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Final Report

Combating Corruption in Jamaica Final Performance Evaluation

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This Final Report was produced by Dr. Corbin Lyday, Team Leader, Mr. Keith Henderson, Senior Anti-Corruption Specialist and Ms. Sharene McKenzie, Civil Society Specialist (Dexis Consulting Group and Management Systems International, Inc.). Earlier findings from it were presented in person to USAID/Jamaica on September 3, 2015 and augmented based on points raised by USAID shortly after. Opinions expressed herein may not necessarily represent official perspectives of the U.S. Government.

Executive Summary

As a standard part of its monitoring and evaluation policies, USAID carries out performance evaluations toward the end of a project's implementation period to uncover which components met with success, which did not, and why. In this regard, during the summer of 2015, USAID/Jamaica commissioned an external performance evaluation of its three-year 'Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project' set to end in early 2016. The primary purpose of this evaluation is to assess what worked well, what did not and why, and to subsequently inform the development of a follow-on anti-corruption project. In particular, this evaluation addresses four specific questions concerning the extent to which the project places corruption on the national agenda, contributes to building public demand for change and is responsive to gender issues, as well as addressing which activities should be prioritized for a follow-on project and why.

Through extensive personal interviews, focus group discussions and a nationally representative survey organized around society's changing perceptions of corruption conducted in 9 parishes, this evaluation found strong internal evidence that USAID's Project has succeeded in raising Jamaican awareness and fostering a national dialogue around corruption and integrity issues. It played a critically important role in fostering political transparency through the advocacy efforts of the Jamaican NGO implementing it – National Integrity Action (NIA) through recently enacted political party registration and campaign finance regulation legislation. Internationally, Transparency International's decision to make NIA the country's official TI country chapter, selecting its Executive Director to serve on the team which developed TI's new *Strategy 2020* – serves as recognition of its ability to replicate its approach throughout the Caribbean.

Yet increased awareness and political successes also come with a concern – rising levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of Jamaica's statutory bodies, including the nation's political parties, charged with fighting it. While institutional progress has been made, the Government's approach to corruption remains piecemeal and unfinished. For a follow-on project to continue fostering civil society's 'leading edge' in demanding better responses from the state, some key lessons include the need to increasingly differentiate public campaigns by class, gender and age, and enter into more formalized relationships with potential sub-grantees to assist the process of moving from policy advocacy to forming a broad-based 'social movement' against corruption. A future project with a more differentiated public message could help stem rising levels of public disaffection, while simultaneously promoting national consensus over the best ways of fighting it.

Adapting the Project's targeted outreach to schools, communities, churches, universities and youth groups, especially at-risk youth, would also help to recruit and train the next generation of anti-corruption champions. As specific legislative outcomes emerge from current debates, USAID is also encouraged to partner with other IDPs to supplement the approach of a future Jamaican project with technical assistance to address continued roadblocks in the political and justice spheres.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	2
Introduction	4
Methodology Review	5
Summary of Findings: What Worked Well and Why	8
Question 1: Placing Corruption on the National Agenda.....	8
Question 2a: Building Public Demand for Change.....	14
Question 4: Difference in Demand between Women/Men.....	17
Question 2b: Project Responsiveness to Gender Issues	18
What Could Have Worked Better, and Why.....	19
Emerging Debates and their Relevance to a Future RFA	22
Toward a Future Integrity Program	34
Question 3: Activities to be Prioritized for Follow-on Project.....	34
In Review.....	39
Dissemination Plan.....	40
Appendices.....	41
Appendix A: List of Interviewees/Meetings	41
Appendix B: Focus Group Discussion Themes	46
Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire.....	48
Appendix D: Survey Results	53
Appendix E: Jamaica Governance Scorecard.....	65
Appendix F: Bibliography	66
Appendix E: Evaluation Scope of Work	69

List of Acronyms

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission (also Integrity Commission)
ALAC	Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
CAFFE	Citizens Actions for Free and Fair Elections
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
COMET II	Community Empowerment and Transformation Project – Phase II
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
CSJP	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada
DFID	Department for International Development, U.K.
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
ECJ	Electoral Commission of Jamaica
EDs	Enumeration Districts
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GOJ	Government of Jamaica
GOPAC	Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption
IACAC	Inter-American Convention against Corruption
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDPs	International Development Partners
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JCSC	Jamaica Civil Society Coalition
JLP	Jamaica Labor Party
JNRWP	Jamaica Network of Rural Women Producers
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KMA	Kingston Metropolitan Area
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LAPOP	Latin America Public Opinion Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, USAID
MOCA	Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency
MOJ	Ministry of Justice

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPs	Members of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International Inc.
NAPDEC	National Association of Parish Development Committees
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIA	National Integrity Action
NIAL	National Integrity Action, Ltd.
OAS	Organization of American States
OCG	Office of the Contractor General, Jamaica
OPDAT	Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance, U.S.
PAJ	Press Association of Jamaica
PNP	People's National Party
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act, Jamaica
PSOJ	Private Sector Organization of Jamaica
RFA	Request for Application
RLA	Resident Legal Advisor, U.S.
RMC	Resident Magistrates Courts
RMs	Resident Magistrates
RPD	Revenue Protection Division
SACA	Single Anti-Corruption Agency
SDC	Social Development Commission
STATIN	Statistical Institute of Jamaica
TCC	Tax Compliance Certificate
TI	Transparency International (Berlin)
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UWIC	University of the West Indies Consulting
WROC	Women's Resource Outreach Centre, Jamaica

Introduction

Purpose of the Evaluation. In an effort to conduct an objective evaluation of USAID’s Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project (“the Project”), USAID asked a three-person, in-country team (“the Team”) made up of specialists from Dexis Consulting Group and MSI, Inc. to employ a three-pronged, multi-varied approach to gauge the successes, failures and potential future directions of the Project. USAID presented the Team with three distinct but interrelated purposes for the Evaluation at the outset:

- (a) To clarify what worked, what did not, and why;
- (b) To inform USAID’s development of a follow-on anti-corruption project; and
- (c) To contribute to USAID/Jamaica’s ongoing refinement of methodologies and approaches in enhancing citizen security.

USAID asked the Team to use this approach to gather qualitative and quantitative evidence to respond to four key questions proceeding directly from the broad purposes of the Evaluation listed above. The four questions are:

- (1) To what extent has the technical approach of the Combating Corruption in Jamaica project effectively placed anti-corruption integrity issues on the national agenda?*
- (2) To what extent has the project contributed to building the Jamaican public’s demand for change in countering the national ineffectiveness in controlling corruption? Is there a difference in demand between men and women?*
- (3) Which activities should be prioritized for a follow-on project and why?*
- (4) To what extent has the project been responsive to gender issues, integrated gender in activity implementation and enhanced gender equity?*

Project Background. For the past three years, USAID’s Project has been implemented by National Integrity Action (NIA), a Jamaican NGO “established to combat corruption and build integrity in Jamaica through the pursuit of various activities, programs and projects that contribute to national development.”¹ Through two Fixed Obligation Grants and a multiyear Cooperative Agreement, set to expire in January 2016, NIA has operated through a flexible USAID M&E Framework to deliver technically sophisticated

¹ NIAL, *Fixed Obligation Grant Final Report*, May 2012, 5.

training and workshops, convene town assemblies, monitor and contribute to media coverage of anti-corruption issues, and co-facilitate meetings with other Jamaican institutions to implement the goal listed above. As the Project is scheduled to come to a close in January 2016, a strategic review of NIA's activities and accomplishments, rather than solely a programmatic one, is timely and will help set a more effective stage for USAID's future endeavors.

Methodology Review

The Team employed a three-pronged approach to answer the four questions listed above. That approach involved (a) garnering specific findings from over 40 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with subject matter experts, senior officials and project beneficiaries; (b) holding four Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) focused on youth, gender and civil society from Kingston and Montego Bay; and (c) results from nationally representative survey (the 'Survey') targeting 500 respondents who are heads of household from town and rural sections of 9 parishes with questions about their awareness of corruption as a national issue, and soliciting their opinions about what they believed to be significant indicators of progress against it in the near future.

First, the Team conducted a Desk Review of background documents and reports, including: (i) Project quarterly and yearly reports against an M&E Framework jointly agreed upon by USAID and NIA; (ii) external survey research and findings from international NGOs; (iii) progress reports from IDPs engaged in parallel efforts; and (iv) Jamaica's own National Security Strategy as a reference. The team found that the Project had met both the original 2012 indicators and revised indicators for 2014-15 M&E Framework.² The Project had been particularly successful in sensitizing civil society and professional groups (such as media groups/private sector organizations) to corruption issues.³

² Selected background documents and references can be found at the end of this Report.

³ While the Project targeted 50 civil society/professionals for corruption sensitization through educational workshops, town meetings and other fora in 2013, 763 persons were actually reached;

Using the desk review as a starting point, the Team then traveled to Jamaica, consulting nearly 50 individuals during August-September 2014 about the Project's effectiveness, its weaknesses and opportunities for future directions. Respondents included top officials from the Jamaican Government and Opposition, statutory bodies (particularly those involved in the fight against corruption), civil society, media, private sector organizations, project beneficiaries, representatives of youth and women's groups, external observers, and several IDPs. During the course of interviews, the Team also convened four focus groups (3 in Kingston and 1 in Montego Bay) targeting civil society actors, women's groups, youth (including disaffected and/or at-risk youth) and members of the religious community to canvas their perceptions of corruption, their knowledge of specific initiatives and activities connected with the Project, and their recommendations for future work in the anti-corruption or integrity field. While the Team did not attempt to use FGD themes to prove or disprove interview findings, many FGD findings paralleled informant interviews, while others helped the Team to think through the implications and priorities for USAID future activities more carefully. Dexis' partner UWIC began undertaking a nationally representative survey targeting 500 respondents across 9 parishes. Heads of household were given 10 questions gauging their subjective perceptions of how much the environment for corruption has actually changed over the past few years and what they believed significant progress going forward in this field might look like.⁴ The results of the Survey have been included throughout this Report.

Taken together, each of the three prongs yielded important qualitative and quantitative evidence for evaluating the effectiveness of the Project placing anti-corruption issues on the public agenda and stimulated public demand for a more effective response from government. The Evaluation process itself uncovered potential new program areas for prioritization as well as apparent differences in demand (as well as understandings of corruption) between men and women. Interviewees

similarly in 2014, even as the Project target doubled to 100, actual figures exceeded 1,300 (NIAL *Annual Reports*, 2013 and 2014).

