for a week. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which heard his testimony in May 1968, but rejected his appeal. \(^47\) In 1970 President Richard M. Nixon appointed Otepka to the Subversive Activities Control Board, an independent governmental body that heard cases against subversive organizations and individuals. The board heard only a few cases, and in June 1972, Otepka retired.\(^48\)
The Otepka affair created an embarrassing black eye for SY; however, the changes it wrought would later prove beneficial for the organization. The affair brought an end to McCarthyism and the accusations and debate over security risks that had haunted the Department of State. The affair led to the departure of one Director of SY (Reilly), false testimony by SY officials, and revelations that one SY senior officer leaked documents to Congress. Yet, the affair also led Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Crockett to recruit G. Marvin Gentile from the CIA to head SY and rebuild the office and its morale. Over the course of his ten-year term, Gentile’s influence and initiatives would transform SY into a much more professional law enforcement organization. As Crockett later recalled, Gentile was “a breath of fresh air.”

**Moscow and Warsaw Networks**

SY officers had expressed concerns about Soviet espionage long before Ambassador Lodge displayed the Great Seal bug at the UN Security Council. In 1959, the security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow admitted that “Soviet radio/electronic technical capabilities are quite advanced,” and that the Soviets were “keeping abreast of new technical developments in the United States.” He also said U.S. magazines had published wiring diagrams of resonant cavity devices (like the Great Seal bug); moreover, an affordable ($30) “transistorized postage-stamp size amplifier” could be purchased by the public and the Soviets in the United States. Perhaps most disconcerting, the Moscow security officer acknowledged that the Department did not possess equipment that could detect these technical threats. Most discoveries of bugs in 1959 and before had resulted from SY officers conducting their “initial physical search,” with their equipment serving more “to trace out wiring and additional microphones.” In fact, two months after the Moscow security officer presented his conclusions, E. Tomlin Bailey, the Director of SY (1956-58), requested permission to purchase 20 British technical search kits (at a cost of more than $63,000) because they were “across-the-board superior” to U.S. equipment. There was reason for SY officers to worry; U.S. officials had been finding small networks of microphones in U.S. embassies in Communist bloc nations. In April 1956,
SY technical officers discovered a partially installed network of microphones with wires leading to the attic in the U.S. Embassy in Prague. The network’s installers had apparently gained access to the attic via a false brick door in a common wall with another building. SY technical experts discovered other sets of multiple microphones in Budapest and Belgrade.51

The early discoveries prompted SY to install its first clear, plastic, acoustic conference room (ACR) in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1960. Commonly called “bubbles,” ACRs were made of plastic and aluminum. First generation ACRs were 12 feet by 15 feet, or 12 feet by 20 feet, and had 5 inches between the interior and outer wall, with a door to enter and exit the secure space. After removing all furniture and fixtures from an existing room and sweeping it for bugs, SY engineers erected the ACR to create a secure room where Embassy officers could hold classified discussions without concerns of bugs.52

Concerns about technical security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow continued, resulting in several security developments in 1962 and 1963. Two more ACRs were installed, prompting the Department to add a Security Officer (Technical) [SO(T)], to the Embassy staff. That person was SY’s Maclyn Musser. The Department installed special shielding to enclose the Embassy’s code room.53 Also U.S. officials noticed that the Soviets had begun directing microwaves at the Embassy in 1962, perhaps starting as early as 1953, and Musser reported in 1963 that the microwave beam was 50 feet across. U.S. officials were uncertain about the purpose of the microwaves, but did not consider the microwaves a technical or health hazard.54
A tip from a Soviet defector prompted SY officials to return to the Moscow Embassy in 1964 and look for bugs. In February, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, who had served in the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate, First Department (which monitored U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union), defected to the United States. He told U.S. officials about Soviet technical surveillance in the Embassy and specified particular offices. With the information, SY sent SO(T)s John Bagnal and Donovan Fischer to Moscow to assist Maclyn Musser in searching for bugs.55

Bagnal and Fischer’s search gives credence to Thomas Edison’s dictum that genius is “1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration.” The SO(T)s systematically demolished the 10th floor office of the military attaché, which was several floors above Foreign Service national employees (FSNs), and had access to the ceiling via the attic. Bagnal and Fischer took apart the electric and telephone receptacles, removed the wiring, ripped up the parquet floor, and jackhammered the plaster off the walls, burning out one jackhammer in the effort. In the attic, they searched through two feet of rubble. They chipped into the apex of the wall and removed the doorjambs. After ten days, the men were frustrated because of their lack of success.56

They then turned to the double ring radiator, which was welded to the pipe that ran from the basement. In Moscow, the Soviet Government provided heat for the entire city through a central heating system. Bagnal and Fischer shut off the main valve in the basement. They returned to the attaché’s room and cut the radiator from the pipe. Upon doing so, they noticed a small hole, about 3/16 of an inch in diameter, in the wall behind the radiator. When they began to pick at the hole, the plaster began to flake off, revealing a plaster cast set one foot into the wall. In the cast, they found a microphone. They checked other rooms behind the radiator and found more microphones, discovering a total of 52 bugs in the Embassy.57
After discovering the microphones, Bagnal and Fischer traced the cables to see where the antennae and listening posts were located. They found that the Soviets’ listening posts were in the apartment building across the street, which was the same direction from which the microwave signals emanated. They jackhammered into the wall and found three coaxial cables, which went to the attic, and were attached to a crude grill that was 4 feet by 16 feet in size, and laid 6-7 inches into the concrete of the attic floor. The grill served as an antenna. The Embassy’s communications center was next to the room above which the grill was located.58

The discovery of the Moscow microphone network raised questions about the new Embassy building in Warsaw. Construction of the Embassy building had employed Polish workers, and the first security officer was only present for the last 3 months of construction. Bagnal, this time with Gene Todd, went to Warsaw and looked behind the radiators. They found 37 microphones; however, there were no microphones behind radiators in the Deputy Chief of Mission’s office. Inspecting the office, they found a microphone behind the baseboard, which led to a second network of 17 microphones, bringing the total to 54 bugs at the Embassy. Bagnal later speculated that the baseboard system was a decoy for the radiator system—the Soviets hoped that a technical security officer would find the baseboard system and then quit looking.59

The discoveries forced SY to reassess the technical security program, and SY adopted three changes. First, SY developed new counter-measures equipment to better detect Soviet bloc listening devices. Second, SY accelerated the installation of secure conference rooms “at all major and sensitive posts abroad.”60

The discovery of a “shoe bug” then prompted SY to modify its ACRs. In 1969, Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission in Bucharest, Romania, called a classified conference, which met in the “bubble.” SY officer Lou Grob was monitoring the meeting from another room and heard the conversation. He immediately informed the Administration Officer (the RSO’s superior) that there was a bug in the ACR. After searching, they found something resembling Don Adams’s “shoe phone” from the 1960s television series Get Smart!–the bug was located in the heel of Barnes’s shoe. Barnes had had the butler take his shoes out to be modified, and someone had installed the bug in the process. After this incident, SY officers covered ACRs with Reynolds plastic wrap to reduce the radiation of low-power devices such as shoe bugs until the proper security modifications could be made.61
As a third change to its technical security program, SY arranged for a group of U.S. Navy Seabees to be assigned to the Department. The Seabee detail resulted from the increasing sophistication of Soviet espionage. Although SY had assigned extra Marine guards to the Moscow and Warsaw construction projects, SY officials noted that Marines did not possess the expertise to recognize efforts by foreign carpenters, electricians, and plumbers to plant bugs. Seabees, however, as a result of their training, could recognize unusual or seemingly unnecessary changes in or aspects of the construction. One senior technical officer later noted that Soviet craftsmanship in masonry and carpentry made detecting Soviet bugs extremely difficult. SY had already utilized Seabees in Warsaw to repair the damage caused by the removal of the microphone network. With 15 “major” building and renovation projects slated for fiscal year 1966, SY decided to create a permanent Seabees detail. The detail would “provide surveillance through close and constant supervision” of projects, and in some cases, complete work in “sensitive” areas. Initially called the “Naval Mobile Construction Battalion FOUR, Detachment NOVEMBER,” the Seabees received as one of their first assignments the removal of the microphone network and the repair of the damage in the Embassy in Moscow. In the last quarter of fiscal year 1965, SY requested money for an additional 59 Seabees, and signed an agreement with the Navy to establish a formal Naval support unit for the Department of State.  

SY divided the Seabees into two groups. One group of 128, plus the later 59, were assigned to specific construction projects, and then returned to the Navy upon the projects’ completion. SY contracted the second group of 27 Seabees on a reimbursable, renewable basis. Assigned to four regional technical centers in Frankfurt, Beirut, Panamá, and Tokyo, this second group assumed several tasks, including setting up secure conference rooms, assisting technical officers, providing labor and supervision for construction projects, and providing close surveillance of “sensitive” areas.
renovation projects in sensitive areas, and repairing the damage incurred while locating a bug. By 1968, the Seabees program was permanent, and securing construction projects at embassies had emerged as a diplomatic security priority.63

With the Moscow and Warsaw finds, several U.S. officials expressed outrage at the potentially damaging effects the bugs might have on diplomacy and U.S. security. However, seasoned Foreign Service Officers and Moscow Embassy veterans played down the threat. When questioned by the press, they assured the public that “American diplomats have always assumed that the embassy in Moscow was not secure against eavesdropping,” and held “their most sensitive discussions” either in “several small rooms-within-rooms installed by Americans for security reasons,” or outdoors. Curiously, in playing down one threat, the veteran FSOs revealed that the Embassy had installed ACRs as a technical countermeasure.64

Some members of Congress dismissed the potential consequences of the technical finds, and maintained their focus upon personnel security. House Appropriations Subcommittee Chair John J. Rooney (D-NY), for example, was unimpressed with the discoveries of microphone networks. He belittled SY Director Gentile’s revelations, his displays of bugs, and his requests for resources to improve physical security. “We have been finding microphones in that building [the Moscow embassy] for as long as I can remember,” declared Rooney. He noted that five years earlier, SY had also shown him microphones, and then “took a cool million dollars” for its budget. In Rooney’s view, SY was merely trying “to impress us again with microphones.” Instead of asking how SY might improve physical and technical security, Rooney devoted more attention to how much taxpayer money was needed to repair damages incurred in the removal of microphone networks from the Warsaw and Moscow embassies.65

During SY’s appropriations hearings, Rooney showed more interest in how many homosexuals SY had dismissed from the Department than discovered listening devices. After entering questions regarding SY’s budget in the public record, Rooney turned the subcommittee’s focus to what he once derisively quipped as “the machinations of the Mattachine Society,” an organization which lobbied for ending discrimination against gays

Figure 22: G. Marvin Gentile, Director of the Office of Security, 1964-1974. Recruited by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State William Crockett, Gentile rebuilt SY after the Otepka affair and professionalized it. He implemented training programs to meet the increasing security demands of the Department, and was deemed by one senior Department official as “a breath of fresh air.” Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, homosexuals constituted three-fourths of all Department of State dismissals by SY. In some years they constituted nearly all dismissals. Amid the security breaches of U.S. facilities in Eastern Europe, Rooney was always more interested in the details concerning the highest ranking, longest employed men and women dismissed from the Foreign Service as security risks.66

Protecting Diplomats

Visits by foreign dignitaries to the United States increased dramatically in the 1960s. President Kennedy entertained more dignitaries and heads of state during his first two years in office than Roosevelt had in his 12 years in office or Truman had in eight years. Kennedy hosted 74 official visits in 1961 and 1962, whereas his predecessor Dwight Eisenhower had hosted 32 official visits in 1953 and 1954. Moreover, the assignment of diplomats from newly independent African and Third World nations—22 in the summer of 1961 alone—multiplied the protective duties of SY. For the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, SY was scheduled to protect 10 foreign heads of state, with the possibility of another 12 attending. Two-thirds of these leaders were from nations that had achieved independence during the previous 8 years.67

Despite protecting diplomats and foreign dignitaries since the 1920s, SY did not possess the formal responsibility to do so. It had implicit responsibility, which was noted in the legal code authorizing security agents to carry firearms. However, the Secretary of State did not have formal authorization and direction from Congress to protect foreign diplomats and visiting dignitaries. When the 1961 Vienna Convention specifically required host countries to provide protection, SY Director William Boswell petitioned SCA to propose Congressional legislation that would specifically authorize the Secretary to assume direct responsibility for protecting foreign officials and dignitaries working and/or traveling in the United States. The SCA drafted the bill for the session of Congress that began in January 1962, but Congress did not pass it.68

By November 1962, SY’s Protective Services Branch had assumed oversight of dignitary protection, and had been transferred from the Division of Domestic Operations to the Division of Investigations. Under the leadership of Keith O.
“Jack” Lynch, Protective Services with 10 Special Agents and 1 secretary was too short-staffed to handle the number of assignments given it; in fact, Protective Services had to pull 5 full-time Agents from other branches and divisions to meet its protective assignments. In fiscal year 1961, Protective Services provided protection for 41 heads of state and dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 25 conferences. During the first 6 months of fiscal year 1962, the branch protected 22 heads of state and foreign dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 22 conferences. SY Director Boswell admitted that agents working protective details had logged more than 4,000 hours in uncompensated overtime. Given the lack of resources, Protective Services often pulled manpower from the Investigations Division, which in turn caused backlogs in security investigations. Accordingly, Boswell also called attention to the constant lack of manpower for protection, and urged SCA to increase SY’s staffing. The shortage of Special Agents also forced SY to collaborate with other agencies, particularly the FBI and local police, to meet its tasks. For example, in September 1960, the New York City Police Department detailed thousands of officers to assist SY in ensuring the safety of 19 heads of state, including Premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, during the General Assembly meeting at the United Nations.

SY protective details, however, could not protect foreign diplomats from segregation and discrimination, particularly diplomats from Africa and Asia. Discriminatory practices were still common in Washington, DC and the surrounding area during the early 1960s. Ambassadors, their staffs, and families routinely were denied service, and African diplomats struggled to find suitable housing in the informally segregated District of Columbia. Washington’s Metropolitan Club granted free membership to ambassadors, but denied it to African and Asian diplomats. White supremacists “roughed up” a Ghanaian diplomat who traveled to Georgia to observe an election. When an Ethiopian diplomat “received menacing phone calls” and found the tires of his car “repeatedly flattened,” Washington police “ignored” his requests for an investigation.

With discrimination and harassment threatening to damage U.S. relations with newly independent states, the Kennedy Administration moved to rectify the problem. President Kennedy strongly believed that winning the “hearts and minds” of the Third World was essential to the U.S. Cold War strategy,
and discriminatory treatment of diplomats and dignitaries from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and even Latin America, did nothing to assist the United States; in fact, it harmed U.S. efforts to win the Cold War. To counter discrimination against foreign dignitaries, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles suggested creating a Special Protocol Service Section (SPSS) within the Department’s Office of Protocol. With Kennedy’s approval, the new division began work in February 1961, under the direction of Pedro Sanjuan. The new SPSS worked in conjunction with SY’s Protective Services to offer protection for African diplomats in the United States, and to ensure that their visits went smoothly, much as the Chief Special Agent had done in the 1920s.72

To his credit, Sanjuan was acutely aware that many African diplomats were from the elite and professional classes in their nations, and news of discriminatory treatment could flow back to the diplomats’ home countries, threatening to magnify the issue into a much larger problem. In response to an incident involving Nigerian diplomats, Sanjuan wrote, “What affects one or more members of these groups is likely to have a strong influence on the opinions and attitudes of their governments,” and could “influence the nature of United States-Nigerian relations to a considerable degree.” Such incidents also affected diplomats and dignitaries of several other African nations, including Mali, Ghana, and Sierra Leone.73

Yet SPSS was not always successful. For example, a restaurant on U.S. Route 40 (connecting Washington, DC with New York City) denied service to the Ambassador from the new nation-state of Chad, Adam Malik Sow, who was travelling to Washington to present his credentials to President Kennedy. After the incident, the Ambassador did not continue to Washington; he instead returned to Chad and quit. Kennedy ordered Sanjuan to “do something” about the Chadian’s humiliation; Sanjuan sent a “lengthy and very formal apology” to the Government of Chad. Secretary of State Rusk related another instance in which an African delegate to the United Nations was travelling to New York and his plane stopped in Miami. “When the passengers disembarked for lunch, the white passengers were taken to the airport restaurant; the
black delegate received a folding canvas stool in a corner of the hanger and a sandwich wrapped with waxed paper. He then flew to New York, where our delegation asked for his vote on human rights issues. That same ambassador later became his country’s prime minister. We learned later that his chronic bitterness toward the United States stemmed from that incident.”

In addition to expanding protection of foreign diplomats, Keith Lynch, the chief of SY’s Protective Services, tried to upgrade the Secretary’s detail by providing 24-hour, round-the-clock protection. The upgrade required two additional officers, because up until that time, the Secretary had received only “portal to portal” protection. Despite Lynch’s efforts, SY only provided 24-hour coverage for two short periods during the early 1960s: the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and after a major escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1964. During these periods, Rusk did not want to alarm his family, so SY maintained a security post in the Secretary’s automobile outside his residence from midnight until 8 o’clock in the morning.

SY provided constant security for the Secretary while he traveled abroad. Such protection required comprehensive collaboration with police and officials in those countries. However, this did not prevent untoward acts against the Secretary. While in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, Rusk was laying a wreath on a memorial when a man broke through the police barricade, ran toward Rusk, and tried to spit on him. The police caught him before he reached the Secretary. Rusk also made trips to South Vietnam, but he eventually suspended his travel there, citing the great amount of effort required to protect him.

The November 1963 assassination of President Kennedy brought federal protective services under close scrutiny. SY flew in more than 100 agents from its various field offices to protect the more than 25 heads of state and other dignitaries who came to Washington for Kennedy’s funeral. The effort also required 115 intelligence agents from Army Intelligence, 20 agents for the Army Criminal Investigation Unit, and 40 agents from the CIA. Keith Lynch and Leo E. Crampsey coordinated the protection effort. SY set up a 24-hour “nerve center,” or command center, to
assist in coordinating efforts and passing information from various agencies. The “unprecedented” efforts were the largest protective security operation that SY had ever undertaken, and they merited special recognition from Secretary Rusk.\footnote{77}

In the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination and funeral, SY reviewed its own protective security practices and procedures. While the Secret Service required tighter security for Presidential and Vice Presidential visits abroad, foreign governments argued that the U.S. officials failed to provide the same level of service to foreign dignitaries traveling in the United States. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Gentile noted in 1964 that if Protective Services failed to receive the additional funding for more security officers, “it would be . . . difficult to explain a reduction in the present coverage, if harm came to a Presidential guest.” To further justify the need for additional officers, the Protective Services Branch illustrated the increase in the number of visits it covered—from 14 in 1957 to an average of 60 in 1964. Despite the growing number of visitors, Protective Services had only gained one officer since 1962. To staff each detail, Protective Services was still forced to enlist the assistance of temporary personnel from field offices and other divisions in the Office of Security.\footnote{78}

Gentile also sought revisions in the travel plans of foreign visitors. He expressed concern about heads of state and foreign dignitaries who often flew on commercial airliners, particularly on airlines that prevented security from searching passengers and luggage. To combat this security risk, Gentile proposed that heads of the other executive agencies place military aircraft at the disposal of visiting dignitaries. Apparently this proposal failed because Protective Services determined that if visitors insisted on traveling on commercial airliners, SY would only assume responsibility for the domestic portion of the itinerary. Thus, SY protective details began and concluded at U.S. ports of entry and departure.\footnote{79}
President Kennedy’s assassination led Congress, on August 27, 1964, to pass Public Law 493, which made it a federal crime to assault or injure foreign dignitaries. Moreover, the law imposed stricter fines of $5,000 and up to 3 years of imprisonment for assaulting dignitaries and Department of State Security Officers working on a protective assignment.  

After the release of the Warren Commission Report on the Kennedy assassination, Gentile offered several proposals to improve security for visiting dignitaries. He recommended transporting dignitaries in armored limousines, creating standard written procedures to govern cooperation with local police, heightening coordination between federal agencies, and increasing SY personnel. Gentile also proposed creating an intelligence unit within SY to collect and analyze intelligence and threat information that could impact the protective assignment of a particular dignitary. The Intelligence Processing Section within the Records and Research Branch was already doing much of this, so Gentile likely was proposing expansion of intelligence processing and analysis efforts. On July 1, 1965, SY created the Protective Research Section under the Division of Protective Security, with Francis R. Tully as its first chief. Rather than creating an entirely new section, the Protective Research Section probably was staffed by moving the Intelligence Processing staff from Records and Research to Protective Security, together with additional staff that SY had hired. New Protective Security procedures mandated that the agent-in-charge of protection during a visit submit a written request for protective intelligence when the Secretary or visiting
dignitaries travelled outside the greater Washington, DC area. The Protective Research Section furnished statistics on threats, bombings, demonstrations, and picketing, against both United States missions abroad and foreign missions in the United States. It also passed specific threat information about the President or Vice President to the Secret Service. Information on threats against the Secretary or visiting dignitaries automatically passed to the Section from other protective and intelligence agencies. In 1966, SY renamed the Section the Protective Support Section, and later elevated it to branch level, underscoring its importance.82

The 1965, Gentile reorganized SY. He divided the office into two large wings. One wing, “Personnel Security,” comprised the Divisions of Investigations, Evaluations, and Protective Security, the latter of which was pulled out of Investigations and elevated to division status. The other office, “Domestic and Foreign Security,” consisted of the Divisions of Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic Operations, the latter of which handled security for the Department’s buildings in the Washington metropolitan area. Gentile also created two small staff units. One focused upon Education and Training, and the other on Special Assignments, which constituted primarily investigations resulting in the termination of a Department of State employee (for homosexuality, espionage, and criminal acts).83

Figure 29: Organization chart for the Office of Security, 1965. The chart shows how Director Marvin Gentile reorganized the office to meet the security demands for the 1960s. Again, the reorganization shows the steady growth of overseas and physical security in relation to investigations, which dominated SY’s work just ten years earlier. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
**Conclusion**

The years between 1960 and 1965 were difficult for SY and diplomatic security, but the most notable developments for diplomatic security and SY resulted from four events. The Cuban Missile Crisis exposed the aging state of U.S. diplomatic communications, leading to the adoption of new computer technologies to provide secure, quick, and effective communications for the Department. The Otepka affair resulted in a wholesale change in SY’s leadership and the exposure of a senior SY official who was leaking classified information to Congress. The affair also brought an end to McCarthyism in the Department of State, and further led to the recruitment of G. Marvin Gentile, who professionalized and rebuilt SY. Third, SY’s discovery of two extensive microphone networks in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw led to the expansion of SY’s technical security division and the creation of a Seabees detachment at SY. Finally, the assassination of President Kennedy initiated a series of improvements in protective security and the expansion of SY’s protective details for foreign dignitaries. In addition, the emergence of numerous new states in Africa and Asia, in conjunction with the Civil Rights Movement, led the Kennedy Administration, largely through the efforts of Pedro Sanjuan, to work aggressively to end discrimination against foreign diplomats.

As 1965 drew to a close, SY was expanding as an organization under the leadership of Marvin Gentile, and the Department was improving security. However, the security threats of the early 1970s would transform SY well beyond the organization that Boswell, Reilly, and Gentile had inherited.
CHAPTER 5  SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

Endnotes


2 Oral History Interview, Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett, 20 June 1990, interviewed by Thomas Stern for the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, p. 46. Hereafter cited as ADST.


8 Denza, Diplomatic Law, 5, 2-3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reprinted as Appendix 1 in Denza. For quotation, see Denza, Diplomatic Law, 423.


10 Oral History Interview, David McCabe, 31 March 2006.


For examples of internal, Congressional, and public complaints, see Letter, Otto F. Otepka, Deputy Direction of the Office of Security, to John Ordway, Chief of the Personnel Operations Division, Department of State, 18 December 1961; Memorandum “Security Office Personnel Cuts,” Joel H. Stearns, Special Assistant to the Administrator of SCA, to E. Allen Fidel, Office of Congressional Affairs, 1 December 1961; Letter, Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs (Fidel), to John G. Tower, U.S. Senate, 18 December 1961; Letter, Dutton (Boswell) to Glenard P. Lipscomb, U.S. House of Representatives, 11 December 1961; and Letter, Dutton (D. Frahme) to Page Belcher, December 1961; all Folder – 1-E/1.2, Box 2, SCA-Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59-Lot 68D175, NA.

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Reilly was appointed as Director of SY in April 1962, but with the move to the Bureau of Administration, he was raised to a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Office Letter, Executive Officer to all SY employees, 8 August 1962, Folder 1, Box 5, Protective Services Policy Files, 1962-1968, RG 59 - Lot 70D292, NA. Report to William Crockett for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 26 August 1963, Box 2, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), RG 59 - Lot 96D563, NA, p. 64.

Kahn, The Codebreakers, 713.


Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 45.


History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State


43 The American Legion Special Liaison Committee to the U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: The American Legion, 1964), pp. 59, 28. This booklet contains the committee’s report, as well as the relevant portion of Rusk’s speech and the correspondence between the Department of the State and the American Legion on setting up the committee and its review.


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49 Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 46. Memorandum “Otepka’s Assignments,” Gentile, 24 February 1967, Box 3, DUSA Subject Files 1967, RG 59 – Lot 70D403, NA.


59 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 3.


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Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” JAH 87/2: 552.


Memorandum “Proposed Budget for the Future, Lynch to Grignon, September 1964; and Memorandum, Grignon to Crockett, 5 August 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.


Memorandum “Protection of Visiting Dignitaries,” Lynch to Robert L. Berry, 1 March 1963; and Memorandum “Justification for Personnel,” Lynch to LaSelle, 30 April 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68 RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.

Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read, Special Assistant to Secretary and Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 20 May 1964; and Memorandum “SY Policy for Protection of Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile to Crockett, 26 May 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.


Memorandum “Establishment of the Protective Research Section,” Lynch to All PRS Personnel, 24 September 1965; Memorandum “Protective Intelligence,” Lynch to All Officer Personnel, 2 February 1966; Memorandum “Study of the Protective Functions of the Office of Security, Department of State,” Grignon to Richard W. Barrett, 5 May 1965; Agreement Between the Department of State and the Secret Service, 28 June 1966; Memorandum “Progress of the Division of Protective Security since July 1, 1964,” Lynch to Grignon, 16 December 1966, Folder – Policy 1965; and Memorandum “Additional Justification Increase in Staff SY/PrS,” Lynch to Muhonen, 25 August 1967, Folder – Policy 1967; all Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.

**CHAPTER 6**

**THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION**

*Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978*

The rise of terrorism transformed diplomatic security. Although new technologies and the growing demands for protection of foreign dignitaries in the United States had prompted changes in security measures in the early 1960s, terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced the Department of State and its Office of Security (SY) to reinvent their approach to diplomatic security. The kidnappings and murders of U.S. diplomats in Guatemala, Brazil, and Sudan, and the murders of the 1972 Israeli Olympic team and Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier, compelled SY—and the U.S. Government as a whole—to expand physical and protective security efforts. Furthermore, terrorism brought SY more into the public eye, as Congress demanded that the Department improve the physical security of U.S. Embassies and the protection of U.S. and foreign diplomats.

Two crucial aspects of the “great transformation” of diplomatic security merit attention. First, the transformation occurred in three phases. During the first phase (1967-1978), discussed in this chapter, the threat of terrorism forced SY and the Department to redefine and transform diplomatic security, laying the foundations for diplomatic security as it is understood in the present day. During the second phase (1979-1985), the threat of terrorism accelerated the transformation because the 1979 mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and the 1983-1984 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait exhibited new terrorist methods that dramatically altered how U.S. officials perceived the terrorist threat. Finally, the third phase (1992-2000) completed the transformation of
diplomatic security to the forms recognized today, with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as the key events that prompted the final phase of transformation.

A second crucial aspect is that during each of the three phases, SY expanded its responsibilities, but did not give up or transfer existing responsibilities. SY continued to conduct background investigations and evaluations, to protect the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, and to strengthen technical countermeasures against Soviet espionage. With the onset of terrorism, however, SY implemented new security measures, such as public access controls, armored cars, and closed-circuit television cameras. It established a command center, and created a threat analysis group to analyze threats to U.S. diplomatic security.

The extent of this transformation was not immediately apparent during this first phase. SY, under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Security G. Marvin Gentile (1964-1973) and Victor H. Dikeos (1974-1978), laid the foundations for what diplomatic security would become in the 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps most importantly, the two men—particularly Dikeos—guided SY as it redefined its raison d’être. Dikeos announced the redefinition in July 1975: “SY’s mission has changed from the traditional concept of thwarting clandestine penetration…to a much broadened role of protection against any and all sorts of hazards including blatant terrorist violence.”\(^2\) SY always had shouldered huge responsibilities in relation to its small size, but, as revealed by Dikeos, SY’s responsibilities grew immensely as terrorists targeted U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities with political acts of violence and destruction.

\section*{Diplomats as Targets}

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the targeting of diplomats and embassies by guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East pressured SY and the Department to redefine protection. Prior to 1965, protection had centered upon the Secretary of State and visiting foreign dignitaries. The idea of targeting a diplomat or diplomatic facility as a violent act of political expression was on the fringe of extreme
possibilities. Subtle signs of a shift from general security (anti-crime, anti-espionage) to protection of U.S. overseas facilities emerged in the late 1950s as the number of SY personnel tasked with overseas security approached the number of those slated for investigations and evaluations. In 1953, there were 110 officers in investigations and evaluations, but only 15 devoted to physical security and overseas operations. By 1963, the numbers had begun to even out, with 142 SY officers dedicated to investigations and evaluations, and 116 to physical and overseas security. The latter figure did not reflect the 758 Marine Security Guards assigned to 95 posts across the world.3

The increased number of personnel assigned to physical and overseas security was due, in part, to the Cold War and the decolonization in Africa and Asia. As one of two superpowers, the United States expanded its diplomatic corps in order to ensure that it had a diplomatic post in every country across the globe. This occurred at a time when the number of new states was rapidly increasing. In 1940, the Department of State had 58 diplomatic posts, but by 1970, that number had ballooned to 117. The effort to expand diplomatic representation abroad gained particular urgency when the Soviets announced a new strategy at their Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 “to temper Cold War tensions and to compete peacefully” with the United States for the hearts and minds of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.4 Moreover, European decolonization efforts, independence movements, and the emergence of numerous new nation-states in the developing world fostered independence struggles, civil wars,

Figure 3: Special Agents Terence Shea (left) and Al Boyd (right) provide protection for President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam (center), at Waikiki Beach in Honolulu, Hawaii in July 1968. Thieu was visiting Hawaii for a series of meetings with President Lyndon B. Johnson and senior Department of Defense officials to discuss a larger role for South Vietnamese armed forces in the war. Source: Private collection.

Figure 4: A missile thrown by anti-Vietnam War demonstrators explodes outside the U.S. Embassy in Grosvenor Square, London, March 17, 1968. During the late 1960s, U.S. diplomatic posts became targets for protesters and terrorists, and the reasons for the protests and attacks varied by region. Long accustomed to diplomatic immunity and inviolability of diplomatic premises, U.S. diplomats and the Department struggled with the new development. Source: © Associated Press.
local political tensions, guerrilla movements, and ethnic conflicts. Several struggles, tensions, and conflicts soon involved U.S. diplomats. As a result, SY needed more RSOs, SO(T)s, Marine Security Guards, and other personnel to secure the rapidly rising number of posts.

By the late 1960s, a growing number of U.S. posts and personnel overseas were becoming targets of violence perpetuated by radical, revolutionary, and terrorist movements. Several U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and United States Information Service (USIS) installations suffered damage from protests, attacks, or riots. During fiscal year 1971, USIS installations alone reported 61 threats or acts of violence. Even in nations perceived as peaceful and safe, such as France, Norway, Chile, and the Netherlands, U.S. posts faced an escalating number of violent acts.

The acts ranged from a few Norwegian demonstrators tossing rocks and bottles at the U.S. Embassy's windows in Oslo, to a bomb exploding in the dining room of the U.S. Consul General in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

The motivations behind the acts depended on locale, issue, and the internal political and economic dynamics of the host countries. In Europe, attacks often arose from opposition to the Vietnam War. In the Middle East, hostility and violence resulted from U.S. support for Israel. During the Six-Day War (June 5-10, 1967), Arab mobs attacked 22 U.S. Embassies and Consulates, with the damage ranging from gutted buildings to broken windows and damaged cars. In Latin America, U.S. actions, past and present, inspired anger and hostility. Such acts included not only the Vietnam War, but also such regional issues as U.S. policy towards Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the presence of U.S. multinational corporations, perceived U.S. support for right-wing dictators and opposition to social and economic reforms. In fact, in April 1968, the senior press chief for Chile's president admitted that it was “in” to be anti-American.
The increasing number of anti-American terrorist incidents in Latin America led U.S. policymakers and SY officials to develop its initial policies and procedures for terrorist attacks in that region. In early 1965, SY organized an ad hoc inter-agency committee to study terrorism, and particularly the isolated attacks against U.S. posts and installations in the region. The result was a “comprehensive guidance document” that SY sent to all Chiefs of Mission in Latin America. Although implementation of the documents’ recommendations was subject to the decision of the Chief of Mission, the guidance document requested that all missions set up Security Watch Committees. SY tasked the Watch Committees to evaluate the state of security in their country, and to devise and implement measures to improve post security. For example, SY called for the inspection of all incoming packages to the Embassy. SY also supplied posts with special protective equipment and launched a project to find a substitute for glass at U.S. facilities. The Department also issued new physical security regulations for all Department of State, USAID, and USIS installations. Recognizing that terrorism was not restricted to Latin America, SY and the Ad Hoc Committee sent an expanded version of the guidance document to all missions across the world in 1966.

By 1970, the levels and methods of violence had escalated. Rocks thrown at U.S. embassy windows in 1965 became Molotov cocktails, car bombs, or sticks of dynamite in 1968 and 1970, and then evolved into fuse and timer bombs in 1972. In Saigon, a person drove a car to the front of the U.S. Embassy and walked away. A few moments later, a fuse bomb exploded, killing several embassy employees and heavily damaging the building. In Beirut, in 1972, terrorists parked a car across the street from the U.S. Embassy, and then fired rocket-propelled grenades at the chancery through two holes cut in the vehicle’s body panels. In Lagos, Nigeria, during the Biafra civil war, the limits of physical security became evident. A mob gathered and threw stones at the Embassy (it had been attacked twice previously). The Marine Security Guards were not allowed to carry weapons, so the RSO issued them baseball bats. Similar problems also existed within allied countries. By 1968, with anti-American sentiment high and U.S. relations with Western Europe “having deteriorated to an alarming degree,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Gentile recommended
that SY relocate 26 percent of its personnel from its regional operations center in Frankfurt to offices in Washington, DC.¹²

Meanwhile, 1968 – the same year that witnessed the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy—also found U.S. officials recognizing that terrorists and guerrillas had begun to target U.S. diplomats for kidnappings and murder. During an attempted abduction, Marxist guerrillas killed U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon Mein on the streets of Guatemala City. One year later, Brazilian Marxist guerillas kidnapped U.S. Ambassador to Brazil C. Burke Elbrick. The Nixon Administration pressured the Brazilian Government to meet the kidnappers’ demands (the release of 15 jailed Communists), and the Brazilian Government did, whereupon the kidnappers released Elbrick. In 1970, the Tupamaros, a revolutionary Marxist guerilla group in Uruguay, abducted and held for ransom Daniel Mitrione, a U.S. police officer who served as an adviser to the Uruguayan police. In this instance, the Nixon Administration stepped back and did not pressure Uruguayan officials to meet the kidnappers’ demands. Ten days later, the Tupamaros killed Mitrione.¹³

Ambassador Mein’s murder sent a shock wave through the Department, in part, because he was the first U.S. Ambassador killed in the performance of duty.¹⁴ SY responded by initiating a “pilot project” for armored vehicles, but soon found that the cost of such vehicles prohibited each U.S. Embassy from purchasing one. While commercially procured armored vehicles had a price tag of $50,000, Department automobiles armored by SY personnel

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Figure 7: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon Mein. Mein was killed by leftist guerrillas on the streets of Guatemala City. His death led SY to begin a pilot project for armoring cars for U.S. Ambassadors overseas. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.

Figure 8: Uruguayan Commemorative Stamp in honor of Daniel Mitrione issued in 1992. The Public Safety Officer for the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, Mitrione was kidnapped and then killed on August 10, 1972, by Tupamaros guerrillas. The Tupamaros, like the Montoneros (Argentina) and MIR (Chile), adopted Guevara-type guerrilla tactics, and at times, threatened U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Cost $25,000, with $19,500 of that cost for bulletproof glass. Another option for SY, one which cost only $5,000, was to partially armor embassy cars, without bulletproof glass. SY officials chose this latter course, and Seabees and SO(T)s worked in teams to armor vehicles for select posts, with some teams able to armor a vehicle in less than a day.\(^{15}\)

The kidnapping of Ambassador Elbrick prompted the Department to enact extensive changes to physical and personnel security at U.S. posts overseas. In an instruction to the region’s diplomatic and consular posts, SY and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) warned that it had become “all too apparent that American official personnel are now potential targets.” Embassies in Latin America convened their Security Watch Committees to evaluate threats and determine the necessary measures for security preparedness. SY augmented Marine Security Guard forces for several Embassies, such as those in Brazil and Argentina; replaced older vehicles of Embassy motor pools; expanded the use of “follow” cars for Ambassadors; and provided more money for mission security expenses. Embassies built or upgraded fences and walls at chanceries and Ambassadors’ residences, installed emergency generators, upgraded lighting, and added vault doors and window grills.\(^{16}\)

SY did not restrict its efforts to the Western Hemisphere. In Europe, it elevated protection for U.S. Ambassadors to Great Britain, Belgium, and West Germany, whom SY believed were the most likely to be targets of violence.\(^{17}\) SY organized a “mobile reserve” of equipment that could be shipped to any mission during “extreme emergencies.” SY and ARA, with a representative from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, formed a Departmental Working Group to study the issue of protecting U.S. personnel “on a world-wide basis.” Finally, the Department of State also approached the Vatican, and asked it to lend its moral authority to help protect diplomats and to assist in negotiations should U.S. diplomats be kidnapped.\(^{18}\)
In the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping, SY admitted that the abductions of and attacks on U.S. personnel “show[ed] no sign of abatement;” and it and other offices in the Department began to formalize procedures for U.S. posts to undertake in the event of a terrorist incident. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management William B. Macomber, Jr., advocated developing a formal policy regarding kidnapping, but Secretary of State William P. Rogers preferred an “ad hoc policy on kidnappings.” Under the direction of Gentile, SY devised a four-phase plan that outlined “graduated responses” to threats against its missions and staff. The four phases were “Early Warning,” “Clear Existence of Threat,” “Clear Existence of Intense Threat,” and “Unacceptable Level of Threat.” Actions to be taken in the first phase, Early Warning, were demonstrated by the efforts taken in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) after Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil. U.S. officials, in consultation with Ceylonese officials, reviewed the situation and deemed the threat minimal, took precautionary measures, and reviewed the situation periodically. The second phase, Clear Existence of Threat, demanded actions similar to those taken by U.S. posts in Latin America in the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping. Phase Three required all dependents and non-essential personnel to evacuate the country, and the post to move the remaining staff into easier-to-protect buildings. “Unacceptable Level of Threat,” the fourth phase meant that U.S. posts should implement their emergency plans and evacuate the country. In 1971, a more extensive, sophisticated version of this phased plan was distributed, with addenda on personal safety and defensive driving.