⁴ See Household Survey Questions, Appendix C.

presented both old and emerging debates about the extent to which public institutions can be designed effectively to change anti-corruption outcomes and the specific role CSOs play in that process, and sensitized the Team regarding how corruption in the country is perceived through gender- and class-based prisms. The Survey underscored that although public awareness of corruption has risen significantly in recent years, frustration with the slow pace made in deterring or reversing it has also increased. The Evaluation also uncovered potentially new, unexpected potential for differentiating education approaches by class, gender, age and income.

A Strategic—Rather than Programmatic—Review. As the Project is scheduled to come to a close with the end of USAID’s Cooperative Agreement with NIA in January 2016, the Team concluded that a strategic review—one that would take into account not just the Project’s past performance, but a rapidly changing anti-corruption landscape—was appropriate and timely. Three interrelated variables appear to be moving the country’s integrity environment in a positive direction: (a) the Project’s activities stimulating public demand for reform; (b) the GOJ’s increasing efforts to comply with international anti-corruption norms and conventions; and (c) the increasing use by both Government and Opposition of anti-corruption as a political platform to engage voter discontent. While it may not be possible through this Evaluation to claim a clear cause-and-effect relationship between Project activities and the other two variables, it is clear that the Project implementer has used new international norms as a rallying cry for more effective GOJ governance responses. At the same time, the Government has sought to publicize its own efforts (such as the Governor General’s Throne Speech committing Jamaica to certain integrity goalposts), while the Opposition increasingly decries such efforts as insincere or ineffective. Corruption issues have thus acquired political prominence in ways that were arguably not present before.⁵ This new, dynamic environment requires flexible and imaginative

⁵ A Market Research Survey poll taken in late 2014 with results shown on RJR/TVJ indicated that corruption is now seen as the most significant reason for the country’s economic “hard times,” displacing harsh IMF structural adjustment terms, currency devaluation, import reliance and the poor management of both political parties as alternative explanations (Anderson Survey, 2011 and 2014).

responses, particularly taking into account that program ownership ultimately rests with a Jamaican institution. The Team anticipates that USAID understands this challenge and will work as closely with the winner of a future RFA as it clearly has with NIA thus far to maintain flexibility in the face of a rapidly changing landscape.

Summary of Findings: What Worked Well and Why

A discussion of the findings and conclusions are presented below, organized by the specific evaluation questions they address.⁶

Question 1: To what extent has the technical approach of the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica project effectively placed anti-corruption/integrity issues on the national agenda?

Interview Results. Overall, interviewees contacted reported near universal consensus that the Project has achieved national relevance and recognition over the past 3½ years. It is a well-respected, widely known and well-regarded source of technical information as well as a catalyst for civil society mobilization. Moreover, Jamaica's statutory bodies involved in anti-corruption efforts regard the Project as a trusted source of expertise and skills training. While the Project sought to place these issues on the national stage, NIA as Project implementer went beyond these goals, moving from an organization simply promoting awareness of corruption to one improving the supply of anti-corruption institutions (improving laws, streamlining procedures and training officials) and finally increasing the demand for change through town hall and issue meetings, skilled use of media and the cultivation of individual anti-corruption champions.

The ability of NIA to cultivate all three aspects of engagement led to TI's decision to designate it as a full country partner in 2015—a significant achievement for any NGO globally. This served as international recognition that the Project had indeed met with

⁶ For the sake of subject matter consistency, the two gender questions will be addressed together, while follow-on recommendations will be addressed toward the end of the document.

success in placing anti-corruption on the state’s agenda and stimulating demand for better governance. Its public messages appear to resonate particularly with the country’s threatened middle-class, and some evidence now exists that this message has reached other classes as well.

Survey Results. Survey findings strongly supported interview conclusions in this regard. Without asking the source of their information, 70% of heads of household (421 out of 605) reported being more aware of corruption issues over the last few years than before.

Table 1: Public Awareness of Corruption Trends over the Past 2-3 Years

		%	Count
Public Awareness of Corruption Trends Over the Past 2-3 Years	More aware of corruption than you were before	70%	421
	Awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other	27%	164
	Less aware of corruption than you were before	3%	20
	Total	100%	605

The most frequent household surveyed was headed by someone in the 46-65 age group living in an urban township, with a 13% unemployment rate, whose highest education was secondary school, who was employed as a skilled worker and had a monthly income of less than J\$50k. However, those surveyed represented all age groups, education and monthly income levels, and they included both townships and rural residents, with statistically equal reporting by male- and female-headed households.⁷

⁷ The main sampling areas include: the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA—comprising Kingston and St. Andrew), Portmore and Spanish Town; Montego Bay and 7 other parishes, including St. Catherine, St. Thomas, Clarendon, St. Mary, St. Elizabeth, Trelawny, and Hanover. Overall, 150 households were interviewed in the rural areas of all 9 parishes (the 7 mentioned above, plus St. Andrew and St. James). Over the course of 3 weeks, a total of 89 Enumeration Districts (EDs) were visited, targeting 690 dwellings allocated by the Survey and representing 2,040,000 inhabitants.

However, when asked whether significant progress is being made in the fight against corruption, a clear majority of households surveyed (386 out of 609, or 63% of all households surveyed) reported that the situation is getting worse, not better (Table 2). The Team notes that this finding broadly coincides with the most recent Corruption Perception surveys undertaken by TI. In 2014, Jamaica’s score of 38 did not change from 2012 or 2013 (where 0 is ranked as “highly corrupt” and 100 “very clean”), ranking 85th out of 175 countries and territories surveyed.⁸

Table 2: Public Perception of Progress against Corruption over Last 2-3 Years

		Public Awareness of Corruption Trends Over the Past 2-3 Years			Total
		More aware of corruption	Awareness has not changed	Less aware of corruption	
Perception of Progress against Corruption	Getting better—that is, corruption has been decreasing—over the past few years	60	20	4	84
		14.2%	12.1%	19.0%	13.8%
	Staying about the same—that is, not much has changed, one way or the other	50	77	12	139
		11.8%	46.7%	57.1%	22.8%
	Getting worse—that is, corruption has been increasing—over the past few years	313	68	5	386
		74.0%	41.2%	23.8%	63.4%
Total		423	165	21	609
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In regard to the Project activities, the household survey results show that public awareness was higher for a larger percentage of people in control rather than target areas. There was a greater chance (77%) of finding people who said they are now more aware of corruption in control compared to target parishes (64%). The people

⁸ TI Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014.

whose awareness level did not change much were the ones most likely to be in the target parishes. This could mean the penetration of public awareness activities by the project was not discriminatory to target areas, or that such activities were not exclusive to the project. But the survey does indicate that there was more likelihood of finding people with a high level of personal responsibility against corruption in the project areas than outside of such areas. Similarly, the target areas had a higher proportion of people who say corruption overall has been trending downward. Project impact cannot be isolated to clarify the attribution for desirable outcomes using this data. However, the project can claim to be part of the set of factors for such an outcome.⁹

Effective Workshops/Seminars for Key Justice Sector Institutions. USAID's M&E Framework specified that NIA would commit to provide training for key officials involved in corruption prevention, enforcement, adjudication and prosecution. Interviews with beneficiaries and informed observers confirmed that the Project met its expectations with workshops and hands-on courses that were considered innovative, interactive and interesting, designed to break down silos, and encouraged information-sharing (if not collaboration) across agencies and functions. Participants included not only senior judges, Resident Magistrates Courts (RMCs), Crown Counsel, but Clerks of the Court as well, who, in Jamaica's system, try 80% of corruption-related cases in courts of first instance. For some training, police and financial investigators were invited as well. Through participant presentations, mock trials, opening and closing arguments (for prosecutors), and peer critiques, the Project introduced approaches considered novel for Jamaican statutory bodies, with timely trainings (as well as publications) on POCA, financial crime and other recent amendments to legislation relevant to anti-corruption efforts. With the assistance of the Chief Justice, highly qualified presenters were selected, including not only retired senior judges and former prosecutors, but also Crown Counsel from the UK, specialists from the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance, US (OPDAT) and assistant attorneys from the US. Through four separate trainings, the Project also targeted RMs

⁹ The household survey was carried out in Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Catherine, Clarendon, St. Elizabeth, St. James, Hanover, St. Thomas and St. Mary. The control parishes (the parishes where NIA had not conducted town hall meetings) were St. Mary and St. Thomas. Please see Annex D.

responsible for trying (and convicting or exonerating) defendants in those same courts. Without NIA's assistance, the Team believes the integrity and independence of both Courts and Prosecutors would have been at greater risk during a time when new laws, procedures and applications of law have come into effect even as several midlevel prosecutors have left the profession altogether.¹⁰



Figure 1
Recent Project Publications Covering the Proceeds of
Crime Act and Other Guidelines for Practitioners

Navigating Between the Aisles. By choosing an NGO that maintains an open-door policy to both Government and Opposition (some assert the door remains slightly more open to the former), the Project has demonstrated political astuteness and sensitivity. JLP Prime Minister Holness served as key speaker at NIA's launch in December 2011, with then-Shadow Minister for Finance Phillips from PNP representing the Opposition. Even with the reversal of political roles, NIA Executive Director Trevor Munroe cultivates individual relationships with key officials in both parties. As a "watchdog," however, NIA does not shy away from criticizing both, as appropriate. Mr. Munroe has lambasted the current Government for poor performance or for failure to perform due diligence (the Azan scandal and 360 MW power station issues come to mind), but in previous years, the National Integrity Action Forum was also critical of former PM Golding's unfinished program presented to Parliament in 2011.¹¹ By cultivating civic, rather than political space, the Project has succeeded in creating a safe space for its operations 'between the aisles.' Without such careful navigation,

¹⁰ Recent examples that underscore training needs include the *2013 Law Reform* (Fraudulent Transactions) *Special Provisions' "Lotto Scam" Act*, the *2013 Committal Proceedings Act*, 2013 Amendments to the *Trafficking in Persons Act*, and the *2010 Cybercrimes Act*.

¹¹ See the Reform Agenda, 'PM Golding's Budget Presentation to Parliament,' May 10, 2011.

progress would simply not have been possible in Jamaica’s highly partisan “orange and green” political environment. Given that USAID’s 2008 Corruption Assessment for Jamaica singled out the causal factor of an over-politicized state in encouraging political corruption, the Project has gone a long way to creating a viable civic alternative to political tribalism.