SY also outlined a four-stage sequence that U.S. posts should follow in case they required additional protection. The sequence advised embassies first to consult with the host government, which bore the primary responsibility for providing security for foreign missions. If the host country provided extra guards and an incident occurred (e.g., a shoot-out), it would be a local issue under the responsibility of the host government, not a diplomatic incident between the United States and the host nation. As a second stage, SY recommended that U.S. posts examine the possibility of hiring local, reputable, professional guards. If that was not possible, then, as a third option, U.S. security officers might be made available. Gentile made clear that hiring additional Marine Security Guards was to be a last resort, partly due to questions of immunity and jurisdiction. Moreover, since many Marines had served a tour of duty in...
Vietnam, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made clear that it was “somewhat unfair to ask that a twenty year-old veteran of Viet Nam, whose reflexes have been sharpened by combat, [to] exercise the restraint and cool judgment” required on protective security assignments.22

Reactions by host governments to U.S. requests for added protection were mixed. Some governments, such as those of Ecuador, Tunisia, Lebanon, Ethiopia, and Portugal, cooperated and increased protective details for U.S. diplomats with their military and police forces.23 In Chile, with a presidential election campaign underway, one candidate had accused the government of permitting a “climate of violence” to prevail. The incumbent Chilean Government believed that obvious increases in security for U.S. diplomats would confirm the accusation and perhaps unsettle the public. Instead, officials said that the Ambassador’s chauffeurs could carry firearms, and that the Embassy could hire private Chilean bodyguards. Chilean officials, however, would increase security if intelligence identified a specific threat, and the Chilean Government promised to discuss the matter and review security at future intervals.24

In its discussions with U.S. officials, the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry questioned the legal and diplomatic status of Marine Security Guards. U.S. officials had been quiet and careful about the presence of U.S. Marines at its Embassies, at times insisting that the Marines wear civilian clothes or grow their hair beyond regulation. Although the Uruguayans determined that the Marines merited the privileges and immunities extended to other U.S. Embassy employees, U.S. security concerns had raised the Uruguayans’ awareness of the Marines’ presence, and their anxieties over a possible clash between Marines and locals. Despite their concerns, Uruguayan officials assisted U.S. officials in improving the security of the chancery and Ambassador’s residence, as well as implementing the protective measures for the Embassy staff.25

Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil led SY to create two new programs. First, SY officials turned the pilot project for armored vehicles into the formal Protective Security Vehicle Program. This enabled SY to not only purchase fully protective security vehicles, but also install mobile radios in Embassy vehicles, obtain kits to armor existing cars, and buy automobiles equipped with “high performance features.” The vehicles went to “high risk” posts such as Saigon, Beirut, and Montevideo. By 1972, SY could claim success for the armored vehicle program. In Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, a bomb exploded near the Embassy’s armored vehicle, and the Chargé d’Affaires, the Chargé’s guard, and the chauffeur walked away unharmed.\(^{26}\)

The second program SY created was the Mobile Reserve and Emergency Action Teams. The Mobile Reserve consisted of a reserve of personnel and equipment that could be temporarily sent to a post where kidnapping and terrorism threats were high. SY officials organized personnel into Emergency Action Teams, the forerunner of Mobile Tactical Security Teams. The teams were three squads of four to five people each, and were assigned as emergencies dictated. Once at post, an Emergency Action Team immediately conducted a “detailed physical survey,” and determined the host government’s capability of protecting U.S. diplomatic personnel. The squad also made recommendations for enhancing post security, and provided temporary security services. If needed, the team could request additional Marine Guards for the Ambassador’s residence or other post buildings.\(^{27}\)

\(\textbf{Protecting the Secretary}\)

Protests, threats, and violence also occurred in the United States, and such threats raised concerns among SY officials about whether they could provide “adequate” protection for the Secretary of State and visiting foreign dignitaries. In 1970, Chief of Protective Services Keith O. “Jack” Lynch cited a notable increase in the number of threats and demonstrations against the Secretary. The fact that local police departments, such as Washington and Los Angeles, would not assign officers for 24-hour protective duty unless SY also assigned an agent further compounded SY’s anxieties. The situation differed little with visiting dignitaries. When the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, visited the United States, SY noted that he received “serious threats” daily, forcing the office to devote many additional hours investigating and analyzing the threats, and protecting the Shah.\(^{28}\)

Several incidents in 1967, resulting from public opposition to the Vietnam War, exposed the need for more Special Agents on the Secretary of State’s detail. During a speech given by Secretary Dean Rusk in Los Angeles, 150 protesters held a demonstration and a mock trial that found Rusk “guilty of gross war crimes.” The judge of the mock trial was found to be active in the Maoist Progressive Labor Party. Student protesters at Indiana University prevented Rusk from

![Figure 12: William “Bill” DeCourcy (left, with pin on lapel, holding radio) protects Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Oslo, Norway, during a 1966 visit. During the 1960s, large anti-war protests made ensuring the Secretary’s speaking engagements outside Washington difficult. In New York City, 1400 New York police were needed to control multiple anti-Vietnam War groups protesting Rusk’s appearance and assist with the protection of the Secretary of State. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.](image-url)
delivering his speech. In New York City, multiple student protest groups demonstrated against his appearance at a speaking engagement, and more than 1,400 police officers were required to control the crowd. After the February 1968 Tet Offensive, antiwar protests further fueled SY’s concern for the Secretary’s safety, particularly at university campuses. The Secretary also received a substantial amount of crank mail on a regular basis, and since crank mail was directed more against the office than the individual, SY anticipated that such threats would continue no matter who served as Secretary of State.  

Despite the increasing threats, resource constraints prevented SY from providing 24-hour protection to the Secretary. In late 1968, SY rotated three agents for portal-to-portal protection for the Secretary. One Special Agent greeted the Secretary at his home, and escorted him to his office (handling the early shift). A second Special Agent took the late shift until the Secretary retired for the evening, and the third agent had the day off. The three agents were responsible for coordinating, arranging, and providing personal protection for the Secretary. The agents also worked to prevent any compromise of the Secretary’s classified papers, and to stop any technical espionage of the Secretary’s voice communications. Rusk did receive 24-hour protection when he traveled overseas. In comparison, President Lyndon B. Johnson had approximately 25 Secret Service agents protecting him 24 hours a day, and in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson extended that protection to Presidential candidates, which required an additional 21 agents.  

The rise of terrorism led SY to expand the Secretary’s detail to 24-hour coverage during Secretary William Rogers’s tenure (1969-1973). An incident at Rogers’s home, in part, motivated the decision to implement a 24-hour detail. On October 8, 1970, a car pulled into the Secretary’s driveway, and Rogers went out to see who it was. Although the men were well-dressed Drug Enforcement Agency agents, at least one SY agent shook his head in amazement that Rogers took the risk of going outside to the car. When Rogers’s personal secretary, Maggie Runkel, heard of the situation, she immediately contacted Protective Services and insisted that the Secretary have 24-hour protection. Gentile ordered the 24-hour coverage to last until Rogers decided to terminate it, but Rogers never did.  

With 24-hour protection, the Secretary’s detail grew in personnel and resources, and in turn, it prompted the formalization and standardization of procedures. Four to five Special Agents now made up the detail, and the number increased when the Secretary traveled abroad. SY renovated Rogers’s garage into a command post, where SY Agents communicated with the Washington Field Office. A Marine guard joined the SY Agent during the night shift. SY also required that two men be with the Secretary at all times, and occasionally more if Rogers attended a public event or dinner. The detail began employing a follow-up car for the Secretary’s motorcade. SY agents now used walkie-talkies, and in 1970, the head of the Secretary’s detail, William D’Urso, obtained an earpiece for his radio to coordinate protection. While the Department had leased a Cadillac from General Motors for the Secretary’s use, additional monies in 1971 allowed SY to purchase a Cadillac, and have a group of Seabees install armor plates and bulletproof glass. William DeCourcy, who preceded D’Urso as
head of the Secretary’s detail, instituted procedures that required Special Agents to escort the Secretary’s baggage to the plane and have the baggage x-rayed to prevent placement of bombs.\textsuperscript{32}

Even with added protection, Secretary Rogers faced harrowing experiences while traveling abroad. On July 31, 1969, he barely escaped injury at the Tokyo airport when a Japanese national charged at him with a knife, and SY Agent Joseph McNulty knocked the attacker to the ground. In May 1972, Rogers traveled to Reykjavík, Iceland, to speak at the local university, against the warnings of SY’s advance team and the objection of Secretary’s detail chief William D’Urso. Iceland’s Prime Minister had assured Rogers of his safety. During the speech, large anti-war demonstrations broke out, and Rogers and the SY detail had to fight through the crowd to leave the campus. Soon afterwards, the local police commander informed Rogers that they had to leave for the airport immediately or risk being cut off en route by the protesters, who were now threatening to use Molotov cocktails. They departed before the protesters could organize, and arrived safely at the airport.\textsuperscript{33}

Rogers’s attendance at the inauguration of Argentine President Hector José Cámpora Demaestre in May 1973 proved equally harrowing. A crowd of one million demonstrators formed, and plain-clothes police left rather than try to control the crowd. Ten motorcycle officers remained, one of whom was killed when a protester knocked him off his motorcycle. Fearing for Rogers’s safety, SY agents prepared to leave Buenos Aires, and hid the Secretary in a safe room until Argentine police backup arrived. When Argentine leaders learned of Rogers’s imminent departure, they doubled the forces protecting him in order to convince him to stay for the inaugural festivities.\textsuperscript{34}

Rogers had resisted protection during his golf outings, but this changed too. During an outing in Bermuda, six men with machetes emerged from the woods during a round of golf. The men were groundskeepers, but Rogers admitted that initially he was nervous. Afterwards he permitted SY Agents to accompany him during his golf outings.\textsuperscript{35}
The Chicago Incident

While the Secretary of State faced threats at home and abroad, foreign leaders worried about security threats when visiting the United States. Thailand, Colombia, France, Israel, Vietnam, and Mexico began to send advance teams to review security arrangements for their leaders. For SY, it became increasingly evident that even with intelligence provided by its Protective Support section, the Protective Services Division could not meet the protective demands of the foreign diplomats, heads of state, and prominent visitors with its available manpower. While the Secret Service received increased funding and resources during the late 1960s for its protective responsibilities, SY did not. SY’s Protective Services openly wondered if the President mistakenly believed that foreign dignitaries and the Secretary of State received the same protection as Presidential candidates. In fact, despite SY’s calls for additional resources, the office could assign only two qualified SY Special Agents and three Marines to protect visiting dignitaries. More Agents could be utilized if they were pulled off investigations and from other SY divisions. At a time when many heads of state visited the United States, SY could only protect those dignitaries deemed highly visible. Moreover, SY had one “fed pak”/radio-equipped vehicle for protective details, and agents had to rent cars if a detail required a follow-up car. SY Agent Dennis Williams recalled once renting the only available vehicle for a follow car at Washington National Airport: an orange Rambler station wagon. A visit by French President Georges Pompidou in early 1970 exposed the deficiency in resources and transformed protective security for visiting heads of state and dignitaries. Prior to his visit, Pompidou had sold more than 100 fighter jets to the Libyan regime of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi, who openly espoused Arab nationalism, supported jihad, and defined “Zionism” and Israel as his enemy. The French sale of jets prompted protests by the U.S. Jewish community and others, who feared that French weapons would fall into the hands of other Arab extremists. Given the extremely strong sentiment against Pompidou—some protests numbered in the thousands—the Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and the Mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, refused to greet Pompidou officially or attend a dinner in his honor at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley had planned to be away when the French President was scheduled to visit his city. Only after a telephone call from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger did Mayor Daley decide to stay and greet Pompidou. Nearly 100 members of Congress signed a petition and planned to boycott Pompidou’s speech to a joint session of that body. President Nixon was livid; H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, remarked that it was the angriest he had seen Nixon since becoming President. Nixon told Kissinger, “I consider this unconscionable conduct towards an official guest of the United States of America, and I will not tolerate it.”

Events climaxed in Chicago. Someone pulled the Chicago police back from President Pompidou and his wife. Demonstrators closed in on the French couple, and one demonstrator spit on Madame Pompidou. She was so shaken by the incident that she was determined to return to Paris; meanwhile, the French President threatened to end his visit. As soon as Nixon heard of the incident, he told Emil “Bus” Mosbacher, Jr., the Chief of Protocol, to do whatever was necessary to ensure that Madame Pompidou stayed, and Mosbacher succeeded in persuading her. Nixon immediately altered his schedule, flew to New York, and attended the dinner in Pompidou’s honor at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. He apologized to Pompidou in person, and made kind, humorous remarks that “obviously moved” and “deeply touched” the French President.

The Chicago incident had diplomatic security and foreign policy consequences. Furious with the protesters, Nixon immediately postponed the delivery of 50 Phantom fighter jets to Israel, despite occasional skirmishes between Israel and its Arab neighbor states Egypt and Syria, and despite opposition from Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Nixon claimed that he faced “a wave of criticism” from Congress and the press, yet he remained firm for 6 months. Then on September 15, 1970, Palestinian extremists supplied by Syria staged an uprising in Jordan that threatened civil war and the demise of Jordan’s King Hussein ibn Talal ibn ʿAbdallah. The Jordan crisis prompted Nixon to release the Phantom jets to Israel.

In the wake of the Pompidou incident, Nixon immediately called for new legislation that transferred the responsibility of protecting foreign dignitaries from the Department of State to the Secret Service. John W. Dean, Counsel to the President, petitioned the Departments of State and the Treasury to develop legislation that reflected Nixon’s wishes. Lawyers from the two Departments favored revising existing arrangements, not a total reorganization. The Secret Service also sought to preserve SY’s involvement in
protective details. William Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, even asked the Secretary of State to maintain oversight over dignitary protection, with the Secret Service providing additional security protection.\footnote{Nevertheless, the task for protecting foreign diplomats was transferred to the Secret Service and staffed by its Executive Protective Service (EPS).} Despite the transfer of protective duties, SY continued to receive protective assignments; and one assignment, the Chinese table tennis team, did much to rebuild SY’s reputation. Nixon and Kissinger secretly had begun to explore the possibility of improving U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after two decades of hostility, tension, and non-recognition. In April 1971, the PRC Government invited a U.S. table tennis team to visit. The invitation and visit led to a gradual thawing of relations and a visit by President Nixon to China in February 1972. In April, the Secret Service turned down a White House request to provide protection for the Chinese table tennis team during its visit to the United States, prompting Special Assistant to the President John Scali to contact SY Director Marvin Gentile. Gentile accepted the assignment, and tasked protection of the 70-person ping-pong team to Protective Services. SY Agent William DeCourcy organized and led the protective detail, which was assisted by a Marine detail and Army intelligence officers. SY’s Protective Support section provided intelligence, and Protective Services acted as the liaison with local law enforcement in the cities the table tennis team visited. Much to DeCourcy’s frustration, the White House frequently tried to change the team’s schedule. While a few people, such as fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntyre, tried to disrupt the exhibition games, SY led a smooth operation that received extensive praise.\footnote{When Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, he broke with tradition and did not accept the protective detail offered by SY. He preferred the Secret Service detail that he had while serving as National Security Adviser, as well as the White House Communications Agency capabilities he enjoyed. A six-month struggle ensued, during which both the Secret Service and SY Agents staffed Kissinger’s detail. SY insisted that they were responsible for the Secretary’s protection, and Secretary Kissinger insisted upon a Secret Service detail. The Secret Service eventually agreed to provide the protection, on the condition that}
they and the Department conclude a reimbursable, annually renewable agreement. The compromise allowed SY to retain “the basic responsibility for the personal protection of the Secretary,” with the Secret Service merely assisting on “an ad hoc basis.” Kissinger’s decision created resentment among SY agents who took pride in having protected every Secretary since Cordell Hull. Kissinger did request that SY protect his wife, Nancy Maginnes, and SY Agents were again travelling and working directly with the Secret Service detail.47

*Munich*

The 1972 Munich hostage crisis marked a three-fold turning point for diplomatic security. On September 5, 1972, international television viewers of the Munich Olympic Games watched in rapt horror as the Palestinian terrorist group Black September took the Israeli Olympic team hostage, and killed one athlete and a coach. When the West German government attempted a rescue, a gun battle ensued and the terrorists killed their Israeli hostages. First, Munich brought diplomatic security to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns, where it would remain. Second, the brutal killings implanted terrorism as one of the three fundamental axes upon which SY (and later DS) would operate. SY had focused on background investigations, evaluations, and overseas security since its founding, but Munich shifted SY’s focus to the axes of terrorism, technology, and personnel (investigations and evaluations were collapsed into one). Third, Munich brought the Secretary of State, the White House, and Congress into the policymaking process for diplomatic security.

Upon news of Munich, SY immediately worked to elevate protection of Jewish diplomatic offices across the United States. SY called upon the local police forces of major cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta, and Los Angeles to assist in protecting Israeli posts, consulates, commercial and visa offices, as well as local synagogues. SY also asked local police to increase security at airports. In addition, SY requested police protection for West German, Soviet, and Arab missions and commercial offices. In anticipation of upcoming visits by Israeli dignitaries, SY coordinated with the Secret Service to provide heightened protection for Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who would attend the UN General Assembly meetings in New York, and Israeli Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir, who would meet with the International Monetary Fund.48 SY also worked with the Secret Service and the U.S. Park Police to provide extensive protective arrangements for the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Washington, DC.49

![Figure 17: One of the Black September terrorists steps out onto the balcony, where the Israeli Olympic team was being held hostage at the Munich Olympic Games. The hostages were later killed. Munich changed diplomatic security and U.S. counter-terrorism policy. After Munich, SY changed its focus to terrorism, protection, and technology, the Department of State created an Office of Counter-Terrorism, and the Nixon Administration developed a negotiations policy for U.S. diplomatic hostage situations. Source: © Associated Press](image-url)
As SY stepped up its protective measures, Nixon considered it of “the utmost importance that [the United States] move urgently and efficiently to attack” terrorism. The U.S. Government, he believed, needed to take further measures to protect Americans and foreign diplomats in the United States and to develop contingency plans for hijackings, kidnappings, and other terrorist situations. He formed an intelligence committee to develop cooperation between intelligence services of the United States and friendly allied governments in order to identify potential terrorist threats. Nixon asked Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to head the committee.\textsuperscript{50}

Nixon also created a cabinet-level committee, the Committee to Combat Terrorism. He asked Secretary Rogers to chair it, and its members included Deputy Assistant Secretary Marvin Gentile, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General, the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the National Security Adviser. Nixon assigned four tasks to the Committee: coordinate activities to prevent terrorism; evaluate preventative activities and programs and recommend ways to improve their implementation; devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism; and make recommendations for funding. The Committee also was to oversee efforts to prevent terrorism, including the “collection of intelligence worldwide, physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad, and protection of foreign diplomats and diplomatic posts in the United States.” The Committee was additionally tasked to address potential terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, as well as terrorist threats against foreign diplomats and dignitaries in the United States. As the chair of the Committee, Secretary Rogers particularly wanted to “take every action possible to preclude” a terrorist incident against foreign diplomats in the United States, which could “cause immediate adverse international reactions.”\textsuperscript{51}

To carry out its tasks, the Committee created the Inter-Agency Working Group on Terrorism. Joseph F. Donelan, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, headed the Working Group, which included representatives from SY, the FBI, the CIA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Treasury Department. As the first interagency group devoted to analyzing terrorism on a regular basis, the Working Group coordinated the multiple agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism, evaluated existing counterterrorism measures, and recommended new measures and strategies. The group considered intelligence gathering to be imperative, as well as a clear delineation of jurisdiction and responsibilities for the various agencies so that there would not be any confusion or delay during a crisis.
Since the FBI had the broadest law enforcement mandate, Donelan proposed designating the FBI as the coordinating agency for counterterrorism, but the Department of State assumed the responsibility. Ambassador Armin H. Meyer soon succeeded Donelan, and his title became Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism. Located in the Office of the Secretary of State, Meyer's office assumed the acronym S/CT; and he reported directly to the Secretary.  

Under Rogers's direction, the Department of State initiated measures to identify and monitor possible terrorists within the United States and among applicants for U.S. visas. The Department required all foreign visitors to the United States to carry visas; however, the anti-terror measures focused on persons travelling from the Middle East. In a joint effort between the Department, FBI, and INS, Rogers instituted a special operation to identify terrorists before they entered the United States. Three days after Munich, Rogers ordered all U.S. posts to screen visa applicants closely. Ten days later, the order expanded into a program that, in addition to close screening, required posts to wire a list of all potential suspect visa applicants to Washington under a special code name. In Washington, SY Special Agent Paul Sorenson served as the expediting officer, and was notified when a person with a specific type of name requested a visa or passport. Upon such notification, Sorenson called Customs, the FBI, the CIA, and INS to check the name and provide a response within 24 hours. Rogers allowed exemptions for ambassadors, diplomatic officers, and aides, but not for celebrities. Department officials admitted that the program created “a bureaucratic storm of paperwork,” and a few complaints emerged from Middle Eastern ambassadors; however, the program continued until 1976.  

The Nixon Administration also pressed for and obtained new anti-terrorism legislation. Congress authorized the President “to suspend airline service to and from any country which aids, harbors, or is host to hijackers and/or terrorist groups, or fails to take adequate precautions to guard against hijacking.” At the personal urging of Secretary Rogers, Congress also passed a law that made it a federal offense to commit serious crimes (i.e. murder, assault, harassment, property damage) against foreign diplomats and official guests of the United States. Originally proposed in 1971 but given urgency after Munich, the law also defined a perimeter of 100 feet around any building used by foreign governments for diplomatic, consular, or official purposes (the latter to
include diplomatic residences). The law stipulated that it was illegal “to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass any foreign official,” as well as to bring an official or foreign government “into public odium or disrepute.”

The Nixon Administration also began working through the United Nations to combat the threat of terrorism and establish international counterterrorist measures. Secretary Rogers spoke to the UN General Assembly when it met one month after the Munich Olympic incident. In his remarks, Rogers noted that in the past five years, 27 diplomats from 11 countries had been kidnapped and 3 had been killed. “The issue is not war…[or] the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence,” Rogers observed, “it is whether the vulnerable lines of international communication…can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together.” He called upon the General Assembly to draft an international treaty for strict punishment of perpetrators of terrorist acts. He recommended swift prosecution and/or extradition of those responsible for attacking or kidnapping diplomats or foreign government officials, and called for the suspension of air service to countries that failed to punish hijackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft. Working with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, the United States tried to get the measures passed; however, African delegates joined with Arab delegates to create a “weak” resolution “geared for little or no progress.”

Also in the wake of Munich, the Nixon Administration developed its policy for negotiations with terrorists who held U.S. diplomats hostage. The Nixon Administration noted that the Palestinian terrorists had not hesitated to follow through on their threats to kill the Israeli athletes. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger had adopted a new policy that one former Department of State officer referred to as the “three noes: no negotiations with hostage-takers, no deals with them, and no concessions to them.” The policy change was not written down, reviewed for its implications, formalized, nor even announced. Furthermore, it was not the policy that the FBI followed within U.S. borders.
The new policy was tested twice in early 1973, with differing results. In January, Haitian gunmen captured and held at gunpoint U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Clinton E. Knox. The gunmen demanded the release of 31 colleagues from jail, transportation out of Haiti, and $1 million in cash. Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber, accompanied by SY Director Gentile, flew to Haiti, and told the Haitian President, dictator Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, that the United States would neither pay ransom payments nor grant concessions to the gunmen. Duvalier disagreed, and successfully negotiated the release of Knox. After Knox’s kidnapping, Armin Meyer, head of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, drafted a Department of State instruction for all diplomatic and consular posts that outlined the Administration’s new hostage policy. However, no senior Department of State official, including Secretary of State Rogers and Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, would sign the memorandum, and the instruction was not sent.58

The Foreign Service and U.S. public learned of the Nixon White House’s new policy two months later, during a Presidential press conference. In March 1973, eight members of Black September stormed the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and took several guests hostage, including U.S. Ambassador George Curtis Moore, and his recently arrived replacement, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. The terrorists demanded the release of 60 Palestinians being held in Jordan, all female Arab prisoners held by Israel, Robert Kennedy’s assassin Sirhan Sirhan, and the Bader-Meinhoff Gang members held in Germany. The demands were soon reduced to only 17 Palestinians held in Jordan. Macomber and Gentile left for Khartoum. In the meantime, Nixon told a reporter during a press conference that the United States would not be “giving in to blackmail demands.” Shortly after the President’s statement, the terrorists shot Moore and Noel. It is not clear if the terrorists heard Nixon’s statement, but the U.S. Embassy in Sudan reported that it was one of the reasons that the terrorists decided to kill the two U.S. diplomats.59

The Nixon Administration informed all posts by airgram on April 1, 1974, that it had “adopted a policy not to pay ransom and to discourage other governments, companies, and individuals from making such payments.” It also would not yield to international blackmail. According to the instruction, the Administration sought three objectives in a hostage situation: release of the hostages, non-acquiescence to terrorist demands, and prosecution of the terrorists. As “a last resort,” the Administration would accept “the Bangkok solution,”60 which was release of the hostages in exchange for freedom for the terrorists.61

There was “considerable” dissent over the new policy, particularly among the middle and lower ranks of Foreign Service Officers who believed that their lives were being sacrificed for the sake of a policy. With opposition to the policy building within Department ranks, a May 1976 telegram to all missions sought to explain the Administration’s policy. The telegram said that 24 hostages had been seized in the last 18 months out of the “hundreds of thousands of Americans living or traveling abroad,” and that in spite of the existing policy, 21 of them had been released unharmed.62 Statistics, however, did little to assuage the ire of the Department’s rank-and-file, and on July 16, 1976, dissent broke out into the open. Chaired by Peter Lydon, a Foreign Service Officer who served on the Policy Planning
Staff, the Secretary’s Open Forum sent a letter to Secretary Kissinger, informing him of “a certain disquiet among Foreign Service professionals” about the no ransom/no deals policy. The primary objection was that while the Nixon Administration insisted on a tough policy towards terrorists, it had done little to bring the terrorists who had killed Moore, Noel, and other Foreign Service Officers to justice. The eight terrorists had been convicted in Sudan and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Sudanese court, however, reduced their sentence to 7 years, and the men were later transferred to Egypt, where they served their prison sentences. In addition, the Open Forum objected to the fact that the Nixon White House had recently welcomed the President of Sudan on an official visit to Washington—the same President who had released the terrorists responsible for the deaths of Moore and Noel to Egypt. The Open Forum insisted that U.S. policy regarding terrorist incidents be subjected to a “systematic review.”

The Open Forum’s objections had already received attention in the months following the Khartoum crisis. Seven months after the Khartoum incident (in October 1973), the Administration hired the Rand Corporation to examine the negotiations policy, as well as “the whole question of negotiating for the release of kidnapped diplomats,” and to offer recommendations. The resulting study was an “indictment of the hard-line policy.” The Inter-Agency Working Group on Terrorism accepted several recommendations of the Rand Corporation study, including having high-level U.S. government officials remain silent during the crisis, screening information (particularly biographic information) about the hostages to the press, and expanding the Working Group to add psychiatrists and police experts.

The Foreign Service Association also opposed the Administration’s hard-line policy, and it moved on two fronts to have the policy revised. The Association formed the Working Group on Terrorism and Extraordinary Dangers to study the events in Khartoum and the new policy. Second, it insisted that if the Nixon Administration was going to adhere to the no-deals policy, it needed to take a hard line against governments that supported terror.

Figure 21: Francis E Meloy, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. Meloy was conducting talks with rival groups in Lebanon. On the way to a meeting across the Green Line, Meloy’s follow-up car broke off early, and the Ambassador was not seen again. His body, as well as that of Economic Counselor Robert O. Waring, were found later in west Beirut. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
The Open Forum and the Foreign Service Association received little comfort from the top echelons of the Kissinger-led Department of State. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger communicated the Seventh Floor’s response to both organizations. To the Open Forum, Eagleburger reiterated the no ransom/no deals policy. He branded the Open Forum’s charge that the Administration had made little effort to bring the perpetrators to justice as “insulting and misleading,” and insisted that “everything possible is being done.” The Foreign Service Association received word from an aide that Kissinger considered their objections “out of order.” Eagleburger told both groups that with regards to the punishment of terrorists, “policy interests would on occasion override other considerations.”

When President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, U.S. policy toward terrorism and hostages changed. In early 1977, the Department of State under Secretary Cyrus Vance redefined its goals. While deterring terrorism and denying success to terrorists remained one goal, a new objective consisted of “protect[ing] and sav[ing] the lives of hostages and victims of attacks.” In 1980, when Egyptians suggested releasing the eight men convicted of the deaths of Moore and Noel, the Carter Administration vehemently opposed it. The Carter Administration’s change in policy proved permanent. Under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), protection of Department of State employees and dependents remained a policy aim.

\[ A \text{ Climate of Terrorism} \]

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos acknowledged in April 1975 that the “indiscriminate bombings of U.S. installations,” “the kidnapping and murder of diplomatic personnel,” and other incidents had created “a climate of terrorism.” Indeed, concerns over the protection of U.S. personnel abroad had grown significantly within the Department after the abduction and killing of Moore and Noel in Khartoum. Other incidents fueling the concerns included the 1975 kidnapping and murder of U.S. Consul John Patrick Egan in Córdoba, Argentina, and the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Francis E. Meloy.

The climate of terrorism existed domestically as well; on January 29, 1975, shortly after midnight, a bomb exploded on the third floor of Main State. Described as “a damn big bomb” by a Washington,

DC, police sergeant, the bomb damaged offices of the East Asia and Africa Bureaus of the Agency for International Development (AID) on the 23rd Street side of the building. Broken water pipes caused considerable water damage to the offices below on the second and first floors, including the office of Joe H. Morton, chief of SY’s Division of Investigations. The far-left Weather Underground (a splinter group of the Weathermen) claimed responsibility and was targeting AID, which was “an instrument for U.S. domination and control throughout the world, not a charitable agency.” In a 12-page manifesto, the Weather Underground charged that President Gerald R. Ford “continues to wage war in Vietnam and Cambodia,” that “US involvement in Vietnam is a chain of lies,” and that the Ford Administration “grossly violated” and was “repudiating” the Paris Peace Accords.70

Although the Department of State was “one of the most closely guarded buildings” in Washington, DC, the bombing occurred shortly after building security had been relaxed. After a series of bombings of public buildings in 1970, the Department had increased the number of Federal Protective Service (FPS) guards at its entrances, and the FPS guards began inspecting all packages and briefcases entering the Department and restricting those who could enter the building. During the seven months prior to the bombing, the number of FPS guards was reduced 20 percent (from 70 to 57) as a cost-saving measure. Despite the bombing, some Department officials expressed concern that building security would become “too stringent:” “If you attempt to close the building down in a mindless sort of way[,] you make a fortress out the place.”71

The threat of terrorism abroad and at home led SY to engage in more extensive efforts to protect Department personnel and to deter terrorist incidents. Most terrorist attacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved a single person or a small group employing a package bomb, a car bomb, or in the case of Beirut, a rocket-propelled grenade to inflict fear. SY pursued measures that aimed at deterring terrorist acts by individuals or small groups. The measures followed two lines: personnel training and physical security. SY adjusted the training of Regional Security

Figure 23: Russ Waller, SY’s resident locksmith, was also one of the leaders of the Mobile Training Teams that travelled to embassies and consulates to train U.S. personnel on various security measures. Source: SY Focus.
Officers, and by 1974, protective and preventative measures comprised more than one-half of seminar-training time for RSOs. In fact one day was devoted to “improvised explosive devices,” emergency procedures, and control plans. SY also circulated articles on hostage negotiations and hostage survival, and guidelines for hostage situations, to its RSOs.72

To train Department personnel at overseas posts, SY developed Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). With Russ Waller, SY’s resident locksmith, as one of the program’s leaders, an MTT consisted of two SY agents who visited a post and conducted training for all post personnel. Posts were notified in advance and requested to schedule time (two to five days) and facilities for training. Training included defensive driving, reacting to bomb threats, residential security, personal security, and first aid. When possible, the teams held “hands-on” sessions for defensive driving and personal protection. Given the number of posts, MTTs conducted “tours,” with Tour 1 travelling to 30 posts in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. There were three teams to a tour, with each team visiting approximately 10 posts per tour. By August 1976, the MTTs had conducted 4 tours, visited 107 posts, and trained over 9,000 Department officers and employees. The MTTs conducted two more tours in 1977, and in that same year, SY made arrangements with the Foreign Service Institute to conduct mandatory three-day briefings of all persons assigned overseas.73

SY also moved to improve the physical security of U.S. posts overseas. It began installing shatterproof or bulletproof glass in U.S. embassies, consulates, and residences, or applying Mylar film to all windows. Marine Security Guards were placed in reinforced
control booths. SY engineers installed alarm systems, better lighting, and closed-circuit television cameras. Many embassies built perimeter walls or fences, and the perimeter was extended further out from post buildings. SY expanded Marine Security Guard details at posts, increased Local Guard service to 24-hour protection, and hired bodyguards for ambassadors at high-threat embassies. Even U.S. embassies previously considered “safe” gained Marine Security Guard details, grillwork on windows, alarm systems, fences, and night guards or patrols.  

The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reflected the means and extent to which SY would go to protect U.S. diplomats overseas in the wake of Munich and Khartoum. Argentina had what the Committee to Combat Terrorism characterized as “the most virulent terrorism in Latin America.” Terrorist groups from the left and the right operated in the country, and acted against “carefully chosen” targets. RSO George “Bullets” Beckett supervised a protective detail of approximately 300 men, and part of that “small army” was a 6-man U.S. Marine Corps Personal Protective Security Unit (PPSU). A new development in response to the rise of terrorism, PPSUs consisted of Marines who qualified as expert marksmen with a variety of firearms, were trained in hand-to-hand combat, and were expert drivers. In addition to the PPSU, the Embassy’s protective security force included 16 Marine Security Guards and 270 Argentine Federal Police officers, as well as several off-duty police officers. Two police officers guarded each member of the Ambassador’s family 24 hours a day. The Ambassador’s car was armor-plated, with bulletproof tires. The car could make a sharp turn at 60 miles per hour, and had a fire suppression system that could cover the engine in foam in 5 seconds. The Ambassador’s residence also contained a “safe haven.” It had a room lined with steel, bulletproof windows, a 10-day supply of food and water, and the ability to flood the rest of the residence with tear gas. 

Figure 26: George Beckett, the Regional Security Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, had a “small army” (more than 300 men) to protect the U.S. Ambassador from the Montoneros and other leftist guerrilla groups engaged in terror in Argentina. He is shown here as an instructor at the SY Training Center. Source: SY Focus.
The “safe haven” in the Ambassador’s residence in Buenos Aires marked another development in diplomatic security—improved physical security. After Khartoum, SY received greater funds to protect embassies. Safe rooms, or reinforced rooms with strong doors, were constructed within an embassy to protect personnel in the case of an attack (sometimes it was the communications vault).77

“Access controls” were another modification. Since 1959, SY had defined physical security construction standards for U.S. diplomatic buildings;78 however, in the 1970s, access controls modified public areas (usually lobbies, visa offices) to prevent access by terrorist groups, individuals, or package bombs. In lobbies and public areas, the Marine Security Guard was moved to a reinforced control booth with shatterproof or bulletproof glass. From there, Marine Security Guards could monitor closed circuit television cameras and alarm indicators, as well as all persons and deliveries coming into the building. Control doors, electrically operated by the Marine Security Guard in the booth, were installed to restrict access to internal areas of the chancery or consulate. Metal detectors were set up, and all visitors and packages were required to pass through them before proceeding into the building. Turnstile-type doors were used for exit doors in some buildings, preventing individuals from reentering.79

Access controls and other efforts during this period were not “concerted programs” because physical security at U.S. embassies in the 1970s depended upon individual RSOs and upon the support that the post’s RSO received from the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Administrative Officer. Often, there was only one Post Security Officer at a post, joined by a Marine Security Guard detail and locally hired guards. There was no “security” budget, and funds for security improvements fell under the control of the post’s Administration Officer,
constituted expenditures from his/her budget, and depended upon the other expenses in the Administration budget. Also, SY did not have enough people to install all of the alarm systems, CCTVs, access controls, and other equipment requested, and it needed to hire additional technical engineers. Another potential obstacle was the Foreign Buildings Office, because SY’s security modifications were often viewed as marring “beautiful buildings.”

SY relied upon cooperation, liaisons, and information-sharing to meet and even anticipate security threats. Like Beckett had done in Argentina, many RSOs and Post Security Officers maintained contacts with local police forces, in part, because they provided protection for an embassy and residences, but also because local police provided information about the various threats to an embassy and visiting U.S. officials. Such cooperation represented the overseas version of what SY had long done with local police forces in the United States when protecting visiting foreign dignitaries. In 1976, SY developed these relationships formally, and created the Protective Liaison Staff. Under the leadership of William DeCourcy, the division sought to develop stronger working relationships and exchanges of information with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies within and outside the United States.

SY’s focus upon cooperation and information-sharing led to the creation of the Command Center and the Threat Analysis Group in June 1976. Although there had been an informal coordination center since 1966, operating under names such as “Crest Control” and “Division Control,” the single desk used to coordinate the Secretary’s detail quite simply was not going to suffice. As a result of the many foreign dignitaries visiting Washington for the 1976 Bicentennial celebration, John F. Perdew was asked to formalize SY’s “Command Center.” Perdew developed the idea of a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week “Command Center” that contained a Watch Officer Group and a Threat Analysis Group.

The Watch Officer Group (WOG) consisted of 10 watch officers rotating in pairs, each pair serving an 8-hour shift, and it fulfilled a number of crucial responsibilities. The WOG received, recorded, and disseminated information, intelligence, and protective security requests. It also assumed operations and alert activities for SY after working hours. The WOG coordinated protective security details, and maintained continuous telephone contact with RSOs. The Command Center replaced the desk with a telephone used to coordinate earlier protective details. The Command Center and its Threat Analysis Group (TAG) could track threats operating across international boundaries, as well as provide a 24-hour monitoring center for posts overseas and the protective details of the Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries. By 1980, TAG had seven analysts studying and tracking terrorist and other threats to U.S. diplomats, and with such analysts as Dennis Pluchinsky and Andy Corsun, TAG became one of the leading authorities on terrorism within the U.S. Government. Source: SY Focus.
around the world. In addition, it provided support and communications during crisis situations. To accomplish these tasks, the WOG monitored the Department’s unclassified and classified communications traffic, as well as the Reuters, Associated Press, and United Press International news services for security-related information. The information was passed to the Threat Analysis Group, but it also allowed the Command Center to alert SY agents in the United States or overseas to a particular threat. Also, RSOs could call the 24-hour command center with questions, concerns, or crises, instead of calling Gentile or Dikeos, or the Foreign Operations division. The WOG had radio coverage of the entire Washington metropolitan area, and access to the Federal Telephone Service (FTS), London toll, and international telephone systems. It also had direct lines to the Department’s Operations Center and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In addition, the Command Center could access the National Crime Information Center, which contained information on wanted individuals, arrest warrants issued, criminal history records, and stolen property such as cars, boats, and guns. The WOG also had access to a name index of those involved in customs violations and terrorist activity maintained by the Treasury Department’s Enforcement Communications Systems.

The Threat Analysis Group (TAG), first headed by Concetta Conigliaro, constituted the other component of the Command Center. TAG was a small cohort of analysts who read departmental communications traffic and news stories, and spoke with post RSOs, country desk officers, and local U.S. police forces to determine the threat posed to a particular dignitary visiting the United States or to a particular U.S. post overseas. The analysts specialized by geographic region and submitted written reports of threats and threat situation at various posts or in various countries or cities. TAG also kept a name list of persons or groups that threatened the Secretary or a visiting dignitary.

The Command Center proved an immediate success and earned high praise, largely because SY took advantage of a source of information often overlooked by other agencies: local police forces. In the face of regional and international terrorist threats, the Command Center permitted SY to look across national boundaries, drawing upon information from multiple posts and sources, notably RSOs’ contacts with local police forces. One agent admitted that much security-related information did not go through the Department’s Operations Center because it was not related to political news. This enabled the Command Center, on occasion, to “ace out” the Operations Center, with the subsequent order to brief Operations. The coordination and threat analysis also enabled SY to increase protective security when and where needed.

**Realigned by Terrorism**

When Deputy Assistant Secretary Dikeos reorganized SY in 1975, the degree to which terrorism had changed SY became evident. Dikeos, an FSO who had risen through the Administration cone and had cracked the 1961 Scarbeck spy case, said that SY had “undergone a metamorphosis” after Munich and Khartoum. The office had transformed from a “small, fraternal organization” to “one of the largest single offices and corps of
As a result, Dikeos’ 1975 reorganization differed sharply from that undertaken by Gentile ten years earlier. When Gentile reorganized SY in 1965, he divided SY into two large groupings: “Personnel Security,” which encompassed Investigations, Evaluations, and Protective Security, and “Domestic and Foreign Security,” which addressed technical and physical security overseas and in Washington. Gentile had also created two small staff units: Education and Training, and Special Assignments. The first unit reflected Gentile’s and SY’s view that ongoing training for the Department’s security professionals was needed to meet the threats confronting the Department’s operations; meanwhile, the second unit focused primarily on investigations resulting in the termination of a Department employee based on criminal activity, personal sex practices, or homosexuality.

For the 1975 reorganization, Dikeos expanded Gentile’s two groupings to five, and created the position of Deputy Director. Investigations and Evaluations divisions remained in the Personnel Security section. Protective Security now contained three divisions: DeCourcy’s Protective Liaison division, the Secretary’s Detail, and Foreign Dignitary Protection. The Operations comprised three divisions: Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic Operations (building security). A fourth group included divisions related to education and training, the Command Center, Special Assignments (investigations for crimes or incidents), and the protective detail at the United Nations. In addition, Dikeos upgraded the Executive Office staff (SY/EX) to a level on par with the others.

Dikeos soon made revisions. Protective Intelligence was added to the Protective Services divisions. The Command Center and Special Assignments were moved to Operations. The fourth grouping now contained the divisions of Education and Training, Policy, Documentary and Information Systems, and Freedom of Information requests.
Figure 31: Illustrated organizational chart for the Office of Security, 1977. Although background investigations still remained prominent, the chart shows SY being reshaped by the new foci of terrorism, overseas security, and protection. Note the large divisions of PRS (protection details) and OPS (overseas operations), as well as the CC (Command Center) and U.S. UN (protection at the UN), compared to organizational charts of the 1950s and 1960s. Source: SY Focus.
Dikeos’ reorganization reflected several developments in SY. Perhaps most notable was the number of SY personnel. SY personnel had numbered 125 in 1962, but Gentile and Dikeos recruited many new agents. By 1979, SY numbered more than 600 people. There were 15 SO(T)s in 1961, but in 1977, there were 68 Technical Security Officers (TSOs). Professionalism increased as well. Gentile initiated professional training for SY agents, which Dikeos significantly expanded during his tenure. Between 1973 and 1978, the Education and Training division under David McCabe grew from 3 to 17 staff members, and SY Special Agents started to attend classes at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. The Education and Training division also extended RSO training from 3 to 7 weeks, managed the MTT program, and conducted 19 different programs.

Figure 32: Organizational Chart of the Office of Security 1979. The chart reflects more clearly how SY has been transformed by the shift in foci to terrorism, protection, and technology (“Info Systems”). Source: Department of State Records.

Figure 33: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos (left) stands with graduates of the first Basic Special Agent Course in November 1974. The development of formal training programs allowed SY to hire college graduates with little or no security or law enforcement training, and mold them to meet specific duty requirements. Dikeos was instrumental in reorganizing and transforming SY to better address the Department’s security needs with the emergence of terrorism. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
The creation of training programs enabled SY to expand its pool of recruits from men with mandatory law enforcement experience to a broader cohort of intelligent, highly qualified, educated men and women. Prior to 1970, SY hired people with law enforcement, intelligence, or technical backgrounds, which minimized the need for training for a small office with a limited budget. After 1970, SY continued hiring recruits with law enforcement experience, but the office drew upon a broader array of federal law enforcement agencies such as the Sky Marshals, IRS, USAID, and military intelligence. The development of training programs now permitted SY to hire college graduates with little or no security or law enforcement training, enabling SY to mold its personnel more extensively. This was, as one agent later described it, “SY’s ‘baby boom’ wave.”

This new wave of recruits entered SY at a time when the Department of State, the federal government, and the nation at large endeavored to remove gender and racial barriers to employment. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 directly encouraged, and even required, government agencies to employ women and minorities at all levels. In 1970, female Department of State employees formed the Women’s Action Organization to lobby the Department to improve the status of women in the Foreign and Civil Service. In 1972, Deputy Under Secretary for Management Macomber appointed Gladys Rogers as Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, with a mandate to create opportunities for women, particularly in offices that did not employ women. SY and the Courier Service were identified as two such offices.

The breaking down of gender and racial barriers shaped the new wave of SY hires, diversifying what had been prior to the 1970s a nearly exclusive white, male world of SY Special Agents. Gladys Rogers was instrumental in hiring SY’s first female agent, Patricia “Patti” Morton. Morton had served as an FSO staff secretary (FSSO) at diplomatic posts in Katmandu, Nepal; Kinshasa, Zaire; and Pretoria, South Africa, and had received a commendation for her
security work in Kinshasa. She recalled receiving an unexpected letter from Rogers requesting a meeting during one of her home visits. Rogers enthusiastically encouraged Morton to consider a position as an SY Special Agent. Morton, despite looking forward to returning to her post in Singapore, felt pressured by the Department’s leadership and agreed to join SY as a Special Agent in April 1972. Six months later, SY hired Doris Rogers, its second female agent. By 1974, Special Agent Mary McAteer was assigned to Nancy Kissinger’s protective detail. The Courier Service also hired its first female courier that same year. Susan Shirley Carter embarked on her first courier trip on November 16. Lillian Godek joined the Courier Service two months later. Both women had previously served in communications and records management in the Department.

The women who served in SY in the 1970s admitted that the transition from an all-male service to a coed force was less than smooth, and many women who entered SY in the early 1970s left after short periods of time. Special Agent Nancy Lestina acknowledged, “Some male agents resent a woman treading on their sacred territory,” and she was “warned that women have a natural fear of weapons.” From this Lestina concluded: “[I]f I did not faint at the sight of a pistol, I could be taken to the range to qualify, and . . . earn the right to carry the badge.” The women also believed that their male colleagues scrutinized their work more harshly, looking for faults and justifications for their dismissal. As a result, female Special Agents felt an enormous pressure to succeed. This often led to a high degree of competitiveness among the few women working in SY, rather than collaboration to overcome the bias they experienced.

Another emergent trend within diplomatic security—computer security—was reflected in Dikeos’ creation of the Documentary and Information Systems division. Although this represented primarily the renaming of the Records and Research unit, the use of the term “information system” indicates that the Department had begun to employ computers beyond using them merely for sending cables. The Department of State had two principal computers in the 1970s, both IBM 370/158 mainframes, located in an enclosed area of the basement. One computer was denoted as classified and supported the Department’s telegram distribution system and the
TAGS system. The unclassified mainframe handled payroll work, personnel record-keeping, and other tasks. The two computers used key cards, and most jobs were submitted either as trays of cards, or as a reel of tape with the job’s control cards submitted in a tray. To submit a classified job, an FSO or Department employee brought a tray down to the window, showed their building pass to a clerk at the desk, asked for their point of contact in the computer room, and gave them the tray. In the absence of the point of contact, one filled out a job form and left the classified job with the clerk.97

“Minicomputers” emerged in the mid-1970s, and they largely handled database management, which included inventory and personnel information. One program, operated on minicomputers, cross-referenced information about an individual agent’s skills, assisting the Personnel office in determining assignments for SY agents. Another database program for the “name check system” appeared in September 1977. Large and bulky by present-day standards, a minicomputer often had its own station/terminal in the office and required the user to insert a 9-1/2 inch floppy disk into the drive to provide the necessary software.98

The Department did not have a computer security program in the 1970s, although SY’s Technical Services division was already considering it. The Department’s two IBM mainframes were located in a large shielded enclosure in the basement of Main State. Security for other Department computers consisted of locking a computer up or placing it in a room that could be locked. Computers were not linked to networks, most software programs did not require a password, and viruses and worms did not exist. In the mid-1970s, an SY Technical Services engineer represented the Department on the intelligence community’s Computer Security Committee, which focused on setting government standards for protecting intelligence information processed in-computer, not the security of computers.99

Something Old, Something New: The Moscow Embassy

As SY and the Department began to wrestle with computer technology, the Soviets were employing new technologies against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets continued to breach security at the U.S. Embassy through the use of microwaves. A “technically unidentified Moscow signal” (referred to as TUMS) was “verifiably
“identified” in late 1962 and early 1963; however, it likely had existed since early 1953. Although TUMS’s purpose was unknown, measurements determined that the beam covered the entire west wall of the Embassy, but operated at very low levels. U.S. officials concluded that the signal constituted a security threat but not a health hazard. They set up a room to monitor TUMS, which was emitted from an apartment building 100 yards west of the Embassy, but did not inform the Embassy community about the microwaves. In March 1972, a second signal, called SMUT (“second Moscow unidentified technical” signal) appeared. Seven times stronger than TUMS, SMUT lasted little more than a year and then stopped; TUMS, meanwhile, continued.

In May 1975, the TUMS signal suddenly stopped, but it was soon replaced by 2 signals. Two days after the TUMS ceased, a new signal appeared and was designated MMTS-1. The signal emitted from the roof of a building to the east of the U.S. Embassy; moreover, it comprised a much more filled-in spectrum than TUMS. Three months later, in August, MMTS-2 appeared, emanating from a building south of the Embassy.

MMTS-1 and MMTS-2 were still well below Soviet and U.S. safety levels; however, Department officials informed the Embassy community about the signals. FSOs and other Department employees expressed concern over the health effects of microwave radiation, and Congress held hearings on the issue. Part of the concern was rooted in the popular understanding of microwaves. Microwave ovens for home kitchens had recently appeared on the market, and concepts about what happened to foods and metal items in microwave ovens were transferred to the situation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Several FSOs filed health complaints, and the Department undertook a bio-statistical study to examine if those serving in Moscow were at a higher risk for cancer, birth defects, and other effects associated with radiation. The study found no connection or statistical association between occurrences of cancer and other health effects and the officers and employees who had served in the Moscow Embassy since 1953. The Department did allow FSOs and other employees to transfer or reject assignments to Moscow, without affecting their careers. The assurances of the study were partially undermined in late 1976 by the ill-timed administrative classification of the Moscow Embassy as an “unhealthy post,” a classification unrelated to the microwaves.

Facing public, Congressional, and internal outcry, the Department took action to reduce and stop the microwaves. It installed screens that reduced microwave radiation by nearly 90 percent over all of the Embassy’s windows. Department officials pressured the Soviets to stop the signals, and the Soviets agreed to reduce the microwave signals.

What the Soviets intended with the microwaves was and remains unclear. Former Regional Security Officer to the Moscow Embassy Gordon Harvey asserted that the apparent purpose of the microwaving was not to harm people; the signal’s power level was significantly below the safety limits established by the Soviets, which were much lower than U.S. safety limits. Bruce Matthews, Chief of the Technical Security Division at the Diplomatic Security Training Center, believes that the Soviets used microwaves for a number of purposes, one of which was to characterize the type of office equipment that the U.S. Embassy was using.
Besides microwaves, U.S. officials were also concerned about fire safety at the Moscow Embassy; in fact, one Department officer considered the Embassy a “firetrap.” The building’s age, its construction, overcrowding, and the accumulation of records and materials in the hallways, stairwells, and attic led Embassy and Department officials to issue warnings about the possibilities of a major fire. A fire safety inspection team made several recommendations, including storing or removing the clutter, but also, U.S. inspectors noted that Soviet electrical repairmen “often use inadequately size[d] wire” and that rewiring was needed in several places. When the Embassy asked SY what its personnel should do in case of a fire on the upper, classified floors (Floors 7-10), one SY official wrote that the policy should be to “allow the [chancery] building to burn to the ground” rather than allow Soviet firefighters on those floors. The comment became the policy. An example of the consequences of allowing Soviet fire fighters access to the Embassy occurred on August 5, 1976, when the Australian Embassy experienced a fire that required more than 100 Soviet firefighters to extinguish. Two years later, after Soviet workmen had repaired the fire damage, the Australians found a network of microphones and accused the Soviets of spying.

During the evening of August 26, 1977, a fire broke out in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Initially, Embassy personnel could not find the fire, but Regional Security Officer Jerome F. Tolson, Jr., noted that in the span of 20 minutes the fire “changed from something that could not be located” to engulfing the entire Economic section on the eighth floor. The fire soon spread to the ninth and tenth floors and the attic. Although policy dictated otherwise, Ambassador Malcolm Toon gave permission to the Soviet firefighters to enter the eighth floor, and then allowed the firemen to fight the fire from aerial ladders when it broke through the chancery’s roof. He denied the Soviets access to the tenth floor. Four unescorted Soviet firemen did enter the ninth floor (Communications and Records) through a window, but “became very shy” when they saw Defense Attaché personnel with an (unloaded) camera aimed at them. Chancery offices and the roof suffered extensive damage; however, the RSO concluded that sensitive equipment and records had not been compromised. The eighth floor and the roof/attic
were “gutted;” the ninth and tenth floors suffered heavy heat, smoke, and water damage; and the seventh floor had water and smoke damage. It took several months to complete repairs, much of which was done by Seabees.  

Almost a year later, in June 1978, SY Technical Security Officers discovered a Soviet listening post in the U.S. Embassy, involving a chimney antenna and an underground tunnel. In late May, TSOs John Bainbridge and Jim Frank arrived in Moscow to conduct an investigation of the South Wing of the chancery building. In one of the South Wing apartments, Bainbridge and Frank focused on a chimney that ran up the outside of the building. They opened the chimney wall, and found a dish-shaped radio antenna connected to a cable that ran down the length of the chimney. At the base of the chimney, the cable continued down a tunnel, large enough for a human to crawl through. The tunnel continued under the U.S. Embassy grounds to a Soviet apartment building next door.  

The antenna-tunnel find was an active listening post, and Soviet personnel were discovered using the tunnel. Bainbridge and Frank tested the antenna system, and found the cables to be “energized.” A Navy Seabee, working with Bainbridge and Frank, “surprised” a Soviet technician crawling through the tunnel, prompting U.S. workers (likely Seabees) to build a brick wall to seal the tunnel. Despite an active antenna, SY and U.S. Government technical engineers could not determine from what or where the antenna received signals, although they suspected the Central Wing of the chancery building, which housed the Ambassador’s offices, was a possibility. The antenna/tunnel find revealed that the Soviets had severely breached the security of the U.S. Embassy. A former Office of Communications Security officer recalled that when he joined the Department about two years after the antenna/tunnel find, the Department was suffering “a counter-measures crisis.”

By 1978, U.S. officials hoped that the new building would offer better security once it was completed. The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to exchange sites for their respective new embassies in 1969. Officials of several U.S. Government agencies agreed to offer the Soviets a 12.5-acre site known as Mount Alto, just above the neighborhood of Georgetown. Meanwhile, in Moscow, U.S. officials pressed for and accepted a 10.5-acre site behind the existing Embassy. Contrary to folklore, the area was not in a “swamp.” The site, instead, was prime Moscow real estate that was walking distance from the Ambassador’s residence, and near major thoroughfares and several metro rail stations.

The exchange of embassy sites coincided with the Nixon policy of détente, but U.S. and Soviet negotiations over the conditions of construction proved difficult and acrimonious. U.S. officials rejected the conditions that the Soviets imposed on previous occasions. When the U.S. diplomats had moved into the Ulitsa Chaikovskovo chancery in 1953, the Soviets until that moment had prevented U.S. personnel from supervising renovations of the building. The Soviets had even covered the building with tarpaulins to deter U.S. observation of the renovations while Soviet workers finished their work inside. The 1964 discovery of a microphone network ensured that U.S. officials did not want to replay this situation with a new building. The Soviets insisted that they should control all phases of the construction, and use Soviet contractors, materials, and architectural
designs. Furthermore, the United States was required to pay for the construction in hard currency. U.S. officials rejected the terms, but they also recognized that besides reciprocity (they did not want the Soviets to build their embassy in Washington unsupervised), it was unrealistic from both a financial and security standpoint to “import an army of U.S. workers into Moscow.” Ultimately, the Soviets agreed to give U.S. personnel “unrestricted access” to the Moscow construction site. U.S. workers would install the windows, doors, roofing, all mechanical and electrical equipment, final wiring, plumbing, and other systems. At the height of détente in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the agreement on construction conditions.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite the 1972 agreement, the conditions of construction in Moscow were what U.S. officials described as “moving targets.” Negotiations over the details stalled the construction and exchange of property for five more years. Eventually after Secretary of State Vance travelled to Moscow in 1977, both nations signed the Protocol of 1977, permitting the formal exchange of properties. The formal exchange of properties generated another element of contention: several buildings for the Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto were completed before U.S. officials had even signed an agreement to begin construction in Moscow. In short, there was little evidence of détente amid the negotiations over new embassies, and tensions would only continue during construction.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{Protective Security at the United Nations}

While Department officers strove to prevent Soviet breaches of security at the current and future U.S. Embassies in Moscow, U.S. officials wrangled over protective security at the United Nations. Although the Chicago incident involving French President Pompidou indicated that foreign dignitaries and diplomats were targets of violence within the United States, an inter-agency struggle erupted over who held responsibility for protection of UN diplomats. President Nixon obtained a law from Congress (Public Law 91-217) authorizing
him to assign agents from the Executive Protection Service (EPS) to protect diplomatic missions outside of Washington. However, since the EPS was a unit of the Secret Service, the Secret Service only took protective assignments on a case-by-case basis. As one Department official later confessed, “In most cases, foreign countries provide us with far more protection abroad on a permanent as well as an emergency basis than we provide them in Washington…We can well imagine the problems we would confront in the case of a serious incident resulting in the death of a foreign diplomat in this country.”

There was also a lack of communication and coordination between SY and the Secret Service. For example, when the Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al Halim Khaddam arrived at Washington National Airport on September 27, 1974, the Secret Service detail quickly escorted him away without informing the Deputy Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and other Department officials who were at the airport to greet and escort the Foreign Minister. Infuriated, the Department of State immediately sent a letter of concern to the Director of the Secret Service.

The Secret Service and the Department of State’s lack of communication for the Syrian foreign minister was minor compared to the difficulties that the Secret Service, the Department, and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) would have in coordinating protection for the diplomatic missions of the United Nations. The NYPD had constantly assisted the Department and EPS with the protection of the representatives and foreign dignitaries to the United Nations. Attacks on missions, offices, and ambassadors, as well as growth of the United Nations, necessitated the creation of “fixed posts” to ensure protective security for the missions to the international organization. The NYPD, however, lacked the manpower to meet the demands for diplomatic protection in addition to its regular duties. In fact, in 1970, patrolmen of New York City’s 19th Precinct staged a protest against the fixed posts near the Soviet mission. They claimed that foreign missions in the United States received better protection than the nation’s cities. In addition, the city of New York insisted upon being reimbursed for expenses it incurred while protecting UN diplomats and dignitaries.

Nixon Administration officials devised an interim solution in 1974. Funding for protection of the United Nations would come from the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which was created in 1965 to direct federal funds to assist state and local police forces. The Secret Service would assume
responsibility for protecting all heads of state and EPS would protect foreign diplomatic missions in Washington and New York City, and it would delegate funds to the NYPD for local protection of UN Missions. Gradually, the Department of State would take on the duty of protecting all “other” distinguished foreign visitors, when they began receiving additional funding. Until then, the Secret Service handled the protection on a case-by-case basis at the direction of the President.¹¹⁹

With an interim agreement in place, efforts for a more permanent solution stalled. In 1975, the Department of State urged Congress to support a House of Representatives resolution that would expand the EPS so that it could undertake protective duties. The bill did not provide appropriations for reimbursing the NYPD, and without that funding information, the bill died. Representative Robert E. Jones, Jr., (D-Alabama) offered another proposal: he suggested expanding the EPS, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to assign EPS officers to several metropolitan areas to protect foreign missions (mostly consulates), and granting reimbursements to state and local governments for providing protection. The Departments of State and the Treasury urged the President to veto Jones’s bill, in part because neither Department wanted to take responsibility for reimbursing New York City. The agencies also stressed that the increase in federal responsibility for what had previously been a local police function seemed “troubling.” The Department of State proffered expanding the EPS enough to assume protection duties in New York City, but not nationwide. President Gerald R. Ford vetoed the bill.¹²⁰
On December 31, 1975, President Ford signed a compromise bill for protection of UN diplomats. Public Law 94-196 required the EPS to protect diplomatic missions in cities outside of Washington that possessed 20 or more full-time missions, if the situation was an extraordinary protective need for which the city required assistance, and occurred at an international organization of which the United States was a member. Given the criteria, the bill was tailored to New York City and the United Nations. The law also authorized the Department of the Treasury to reimburse state and local entities that provided the protection. The law limited federal reimbursement to $3.5 million annually, but permitted retroactive claims to July 1, 1974. Besides offering reimbursement, P.L. 94-196 did much to resolve the UN security debate.\(^{121}\)

U.S. officials became acutely aware of the political and diplomatic ramifications of the death of a foreign diplomat when SY Special Agents stopped an assassination attempt against the former Prime Minister of Turkey. On July 29, 1976, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulen Ecevit was touring the United States, and scheduled to give a speech at New York City’s Waldorf Astoria Hotel. SY had learned that a demonstration against Turkey’s policy in Cyprus would occur at the hotel. SY Special Agents Bernard A. Johnson, George R. Mitchell, Fred Lecker, and Horace H. Mitchell were assigned to protect Ecevit. About 400 protesters pelted members of Ecevit’s party with eggs and tomatoes. Johnson ordered a “tight shield” around Ecevit. As they were walking toward the hotel entrance, Johnson noticed that a man in the crowd had aimed a pistol at the former Prime Minister. Johnson dived at the gunman before the man could shoot. George Mitchell saw the gun rising among the crowd, moved in front of Ecevit to protect him, and with the assistance of Lecker, hurried Ecevit into the hotel. Horace Mitchell pushed through the crowd to assist Johnson in subduing the gunman. He grabbed the gunman’s left arm to put it behind the assailant’s back, and the arm twisted off (it was a prosthetic). The Department of State awarded Johnson and George Mitchell the Award for Heroism, and Horace Mitchell received the Award for Valor. In September 1976, the Government of Turkey hosted Special Agents Bernard Johnson, George Mitchell, and Fred Lecker as official guests, welcoming them as heroes.\(^{122}\)

The assassination of former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier created a political and diplomatic

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Figure 42: SY Special Agent Scott Tripp (third from left) protects Sunao Sonoda, Foreign Minister of Japan, during the latter’s 1979 visit. Protecting foreign dignitaries created inter-agency debates during the 1970s, particularly with the growing size of the United Nations and after the murder (car bomb) of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
firestorm. On the morning of September 21, 1976, Letelier and his work colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt were murdered when a bomb attached to the underside of their car exploded as they entered Sheridan Circle in Washington DC. Letelier was the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States for the government of President Salvador Allende, who had recently been overthrown by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. The Pinochet regime’s Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) had already carried out an assassination in Argentina, an attempted assassination in Italy, and numerous arrests and disappearances in Chile. The Pinochet regime also helped to organize Operation Condor, a joint effort by the military regimes of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay to target and kill Leftist leaders. Department of State officials had some vague knowledge of Operation Condor; however, they did not anticipate that Condor agents would undertake an assassination in the capital of the United States. The Letelier assassination exacerbated public and Congressional criticism of Secretary Kissinger’s handling of U.S. policy toward Latin America and of supposed U.S. support for a regime such as Pinochet’s. A lengthy investigation by the Justice Department, the FBI, and the CIA led to the arrest of a DINA agent, who pleaded guilty to the bombing in 1978 and implicated several senior Chilean officials. The Pinochet regime refused to cooperate, and cleared those implicated in a military court. In 1982, released correspondence definitively linked the Pinochet government to the bombing.123

Technically Letelier did not merit protection by SY or EPS; however, the publicity and criticism of U.S. policy prompted the Secret Service to reenter the debate over protection of UN diplomats. In 1973, the Nixon and Ford Administrations had extended protection of UN diplomatic missions, in 60- to 90-day increments, by presidential directive. Upon entering office in 1977, the Carter White House questioned the EPS’s expenses for guarding U.N. missions. With an expiration date looming, and despite the Ecevit and Letelier incidents, the Secret Service now suggested that current EPS assignments to the United Nations might be contrary to Congressional intent. EPS officers, the Secret Service asserted, were only supposed to be tasked to New York for short periods of time, and the protection should be terminated “when the local police forces are able to handle the protective need.” Furthermore, the Secret Service said, EPS officers did not have the authority to “challenge” visitors to the mission, and had “no police function except to be present in the event of an emergency.” The Service then proposed that the federal government either reimburse the New York City Police Department for protective security expenses, or create a permanent security detail manned by SY agents.124

The Department of State opposed the Secret Service’s interpretation and suggestion. Assistant Secretary of State for Administration John M. Thomas emphasized the four general conditions governing requests for protection by EPS: 1) an immediate and specific threat directed against the particular mission or person in that mission, 2) a broad and long-term threat targeting that mission, 3) a situation where an incident would damage important U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and 4) the principle of reciprocity. When overseas, he wrote, U.S. diplomats and officials received protection from foreign governments; therefore, the United States should reciprocate for foreign missions in New York. The Department admitted that the EPS provided minimal protection, but argued that
EPS protection satisfied protective and reciprocity demands. The Departments of State and the Treasury had explored the issue of reimbursing the NYPD, but found the cost to be prohibitive. Furthermore, SY opposed assigning Special Agents to the missions on grounds of orientation. The EPS’s main mission was to guard the buildings; meanwhile, SY agents guarded people. Moreover, SY agents were “neither hired nor trained to work as building guards.” The Department of State proposed establishing a small permanent EPS contingent in New York City “to fulfill the U.S. obligation to the diplomatic community.”

The issue of reimbursing the NYPD plagued the Carter Administration, but was partially resolved in 1980. In the spring of that year, the Department of the Treasury revised its regulations and authorized reimbursement to New York City for costs incurred during fixed post assignments and extraordinary protective operations. However, this regulation only covered costs associated with protecting UN missions and foreign dignitaries. It did not include costs relating to protecting diplomatic residences or foreign commercial offices, nor did it cover costs associated with maintaining order during demonstrations outside the UN building.

### Organizing for Terrorism

Unlike the Nixon Administration, the new Carter Administration viewed terrorism as a “given” and organized itself accordingly. With Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, SY resumed its protection of the Secretary; however, Vance’s protective detail differed significantly from that for Secretary Rogers in the early 1970s. Vance’s 37-man detail included a chief, a deputy, and three full shifts to provide 24-hour protection. Director of the detail, William D’Urso, upgraded communications, increased the vehicle pool to 35 cars, and required a dummy motorcade and a follow-up car. Besides regular in-service and firearms training, all SY Special Agents serving on the detail were required to re-qualify on a quarterly basis, including qualifying at the shooting range on handguns, Uzi sub-machine guns, and shotguns. Another change was to detail an SY Special Agent as the Secretary’s chauffeur. D’Urso wrote a manual to formalize the detail’s procedures and operations, and insisted upon advance preparation for all of Secretary Vance’s travels and appearances.
The Carter Administration also restructured the Office for Combating Terrorism. In August 1976, the Office reported to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management instead of the Secretary, and the office’s chief was Director of M/CT and Chair of the Inter-Agency Working Group. The move was intended to “provide a more effective link between the policy and operational aspects of efforts to combat terrorism.” However, M/CT remained a small staff of six, although its responsibilities now included overseeing emergency action planning.\textsuperscript{128}

By September 1977, the Carter Administration abolished the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism created by Nixon. The Committee had met only once (in 1972), and as a result, the Inter-Agency Working Group became a working group of the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee. The Carter Administration also created the Executive Committee on Terrorism, with its membership determined by the NSC. Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, selected the Department of State’s Director of M/CT as the chair for both the Working Group and the Executive Committee. Thus, the Department of State continued its lead role in the government-wide effort to coordinate counterterrorist efforts.\textsuperscript{129}

In 1978 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton became Director of M/CT, and he found the Working Group too cumbersome, with its representatives from 28 departments and agencies. Quainton reorganized the group and streamlined its work. He divided the Working Group into seven committees, which included the Research and Development Committee, the Foreign Security
Policy Committee, the Domestic Crisis Management Committee, and the Foreign Crisis Management Committee. However, the following autumn, the Department reorganized itself too, moving M/CT to the office of the Deputy Secretary of State (D/CT).  

\section*{Conclusion}

Beginning with the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Elbrick, SY and the Department of State responded quickly to the threats posed by terrorism, and in the process of doing so, dramatically altered security procedures. SY developed emergency plans for U.S. posts overseas as they faced emergency situations in the face of terrorist attacks. SY developed an armored car program, a mobile reserve of equipment, and Emergency Action Teams to train and assist posts. Threats forced an upgrading of the Secretary of State’s protective detail. When a member of the crowd in Chicago spit on the wife of French President Georges Pompidou, President Nixon ordered improvements in the protection of foreign dignitaries when they visited the United States.  

The kidnapping and murder of Israeli Olympic team members at Munich prompted additional changes that began a counterterrorism effort and policy by the United States. Nixon created the Committee to Combat Terrorism, which evolved into the Office of Counter-Terrorism under the Secretary of State (S/CT). The Nixon Administration also developed a hard-line policy regarding U.S. diplomatic hostages, a policy that was challenged by rank-and-file in the Department of State. An inter-agency debate occurred over the protection of UN diplomats, a debate that was largely resolved during the Carter Administration.  

When Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos declared in 1975 that “a climate of terrorism” existed, the office he headed (SY) was already reoriented and reshaped toward three new axes: terrorism, protection, and technology. Training of Special Agents, RSOs, and Department personnel focused on how to prevent and anticipate the various types of terrorist attacks. SY created Mobile Training Teams to train personnel at U.S. posts. SY also installed access controls to limit persons entering U.S. posts, and the office installed bulletproof glass or Mylar on windows to prevent shards from shattering windows. Protective details of ambassadors were increased, and safe havens were built into U.S. embassies and consulates. SY developed a liaison office to coordinate and build relationships with foreign law enforcement entities. John Perdew created the Command Center and the Threat Analysis Group to coordinate SY efforts and anticipate developing threats. With microwaves and the chimney antenna, the Soviets were still trying to breach security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The adoption of computer technologies by the Department led SY to add computer security to its calculations.  

As Dikeos reached the end of his four-year tenure as head of SY in 1978, the Office of Security and diplomatic security at the Department of State had undergone a great transformation as a result of terrorism. The organization and its efforts bore little resemblance to the security entity that existed 10 years earlier. Gentile—and particularly Dikeos—had initiated numerous changes to meet the new threats posed by terrorism. Yet no sooner were these changes made than the terrorist threat evolved into a different form, accelerating SY’s transformation.
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Endnotes

1 The phrase “the great transformation” is drawn from Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]).


6 Instances from “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas …,” in Testimony of Ralph S. Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget, 4 October 1966, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, *Departments of State, Justice… Appropriations for 1967*, p. 299.


8 The document also appears to have been sent to Saigon as well. Report “The Protection of U.S. Personnel and Installations Against Acts of Terrorism in Latin America,” Office of Security (Inter-agency Ad Hoc Committee), 12 May 1965, NA.


11 Testimony of William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 9 June 1965, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 134. Telegram 9948, Buffum, to Secretary of State, 21 December 1972, Folder – BG Beirut, Box 6, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA.


14 Memorandum “Transportation for the Body of Ambassador John Gordon Mein,” John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary (Viron P. Vaky) to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 29 August 1968, Folder – PER Mein, John Gordon, 1/1/68, Box 180, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA.


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Telegram 981 “Foreign Ministry’s Query Re Embassy Marine Guards,” Adair to Secretary of State, 15 April 1971; Telegram 1118, Adair to Secretary of State, 4 May 1971; Telegram 83950, Rogers (D. W. Cox) to U.S. Embassy Montevideo, 14 May 1971; and Telegram 1896, Adair to Secretary of State, 28 August 1970; all Folder – BG Monrovia, Box 8, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. For Marines being less identifiable as U.S. military, see Beckett, Special Agent, 83-84.


34 Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, pp. 3-4.


38 For Qaddafi’s declarations and ideology of this period, see Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 87-106.


44 Memorandum, General Counsel of the Treasury to Director of Management and Budget, n.d. [September 1970]; and Memorandum, William L. Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Macomber, 22 September 1970; both enclosed with Information Memorandum “Proposed Legislation to Transfer Protective Security Functions to United States Secret Service,” J. Edward Lyerly, Office of the Legal Advisor, to Macomber, 28 September 1970, A/DUSA, Subject and Name Files, 1970 (Macomber), Folder – SY, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 72D179, NA.


47 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 4. Letter, John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 March 1974, Folder – SY 1 General; Letter, Director of the Secret Service to Thomas, 16 September 1974; both Folder – SY 1 General; and Memorandum “Protection of Mrs. Kissinger,” Carlyle E. Maw, Office of Legal Affairs, to the Secretary 7 May 1974, Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism; all Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59-Lot 76D71, NA.

48 Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Macomber, 14 September 1972, attached to Memorandum, Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; and Memorandum “Protection of Israeli Establishment in the United States,” Gentile to Donelan, 12 September 1972; all Folder – SY 4, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59 - Lot 75D101, NA.


58 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 116-121.

59 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 177.

60 The term “Bangkok solution” resulted from a December 1972 incident, during which 4 members of Black September entered the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok and took hostages. Thai officials allowed the 4 men safe passage out of Thailand in exchange for releasing their hostages.


65 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 221-226.


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114 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, pp. 5-7.


117 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, Number 97-687, p. 1. Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, to Ambassador Henry Catto, Chief of Protocol, 27 September 1974; and Letter, Ingersoll (David Korn, NEA/ARN), to Stuart Knight, Director of the Secret Service, 1 October 1974, attached to Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” Ingersoll to Catto; both Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA.


119 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations,” John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism, 9 August 1974; Memorandum “Discussion between State Department and Secret Service on December 4, 1974, Relative to EPS Responsibilities…,” Acting Special Agent in Charge Wilson Livingood to Assistant Director Hill, 4 December 1974, enclosed with Memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation with Secret Service,” Hoffacker to Thomas and Dikeos, 5 December 1974; and Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations (NSC 4853), George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Council, 6 December 1974; all Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA.


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CHAPTER 7

ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION
Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Terrorism fundamentally changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, terrorists generally targeted individual diplomats for kidnapping. As hostages, the diplomats would later be exchanged to obtain money or arms, to secure the release of jailed colleagues, or to draw public attention to a cause. By the early 1970s, terrorists became more deadly, killing diplomats if and when they chose. The February 1979 mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran marked a profound shift in terrorist tactics, repeated in the subsequent attacks on U.S. Embassies in Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Terrorists began targeting U.S. diplomatic buildings as symbols of the United States and sought to wreak as much destruction, injury, and death as possible. By doing so, terrorists subverted long-held diplomatic customs, such as the inviolability of embassies and reliance upon local governments to protect diplomats.¹

Terrorism's shift from individual diplomats to U.S. diplomatic buildings partly resulted because well-trained cadres sponsored by rogue states such as Iran, Syria, and Libya executed the attacks, not the individuals or small groups of a decade earlier. Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger charged that the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was conducted with the “sponsorship, knowledge, and authority of the Syrian

Figure 1: The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, circa 1975, demonstrates several challenges confronting the Security Enhancement Program (SEP). Like many embassies, the U.S. Embassy Baghdad had low perimeter walls, the walls were not solid stone or concrete, parking was allowed around the Embassy, and the building was an “open” design with large windows. The gates are also left open during the day, making the Embassy even more vulnerable. Other embassies were located in crowded city centers, making SEP upgrades more expensive and more difficult to install. Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian Files.
Government.” In this new milieu, U.S. diplomats and embassies were not just victims of terrorism, but also pawns in certain nations’ and groups’ larger political struggles against the United States.²

Terrorist attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, and Kuwait accelerated the transformation of the Office of Security (SY). As the Department of State responded to the new methods of terrorism, SY transformed into a new and larger entity, one that coordinated, implemented, and oversaw the expanding number of security measures enforced at U.S. posts overseas. Although the Inman Panel in 1985 would recommend and define that new entity as the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, by early 1984, before the Inman Panel was formed, SY was already rapidly evolving to the Department’s central entity for diplomatic security. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security David C. Fields admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb were reshaping SY: “We were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, and change procedures. SY’s role was changing.”³

**Tehran**

Iranian guerrillas attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979, two weeks after the Ayatollah Khomeini had returned to Iran from exile. During the previous year, civil unrest in Iran increased as Iranians directed their protests against the repressive rule of Shah Rezi Khan Pahlavi, who had ruled Iran since 1941 and had long identified himself as a U.S. ally. In November 1978, a widespread revolt forced the Shah to create a military government and ask Shahpour Bakhtiar, a moderate opposition leader, to serve as premier. Unrest continued, and upon Bakhtiar’s advice, the Shah relinquished power in January 1979 and fled the country.

Hostility towards the Shah’s ally, the United States, remained, and U.S. Embassy officials feared and anticipated an attack against the Embassy. During January and February 1979, U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan reduced the number of U.S. personnel at the Embassy, and shipped most of the Embassy’s classified files to Washington. On February 12, the Iranian military unit protecting the U.S. Embassy was ordered back to its barracks, leaving only the Marine Security Guard detachment to protect the Embassy. At 10:30 a.m., on February 14, 75 Iranian guerrillas climbed over the compound’s wall, opened fire on the chancery, and headed to the Ambassador’s residence. Sullivan ordered everyone within the chancery to get into the communications vault on the second floor (the Embassy’s safehaven). He then called the interim Iranian Government and asked for assistance. In the vault, Embassy staff shredded

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*Figure 2: Iranian rebels supportive of Ayatollah Khomeini carry the U.S. flag from the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran on February 14, 1979. The gate to the compound, seen behind the flag, stands open. Source: © Associated Press.*
documents and destroyed cryptographic equipment. The Marine Security Guards, directed by Regional Security Officer (RSO) Rick May, launched a volley of tear gas to slow the guerrillas, and were the last to enter the vault. An Iranian military force arrived at the Embassy to repel the guerrillas, but by then the guerrillas had blasted out the chancery’s front door and shot up every door on the first floor. The episode lasted 2 hours, ending about 1 p.m., and no one was injured.4

In the wake of the February attack, SY moved quickly to improve physical security at the Embassy in Tehran. U.S. officials made major modifications to the chancery’s entrances: they added electronic surveillance cameras, remote-controlled tear-gas devices, and heavy steel doors with automatic alarm systems. During the summer of 1979, however, several agencies returned many boxes of classified files back to the Embassy, creating what one official described as a “paper albatross around [the Embassy’s] neck.”5

After President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah to enter the United States for medical treatment, Iranian students stormed the Embassy on November 4, 1979, and took 63 Americans as hostages. The security modifications provided some time for Embassy staff, but former hostage Victor Tomseth later remarked that the modifications were “meaningless” when a host government demonstrates an “absence of will and capacity” to protect the Embassy in a crisis. The Iranian students soon released 13 hostages; however, the students gained access to the large amount of classified files. The Iran Hostage Crisis lasted more than a year, involved a disastrous rescue attempt, and concluded with the release of the American hostages on January 20, 1981, just minutes after Carter turned over Presidential power to Ronald Reagan.6

Tehran was not the only location where a mob stormed a U.S. embassy. Two weeks after the start of the Iran Hostage Crisis, on November 21, 1979, Pakistani demonstrators emulated the Iranian students and stormed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the morning, approximately two busloads of Pakistanis

Figure 3: A large crowd of Iranian students gather outside the gates of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 5, 1979. The previous day, students stormed the U.S. Embassy and took 63 Americans hostage. Source: © Associated Press.
had demonstrated in front of the Embassy but then left. In the afternoon, a much larger group returned and began throwing rocks. The demonstrators-turned-rioters soon broke through the gate and overwhelmed the security perimeters of the U.S. Embassy. One Marine Security Guard was fatally injured. David C. Fields, the Embassy’s Administration Officer, ordered the staff into the communications vault that served as the Embassy’s safehaven. A mob of more than 1,000 ransacked and looted many of the buildings on the Embassy compound and set fire to the chancery. After several hours, Fields sent a team of five to the roof to open the hatch, allowing the staff to climb out of the vault.\footnote{As had occurred in Iran, the Pakistan national government was reluctant in coming to the aid of the U.S. Embassy. The Pakistani army did not arrive until six hours after the incident started. Embassy officials believed that many Pakistani officials refused to take seriously the U.S. Embassy’s warnings about possible trouble in the days prior to the attack. One U.S. official admitted that local Pakistani police had never dealt with such a large and riotous crowd; furthermore, the Pakistani Government had few military units available to assist the Americans. In fact, one Pakistani Foreign Ministry official lost an ambassadorship because he made concerted efforts to help the Embassy staff during the crisis.}

Other groups emulated the Iranian students and mobbed U.S. diplomatic posts elsewhere. Shortly after the attack in Islamabad, a Libyan mob “sacked” the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Just days after the seizure of U.S. hostages in Tehran, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and burned the U.S. flag.\footnote{The Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General noted that the attacks in the four capitals exposed “the vulnerability of our installations to mob violence and the futility of relying on host governments” to fulfill their responsibility to protect diplomatic personnel and facilities.}

Figure 4: One of the U.S. hostages, blindfolded and bound, is brought outside the U.S. Embassy. Source: © Associated Press.
In response to the new threat of mob attacks, the Department immediately ordered all overseas posts to take three actions to improve security. First, the mission had to review and update its contingency planning to protect its personnel and property. Second, the Department required all posts to reduce non-essential classified file holdings to an absolute operational minimum. This, no doubt, resulted from the well-publicized acts of Iranian students piecing together shredded classified documents, and the large volume of classified documents that fell into students’ hands. Third, the Department instructed posts to contact their host governments and discuss protection of the U.S. embassy and its personnel during crisis situations.  

As another measure, the Department centralized responsibility for post security with the Chief of Mission or officer-in-charge, and granted more authority to Regional Security Officers (RSOs) to implement increased security. When one senior mission officer rejected additional security measures even though the RSO had ample intelligence that the FSO could be a target, the Department told all posts, “key officers . . . are not free to ignore the advice” of RSOs. In another instance, a Chief of Mission tried to relinquish the decision to evacuate dependents to individual officers. The Department considered this unacceptable and instructed all diplomatic and consular posts that the Chief of Mission or acting officer-in-charge would be held accountable for all decisions and actions in an emergency.

The Department also requested and received from Congress a supplemental appropriation for an “extensive security enhancement program.” It obtained $6.1 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 1980 and $35.8 million for FY 1981, as well as other funds, for a total appropriation of approximately $200 million to harden U.S. embassies. The $200 million supplemental signifies how much terrorism had changed public attitudes about security, particularly if one considers that in 1965, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee complained when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security G. Marvin Gentile obtained a $1 million appropriation. Even so, the sizeable appropriation created a “big fight” within the Department; the Foreign Buildings Office (FBO), Operations, and the Office of Communications (OC) vied with SY for a portion of the funding. Eventually Assistant

Figure 5: An SY Special Agent (rear left, looking to his left) covers Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (standing center behind saluting U.S. Air Force Honor Guard) while he attends a funeral service at Arlington National Cemetery for American aid workers murdered in El Salvador, in early January 1981. Vice President Walter Mondale (center right) leads the U.S. Government delegation to the service. Source: STATE magazine.
History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Secretary of State for Administration Thomas A. Tracy took control of the funds, and he created the Special Program and Liaison Staff (A/SPL) to manage the Security Enhancement Program (SEP). George Jenkins was named as head of the division, and John Perdew (who had developed SY’s Command Center) served as his deputy.\textsuperscript{13}

The Security Enhancement Program had four objectives. It worked to harden embassies against mob attacks. It tried to provide security in case the host government fell short on its protection responsibilities. SEP also strove to ensure that U.S. personnel were not killed or taken hostage. Finally, it sought to prevent national security information from being compromised.\textsuperscript{14}

To implement SEP, A/SPL followed a three-stage procedure. First, it sent a team to the post to do a thorough security survey. The team numbered about 15 people and included an SY Special Agent, an architect, and officers from FBO, OC, and other foreign affairs and national security agencies. Furthermore, one of the team leaders was former SY chief Victor Dikeos. After the security survey, A/SPL contracted the security upgrades to a private company, which then completed the required enhancements. FBO supervised installation of the security improvements, which included upgrading and reinforcing perimeter barriers, erecting impediments to forced entry, and raising interior barriers. Other improvements included elements that had worked in Islamabad, such as strengthening the vault/communications room walls, and developing a space into a “safehaven” that would protect U.S. personnel for approximately 12 hours. A/SPL also installed access denial systems that utilized foam or tear gas, and purchased additional document destruction equipment.\textsuperscript{15}

As a direct result of the SEP, SY began to explore several new technologies to improve embassy security. “Centralized electronic storage systems” (i.e. computers) promised a reduction of paper files, quick destruction in a crisis, and rapid reconstruction of post files afterwards. SY also experimented with the Aqueous Foam System. When activated, the system dispensed a great amount of soap foam into an area. The soap bubbles made everything slippery, and holding tools became very difficult. The system was easier to clean up than tear gas (virtually impossible to remove from furniture, drapes, and carpet). The bubbles also refracted light, causing individuals to lose their orientation and have difficulty seeing. SY installed Aqueous Foam systems in the U.S. Embassies in Ankara, Turkey, and Bogotá, Colombia; however, the system lost favor due to the high maintenance that it required.\textsuperscript{16}

Another project involved strengthening doors at U.S. posts. Because the doors at the Embassies in Iran and Pakistan were mostly glass and did little to impede the mobs, SY’s technical engineers tried to design an ideal door. The engineers made two determinations. First, they believed that a mob would have hand tools such as pipes, sledgehammers, clubs, and crowbars, but would not have fire, drills, saws, or explosives. Second, SY decided that the door must withstand attack for at least 15 minutes, time enough for the Marine Security Guard to notify everyone in the building and for the staff to retreat to the safehaven.\textsuperscript{17}
SY engineers worked with H.P. White Labs to test products. John Wolf, who developed many of the Department’s physical security standards, noted two doors that did not survive the testing process. A company that often did work for prisons tested its door prototype by having a group of prisoners try to break the door down in order to get the case of beer on the other side. The door passed that test; however, when H.P. White personnel, assisted by SY’s Franchot White and Russ Waller, tested the door with pry bars and sledgehammers, they broke it down in less than 30 seconds. Another company submitted a door prototype that had bullet-resistant glass in the top and bottom panels, a door designed primarily for gas stations and convenience stores. H.P. White hired local farmers to test it with a sledgehammer. With a single blow, the door fell out of its casing.¹⁸

The SEP was never intended nor designed to enhance security at all U.S. diplomatic posts across the world; rather, it focused on posts considered at high risk for terrorism, crime, and other threats. A/SPL made clear distinctions between a post in Beirut, designated as high threat, and a post in Bermuda, designated as low threat. A/SPL implemented a 5-year plan to improve security at 122 selected high-risk posts. Officials had few illusions about the effort needed for the SEP: enhancing security at high-risk embassies constituted “a long term venture” that would require “major funding by the Congress and a strong commitment by both the Congress and the Department of State.” Ultimately, the SEP received little time, funds, and commitment beyond that provided by SY.¹⁹

The SEP faced several difficulties from the beginning. Although Congress provided funds, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did not create any positions for the program. The Department had to reallocate 35 positions from other offices for SEP, and SEP had to maximize the use of contractors and private sector resources. Department officials conceded that the scope and complexity of the SEP was far greater than any previous security program; furthermore, they

Figure 6: A female Special Agent (left) is alert for threats in early 1984 as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering (foreground) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick (right) view devastation resulting from El Salvador’s civil war. A Salvadoran Army major (rear center) briefs Pickering and Kirkpatrick. SY’s Threat Analysis Division determined the threat matrix for each post and designated some as “high threat.” Such designations enabled SY, in the early 1980s, to maximize its limited resources. Source: Private collection.
confessed that their efforts were hampered by the great variation in size, location, age, vulnerability, and types of construction of its embassies and consulates. The Department originally told Congress that it could harden 25 embassies per year; however, as the surveys and work were undertaken, the figure dropped to 3 or 4 embassies per year. SY and A/SPL additionally had trouble finding products to meet their security requirements, and they had to urge private companies to develop such products. For example, high standard ballistics glass (as opposed to simple bullet-resistant glass) did not exist when the SEP was initiated. The SEP also required A/SPL to coordinate with SY, FBO, and OC; however, a Director headed A/SPL, but SY, FBO, and OC each had a Deputy Assistant Secretary. A/SPL therefore lacked sufficient clout to push its projects through the Department’s bureaucracy. Moreover, the SEP was initiated during a transition of Presidential administrations; in fact, during the 1980 Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan made the reduction of overhead and personnel costs in the federal government a primary goal. In its first year, the Reagan Administration reduced SEP’s funding by one-third, and between 1982 and 1984, the scope and emphasis of SEP projects were further scaled back, and expectations were downgraded.