Promoting Civil Society Oversight of State Functions. A more recent USAID indicator has revolved around the cultivation of fora and meeting spaces where MPs interact with citizens on issues relating to good governance. In 2013, media sources following NIA achievements published the Project’s Performance Scorecard, enabling citizens to quickly review promises made (kept and not kept) by the new Government¹² By gradually moving from town meetings across parishes co-facilitated by the Social Development Commission (SDC) toward more recent, innovative approaches like its Social Auditing training in 2015, the Project is beginning to provide skillful ways for citizens to interact with elected and appointed officials. The Social Auditing training in particular potentially offers a new role for civil society observers, or even chairpersons, of local Parish Accounts Committees—an office once reserved only for the opposition political party.¹³ In this fashion too, the Project is helping to create new civic, non-politicized spaces to improve overall levels of governance. Its skillful co-facilitation of voter outreach meetings held by the Electoral Commission of Jamaica (ECJ) serves as another example where voter education has been integrated with voter integrity issues in a meaningful way.

¹² See Appendix D: *NIA 2012-2013 Governance Scorecard*.

¹³ Three new draft laws that would form a single uniform Local Government in Jamaica were sent to the Office of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel (OCPC) after approval by the Cabinet in October 2013. The Senate passed the Local Government Amendment in July 2015, entrenching local government in the Constitution. The three bills tabled and still awaiting Parliamentary action thus include: (a) the Local Governance Bill; (b) the Local Government Financing and Financial Management Bill; and (c) the Local Government (Unified Services and Employment) Bill (<http://jis.gov.jm/senate-passes-bill-to-entrench-local-government-in-constitution/>).

Question 2a: To what extent has the project contributed to building the Jamaican public's demand for change in countering the national ineffectiveness in controlling corruption?

An Effective Platform for Change, but One with Possible Unintended Consequences.

While many respondents and interviewees disagreed about definitions of corruption in Jamaica's context, there was widespread agreement that the Project has succeeded in "getting the donkey's attention." Through NIA's longer documentaries (the first of which, *The Cost of Corruption*, was shown on national TV on several occasions and has garnered more than 160,000 views on YouTube to date), advertisements, radio spots and billboards, and well-publicized instances where its Executive Director has been called upon to serve as an expert witness on public issues involving corruption and integrity (such as recent testimony to the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on the proposed Integrity Commission bill), strong evidence exists that more—rather than fewer—persons are aware of corruption than they were several years ago.

Significantly, no interviewee (or FGD participant) stated that Jamaicans are now less aware of these issues than before. Only 3% of households in our Survey stated that they were less aware of corruption than before the Project began.

Two Distinct Survey Trends. Past surveys tend to show two distinct, somewhat contradictory trends. On the one hand, an increased societal awareness of corruption does *not* translate to a reduction in corrupt outcomes.¹⁴ The 2014 AmericasBarometer underscored that Jamaica ranks in the top 7 of all Latin American/Caribbean countries where citizens believe corruption is 'very common.' At the same time, Jamaica is among those countries where levels of corruption victimization (citizens being asked to pay bribes) are now lower than the hemispheric average.¹⁵ This is a common

¹⁴ Transparency International's *2013 Global Corruption Barometer* reports that Jamaicans believe corruption has increased, joining 53% of global respondents in a majority of countries who feel similarly.

¹⁵ Overall, 78% of Jamaican citizens believed corruption in their country to be "very common" in 2014, yet the victimization rate of 10% was a marked decrease from the 36% of those reporting some kind of victimization during 2006 (*Executive Summary, Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2014* and *Figure 3.8, Full Report, 60*). The corresponding victimization figure in the Global Corruption Barometer was 12% in 2013 (Barometer, Appendix C, 33).

discrepancy encountered in corruption surveys and connected to the fact that with victimization, respondents are being asked to report instances of petty corruption, whereas with broader questions on country progress, respondent reactions are influenced by media coverage, national scandals and the like. Even as public awareness brings needed attention to the issues, actual victimization may be decreasing.

But another trend may be more disturbing. In Jamaica, particularly, a statistically significant correlation exists between rising awareness of corruption on the one hand and an increasing *dissatisfaction* with the performance of the country's leading anti-corruption agencies and institutions on the other.¹⁶ The Team's Household Survey underscored this pattern strongly. A large plurality of households (46%, or 281 out of 608) believe that statutory agencies are performing worse, taking fewer steps than before, or are *less deserving* of public trust and confidence than before. In a parallel vein, 45%, or 274 households surveyed stated that political party campaign financing is becoming *less*, not more, transparent, and that both parties are becoming *less* accountable to voters over time (Table 3).

¹⁶ Two separate 1000-respondent surveys (with a 95% confidence level and $\pm 3\%$ margin of error) carried out by Market Research Services Ltd. in 2011 and 2014 showed that while 20% of respondents reported being dissatisfied with the work of the OCG in 2011, that percentage had risen to 54% by 2014. Dissatisfaction rates with DPP rose similarly from 28% to 48%, while the number of respondents believing the Government to have a weak/ineffective response to corruption increased to 72% in 2014, up from 44% in 2011 (*Tabular Report on a Poll on Corruption Issues*, Kingston, November 2014).

Table 3: Perceived Performance by Statutory Agencies and Political Parties

		Overall Perceptions of Change Over Past Few Years			Total
		Getting better— that is, decreasing	Staying about the same	Getting worse— that is, increasing	
Perception of How Well State Agencies Have Been Fighting Corruption	Gradually getting better, taking more effective steps, and more deserving of your trust	57	37	32	126
		67.9%	26.8%	8.3%	20.7%
Total	The steps they are taking are about the same as before, and my attitudes toward them have not changed much	18	76	108	202
		21.4%	55.1%	27.9%	33.2%
Total	Gradually getting worse, taking fewer effective steps, and being less deserving of your trust	9	25	247	281
		10.7%	18.1%	63.8%	46.1%
Total		84	138	387	609
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Perceived Trend of Accountability of Two Major Political Parties	Gradually becoming more accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting more transparent over time	33	22	32	87
		39.3%	15.9%	8.3%	14.3%
Total	Staying about the same as they have been, not much more or less accountable to voters or financially transparent than they have been	32	76	139	247
		38.1%	55.1%	36.0%	40.6%
Total	Gradually becoming less accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting less transparent over time	19	40	215	274
		22.6%	29.0%	55.7%	45.1%
Total		84	138	386	608
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Survey results in particular raised a critical question for the Team: is an increase in corruption awareness really the correct indicator for measuring the success of an anti-

corruption programme?¹⁷ What is the best explanation for the apparent inverse relationship between public awareness and public satisfaction? From other country experiences, the Team’s hypothesis (which could not be fully tested given that this was not the primary purpose for this Evaluation) was that while Jamaica’s media may be considered robust, the sensationalist, nonspecific manner in which it often reports these issues actually promotes the image that things appear worse than they are and leads to public frustration with agency performance.¹⁸ The Team believes that sensationalism and no specificity in reporting is an outcome of the country’s media environment. (These apparent dichotomies are explored further in the later Emerging Debates section.)

Question 4: To what extent has the project been responsive to gender issues, integrated gender in activity implementation and enhanced gender equity?

An Untapped Potential? The Project has striven for gender balance in its training and workshops, with men and women given equal opportunity to participate. Yet, gender imbalances are clearly evident—not necessarily in the Project’s approach, but in the responses by individuals interested in corruption and integrity issues. Women beneficiaries clearly outnumber men in the Project’s trainings, and a similar imbalance shows up in NIA’s individual membership, where women vastly outnumber men,

¹⁷ Even before the Household Survey, such a possibility was broached in the no-cost extension accompanying the DFID’s Jamaica Accountability and Governance Programme for 2014. “Survey data showed that public confidence in anti-corruption agencies *significantly* decreased, while their general understanding of corruption has increased. Although we cannot conclude there is a causal linkage behind this inverse relationship, *perception surveys may not always be a reliable indicator for interventions that aim to increase public awareness of corruption*” (original emphasis). *DFID Programme Completion Report*, 2015, 4.

¹⁸ A perspective frequently voiced by NIA’s Executive Director is that media report tends to be sporadic, highly sensationalized and often vague. The Team shares this opinion and believes these issues are caused, in part, by the country’s outdated libel and slander laws, which tend to discourage serious investigative journalism and promote sensationalism at the same time.

reflecting a university-targeted population where women also outnumber men.¹⁹ Because the Project never had an overt strategy to differentiate understanding or teaching of corruption issues by gender, the easiest explanation for the discrepancies is that women appear to be much more interested in integrity issues. Through Women’s Resource Outreach Centre’s (WROC) gender-based guide to corruption (which the Project funded and helped disseminate), the first of its kind in the Caribbean, researchers found that women do, in fact, experience corruption differently from men (a finding echoed in the Team’s FGDs). Women remain recipients of unwanted sexual harassment and favoritism, and their daily lives appear to include compensation mechanisms requiring skillful navigation with which few men have experience.²⁰ While the WROC report stated that society does not perceive women as somehow being less corrupt than men, the Team heard from several respondents that society expects more ethical behavior from women than from men. More burdens are thus placed on women to refrain from bribe-giving or taking, while men—particularly young men—ironically end up subjected to a different type of prejudice, such as the tyranny of lowered expectations and lower participation in integrity efforts.

Question 2b: Is there a difference in demand between men and women?

Many interviewees (and FGD participants) expressed their sense that women seemed to be both more interested in, and more involved with anti-corruption activities. More specifically, the Team found that corruption was perceived differently, not only between genders, but between classes, and parallel differences between urban and rural respondents could be discerned as well. Urban respondents tended to describe corruption in cultural terms—as a method of survival—while rural women tended to

¹⁹ From 2012 through the 3rd Quarter 2015, including all workshops, seminars, town hall meetings, ALAC beneficiaries and roundtables, the Project served 1,538 women and 570 men, reflecting distinct levels of interest among respondents by gender. In terms of individual membership, a strategic decision was taken to target university students, which has been endorsed by TI now that NIA has been formally designated Jamaica’s official TI chapter. Desk Review (NIA Yearly Reports to USAID).