SEP also faced resistance from Embassy officers in the field, and criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO). The Embassy in Ankara was among the first to receive a comprehensive security survey; however, A/SPL confessed, “Senior officials at the post have fought [the SEP] plan from the beginning and have successfully delayed implementation.” Embassy officers objected to SEP modifications and requested another survey, even though the architect and A/SPL’s director made special trips to Ankara to resolve the impasse.

When the GAO audited the SEP in 1982, it offered a harsh assessment: “State Department officials overestimated the number of posts they could improve each year;” furthermore, “inadequate planning, coordination, and property management” plagued the program.

Despite its difficulties, the SEP laid important foundations for future diplomatic security programs. Under the SEP, SY and many Department officials embraced a “total approach” towards security, an attitude non-existent before 1979. Also, SY and A/SPL completed extensive groundwork for obtaining better materials and equipment, coordinating projects, and determining the various upgrades that each post needed. Likely a result of A/SPL’s small staff, SY assumed leadership of the expanded security efforts overseas. SY resolved differences among the various agencies, and sponsored inter-agency meetings on overseas security. When the Office of Counterterrorism (M/CT) requested information about the status of the SEP at high-risk posts, it contacted SY. Moreover, the Reagan Administration reinvigorated and expanded the SEP after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 attack on the Marine barracks near the Beirut airport; it did not create a new program. The SEP did not harden the number of embassies that many had hoped, but hopes far exceeded what was possible. Few appreciated the groundbreaking nature of A/SPL’s and SY’s activities.
**Protective Security in the United States**

As Department officials improved security at U.S. posts overseas, foreign diplomats and dignitaries grew anxious about the protection they received in the United States. In January 1982, two Armenian immigrants murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and one member was arrested. The Justice Commandos demanded that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,” the deaths of more than one million Armenians in Turkey in 1915. After the killing, SY asked its field offices to work with local law enforcement to ensure maximum protection for Turkish establishments and personnel. The Department of State spokesman commented that the murder was “a sharp reminder to all nations of the need to redouble their efforts to stamp out the worldwide menace of terrorism.”

The murder of Arikan resurrected latent concerns within the foreign diplomatic community about the adequacy of protective security in the United States. In a February 11, 1982, letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States, Sukru Elekdag, expressed grave concerns about the quality of protection that U.S. officials were providing Turkish diplomats and missions. Elekdag was particularly upset because Turkish officials, despite their relatively scarce resources, had made every effort to provide maximum security to foreign diplomats and missions within Turkey. In a letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the Ambassador chided the Department for the lack of “effective, continuous protection,” and insisted that U.S. officials reciprocate Turkish efforts and provide more extensive protective security.

The Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Daryl F. Gates, also wrote Secretary Haig and raised issues similar to those that New York City policemen had raised a decade earlier as to why municipal...
resources should be diverted to diplomatic protection and away from metropolitan policing. Gates believed that protection of foreign diplomats should be a federal government responsibility, not a local one. Gates also wrote William P. Clark, National Security Advisor to President Reagan, and urged him to ask Reagan to find a solution. In the Department of State’s response to Gates, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy assured Gates that the Department would review his proposal. Meanwhile, Secretary Haig acknowledged the opinion among foreign diplomats that the United States had not provided reciprocal protection for visiting dignitaries. Moreover, Haig admitted that if the United States failed to provide adequate, reciprocal protection, it would have detrimental effects on the United States’ ability to conduct diplomacy and combat terrorism.27

Foreign diplomats and dignitaries began requesting additional protective security, even when there was not an imminent threat, but SY simply did not have the manpower to meet all of the requests. When the United Nations held a disarmament conference in June 1982, the number of dignitaries requiring protection far outweighed the number of SY Special Agents available for protective details. Consequently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Marvin L. Garrett, Jr., made clear that if that many SY agents were going to be utilized for protective services, then no one in Main State should complain about a lack of services at Main State or about emergency responses. To prevent such a situation, Garrett suggested that a high-level protective security review committee be created to address protective security requests exceeding SY’s resources. Garrett’s primary goal was to create a review mechanism to determine the level of threat that a foreign dignitary faced.28

The Department of State quickly moved to ensure that the necessary authority and resources were available to protect foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. In the summer of 1982, the Department asked members of the House of Representatives to introduce a bill that would extend protective security to foreign consulates outside of the Washington, DC, area. The bill would also grant the Secretary of State the authority to request extraordinary protective services for foreign consular personnel from state and local police forces, and the ability to pay for such services. Department officials believed that there was a chance that Congress might grant the Department responsibility for protection of all missions and consulates in the United States. However, they concluded that the cost of reimbursing local police forces for such protection would likely deter Congress from granting the Department this responsibility.29

After debates and hearings, Congress passed the bill, titled the Foreign Missions Act of 1982. The Act increased SY’s authority for protecting foreign diplomats. It also gave the Department of State authority to reimburse or contract protection for foreign embassies in Washington, DC, and for consular officers and personnel elsewhere in the United States (this became the Foreign Consulate Program).30 The Secret Service contested the authority by reminding Congress that in 1974, it had given specific responsibilities to the Treasury Department (the Secret Service) to protect diplomats within the Washington, DC, area. The Foreign Missions Amendment Act of 1983 called for a new regulation to be issued after consultation with appropriate committees of the Congress, but the process soon bogged down.31
On January 4, 1983, Congress also passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division (formerly the Executive Protective Service, and renamed on November 15, 1977), allowing it to protect motorcades and other places associated with visits of certain foreign diplomatic missions. The law granted additional funds to the Department of State and local governments so that they could assist with protection. The law also directed the Departments of State and the Treasury to consult with the Secretary of the Navy regarding the use of Marine Security Guards at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Although Congress created the Foreign Consulate Program in 1982, it had not granted the funds needed to reimburse state and local authorities. Consequently, the Department of State began drafting legislation in early 1984 to earmark appropriations for this purpose and to transfer authority to grant such funding to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department and Congress soon debated the term *equal protection of the law* versus *extraordinary protection*, and over compliance between SY and the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, who headed M/CT, made clear to Congress that while the Department agreed that the Constitution provided “equal protection of the law” to all persons within state and local jurisdiction, the Department’s request to Congress went beyond that obligation. The Department requested protective security for foreign dignitaries when there was reason to believe that the dignitary was threatened; therefore, the inclusion of the word “extraordinary” was necessary in the legislation.

In March 1984, Sayre crafted a deal with Congress. Congress agreed that the U.S. Government had an obligation to provide protective security for foreign officials that went beyond the equal protection provision of the Constitution; meanwhile, the Department of State agreed to restrict how such funding would be used. The Secretary of State would not grant protective security services unless a specific threat existed against a person and/or facility. The Secretary also assumed responsibility for reimbursing New York City for protective services. On May 23, 1984, President Reagan gave further protective authority to the Department when he signed Executive Order 12478. E.O. 12478 granted the Secretary the authority to reimburse state and local
governments for protection given to foreign missions. The changes largely resolved the protective security issues that had plagued the Department since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{The Moscow Embassy Again}

Security concerns also plagued the soon-to-be-constructed U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and officials worked to improve security at the construction site. On June 30, 1979, the United States signed a contract with the Soviet firm SVSI to construct the new embassy; however, U.S. officials had no intention of repeating the experience of the 1953 renovation, when the Soviets denied U.S. officials access to the site and placed tarpaulins over the structure to prevent observation of the renovation. As one Department official admitted, it was “a foregone conclusion…that the Soviets will attempt to install one or more clandestine listening systems.”\textsuperscript{35}

To prevent technical penetration of the new embassy, the Department, with the assistance of the Seabees and the Army Corps of Engineers, conducted extensive surveillance of the construction site. The Army Corps of Engineers provided an electrical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an architect, and a logistics scheduler to assist with the construction. More than 30 Seabees conducted surveillance and worked at the site; many of them would build the restricted areas of the embassy (e.g. the communications vault). Department officials also assigned an FBO project management team, at least 2 Security Engineering Officers (SEOs) from SY, and 9-10 Marine Security Guards, the latter of which provided two guards on watch at all times at the construction site. The Department conducted numerous inspections of the construction, and SY set up perimeter fences, perimeter alarms, closed-circuit television, microwave alarms, infrared vision devices, and fiber-optic probe viewers for extensive surveillance during construction.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Protecting U.S. Personnel Overseas}

As construction of the Moscow Embassy proceeded, U.S.-Soviet relations were strained by the killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs. On the morning of February 14, 1979, four Afghan terrorists stopped the Ambassador’s car and abducted him as he was traveling from his residence to the Embassy. By 8:50 a.m., the terrorists had taken Dubs to a second floor room in the Kabul Hotel. Afghan police, with Soviet advisers, surrounded and isolated the room, with snipers placed on the roofs of nearby buildings. During the hostage situation, Afghan officials excluded U.S. Embassy officials and kept those U.S. officers present at the hotel at a distance. Despite U.S. Embassy urgings to engage in “patient negotiations,” Afghan police stormed the room just after noon, and shots were fired. When U.S. Embassy officers were able to enter the room, they found the Ambassador dead from several gunshots.\textsuperscript{37}

Several questions arose from Dubs’ death, not the least of which was the role of the Soviet advisors in the crisis. Upon receipt of the official report from the Marxist-oriented Afghan Government, U.S. officials deemed it “incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate.” The Afghan Government refused to cooperate in clarifying the
circumstances of Dubs’ death, and U.S. officials could not obtain information on the identities or associations of the terrorists. The report also contained several discrepancies. It said that Afghan police heard gunshots before they stormed the room; U.S. Embassy officers at the scene denied this. Although four terrorists abducted the Ambassador, only three were killed and captured. The report did not mention the Soviet advisers at the scene, even though U.S. officials saw them playing an “operational role.” After the United States lodged official protests, the Soviet Government acknowledged the presence of Soviet representatives at the hotel, but claimed that they “had nothing to do with the decisions of Afghan authorities.” Many of the Department’s questions remain unanswered.38

Department officials also had grown particularly concerned about the security of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Since the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, the Department had kept a close watch on the safety of U.S. personnel in Lebanon, and had nearly closed the mission in mid-1976. During the late 1970s, the Embassy came under repeated fire, ranging from small arms fire to rocket attacks. SEP improvements scheduled for the high-risk post were repeatedly revised, and incurred significant delays. In a September 1982 review, John Perdew of A/SPL observed, “Given the war conditions, the shortage of construction materials, and other logistic problems of working in Beirut, it is uncertain how long it will be before we can begin the construction project.”39

The Beirut SEP project illustrates how local factors often impeded completion of security enhancements. Local factors ranged from the civil war conditions in Beirut, to the Soviet military presence in Kabul, to the inability to reach agreement with the landlord in Tegucigalpa. In Kampala, Uganda, where the U.S. Embassy building was owned by the United Kingdom, British officials refused to grant the Department permission to “harden” the Embassy.40

Figure 9: U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs. Dubs was kidnapped in 1979 and later killed when Afghan police stormed the room where he was held. Many questions remained about the kidnappers and the role of Soviet advisers to the Afghan police during the incident. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
SY officials also expressed concern about the ability of an embassy’s staff to manage the growing number of security programs and efforts. Holsey Handyside, the Action Officer for High-Threat Posts, noted that most RSOs and Administrative Officers had not been asked to manage such large quantities of resources. For example, the security program at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador in early 1983 involved 110-120 people and cost $1 million per year. Furthermore, the new measures and equipment required more training and management, basic behavioral changes from post staff, and time for the staff to “digest” and “assimilate” them. Handyside urged the Department to continue pressuring all posts to “think security.”

 Rejecting a Single Bureau

As the magnitude of the security measures and efforts became apparent in early 1982, Department officials rejected the idea of moving all of the Department’s security-related programs and offices into a single bureau. Richard T. Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for Management, convened a senior level task force to review the status of the Department’s security-related programs in order to recommend improvements. The task force concluded that it saw no benefit in placing all security efforts and programs into one organization; instead, it recommended that Kennedy appoint someone to coordinate security efforts without “interfering with operations.” Kennedy appointed Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Director of M/CT, whose office had recently (January 1982) been moved back into the Bureau of Management. The task force also reviewed the SEP and admitted that SEP faced problems, but it insisted that intra-agency and inter-departmental cooperation and coordination were not among them.

One year later, the Working Group on the Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas reviewed the SEP and other Department security efforts. Headed by SY Director Marvin Garrett, the Working Group determined that sufficient interagency consultation and coordination on security matters existed. The Group found that the “main problem” with enhancing security overseas was “the insufficiency of resources” being provided by Congress, OMB, and the Department.
Even though Department officials rejected creating a single security bureau, the Department’s security responsibilities, measures, and programs were already concentrating under SY. SY’s Threat Analysis Group (SY/TAG) prepared the “threat category list,” which determined which posts were high risk, and thus received SEP improvements. SY worked closely with M/CT to coordinate Department security efforts. Garrett chaired the Working Group on the Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas. He (or his representative) also sat on or headed other groups, task forces, and committees related to post security. SY officials, including former SY head Victor Dikeos, were part of the security survey teams. The RSOs, Post Security Officers (PSOs), Marine Security Guards, and SEOs were responsible for the physical and operational security of the posts; they implemented and installed the new security measures and equipment, and often conducted security training. Regional security technicians, Seabees, and post communicators were swamped with installing and maintaining the new security equipment purchased and distributed by the SEP. Therefore, *en toto*, the emphasis on physical security overseas was placing greater demands and responsibilities upon SY, straining the office’s resources and structure.

**Beirut I: New Method**

The 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut increased the already burgeoning demands upon SY and its personnel. The radical aspect of the attack, one which no one anticipated, was that the driver of the vehicle was willing to commit suicide in the process of the attack. On April 18, just after 1 p.m., a suicide bomber drove a one-half-ton black pick-up truck laden with approximately 2,000 pounds of TNT to the east entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The driver crashed the vehicle through the wall of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces guardroom before detonating his bomb. The blast collapsed the building’s entryway and a portion of the building itself, killing 86 people, including 17 Americans, and injuring over 100. Shortly after the bombing, officers at the Beirut Embassy wrote: “We were all

![Image of Marine standing guard as rescue workers search the rubble of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck to the east entrance of the Embassy, where the truck exploded. It was the first instance of a suicide bomber attacking a U.S. diplomatic post. Source: © Associated Press.](image)
shocked by the size and intensity of the blast; the fact of an attack was not really a surprise.” Richard M. Gannon, the security officer at the Embassy, said that car bombs were common in the Lebanese capital, and that “the prospect of a car bomb deployed against the embassy had been considered sufficiently real” that Lebanese police refused to allow vehicles to park near the Embassy. Shortly after the bombing, SY’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) sent a telegram to several high-risk embassies, warning them that a “martyrdom complex” was emerging among Palestinian and other Near East and Asian groups. “In the past few years,” wrote TAG, “there appears to be an increasing tendency to carry out operations for the sole purpose of the act itself, with no regard for whether the perpetrator lives or dies in committing the act.”

In its response to the Beirut bombing, SY enacted several security improvements. It evacuated all Beirut Embassy personnel to the British Embassy and the Durraford Buildings, an apartment complex leased by the U.S. Government. Within 30 minutes after the explosion, SY and the Marines increased perimeter security around U.S. facilities in Beirut; and then added bollards, sandbags, and anti-vehicle devices to limit access. Protective Services increased the personnel on the Ambassador’s protective detail and post operations. Marines from the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), a combat unit that was serving as part of the Multinational Force sent to Lebanon, set up and manned checkpoints on all access roads to the Durraford Buildings and British Embassy. The MAU assigned investigators to the dumping area, where the Embassy’s debris was screened for classified materials and passport and visa plates lost in the explosion.

Immediately after the bombing, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered to provide funds to improve security at U.S. overseas posts. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) said, “I would like to see us have whatever force is necessary to protect our embassies.” “If it takes a small army in places like Iran and places like Beirut,” he added, “my sense is that Congress would support whatever it costs.” Secretary of State George Shultz said that he would “review” the Department’s “security arrangements.”

Behind the scenes, SY and Bureau of Administration officials quickly initiated and implemented an “enhanced” SEP. The Bureau of Administration compiled a list of 64 posts that faced long-term threats and required immediate projects to improve security. The 64 posts were designated as the focus of the SEP. Another 28 posts not placed on the SEP list but still requiring security upgrades received funding through the Department’s regional bureaus. By June, just eight weeks after the Beirut bombing, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy told the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Department was working on about 40 of the original list of 64, and was giving priority to a “top tier” of 26 posts. Of those 26, said Tracy, the Department had completed security improvements on 10 or 12.50

Then, on October 23, 1983, six months after the Beirut bombing, a terrorist bombing rocked the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut. A suicide truck bomber crashed through the gates of the command center used by international peacekeeping forces. The subsequent explosion reduced two buildings to rubble, left a 30-foot deep crater, and killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers. After the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Philippe de Longeaux of the French forces in Lebanon remarked that “real security is not possible” in Beirut. Congress promptly questioned the security measures in place; meanwhile, Secretary Shultz told reporters, “the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very significantly.”51

Following the Marine Barracks bombing, the Department submitted and received approval for another appropriation request from Congress, enabling SY to make significant progress in improving embassy security by late 1983. The new funding allowed projects such as reinforcement of the gate at the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait to go forward in early December.52 SY worked with local governments to restrict access to U.S. embassies, particularly entrances and on-street parking near the embassy. SY implemented several measures to limit the risk of vehicle bomb attacks worldwide, including screening vehicles, constructing perimeter walls, hiring more local guards, and installing fences, gates, bollards, and vehicle arrest systems. SY approved 81 physical security projects, conducted physical security surveys at 33 posts, and spent $3.5 million on 13 new armored vehicles and weapons for posts in need. SY obtained equipment for public access control projects at 31 western European posts, and it reviewed architectural and engineering drawings for security enhancement projects at 25 embassies. Moreover, SY, FBO, and A/SPL established a mechanism to accelerate the Department’s response to post requests for security enhancements. SY also established long-term procedures (likely in cooperation with FBO) such as more rigid site selection for post buildings, construction of freestanding buildings, and larger compounds.53

In the wake of the Beirut bombings, the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas gained new relevance. Formed just days before the first Beirut bombing, the Working Group was created by the Interagency Group for Countermeasures (IG/CM). Headed by

Figure 13: British soldiers assist in rescue operations at the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, after a suicide bomber crashed a truck through the gates on October 23, 1983. The explosion killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers, and left a crater 30 feet deep. Source: © Associated Press.
SY, the Working Group’s members were from SY and other foreign affairs agencies, as well as FBO, OC, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). During the Working Group’s first meeting in May 1983, it identified four goals: 1) moving existing high-threat posts to free-standing buildings; 2) acquiring sufficient land to build free-standing posts; 3) using only U.S. personnel to repair a post’s attic, roof, façade, and other sensitive areas; and 4) working toward building at least one acoustic or treated conference room for each post. The IG/CM suggested that the Working Group establish policy guidelines for the entire federal government, and one year later, the SY-led group issued a formal policy statement on embassy security that circulated in the Department of State and the National Security Council. The statement not only elevated the Working Group’s four goals to policy aims of the U.S. Government, but added several other objectives to the federal agenda. These included assigning Marine Security Guards to every U.S. embassy, and ensuring the security of word processing, communications, and information systems. The Working Group then disbanded, and the Overseas Security Policy Group and the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee continued its efforts.

The surprising element of the Working Group was that M/CT was not included, even though Sayre was charged with coordinating the Department’s security policies. The omission indicated that, on a practical level, SY, not M/CT, was managing the SEP and the Department’s other security matters. SY’s Threat Analysis Group prepared threat alerts for the field, and coordinated with INR, M/CT, regional bureaus, and other intelligence agencies in preparing the alerts. In truth, Sayre did not have the personnel to direct counter-terrorism policy and coordinate security policies and programs. M/CT’s staff numbered 13 officers and 6 secretaries. In comparison, SY’s Threat Analysis Group alone had 8 officers and 2 secretaries, and SY as an entity had 436 people.

Yet SY also lacked the staff to meet the growing security demands. After only a few weeks on the job, David C. Fields, who replaced Marvin Garrett as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, admitted that SY was “hard-pressed to handle its traditional responsibilities and growing demands.” In fact, in addition to 30 vacancies, SY experienced a decline in staff between 1980 and 1982. In order to free resources for the new security demands that it faced, SY, in 1982, “surrendered, with qualms,” its long-held task of conducting background investigations of applicants for civil service jobs to the Office of Personnel Management.

Just before Marvin Garrett departed as the head of SY, he formulated a proposal that would increase funding for embassy security and provide more staff for SY. Garrett’s proposal was to be submitted to Congress in 1983, no doubt to take advantage of Congress’s expressed interest in improving physical security. Assistant Secretary Tracy and Under Secretary Jerome W. Van Gorkom instead chose to submit Garrett’s proposal as a supplemental request in 1984, after Congress had taken up the Department’s appropriation bill. Sayre, meanwhile, sought to shelve Garrett’s proposal altogether and have SY, FBO, and OC directed to work with M/CT and others to formulate a new proposal.
### To Kuwait and Back Again

The December 12, 1983, terrorist attack on the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait led to a substantial enhancement of SY and a thorough reconsideration by the Department about how to manage security. During the Kuwait City attack, two men crashed a dump truck packed with explosives through the gate of the U.S. Embassy compound, and it exploded next to the U.S. Consulate building. No Americans were killed, but the Consulate was destroyed and the chancery heavily damaged, despite the fact that the Embassy had taken measures to limit vehicular access.\(^60\)

Department officials determined that the bombing, the third major attack on a U.S. facility in the Middle East since April, constituted “a marked escalation in the security threat” to U.S. posts in the region. On December 16, the Department ordered its embassies to erect barricades or take measures to prevent further truck bomb explosions. Department officials also decided to move the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to the east (Christian) side of the city. Since the move cost significantly less than completing the new Embassy in West Beirut, the Department shifted the remaining funds to acquire and build more permanent and secure facilities in other regional posts, namely Amman, Jordan; Sana’a, Yemen; Manama, Bahrain; and Muscat, Oman. Department officials now embraced the idea that free-standing buildings and larger compounds were a necessity.\(^61\)

The Kuwait City bombing and the new attitude about security in the Department undercut Sayre’s efforts to shelve Garret’s proposal, primarily because Sayre’s recommendations seemed inadequate to the severity of the threat confronting U.S. posts. Sayre favored “common-sense, less dramatic and less costly” measures for improving embassy security: expanding the Marine Security Guard program to all embassies, constructing better perimeters for missions, assigning more security officers to posts, and purchasing additional armored vehicles. However, he believed the cost for free-standing buildings and larger compounds to be excessive.\(^62\) SY, with FBO and others, however, had already extensively developed in other forums the idea of free-standing embassy buildings and larger compounds as long-term policy goals for the U.S. Government. The Kuwait City bombing accelerated acceptance of SY/FBO’s ideas and shifted greater responsibility for coordination of security measures onto the shoulders of SY.

Despite Sayre’s assertion that SY did not have the resources to augment embassy security, SY always seemed to find resources when it needed them. Often, SY responded by using what it had, shifting resources, and coordinating inter-agency or inter-departmental assistance. In early 1984, SY had five security officers engaged in overseas emergency situations. When the U.S. Embassy and personnel in Guatemala faced a threatened terrorist attack, SY quickly sent a security officer and eight additional Marine Security Guards to the Central American capital. M/CT, meanwhile, arranged for a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) team to go to Guatemala; but when the team arrived in Guatemala City, the Embassy’s RSO coordinated and integrated the JSOC team into the Embassy’s MSG detail. In fact, Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields informed Sayre that SY had drastically reduced the role of JSOC teams and that they would eventually be phased out. Just nine months after the first
Beirut bombing, Fields and SY largely and effectively had shouldered the coordination of the SEP and other Department security programs. In fact, Sayre likely recognized that coordination had drifted to SY when he informed his staff that he was “taking steps” to ensure that M/CT was “at least an info recipient” of message traffic on security improvements and enhancements.63

Under Garrett and Fields, SY gained responsibilities; meanwhile, M/CT lacked the resources to carry out its assigned functions. In January 1984, SY instructed its RSOs to submit monthly reports on crimes committed against members of the U.S. missions they served. SY also, at the request of Sayre, assisted with M/CT’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA). ATA had been created in 1981 with five goals in mind: enrich law enforcement skills of foreign police forces and provide equipment; strengthen bilateral relations with friendly governments; promote cooperation between foreign police forces and the U.S. Government; raise the level of respect for human rights; and assist foreign governments in protecting American installations. When ATA was finally funded in early 1984, M/CT, due to its lack of resources, sought SY’s help. Fields welcomed M/CT’s appeal. He later thanked M/CT for supporting the addition of eight new SY officers who would enable SY to establish a meaningful training program for foreign police and create “a ready reserve pool to provide short-term training for Foreign Service personnel at critical posts.”64

**Enhancing SY**

After the Kuwait bombing, the Department of State pushed several initiatives to restructure the Department’s organization regarding security. One initiative was the Inman Panel. Conceived in early March 1984 by Under Secretary of State for Management Ronald Spiers, the panel would examine potential security improvements and recommend necessary changes. Several senior Department officers believed that the Department needed to take more dramatic action; otherwise, it was exposing itself to “second guessing and accusations” that it had no strategy for the terrorist threat other than requesting supplemental appropriations from Congress. In a

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**Figure 14: Under Secretary of State for Management Ronald Spiers.** Spiers was very supportive of efforts to improve security and expand SY. He proposed to Secretary of State Shultz the idea of having a committee of esteemed individuals examine diplomatic security for the Department of State. The committee became the Inman Panel. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
memorandum to Secretary Shultz, Spiers proposed convening a group of seven esteemed Department of State, Congressional, and business leaders to undertake “a new, comprehensive examination of [the Department’s] security strategy.” Among the luminaries Spiers suggested were former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Ambassador Shirley Temple Black, Chrysler Motors Chairman Lee Iacocca, and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Shultz immediately liked the idea, and recommended that the panel be given “a limited but reasonable time to complete” their examination. Before moving ahead, Shultz discussed the idea with Fields, Sayre, and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb. In July 1984, retired Admiral B. R. “Bobby” Inman agreed to serve as the panel’s chair, and in August, Victor Dikeos, former head of SY, agreed to serve as the panel’s Executive Secretary.65

The final membership of the panel included few of the individuals on Spiers’ original list, but it remained a highly respected group. In addition to Inman and Dikeos, Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Congressman Daniel Mica (D-FL) represented Congress. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger represented the Department of State; Lieutenant General D’Wayne Gray, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Marine Corps, represented the Department of Defense; and Anne Armstrong, chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, represented the intelligence community. Robert McGuire, Chairman of the Board for Pinkerton’s, served as the panel’s sole private sector member.66

While the Department was assembling the Inman Panel, Fields put forward two proposals in June 1984 that would create an “enhanced,” larger Office of Security. One proposal, offered jointly with FBO, suggested that the Bureau of Administration disband A/SPL and divide A/SPL’s positions between SY and FBO. The Bureau of Administration could then create an “Inter-departmental Committee on
Physical Security” under the leadership of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and the committee would supervise SEP projects and provide direction and long-range guidance to the Department’s physical security program. With this proposal, Fields was formalizing what was already occurring: management, oversight, and coordination of the SEP and embassy security was being accomplished by SY.67

Fields’ other proposal, put forward on June 12, 1984, was innocuously titled “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State;” however, it proposed a much larger, restructured SY and set an ambitious agenda for embassy security over the next several years. Since the Department “has accumulated a body of experience and a growing cadre of experts,” the proposal argued, it was time to increase the personnel and material resources to carry out embassy security improvements. The Acceleration program delineated three categories of work: “extension to all posts…[of] the level of security now afforded the high threat posts,” “replacement of facilities not adequately securable” [85 posts], and provision for “on-going service and maintenance to derive maximum benefit from our security of overseas missions.” To complete the work in the three categories, SY requested 489 new people (which would double its size), plus an additional 275 Marine Security Guards and 100 Seabees, as well as $670 million in funding and another $1.438 billion to construct 85 new office buildings overseas.68

If the sheer numbers were not enough, the Acceleration program clearly indicated that not only would SY become a very large component in the Department’s bureaucracy, but it also would be the lead agency on diplomatic security. Fields’ proposal made clear that SY would assume control over, if not absorb, some M/CT programs, such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and Emergency Action Planning (EAP). The Acceleration program also arranged for SY to obtain the funding for the Department’s Rewards for Information program, recently created by the Payment of Rewards for Information Act.69

The parameters of the Acceleration program demonstrate that SY and the Bureau of Administration officials were dissatisfied with the existing organizational structure and now sought a single security bureau to enact and coordinate improvements in overseas security. An important reason for the shift in attitude was change in personnel in the upper echelons of the Department. Sayre had received his responsibilities for coordinating security policy from Under Secretary of State for Management Van Gorkom and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger; however, by May 1984, Ronald Spiers had replaced Van Gorkom.
and Eagleburger had left the Department. In November 1983, Garrett received little support for his proposal from Van Gorkom and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Thomas Tracy; yet, seven months later, Fields found sympathy for a stronger, centralized SY among Spiers and new Assistant Secretary for Administration Robert Lamb. As Spiers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “we have had some coordination problems within the State Department, and…this is what led me to be a very frustrated Ambassador overseas” (Spiers had served as Ambassador to Turkey and to Pakistan).°

Another reason for the shift to creating a single security entity was the number of other agencies that now had representatives at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. Since the 1950s, the number of agencies represented at a given embassy or consulate had increased markedly; moreover, the various agencies had differing security needs. This resulted in “a degree of incoherence” in trying to provide for security at the posts. As SY’s Acceleration proposal noted, “The multiple survey teams, funding sources, approval chains, and supply conduits contribute[d] to confusion and bureaucratic maneuvering which complicates and frequently slows the improvement process.” SY’s proposed program asked the Department to seek the National Security Council’s approval for centralizing overseas security in the Department, specifically in SY, and having all agencies put their security requirements in writing and submit them to the Department.°

Department officials were sympathetic to both SY proposals. In fact, by August, they had acted on one of them: the inter-departmental committee on physical security. This emerged as the Overseas Security Policy Group, and SY’s Deputy Assistant Secretary chaired it.° The support for the Acceleration program reveals that leading officials in the Office of Management and the Bureau of Administration were already contemplating and establishing some form of an “enhanced” SY in the summer of 1984, well before the Inman Panel had begun its work. The SEP and the bombings in Beirut and Kuwait had generated such an emphasis on embassy physical security that existing bureaucratic structures in the Department strained to meet the demand. Administration officials sought to resolve these problems by centralizing diplomatic security into one entity. SY was the obvious candidate; moreover, with Fields at the helm, SY was asking for the responsibility. The centralization included moving M/CT’s ATA and EAP programs, the Rewards for Information program, and A/SPL under the control of SY. The Acceleration program altered the bureaucracy to coincide with existing practice and to keep pace with evolving international circumstances. The program strove to “enhance” SY and outlined the structure of an “Office of Diplomatic Security.” The question was whether Congress, the White House, and OMB would accept the ambitious program.

**The Moscow Typewriters**

While the Department was moving to enact SY’s two proposals, the 1984 discovery of Soviet bugs in typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow prompted further scrutiny and criticism of the Department. The discoveries pushed Department officials to adopt a more aggressive technical security program and encouraged the
movement toward an enhanced security office. The
discoveries also suggested a possible purpose for the
chimney antenna that SY engineers had discovered
in 1978.

In 1983, French intelligence informed U.S.
officials that the Soviets might have planted a bug
in the U.S. Embassy’s communications system. The
French had found a Soviet bug in one of their coding
machines. A data storage device that transmitted a
signal only intermittently, the new Soviet bug could
be quickly and easily installed, resisted detection by
conventional methods, and was controlled remotely
and wirelessly. Working with other agencies, the
National Security Agency (NSA) presented the
news to President Ronald Reagan and proposed “Operation Gunman,” which sought to replace all information
and communications processing equipment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, more than 20,000 pounds total.
Reagan approved Operation Gunman, and the NSA found 16 IBM typewriters containing bugs similar to the
device that the French had found. The devices could record and transmit keystroke sounds to Soviet monitoring
equipment.73

The typewriter finds proved alarming, in
part because SY was unsure how extensively the
Soviets had penetrated the Embassy. In response,
SY conducted a worldwide search for additional
bugs in IBM typewriters. Security Engineering
Officer George Herrmann recalled that the news was
“terrifying,” because nearly every telegram generated
by the Department was prepared as a machine-
readable document on an IBM typewriter, and then
carried to the post communications center. The bugs
also demonstrated that the Soviets possessed highly
sophisticated electronic technology. Former head
of the National Security Administration Lieutenant
General Lincoln D. Faurer admitted that many
would concede that the Soviets had “enormously
narrowed the [technological] gap and have caught us in a number of places.”

Questions arose over how the Soviets were able to implant the bugs, and how much damage was done to U.S. national security. The Department of State learned that the typewriters had been shipped through “normal channels,” that is, by unescorted shipments that had passed through Soviet customs; in fact, one typewriter was left overnight in Soviet customs. The typewriters should have received special diplomatic handling, which included a U.S. Government escort, as required by Department regulations. Moreover, some typewriters had been shipped to the Embassy as early as 1976, and the batteries in a couple of the bugs were found to be dead. This led to the suggestion that perhaps the chimney antenna found in 1978 might have retrieved the data from the typewriter bugs.

While it is possible that damage to national security was minor, Department officials took the breach “seriously” and adopted several measures to improve technical security in U.S. embassies. Of the new measures that the Department adopted to improve technical security, one was a program to provide equipment maintenance, a controlled procurement channel, and inspection and inventory controls for office equipment destined for U.S. embassies and consulates. Also, Secretary Shultz asked the Inman Panel to add electronic espionage against U.S. overseas posts to its list of subjects to study. The Department assured the U.S. public that there was “no evidence that the Soviets ever acted on information obtained from monitoring the compromised typewriters.” Yet detractors in the intelligence community and Congress cited the typewriter episode as demonstration of the Department’s inattention to technical security.

**Beirut II**

During the typewriter discoveries and investigation, the Department worked quickly to increase security at U.S.-occupied buildings in Beirut, where the situation was deemed “extremely grave.” The Embassy, headed by Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, recommended moving most of its operations and personnel to a new office building in East Beirut, while keeping a token presence in West Beirut. SY fully supported the move, but expressed “strong reservations” about maintaining a presence in West Beirut, asserting “even a limited U.S. presence in West Beirut...is extremely dangerous and should probably be deferred until the situation improves
markedly.” The Department supported the East Beirut move, and justified keeping West Beirut open because it feared that closing the West Beirut office would “send a major negative signal to the Muslims in Lebanon.” After surveying the Baaklini office building in East Beirut, SY, FBO, and OC inspectors approved it, with SY asserting that it offered a “substantially lower” threat of terrorism than West Beirut.

SY coordinated, supervised, and/or installed most of the building’s extensive security upgrades, but Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields had grave doubts that SY could have everything in place before summer’s end. He insisted that perimeter security would have to be very tight to preclude a repeat of the 1983 experience. SY had barriers constructed that would “totally block” access to the Baaklini Building, which would be accessible only to Embassy employees. SY brought in a Mobile Training Team headed by Bill Penn to prepare local Lebanese guards in procedures and skills for protecting the Baaklini Building. While many security improvements were completed, Ambassador Bartholomew insisted the move to the Baaklini Building occur before the summer ended. Given this deadline, the company installing several security measures was stretched extremely thin between the two Embassy locations, and could not complete some security upgrades on schedule. One of these upgrades was the swinging steel gates for the two entrances to the Baaklini Building. When the compound was attacked on September 20, 1984, the gates lay on the ground near where they were to be installed.

The Department of Defense endorsed moving Embassy operations to East Beirut, saying that the Embassy’s reliance on the 80-man Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) for guarding the perimeter in West Beirut must end because the Department could no longer sustain the unit in Lebanon. The facts that troop units were needed elsewhere, other members of the Multinational Force had pulled out in February, and the Marines were high profile targets demanded that the Pentagon withdraw the MAU. Also the three Navy ships stationed offshore carrying 2,000 Marines and 1,200 Navy personnel that supported the MAU typically served a combat role, not a protective one. By June, the Navy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would have to terminate the MAU security support role in Beirut, and it strongly advised that Department of State, Department of Defense, and the NSC should anticipate August 8, 1984, as the termination date for the MAU’s role in supporting the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

The Department of State responded with alarm. If the Marines did not stay to provide reinforcement to the Beirut Embassy, SY proposed that the U.S.
mission be shut down. The Joint Chiefs conceded that the Marines could stay past the August 8 deadline if the Embassy had not completed its move to the Baaklini Building, but they strongly admonished the Department of State for not moving faster in finishing the security improvements. Throughout June, SY alerted senior Department officials of the dire security situation in Beirut, warning that “U.S. personnel who will continue to operate in West Beirut will not be adequately protected.”

Most of the Embassy’s staff relocated to the Baaklini Building on July 31, even though several security enhancements were not completed. The MAU departed shortly after. The Embassy relied upon the MSG detail and an increased number of Lebanese security guards, supported by the Lebanese Army, for the protection of the Baaklini Building and the Embassy in West Beirut. On September 20, 1984, a suicide bomber, driving a van bearing diplomatic plates, approached the northern entrance of the Baaklini Building. Speeding, the bomber navigated the chicanes and headed straight for the U.S. Mission. Guards fired at the vehicle, but could not stop the van before it exploded in front of the building. The blast killed at least 14 people and injured many, including Ambassador Bartholomew, the visiting British Ambassador, and the Embassy’s Regional Security Officer Alan Bigler.

While working to survey the damages and injuries in Beirut, the Department of State immediately required all 262 overseas posts to revise their security arrangements. It dispatched teams to tighten post defenses against vehicle bombs and identify other security needs at 23 high threat posts. Under Secretary Spiers cabled all U.S. ambassadors and consuls, instructing them to review “every conceivable aspect” of post security, and bluntly telling them that “adequate security should be [their] objective, even at the expense of aesthetics or convenience.” Posts were told to advise Washington of their needs and vulnerabilities, and Spiers received assurances from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress that SY would receive the necessary support to protect U.S. Government personnel and property overseas.