²⁰ *Gender and Corruption: Making the Connections to Promote Good Governance* (Women’s Resource and Outreach Centre, Ltd.: Kingston, February 2014), 7.

see it more strongly in terms of exploitation. The Team noted that the WROC Report saw parallel differences among class, with “upper income brackets us[ing] their class positions to secure benefits ... not afforded to lower socio-economic groups.”²¹ One possible implication from this is that the middle-class as a whole may be more focused on getting “big fish” than those from lower socioeconomic strata, who may simply see corruption as a bread and butter issue of survival. More middle-class recipients also tended to know more about the Project than lower-class recipients. The Team believes that not only do men and women demand integrity in different ways, but it also thinks these differences can be extended to different income and geographic groups as well. This is consistent with informal interview responses that stressed that there are many Jamaicans in the country with widely differing attitudes toward corruption and integrity. In parishes where Project town hall meetings took place, women did appear to participate more than men, and the Team Survey has already noted that awareness of corruption tends to be higher in the parishes where town meetings or other interventions took place.

What Could Have Worked Better, and Why?

When asked carefully, some interview respondents presented sophisticated critiques of the Project, which the Team tried to correlate with its own review of the Project’s quarterly and annual reports. Most critiques were presented from the perspective that with additional changes, the Project could have become even more effective and influential than it was. The most salient critiques included:

The Need for More Formal Grant Relationships. The Project was not the country’s first organized CSO response to corruption. Forming in the aftermath of the 1999 Gas Riots at Half-Way-Tree, Jamaicans for Justice came to symbolize civil society’s deep frustration with corruption and justice abuse. In 2010, in the aftermath of a U.S. extradition request for a Jamaican Don came the realization that linkages between Jamaica’s formal political structures still existed with state-within-a-state garrison

²¹ *WROC Report*, 8.

communities. Using UNDP and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Foundation (FES) expert assistance to form a Secretariat, JCSC took shape with NIA's Executive Director working with JCSC's Director to research viable civil society forum models to guide Jamaica's responses to this governance challenge. DFID's Jamaica Accountability and Governance Programme provided critical support for NIA shortly afterward, with JCSC funded as an NIA sub-grantee.²² While the relationship between the two organizations was fruitful, as supported by information gathered during the Desk Review, the Team wondered whether the groups could have strengthened each other more productively with a more strategic approach to enlisting additional allies and anti-corruption champions, perhaps through additional grant relationships that reflected the strengths of those other organizations. Now that DFID's support for NIA (through its own program) has been phased out, and JCSC's Secretariat has become moribund, the question of recruiting and organizing new champions and grantees has become even more critical for USAID. If the Project seeks to evolve from simply advocating for policy change using an NGO to empowering a "social mobilization" movement (in the words of NIA's Director), USAID may have to consider how best to enlist the specialization of other organizations as grantees to the Project.

More Robust Youth Engagement. A large number of respondents pointed out that the country's youth have complex questions about (and definitions of) corruption, which the Project has only begun to tap into. This theme was repeated throughout FGD discussions and from various segments of civil society. The lotto scam was repeatedly cited as evidence of the country's youth simply not perceiving what corruption is, as they believed this scam to be a victimless crime. The costs of entry are so low and the formal economic opportunities are so limited (in the western part of the island particularly) that young people have no reason *not* to participate in scams. The Team agreed that while the Project deserved much credit for promoting awareness of corruption, the message has not resonated with Jamaica's youth beyond the elites. Public campaigns do not appear particularly youth- or class-sensitive, and outreach

²² This relationship with NIA allowed JCSC to research and publish its highly regarded *Integrity Ambassadors Training Manual*, which NIA has already test-piloted in 3 high schools in the Kingston Metropolitan Area.

approaches have yet to fully embrace social media in formats that appeal to the young or perhaps to the semi-literate to be attractive.



Figure 2

1 of 3 winning posters submitted to the Office of the Contractor General in a recent youth competition for publicizing corruption.

Long-Term Project Sustainability. With the ending of DFID's parallel project, USAID has become the sole funder in Jamaica for a major effort supporting civil society's long-term anti-corruption awareness. On top of this is the concern – repeated by TI – that while Executive Director Trevor Munroe's presence has been instrumental to the Project's success, he remains the principal person connected with it despite the presence of a young, energetic and capable staff. On one level, this is a story about an individual who skillfully used a national reputation as labor organizer, former Senator, radio host and now anti-corruption champion to build an effective awareness campaign around this issue. Indeed, it is difficult indeed to imagine how another, lesser-known individual could have replicated such an achievement. On the other hand, for an older generation of Jamaicans, Munroe's presence does not come without controversy, which he himself has acknowledged.²³

For some, these remain critical debates that inhibit full participation in Project efforts. For others, however, and for the Project as a whole (which must consider a changing landscape and the need to cultivate future anti-corruption champions), the need to find, recruit and cultivate next-generation leadership is critical. The unexpected recent departure of the Project's former Deputy Director, Nadiya Figueroa, underscores the

²³ See Gary Spaulding, "'I'm No Angel' – Munroe Defends Right to Lead Anti-Corruption Push," *Jamaica Gleaner*, December 11, 2014 (<http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20141211/im-no-angel-munroe-defends-right-lead-anti-corruption-push>).

importance for USAID of planning for the end – not simply the beginning – of the subsequent Project.

Emerging Debates and Their Relevance to a Future RFA

Throughout this Evaluation, the Team encountered differing perspectives – even within the relatively small community of government experts and civil society observers in Kingston – with regard to the effectiveness of Jamaica’s approach to combating corruption. Such differences appear to be magnified by the rapidly changing political, economic and institutional landscape alluded to previously in this Report. Whenever possible, the Team tried to identify gaps in the GOJ’s approach, as a critical component of any future USAID integrity project would logically try to address those gaps. In general, despite considerable progress in terms of corruption awareness, the Team uncovered repeated instances in which the ability of the institutional, legal and political environment to address or prevent corruption remained weak, slow, fragmented or, in certain contexts, dysfunctional. Some of the most important of these gaps – and the debates surrounding them – are outlined below:

Imbalances within the Justice System. A key argument NIA’s Executive Director frequently makes is that Jamaicans will not take efforts to combat corruption seriously unless the misdeeds of “big fish” are exposed, the sources of illicit enrichment are halted and the perpetrators are brought to justice. However, Jamaica’s larger system of justice – beginning with the investigative process and including the prosecutorial, judicial, enforcement and review processes – remains slow, siloed, backlogged, overburdened and lacking in resources. Existing legal opportunities for preventing corruption are often underutilized or insufficiently identified. At times, they even appear to be working at cross purposes.

Two of the three principal corruption-prevention bodies – the Commission on the Prevention of Corruption and the Integrity Commission – are so limited by statute, practice or resources, that they are ineffective watchdogs for monitoring potential illicit

enrichment through income/asset disclosure mechanisms. The third body – the Office of the Contractor General (OCG) – remains independent and well-functioning, yet past referrals to DPP have gone largely unanswered, and recent ones may not have been acted upon properly.²⁴ The draft Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) legislation before Parliament may end up subsuming some of the OCG’s independence (whether inadvertently or by design), and the proposed ACC itself may share legal powers with the recently created MOCA (formed from the Anti-Crime and Corruption Task Force and the anti-corruption branch of the JCF under joint command).²⁵ MOCA operates with a broad mandate, and potential overlaps between it, the Ministry of Finance’s RPD and the proposed ACC have yet to be resolved. Even were all these overlaps to be ironed out, the Commission’s proposed 5-member structure may turn out to be an unwieldy amalgam that impedes, rather than promotes, speedy adjudication. Prosecutorial responsibilities would still have to be shared with DPP in an arrangement that has yet to be settled and that may require constitutional – not merely statutory – changes. The nation’s Courts remain backlogged, overall GOJ compliance with UNCAC and IACAC remains problematic, and whistleblower practices – meant to promote citizen monitoring – run counter to a much stronger, informal “informer fi dead” code of silence.²⁶ Both the downsides and the upsides of the mergers that the draft legislation calls for need to be carefully weighed. The Team believes that, as yet, there is not a significant national consensus about this topic.

²⁴ See, for example, Abka Fitz-Henley, “OCG Seeks Return of DPP’s Houghton Ruling,” Evening News, Nationwide 90FM, January 27, 2015 (<http://nationwideradiojm.com/ocg-seeks-overturn-of-dpps-houghton-ruling/>). Downplaying these reports, the DPP points to other examples in which it has adopted OCG recommendations (<http://rjrnewsline.com/local/dpp-downplays-reports-of-rift-with-ocg>).

²⁵ Personal communication to the Team from the Justice Minister, August 2015.

²⁶ See OAS/MESICIC compliance report (www.oas.org/juridico/english/jam.htm). A compendium of global best practices, tools and model anti-corruption courses can be found with UNODC (www.unodc.org/track). The Corruption Prevention Commission itself notes that even in the absence of a cultural issue, whistleblower implementation regulations have not been developed and remain largely unfunded.

Big Fish or Big Processes? The above challenges are both serious and structural, meaning that they are likely to persist (and have persisted for many years) despite changes in governments and rhetoric, and sometimes despite many intentions. The Team believes they reflect a combination of a lack of resources and a lack of professionalization over time. Because the effects serve to deter speedy and effective justice, it is unlikely that many “big fish” would be caught even if there were a national consensus for such an approach. The Project implicitly understood this, as it used NIA to deliver skilled trainings and workshops for key enforcers to increase their capacity and improve their self-confidence and skills. Because the need has been so great, the Project’s technical assistance now fills a large gap: NIA has become the *de facto* Judicial Training Institute for the country’s courts and the principal source of Continuous Legal Professional Development for prosecutors. Inadvertently, a civil society organization has turned into the principal source of technical expertise for the state’s anti-corruption efforts. Key training staff at DPP, for example, informed the Team that they no longer even approach the Ministry of Justice with requests for training (and have not for several years, knowing that the Ministry has not budgeted for this). However, this situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long run.

In other countries facing similar choices, IDPs have negotiated MOUs with host-country governments over time which shift responsibility for technical training back to host-country institutions. Instituting a train-the-trainers approach in a future Project component with a clear end-date is one way to address such a challenge. The Team strongly recommends that USAID negotiate some kind of formal understanding in this direction in order to avoid a situation in which Jamaica’s key anti-corruption and criminal justice institutions are seen as being dependent on external funding to survive and to thrive.

A Robust or an Intimidated Media? While Freedom House has noted that Jamaica’s media is one of the freest in the Western Hemisphere, interviews with seasoned, well-respected journalists and academics with expertise in media issues revealed gaps in this analysis. While Jamaica indeed has highly rated laws governing whistleblowers, witness protection and income and asset disclosure, these regulations look better on

paper than in practice. Underfunding, over-application and cultural impropriety remain real impediments to these laws' implementation and application. Over an 18-year process, libel and slander were finally decriminalized (approximately 2 years after a UN Commission on Human Rights 2012 ruling), yet some journalists report still being stymied by high burdens of proof, leading to editorial censorship or vague, imprecise reporting – self-censorship in effect.²⁷ Without legal precedents that establish a higher burden of proof for officials wishing to prove libel or slander (sometimes known as Sullivan exceptions), this situation will continue.²⁸ In a small country, without the benefit of protection from legal action, the threat of financial ruin or fear of job loss serves to cancel out progress in libel and slander legislation as it applies to high-level officials, parliamentarians, judges, prosecutors or private-sector executives. The risks to a serious investigative journalist (or her editor) in Jamaica thus still run high, and the rewards are few or even nonexistent.

The effects of these impediments are that reporting of corruption tends to be sporadic, sensationalistic and nonspecific. Not only does public confidence in all institutions decrease accordingly, but the public (and law enforcement authorities) are not provided with information that is specific enough to prosecute a high-level case. The Team's Household Survey findings underscored that how the media reports corruption issues remains the most important variable for explaining the increased societal awareness of corruption; personal discussions with friends, family and colleagues are a close second (Table 4).

²⁷ See Krishna Desai, "The New Law of Defamation in Jamaica," *Jamaica Observer*, January 22, 2014 (http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/business/The-new-law-of-defamation-in-Jamaica-_15839916).

²⁸ In 1964, a series of court rulings in the US established that a public official could not successfully win a libel case unless s/he could prove that the author/publisher wrote with "reckless disregard" for the truth or with actual malice (*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 364 U.S. 254 (1964)). Many international experts embrace this shift in the burden of proof as a model for balancing the needs of a free press against the concern of government officials. In effect, Sullivan holds government officials to a higher standard than private citizens when proving libel. While the Sullivan exception was vigorously debated in Jamaica's Parliament during the decriminalization process, the provision was ultimately not included.

Table 4 – Most Influential Factors Guiding Awareness of Corruption Over Last Few Years

Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption	Factors Considered Most Influential in Perceiving Corruption							
	How the media cover these issues	My own discussions with friends, etc., about these issues	Official statements, etc., of political leaders	My personal experience dealing with statutory agencies	How Jamaican civil society, etc., cover these issues	Other	Total	
More aware of corruption than you were before	74%	62%	54%	69%	53%	67%	423	69%
Awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other	23%	32%	42%	28%	27%	33%	165	27%
Less aware of corruption than you were before	2%	6%	4%	3%	20%	0%	21	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	609	100%

Income/Asset Disclosure Impediments. In another media-related issue, the Team notes that income and asset disclosure statements can work effectively as a deterrent to corrupt behavior as long as NGOs and the public have the opportunity to see and report on them, provided that there is balance between expanded information and human rights concerns over financial privacy. But with the approximately 30,000 disclosure statements that all public officials in Jamaica are required to file (with only small fines incurred mostly for the failure to do so), little streamlining of cases can take place. Information is shared only with Parliament, and even then, a sizeable degree of discretion is used when other agencies (such as MOCA or DPP) are involved. Given the lack of resources, even the motivated officials at the Corruption Prevention Commission could only investigate a few dozen discrepancies out of a much larger number. It is thus hardly surprising that there have not been successful prosecutions of high-level officials over the past several years.

Without media or NGO involvement, state bodies can control information so that it is known only to a few individuals. Taken together, the above deficiencies reinforce media self-censorship and a national culture that discourages whistleblowing, keeps systems of trust highly personalized (rather than institutionalized) and makes measurable progress in the justice arena more difficult.²⁹

Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC). Challenges with the implementation of whistleblower practices also led the Team to explore the need for, viability of and demand for a future legal assistance program in the form of the Project's ALAC program, which the Project recently hired an attorney to lead. ALAC-style programs are well-documented and have been used successfully by TI in many countries, including the LAC region.³⁰ However, the personal and professional risks involved in whistleblowing in Jamaica means that to be successful, programs must be skillfully adapted to the local context, with protections extended providing safety for and preventing retribution against those who report.³¹

²⁹ The World Bank has recently compiled and published several case studies (including two from the LAC region) and guides for both legislators and civil society on successful uses of income and asset disclosure to further anti-corruption efforts. See *Income and Asset Disclosure: Case Illustrations* (World Bank, Washington DC, 2013), <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-9796-1>.

³⁰ From the nearly 90 TI ALACs currently in place in over 60 countries, case studies and implementation guidelines can be found from all global geographic regions, including several in the Americas (http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/alacs/stories).

³¹ See Eleanor Kennedy, "Blowing the Whistle in Central America: Not as Easy as it Sounds," *Transparency International Americas*, January 2012 (<http://blog.transparency.org/2012/01/12/blowing-the-whistle-in-central-america-not-as-easy-as-it-sounds/>).



Figure 3
MOCA billboards encouraging whistleblowers to report both crime and police malfeasance.

At the Team's request, NIA prepared a table of the number and type of assistance requests it had received over the last three years, noting that 2015 has already seen a 67% increase in the number of requests compared to the same period last year.³² In many cases, clients are referred back to the original organization, while others are referred to different statutory bodies to address their complaints. A few complaints deal with entirely private, rather than public, matters, and the Project advises those clients accordingly. From this database and from Team interviews and themes uncovered during 4 FGDs, the Team can confirm that the demand and the need for such referral services clearly exists in Jamaica. However, the recommendation to continue this portion of the Project also comes with a caveat. Virtually all those who were interviewed or questioned asserted that they would be more likely to report on corruption or blow the whistle when talking to a person they knew or to an NGO they trusted, rather than to a government official or even to an anonymous government hotline. Most added that even when discussing such issues with an NGO, they would prefer to do so anonymously. This finding is entirely in keeping with two observations made earlier: (a) networks of trust in Jamaica remain highly personalized, rather than institutionalized; and (b) regardless of legislation, the national culture against informers works against the entire concept of whistleblowing.

³² Team analysis of Project data revealed that NIA had received at least 100 requests for assistance from 2012 thru July 2015 from all 14 parishes, by telephone, walk-ins, direct mail or email. Many (but not all) complaints were anonymous at the client's request, and these covered a wide range of alleged crimes, including bribery, assault, fraud, nepotism, extortion and public procurement fraud (NIA *Log of Complaints Received*, 2011-15).

What is the 'Right' Role for an Anti-Corruption NGO? USAID's Project has clearly highlighted the critical role civil society can (and must) play in raising awareness of how corrupt behavior impedes national development and economic growth. However, the Project also raises further questions about the limitations of that role, and these questions have not yet been answered. At times, NGOs must create and sustain public/private partnerships with targeted state institutions to make progress that is important to both; at other times, the role of an outsider keeping government's feet to the fire – by monitoring compliance with new laws and procedures – may be more appropriate. In some countries where corruption is endemic, IDPs have used their influence to support a series of quick wins for reform-oriented governments, mostly in the arena of petty corruption, where state agencies are given primary support and NGOs play a familiar watchdog role.

In Jamaica's case, USAID has largely done the reverse. It has employed an NGO to compel a national focus on the effects of grand corruption and supported large-scale change through wide-ranging issues and laws, new norms, and revamped top-down procedures. At the same time, the Project has used the same NGO to break down information siloing, thus enhancing the capacity and self-confidence of key state agencies that are involved in combating corruption in this process. Through its selection of the NIA as a national chapter organization, TI (Berlin) considers the Project's three-tiered approach (publicizing awareness of corruption, engaging public demand for cleaner government and improving the supply of anti-corruption services) to be not only a successful evolution of an anti-corruption NGO in a short time but also a model for the entire Caribbean.

Notwithstanding, opinions are not uniformly supportive of the Project's approach. Some business groups (and Opposition leaders) believe the focus on big issues is misplaced – that it leads to very good PR but overlooks opportunities to target individual agencies or institutions in favor of campaigns that get a lot of people riled

up.³³ Even among those who support a focus on grand corruption and big issues, some assert that such an approach does not necessarily yield results – or worse, that it can easily turn into a campaign targeting individuals, thus becoming a tool for abuse and witch hunts. Some singled out the failed Special Prosecutor Act of 2006 and the killing of scores in the wake of the police attack against Tivoli Gardens to underscore two related points for the Team: (a) Jamaica’s respect for human rights and justice remains fragile, and (b) “Jamaica is a small country” – as many put it – where reputations can be ruined with innuendo alone, long before charges are brought or guilt determined by law.

Long-Term Economic Development – An Effective Message. The Team wondered whether the Project’s focus on grand corruption might obscure a different sentiment in the country. When asked, interviewees and FGD participants frequently voiced distrust of the police, tax and licensing authorities and seemed more motivated by issues involving day-to-day issues of petty corruption, bureaucratic red tape and official ineptitude. For these respondents, the focus of an anti-corruption campaign should not deviate from the simple task of ‘just getting the job done’ rather than more complex issues of whether large state procurements have been carried out with due diligence or not.

³³ Personal communication to the Team from Hon. Andrew Holness, Leader of the Opposition. Some highlight the JCF’s anti-corruption program – as a result of which 500 individuals have already been dismissed from the force outright and new vetting procedures have been put in place to ferret out corrupt behavior – as a preferred strategy. Such an approach also appears to resonate with a few civil society actors, who told the Team that there is greater value in “cleaning up one corner of the stable” rather than simply condemning corruption as a whole.

Table 5 – Most Significant Sign the Country is on the Right Track

Most Significant Signs of Anti-Corruption Progress		Column N %	Count
Most Significant Sign that the Country Is on the Right Track to Fight Corruption	Seeing “big fish” successfully prosecuted their assets confiscated, or even being sent to jail	27%	166
	Getting a driver’s license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport, etc., quickly and without the need for bligh	6%	38
	Having a clean police force that respects people and doesn’t abuse its authority	21%	130
	Enacting new laws that will create an independent anti-corruption agency with the power to prosecute wrong-doers	7%	42
	Having a government that helps the economy to grow with jobs and investment	30%	180
	Having a moral society in which personal integrity and high ethical standards are increasingly valued	7%	41
	Other	1%	9
	Total	100%	606

However, results from the Household Survey downplay both petty corruption and a focus on new legislation as motivating forces. Only 6% of households surveyed thought that addressing petty corruption (such as getting a driver’s license, vehicle inspection, TCC or a passport without ‘giving’ a bligh’) would be the most significant evidence that the country was on the ‘right track’ to combat corruption. However, a similar percentage (7%) believed that forming a single anti-corruption agency with prosecutorial authority would be the most significant sign of progress. A similar lack of interest was shown in the indicator of simply seeing a more ethical society. A plurality of households (30%), however, stated that the most significant evidence for change would be a government that would actually *help the economy to grow*, increasing jobs and investment, and another 27% stated that capturing “big fish” was the evidence they most sought. Having a clean police force was most critical for another 21% (Table 5). Roughly 80% of all households surveyed felt these were the ‘top 3’ changes they were looking for, rather than any other marker. From these results, it would appear that the Project’s focus (frequently found on billboard advertisements)

of 'Less Corruption = More Investment = More Jobs' is an effective organizing approach.