The Department also requested a supplemental appropriation from Congress for embassy security, and the request’s specifics were drawn directly from Fields’ Acceleration program. Whereas the Acceleration program asked for 40 additional security officers overseas, 90 SEOs, 14 communications staff, 30 new administration staff (for training) and 100 additional Seabees, the supplemental submitted to Congress requested...
requested 26 security officers, 15 SEOs, 15 communications staff, 20 administration staff, and 50 Seabees. The Acceleration program asked for $37.3 million for armored vehicles over 5 years, but the supplemental requested $11 million. The Acceleration program wanted $3 million for new security improvements for Main State and $2 million for the Rewards for Information program; the supplemental asked for $1 million for each. There was $1 million for research into an ideal embassy (this would become the Model Embassy program), and $28 million to seek and obtain new sites for the most vulnerable embassies. In all, SY sought 87 new people and approximately $60 million in new funding for security enhancements.87

Members of the House and Senate were sympathetic to the Department’s supplemental request; however, Senate committee hearings revealed that the impediments to improving security overseas rested with the OMB, not Congress’s reluctance to appropriate funds. The Department requested money to improve security at 70 posts, but OMB limited it to 35 posts. The Department requested funds to install physical access control projects at 10 posts; OMB cut it to 2. OMB cut the number of new Regional Security Officers from 104 to 51, and reduced the armored vehicle program from 120 to 60 vehicles. OMB also denied a $12 million request for 310 new Marine Security Guards, and refused a $1.7 million request to improve security at Main State. Of the $174 million of security improvement requests by the Department of State, OMB permitted $28 million. In exasperation, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) exclaimed, “Is the OMB on our side or on their side? Who does OMB work for?”88

Spiers and other Department officials endured extensive questioning and heavy criticism from Congress and the public. Just days after the September attack, Congressional representatives questioned why, in spite of two previous bombings, Department officials could not reduce the risks to U.S. personnel in Beirut. Representative Robert Torrecelli (D-New Jersey) alleged that the entire security program suffered from poor management. “I’ll vote for the $100 million,” he remarked, “but you need 100 good managers more than $100 million.” Congress also sought to identify who decided “to move the embassy to East Beirut before the security enhancements had been completed.” Spiers conceded some of the Congressional representatives’ points, but he insisted that the attack did not result from organizational failings or a lack of resources. He admitted that had all perimeter security measures at the Baaklini Building been completed, the bombing might have been avoided. However, Spiers noted that other threats, such as rocket attacks and kidnappings, were considered more likely, and installation of the vehicle gate was delayed in order to complete improvements for these more likely threats. Spiers stressed that, “the Department and other U.S. agencies understood the risks of maintaining our presence in the middle of a war zone.”89

When Congress passed the Department’s supplemental, it rapidly enhanced and expanded SY. Titled the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the supplemental added $55 million to SY’s budget for FY 1984, doubling SY’s budget for FY 1984 to a total of $110 million. The influx of funds is more spectacular given that SY’s entire FY 1982 budget was only $27 million. The supplemental request nearly quadrupled SY’s monies in less than 2 years, and added 87 positions to SY’s staff, pushing the total personnel for SY to more than 500 people.90
The 1984 supplemental, in conjunction with the second Beirut bombing, allowed the Department of State to centralize many security functions under an “enhanced” SY. After the 1984 bombing, the Bureau of Administration implemented SY’s proposal to disband A/SPL and divide its people and responsibilities between SY and FBO. Congress’s supplemental allowed SY to double the size of its Threat Analysis Group and to devote three people toward coordinating security for all agencies with offices and personnel in posts overseas. SY raised its number of Seabees by 60 and its number of Marine Security Guard detachments (6 Marines each) by 37. In addition to obtaining 26 new RSOs and 41 new SEOs, SY initiated a preventative maintenance program for technical equipment, set up a working security committee with the Office of Communications to cooperate on security measures, and worked with FBO to create guidelines and standards for current and new sites and buildings. SY also gained Emergency Action Planning of M/CT, and the Bureau of Administration changed its name to the Bureau of Administration and Security, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security becoming the number-two person in the Bureau.91

In addition, SY created a permanent Mobile Training Team (MTT) program. Although MTTs had existed for a decade, the program had become more ad hoc after the training tours of the mid-1970s. When called, the heads of SY’s Range and Locks divisions pulled together a team and headed to the designated post. SY officials asked Alan Bigler, who had been injured in the second Beirut bombing, to head the new MTT program. MTTs were tasked to train U.S. and local personnel at high threat posts, expand SY’s research and development of security products, and increase training for SY personnel. Bigler re-formed the MTTs, creating teams that were a cross between a training team and a Special Forces team. Bigler wanted highly-trained SY experts who could perform several functions, namely giving the best training for post personnel in high-threat areas, offering ambassadors the best advice available, providing local RSOs with highly trained agents to assist them, and furnishing posts with the capability to respond to terrorist, criminal, and high threat situations.92
Bigler developed the MTTs into formal units. Bigler and his staff drew team leaders from select SY agents at high threat posts. All team members received extensive training, including Hostage Rescue Team training from the FBI. The MTTs trained Department personnel in surveillance detection and counter-surveillance. Post personnel learned how to steal cars so that, in a high-threat situation, they could get away from a hostile environment. Other training included how to prevent becoming victims of crime and how to survive when confronted by a criminal. Bigler noted that “a lot of suspicion” existed among Foreign Service Officers about what his teams were doing, and for what situations they were training people. Since their formation under Bigler, Mobile Security Details, as the MTTs were later renamed, have more than doubled their original size, but they still carry out much of the original mission.

Two other programs gained significant funding from the 1984 supplemental. The first was the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. Comprising about eight staff members and a $9 million budget, ATA approached terrorism as a global problem requiring international cooperation. Under the control of M/CT, ATA trained police forces from other countries in counterterrorism skills, specifically SWAT training, counter-intelligence, and threat analysis, among others. The program sought to offer bilateral assistance for anti-terrorism training and communications in order to increase the ability of other nations to counter international terrorism. By 1985, ATA conducted extensive exchange and training programs with 15 nations, which included Portugal, Costa Rica, Turkey, Italy, Thailand, Tunisia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Cameroon, and Liberia.

ATA initially generated public protests against its training efforts. The program first conducted its training in the Phoenix area; however, demonstrators appeared and accused ATA of training “death squads” and of being akin to the Pentagon’s “School of the Americas.” ATA moved its training site to the campuses of Louisiana State University and the Louisiana State Police Academy. Congress too had qualms about ATA’s training program, and mandated that training could only occur in the United States. John Rendeiro, SY’s first agent assigned to ATA, recalled that Congress was reacting partly to the old AID programs and to the death of Daniel Mitrione in Uruguay, which had generated considerable hostility and opposition among local nationals in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite the concerns, ATA conducted “straight counter-terrorism police training, with humane, law-abiding, police techniques.”
The 1984 supplemental also funded a second program, which enabled the Secretary of State to pay rewards for information relating to terrorism. Initially called Rewards for Information, the program was designed by Special Agent Steve Gleason, who had investigated the two U.S. Embassy bombings in Beirut. The DS program paid individuals a cash reward for information that led to the arrest or conviction of terrorists, or the prevention or successful resolution of international terrorist acts. The Secretary of State determined whether the information merited a reward, and rewards were paid out of confidential, no-year designated funds. At the Attorney General’s discretion, persons granted a reward could enter the witness protection program if necessary. The program capped rewards at $500,000 per informant. A year later, however, Congress designated $2 million for such rewards, and the program was re-titled “Rewards for Justice.”  

The Inman Panel and the Creation of DS

Several months after the 1984 supplemental, in June 1985, the Inman Panel submitted its report to Secretary of State Shultz, and in it, the panel urged the Department to undertake a fundamental reorganization of diplomatic security. The panel recommended creating a Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security who reported directly to the Under Secretary of State for Management. SY and the several initiatives it had gained during the previous two years comprised the bulk of the new bureau, but the Inman Panel advocated moving several other security-related programs and offices into the bureau, including the Diplomatic Courier Service. The panel also proposed stripping M/CT of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs, and giving both to DS. The Inman Panel advised the Department to create a Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), which would combine Special Agents and SEOs into a highly skilled corps of security professionals within the Foreign Service, to allow for their recruitment and advancement. Although the Inman Panel preferred to move all foreign dignitary protection duties into the new DS, the panel recommended that DS and the Secret Service form a working group to develop standards and procedures, with the function of dignitary protection eventually falling entirely under the purview of DS. The panel also suggested improving intelligence gathering and analysis, physical security (building) standards, and a substantial building program.
History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The Inman Panel report gained the immediate support of the Secretary of State and Congress. Secretary Shultz appointed Assistant Secretary Lamb to implement the panel’s recommendations and tasked him to complete the reorganization of the Department’s security programs by January 1, 1986.98 The Department established the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on November 4, 1985, with the new Bureau acquiring the Courier Service, the Rewards for Justice program, as well as ATA and the Emergency Planning program. On August 12, 1986, with overwhelming support, Congress passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (Public Law 99-399), creating the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and providing the new bureau with extensive funding. President Reagan signed the act into law on August 27.99

The transfer of ATA to DS, however, did generate a brief clash between Congress and the Inman Panel on one side and the Department of State on the other. The issue centered upon which office should manage ATA. Secretary Shultz said that M/CT should retain management of ATA. The House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Inman Panel insisted that DS should manage it because ATA was an operational training program. Congress and the Inman Panel members did agree that DS and M/CT should coordinate their efforts with regards to ATA’s training program, and Shultz concurred. The result was that M/CT would provide policy guidance for ATA; meanwhile, DS would manage it.100

With the transfer of ATA and the Emergency Planning offices to DS, the Inman Panel suggested that the remnants of M/CT should be reformed into a policy formation and coordination office. The panel drew a marked distinction between the operations of counterterrorist programs and the development of counter-terrorism policy. It advocated moving all operational components to DS, with the new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security serving as coordinator of terrorism and security matters in the Department and as chair of

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Figure 25: Admiral (Ret.) B. R. “Bobby” Inman. Inman headed the 1984–85 panel to examine security at the Department of State. The Executive Secretary of the Inman Panel was former SY chief Victor Dikeos. The Inman Panel made several recommendations, all adopted by Secretary of State George Shultz. The most prominent was the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Source: © Associated Press.
the Interdepartmental Working Group on Terrorism. The rest of M/CT, the panel believed, should be shifted to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs because much of counterterrorism involved diplomacy, and counterterrorism policy could “best be carried out from the Department’s foreign policy office.” Implementing the Inman Panel’s recommendations, the Department named Robert Oakley as Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism; and the new office, S/CT, would lead the formulation, presentation, and negotiation of the Department’s counterterrorism policy, with the Ambassador at Large reporting directly to the Secretary of State. On October 1, 1985, the Department transferred the 20 remaining staff of M/CT to the Ambassador at Large.
Conclusion

The shift of terrorist methods from individual and small group acts to mob attacks and suicide bombings redefined diplomatic security during the early 1980s. With attacks on U.S. diplomatic personnel and buildings becoming symbolic acts against the United States, terrorism magnified the need for a larger, more centralized security entity in the Department of State. Hostage situations, killings of diplomats, mob attacks, and suicide bombers subverted the long-held concepts of “gentleman diplomats” and diplomatic immunities, as well as U.S. officials’ commitment to demonstrating U.S. openness and friendliness in its diplomacy and embassies. The mob attacks on U.S. Embassies in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya prompted the Department to create the Security Enhancement Program (SEP) to harden U.S. posts against such attacks. Although the SEP did not attain its lofty goals, the implementation of measures and the installation of new equipment and barriers increased SY’s responsibilities and importance. Moreover, as the local security officers, SY’s RSOs gained greater authority, and they were the ones whom ambassadors and chiefs of mission turned to in crisis situations.

Although the Inman Panel complained that between 1979 and 1984 the “organization for security activities has become complicated by the proliferation of special offices and separate budgets for specific programs,” the opposite had occurred. The 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport, and the 1983 suicide bombing in Kuwait pushed the Department to concentrate several security-related initiatives and programs into an “enhanced” SY. It also encouraged the creation of a panel to study how security was implemented in the Department. The second Beirut bombing in 1984 provided the impetus for the Department to embark on SY’s “Acceleration” program, which essentially created the basic structure for a larger diplomatic security entity within the Department. By the time the Inman Panel recommended that the Department create a “bureau of diplomatic security,” such an entity already existed in rough form and substance in the rapidly expanding and evolving SY. The panel justified further centralization, bringing the Diplomatic Courier Service under SY’s wing and giving M/CT’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs to SY.183
Although much has been made of the pre-/post-Inman Panel dichotomy, the fact was that between 1979 and 1984, SY was rapidly evolving into a different entity. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security David Fields admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State Lamb “were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, and change procedures.”

Whereas in 1982, the idea of centralizing the State Department’s security functions into one organization was rejected, just two years later the idea was welcomed and enacted when proposed by SY in David Fields’ Acceleration plan. The growing security needs during the years 1979 to 1984 redefined diplomatic security and accelerated the transformation of SY. It was Fields’ larger, enhanced SY that became DS.

Endnotes


CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985


26 Letter, Sukru Elekdag, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic, to Haig, 11 February 1982, Folder – Turkish Consul General’s Assassination, Los Angeles, January 28, 1982, Box 8, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

27 Letter, Daryl F. Gates, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, to Secretary of State Haig, 4 February 1982; Letter, Tracy to Gates, 18 February 1982; and Letter, Haig to William P. Clark, 20 February 1982, all Folder – Turkish Consul General’s Assassination, Los Angeles, January 28, 1982, Box 8, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

28 Memorandum “Protective Detail Policy,” Tracy to Kennedy, 17 June 1982; Memorandum “Protective Security Details,” Garrett to Tracy, 2 June 1982; both Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, January-June 1982, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

29 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Missions to United Nations in New York,” Sayre to Kennedy, 1 June 1982; Memorandum “Proposed Legislation on Protection of Consulates,” Sayre to Kennedy, 29 June 1982; Memorandum “Responsibility for Protective Services to the UN and Related Mission – NYPD Reimbursement,” Sayre to Hunt, Weiss, et al., 13 October 1983; all Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

30 Memorandum “Protection for Foreign Missions in the United States,” Fields to Sayre, 23 April 1984, Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86.

31 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Diplomats in Washington Metropolitan Area,” Sayre to DePree, 2 August 1984, Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86.


33 Memorandum “Proposed Executive Order,” John Condayan (A) to Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary of State for Management, 21 February 1984; Memorandum “Proposed Executive Order,” David A. Stockman to the President, 19 March 1984; and Memorandum “Regulations on Protective Security for Foreign Officials,” Sayre to Burman (L/M), 26 March 1984; all Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86.

34 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials in the United States,” Sayre to Spiers, 23 March 1984, Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86.


In Kampala, the U.S. Embassy was housed in the British High Commission building. Memorandum “Your Request for Information, Same Subject, to A/SY,” Perdew to Nudell, 20 September 1982.


Memorandum “A/SY Actions Taken in Response to First Beirut Bombing of April 18, 1983,” Fields to Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 27 September 1984; and Memorandum “Responses for Brooks
Committee,” Garrett to Tracy, 18 May 1983; both DS Files, Rosslyn. See also Damage Assessment – Classified Material, DS Files, Rosslyn.


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64 Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following September 1984 bombing in Beirut, Spiers, Folder – AMGT: HFAC/SFRC Testimony, Box 3, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing.

65 Memorandum “Providing for Funds for Continuing Security Upgrade,” Fields and Buffalo (A/FBO) to Lamb, 27 June 1984, attached to Shultz to Faurer, 16 August 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.
CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

68 Memorandum “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State,” [SY - Fields], 12 June 1984, attached to Shultz to Faurer, 16 August 1984.


71 Memorandum “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State,” [SY], 12 June 1984.

72 Memorandum “The Secretary's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security: Tasking Requirements,” Hill (Kauzlarich) to Fields et al., 6 August 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Missions Abroad, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.


77 Telegram 40187 “Terrorist Threat to Americans,” Shultz (Cadogan, Montgomery) to All European Diplomatic Posts, 10 February 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

78 Memorandum “Proposed Embassy Move from West to East Beirut,” Fields to Lamb, 14 May 1984, Folder – Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

79 For support of move, see Memorandum “Beirut Operations,” Lawrence B. Lesser (NEA/EX), 10 May 1984; and Memorandum “Beirut Operations,” Clarence Pegues (NEA/EX), 21 May 1984; both Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. For concerns about “ceasing” operations in West Beirut, see Memorandum “Beirut Buildings,” [?], n.d. [@27 September 1984], Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #2, Box 10, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

80 Memorandum “Proposed Embassy Move from West to East Beirut,” Fields to Lamb, 14 May 1984; and Memorandum “Security Overview of the T/NOB (East Beirut)- Baaklini Building,” Andy Koritko (A/SY/OPS/PSD) to Fields, 14 June 1984; both Folder – Archives - Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

81 Bill Penn, a former Marine, was an Explosives and Ordinance Disposal Captain. Memorandum “Security Overview of the T/NOB (East Beirut)-Baaklini Building,” Koritko to Fields, 14 June 1984; Memorandum “Proposed Embassy


83 Memorandum “Background to Decision to Relocate Embassy Beirut,” SY, DS Files Rosslyn.

84 Prepared answers for press questions following the September 20 bombing, SY, September 1984, Folder – ABLD, Background, Box 1, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing.


86 Spiers, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following September 1984 bombing in Beirut, Folder – AMGT: HFAC/SFRC Testimony, Box 3; and Telegram 287353, Department of State (Spiers) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 27 September 1984, Folder – Telegrams, Beirut, Box 1; both DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing.


89 Telegram 289705, Department of State to Embassy Beirut, 26 September 1984; and Statement of Spiers, Department of State, 26 September 1984; both DS Files.


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Letter, Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to David A. Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Folder --Secretary/7th Floor, Action Memorandums, 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Oral History Interview, Fred Burton, 9 October 2008, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2. Congressional Committee Statement, Spiers, 26 September 1984, DS Files. Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985. Bill to Amend Title 50 of the U.S. Code to Authorize the United States Secretary of State to Pay Rewards…,” Folder-- Secretary/7th Floor, Action Memorandums 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.


Letter, House Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Secretary, 20 September 1985; and Letter, Shultz to Representative Dante B. Fascell, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, October 1985; both Folder – ASEC Congressional Correspondence, Box 1, DS Subject Files 1985-86.


The Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) appeared to have an auspicious beginning. With strong support from the Inman Panel, Congress, and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, DS obtained extensive monies, personnel, and other resources. Also, the Inman Panel’s call for centralization of the Department’s security functions resulted in several security-related offices, such as the Diplomatic Courier service and the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, being moved into DS. Further centralization in 1989 brought the Office of Information Management (IM) into DS, adding responsibilities for communications and computer security.

Despite strong support, increased resources, and greater authority, DS experienced a rough start. Some offices and divisions, such as the Diplomatic Couriers and Information Management (IM), did not want to join DS. Construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow presented additional problems when the foundations of a Soviet listening/surveillance network were discovered in the building’s support structure. The fraternization of two Marine Security Guards with known operatives of the Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or State Security Service) further undermined confidence in the Department’s management of security. Then, in 1990 and 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many believed that the security threat posed by the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Congress cut funds...
and staff, and IM left the bureau. DS shifted to a “risk management” strategy, focusing its now-limited resources upon those overseas posts facing the highest security threats.

**A New, Expanded Bureau for Diplomatic Security**

The new Bureau of Diplomatic Security would have been unrecognizable to Robert L. Bannerman, who created the Security Office in 1945. Headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, assisted by a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and a Front Office staff, DS stood in sharp contrast to Bannerman and his single secretary. Whereas Bannerman had divided the Security Office into three divisions (Background Investigations, Evaluations, and Physical Security), DS had 34 divisions, grouped into 11 offices. In fact, all three of Bannerman’s divisions were now under the same Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Investigations and Evaluations were two divisions under the Office of Investigations. Furthermore, the Office of Investigations was supported by nine Field Offices across the country, a significant change from relying upon local Post Office Inspectors in 1945.¹

The new DS was also a much larger, more expansive bureau than Fields and Lamb had proposed with the Acceleration program, or that the Inman Panel had recommended. DS was divided into three parts: Operations, Policy and Counterterrorism, and Resource Management. Operations contained several of SY’s “traditional” tasks, including Investigations, Protection (Secretary’s detail and Dignitary protection), Overseas Security, Security Technology (Technical Security), the Diplomatic Couriers and Counterintelligence. Policy and Counterterrorism oversaw the Threat Analysis Group, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and Emergency Planning programs. Resource Management and Policy consisted of many programs that Victor Dikeos had promoted, including Professional Development, Administration, Management, and a new Public Affairs office that would serve as DS’s liaison to the press.²

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² Figure 2: Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985-1989. Earlier, as Assistant Secretary of Administration, Lamb supported Director David Fields’ efforts to expand SY. Secretary of State George Shultz asked Lamb to oversee implementation of the Inman Panel recommendations and to serve as the first Assistant Secretary of State for DS. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
DS Agents also gained new law enforcement powers, as well as law enforcement status. DS had pressed for greater arrest authority for several years, and in 1985, in the wake of the Beirut bombings and the Inman Panel report, Congress passed Public Law 99/93, which gave DS agents the power to arrest suspects and execute search warrants. DS Agent Gerald Lopez made the first DS arrest, and then in July 1986, two DS Agents cooperated with U.S. Postal Service agents to apprehend two suspects charged with 21 counts of passport and visa fraud in Houston. The new law, however, only permitted DS Agents to make arrests and execute warrants in connection with their specific law enforcement duties, for example during visa and passport fraud investigations and dignitary protection details. If a DS Agent seized a person for passport fraud and discovered the person to be in possession of illegal drugs, the DS Agent could not arrest the individual on drug charges.3

The Special Assignments Staff (SAS) also expanded its range of investigations and began to formalize its procedures. The SAS initially focused its investigations upon homosexuals and sexual deviants; however, the Irvin Scarbeck case in the early 1960s and the Alfred Erdos case of 1972 (in which the Deputy Chief of Mission killed his male lover at the U.S. Embassy in Equatorial Guinea) helped to expand SAS’s investigations to include criminal activities such as rape, drug smuggling, and murder. In previous eras, if someone did something wrong or illegal overseas, they were often shipped out and fired. In the 1973 Erdos v. United States decision, this changed; the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a U.S. embassy constituted “special maritime jurisdiction,” in other words, a crime committed at a U.S. embassy or on its grounds would be treated under U.S. law just like a crime committed on a U.S. ship. As a result, SAS had to document and process the person and the crime,
prompting SAS to develop formal techniques for criminal investigations.4

With the creation of DS, Criminal Investigations—SAS had changed its name in the early 1980s—expanded significantly under the direction of Clark M. Dittmer. In 1982, only three agents worked in Criminal Investigations (CI), but by 1986 under DS, the office had grown to ten people. Dittmer began to formalize CI’s procedures and practices and tasked Special Agent Jimmy Hush to write a manual, which detailed investigative procedures, and provided guidance for new DS agents entering the CI office. In writing the manual, which appeared in 1986-87, Hush borrowed procedures and practices from the Secret Service, the FBI, the New York City Police Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department, among others.5

Under DS, the Secretary of State’s protective detail expanded, and Secretary Shultz had a much larger detail than any previous Secretary. Before the Inman Panel, the Secretary’s detail numbered only about 30 agents, but in its review, the Inman Panel recommended that DS double the budget and personnel for the Secretary’s detail. After the Inman Panel, DS added agents to the detail, raising Secretary Shultz’s detail to 41 agents. The Secretary’s detail, however, fluctuated in size according to the level of security that each subsequent Secretary desired. The detail for Secretary James A. Baker III (1989-1992) numbered 34 agents, and when Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger assumed the office in 1992, the detail shrank to 30 agents.6

DS considered other security measures for the Secretary, such as a secure telephone booth and a Secretary’s residence. Since Secretary Shultz traveled more than most Secretaries of State, DS developed a “telephone booth” to ensure that the Secretary could make calls without worries of talking in a “bugged” room. Two U.S. Navy Seabees accompanied Shultz and set up the telephone booth in his room. DS also proposed creating an official residence for the Secretary of State, an idea first suggested during the SY days. Prior to the Inman Panel, Secretaries either owned or leased their residences, which made it costly to install such physical security measures as alarm systems and

Figure 5: Clark M. Dittmer, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, 1988-1993. Open to new and promising ideas, Dittmer was instrumental in expanding the Criminal Investigations office and creating the Counter-Terrorism office. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

...bullet resistant glass. Given the increasing number of threats to the Secretary and the development of sophisticated timing devices in the 1970s, DS had deemed a Secretary’s residence a necessity. Although the Secretary’s detail was expanded under the new DS, the cost of a residence proved too much even for the Inman Panel to recommend, and the idea did not get sufficient support.

Further improvements in security occurred for the Harry S Truman Building (“Main State,”) after the 1985 murder of a Department employee. A young man entered the building with a gun, went to a seventh floor office—the same floor as the Office of the Secretary of State—and murdered his mother. The murder prompted the Department to tighten access and visitor controls to Main State. DS installed an automated card reader system at Main State’s entrances, erected barriers at driveway entrances, and in 1987, introduced a domestic Uniformed Protective Officer contract program. Also, in 1987, DS sought to promote security among Department personnel by holding its first annual Security Awareness Day in the Department’s Exhibit Hall; most of DS’s offices gave demonstrations. In 1988, DS installed magnetometers and x-ray screening, and required all visitors to Main State to pass through them. DS set up a press visiting area and required all Eastern Bloc reporters to be escorted while in the Department. In October 1989, uniformed security guards contracted by DS assumed access control duties and regular patrols at Main State and ten Department annexes in the Washington area.

**The Rewards for Justice Program**

Under the new DS, the Rewards for Justice program (RFJ) expanded its efforts and outreach, largely due to the efforts of Special Agent Brad Smith. Initially created as “Rewards for Information,” the RFJ offered money in exchange for information that led to the arrest or conviction of terrorists, but awareness of the program remained limited. Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Robert Lamb and Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism L. Paul Bremer concluded that the Department had not sufficiently advertised the RFJ.
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As a result, DS conducted a poster campaign at all U.S. embassies, consulates, and passport agencies in April 1987, publicizing rewards for information about five terrorist incidents. Despite the greater distribution, the poster campaign did not yield any tips that resulted in convictions. DS and S/CT then decided to expand the publicity campaign further. They ordered new posters in English, Arabic, French, German, and Spanish, but the posters were displayed in U.S. facilities and Interpol offices, not public spaces. The Department considered media releases through U.S. Government media channels and, in the most high-risk areas, paid advertising in host country media.9

The structure of the RFJ program added other difficulties. Several rewards approved in 1985 and 1986 remained unpaid in 1990, even though the funds had been designated. The unpaid rewards prevented the Department of State from asking for funds to pay rewards approved in 1988 and 1989, some of which led to the conviction of TWA 847 hijacker Fawas Yunis. DS agents also recognized that the Bureau’s policy of requiring informers to report directly to U.S. officials in U.S. facilities discouraged those who feared discovery and repercussions. To correct this, DS established a special post office box that allowed informers to contact U.S. officials by mail rather than appearing at a U.S. embassy.10

In response to the December 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the U.S. Government and the airline industry raised the amount of the rewards. President George H. W. Bush signed legislation that increased RFJ awards to $2 million, and the Air Line Pilots Association agreed to match any Department of State reward for terrorist acts against U.S. air carriers, up to $1 million. The Air Transport Association added another $1 million, raising the possible reward amount to $4 million. Although the larger rewards raised the RFJ profile, DS met resistance from some Foreign Service Officers who disliked the more “black and white” law enforcement approach.11

DS Agent Brad Smith creatively and successfully increased public awareness and the effectiveness of the RFJ program. He improved foreign language publicity efforts, ran advertisements in Arab press outlets, and produced radio and television spots with stars such as Charlton Heston and Charles Bronson. Noting that smoking was very popular in the Middle East, Smith implemented the “matchbook cover” campaign. Printed in Arabic, the matchbooks detailed reward amounts, described how to submit information, and featured illustrations of known

Figure 7: Matchbook covers of the Rewards for Justice program, including one for Osama bin Laden. The matchbooks are placed in local stores that sell cigarettes and thereby provide exposure to segments of the population that posters in a U.S. embassy or diplomatic facility would not reach. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
 suspects. The matchbooks were placed in local stores. To improve the discretion and security of communications channels for those offering information, DS set up telephone hotlines at relevant embassies. Smith later developed a website for the RFJ program.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Overseas Security Advisory Council}

The increase in the number of terrorist attacks focused attention upon the security and safety of U.S. citizens living and working abroad, which led to another addition to DS—the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). U.S. corporations with overseas operations grew concerned about the security of their U.S. citizen employees. Speaking to the American Society for Industrial Security in 1984, Secretary of State Shultz announced that he would create a council that would bring together corporate executives and Department officials to discuss terrorism and share information related to security. Shultz then asked Assistant Secretary Lamb and Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields to put the council together. Sixteen major corporations initially joined OSAC, including Citibank, Bechtel, Boeing, Exxon, IBM, and Pan American Airlines. The Inman Panel strongly endorsed OSAC, asserting that while the Department did not have an official responsibility to protect private citizens, businesses, and other organizations operating abroad, it did have a moral obligation to provide them with some guidance and information about security within a particular country.\textsuperscript{13}

OSAC was a “huge success” from the beginning. Under the guidance of DS, OSAC sought to facilitate a dialogue between Department security experts and U.S. companies operating overseas, particularly those operating in countries considered high risk. As a service to the private sector, DS updated companies on security situations in countries, developments in protective security, and advances in security technology. Together, DS and corporate officials formulated security and crisis-response guidelines for U.S. companies operating overseas. The Department also benefited from OSAC, by preventing private corporate security forces and measures from acting at cross-purposes with DS operations.\textsuperscript{14}

Initially, OSAC members focused on terrorism, hostage situations, and crime. Private companies sought information and advice from the Department

\textbf{Figure 8:} Created in 1984 at the initiative of Secretary George Shultz, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) assumes new importance as terrorism emerges as the preeminent threat to U.S. citizens abroad after the Cold War. OSAC brings together DS officials and private sector leaders to share information and coordinate appropriately, to improve security for U.S. citizens working and living overseas. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
on the likelihood and prevention of threats. DS established a private liaison analyst group to analyze relevant data, and make its findings available to the business community on a frequently updated Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board. In 1990, DS began sharing the electronic bulletin board with the Bureau of Consular Affairs on a daily basis, extending the advisory service to all U.S. citizens working and traveling abroad. The sharing resulted from the “no double standard” on threat information that arose after the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. The “no double standard,” mandated by Congress, stated that U.S. Government officials and employees could not possess information on threats that was not available to the general public.\footnote{15}

\section*{Couriers}

The Department’s well-established Diplomatic Courier service was a new addition to DS. The service came under heavy scrutiny from the Inman Panel after the 1984 discovery of Soviet bugs in typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Because the typewriters likely had been shipped unaccompanied rather than by courier into the Soviet Union, the Inman Panel determined that there were “serious flaws in the [courier] system.” The panel recommended transferring the courier service to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. In doing so, the panel hoped that the courier service would retain its historic identity, while establishing a closer operational relationship with professional security agents, and thus, increase security.\footnote{16} The Office of Communications (OC), which oversaw the courier service, protested the Inman Panel’s recommendation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications Robert Ribera warned that the transfer would lead to the courier system’s “demise.” Also, after the typewriter finds, OC revised procedures and provided couriers with a cleared U.S. escort when they arrived, departed, or transited all posts. OC also assigned armed guards and armed vehicles to protect couriers working at high-threat posts. Despite OC’s objections, the Department transferred the Diplomatic Courier service to DS in 1985, and DS promptly added 12 positions to the courier staff and conducted a major review of pouch and courier operations.\footnote{17}

The concerns about diplomatic couriers may have resulted more from the Department’s demands upon the couriers rather than lax security standards. Prior to the Inman Panel, the courier service with its staff of 75 maintained its headquarters in Washington, with Regional Diplomatic Courier Divisions in Washington, Frankfurt, and Bangkok. All classified material sent from the Department to diplomatic posts

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure9.png}
\caption{Circa 1986, a DS Diplomatic Courier loads bagged pouches aboard an international flight at a Washington, D.C., airport. Today, Diplomatic Couriers spend tens of thousands of hours annually delivering tens of millions of pounds of classified diplomatic pouch material by air, sea, and over land, including palletized equipment for new Embassy construction. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.}
\end{figure}
was assembled into pouches in the Diplomatic Mail and Pouch Center in Main State. Once assembled, pouches heading to Europe and Asia were then sent to the Defense Courier Service receiving station in Fort Meade, Maryland. From Fort Meade, couriers carried the pouches onboard military or commercial flights to the courier receiving stations in Frankfurt and Bangkok. In Bangkok or Frankfurt, a courier based in that city took their assigned pouches, usually on commercial flights, to delivery points on regularly scheduled routes. As required since the 1940s, couriers were expected to “never lose sight of the pouches while they are outside the cargo hold of the aircraft;” therefore, couriers often boarded the plane at the last minute. A single courier might stay in transit for as many as 25 days in a row, visiting perhaps 10 cities on one route. Pouches headed for Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America did not pass through the Defense Courier Service, but went to the Washington Regional Diplomatic Courier Division. At the Washington regional center, couriers followed the same procedure as those in Bangkok and Frankfurt. DS later established a regional center in Miami for pouches bound for Latin America and Africa.  

The challenge for Department of State couriers was the quantity and size of diplomatic pouches, not the structure of system and routes. By the 1980s, couriers faced a situation similar to that during the 1920s: the system had grown into what one official called a “freight hauling concern.” With the Department’s computerized communications center and improved technologies of the 1970s and 1980s, much of the Department’s correspondence (despatches, instructions, memoranda, circulars, etc) was cabled. However, as diplomacy expanded to include agriculture, finance, education, police/Interpol, and cultural exchanges, the number of agencies and personnel at U.S. embassies grew dramatically, as did the amount of information
transmitted between overseas posts and Washington. The Department estimated that the weight of its escorted pouches had increased twenty-nine fold since 1947 and would soon reach 4.5 million pounds of classified material per year. Couriers struggled to maintain close supervision of their pouches. DS recommended hiring U.S. escorts or planeside security watchers to enhance the security of classified pouches while couriers handled any official business. Couriers admitted that they found it “impossible to provide adequate security when trying to oversee the loading, offloading, and maneuvering what was often 16 full baggage carts through a crowded terminal.”

Whereas in the late 1940s, a courier’s pouch resembled a hand-held brief case, by the 1980s, “pouches” assumed multiple sizes and weights because the Department was shipping numerous items including office equipment and building materials via pouch. This, in part, resulted from security requirements spurred by the typewriter finds at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and by the lack of an alternative secure means of transport. The large size of pouches threatened to jeopardize the courier service’s protection under international law. A Department official admitted, “our broad interpretation of what may be shipped by pouch stretches the intent of…the [1961] Vienna Convention.” By 1985, 40 countries had placed restrictions on incoming diplomatic pouches, in part due to suspicion of the contents of large pouches. The General Accounting Office (GAO) warned that the United

![Figure 12: During the late 1980s, under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the amount of materials that Diplomatic Couriers were carrying increased markedly. With most reports and memoranda sent via electronic means, the Department was now shipping office equipment (e.g. typewriters), building materials, furniture, and other items in “pouches,” largely due to the lack of a secure means of transport. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.](image-url)
Nations International Law Commission might revise the definition and laws governing the inviolability of pouches if the United States did not voluntarily limit its use of diplomatic pouches.  

Despite the warnings, the Department of State, in practice and policy, expanded the volume of materials it transported in secure pouches. A 1987 policy decision required secure transit for all building materials associated with new construction and security upgrades at overseas posts. This included all construction materials, furniture, furnishings, and supplies. Combined with the extensive program to update post security as mandated by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, the 1987 decision guaranteed that the volume of pouch contents would increase rather than decrease.

After transfer of the Courier service, DS officials instituted new security guidelines for couriers. Couriers were instructed to travel in a window seat and “avoid emotional reactions” that might draw attention. Couriers were not to carry liquor, “provocative” materials, or items such as membership cards that identified political or religious affiliations that could place the courier in danger. In case of an airline hijacking or hostage situation, couriers were not to hide the nature of their duties or the location of their pouches; however, they should not volunteer any information. Upon their release, and if detained by airport officials, couriers were to take control of their pouches as soon as possible, or at least maintain visual control of the aircraft. They should immediately notify the regional courier office of the emergency situation that they were experiencing and the status of their pouches.

After joining DS, the Diplomatic Courier service grew. By 1990, it handled more than 78 million pieces a year for approximately 40 U.S. Government agencies. In FY 1991, the Courier division’s budget was over $20 million and had a staff of 120 employees. DS also altered the structure of the courier system. DS shifted to a “hub and spoke” system, with couriers making short trips to one or two posts instead of regional centers with long routes and couriers stopping at several posts. The hub and spoke arrangement meant that new couriers no longer logged the many miles that their senior colleagues had. In fact, Courier Joel Bell’s record may be secure: retiring
in 1987 after 37 years as a courier, Bell travelled an estimated 9 million miles, more than any other U.S. Government employee, astronauts notwithstanding.  

**Breaches at Embassy Moscow**

Besides diplomatic pouches, the Department confronted intense scrutiny from Congress, the press, and the public regarding security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The typewriter bugs had prompted Congressional criticism of the Department’s handling of security; in fact, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) called Embassy Moscow “a sieve.” Congress and the Inman Panel pressured the Department to reduce the number of Soviet nationals employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the Soviet mission to the United Nations; in fact, Soviets in the United States outnumbered U.S. diplomats in the Soviet Union by about 100. A Department of State official acknowledged that several Soviet diplomats in the United States were KGB agents, and U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow knew of at least 50 Soviet employees who worked for the KGB. Also, U.S. Embassy officers discovered that the Soviets had employed a fine powder, popularly called “spy dust”, to track Embassy personnel and their activities in order to identify agents of other U.S. agencies. Another irritant emerged when the Soviets completed the structural shells of the last three buildings (chancery, consulate, and reception hall) at their embassy complex at Mount Alto in Washington; meanwhile, the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow languished far behind schedule and was more than $90 million over budget.  

On August 17, 1985, just after the Inman Panel released its report (and before DS was created), the Department of State, without warning, locked out all Soviet workers from the construction site of the New Embassy Office Building (NOB) in Moscow. U.S. officials had discovered that rebars in the NOB’s concrete pillars had been altered to serve as antennae, that unauthorized changes had been made to the roof design, and that Soviet construction workers were caught putting objects in the concrete. In short, U.S. officials found that
collectively the alterations created the foundations of an extensive bugging network. While SY and other agency personnel were investigating the discoveries, SY Engineer John Bagnal recalled that they suddenly saw lights in a steeple of a nearby Russian church, prompting them to dub the building, the “Church of Holy Telemetry.” Upon hearing of the discoveries, John Wolf, a Security Engineering Officer who worked on the project, said that he felt like he had been “had.” Representative Connie Mack (R-Florida) described the NOB as “essentially an eight story microphone plugged into the Politiburo.” It did not help that in the NOB’s façade, Soviet workers had arranged bricks of a darker shade to read “CCCP” (Cyrillic for USSR) from a distance, or that the architectural firm hired to design the Embassy had employed a Russian who later moved back to the Soviet Union and disappeared. Department officials halted construction at the NOB, and Soviet workers were locked out until an alternative plan could be determined.27

The Department tried to import U.S. workers to continue NOB construction, but that too encountered difficulties. One subcontractor defaulted on three contracts and basically went bankrupt. Of 42 contractors hired by the Department, 19 did not have Defense Industrial Security Clearances, and one contractor that supplied 16 workers sent 7 workers back to the United States for not having proper security clearances. In addition, the Office of Foreign Buildings (FBO) showed a lack of coordination in managing the construction and repairs. The new project manager sent to Moscow by FBO told a visiting group of U.S. Senate officials about his plan to fix the NOB roof, a plan that would cost $700,000; however, FBO denied the plan was under consideration and said the repairs would only cost $80,000. Two other FBO officials working on the same roof repair project offered conflicting descriptions of which repairs needed to be completed. Citing “poor management and coordination,” the Senate group concluded that the Department of State officials had waited too long to address construction and security problems in Moscow.28

Evidence of Soviet espionage in the new NOB’s structure, and the exposed inadequacies of security and oversight at the construction site prompted the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security to create the Construction Security program. Organized by John Wolf, DS assigned a construction security team to each FBO project. The team included a site security manager, Seabees, and cleared U.S. guards. The Seabees would conduct surveillance

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Figure 15: The New Office Building at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Due to the bugging system discovered in the structure of the red brick building, the United States expelled the Soviet workers, tore down the upper floors (to the base of the fifth floor), inserted shielding to prevent any new bugs, and rebuilt the upper floors. Soviet workers arranged darker colored bricks so that one could read “CCCP” (Russian for USSR) in the façade of the U.S. Embassy. Source: © Associated Press.
and inspect the construction work to see if workers had tampered with or altered parts of the project. DS also developed a Transit Security program to ensure the secure transport of construction materials to the site, and that only designated, cleared workers could enter the site.\(^\text{29}\)

Despite the new construction security measures, the question of securing the NOB’s classified floors remained. Assistant Secretary Lamb endorsed a plan to nearly triple the amount of space dedicated to classified work, and the Inman Panel had favored improving shielding at all U.S. embassies in medium to high threat environments. A special multiple agency taskforce recommended installing specialized shielding in the NOB, but DS argued that the experimental system did not justify the $21 million price tag. DS instead proposed more traditional shielding, which would cost only $5 million and delay the building’s completion only until mid-1989. As Under Secretary of State for Management Ronald Spiers explained to Secretary Shultz, delaying construction and increasing the cost of the Moscow Embassy project would be highly unpopular with Congress. On the other hand, completing the facility without shielding, Spiers said, would leave it without the necessary protection and subject the Department to further criticism and scrutiny from other agencies. Shultz approved DS’s proposal.\(^\text{30}\)

Congress was already critical of management and security at the NOB construction site when the Reagan Administration and the Soviets drew further attention to security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, resulting in the withdrawal of all Soviet nationals from embassy employment. Despite opposition by U.S. Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman and several Embassy officers, the Department (as recommended by the Inman Panel) proposed a reduction in the number of Soviet nationals working at the Embassy. In late August 1986, the FBI arrested a Soviet employee at the United Nations for espionage, and the Soviets reciprocated by arresting a \textit{U.S. News and}
At the same time, a bipartisan measure was moving through Congress that called for a reduction in the number of Soviets working at the United Nations. When Congress issued its report in early October—the report insisted that the employment of Soviet nationals constituted a “threat to the security of U.S. operations”—the Soviets told the White House that they would not comply with the reductions. President Reagan then expelled several Soviet officials from the United States, and the Soviet Union and the United States proceeded to engage in a series of reciprocal expulsions that culminated in the Soviets’ withdrawal of all Soviet nationals from employment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.  