What Comes Next After Big Processes? For a future RFA, USAID must not only decide how best to harness the strong economic sentiments that underscore any concern about corruption, determine the contours of a future, more differentiated public awareness program and grapple with the challenges of long-term systemic change in Jamaica's justice system; it must also address what comes after the focus on the specific legislative outcomes the Project has championed. Like other civil society groups that coalesced in the aftermath of the 2010 US extradition order of a major Don and the former government's widely criticized response to that order, the Project has focused much of its advocacy-related energy on specific changes to the country's legislative and institutional framework, including:

- (1) *the creation of a new, single-agency Anti-Corruption Commission* to consolidate 3 existing (and, many believe, overlapping) integrity/anti-corruption related offices into one;
- (2) *registering political parties* through the 2014 Representation of the People (Amendment) Act – which not only registers but provides public funds to political parties; and
- (3) *adopting the ECJ's 2011 recommendations to Parliament on Campaign Financing*, creating new disclosure, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms designed to sever illicit funding of political party campaigns and to prosecute offenders through little-used illicit enrichment laws.

While the Project contemplated an additional focus on political codes of conduct (through amendments to the *1973 Parliament (Integrity of Members) Act* and changes to subcontracting law (amendments to the *1968 Contractor General Act*), USAID made a strategic decision not to expend significant effort on these additional laws for fear of diluting or slowing progress on the above 3 pieces of legislation. The Representation of the People Act has now been adopted – the first of its kind in the Caribbean. A single-agency anti-corruption draft bill, tabled in Parliament in December 2014, is nearing review completion by a Joint Select Committee, after which amendments will

be offered. The third challenge – campaign finance reform - may be the most difficult, and it remains effectively sidelined for the time being. As speculation mounts that the Prime Minister may ask the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and hold national elections at any time, the Project recently joined forces with the PSOJ and the Jamaican Bar Association to call for tabling legislation on illicit campaign finance, as recommended years ago by the ECJ.³⁴

Anti-Corruption Commissions – The Global Experience. While the Ministry of Justice asserted that there is little organized opposition to the proposed ACC, some critics assert that more could have been done to ensure that the draft bill conforms to the stronger Sierra Leone model (often cited as influencing Jamaica), which in turn was influenced by Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).³⁵ The Team noted that the Project apparently took a middle ground in this debate, cultivating an “art of the possible” approach to secure government support for a legislative compromise that may address some systemic weaknesses and overlapping legal competencies for the first time. The draft would combine three agencies (the Contractor General, the Corruption Prevention Commission and the Integrity Commission) into a single agency, which would be managed by a 5-member Commission. While the MOJ argues that significant savings would ensue as a result of eliminating overlapping competencies, it remains unclear how the three named portfolios (and potentially 2 others) might be managed under separate directors in the new Commission.

How much the draft legislation would really change the overall corruption environment, or how many more successful prosecutions of wrongdoers it would facilitate, remains untested. In nearly every interview the Team conducted, the question of the new agency’s effectiveness and appropriateness as a benchmark for

³⁴ See “Local Groups Call for End to Delay in Enacting Campaign Financing Law,” *The Gleaner*, September 21, 2015 (<http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20150921/local-groups-call-end-delay-enacting-campaign-financing-law>).

³⁵ See Abka Fitz-Henley, “Christie Criticizes Bunting, Golding,” *Radio Jamaica Evening News*, July 29, 2015 (<http://nationwideradiojm.com/christie-criticizes-bunting-golding/>).

Project success surfaced. The experiences of the approximately 30 new single-agency anticorruption commissions created in other countries over the last 15 years have been mixed at best. USAID and other donors are encouraged to consult some of these agencies' frameworks, guideposts and case studies to understand how the implementation of a new single-agency commission might proceed once the legislation is adopted.³⁶ TI, as well as the OAS and UNODC can provide technical assistance should the decision be made to review the legislation. Some issues likely to arise include the Commission's organizational capacity to check the abuse of investigative or prosecutorial authority, the extent to which combining agencies may weaken an already-existing and highly effective agency and the extent to which adequate financial resources and delineations of responsibilities exist for the new agency to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.

Barring an assessment, the Team recommends that IDPs make clear to the GOJ that future commissioners' reputations for integrity and independence will be critical to success and funding. To promote longer-term Jamaican ownership, it may also be appropriate to make the technical assistance short term. Over time, a future Integrity Commission could help fashion a still-missing national consensus on how best to tackle corruption. From the experience of the ECJ, the Team noted Commissioner McClarty's belief that ECJ's reputation and public standing emerged over time as a result of the increasing professionalization of oversight mechanisms; this has been a key reason for the national consensus over the right way of conducting elections.³⁷ It may well turn out that a future Integrity Commission could use the ECJ's experience to craft a similar consensus with regard to combating corruption.

Toward a Future Integrity Program

Question 3: Which activities should be prioritized for a follow-on project and why?

³⁶ See research from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Norway, on agency effectiveness, http://www.u4.no/publications/PublicationSphinxSearchForm?PublicationSearch=&Category=&Themed=D=14&Year=&Country=&SearchLocale=en_US&locale=en_US/.

³⁷ Personal communication to the Team, Commissioner McClarty, September 2015.

Taking Stock. Jamaica’s anti-corruption and integrity landscape appears to be changing rapidly. Despite backsliding, two successive governments have increasingly tied their reputations to progress made on corruption issues. Within elite circles, governance-related conversations are taking

“...If the honest majority takes the decision [in the National Pledge] ‘to stand up for Justice, Brotherhood and Peace, to work diligently and creatively, to think generously and honestly,’ then the minority bent on being dishonest and depraved will eventually fail. We have to unite for the cause. We need to stop waiting on the next man to do it. We cannot leave it for Politicians, Dons or future generations to effect change. As it is, that has not worked. We have to stand up and encourage each other to come together as one, for the same cause. We can do it.”

--Dirk Harrison, Contractor General, *Annual Report 2013*

place that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago. Institutional reforms started nearly a decade under the JCF have been expanded or strengthened through new law-enforcement mechanisms. Economic performance is on track – not just in terms of meeting difficult IMF targets, but also in successfully restructuring longer-term debt and through low inflation rates (the lowest in 46 years), low interest rates (the lowest in 15 years) and the presence of new start-ups. Jamaica’s Customs Agency is replacing the country’s previous 21 unconnected databases with a modern, streamlined, integrated record system (ASYCUDA) using technical assistance from UNCTAD; this system is designed to transform paper operations into electronic ones – a significant disincentive for corruption at the ports.³⁸ The Team’s Household Survey underscores that broad economic progress – far more than legal change – remains the most salient indicator for those who want to see progress on this issue. Notwithstanding the above, the public also seems to be saying that it is increasingly *dissatisfied* with the results of recent GOJ efforts. The Project’s focus on increasing anti-corruption awareness, like DFID’s parallel project before it, seems to coincide with this dissatisfaction, which the Team believes is heavily influenced by the quality of media reporting on the issue, which places less pressure on officials to perform than

³⁸ “...[The system] is aimed at encouraging a pattern of self-policing and self-regulation among those using [it]...If you are deemed to be in willful breach, then there is high probability of the penalty being applied.” Citing Finance Minister Dr. Peter Phillips, Daraine Luton, “‘Nothing to Fear’ – Phillips Stands by Customs Bill,” *Jamaica Gleaner*, August 21, 2015, and personal communication to the Team by CEO Gen. Richard Reese, September 2015.

might be imagined. USAID's challenge will be to capture momentum from this disaffection and use a future Project to provide wins for society to reverse some of the ill effects of this trend.

How Should Future Activities Be Prioritized? But carrying the analogy of a last leg of a 4 x 400 relay, the country cannot afford complacency. Legislation remains unfinished or unharmonized, much of the public education campaign has yet to touch lower socioeconomic strata and the country's political party and election campaign systems remain the weakest link in the way of a cleaner Vision 2030 Jamaica. With that in mind, the Team believes that USAID assistance to promote anti-corruption awareness continue with a similar 3-year duration as the current expiring Cooperative Agreement. With the caveat that ultimate responsibility for activity prioritization belongs with a Jamaican institution, *we encourage a future Project to continue with the sensitization and training of justice officials but through a train-the-trainer approach.* By the end of the new grant period, we encourage USAID to negotiate an MOU with the Justice and/or National Security Ministry where responsibility and support for training is increasingly passed back from the Project and its implementer(s) to the GOJ. We believe it is imperative that the GOJ increasingly assume primary responsibility for its own anti-corruption training to avoid long-term dependence on USAID (or other donors) to ease concerns that the Jamaican public and statutory bodies might have over long-term ownership of anti-corruption efforts.

Other Program Recommendations. With the understanding that additional programs must be thought out carefully, the Team suggested several discrete additions to this basic focus:

1. "Bring Civics Back" – Introduce a School Integrity Curriculum for Jamaica's Next Generation. Developed by JCSC and supported by NIA, an Integrity Ambassador Manual has already been developed and approved by the Ministry of Education, and it is ready for a rollout beyond its 3 pilot high schools in the KMA where NIA has already introduced it. The Ministry of National Security has offered to use its convening authority to help promote this process, and USAID

is well-positioned to work with NIA, Teacher's Associations or others to help reintroduce a comprehensive civics elective in high school with a focus on integrity. The manual already includes space to use new and nontraditional forms of education, including theatre, arts, music and sports. Students could be encouraged to come up with their own social media approaches using outlets that speak to them directly. At-risk, underserved or incarcerated youth could be included as another source of anticorruption champions through the Office of the Children's Advocate. An activity such as this would be well-poised to evolve into a *stronger youth outreach* mentioned earlier in this Report. At the tertiary level, the Team noted that two professors are planning to teach undergraduate or law school anti-corruption courses, adapting a UNODC-developed course to a Jamaican context.

2. Consider a Short-Term Political Assessment Focusing on Political Parties and Parliament. While USAID may wish at some point to consider a longer-term whole-of-government corruption or integrity assessment, as it did in 2008 (or even a UNODC review of current anti-corruption legislation), an analysis of the country's political party system would be timely and is long overdue, given the renewed focus on campaign/election finance. The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer underscored that Jamaicans believe their own political parties to be more corrupt than any other public institution (surpassing the military, NGOs, the media, civil servants, health/education institutions, Parliament and the private sector by wide margins).³⁹ The Team notes that the sharp rise in disaffection, dropout and disinterest documented by the 2014 LAPOP surveys is likely correlated with this phenomenon. When queried, respondents stated that an old guard still dominates both parties and prevents the needed evolution of the country's institutions. USAID may wish to collaborate with DFID to invite an experienced, nonpartisan and well-recognized group, such as the Westminster

³⁹ Only a small handful of country respondents across the globe considered their political parties to be even more corrupt than Jamaica's (Nigeria, Nepal, Greece and Mexico), with residents of Italy and El Salvador tied with Jamaica's in their negative perceptions of party conduct. Table 2, Perceptions of Corruption by Institution, *Global Corruption Barometer*, 35-38.

Foundation (<http://www.wfd.org/>) to Jamaica, whose record includes technical assistance with legislatures and societies recovering from conflict or facing sudden representational crises. A part of this collaboration might include Canada's DFATD in the strengthening of ties between GOPAC (<http://gopacnetwork.org>), the global organization of parliamentarians against corruption, and Jamaica's Parliament.

With regard to a longer-term whole-of-government perspective, USAID may wish to join forces with other IDPs in encouraging the GOJ to complete its own anti-corruption assessment, which would include civil society, media and the private sector as full participants. The disaffection referred to above, including the lack of national consensus on how best to tackle corruption, may reflect the fact that the GOJ itself has yet to adopt a fully systemic approach to the issues involved, relying instead on more piecemeal tactics that have not succeeded in altering the overall anti-corruption environment.

3. A Future RFA with Differentiated Awareness Programs Targeting Specific Audiences. One of the more unexpected and repeated findings was how frequently – and from what surprising sources – came the recommendation: “If you want to do something meaningful in the future – focus on civic education, reach out to young people in schools, cultural and sports associations.” Many stated that donors should target the younger generation, rather than existing institutions of any kind, enlisting help from broad parts of civil society, including churches, the Office of the Child’s Advocate, schools, popular music and culture in the process. It isn’t enough – many said – to just make people aware of corruption; now you have to help people define and understand it, and help them generate individual and successful responses to it. One person used the analogy of focusing energy less on cleaning up the final package of goods once it rolls off the assembly line and more on ensuring that the goods at the beginning of the process are of high quality. Otherwise, the culture of corruption and noncompliance will start all over again.

4. The Need to Recruit New Anti-Corruption Organizational Champions. The Project clearly understands that building a social movement requires the recruitment of new forces, both individually and organizationally. The Project's second documentary, *Building Integrity: A Work in Progress* recognizes the challenges implicit in this long-term task. The Team believes that one way to help this would be to craft educational messages *increasingly differentiated by class, age and gender*. Publicizing integrity approaches and making them attractive to large segments of the population which arguably see little benefit to changed behavior seem to be a part of this process. Many respondents asserted that new behavior cannot take hold until individuals see personal – not just societal – benefits from it. Such message differentiation would not just increase the Project's effectiveness but would help foster a still-absent national consensus over how best to tackle corruption.

Facilitators could be encouraged to show greater awareness that more women than men appear to be interested in integrity-related activities. It may well be that the next focus should be on how to strengthen *men's participation*, particularly among at-risk men, using targeted messages through advertisements, art/music programs, sports, etc. and community forums which may have been insufficiently utilized thus far.

In Review

Over 3 years, the Project has made skillful use of public sentiment, legislative advocacy and initiative while seeking to fill critical gaps in state anti-corruption capacity. In so doing, it has filled a societal niche and increased the demand for cleaner government. The choice of NIA turned out to be wise in the sense that the organization quickly earned a reputation for delivering impartial, nonpartisan, sophisticated and necessary technical assistance to agencies charged with the prevention or enforcement of new anti-corruption legal and procedural norms. Simultaneously, the Project used town meetings and other forums to increase public demand for integrity using a message backed by results obtained from our

Survey - that less corruption leads to more jobs and more investment. For a future Project, USAID is encouraged to develop indicators for program success that go beyond simply increasing awareness to craft increasingly differentiated public messages about corruption which recognize the dangers posed by rising levels of dissatisfaction with institutional performance.

Dissemination Plan

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this final performance evaluation of the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project can be disseminated to the intended users through a variety of mediums including presentations, documents, websites, social media, and emails. In particular, presentations could include USAID Senior Staff as well as USAID stakeholder presentations including the NIAL. Document dissemination could include sharing of the Final Report and/or the executive summary of the Final Report. Website dissemination of the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations could include electronic databases such as the Development Experience Clearing House as well as the USAID/Jamaica homepage and related websites directing users to the DEC. Social media dissemination of the evaluation could include platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Evaluation Interest Group listservs, as well as other relevant USAID listservs. And lastly, copies of the report can be disseminated via email to select USAID M&E points of contact and implementing partners and donors.

Appendix A
List of Interviewees/Meetings

Government of Jamaica/Jamaican Statutory Bodies

Most Hon. Sir Patrick Allen, Governor General (invited but declined)
Courtney Brown, Permanent Secretary/Ministry of National Security
Hon. Peter Bunting, Minister of National Security
Hon. Mark Golding, Minister of Justice
Selvin Hay, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Deputy Director General, MOCA
Hon. Zaila McCalla, O.J., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Lisa Palmer-Hamilton, Acting Director of Public Prosecutions
Training Department, Office of Public Prosecutions
Donna Parchment-Brown, *Custos Rotulorum*, St Andrew (invited)
Hon. Phillip Paulwell, Leader of Government Business in the Lower House
Dr. Dwayne Vernon, Executive Director, Social Development Commission
Maj. Richard Reese, M.P., CEO/Commissioner, Jamaica Customs

MPs/Standing Commission Staff

Hillary Alexander, J.P., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology
Maurice Barrett, Senior Director, Office of the Contractor General
David D. Grey, J.P, Secretary/Manager, Commission for the Prevention of Corruption
Dihann Gordon Harrison, LL.B., Children's Advocate of Jamaica
Hon. Justice Paul Harrison, Integrity Commission (invited but declined)
Dirk Harrison, Contractor General
Hon. Andrew Holness, Leader of the Opposition
Pamela Monroe-Ellis, Auditor General (invited)
Hon. Dorothy Pine-McLarty, O.J., Commissioner, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
Sen. Tom Tavares-Finson, Leader of Opposition Business, Senate and Member, ECJ

Civil Society, Professional, Media, Educational, Private Sector, Youth Organizations
And Other Private Companies/Individuals

National Integrity Action

Professor Trevor Munroe, Executive Director

Jamie-Ann Chevannes, Administrator

Lisanne Hamilton, Research Associate

Ann Harrington, Office Assistant

Omar Lewis, Research Coordinator

Marlon Moore, Events/Public Participation

Richard Pasley, Outreach Officer

Loy Taylor, Assistant

Mitzie Young, Finance/Administration

Fabian Brown, Past Founder, CAFFE

Jenni Campbell, Immediate Past President, PAJ

Greg Christie, Attorney and Former Contractor General

Dennis Chung, Chief Executive Officer, PSOJ

Paul Clare, On-site Coordinator

Erica Douglas, General Manager, NAPDEC

Bishop Rowan Edwards, St Catherine's Ministers Fraternal (invited but declined)

Kent Gammon, Attorney-at-Law (by email)

Franz George, Past Vice-President, Guild of Students, MONA, University of West Indies

Dr. Paul Golding, Dean, College of Business and Management, University of Technology

Carolyn Gomes, Past Convenor, Jamaicans for Justice

Danielle Harris, Program Manager, EWA Marketing

Dr. Omar Hawthorne, Department of Government, University of West Indies

Dionne Jackson-Miller, President, PAJ

Dane Lewis, Executive Director, J-FLAG

Herbie Miller, Director/Curator, Institute of Jamaica

Carol Narcisse, Secretariat Chair, JCSC

William Shaghoury, Executive Director, NAPDEC

Terry Williams, Managing Director, EWA Marketing

Andre Wilson, Youth-for-Development Network, University of Technology

Christopher Zacca, Immediate Past President, PSOJ

IDPs

Canada

Walter Bernyck, Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Canadian High Commission

Vivian A. Gray, Jr., Senior Development Officer, Canadian High Commission

Colleen Pigeon, Political/Economic Counselor, Canadian High Commission

European Commission

Jesus Orus Bagueña

Inter-American Development Bank

Therese Turner-Jones, Country Representative

United States and USG Project Implementers

Deborah Banks, Acting Mission Director, USAID/Jamaica

Allan Bernard, AOR, Combating Corruption in Jamaica, USAID/Jamaica

Bion Bliss, Political Officer, US Embassy

James Burrowes, Director, Office of Program & Policy Management, USAID/Jamaica

Ian McKnight, Chief of Party, Community Empowerment and Transformation Project II

Rebecca Molinoff, Political Officer, US Embassy

Rebecca Robinson, Supervisory Program Officer, USAID/Jamaica

Dacia Samuels, Development Program Specialist, USAID/Jamaica

United Kingdom

Sarah Barnett, Governance Advisor, DFID/Caribbean

International NGOs

Alejandro Salas, Secretariat, Transparency International (Americas)

Marta Erquicia, Project Coordinator (Americas)

Focus Group Participants

Youth (Kingston)

Leon Burrell

Shelly-Ann Campbell (invited)
Zanj Carr, Stand Up for Jamaica (invited)
Samantha Dunkley, Property Maintenance
Anika Kiddoe
Omar Jones, Property Maintenance
Kethania Griffiths (invited)
Reynaldo Henry, Property Maintenance
Donat Robinson, East Kingston Society
Javayne Robinson, Youth Crime Watch of Jamaica
Leon Samms, Fletchers Land Police Youth Club (University of Technology)
Jillian Watson (invited)
Tarik Weekes, Institute of Criminal Justice and Security
Michelle Williams, University of the West Indies

At-Risk Youth (Kingston)

30-40 participants, Netball Jamaica Youth Leadership Program (U'tz Shine) COMET II

Gender (Kingston)

Mildred Crawford, President, JNRWP
Joan Cummings, WROC
Kemesha Ennis, University of the West Indies
Joan French (invited)
Jeanette Calder (invited)
Julian Moore, University of the West Indies
Pat Phillips (invited)
Dorothy Whyte (invited)
Elaine Wint (invited)

Civil Society (Montego Bay)

Trecia Woolery, New Ramble Citizen Association
Latoya Tinglin, Cambridge CPYC
Tevorn Fabnego, Cambridge CYPC

Shaniel Edwards, UWI MONA WJC/Guild Council
Daniel Adams, UWI MONA WJC/Guild Council
Judith Whyte, Roman Catholic Bishops Office
Devon Crooks, Roman Catholic Bishops Office
Maxene Jones, UCJCI – WRMC
Fayan Reid-Black, VP Youth Dept Full Gospel Church
Jessican Hines, UWI MONA – WJC Guild Council
Monique Smith, UWI MONA – WJC Guild Council
Natasha Broodie, UWI MONA – WJC Guild Council

Appendix B

Focus Group Discussion Protocol

Key questions asked/answered. Key questions posed through the FGD's are directed at targeted groups and prior NIAL program participants representing a range of civil society members, including the business community. This includes professionals, CSO activists, business and/or press association members, as well as several NIAL sensitization training beneficiaries or attendees at select PDC town hall meetings.