Amid this atmosphere, newspaper headlines announced that two Marine Security Guards (MSGs), Sergeants Clayton J. Lonetree and Arnold Bracy, had worked with “Uncle Sasha” (the cover for KGB officer Aleksei G. Yefimov) and facilitated KGB espionage of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. News that Lonetree had committed espionage appeared in early January; then in February, Ambassador Hartman and the Department divulged that several MSGs at the Embassy were dismissed from duty for rules and currency violations, actions unrelated to the Lonetree affair. The revelation that a second Marine guard had engaged in espionage, however, brought the entire affair to the cover of the April 20, 1987 edition of Time, and Time’s cover showed a Marine in dress uniform with a large black eye next to the phrase “Spy Scandals” in large letters. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger called the revelations “a very great loss,” and Assistant Secretary Lamb said “a serious loss of classified information” had occurred. As the third security breach at Embassy Moscow in nearly as many years, the Lonetree-Bracy affair was problematic, not because Marine guards had assisted the KGB spies whom they were assigned to keep out, but because Lonetree and Bracy confessed to letting KGB agents into the most sensitive areas of the Embassy, the secure upper floors that included the Communications Programs Unit (CPU).  

Confusion clouded events and the cases, in part because Bracy recanted his confession; however, Lonetree and Bracy (if the latter did assist the KGB) may have been separate espionage efforts. Both Marines became romantically involved with Russian female employees, and both women introduced the two Marines to “Uncle Sasha.” The two guards, however, could not have conspired together because they only stood night watch duty together twice, in October 1985 and in November 1985, and both instances occurred before Lonetree began cooperating with Yefimov. Lonetree assisted Uncle Sasha during his assignment at Embassy Moscow and later in Vienna. He confessed to providing Yefimov with

Figure 17: As part of the DS Antiterrorism Assistance program, DS Special Agents are shown here training a partner nation’s security force. Source: Department of State Records.
floor plans of secure upper floors of both embassies, and with the identities—and in some cases, photographs—of persons working for other agencies. Bracy later confessed that he assisted Lonetree in allowing Soviet agents to have access to classified areas of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, assistance which included turning off alarms. Bracy later recanted his confession, after he twice failed lie detector tests. Only Lonetree was convicted of espionage, but he denied working with Bracy and passed polygraph tests on this question.  

After Bracy’s March 1987 confession, the White House, Department of State, Marine Corps, and other agencies were in a “near crisis” atmosphere, and the Department of State and the Marine Corps quickly made several changes to security at Embassy Moscow. On March 25, the Department ordered the Embassy to stop transmission of all classified communications and processing of classified information. All communications equipment—a total of 120 crates—as well as the secure conference rooms were removed and returned to Washington for inspection. Classified communications did not restart until April 1988, when Secretary Shultz travelled to Moscow for a two-day visit. On March 30, 1987, the entire Marine Security Guard detail was replaced with 28 new Marines. Regional Security Officer Frederick Mecke, who had requested Bracy’s removal from post and had improved security at the Embassy, was recalled and reassigned to Washington. Mecke’s reassignment was not unusual; by November 1987, around 70 percent of Embassy personnel received new assignments and were replaced. 

The White House could not ignore the scandal, and President Reagan named three commissions to review security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird headed the Moscow Assessment Review Panel, which studied security procedures and the state of security at the existing Embassy in Moscow. Among other things, the Laird Commission held Ambassador Hartman responsible for the lax security at the Embassy, saying that he “failed to take appropriate steps to correct the situation.” Former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA James Schlesinger headed another commission that studied the NOB structure. In his report, Schlesinger charged that the bugs in the NOB were “both foreseeable and foreseen,” and the Department of State “was one of the last to get on board” in appreciating the extent and pervasiveness of the Soviet espionage. Third, Reagan asked Anne Armstrong, Chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), to review security at the U.S. mission in Moscow. PFIAB recommended spending $80 million to remove the bugs from the NOB, and apparently reiterated many of Laird’s and Schlesinger’s criticisms.
Seizing upon the Embassy's problems, Congress dramatized the lack of security in Moscow in order to force improvements in security at the Department of State. Representatives Daniel Mica (D-Florida) and Olympia Snow (R-Maine), the Chair and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee respectively, travelled to Moscow to investigate security conditions at the Embassy. Supporters of SY and DS, Mica and Snowe held a press conference and displayed a “Magic Slate” (an erasable tablet) to dramatize the lack of security at the Embassy. Mica said that he and Snowe were told during their briefing that the Magic Slate was “the only secure means of communication in the embassy.” While the Magic Slate had an element of humor, Snowe and Mica’s findings possessed none: “[T]he embassy’s security system has serious shortcomings and is fundamentally flawed in both physical and personnel areas.”

Congress used the Marine Security Guard scandal to examine several security-related issues. Besides delving into the training of Marine Security Guards and management of the MSG program, Congressional committees scrutinized security at the bug-plagued, partially constructed NOB and at the existing Embassy. Committee members reviewed U.S.-Soviet agreements and the site selection for the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the new Soviet Embassy in Washington, which had occurred during the height of détente under President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Congress studied the security threat posed by the new Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto, and some Congressmen moved to eject the Soviets from Mount Alto (the highest point in the District of Columbia) and relocate the Soviet Union's embassy elsewhere in Washington.

Barely a year old, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security confronted a major security breach that questioned the Department’s ability to maintain security at its posts. As part of its response, DS refused to waver in its support of the Marines and the MSG program, and it took the attitude that Lonetree and Bracy were only two “bad apples” in a program that had done excellent work for many years. DS officials later admitted that the Marine Corps took the Lonetree and Bracy revelations pretty “hard,” and that the affair “shamed” the MSG program. The Department of State, however, proceeded to conclude a new memorandum of agreement with the Marine Corps, a vote of confidence in the Marine Corps that had served the Department so well. Senior DS officials Mark Mulvey and Greg Bujac, among others, defended the Marines before Congress. Mulvey described the Marines’ honorable efforts in Saigon and how the Marine guards had saved the U.S. Embassy building in Cyprus from burning down, and probably saved U.S. lives as well. Bujac, meanwhile, described the “positive and rewarding” relationships that he and other RSOs had developed with the Marine detachments, which he attributed to the Marines’ highly professional conduct and personal integrity. DS was not going to let two “bad apples” taint what was an otherwise successful program.

As a result of the Lonetree-Bracy affair, DS reformed and expanded its Criminal Investigations office, for as one former CI agent remarked, “CI had not done its job.” The Laird Commission acknowledged that CI had made “a strong effort” to coordinate with other agencies; however, CI’s briefings of U.S. personnel contained “moldy,” “uninteresting,” and excessively general information. DS brought in FBI Special Agent Ray Mislock
to reorganize the office, and as a result, CI adopted many FBI techniques. DS increased CI’s staffing and improved its training. By the fall of 1988, DS had authorized 38 CI positions, filled 23 of them, and had 4 officers detailed from other agencies.  

DS’s Construction Security encountered difficulties from FBO. FBO did not want either a DS security team or even a DS officer at the construction sites. Furthermore, FBO feared that DS would slow down the work, and thus increase project costs, or would infringe upon the project director’s work. FBO sought to have the Security Officer report to FBO rather than DS. Ultimately, Construction Security was transferred to FBO on December 22, 1989, and renamed Construction Security Management.

Congress and the Reagan Administration moved to resolve the dilemma about what to do with the bug-riddled, partially constructed U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Of the three commissions appointed by President Reagan to review Embassy Moscow security, PFIAB and the Schlesinger Commission recommended partial rebuilding of the NOB. Schlesinger suggested tearing down only the top few floors of the NOB, rebuilding them, and building a six-story annex next door, for a total cost of $35 million; meanwhile, PFIAB advised spending $80 million to clean out the bugs in the NOB structure. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, however, voted unanimously to demolish the building and start over. A Department of State-commissioned study by the BDM Corporation and MK Ferguson Company concluded that razing and rebuilding the new Moscow Embassy was the better option, and it would cost $160 million and take 45 months to complete (1992). In October 1988, President Reagan announced that the NOB would be demolished because “there’s no way to rid it of the many listening devices that have been built into it.” Secretary Shultz concurred, saying that demolition and rebuilding was “the only option.” The United States was also considering suing the Soviets in order to recoup some of the costs of the compromised structure.

**From Risk Avoidance to Risk Management**

Despite the uproar over the Moscow Embassy, DS faced budget cuts in 1988. One Congressional committee aide remarked, “Diplomatic Security were the hotshots for a little while and got overextended. They’ve got some
real problems now, but I don’t know how much of it they brought on themselves.” The urgency to improve security after the Beirut attacks had faded, and for fiscal year (FY) 1988, the Reagan Administration requested $303 million for DS, well below the $458 million anticipated by the Bureau. Assistant Secretary Lamb admitted, “Each post is going to see cutbacks in every [security] program.” The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) set a ceiling of $303 million for DS’s budget in FYs 1989 and 1990 as well. In FY 1990, the total funds available to DS were only $180 million, and DS leaders questioned whether they could fulfill the security responsibilities authorized by Congress.44

The budget cuts, in part, reflected the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev enacted the domestic policies of glasnost and perestroika (“openness” and “restructuring”), which enabled Soviet citizens to criticize various policies and actions taken by the Soviet government. U.S. Embassy officers in Moscow claimed “the prospects [that] the Gorbachevian reforms open for the Embassy to influence change in Soviet society are unprecedented.” Gorbachev also encouraged Soviet satellite nations to adopt similar policies, and in the fall of 1989, the United States and the world witnessed the collapse of Soviet-backed Communist governments across Eastern Europe. Perhaps few events were as dramatic as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the subsequent reunification of Germany in October 1990. Former head of the CIA William E. Colby found himself advising East European intelligence

Figure 20: DS Special Agents (left and right) provide security for South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela during his June 1990 visit to New York. By 1990, the DS Bureau’s duties and tasks were expanding, even as it was enduring budget cuts at the end of the Cold War. Source: © Associated Press.

Figure 21: Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Premier of the Soviet Union, closes his resignation speech, delivered on Soviet television on December 25, 1991. With his resignation, the familiar red flag with the hammer and sickle was lowered from the Kremlin’s flagpole. With the collapse and end of the Soviet Union, DS suffered budget cuts and losses of personnel due to the false sense that threats to the United States and its diplomacy had ended. In a few short years, many would be reminded that diplomatic threats had dramatically expanded since the late 1960s because of terrorism. Source: © Associated Press / Liu Heung Shing.
services on how to operate in a democratic society. Colby even appeared in a 30-second television ad, calling for what would be called “the peace dividend,” a 50 percent reduction in military spending, which would be reinvested in education, health care, and other parts of the U.S. economy.45

Meanwhile, tensions increased between the United States and Iraq during 1990 and 1991 when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait, and DS experienced the odd situation of facing increased demands for its services, notwithstanding cuts in its budget. President George H. W. Bush ordered Operation Desert Shield in the fall of 1990, which defended Saudi Arabia and Israel from potential Iraqi aggression, and then Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, which liberated Kuwait from the Iraqi army. The Department of State reported an increased amount of hostile surveillance of U.S. facilities and personnel, and a rise in terrorist threats against U.S. interests. DS increased guard services at several Middle East posts, and sent security teams to posts considered to be at highest risk in order to develop contingency planning for terrorism and mob violence. Actions by Iraq prompted the evacuation of thousands of people from a number of high threat posts, increased protective security, and overtime work by RSOs and DS agents. The Department estimated that it incurred an additional $22 million in expenses for increased diplomatic security and another $11 million in evacuation costs as a result of the Gulf War. Ironically, Congress agreed to large security supplemental appropriations for Operation Desert Storm while debating a reduction of budget appropriation for DS.46

The supplementals for the 1991 Gulf War did not arrest the trend of budget cuts and staff reductions faced by DS. DS shifted its goals and philosophy from total risk avoidance, as promoted in the mid-1980s, to reducing risk “to an acceptable level” where possible, i.e. risk management.47 This shift in approach, DS hoped, would allow it to direct its increasingly limited resources toward its most urgent security needs. DS, together with the Overseas

Figure 22: A DS Special Agent (center rear) provides security for U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III (center) during his November 1990 visit with U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. troops were part of Operation Desert Shield, which sought to protect Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states from potential aggression by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Hussein had recently invaded the neighboring state of Kuwait. Source: Private collection.
Security Policy Group, undertook a wholesale review of existing overseas security standards. In addition, DS revised its Composite Threat List (CTL). Initiated in 1987 and published on a quarterly basis by the Threat Analysis Division (TAD), the CTL initially determined crime and terrorist threats to each post overseas. In 1990, the CTL expanded the number of threat categories TAD evaluated to terrorism, human intelligence, technical intelligence, and local crime. The criteria for determining the level of threat in each category included the actual expression of the threats, the credibility of the threats, the level of local stability and civil order, and quality of the bilateral relations between the United States and the host government. With the expanded threat assessment, DS could implement the revised security standards in a threat-driven, post-specific manner. Facing continued funding reductions, DS could manage risk, and cut local guard and the armored vehicle programs at those posts deemed at a lower risk.

By the spring of 1991, the budget cuts began affecting DS operations. Lamb’s successor, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Sheldon Krys noted that staffing shortages had forced him to employ front office personnel on protective details. Overseas support positions were not filled, and technical security countermeasures work fell behind. In March 1992, Under Secretary of State for Management John W. Rogers informed the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State that the Department faced a conflict between security measures demanded by its revised security standards and the Department’s ability to pay for implementing those standards.
Despite President Reagan’s decision to raze and rebuild the NOB, his successor, President George H. W. Bush, had to determine how to pay for the project. In March 1989, the Bush Administration announced that it was reconsidering the decision to raze the NOB. The Senate Intelligence Committee was angry, declaring that any other plan than razing the NOB structure would invite a “security disaster,” and it reminded the President of a 1988 law that barred any spending of funds on the U.S. Embassy in Moscow without permission from the Appropriation Committees of both houses of Congress.\(^{51}\)

In October 1989, the Department of State announced that it would tear down part of the NOB structure and rebuild the upper floors only, a plan which drew upon the shielding plan initially endorsed by Secretary Shultz and advocated by the Schlesinger Commission. Department officials informed Congress that razing the NOB would actually cost $300-400 million and take more than 5 years, larger and longer estimates than suggested previously. The Department also established a Moscow Embassy Building Control Office (MEBCO) to oversee the chancery construction project. The Director of MEBCO would report directly to the Under Secretary of State of Management, and would have responsibility for all aspects of the new building project, including planning, design, construction, security, acquisition, logistics, budgets, and schedules. DS worked closely with MEBCO, which was staffed by Department of State and intelligence community employees, and all awaited a final decision on how reconstruction and/or demolition of the building were to proceed.\(^{52}\)

Partly as a result of Congressional opposition, Secretary of State James A. Baker announced two months later (December 1989) that the Bush Administration would raze the NOB, but Under Secretary of State for Management Ivan Selin offered the caveat: the Department would tear down the structure to the foundation and use shielding “to isolate the foundation” and create a secure work space. The Bush Administration also reverted
to the original $270 million price tag, but said the project would take 5½ years. By April 1990, U.S. and Soviet officials were nearing an agreement on the project, as required by the original 1972 agreement.\textsuperscript{53}

On March 28, 1991, a fire broke out in the existing Embassy Moscow office building. Two welders were working on the elevator shaft, and the fire ignited some flammable material and quickly spread to the upper secure floors of the Embassy. Soviet firefighters quickly responded to the scene and began fighting the fire. Four floors suffered extensive fire, smoke, and water damage. Marine Security Guards with gas masks initially escorted the Soviet firefighters but had to leave the building when their gas masks gave out. As had occurred during the fire in 1977, the Regional Security Officer caught Soviet firefighters looking around the building and taking small items such as alarm clocks, picture frames, and drinks. One month after the fire, accusations arose that unescorted KGB agents dressed as firefighters had entered the vaults and other secure areas during the fire, and that secure telephones and other communications equipment were missing from the Embassy. A preliminary report from Assistant Secretary Krys acknowledged that Soviet firefighters entered areas of the Embassy without escorts, some offices were evacuated before safes and other material had been secured, some unclassified computer discs were missing, and some material and equipment had been compromised. The team investigating the damaged floors, however, found no evidence that cryptographic or other communications equipment had been taken and that the most sensitive areas of the Embassy were appropriately secured during the emergency.\textsuperscript{54}
Although the security breach was much less damaging than initially suspected, the fire pushed the Department of State and Congress to resolve the future of the NOB. The lack of space, alternatives, and security amenities compelled Under Secretary Selin to move executive and classified operations to the south wing of the new compound, which housed recreational facilities. The bowling alley was converted into the communications center, and was dubbed “the submarine.” One-half of the parking garage was turned into workspace. Pressed for space and facing growing Congressional opposition to additional expenditures, the Department decided to take up Schlesinger’s 1985 shielding plan, that is, the Department would demolish and rebuild the upper floors of the NOB, and then insert shielding between the unclassified lower floors and the classified upper floors.55

With a decision on the NOB finally made, the Department started to prepare for rebuilding the NOB. In June 1992, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a bilateral Supplemental Conditions of Construction Agreement. The agreement permitted the Department to tear down the upper floors of the new chancery and begin construction with a U.S.-controlled design, U.S. construction workers with Top Secret clearances, a U.S. contractor, and U.S. materials. Congress appropriated $240 million for the project for FYs 1992 and 1993. Congress also stipulated that MEBCO must submit a detailed plan for review. More than seven years after the discovery of bugs in the structure, work on the NOB was about to begin again.56

**Technological Revolution and Unhappy Merger**

During an April 1987 meeting with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary Shultz explained that the world was experiencing an information revolution as a result of the innovations in computer technology. Gorbachev admitted that science and technology had fostered dramatic changes and growth during the 1980s; however, Shultz did not believe that the Soviet leader had fully grasped the magnitude of developments. The Secretary stressed that with the information revolution, “the old categories” of capital and labor were “becoming obsolete” and “the truly important capital is human capital, what people know, [and] how freely they exchange information and knowledge.” “The key,” said Shultz, “is going to be knowledge-based productivity, even in defense: an aircraft carrier is really one big information system.”57
If, as Secretary Shultz noted, an aircraft carrier was now one big information system, then a system is only as secure as the weakest link, and the challenge for DS was determining the weak links, or vulnerabilities, of the Department’s computer systems. By the mid-1980s, DS was already concerned about hackers and security breaches, and to a degree, the threat of a hacker like Matthew Broderick’s character in the 1984 film *War Games* was a real possibility. DS officials worried that a hacker might dial into the Department’s system undetected, and implant trojan horses, time bombs, trap doors, or viruses. Hackers were also increasingly sophisticated in their knowledge and tactics, sharing knowledge with each other, and seeking to do much more than merely getting into the Department’s system in order to brag about it later. With more and more FSOs using modems, DS also grew concerned about unfriendly parties tapping into the unsecured telecommunications lines used by FSOs and obtaining copies of facsimiles, messages, and/or documents. Moreover, DS made clear in 1988 that many people who used personal computers were relying on good faith, and that reliance upon passwords and access codes as one’s primary security barrier was “no longer valid.” Part of the problem rested with the fact that many users employed the same password or access code for several systems, used variations of a single password, or selected easily identifiable passwords such as birthdays, anniversaries, and names of children, spouses, or pets.

Several U.S. Government entities began setting the computer security policy for the federal government. With NSDD-145, President Reagan designated the National Security Agency as the “national manager” for the security of the U.S. Government’s computer and telecommunications networks. Congress passed and Reagan signed the Computer Security Act of 1987, and among its provisions, computer security procedures to be implemented by the OMB were defined, as was the category of “Sensitive But Unclassified” (SBU) information. The Reagan White House also issued NSDD-211, which placed the Department of State in charge of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), which was largely managed by the Office of Communications but worked closely with DS to maintain its security.
DS and its predecessor SY had shaped several elements of the Department’s computer security policy. Due to the self-enclosed structure of the Wang system, the Department of State enjoyed a certain degree of computer security because the Wang system was incompatible with outside networks such as the Internet. Furthermore, DS insisted from the beginning that the Department had to have two distinct and separate systems: classified and unclassified. DS engineers recognized that there was no effective means to protect state secrets and national security within a single combined information system. While some Department officials wanted a single network, DS insisted upon separate networks, separate email systems, and a strict ban on email between the classified and unclassified networks. DS was working to connect Department personnel in Washington and overseas to email networks. In 1991, only 17 percent of unclassified users and 18 percent of classified users had access to email. By 1993, despite costs that were running close to $10 million, DS planned to provide 77 percent of unclassified users and 48 percent of classified users with access to email.

With DS’s rise to bureau level, some DS officials believed that DS should take the lead on information security. In 1987 and 1988, Director of Technical Security Gregorie Bujac, among others, argued unsuccessfully for moving information security into DS. Yet security breaches such as the Lonetree/Bracy affair, the drive to centralize security programs in DS, and the 1987 Computer Security Act, had prompted the Department of State to combine communications, computer operations, office automation, and records management into Office of Information Management (IM) under the Bureau of Administration. Then, in 1989, in an effort to improve information security and better coordination of information, the Department, through the efforts of Assistant Secretary Krys, transferred IM to DS. The IM transfer incorporated OC’s Office of Security (OC/S) and all of OC’s electronic and technical countermeasures into DS. Also, OC’s Field Inspection Teams went to DS, as did the Shield Enclosure program for post communications centers.

The merger of IM and DS proved unpopular and difficult, and the rapid pace of innovation in computer technologies aggravated the situation. Several officials in OC and IM did not like the transfer. One OC/S veteran, Robert Surprise, who was studying at the National Defense University in 1990, devoted his research paper to a reassessment of IM’s transfer to DS. Surprise concluded that the merger did not achieve its intended goals, and that “user and IM communities have expressed dissatisfaction with the new structure” because it was “too bureaucratic, unresponsive, and a hindrance to progress.” The
Office of the Inspector General used Surprise’s paper to argue that IM should be removed from DS and put back into the Bureau of Administration.\textsuperscript{64} Krys, who had favored the initial transfer, concluded after just two years, that IM should be its own bureau (at least theoretically). After three years, Department officials approved IM’s move back to the Bureau of Administration. While most information management and communications offices left, the security-oriented offices like Computer Security remained with DS.\textsuperscript{65}

\section*{Conclusion}

During the six years after its creation, DS experienced a series of disappointments. Its budget suffered constant cuts; its personnel were cut, retired, or not replaced; and its programs operated at a reduced level. The new Embassy Moscow building had a plan, but progress remained stalled. The merger between DS and IM went poorly, and after three years, IM moved back to the Bureau of Administration. DS was not the only bureau or agency that suffered cuts, because the euphoria of the ending of the Cold War pervaded Congressional and U.S. Government thinking. Did the end of the Cold War mean fewer threats to security, and thus require a reduction of DS? Did the end of the Cold War mean the end of terrorism as well? In 1992, these remained open questions.

\section*{Endnotes}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Oral History Interview, Robert Booth, 7 December 2005, p. 6.
\end{enumerate}
History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

7 Oral History Interview, Casper Pelczynski, 24 May 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Memorandum “Official Residence for the Secretary of State,” Lamb and Donald J. Bouchard, Assistant Secretary for Administration, to the Secretary, n.d. (1985); Memorandum “Secretary’s Residence,” John H. Clemonns (AS/PRS) to Diane DeVivo (M/PAO), 14 January 1985; and Action Memorandum “Residence for the Secretary of State,” Abraham D. Socaer (L), J. Edward Fox (H), Bouchard, and Lamb to the Secretary, 1 August 1986; all Folder – Secretary’s Residence, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland.


25 Jerry LaFleur, “Joel Bell circled the globe as courier – 360 times,” The Roadbag (Spring/Summer 1987), 16.


Briefing Memorandum, Spiers to the Secretary, 17 March 1986, Folder – ASEC: Technical Security Responsibilities 1985, Box 4; Draft Memorandum “Construction Projects in the USSR,” Bouchard to the Secretary, 7 October 1985, Folder – ASEC Moscow, Box 2; Draft of NOB Moscow Countermeasures Plan, Dan Carlin to Lamb, Folder – ASEC Moscow, Box 2; all RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland.


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Memorandum “Responses to Questions from Representative Harold Rogers,” M. Coffey (DS/POL/PPD), 28 March 1990; Proposed Testimony of Selin before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 10 May 1990; and Memorandum “Answers to Questions submitted by Chairman Neal Smith in conjunction with Secretary Baker’s appearance before the CJS Subcommittee March 7, 1990,” Coffey, 3 March 1990; all Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. Written Statement on Salaries & Expenses before the House CJS, Rogers, 3 March 1992. Memorandum “Briefing Materials for Secretary Albright’s Appearance…” and attachments, DS to the Secretary, 21 February 1997.


The euphoria brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led many in the Department of State and Congress to believe that the primary threats to U.S. diplomacy and security had largely vanished. Republican and Democratic Congressmen, as well as political commentators, spoke of a “peace dividend,” and one scholar claimed it was “the end of history.” Amid the euphoria, U.S. leaders forgot two key elements about diplomatic security. First, the euphoria seemed to confuse the end of one threat (the Soviet Union) with the cessation of other threats. Overlooked, perhaps forgotten, was that the transformation of diplomatic security—and the elevation of the Office of Security (SY) into the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)—had resulted from the threat of terrorism, not Cold War threats. Second, U.S. officials seemed to assume that with the Soviet Union gone, the Russians (and others) would no longer be interested in espionage against the United States.¹

The jubilation of the immediate post-Cold War period hampered DS and its efforts to secure U.S. posts and facilities. The “peace dividend” led to cuts in Department of State appropriations, and U.S. officials pursued a “more with less” strategy regarding government services, including those provided by DS. As the post-Cold War euphoria wore off and
new tensions surfaced, DS undertook duties that placed its agents in some of the most dangerous regional conflicts of the decade. Such duties increased DS’s visibility and demonstrated once again the Department’s dependence upon a professional protective security service.

Terrorism from domestic and foreign sources elevated security concerns in the United States. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, and the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympic Games brought attention to the need for improved diplomatic security. However, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, directed by Osama bin Laden, caused extensive casualties and brought a new focus upon security issues at U.S. diplomatic facilities. While the Crowe Commission investigated the attacks, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Peter Bergin presented a “blueprint” for a restructured DS to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Secretary approved it, and the restructuring resulted in more resources, more personnel, more authority, and the ability to report directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission. As the demands for security have increased in the years after the East Africa bombings, DS has continued to build upon this blueprint.

**Peace Dividends and Laboratories**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a belief emerged that many security threats had faded, and members of Congress and foreign policy commentators spoke of a “peace dividend.” The peace dividend was a budgetary savings that the U.S. Government would incur because it no longer needed elevated levels of U.S. military forces to counter the Soviet threat. Although DS officials were acutely aware that not all threats emanated from or were fostered by the Kremlin, the pressure from Congress and senior Department officials to limit spending overrode DS concerns.

Like his superiors, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, affirmed many “peace dividend” sentiments. He commissioned a task force of senior DS officers to study and make recommendations on how DS could adjust to the post-Cold War future. He asserted that DS needed to reexamine “the way we do business in light of changing world realities [and] the growing scarcity of personnel and
financial resources.” Citing the political pressure to streamline the federal government, Quainton advised that DS should do the same “to remain relevant, efficient, and effective.”

Amid the new post-Cold War world, a movement to “reinvent government” emerged, and Assistant Secretary Quainton and Under Secretary of State for Management Richard Moose sought to make DS a “laboratory” for the movement. Headed by Vice President Albert “Al” Gore, Jr., “Reinventing Government” sought to reduce archaic rules, excessive layers of bureaucracy, and wasteful spending on duplicate efforts in several agencies. If successful, the federal government could be more responsive to the public, more effective and cost-efficient in its operations, and more innovative in resolving challenges and problems. In several ways, such efforts echoed the Crockett Reforms of the 1960s, except that it was a U.S. Government-wide effort. Under Quainton and Moose, “reinventing” DS meant embracing the “risk management” approach more fully (as opposed to risk avoidance) by developing security standards based on threat levels and applying countermeasures in a cost-effective manner based on a post’s threat classification. Reinventing DS also included reclassifying many positions to a lower security clearance, eliminating research and development in technical security, and reducing the Secretary’s detail, the number of local guards at posts, and the Diplomatic Security Guard program. There was an effort to consolidate background investigations and allow U.S. Government employees to transfer their security clearance when they moved to a different agency (a move to a different department or

Figure 3: Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1992-1995. Quainton sought to make DS one of the Department of State’s laboratories for the “Reinventing Government” effort spearheaded by Vice President Albert P. Gore, Jr. Under Reinventing Government, DS lost resources and personnel, and Quainton tried to have some long-time tasks, such as visa and passport fraud investigations, transferred to other agencies. The proposals were unpopular among DS rank-and-file. Source: Department of State

Figure 4: Mark E. Mulvey, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1993-1996. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
agency prompts a new background investigation and security clearance evaluation). 3

In what was perhaps one of the most controversial elements of the DS “laboratory” effort, Under Secretary Moose asked Quainton to consider having DS relinquish its criminal investigative function. In 1993, Quainton requested Foreign Service Officer Jock Covey to prepare a study on the topic. Covey reported that while the Bureau of Consular Affairs was responsible for preventing passport fraud, it relied upon DS to pursue any fraud cases. To conduct fraud investigations, DS utilized field offices in 21 U.S. cities, which were staffed by Special Agents trained as federal investigators with full law enforcement powers. Yet in order to bring a passport fraud case to court, agents had to persuade the local U.S. Attorney of three things: that a more serious crime was involved, that the case could be won before a jury, and that a meaningful penalty would be imposed."4

Based on Covey’s study, Quainton determined that the investigative function was unproductive, and sought to transfer it to another agency. If DS transferred passport and visa fraud investigations to another agency, DS could shut down several domestic field offices and reap a significant savings for the Department. Moose and Quainton even discussed the transfer of investigation duties with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In a meeting with the Under Secretary of State, DS Assistant Director for Investigations Peter Bergin opposed the transfer. When Moose called Bergin later, Bergin bluntly told Moose, “[Secretary of State Warren] Christopher and you are doing yourselves no service here. You are setting us

Figure 5: A DS Security Technical Specialist (foreground) inspects a surveillance camera while a DS Security Engineering Officer works on the mounting hardware at a United States diplomatic facility. Although the Cold War had ended, threats to U.S. diplomacy, such as espionage, terrorism, and crime, continued. Moreover, the United States needed to establish embassies in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. As a result, DS faced many challenges in ensuring the technical security of U.S. diplomatic posts during the 1990s. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 6: Winter 1994: A DS Security Engineering Officer works to install alarms in the utility tunnels beneath a U.S. embassy overseas. The alarm system was a precautionary countermeasure aimed at alerting embassy security personnel if intruders entered the tunnels. Running beneath public streets, such tunnels sometimes were used in espionage efforts by foreign intelligence operatives. Source: Private collection.

[DS] up for failure two to five years down the road.” Ultimately the criminal investigations function was retained; however, as word of Quainton and Moose's talks with the FBI spread among DS personnel, Quainton’s standing plummeted. In retrospect, Quainton admitted it “effectively ruined [him] with a large number of people” in DS.5

Quainton and Moose streamlined other tasks in DS and considered other budget cuts. Under Quainton, the Bureau's 1993 salaries and expenses budget was approximately $180 million, a figure unchanged from 1990 and slightly less than the amount in 1986. Quainton and Moose tried to downsize the Secretary of State's protective detail while the Secretary was in Washington, outsource protection of foreign dignitaries, restrict expenditures on the local guard program overseas, and reconsider embassy security measures. Quainton sought to reduce DS's protective security commitments, believing that many protective details were unnecessary. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, was one of only five high level foreign officials who enjoyed a full-time DS protective detail, and Quainton considered cutting it. However, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian insisted that DS retain it because the Saudis provided the U.S. Ambassador in Riyadh with a full security detail. As enacted by Moose and Quainton, the Reinventing Government effort seemed to view DS as an entity without a past and with a function whose need had lessened. Department officials appeared to forget that DS arose as a bureau and expanded dramatically due to the threat of terrorism, not the threat posed by the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union gone, Reinventing Government seemed to accept that the Russians, the Newly Independent States (as former Soviet republics were called), and other governments were no longer interested in intelligence gathering on the United States, its policies, and its actions.6

Furthermore, the implementation of Reinventing Government seemed disconnected from existing threats and continually expanding security needs. When successor states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States established diplomatic relations with each of the newly independent states. This required establishing new embassies—each with its own staff—and for the new states to establish embassies of their own in Washington. (The U.S. Embassy in Moscow continued to function as the U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation.) Just as had occurred with post-World War II decolonization and the subsequent emergence of new independent countries, the expansion of U.S. diplomatic posts imposed greater demands upon DS. In the newly independent states such as Tajikistan, Armenia, Estonia, and Ukraine, DS assisted in determining the security of sites for new U.S. diplomatic posts. It also prepared and established security programs and Marine Security Guard details for those embassies and consulates.

In addition, international espionage did not end with the Cold War. One DS engineer recalled a 1985 warning by a KGB colonel: “You will some day see a great peace break out. It is easier to spy on your friends.” With the end of the Cold War, DS reduced its countermeasures; meanwhile, other agencies cut them outright. DS agents knew the FSB (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti—Federal Security Service), the successor to the KGB, was still conducting spy operations. Moreover, the New Independent States, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, developed their own intelligence services, with people formerly trained by the KGB.7
For example, DS engineers Bruce Matthews and Lonny Price learned that the Russians were conducting espionage against the new U.S. Consulate in Yekaterinburg, as if the Cold War had not ended. The building that housed the new U.S. consulate abutted a hotel, and upon examining the rooms next to the U.S. Consulate, Matthews and Price found that the Russians were building listening posts in rooms adjacent to the consulate. In Vladivostok, Matthews found that the FSB had set up lines along the new Consulate’s telephone wires. Using a video camera, Matthews began following the lines to their source, only to have some FSB “heavies” chase after him.⁸

New Security Demands: The Olympics, World Trade Center, Burundi, and Haiti

While Russian espionage continued unabated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demand for security imposed new stresses upon DS, even as Reinventing Government sought to streamline operations in the bureau. One of the first additional responsibilities that DS gained in the post-Cold War era was protective security for the U.S. Olympic team. DS had been involved with protective security of U.S. Olympic athletes since the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada—the first Games after the 1972 Black September terrorist attack in Munich where members of the Israeli Olympic team were held hostage and killed. DS became further involved in 1984 when it protected foreign dignitaries who attended the Los Angeles Olympics (President Carter ordered a boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan). More serious concerns about the security of U.S. Olympic athletes first arose in 1991 when Cuba hosted the Pan American Games. During the months preceding the Havana Pan Am Games, several Cuban sports athletes defected. U.S. officials had concerns that the Cubans would exploit and harass U.S. athletes, or even build relationships to exploit at a later date. The U.S. Olympic team turned to the Department of State, and DS Agents briefed Pan Am Games athletes on security issues in Tampa before they flew to Havana.⁹
After the Havana Pan Am Games, DS developed a more formalized program, with particular emphasis upon preparation prior to a Games event. In 1992, the Division of Overseas Programs created a specific position responsible for the security of U.S. athletes for the Olympics in Barcelona, Spain. Bill Marsden, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Madrid, served as the first Olympic Coordinator. For the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Special Agent Ed Moreno coordinated the DS effort at the U.S.-hosted games, which consisted largely of dignitary protection and protection of the Israeli Olympic team.¹⁰

The bombing at the Atlanta Olympics, although perpetrated by domestic terrorists, prompted DS to create a permanent Olympic Coordinator position. John Kaufman was named as the first Coordinator, and he began preparations for the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia. As Coordinator, Kaufman undertook three tasks: working with and coordinating assistance for Australian security and law enforcement agencies; serving as a liaison with the U.S. business community; and preparing to assist the U.S. Olympic team. He worked with the Australian Prime Minister’s office, and coordinated efforts with the Australian Federal Police, Australian intelligence, the Secret Service, the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided explosive-sniffing dogs. The U.S., Australian, and New Zealand military forces conducted maneuvers as well. Although Kaufman admitted that in 1996, he did not believe that the Australians were ready for the Games, by 2000, U.S. officials were enthusiastic about the Australians’ preparations, measures, and broad public commitment to assist. After the success in Sydney, DS expanded its coordination and preparation for the Olympics and similar events. It initiated an exchange program for the host country’s police forces during the years preceding the next Olympics, and DS created a Security Event Training program to coordinate protective security.¹¹
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the first indication for DS that terrorism was evolving from a regional phenomenon to a transnational phenomenon. On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in a parking garage of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. The NYC Police Department and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force immediately called upon DS for support during the investigation. Working with NYC Police, the FBI, and ATF, DS helped to quickly identify a group of Middle Eastern radicals as those responsible for the attack. FBI and NYC police arrested most of the terrorists before they could leave the United States; however, Ramzi Yousef, the driver of the van containing the explosives, escaped.\(^{12}\)

The ensuing search for Yousef resulted in a debate between the Department of State and the FBI over the Department’s Rewards for Justice program. The Department offered a $2 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Yousef, but the reward was controversial. First, it departed from previous practice of compensating individuals for information about specific incidents; the Department had not previously paid compensation for information on the whereabouts of suspects. Also, the Department and the FBI clashed over who should pay the reward.\(^{13}\) Since the bombing occurred on U.S. soil, the Department of State argued that the FBI should pay. The Department insisted that Congress had prevented them from offering rewards in domestic terrorism cases. The FBI, who placed Yousef on its “Most Wanted” list, asserted that it did not have funds available to pay a reward for Yousef’s capture. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee...
then drafted legislation allowing the Department of State to offer rewards for domestic attacks if perpetrated by international terrorists; in July 1993, the Department offered a $2 million reward.\textsuperscript{14}

By this time, Yousef had disappeared underground; however, DS Special Agents did much of the work that led to his capture in Pakistan. U.S. law enforcement officials believed that Yousef had escaped to Pakistan, but they had little reliable information about his location. In February 1995, nearly two years after the WTC attack, a man presented himself at the residence of a U.S. diplomat in Karachi, and claimed to have information about Yousef’s location. DS agents in Pakistan confirmed that the man was a legitimate source: he was a former contact for Yousef. Based on his information, DS agents Bill Miller and Jeff Riner alerted Pakistani officials and prepared to raid Yousef’s hotel room. On February 7, 1995, a team of Pakistani law enforcement officers and DS agents, including Miller, stormed into Yousef’s room, waking him from a nap, and arrested him. The next day, Pakistani officials turned Yousef over to FBI agents, who flew him to New York City for arraignment. The informant received a $2 million reward, and on March 11, Yousef was indicted for the 1993 WTC bombing.\textsuperscript{15}

DS’s protective responsibilities at U.S. Embassies increased, in part due to local conflicts, with two more notable examples being Burundi and Liberia. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, ethnic tensions between Tutsis and Hutus spilled over into neighboring Burundi. The situation created a tense, high-risk situation for the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura and threatened the life of the U.S. Ambassador. On April 6, 1994, unknown assailants shot down a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land at the airport in the Rwandan capital of Kigali. The assassination sparked the Rwandan genocide; meanwhile, Tutsi and Hutu leaders in Burundi appealed for calm.\textsuperscript{16} As Rwanda’s genocide garnered world press attention, ethnic tensions simmered in Burundi, with occasional
human rights abuses committed by extremist Tutsi groups. U.S. Ambassador Robert Krueger investigated the abuses; and in one case where 150 Hutus were massacred, the Ambassador reported his finding to the press. Tutsi newspapers excoriated Krueger and published death threats again him, prompting DS to increase the number of its agents at the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura. In July 1995, Ambassador Krueger, escorted by RSO Chris Reilly and ARSO Larry Salmon, traveled to a northern province of Burundi with an official government convoy. During the trip, his convoy was attacked. Reilly and Salmon moved Krueger out of danger, and later each received the Department’s Award for Valor for protecting the Ambassador. Threat analysts in DS’s Intelligence and Threat Analysis office, however, warned that Krueger would continue to face “an extremely serious threat” from Tutsi extremists because of his perceived sympathy for the Hutus; and Krueger returned to Washington for consultations.  

DS opposed Krueger’s return to Bujumbura, but the new U.S. Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, Jr. did not lessen DS’s protective work in Burundi. In what Hughes described as “a slow-motion coup led by civilians,” the President of Burundi, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, feared for his life and asked Hughes on July 23, 1996, to permit him to stay the night at the Ambassador’s residence. Hughes consented. DS sent a four-person Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) team to protect the Ambassador’s residence. Ntibantunganya’s protection detail lasted several months. DS had serious qualms about the wisdom of the Burundian president staying in the U.S.
Embassy, and the potential problems it posed for the Embassy, its personnel, and its diplomatic inviolability.18

As civil war among three factions engulfed the West African nation of Liberia, the declining security environment placed heavy demands upon DS agents at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. In 1996, Special Agent John J. Frese made several trips to negotiate with various factions and bring more that 250 people, most of them U.S. citizens, to safety. Frese earned the Department’s Award of Valor and other awards. In 1998, as the capital city of Monrovia, including the neighborhood of the U.S. Embassy, became a war zone, Special Agents Tony Deibler, Scott Folensbee, and Steve Fakan sought to bring Americans to safety, and to rescue several journalists who were trapped in a hotel by factional clashes. Their efforts became the subject of an episode of the History Channel series Heroes under Fire.19

While protecting the Burundian president was unexpected, DS was formally tasked in 1993 to train and advise a protective detail for the President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide. Haiti’s chronic economic desperation and political corruption led the United States to assist Aristide in the hope of encouraging democratic stability for the Haitian people—with varying levels of success. In 1994, DS hired DynCorp to provide a protective detail for Aristide when he returned to Haiti, the first time that DS turned to a private contractor to provide personal protection. Then, in October 1994, DS Agent John Rendeiro flew to Haiti with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and President Aristide. He and a DS team trained 50 Haitians to serve as Aristide’s protective detail.20
In December 1995, Haitians elected René Préval as Aristide’s successor, and DS now had the task of protecting President Préval as well. However, DS could not legally accept responsibility for protecting Préval under the law enforcement authorities that it had. President William J. Clinton added Haiti to the Foreign Assistance list as an AID mission so that DS could proceed with the operation, and funds for protecting Préval could be included in Haiti’s foreign aid package. The National Security Council pressured other agencies to permit DS to protect Préval, and DS received additional support from the Department of Defense, Secret Service, the Army and Navy Criminal Investigative Services, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. DS conducted the tactical planning and the operations of the multi-agency protective security detail. A DS team arrived by two C-130s on a Sunday morning, and took over the protection of the palace. Later, after several months, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Greg Bujac traveled to Port-au-Prince, and accepted President Préval’s thanks for DS’s efforts. The occasion marked the first-time that a head of state formally thanked the Department of State’s security office for its efforts. DS supervised contracted U.S. personnel serving on the protective detail until the detail ended in April 2006.

With the new tasks, DS’s need for additional Special Agents and security personnel in general became acute, particularly in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The April 19 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in that city by domestic, anti-government militia sympathizers prompted President Clinton to direct all federal facilities to meet the minimum security standards. Consequently, the Department of State received $1.68 million in the 1996 Antiterrorism Budget Supplemental to upgrade security at its domestic facilities. When President Clinton announced that he would request an additional 1,000 law
enforcement officers to combat terrorism at home and abroad, Assistant Secretary Quainton asked Under Secretary Moose “to seize the opportunity to ensure that DS has adequate personnel.” Quainton received no support for his appeal.²²

When Eric J. Boswell took over as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security in January 1996, he criticized the cutbacks in hiring, personnel, and resources that DS had endured since the end of the Cold War. DS stopped hiring new agents in 1990, and did not begin hiring again until late 1997. DS suffered budget cuts of $186 million in FY 1993 and $156 million in FY 1996; the latter was the smallest annual cut during the previous five years. DS lost 126 Foreign Service and 159 Civil Service positions between 1992 and 1996, prompting Boswell to admit that staff shortages left DS “unable to meet our most critical requirements.”²³ Boswell also acknowledged that DS was “graying.” The average age of DS agents was 44, and many were approaching retirement. The average age of Security Engineers was 45, and the average age of the Diplomatic Couriers was 47. In early 1997, Boswell bluntly told Acting Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy that “asking this Bureau to take further reductions…is irresponsible and inconsistent with the intent of Congress.”²⁴

The Department of Defense became highly critical of the cuts to DS. With many military attachés and other military personnel working in U.S. embassies across the globe, the Department of Defense complained that the Department of State “unilaterally” decided to set aside physical security standards when it opened new embassies in the former Soviet republics, the former Yugoslav republics, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Also, Department of Defense officials disliked the fact that the Department of State had withdrawn Marine Security Guard (MSG) units from several posts, and had not assigned MSG detachments to many of the new embassies. The Department of Defense made clear to the Department of State that it was considering three options: “weigh[ing] the risk of operating in less than secure facilities, choosing not to locate in the host country, or, with DOS approval, constructing a DOD facility.”²⁵

Figure 17: Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1996-1998. Boswell was critical of the cuts DS suffered during the early 1990s, and bluntly said that additional cuts were “irresponsible.” He and DAS Bujac undertook a rebuilding of DS between 1996 and 1998, bringing in many new agents and acquiring additional monies. Source: Department of State.
The 1996 Al-Khobar Towers bombing emphasized the need for greater security, and DS immediately reviewed security at all U.S. posts in the Middle East. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb destroyed the Al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. military personnel were killed, and 515 people, including 240 U.S. military, were injured. Al-Khobar Towers was not a Department of State facility; it was residential quarters for U.S. and allied Air Forces for Operation Southern Watch, the coalition air operation over Iraq. Even so DS immediately sent three security teams of six persons each to the Persian Gulf to survey and “recommend the necessary upgrades” for Department posts and facilities. The three teams divided the posts into groups: one team focused exclusively on Saudi Arabia, another examined posts in Kuwait and Bahrain, and the third surveyed Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

Over the next few months, DS completed numerous upgrades at several posts in the Persian Gulf and former Soviet Union. The upgrades consisted largely of perimeter barriers, closed streets, additional guards, and training of U.S. diplomatic personnel. Congress approved a budget supplemental for DS, funding 55 new positions, including 15 security officers for the Persian Gulf and the Newly Independent States. The extra money also funded six new mobile training teams, more local guards, 43 armored and light-armored vehicles, 80 alarm systems, 80 walk-through metal detectors, and other equipment.

As a result of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS became very proactive in trying to prevent terrorist attacks. In February 1997, DS officials informed Secretary Albright that there was “credible evidence of planning for a terrorist attack on U.S. interests or facilities in the Persian Gulf.” With many connecting the Al-Khobar Towers attack to the bombing of a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh six months earlier (November 13, 1996).
1995), NSC Advisor Sandy Berger inquired whether the U.S. Government should issue a security alert message for the Middle East. Boswell did not believe this was necessary because information on a specific threat did not exist. However, Boswell assured Albright that DS had elevated the threat level in the region to “high” and was “properly and adequately” addressing the heightened threat situation. Boswell also detailed for the Secretary the specific security upgrades DS had undertaken at U.S. posts around the Persian Gulf.29

After the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS gained new resources and other agencies began turning to DS on issues regarding security and related issues at U.S. posts overseas. With intelligence reports citing more “surveillance and possible pre-attack planning against” U.S. diplomatic facilities, the Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the NSC asked DS in mid-1997 to coordinate three interagency teams that would conduct security vulnerability assessments of possible targets. Former SY chief Ambassador David Fields headed one of the teams, and the three teams presented their findings to the Counterterrorism Subcommittee in September 1997. When Boswell requested an additional 70 agents, 31 were approved immediately, with many going to the security details of the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Acting Under Secretary Kennedy believed that another 32 agents were “warranted” and requested information on costs. In December 1997, Boswell told Secretary Albright that DS had hired 105 new agents and was “reversing a long period of slow decline.”30
DS’s Global Plan for Security Engineering Officers perhaps best demonstrates the rapid change of attitudes within the Department regarding security in the wake of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing. Designed during the Quainton/Moose period, the Global Plan resulted from efforts by the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) to cut personnel at its posts in the immediate post-Cold War years. DS offered the Global Plan in hopes of making “the best out of a bad situation.” The proposed plan argued that the technological revolution of computers, wireless communications, and connectivity demanded that DS restructure its technical security programs; that is it would turn over the lock/safe/alarm repair tasks to privately contracted technicians under DS supervision and eliminate 16 SEO positions. The trade-off was that all SEO positions would be transferred out of the geographical bureaus and into DS (SEO positions were formally part of the geographic bureaus, and DS needed approval from the geographic bureaus for changes and initiatives). Shortly after Boswell became Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary Moose approved the Global Plan just before he departed, and the plan was soon implemented.\(^3^1\)

After Oklahoma City and the Al-Khobar Towers bombings, the new leadership of EUR questioned the wisdom of the Global Plan. In fact, they now opposed it. Apparently not aware that the Global Plan was a EUR initiative, EUR’s new senior officials asked DS “to justify” the Global Plan and the cuts of SEOs at European posts. In addition, several U.S. embassies, who had opposed the Global Plan from the start, mounted “valiant and convincing” appeals for retaining their SEOs. By August 1997, just one year after the Global Plan’s approval, DS found itself implementing a plan it originally had not wanted, at embassies that steadfastly opposed it, and that was now rejected by the geographic bureau that had initially pressed for it. By the fall of 1997, DS was hiring more SEOs, and it pledged to work with EUR to resolve issues and concerns. Meanwhile, the SEOs moved to DS, and there were few actual cuts.\(^3^2\)
The Al-Khobar Towers bombing and the increase in terrorism renewed interest in the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). OSAC was a liaison for the private sector, primarily for U.S. companies operating overseas. With “peace dividend” budget cuts, OSAC withered from a lack of resources and inactivity. To conserve limited resources, Assistant Secretary Quainton had tried to combine OSAC’s private liaison analyst group with DS’s Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA) division, believing that a combined group of analysts could fulfill both obligations. ITA struggled to meet the Department’s increasing need for threat analysis, and as a result, OSAC suffered. In the late 1990s, OSAC developed the Research and Information Support Center (RISC), which directly supported the private sector by providing threat analysis information. The revival of OSAC improved its effectiveness as a liaison and an advisor to the private sector. OSAC was soon being touted as “something that works;” moreover, it began bringing in other government agencies to assist the private sector.33

The Half-Finished Embassy

DS under Boswell renewed its emphasis upon physical security overseas, but construction of the stalled, bugged, and much-maligned new U.S. Embassy in Moscow began moving forward. In 1994, Congress approved the Secure Chancery Facilities plan for Embassy Moscow, and the project became known as “Tophat.” The next year, the Department of State contracted architects Hellmuth, Obata & Kassebaum, P.C., to design the demolition to the fifth-floor slab and the subsequent construction of five new floors. The lower four floors would be the unclassified common areas and offices for local employees, as well as the Embassy’s offices for administration and budget. The upper floors (the 5th floor and above) contained the classified briefing areas and the post communications center. In 1997, U.S. construction teams began demolition of the upper floors down to the fifth-floor slab and reconstruction of the New Embassy Office Building (NOB). Shielding was inserted between the fourth and fifth floors to prevent installation of any “bugs” from the lower floors.34
DS Agent Richard Gannon served as the Director of Security at the Moscow Embassy construction project, and he and DS worked with the intelligence community on the project to address its concerns in the best possible manner. One of the intelligence community’s fears was that the Russians would manage to place a team of agents into the building and implant listening devices. DS responded by having Marine Security Guards guard the construction site 24 hours a day. DS installed video cameras along the fences and put infrared beam alarms inside the fences. The cameras also contained alarms to prevent tampering or adjustment. DS collected all videotapes from the surveillance cameras in case a concern about security arose. If someone got into the building, DS could review the specific tape.

DS also developed a counter-intelligence program for the U.S. workers brought to Moscow to work on the NOB in order to safeguard the construction site. DS officials concluded that a no-fraternization policy was unachievable, in part, because U.S. electricians and laborers would want to visit the city and would need an outlet for rest and entertainment. Despite opposition, DS implemented a program that permitted fraternization of U.S. workers with Russians, notwithstanding the workers’ Top Secret clearance. DS agents educated workers on the possibilities and signs of espionage, and developed relationships with them. DS encouraged the workers to report any fraternization with Russians, and assured them that such reporting was without repercussions or punishment. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Peter Bergin said that the idea was to develop transparency, and investigate the persons with whom the workers fraternized to see if they were KGB operatives or posed any other problems for U.S. workers. If the fraternization was not reported, the worker was sent home. Bergin admitted the program was counter-intuitive, but it sought to serve as an enabler for security.

**Secretary Albright’s “Worst Day”**

By the mid-1990s, DS recognized that terrorism was changing to a more transnational phenomenon and that it was starting to pose a different type of threat. Because many analysts expected a terrorist attack in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, DS took several preparations. In 1997, Peter Bergin, who was then Director of the Office of Investigations and Counter-Intelligence, heard that Richard A. Clarke of the NSC and head
of the Counterterrorism Security Group was holding meetings on terrorism. The Department of State's Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (S/CT) attended these meetings, but DS did not. Bergin attended one meeting and determined that DS should participate. By the fall of 1997, DS was participating in the meetings, and Clarke soon asked DS to do vulnerability assessments for him. DS led 10 or 12 assessment teams, and when the Bureau made its presentation Clarke liked what DS produced.

According to long-time DS Threat Analyst Dennis Pluchinsky, most terrorist groups have a domestic agenda, with some groups possessing a regional agenda; however, Al-Qaeda's global agenda made it difficult to predict. Also, he said, there was a lot of terrorist rhetoric, but the key question for threat analysts was whether action would accompany the words. The 1992 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the Jewish Defense League, led to the arrest of El Sayyid Nosair, the first member of Al-Qaeda arrested in the United States. That arrest indicated that something was brewing in Afghanistan. DS Threat analysts noted that there were rumblings and a lot of jihadists without jobs. Although U.S. officials had identified Ramzi Yousef in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993, the connection with bin Laden was not clear until early 1996. Bin Laden also was involved in terrorism in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, but again, the connections were not immediately clear. Also, Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks in Israel, Argentina, and Bahrain, as well as a far right group's bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City further clouded the terrorist picture. On February 23, 1998, bin Laden and four associated...
clerics issued a “fatwa,” calling for “jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” i.e. the United States and its allies such as Israel. The CIA tried to follow this in order to see if words would translate into action.38

On August 7, 1998, two trucks laden with explosives entered the U.S. Embassy compounds in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania—at 10:35 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. respectively—and detonated. The near-simultaneous explosions killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. The blasts also injured more than 5000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans. Both embassies were heavily damaged. Secretary Madeleine Albright described it as “my worst day as Secretary of State.” President Clinton called the attacks “abhorrent” and “inhuman,” and vowed, “We will use all means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it takes.” The U.S. Embassy was located in downtown Nairobi on Haile Selassie Avenue, near one of the city’s busiest intersections. The bomb, comprising 400-500 pounds of explosives, destroyed the rear of the U.S. Embassy, leveled the six-story Ufundi Cooperative Building, set ablaze a passing city bus, and blew out windows more than one and one-half miles away. U.S. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell was meeting with the Kenyan Trade Minister in the 18th story of a nearby building, and both were injured in the blast. In Tanzania, the near-simultaneous blast occurred next to the U.S. Embassy, which was located three miles out of Dar es Salaam city, in an up-scale residential neighborhood. It devastated the front of the U.S. Embassy, blew out windows and damaged homes blocks away. Secretary Albright travelled to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to survey the damage, met
with the staffs of both embassies, and personally escorted the caskets containing the bodies of the American dead back to Washington. President Clinton, the families of the dead, friends, and Department of State personnel met the plane carrying the 10 Americans at Andrews Air Force Base, and held a tearful, “grim ceremony.”

The severity and coordination of the terrorist attacks immediately directed suspicions at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The Clinton Administration took several actions, including an attack on bin Laden. First, based upon intelligence that bin Laden would be meeting with his top staff on August 20 in Afghanistan, President Clinton ordered National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to coordinate “Operation Infinite Reach.” On August 20, 79 cruise missiles struck targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, heavily damaging al-Qaeda training camps, killing 20-30 al-Qaeda members, but missing bin Laden by a few hours. Second, the Clinton Administration commissioned the Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to investigate the bombings and make recommendations on embassy security. The boards were informally and collectively referred to as the Crowe Commission. Third, the Administration asked Congress for $1.8 billion for emergency security improvements overseas.

Under new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter, DS’s response to bin Laden’s attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, initially resembled SY’s approach in 1983-84 but then diverged sharply. Upon news of the bombings, DS sent 41 DS agents, 4 SEOs, and 41 Seabees to Tanzania and Kenya to meet the two Embassies’ immediate security needs. Clarke, the NSC member serving as the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, asked the Department of Defense to send two FASTs (Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Teams) to the two African capitals, with 50 Marines going to Dar es Salaam and a platoon of Marines to Nairobi.

DS moved to enhance security at U.S. diplomatic posts regionally and worldwide. Carpenter informed Secretary Albright and Under Secretary for Management Bonnie Cohen that, “The Usama bin
Laden [UBL] organization has the ability, training, funding and motivation to strike at U.S. interests almost anywhere in the world.”42 With reports that al-Qaeda might be planning more attacks, the three U.S. Embassies in Kampala, Uganda, Kigali, Rwanda, and Tirana, Albania, were closed temporarily. DS sent additional agents to several posts, including Kampala, Tirana, Asmara, Kosovo, and Kuala Lumpur. DS officers increased embassy security at the Department of State’s most vulnerable posts, installing more video cameras and new alarms systems. The Bureau instructed low-threat posts to implement the vehicle inspection and personal identification procedures that had been followed at high and critical threat posts for some time. DS asked its RSOs around the world to submit daily reports on their “security posture,” and to develop long-term and short-term requests for security upgrades for their posts. DS officials also created the Emergency Coordination Group, which served as the “focal point for all security action issues.”43

DS assembled seven Embassy Security Assessment Teams (ESATs) to evaluate and make recommendations for improvements in the security posture of its embassies. Each team was led by a DS agent and composed of one officer each from FBO and several foreign affairs agencies. The teams traveled to 27 embassies around the world between August 20 and September 8, 1998. A seventh ESAT traveled to the East Asia and Pacific region on September 30. At the recommendation of the ESATs, the U.S. Embassy in Doha (Qatar) was relocated to a more secure location in the city. Meanwhile, operations of the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, were transferred to Almaty, Kazakhstan. In summarizing the ESATs’ findings to Under Secretary Cohen, DS officials confessed that most of the 27 embassies required replacement facilities and that there were limits to what the United States could do to improve existing facilities.44

DS created the Surveillance Detection Program when 217 of 260 U.S. posts (about 85 percent) were unable to meet the 100-foot setback. The Surveillance Detection Program was a departure for DS because its basic focus was to look outward from the post. Previously DS and its predecessor SY had concentrated on upgrading security within the post’s perimeter. The program hired and trained local nationals to detect suspected terrorist or surveillance activities, as well as suspicious activities of individuals or vehicles. The program was part of a larger effort to upgrade embassy security, particularly perimeter security and local guard details. As Bergin later remarked, "DS began “looking beyond the
perimeter” and “watch[ing] the people who were watching us.” Under the direction of an embassy’s RSO, local guard personnel patrolled the area around the embassy in cars, food stands, and even apartments overlooking the embassy. Bergin informed all diplomatic and consular posts that the terrorists’ “preliminary target assessment and information gathering on [embassy] vulnerabilities” was “the weakest link” of their attack plan. Target assessment and information gathering, i.e. surveillance of the embassy, was often “poorly done” and occurred over a period of time, thus allowing possible detection.

For its intensified effort, DS received the necessary money from Congress and support from senior Clinton Administration officials. Supplemental funding from Congress not only funded the Surveillance Detection Program and security upgrades at U.S. embassies, it also enabled DS to hire 200 new Special Agents (130 of whom were hired before 1998 ended), 34 new technical security specialists, and 20 new couriers. The hires expanded DS by one-third, and the Bureau numbered more than 1,000. It also increased DS’s presence at overseas posts from 270 people to more than 400. By December 1998, Secretary Albright had promised that all posts would receive funding for a Surveillance Detection Program. The Department reinvigorated the long understaffed Mobile Training Teams and advised all Chiefs of Mission to “personally participate” in as many training sessions as possible. In his 1999 State of the Union message, President Clinton declared diplomatic security a national priority, and asked the nation to give U.S. diplomats the “support, the safest possible workplaces, and the resources they need so that America can lead.”

**A Blueprint for DS**

After the East Africa bombings, DS shifted to a proactive approach. Partially symbolized by the creation of the Surveillance Detection Program, DS’s new approach led it to more aggressively pursue several initiatives. DS began working more closely with other agencies to share information and coordinate responses to terrorist threats overseas, particularly the NSC’s Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG) chaired by Richard Clarke. Assistant Secretary Carpenter chaired an ad hoc group of the CSG to study how to implement additional security countermeasures for U.S. posts abroad. DS organized and dispatched five Security Augmentation Teams (of 5 persons each) to embassies in the Middle East and Africa. Their objective was to evaluate posts for physical security vulnerabilities, lack of host government support/capabilities, and possible Osama bin Laden targets. DS also formed a task force to examine chemical and biological warfare threats to overseas posts, and then adjusted emergency action plans and provided CBW equipment and training for U.S. personnel. DS also held a town hall meeting with more than 500 Department of State employees to discuss security concerns.

No single effort represented DS’s new proactive approach better than the Carpenter and Bergin “blueprint” for DS. Just as David Fields and Robert Lamb had put forward SY’s Acceleration proposal and did not wait for the Inman Panel, Carpenter and Bergin did not wait for the Crowe Commission to recommend changes. Instead, they detailed specific proposals to implement and enforce security measures in Department facilities.
at home and abroad. Their proposals were more extensive than those that the Crowe Commission would recommend.\textsuperscript{50}

In their memorandum, Carpenter and Bergin pressed for several structural changes for DS and its people. First, given the priority of security, they asked that the RSO report directly to the Chief of Mission or the Deputy Chief of Mission, instead of the Administrative Officer as was then currently done. Second, they requested permission to create Regional Directors of Security who would supervise, review, inspect, and consult with RSOs in a designated region. The Regional Director of Security would also serve as a liaison with the particular geographic bureau. Third, Carpenter and Bergin asked to have the management of and resource support for RSO and ARSO positions transferred from the geographic bureaus to DS, just as had occurred earlier with the SEOs. Without control over DS personnel and monies, Carpenter argued, he had “no flexibility… to meet an evolving emergency or crisis.” Carpenter and Bergin also asked that a formal career path be established for DS personnel, and that DS create separate promotion panels for its agents and SEOs, with DS personnel chairing and comprising a majority on the panels. Finally, Carpenter and Bergin requested that the “time-in-class” requirement be adjusted so that senior DS officers would be able to train and mentor the new recruits without being selected out of the Foreign Service (many DS agents were facing this in 1999).\textsuperscript{51}

On March 9, 1999, in a meeting requested by Albright, Carpenter and Bergin presented their “Blueprint for DS.” Describing DS as a 1980s car, Carpenter and Bergin asked the Secretary, “How many of us are still driving a 1984 automobile?” They recommended that DS be rebuilt in the likeness of the Secret Service. They requested each of the items listed above and added two others. They asked that the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security report directly to the Secretary regarding security matters, and that DS be allowed to hire an additional 500 agents over the next three years. Albright was sympathetic, and recommended that they consult with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering, Director General of the Foreign Service Edward...
W. “Skip” Gnehm, Counselor Wendy Sherman, and Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Barbara Larkin.  

Although some resistance arose—in fact, one senior officer warned Bergin to “marshal his allies”—Carpenter and Bergin obtained nearly everything they requested. In consultations with Pickering, Gnehm, Sherman, and Larkin, they found no opposition to the career path, promotion panel, and time-in-service proposals. The creation of Regional Director of Security and the changing of the chain of command so that the RSO reported to the DCM or Chief of Mission were also approved, although resistance stalled the latter proposal for several months. DS obtained six of the seven positions requested for Regional Director of Security, and an authorization for 300 additional agents (they had requested 500). The proposals for the Assistant Secretary to report directly to the Secretary and for moving the RSO and ARSO positions into DS were opposed outright; in fact, three of the four officers consulted expressed concern that this would be creating “an autonomous DS.”

Despite not achieving the last two elements, DS emerged a much stronger, much larger organization. The Department established 37 new RSO positions and 106 new ARSO positions, raising the number of overseas posts served by either from 172 to 254. The Department announced that it would undertake a “comprehensive curriculum review” of the RSO training, and it pledged to establish 37 new Marine Security Guard detachments, increasing the number of posts having such details to 159.

**The Crowe Commission**

When the Crowe Commission issued its report, it harshly criticized DS, the Department of State, and Congress for not meeting the standards set by the Inman Panel. Admiral Crowe attributed the severity of the attacks to “a collective failure by several administrations and Congresses over the past decade to invest adequate efforts and resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.” Commission also criticized DS for not requiring full application of security standards at all U.S. posts. It found that DS had granted exceptions
to both East African embassies on such mandated security standards as the 100-foot perimeter requirement, because both facilities were categorized as medium risk posts and built before 1986. What was perhaps less noticed was that DS had completed many security improvements at high-risk posts, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Moreover, following a risk management strategy, DS officials expected an attack on a U.S. post in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, but not on the continent of Africa, where no terrorist attacks had occurred, and where DS considered crime to be the greater threat.56

The Crowe Commission offered several conclusions regarding the course of action Congress and the Clinton Administration should take to improve security at U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. It advised the Department and the Federal Government as a whole to “give sustained priority and funding to security improvements.” The Commission recommended that the Department should fully examine all posts, make note of needed improvements, and, if necessary, close those posts that were highly vulnerable and difficult to convert to new standards. The Commission encouraged the Secretary of State to create an Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) to oversee this work, and to evaluate “our overseas presence in the context of our national priorities, our resource constraints, and our worldwide security concerns.” Albright created the panel, and Admiral Crowe served on it with several former ambassadors, members of Congress, and heads of nonprofit organizations and private corporations.57

DS largely concurred with the Crowe Commission’s report; however, the Crowe Commission’s criticism, as well as its proposal for a capital building program for the Department of State, signified Washington’s re-recognition of the threat of terrorism. In some ways, the Crowe Commission in its criticism seemed to overlook international developments (end of the Cold War) and domestic political dynamics (“peace dividend”) of the previous decade. While many lawmakers and commentators spoke of the new post-Cold War order, many DS agents and engineers
did not conflate the threats of Cold War, espionage, and terrorism. Enduring shrinking resources, in part due to the “peace dividend” and Congressional budget cuts, DS had analyzed all U.S. posts across the world and focused its energies and resources accordingly. Now, after a series of terrorist attacks that included al-Khobar Towers, the *U.S.S. Cole*, and the East Africa bombings, Washington’s attention focused upon terrorism.

The Crowe Commission’s proposal for a capital building program for the Department of State reflected Washington’s new appreciation of the terrorist threat. The Commission estimated that the sustained building program for new U.S. embassies would require $1 billion per year for 10 years, and an additional $400 million per year for security upgrades and new security personnel. The Clinton Administration had already asked for $3 billion over 5 years to rebuild embassies overseas, but budget caps prevented the Department from asking for more. Secretary Albright also tried to convince a hostile Congress to lock in a commitment for the five-year building program. Admiral Crowe now criticized Congress and the Department of State. He said that the Department was being “intimidated by Congress,” and he warned Congress not to appear as if it was “putting money in front of lives on the priority list.” By the summer of 1999, the Clinton Administration increased its request for FY 2000 by another $264 million, and by $150 million a year for the following 4 years. In an attempt to demonstrate the national commitment to security that the Crowe Commission had called for, Congress approved $1.4 billion for embassy security in 2000, more than what the Clinton Administration had requested.

The Crowe Commission also faulted DS’s Division of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (formerly called the Threat Analysis Group) for its method of compiling the Crime-Threat List (CTL). The CTL...
rated the threat each post faced with regards to the categories of crime and terrorism. The categories were rated on a scale of Critical, High, Moderate, and Low. While the Defense Intelligence Agency compiled a similar list by country, DS was the only agency examining each post, recognizing that in large countries like Germany, Brazil, and India, one area of a country might have a different threat dynamic than another area. Critical of why DS had not put Tanzania and Kenya higher on the list, the Crowe Commission believed the CTL was not properly compiled, and demanded changes. In response, DS Threat Analyst Pluchinsky divided the “Terrorism” category into three separate categories: “Indigenous Terrorism,” “Transnational Terrorism,” and “Political Violence.” He also changed the name of the list to SETL (Security Environment Threat List). To the present day, the Department of State, NSC, and other agencies continue to rely on SETL for determining the threats faced by a post.60

The Crowe Commission further suggested that the Department of State should consider closing small posts. U.S. diplomatic representation to small nation would not be eliminated, but merely carried out from new, regional embassies located in less threatened and vulnerable countries. Ambassadors serving at the consolidated posts would be “accredited to several governments.” Called the Special Embassy Program, this had been proposed when the New Independent States emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but was recast in the wake of the East Africa Bombings. The idea represented an effort to regionalize certain functions and re-conceptualize the embassy. Some hoped that new technology and a division of labor between posts within the same region could improve the efficiency of the U.S. embassy system. Proponents of the Special Embassy Program argued that it would reduce costs while increasing security by reducing “field presence and thus the exposure of employees.” Although the program was not implemented, the Department of State believed that too many U.S. Government representatives served abroad, and suggested that there be an interagency effort to achieve a “leaner, more agile” overseas work force.61

Perhaps the most dramatic change precipitated by the East Africa bombings was a marked shift in attitude towards security within the Department of State. As one FSO told The New York Times, “Once you treated the threat of terrorism as the price of being a diplomat; you didn’t demand resources for embassy security. Now you do.”62 With the emergence of transnational terrorism, the Foreign Service became even more conscientious about diplomatic security. Secretary Albright took “a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad.” Albright met with her Assistant Secretary Carpenter every morning when she was not traveling, and Carpenter and Albright regularly reviewed intelligence pertaining to potential future attacks and other security related information.63

This support proved crucial, for DS had asked Secretary Albright to elevate the RSO, so that he/she would report to the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the post. Up through the East Africa bombings, if the RSO wanted to talk to the Ambassador or DCM, he went through the Administrative Officer. Bergin believed this imposed an artificial constraint, and hence, he and Carpenter had asked Albright for a change in post organization. She approved it. Under Secretary Pickering did not like it, and it took a number of months
to craft a cable implementing it. The initial draft telegram said the RSO “should report” to the ambassador. Bergin objected to the phrasing, asserting that use of the word “should” made the change discretionary and did not serve the ambassador or the United States well. In 2000, the draft wording was changed to read that the RSO “will report” to the Ambassador. The ALDACLAC telegram was sent, and as a result, the RSO reports directly to the Ambassador, like the post’s Political or Economic Officer. With this change, Carpenter and Bergin achieved nearly every item they requested under the blueprint they presented to Secretary Albright.\(^6^4\)

\begin{center}
\textbf{Security Breaches at Home}
\end{center}

In the late 1990s, the Department of State suffered several security breaches within Main State. The first occurred in February 1998, before the East Africa bombings, when an unknown man removed classified documents from a secure office suite that served Secretary Albright. DS instituted an escort policy for all visitors at Main State. In December 1999, the investigation of suspected surveillance of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Affairs’ conference room culminated with the arrest of Russian intelligence officer Stanislav Gusev outside the building. Gusev had monitored conversations on the Department’s Seventh Floor conference room via a bug implanted in the arm of a chair. Unable to prosecute Gusev due to his diplomatic immunity, the United States declared him \textit{persona non grata}. One month later, a laptop containing highly classified work disappeared from the offices of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).\(^6^5\)

Assistant Secretary Carpenter admitted that the security breaches resulted not from an absence of policy, but from non-compliance and a lax attitude toward security among Department personnel. For example, a review of the INR laptop incident revealed that staff had allowed contractors without appropriate clearances to enter restricted workspaces, and had propped open doors to secure areas. DS tightened its oversight of security, established further access restrictions to the

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Madeleine_Albright.png}
\caption{Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Few Secretaries were more supportive of the Diplomatic Security Bureau. Secretary Albright approved Assistant Secretary Carpenter’s and Director Bergin’s “blueprint” to restructure and revamp DS. During a Department-wide town hall meeting, she declared, “I don’t care how skilled you may be as a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative you are as an administrator, if you are not professional about security, you are a failure.” Source: Department of State.}
\end{figure}
Secretary’s suite, instituted a more rigorous escort policy, strengthened computer safeguards, and set up more security patrols and sweeps within Main State. Carpenter also convened an interagency review panel, comprising senior representatives from the FBI, DOD, Secret Service, CIA, and DS to review existing countermeasures.66

Following the security breaches, Secretary Albright initiated measures to emphasize the necessity of following security procedures. On May 3, in response to the lost INR laptop, Albright held a Department-wide town meeting dedicated exclusively to security. She stressed to all employees the importance of security: “I don’t care how skilled you may be as a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative you are as an administrator, if you are not professional about security, you are a failure.”67 Albright also ordered a full-scale investigation into the laptop incident. This led to the discipline of a number of Department personnel, including the dismissal of Allen Locke, a member of the senior executive service, the suspension of INR’s Donald Keyser, and the resignation of Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.68

During hearings on the security breaches, Congress questioned Carpenter on the Department of State’s escort policy. Carpenter had implemented a stringent escort policy for most visitors shortly after he assumed leadership of DS in November 1998; however, many geographic bureaus complained that the policy restricted their work, forcing Carpenter to withdraw the new escort rules. Carpenter re-implemented new escort regulations in August 1999, requiring escorts for all visitors and restricting unescorted members of the press to the first two floors of the Truman building. Congressmen questioned the effectiveness of the new policy, particularly what they referred to as the “gentleman’s agreement” with the press. Carpenter assured Congress that he was exploring new approaches to securing restricted areas, such as hiring permanent escorts or establishing an entirely separate facility for press events.69

Technology and Y2K

During the 1990s, computer security constituted a growing concern for DS. DS security engineers admitted that the Department’s Wang computer system installed in the 1980s provided computer security, primarily because it was a “cocoon” system, without connections to outside or civilian networks. With the rise of the Internet, Department officers and employees increasingly pressured DS to permit access to the Internet. Although the Department did have File Transfer (FTP) capability before the 1990s, the earliest Internet connection appeared in the computer
room in 1991. Such connections did not expand to major departmental offices until 1993 and 1994. In 1995, the Department possessed three connections for its posts: one to Seoul for Asia and two to Ankara for Europe, Middle East, and Africa. In 1998, the Internet tunnel was constructed to Scandinavia, and during the same year, the Department introduced IP (internet protocol) communications system to its posts. The NASH handled the encryption of the circuits.\textsuperscript{70}

With the rapidly developing Internet connections, by the mid-1990s, email emerged as a significant problem. The Department had three email systems operating: MS Mail, Wang Office, and CC Mail. By the late 1990s, Department officials recognized that they needed to develop tools to manage email. With the looming Y2K (Year 2000) computer conversion concerns, IRMA took the lead to consolidate everything onto Microsoft software and completed the conversion in 1999. Despite email, the number of cables between the Department and its posts continued to increase, with instructions, formal statements, and others messages sent.\textsuperscript{71}

Telephone communications experienced innovations as well. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III appeared in the early 1990s, and arrived as a telephone-size package. The package contained a key and a sealed telephone, and one had to insert the key into the telephone for it to work properly. Although transmission of one’s voice was encoded, users still had to consider whether the space in which they talked was bugged. The security of the STU-III mattered little if the conversation occurred in a “bugged” room. Even so, one DS technical engineer recalled that the STU-III became “status symbols” within the Department, suggesting that one had “important” information to relay to Washington or overseas.\textsuperscript{72}

The looming threat of Y2K computer conversion problems greatly improved the security posture for Department of State communications. Computer experts and public officials around the world worried that the change of date would cause problems for a myriad of computer and electronic equipment. No one was sure whether computers, automatic teller machines, power stations, and anything else that relied on computers would continue to function when the computer read “2000” for the year. As a result, much of the old equipment was replaced; however, the worry was that other countries, particularly allies, might go down as a result of the Y2K phenomenon. DS headed the contingency planning for Y2K, and it was a pleasant surprise when Y2K did not prove the problem that many feared.\textsuperscript{73}
Conclusion

By 2000, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security had emerged as one of the Department’s preeminent offices working on the frontlines of diplomacy. Struggling since its creation in 1985, especially during post-Cold War efforts to streamline it and transfer responsibilities to other agencies, DS witnessed an expansion of its responsibilities as the Department’s demands for security grew during the 1990s. Continued espionage and terrorism, in addition to rapidly expanding and evolving computer technology placed greater demands upon DS. New security responsibilities for protecting the U.S. Olympic team, the President of Haiti, and U.S. personnel in the regional crises of Liberia and Burundi increased demands on DS. Under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Eric Boswell and Deputy Assistant Secretary Greg Bujac, DS underwent a revival that sought to match its financial and personnel resources with the responsibilities it was accumulating.

With the 1998 East Africa bombings, DS experienced a fundamental shift: it moved from a responsive entity to a proactive office. Before the Crowe Commission completed its work, Assistant Secretary David Carpenter and Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Bergin offered the blueprint for DS that reconstructed the bureau into one of the leading operational bureaus of the Department. DS gained greater funding and increased its personnel to meet the terrorist and technological threats confronting U.S. posts overseas. Now, DS’s Assistant Secretary briefed the Secretary on a constant basis, and at posts, the RSO reported directly to the Ambassador, just as the Political and Economic Officers did.

By 2000, DS had grown into one of the largest bureaus in the Department, and one of the most critical for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Security tasks and responsibilities increased at U.S. posts overseas, and expanded to computer-based security threats that could compromise the operation, communication, and files of the Department. DS also expanded its liaisons and cooperation with overseas police forces, its training of local law enforcement, and its assistance in developing protective details for foreign leaders. Although DS agents and engineers had always recognized the value of their work, the 1990s found the Department as a whole even more appreciative of the DS role as a critical element in U.S. diplomatic operations.
Endnotes


2. Telegram “DS Reorganization Activities,” Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, to all DS personnel, RSOs, SEOs and Couriers, 23 December 1992; and DS Reorganization segment in Report “Consolidating the Department’s Terrorism-Related Functions,” DS to Bureau of Management, 12 December 1992; both Folder – AMGA (Reorganization), Box 17428, RAG 59-Lot 94D406, Suitland.


21 Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 26 October 2005, p. 4. Email, Robert Downen (DS/PA) to Mark Hove (PA/HO), 28 April 2009.


Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 5.

Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 4.


50 Carpenter’s memorandum to Cohen is dated 7 January 1999, the day before the release of the Crowe Commission reports. However, a signed memorandum on Cohen’s desk on 7 January indicates that the memorandum was typed and proofed a couple of days before that date. It is likely that Carpenter, Bergin, and others were discussing or formalizing these ideas before 1 January.


52 Memorandum “DS: A Blueprint for the Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 16 March 1999, Folder – March 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Attached are two memoranda: The first is “A Blueprint for DS,” and the second is Carpenter’s 7 January memorandum to Cohen; however, minor adjustments were made to wording and it was re-dated 9 March, the day Carpenter and Bergin met with Albright. For Albright’s suggestion to consult with the four senior State Department officers, see Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 9 April 1999, Folder – April 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.

Report to Congress on Actions Taken By the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999, Folder – ASEC - ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.

Letter, Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to Secretary of State Albright, 8 January 1999, Crowe Commission Files, DS Files, Rosslyn.


Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005.

Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, p. 5.


70 Oral History Interview, Charles Wisecarver, 18 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2-4.
73 Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, p. 3.
One decade into the twenty-first century, a quarter-century after its creation and nearly a century after the first Chief Special Agent was hired during World War I, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security reflects the best of its past and all the promise of a growing, dynamic force that is equal to the critical challenges of the present and the future.¹

Diplomatic Security possesses a unique identity and set of capabilities and duties today that remain as relevant and vital as ever. Despite on-going dramatic changes in the threat environment and other day-to-day challenges, the central mission of DS is really much the same as it has always been: the critical protection of U.S. diplomatic personnel, property, and information, together with the investigations essential to that mission. The fundamental agenda and objectives are essentially unchanged from those of the past.

Yet the scope and scale of that mission – and how the diplomatic security service performs and accomplishes its critical duties – have changed substantially over time. The proportions of the task and the methodologies of success have evolved along with changing circumstances, as the history in this book demonstrates.

Figure 1: Protected by a DS Special Agent (center), Secretary of State Colin Powell leaves the Presidential Palace in Lima, Peru, just moments after receiving word of the series of terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington. By 2001, DS had become one of the largest operational bureaus in the Department, and one of the most critical to diplomacy. More than ever, in the worldwide environment of terrorist threats, the Department recognizes DS and its mission as an essential element of international diplomacy. Source: Private collection.
During most of the half-century following World War II, from 1945 until the early 1990s, diplomatic security challenges were defined primarily by the Cold War. East-West politics overshadowed all U.S. national security issues and overseas operations, and so diplomatic security duties – protection, investigations, and counterintelligence – were viewed routinely through the prism of Cold War realities.

Of course this is no longer the case. DS still performs counterintelligence work to protect U.S. personnel and property abroad; but it is not the sole focus of the Bureau’s special agents, security engineers, and technical specialists.

While the central mission of DS security and law enforcement today is much the same as in the past, DS is in several respects a different organization today than what it was at the end of the twentieth century. The traditional mission is augmented now by major counterterrorism, cyber security, and other homeland security responsibilities as well.

And the organization, while at core the same in many ways, has grown substantially in size and complexity. Today DS is among the largest United States federal law enforcement agencies with close to 1700 agents, compared to 700 in 1997, and with truly global representation and reach.

An increase in resources has provided the necessary capability and flexibility for dealing with today’s complex challenges. By necessity, DS overall has increased in size some three-fold; correspondingly, it also is three times as well-funded. New technologies and technical innovation are playing a significant part in augmenting DS capabilities, as well.

Early in 2004, the Diplomatic Security Bureau headquarters relocated to a new building in Rosslyn, Virginia, just across the Potomac River from Washington, DC. In a sense, the move symbolizes the new age of DS responsibilities. It is an age of new initiatives, new energy, and yet the same outstanding, diligent performance as always. That performance continues to ensure that U.S. diplomacy can be conducted safely and securely around the world, often at great personal risk to DS personnel themselves.
Twenty-first century leadership in Washington supports reconstruction and stabilization for failed states around the world. Within the scope of its mission, DS shares responsibility for this operational agenda. Throughout its history, DS has looked to the policy challenges defined by the United States Government, and worked to become a supportive, integral part of the international diplomatic mission. It continues to do so today.

A Changing Threat Environment

Clearly the overall threat environment within which Diplomatic Security works today is magnitudes greater in size and complexity than that of a decade and more ago. The array of terrorist and criminal threats overseas and at home is infinitely larger. At the same time, DS is a far more capable organization for dealing with the markedly more complex nature of this difficult, dangerous environment.

The widespread incidence of religion-based extremism overseas now impacts U.S. security interests in a major way. “Extra-state actors” like these have fundamentally destabilized security environments for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy and exerted new pressures upon protective measures currently in place.

Today, U.S. diplomatic personnel are charged with operating in combat zones, and in high-threat locations with a nation-building presence, much different from diplomatic assignments of the past. As a result, diplomatic security operations have changed as well, including critical responsibilities at locations overseas where the U.S. foreign service might have minimized its presence and its activities in the past. Given the widespread existence of high-threat posts today, simply withdrawing from areas of conflict is not a practical option.

DS responsibilities have evolved and grown along with the expanding presence and practice of U.S. diplomacy. This has placed DS personnel in far greater danger as well, as they go about their assigned duties. Sadly, two DS special agents died in the line of duty during the Iraq War: Special Agent Ed Seitz...
died during a mortar attack in Baghdad in 2004, and Special Agent Stephen Eric Sullivan died in 2005 when his motorcade was attacked by a vehicle-borne explosive device. Their personal courage and sacrifice serve as an inspiration to others in Diplomatic Security, and will be long remembered.

DS has utilized local contract guard services overseas for decades to help protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, DS began augmenting these local guards with protective security contractors in 1994 to meet increasing security requirements in areas affected by war and political violence.

In the extraordinary multi-theater wartime environment following September 11, 2001, the increasing utilization of protective security contractors became a necessary means of augmenting DS efforts and personnel, to ensure full protection of U.S. diplomats and diplomacy in high-risk, non-permissive environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of private security contractors has enabled DS to quickly hire and deploy a skilled cadre of security professionals for emergency needs, allowing for flexible and cost-effective security in critical-threat, non-traditional diplomatic mission environments.

In 2000, the Department of State awarded the first Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract for security support in Bosnia, Israel/Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq. A second generation WPPS contract was awarded in 2005 for these same areas as well as Pakistan. As world events and emergency needs require, DS will continue to rely on armed security contractors in high-threat locations; and those experiences will help shape future operations, oversight, and accountability.

During the 1990s, DS was given responsibility to implement a new stage of hardening U.S. posts overseas against potential assaults. Initially, the concept of so-called “fortress embassies” was highly controversial in Washington, as Chapter Nine of this book indicates. The denial of Ambassador Prudence Bushnell’s request for a
new, more secure U.S. Embassy building in Nairobi, Kenya, followed by the tragic bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 12 Embassy staff in August 1998, was an historic turning point.

In the wake of those bombings, the newly created Accountability Review Board (the “Crowe Commission”) in its 1999 Report cited failure by the United States Government to adequately protect its people overseas. Diplomatic Security, along with the rest of the United States Government, resolved to do far better.

With the new global threat environment and its ever-present dangers, necessary expansion and revitalization of the DS Bureau has substantially enhanced its protective mission. Previously the Bureau was relatively small, with senior management composed of the Assistant Secretary, the Diplomatic Security Service Director, and one Deputy Assistant Secretary. Its ranks have since expanded to include more Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Directors, and the Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA) Directorate was established as well. These and other improvements ensure that DS will be able to keep pace with State Department goals and keep up with the significant growth in diplomatic security tasks and personnel.

Not all the changes have transpired in the field of overseas protection. The DS role in criminal investigations has expanded as well, in view of an increase in organized criminal activity and the related threat environment. Document fraud is of more danger to national security than ever before, given links to international terrorism, so there is even greater emphasis on passport and visa fraud.
investigations in the aftermath of 9/11. DS also performs a critical role today in the fight against international narcotics trafficking, sexual crimes, and currency counterfeiting, assisting in apprehending fugitives from justice both at home and abroad. The quality of agent work and tangible results in the criminal investigations field has improved dramatically in recent years, with DS investigations facilitating thousands of arrests on fraud and other charges.

In every area, DS duties and procedures have transitioned well to meet the demands of the new century. After years of reorganization, expansion, and modernization, no federal law enforcement agency today responds better to emerging security and criminal threats than Diplomatic Security.

Strategic and tactical threats against U.S. interests are becoming more sophisticated over time, however, and DS must adapt to stay ahead of terrorists and criminals. Like every law enforcement agency, DS must stay flexible and relevant, or it will wither away. That’s why Diplomatic Security continues adjusting year after year to meet changing circumstances and requirements. By any standard of measurement, DS is performing its job with expertise and efficiency, setting the gold standard for modern professional law enforcement.

**Budget and Resources**

Diplomatic Security is able to accomplish its critical mission today only because it has a sufficient budget and the resources to do so. And the Bureau’s budget and resources are adequate because the Department of State recognizes and fully supports the critical value of DS services to the larger overall mission of United States diplomacy and law enforcement.

Moreover, the federal Office of Management and Budget, and the United States Congress also understand the critical role and importance of DS, and therefore support its annual budgetary requirements. Appreciation on Capitol Hill for the role and capabilities of DS is far greater today than it was immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, when some assumed that serious threats to U.S. diplomacy and national security had ended. Strong Congressional support today in view of threats against U.S. mission security, and in view of the growth of international terrorism and criminal activity, has produced the resources essential to DS operations and personnel.
The serious decline in Diplomatic Security’s budget and resources at the end of the Cold War, however, was a crucible that ultimately made DS more efficient and effective at its mission. In the long run, this was beneficial. Faced with a drop in resources, but shouldering essentially the same range of duties, the Bureau inevitably became more efficient and resourceful than ever. It had to economize in order to sustain its mission.

Then came the rapid surge in responsibilities, public support, and resources following the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. No longer contending with clear-cut distinctions between “low-threat” and “high-threat” posts, DS proceeded to conduct protective measures commensurate with the reality that all U.S. embassies are potential targets for acts of terrorism in the current threat environment. The positive reversal of the slide in DS growth, budgets and resources – together with the successful institution of Law Enforcement Availability Pay (LEAP) for DS personnel beginning in 1999 – substantially reinforced the professionalism and preparedness of the service.

Regional Security Officers

One important outgrowth of the DS modernization process has been the enhanced role for Regional Security Officers (RSOs) in security planning at overseas posts. The nature of RSO duties had been evolving, post-by-post, for many years. But it was a seminal event when all RSOs began reporting directly and routinely to their Chiefs of Mission rather than to embassy Administrative officers. This major change in the overseas reporting structure was one of the many useful outgrowths of the Crowe Commission Report.

Previously, RSOs reported to management counselors at U.S. embassies. Since 1999, they have reported to their ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission. They now serve a primary role in each mission’s planning and operations, especially in the areas of protection and security safeguards. RSOs today are less operational, and more management and policy-oriented in their tasks and responsibilities at many posts overseas.
At the same time, RSOs also are much more involved in day-to-day bilateral relations between the United States Government and the countries where they are posted. They are highly engaged with host nation law enforcement agencies, and they are the prime coordinators of U.S. law enforcement working groups overseas. Along with other programs, RSOs make a critical contribution to OSAC, with its presence at more than 100 posts around the world today. And RSOs are integral to the Antiterrorism Assistance program, implementing post and regional strategic requirements of the U.S. Government in coordination with host nation strategic requirements.

Given these expanded responsibilities, the demands placed on RSOs everywhere have increased along with demands on other DS personnel and resources, commensurate with growing criminal and terrorism threats worldwide. To meet this need, the total number posted overseas, including Deputy and Assistant RSOs, has increased accordingly; they now are on duty at all U.S. embassies and most consulates. A greater number of U.S. posts now have more than one RSO stationed on site, as well.

Countermeasures and Security Infrastructure

Inman Panel standards (see Chapter Seven) require regular upgrading of security construction, equipment, and technology to ensure that DS operates at up-to-date levels. And significant advances in equipment and technology since 2000 have placed the Bureau squarely on the cutting edge of high-technology proficiency. Yet in the twenty-first century, DS faces the ongoing challenge of keeping U.S. diplomatic facilities, information, and
personnel secure without compromising openness, transparency, and efficiency in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and commercial and consular affairs.

To protect U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel, DS now deploys state-of-the-art countermeasures that ensure physical security overseas and at home. This includes modern construction standards and transit security, as well as defensive equipment to protect buildings and people against acts of violence.

DS security engineers and technicians today are implementing physical and technical security countermeasures far beyond anything done before, to provide an up-to-date, secure working environment for diplomatic personnel assigned domestically and abroad. Given the constant evolution of these environments, DS works tirelessly to research, design, test, and implement new security technologies. Comprehensive security surveys and risk assessments, along with modern technical security design, engineering, and the installation of security systems are all part of the approach. In the process, DS works very closely with the Department’s Overseas Building Operations personnel at every step.

Moreover, a new Security Management System enterprise Network now enables DS to integrate all technical security countermeasures at a given facility so that the DS Command Center at headquarters can monitor that security and video data.

The DS Command Center itself is a completely updated unit of unprecedented capability and responsiveness, ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel, property, and information. The completely modernized Center, launched in 2009, operates with a vast spectrum of new security vigilance capabilities including meticulous monitoring of U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas as well as alarm systems at domestic...
federal facilities within State Department jurisdiction. Operating around the clock, the Center is now able to track images on surveillance cameras at U.S. embassies and consulates abroad; check anomalies in intrusion alarms and door activity; examine geospatial imagery; monitor Federal Aviation Administration aircraft threat alerts; and track activities of DS special agents during domestic criminal arrests, among other capabilities.

DS also works to ensure compliance with Overseas Security Policy Board security standards, including new construction and major renovation projects. The Bureau regularly conducts security reviews and accreditation inspections for new or renovated embassies and consulates; and it conducts post occupancy compliance reviews at newly commissioned facilities six to nine months after they begin operation. Modern standards include new bomb-resistant construction techniques, and anti-ram and forced entry/ballistic-resistant products. Chemical- and radiological-based systems are installed, as well, to detect explosives.

In the heightened threat environment of this century, DS provides funding for thousands of personnel supporting U.S. embassy security programs worldwide. DS has succeeded in protecting U.S. diplomatic officers, facilities, and classified information during security incidents in scores of locations worldwide. As indicated earlier, DS has hired additional protective security personnel to augment the local guard force, and funded armored vehicles and residential security and surveillance-detection programs in high-threat areas.

At the same time, DS provides diplomatic personnel at U.S. missions with the knowledge and equipment to respond to a chemical, biological, or radiological attack with a minimal loss of life. In an era of threats from weapons of mass destruction, escape masks and guidance for safe handling and analysis of suspicious substances has become a standard part of countermeasures support.

Sophisticated new high-security intrusion detection systems have replaced vulnerabilities in old alarm systems. DS also led a successful multi-agency effort to develop new technologies to prevent hostile foreign
entities from collecting radio frequency signals through windows at U.S. Government facilities. And it has designed, tested, and deployed an advanced mobile surveillance system for the annual United Nations General Assembly gathering in New York City, providing data from multiple inputs for dissemination to special agents in the field.

Today, DS provides hundreds of fully armored vehicles needed by diplomatic missions to safely and securely transport U.S. personnel. Electronic countermeasures have been developed to protect DS vehicles in conflict areas, while vehicle navigation, tracking, and video-monitoring systems have been upgraded as well. Improved design of the armored vehicle fleet enhances protection for personnel in critical high-threat environments like Iraq and Afghanistan.

As part of the DS Countermeasures Directorate, more than 100 Diplomatic Couriers today provide scheduled and special delivery of materials for the State Department and other federal agencies working at U.S. diplomatic posts. They spend tens of thousands of hours each year delivering classified diplomatic pouch material by air, sea, and over land. These diplomatic materials total millions of pounds annually, much of it palletized equipment for new embassy construction, helping ensure completion and accreditation of new U.S. embassy compound and renovation projects.

Meanwhile, reliable modern methods for ensuring information security are just as critically important as advanced physical equipment and hardware. The dramatic growth in crime involving electronic technologies has drawn increasing attention
by DS leadership and by Congress. Challenges to the entire State Department computer network have met with expanding resources and the advanced technology needed to counter such threats. The DS Security Infrastructure program counters external-based intrusions and data theft today with award-winning, state-of-the-art approaches that serve as a model for the rest of the U.S. Government.

With more than 45,000 Department users worldwide in the twenty-first century, integrity of the State Department computer system poses immense challenges every day for security oversight operations. Department employees generate as many as 800,000 e-mails daily, requiring DS to block thousands of viruses and more than a half-million cases of spam e-mail on a typical day. There are up to two million external probes of the Department’s network vulnerability on a regular daily basis. Overseas efforts to map and steal our technological assets, by both state and non-state actors, is an ongoing problem that will require constant vigilance in the years ahead.

The contributions of the Cyber Threat Analysis Division to the Department’s computer security infrastructure provide an “early warning tripwire” to guard against external threats. Seven days a week, around the clock, the DS Network Monitoring Center in Beltsville, Maryland, monitors potential cyber intrusions, ensuring that DS maintains a continuous incidence response capability.

DS also scans remotely for security gaps throughout its worldwide cyber network, both frequently and regularly. Its site-risk scoring efforts contribute significantly to the Department’s overseas post security system. In fact, the DS cyber security paradigm is becoming a best-practices model for other U.S. government agencies, while contributing to a new set of rules of behavior for coordination of efforts within the international community.

Success in safeguarding the U.S. Government’s cyberspace will continue to require a multi-agency approach in the years to come, and Diplomatic Security will occupy a key role in that coordinated effort, on behalf of the Department of State. Its well-trained work force is prepared to meet the increasing challenges ahead.

The Security Infrastructure Directorate also has made great strides in the speed and efficiency of its security clearance review process for federal employees. DS slashed the amount of time previously required to complete security-clearance investigations on job applicants, employees and contractors. In fact DS has reduced, by more than half, the average time required for standard background security investigations.
DS also took swift action in recent years to help the Department reduce a backlog in the processing and issuance of security clearances, by reviewing thousands of clearance applications, interviewing tens of thousands of references, and conducting several thousand background investigations. Thousands of contractor personnel needed to provide critical protective services and local guard services in Iraq and Afghanistan were rapidly and efficiently processed by the Bureau as well.

Toward the end of the century’s first decade, DS was handling some 25,000 security clearance cases each year, the vast majority of which were completed in about ten weeks. Whereas the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Defense Act mandated a sixty-day clearance process by the end of 2009, DS was well along the way toward completing that goal prior to the deadline.

**Recruitment**

With increasing requirements for DS personnel overseas, and with major law enforcement tasks here at home, the need for top-quality DS special agents, engineers, couriers, and specialists has never been greater. Fortunately, recruitment efforts in the twenty-first century have proved phenomenally successful. At the end of the first decade of this century, the diplomatic service force stood at some 1700 special agents, 200 security engineering officers, 110 security technical specialists, and 100 diplomatic couriers. New agent classes numbered about 50 candidates each, quite impressive by historical standards.

Not surprisingly, the competition for recruits among U.S. law enforcement agencies overall has risen sharply along with the dramatic increase in the threat environment. Yet within this context, the DS recruitment outreach effort has remained highly competitive among all such agencies.

In fact, Diplomatic Security today has a far more capable and diverse work force than ever before in its history. There is more diversity in gender, ethnicity and culture, professional backgrounds, and career experiences than in years past; and it is fair to say that DS personnel today are more representative of the nation overall. Of course this has strengthened Diplomatic Security on many levels.

![Patrick Donovan, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 2009. Source: Department of State.](image)
More important than numbers is the fact that DS has been able to maintain the same high quality among its recruits, and the same high standards for all its personnel, along with rapid and substantial growth.

Training

DS maintains a rigorous training regimen for all its security professionals, and is working constantly to improve upon it. In fact, the process has been fine-tuned and vastly improved in recent years, based on considerable feedback received from the agents themselves. As a result, the level of professionalism among DS employees has risen steadily over time, producing the outstanding force at work today.

Training programs and methods today are more standardized than they were in the past. The DS Training Center became the first federal law enforcement organization ever to receive accreditation from the Office of Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) in 2005. This represented a major endorsement of the Bureau’s training practices and, since accreditation is an ongoing process, it has been a continuing important asset for recruitment efforts.

Training courses, methods, and objectives continue to evolve to meet modern high-tech requirements in such areas as electronic countermeasures; armoring; vehicles; electronic monitoring; and information technology. DS also has adopted additional skill sets, notably the hard-skills-based security training now available for families of Foreign Service Officers about to be
posted overseas. The need for a dedicated hard-skills training facility was recognized by Congress and the White House, and consequently funding was included in both the 2009 Federal Stimulus package and the federal budget for fiscal year 2010.

Communications with other Law Enforcement Agencies and the Public

Historically, physical presence was considered the essence of the DS mission, and that of its predecessors, throughout the twentieth century. While it is still a vital component, today information is every bit as important as physical presence. In fact, both components are critical to any mission and its successful completion in the twenty-first century.

Now more than ever, it is raw intelligence, threat analysis, information sharing, and analytical planning that are essential to decision makers, and the critical complement to manpower. The outlook has never been better for DS information sharing and coordination with other U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. This was both essential and inevitable. Today’s U.S. law enforcement leadership will not abide anything less than full interagency cooperation; it is the only way to win against crime and terrorism.

Through the inter-agency Counter-Terrorism Security Group (CSG), senior U.S. Government law enforcement officials now conference daily—often several times each day—by closed circuit television, in secure communications environments. Indeed, communications technology advances have revolutionized DS security work in this century. To cite an obvious example, the use of e-mail in itself has greatly expedited and expanded field reporting beyond that of the past, significantly enhancing law enforcement efforts domestically and worldwide.

In fact, DS regularly interacts and shares information with the Department of Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the Drug Enforcement Agency; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; and other law enforcement agencies — not only at the headquarters level, but among U.S. field offices, at overseas posts, and through various task forces (including the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Immigration and Document Fraud Task Force, and others). There is more extensive inter-agency security cooperation in connection with major national and international events as well, such as U.S. presidential inaugurations, the Olympic Games, and other events. All federal agencies recognize that there simply is no alternative to cooperation if law enforcement is to be successful.

Greater DS coordination with other agencies, along with its larger presence overseas, also has contributed to a higher profile for Diplomatic Security. It has led to wider appreciation of the Bureau’s role in conducting anti-terrorism investigations and its superior ability to process information regarding criminal activity and terrorism. Again, the addition of more RSOs has improved program coordination with foreign government law enforcement officers. With representation at more than 280 overseas missions, the DS “reach” is greater now than that of any other U.S. law enforcement agency.

At the same time, improved efficiency of information flow, and the increasing transparency of all governmental operations, have helped to broaden public awareness and appreciation for the diligent job that DS performs, day in and day out. Traditionally, DS and its Department predecessors were less inclined to publicize U.S. diplomatic security efforts. However, given the reality of linkage between public opinion, policymaking, and budgetary resources today, there is obvious practical benefit in visibility and a positive public image.
As one prominent example, the critical value of OSAC to the security interests of the U.S. private sector should be as broadly understood and utilized as possible. OSAC has demonstrated time and again the benefits of its vital information network to U.S. business in the contemporary security environment. It should become thoroughly familiar to, and accessible by the American commercial sector operating overseas. Proactive public communications efforts are making this possible.

**Indispensable to U.S. Diplomacy**

Today, it may be said that Diplomatic Security is an organization greater than the sum of its many individual parts. In its totality as a modern, well-trained federal law enforcement agency, it is an indispensable factor and force in the successful conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Greater awareness throughout the Department of State of the DS role in facilitating the Department’s overall mission has generated unprecedented respect from the rest of the United States Foreign Service. And the profile of DS before the entire United States Government has grown as well.

Diplomatic Security in the twenty-first century will continue to look to its distinguished legacy and will remember all those who have gone before – those who laid the solid foundation upon which the Bureau stands today.

Proudly, Diplomatic Security personnel recognize that the same key characteristics and objectives that motivated their predecessors decades ago continue to define DS today and continue to be instrumental to its effectiveness: flexibility, responsibility, integrity, and individual effort. These same traits are every bit as relevant today as they have been over the past century. They are, and will remain, Diplomatic Security’s hallmark.
Endnotes

1 Content of the Epilogue is based upon oral interviews with Eric J. Boswell, 10 February 2009; Gregory B. Starr, 4 March 2009; Joe D. Morton, 6 February 2009; Donald R. Reid, 12 May 2009; and Robert A. Eckert, 12 January 2009, conducted by Robert L. Downen of the DS Public Affairs office.

Figure 25: A DS Special Agent (left) and a member of the Olympic Organizing Committee discuss security measures for U.S. athletes at the Pacific Coliseum in Vancouver, Canada, site of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. This venue housed numerous Olympic skating competitions, including figure skating and short-track speed skating, at the February 2010 event. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
CONCLUSION

A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

Diplomatic security has a long history at the Department of State. Since the first American diplomats, U.S. policymakers have confronted threats to the nation’s diplomacy and sought to counter those threats with effective security measures. Ensuring the security of U.S. diplomacy, however, has been a monumental task, and those assigned to it have undertaken that task with limited resources and high expectations. In doing so, the men and women of DS and its predecessors have created a proud tradition of innovation, hard work, and selflessness.

The United States has always had some form of diplomatic security procedures. The persistent evolution of threats, the adoption of new technologies, and the growth of the Department of State have continually redefined and reshaped diplomatic security. U.S. diplomatic security efforts began with codes and diplomatic pouches, and gradually expanded during the nineteenth century to include Despatch Agents, safes, formal procedures outlined in Department manuals, and classification of Department affairs as “confidential.” The rise of the United States as a world power and its participation in two world wars hastened the development of diplomatic security, adding Special Agents, foreign dignitary protective details, and passport fraud investigations to its purview. The Cold War prompted the Department of State to appoint Regional Security Officers, Technical Security Engineers, and Marine Security Guards. The rise of terrorism accelerated the evolution of diplomatic security, not only transforming the Office of Security (SY) into the Bureau...
of Diplomatic Security (DS), but also expanding diplomatic security to include threat analysis, access controls, Mobile Security Deployments, physical security standards, construction security, and a 24-hour detail for the Secretary of State. The adoption of computer technologies required additional security measures to counter a new host of threats to U.S. diplomacy, such as viruses, hackers, trojan horses, and denial-of-service attacks. Transnational terrorism as represented by al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, further defined and expanded diplomatic security. Diplomatic security in 2010 hardly resembles diplomatic security of earlier generations; but the United States, the Department of State, and the threats to U.S. diplomacy in 2010 also bear little resemblance to their earlier forms.

Major wars have caused Department officials to reshape diplomatic security measures and construct new frameworks for enforcing it. During World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, belligerents exploited new tactics that undermined the security of U.S. diplomacy. During World War I, the Germans and Austrians encouraged sabotage and espionage, which in turn led Secretary of State Robert Lansing to create Special Agents. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Nazis, fascists, and Communists created fraudulent U.S. passports and recruited U.S. Government personnel to conduct espionage, leading the Office of the Chief Special Agent to begin conducting passport and visa fraud investigations. As a result, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull expanded diplomatic security in several directions under multiple offices, including State Department...
personnel background investigations, creation of a multi-level classification system for U.S. Government documents, surveillance of foreign agents, and munitions controls. The reshaping of security during World War II received perhaps its clearest expression in Robert L. Bannerman’s three-point plan for the Security Office, which included personnel security (background investigations), documentary and physical security (classification, training of Department personnel, Main State security), and overseas security.

The Cold War redefined security twice. At the Cold War’s beginning, Soviet recruitment of U.S. citizens as spies led U.S. officials to consider a person’s past and present associations as crucial in determining their suitability for U.S. Government employment. The early Cold War highlighted Soviet technological espionage and exploitation of diplomatic privileges, which made every U.S. diplomatic post a potential site for a security breach, not just the U.S. embassies in Soviet bloc capitals. The Cold War reshaped security a second time when the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed, ending the bipolar framework that had long characterized U.S. thought about diplomatic security. Although many threats such as espionage continued, often by the same players, the end of the Cold War did allow U.S. officials to reevaluate and revise how they were responding to the evolving threats of terrorism and civil disorder, as well as to emerging threats from cyber attacks.

Terrorism has singularly redefined and expanded diplomatic security; in fact, by 1975, Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos and SY personnel recognized that terrorism had fundamentally transformed SY and
its mission. Since the emergence of terrorism in the mid-1960s, terrorism has not been embodied in hostile nation-states, their militaries, and their intelligence services, and the battle lines have not been defined primarily in territorial terms, as was the case during two world wars and the Cold War. Terrorism, instead, is a strategy employed by groups, organizations, or non-state entities to achieve specific objectives. Membership in terrorist entities has been elective, fluid, and transnational, and some international leaders have supported or sponsored terrorist organizations in order to facilitate the attainment of their diplomatic or national objectives. Over the course of four decades, Department officials have altered existing, or initiated new security measures to protect U.S. diplomats and diplomacy from terrorism.

Terrorists and other violent extremists operate on a “moral equation of self-righteousness.” They deem that such acts as bombing an embassy, kidnapping or killing a diplomat, or attacking a diplomatic vehicle constitute acceptable expression of opposition to a nation-state and its policies, and/or suitable retribution for perceived “oppression” from that nation-state, its apparatus (facilities, representatives) — even its local “collaborators.” Moreover, terrorists and extremists operate under the belief that such tactics constitute an effective strategy for drawing attention to the “justice” of a cause. Indeed, if one reviews the past four decades, one cannot deny that terrorist acts, with all of their injury, damage, emotion, and drama, have grabbed the attention of the public media, national governments, and international organizations.

By undermining one of the most deeply held principles of diplomatic immunity—the physical security of diplomats—terrorism has transformed diplomatic security. When the United States emerged as a nation in the late eighteenth century,
diplomatic immunities were largely accepted, and instances of diplomats being targets of deadly violence were rare. Since its rise in the late 1960s, modern terrorism has broken down the traditional rules, immunities, and practices of diplomacy, many of which have been in place since the Vienna Convention of 1815 or even the Renaissance. Among the most notable has been the ability of and commitment by host governments to protect the diplomats assigned to them. By breaking down such long-held rules of diplomacy, terrorism transformed the SY from a reactive force to a precautionary entity that introduced additional security measures to minimize risk and physical harm to U.S. diplomatic personnel. With the 1983-1984 suicide bomb attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait City, terrorism joined espionage as a preeminent threat to U.S. diplomacy and prompted the elevation of SY to a bureau with the resources and authority necessary to implement and enforce stronger, more effective security procedures. Al-Qaeda’s 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania again transformed DS, this time from a precautionary organization into a proactive bureau working to safeguard American diplomacy.

Several factors have abetted those choosing to employ terrorism. Two of the factors include the minimal resources and personnel required to inflict terror, and the willingness of particular leaders and non-governmental organizations to support or sponsor terrorism as a means to achieve political or diplomatic ends. The brutality and horror of the attacks and the ability of such attacks to capture media and public attention have combined with the global expansion of mass media – and such media developments as the 24-hour news cycle – to further abet terrorism as a strategy. Terrorism has also benefited from post-World War II structural changes to international diplomacy. Such changes include the sharp increase in the number of diplomatic posts and personnel abroad, the number of U.S. Government agencies represented at an embassy, and the diversification of diplomatic relations to encompass social, cultural, environmental, and technological relations, as well as the more traditional political and diplomatic ties.
Terrorism has prompted diplomatic security measures that were unimaginable prior to World War II. Diplomatic security now encompasses armored cars and security details for ambassadors and other dignitaries. It includes threat analysis, surveillance detection programs, rapid response details, building and architectural design standards, and construction site security. DS Special Agents have trained embassy staff in personal protection skills and embassy chauffeurs in defensive driving skills. Through the Antiterrorism Assistance program, DS has provided training and assistance to local police forces to combat terrorism. DS’s Rewards for Justice program has obtained information on the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and the Overseas Security Advisory Council has aided U.S. citizens and businesses by sharing information about local security conditions.

Structural changes to U.S. diplomacy since 1945 have increased the demands for diplomatic security. Embassies and consulates are now communities, housing representatives of many U.S. Government agencies, not the single diplomat or small delegation of three or four persons that often comprised a legation or consulate prior to World War II. Around 1885, with the addition of military attachés, diplomacy has extended to military relations and gradually expanded to international economic, financial, commercial, agricultural, cultural, and environmental relations, in addition to the political and diplomatic realms. Additionally, the number of nation-states grew dramatically (largely a result of decolonization), and this, in turn, led to a proportionate rise in the number of diplomatic posts and personnel overseas. Furthermore, the airplane fostered an exponential increase in diplomatic travel by the Secretary of State and other Department officials, and in visits to the United States by senior foreign diplomats. The creation of regional and international entities such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of American States (OAS) further added to the number of diplomatic officials and amount of overseas travel. The additional facilities and personnel required DS to expand and adjust how it implemented and enforced security after 1945.

The exponential expansion of diplomatic posts, personnel, and travel has altered the dynamics and demands of diplomatic security. Whereas local police forces could previously protect a single diplomat or small delegation when the infrequent need arose, now U.S. embassies...
are compounds and communities that require a group of DS personnel, large guard details, and a contingent of the host nation’s police or armed forces for security. The larger groups of security personnel also have led to questions regarding diplomatic privileges, such as whether or not Marine Security Guards merit diplomatic privileges (they do). Moreover, the greater number of diplomatic personnel overseas has significantly impacted how the U.S. public and Congress have viewed diplomatic security crises, as exemplified by the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998. In basic structural terms, ensuring the security of U.S. diplomacy has become a monumental but essential task. In many ways, DS in the twenty-first century continues to confront the challenge that bedeviled the first Special Agents a century earlier: how to allocate limited resources to meet the great task of ensuring security for the Department.

New technologies create greater vulnerabilities, expand the number of threats, and increase the number of security measures. Despite the allure of new technologies and the many ways that they facilitate the Department’s work, new technologies have increased, not lessened, the need for and the cost of security. Technologies such as the telegraph and computer have unquestionably offered tangible benefits to U.S. diplomacy, whether through more or better information or greater productivity of the Department’s employees. However, one cannot ignore that the adoption of new technologies incurs a much higher price than merely the cost of software, hardware, and installation. The telegraph was among

Figure 10: Diplomatic Security weapons familiarization training in 2005, part of the “DSAC/Iraq” course offered by the DS training center in Virginia. All U.S. Government employees working under the U.S. Chief of Mission in Iraq are required to undergo this training, to prepare for the rigors of serving in Iraq. In February 2007, the course was expanded into the “Foreign Affairs Counter Threat” course to prepare government employees for service in various high-threat environments abroad. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 11: A DS Uniformed Protective Division officer screens a package entering the Harry S Truman building at the Department of State, in Washington, D.C. The DS Uniformed Protective Division safeguards more than 100 domestic State Department facilities today. Source: Department of State.
the first technologies to expose this development. The telegraph hastened communications between the Department and its posts, and provided the Department with greater, more current information about international events and local national affairs. Department officials also deemed the telegraph an inherently unsecure communications medium, recognizing the ease with which one could “tap” a telegraph line, the fact that other governments sought to break U.S. telegraphic codes, and the need for more sophisticated codes to protect classified U.S. communications. The telegraph offered significant benefits to U.S. diplomacy, yet it also created a greater demand for security if the United States was to continue to enjoy the benefits of that technology.

The computer revolution replayed the Department’s experience with the telegraph but on a larger scale and at even higher stakes. Computers exponentially increased the amount of information available to Department personnel, sharply elevated their productivity, and greatly facilitated the sharing and transmission of documents. Simultaneously the threats to U.S. diplomacy have also exponentially increased, with viruses, worms, phishing attacks, spyware, and other types of malware hampering U.S. diplomacy. Equally challenging to diplomatic security is the capability of “thumb drives” to store vast amounts of information without producing a detectable signal. The benefits of new technologies outweigh the extra costs of security; but as with the telegraph, additional security measures and costs are needed if the Department is to continue to enjoy the benefits of computer technologies.
The degree or extent of diplomatic security appears to be a reflection of a nation-state’s power and wealth. During the nineteenth century, the United States was a developing nation on a continent distant from the European centers of power; therefore, its diplomatic security threats centered on the confidentiality of correspondence and Department business. After 1900, the United States became one of several great powers, and correspondingly, its concerns about diplomatic security grew. During World War I, Secretary Lansing created Special Agents; and when the United States emerged as a superpower after World War II, the Department created an Office of Security. As a superpower, the United States’ extensive involvement in global affairs resulted in greater amounts of classified information, greater appeal of U.S. personnel and facilities as targets of espionage, and a larger bureaucracy to conduct diplomacy. Only a nation of great wealth could afford the security measures undertaken since the 1980s to ensure the physical security of U.S. embassies overseas.

Finally, this history of diplomatic security has shown that the threats to U.S. diplomacy are real, numerous, and constant. Countermeasures and preventative initiatives generally arose after a hostile entity exploited for an extended time a particular security weakness in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Furthermore, that weakness resulted from a new tactic by the hostile entity (e.g., suicide bombers breaching perimeter security) or the rise of a new diplomatic practice and development (e.g., use of passports and the rise of passport fraud during the 1920s). DS and its predecessors consistently have sought to facilitate the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, not impede it.

9/11 and Diplomatic Security

Diplomatic security after September 11, 2001, in several ways, exhibits continuity with the 1990s and eras prior to the post-Cold War period. The emphases on protecting U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities from terrorism, and protecting the Department of State’s computer and communications systems from cyber attacks, emerged during the 1990s. Several parallels exist between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security during the post-Cold War era and the Office of the Chief Special Agent during the World War II era. Just like the Chief Special Agent’s office that confronted Nazi and Communist threats during the
Figure 15: Organizational Chart for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, January 2010. Source: Department of State.
1930s, well before World War II had started, DS confronted the terrorist threat well before September 11, 2001. Perhaps no bureau in the U.S. Government was better prepared to meet the elevated security needs of the post-9/11 world than DS; programs such as Antiterrorism Assistance, Rewards for Justice, Surveillance Detection, Mobile Security Deployments, and Intelligence and Threat Analysis were already well-established by 2001. Also, like the World War II era when the use of airplanes and developments in cryptology altered U.S. diplomacy, technological innovations during the post-9/11 era may be altering diplomacy in new ways. Video conferencing is one innovation that appears to have gained prominence, where it was virtually non-existent before 1992. Also, cellular telephone cameras, Blackberries, and other personal mobile hand-held devices have altered the sharing and distribution of information.

As another parallel of the post-9/11 era with the World War II era, the shocking attack did not fundamentally alter the Department’s diplomatic security office. Although the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sharply altered the American mindset towards the wars in Europe and Asia, it did not change the Office of the Chief Special Agent, but rather placed greater emphasis upon its existing responsibilities of protective details, background investigations, and passport fraud. The experience of DS after 9/11 appears to have followed a similar course. DS already had focused upon terrorism and established programs to combat it before 9/11. The aftermath of 9/11 appears to have expanded and accentuated DS’s existing programs, such as Antiterrorism Assistance, Mobile
Security Deployments, the use of contracted private protective security details, surveillance detection, and threat analysis.

The parallel with the World War II era, however, may not apply to the post-9/11 era in one key respect. During World War II, new diplomatic security measures and changes in munitions controls, the courier system, the document classification system, and use of military squads to guard U.S. embassies appeared, none of which fell within the parameters or duties of the Office of the Chief Special Agent. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the President’s authorization of surveillance measures by the National Security Agency after 9/11 demonstrate that new developments in security are emerging outside the Department of State, yet DS has continued to innovate its diplomatic security efforts and practices. In
fact, since 9/11, DS has continued to remain at the forefront of diplomatic security and has deepened its inter-agency relationships.

Diplomatic security has had a long and fascinating history in the Department of State. It has grown dramatically over the course of more than two centuries, and the range of duties defined as security-related now extends far beyond the codes and diplomatic pouches of the Department of State’s early days. The men and women who have served as the Department’s security professionals have faced a monumental but essential task, often with limited resources. Even so, DS and its predecessors have also enjoyed a tradition of excellent leadership and vision, and a tradition of innovation rising from the ranks of Special Agents, Security Engineers, Security Technical Specialists, Diplomatic Couriers, and other professional support personnel. As a result, diplomatic security remains a fundamental, even pivotal component of U.S. engagement with the rest of the world.
IN MEMORIAM: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security honors all its employees and contractors who have died while in service to the bureau and the United States of America. These four Special Agents and the Diplomatic Courier died in the line of duty since 1988. The courage and devotion to duty of our fallen colleagues will never be forgotten. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
APPENDIX
President Ronald Reagan today commemorated the signing of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which he had signed into law on August 27, 1986. This law is the result of a broad bipartisan effort which includes the recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, Secretary Shultz's and Admiral Inman's Panel on Diplomatic Security, and many thoughtful Members of Congress. Congressmen joining the President for the occasion were Senators Richard Lugar, Warren Rudman, and Claiborne Pell, along with Representatives Dante Fascell, Bill Broomfield, Dan Mica, and Olympia Snowe.

The President noted that this historic legislation will significantly improve our ability to counter the scourge of international terrorism. The President reiterated his commitment to ensure the safety of our diplomats, servicemen, and citizens wherever they may be. The $2.44 billion in this act provides the organization and authority necessary to increase the effectiveness of our physical security program. Another important part of this act provides for the care and welfare of the victims of terrorism and their families.

This act sends a strong signal to those who would instigate acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property. The President restated his commitment to seek further international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. In this regard the President remains convinced that we must confront this criminal behavior in every way possible—diplomatically, economically, through the legal system, and when necessary, with force.

Along with an improved organization and better physical security, first-rate intelligence remains the key element in our ability to confront terrorism. We must continue to improve our ability to predict, prevent, and respond to the terrorist threat. This includes continued support for a research and development program to counter the evergrowing sophistication of weapons and methods in the terrorist arsenal.

The President recognizes that this legislation in and of itself will not bring an end to terrorism; however, we must continue on all fronts with all of our resolve to meet the challenge international terrorism poses to democracy and our way of life. Freedom-loving people of every nation reject these criminal acts and support an unwavering policy never acquiescing to or accepting this outlaw behavior.

Note: H.R. 4151, approved August 27, was assigned Public Law No. 99 - 399.
EXEMPLARY FROM THE
OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
AND ANTITERRORISM ACT

PUBLIC LAW 99-399—AUG. 27,1986

To provide enhanced diplomatic security and combat international terrorism, and for
other purposes.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986”.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.

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Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 103. Responsibility of the Secretary of State.
Sec. 105. Responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
Sec. 106. Cooperation of other Federal agencies.
Sec. 107. Protection of foreign consulates.

TITLE II—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Sec. 201. Establishment of Diplomatic Security Service.
Sec. 203. Positions in the Diplomatic Security Service.

TITLE III—PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Sec. 301. Accountability review.
Sec. 302. Accountability Review Board.
Sec. 303. Procedures.
Sec. 304. Findings and recommendations by a Board.
Sec. 305. Relation to other proceedings.

TITLE IV—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM

Sec. 401. Authorization.
Sec. 402. Diplomatic construction program.
Sec. 403. Security requirements for contractors.
Sec. 404. Qualifications of persons hired for the diplomatic construction program.
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Sec. 406. Efficiency in contracting.
Sec. 408. Training to improve perimeter security at United States diplomatic missions abroad.
Sec. 409. Protection of public entrances of United States diplomatic missions abroad.
Sec. 410. Certain protective functions.
Sec. 411. Reimbursement of the Department of the Treasury.
Sec. 412. Inspector General for the United States Information Agency.
Sec. 413. Inspector General for the Department of State.
Sec. 414. Prohibition on the use of funds for facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank.
TITLE V—STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 501. Rewards for international terrorists.
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Sec. 503. Coordination of terrorism-related assistance.
Sec. 504. Counterterrorism Protection Fund.
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Sec. 509. Exports to countries supporting acts of international terrorism.

TITLE VI—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Actions to combat international nuclear terrorism.
Sec. 602. Authority to suspend nuclear cooperation with nations which have not ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Sec. 603. Consultation with the Department of Defense concerning certain nuclear exports and subsequent arrangements.
Sec. 604. Review of physical security standards.
Sec. 605. International review of the nuclear terrorism problem.
Sec. 606. Criminal history record checks.

TITLE VII—MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 701. International Antiterrorism Committee.
Sec. 702. International arrangements relating to passports and visas.
Sec. 703. Protection of Americans endangered by the appearance of their place of birth on their passports.
Sec. 704. Use of diplomatic privileges and immunities for terrorism purposes.
Sec. 705. Reports on progress in increasing multilateral cooperation.

TITLE VIII—VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION

Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Payment to individuals held in captive status between November 4, 1979, and January 21,1981.
Sec. 803. Benefits for captives and other victims of hostile action.
Sec. 804. Retention of leave by alien employees following injury from hostile action abroad.
Sec. 805. Transition provisions.
Sec. 806. Benefits for members of uniformed services who are victims of hostile action.
Sec. 807. Regulations.
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Sec. 901. Short title.
Sec. 902. International measures for seaport and shipboard security.
Sec. 903. Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships.
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TITLE X—FASCHELL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Sec. 1001. Short title.
Sec. 1002. Fellowship program for temporary service at United States missions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Sec. 1003. Fellowship Board.
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Sec. 1102. Recommended actions by the Secretary of Defense.
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TITLE XI—CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 1201. Encouragement for negotiation of a convention.
Sec. 1202. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over terrorist conduct.

TITLE XIII—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Peace Corps authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 1302. Demonstrations at embassies in the District of Columbia.
Sec. 1303. Kurt Waldheim’s retirement allowance.
Sec. 1304. Eradication of Amblyomma Variegatum.
Sec. 1305. Strengthen foreign language skills.
Sec. 1306. Forfeiture of proceeds derived from espionage activities.
Sec. 1307. Expression of support of activities of the United States Telecommunications Training Institute.
Sec. 1308. Policy toward Afghanistan.

TITLE I—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
Titles I through IV of this Act may be cited as the “Diplomatic Security Act”.

SEC. 102. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) the United States has a crucial stake in the presence of United States Government personnel representing United States interests abroad;
(2) conditions confronting United States Government personnel and missions abroad are fraught with security concerns which will continue for the foreseeable future; and
(3) the resources now available to counter acts of terrorism and protect and secure United States Government personnel and missions abroad, as well as foreign officials and missions in the United States, are inadequate to meet the mounting threat to such personnel and facilities.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of titles I through IV are—
(1) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State with respect to the security of diplomatic operations in the United States and abroad;
(2) to provide for an Assistant Secretary of State to head the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State, and to set forth certain provisions relating to the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State;
(3) to maximize coordination by the Department of State with Federal, State, and local agencies and agencies of foreign governments in order to enhance security programs;
(4) to promote strengthened security measures and to provide for the accountability of United States Government personnel with security-related responsibilities; and
(5) to provide authorization of appropriations for the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities in the area of security and counterterrorism, and in particular to finance the acquisition and improvements of United States Government missions abroad, including real property, buildings, facilities, and communications, information, and security systems.
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