The questions are aimed at helping the Team answer the 4 core questions highlighted by USAID in the Scope of Work, with our evaluation eyes focused on both past as well as future programming opportunities.

Draft Questions/Prompts:

- What contributions, if any, do you think NIAL program activities have been made to raising the public's awareness about corruption issues in Jamaica over the last three years?
- Do you think the public's demand for anti-corruption reforms has increased or decreased as a result of NIAL programming activities over the last three years?
- Have your personal views about the nature, scope and cost of corruption in Jamaica changed over the last three years of the NIAL program?
- Do you think a new one-stop anti-corruption agency is necessary and politically feasible to addressing and preventing corruption in Jamaica?
- Do you think creation of this kind of institution should be a high priority and the focus of any new anti-corruption program and do you think this issue has been effective in raising public awareness and demand for reform in this area?
- What current anti-corruption institution is most trusted and effective and which one is least trusted and effective in addressing and preventing corruption?
- Do you think it is necessary and politically feasible to promote anti-corruption laws related to political party campaign finance reform in order to address and prevent corruption in Jamaica?
- Do you think passage of this law should be the focus on any new program and has this issue been effective in raising public awareness and demand for reform in this area?

- Are you more aware of the nature and cost of corruption to individuals and Jamaican society as a whole today as opposed to several years ago?
- What kind of civil society oriented anti-corruption activities should be included and prioritized in any future anti-corruption program?
- What kind of anti-corruption reforms or issues are most important to addressing and preventing high-level corruption in Jamaica?
- What kind of anti-corruption reforms or issues are most important to addressing issues of concern to women and which NIAL activities have been most effective in identifying these issues and outreach to women?
- What kind of corruption reforms or issues are most important to addressing issues of concern to Jamaican youth and which NIAL activities have been effective in identifying these issues and reaching out to Jamaican youth?
- Do you have more or less confidence that the government is serious about addressing and preventing corruption today than several years ago?
- Do you think addressing internal corruption within existing anti-corruption institutions is necessary to addressing and preventing corruption and enforcing the laws in Jamaica?
- Are you now more engaged and able to obtain and share information with other individuals and organizations involved in anti-corruption activities and issues than you were three years ago?
- Would you be willing to participate as a volunteer in a future NIAL anti-corruption program?
- What score, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest, would you give the NIAL program you participated in as well as the overall NIAL program?

Appendix C –Survey Questionnaire
Public Attitudes Toward Corruption Over the Last Few Years

HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION OVER LAST FEW YEARS

Identification

Parish: Constituency: ED number:

Dwelling number: Community: _____

Interviewer's name: _____ Interview's ID:

Introduction

Good morning,/Good Afternoon, my name is _____

The U.S. Agency for International Development is supporting a program to promote awareness of corruption-related issues in Jamaica and how corruption affects business investment in the country, and attitudes of citizens toward their own government and state institutions. We are asking heads of households in several different parishes, towns and rural areas if they would be willing to answer a few questions to get a sense of how well that program is working. If you would, we would like ask you about 10 questions, based on your own experiences and perceptions. It would not take more than about ten minutes to answer all of them. Your answers will be anonymous and confidential. Would you be willing to participate in this survey? Thank you.

Section A: Looking Back

1. In thinking back over the last 2-3 years, do you think you have become:

(A) more aware of corruption than you were before?
(B) less aware of corruption than you were before?
(C) my awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other.

2. With regard to levels of corruption you know of or have heard about, would you say that the country's situation overall is:

(A) getting worse - that is, corruption has been increasing - over the past few years?
(B) getting better - that is, corruption has been decreasing - over the past few years?
(C) staying about the same, not much change, one way or the other?

3. And again, looking back over the last few years, would you say that the various state agencies whose job it is to fight corruption - the police, the courts, the Contractor General and other Parliamentary commissions:

- (A) are gradually getting better, taking more effective steps, and more deserving of your trust?
- (B) are gradually getting worse, taking less effective steps, and less deserving of your trust?
- (C) their work, the steps they are taking, are about the same as before, and my attitudes toward them have not changed much, one way or the other.

4. And once again, looking back over the last two or three years, would you say that the two major political parties:

- (A) are gradually becoming more accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting more transparent over this time?
- (B) are gradually becoming less accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting less transparent over this time?
- (C) are staying about the same as they have been, not much more or less accountable to voters or financially transparent than before?

5. And the last question about looking back over the past few years - what do you feel has influenced your perceptions about corruption most during this time the most?

- (A) how the media (TV, radio, newspapers, Internet sites, blogs) cover these issues.
- (B) my own discussions with friends, church/community members, school and workmates about these issues.
- (C) official statements and platforms of political leaders and parties, whether national, parish or local.
- (D) my personal experience dealing with statutory agencies (police, courts, vehicle licensing/inspection facilities, getting business permits, tax compliance, etc.)
- (E) how Jamaican civil society and human rights organizations cover these issues.
- (F) Other _____

Section B: Looking Ahead

6. And now, just a few questions about looking ahead the next few years, please. Looking at all government and state institutions right now, would you say that in the next 2-3 years, you expect to have

- (A) more confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past?

- (B) less confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past?
- (C) I don't expect my opinion of the ability or willingness of government or state institutions to change much - one way or the other - over the next few years.

7. And if I asked you the same question - but looking at the country's non-governmental civil society, human rights and anti-corruption organizations - would you say you have

- (A) more confidence in their ability to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years?
- (B) less confidence in their ability to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years?
- (C) I don't expect my opinion of the ability of civil society groups to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption will change much, one way or the other.

8. And again, looking ahead, what - for you - would the most significant sign that the country is finally on the right track with regard to fighting corruption?

- (A) seeing 'big fish' successfully prosecuted, their assets confiscated, or even being sent to jail.
- (B) getting a driver's license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport or other service quickly without having to give a bribe to somebody.
- (C) having a 'clean' police force that doesn't abuse its authority and respects people.
- (D) new laws that will create an independent anti-corruption agency with the power to prosecute wrong-doers.
- (E) a Government that helps the country to grow economically, with more employment and business investment in the country as a result.
- (F) a more moral society where personal integrity, and high ethical standards are increasingly valued.
- (G) Other _____.

Section C: What Can I Do?

9. And now, getting to the end, just a couple of questions about what you - or perhaps your family, community or church could do - to help create a cleaner future for the country. Which of the following best describes your own attitudes toward this question?

- (A) I feel I have a lot of personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt.
- (B) I feel I have some personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt.
- (C) I feel only a little personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt.
- (D) I don't feel I have a personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt.
- (E) I'm not sure what my personal responsibility is in this regard.

- | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| (A) Less than \$50,000 | (B) \$50,001-\$80,000 | (C) \$80,001-\$120,000 |
| (D) \$120,001-\$180,000 | (D) \$180,001-\$250,000 | (E) \$250,000 + |

Thank you again for your time today. Your responses will be completely anonymous and used to help international donors, Government and civil society in Jamaica to better understand the directions the country is moving in with regard to corruption issues.

Appendix D – Survey Results

Perception of Corruption in Jamaica: Nationally Representative Survey, 2015⁴⁰

Descriptors of the Sample

The gender, age, education, occupation and household income of the sample are reported in qual (sig.=.570).

Table 1. There were differences within the sample on all the background variables except for gender. Overall, the sample was mostly persons aged 46 – 65 years living in urban townships, whose highest schooling was secondary level, worked as ‘skilled worker’ and whose monthly household income was less than \$50,000. The unemployment rate is 13%. Concerning gender, one-sample binomial test proved the male female ratio was statistically equal (sig.=.570).

Table 1: Demographic Profile of Sample

Categories		N	%
Gender	Male	296	48.8%
	Female	311	51.2%
	Total	607	100.0%
Age group	18-25	73	11.9%
	26-35	150	24.5%
	36-45	129	21.1%
	46-65	203	33.2%
	Over 65	56	9.2%
	Total	611	100.0%
Education - Highest Level	Primary	89	14.8%
	Secondary	345	57.4%
	Post-secondary/college	51	8.5%
	Skills/Vocational	68	11.3%
	University	48	8.0%
	Total	601	100.0%
Household monthly income	Less than \$50,000	203	35.9%
	\$50,001-\$80,000	187	33.0%
	\$80,001-\$120,000	101	17.8%
	\$120,001-\$180,000	47	8.3%
	\$180,001-\$250,000	17	3.0%
	\$250,000+	11	1.9%
	Total	566	100.0%
Urban status	Urban	428	69.8%
	Rural	185	30.2%
	Total	613	100.0%
Occupation	Professional	31	5.1%
	Administrative/Clerical/Sales	83	13.5%
	Semi-Professional	32	5.2%
	Skilled Worker	102	16.6%
	Unskilled worker	39	6.4%
	Manual Tradesman	20	3.3%
	Farmer/Fisherman	46	7.5%
	Protective Services	29	4.7%
	Pensioner/Retired	34	5.5%
	Unemployed	77	12.6%
	Student/ Housewife	46	7.5%
	Other	74	12.0%
	Total	613	100.0%

⁴⁰ This nationally representative survey description, methodology notes and survey results were prepared by UWIC as a supplement to this report.

Trends in the Last Few Years

Overall Corruption Level and the Anti-Corruption Fight

Most people (64%) believe the overall situation regarding the level of corruption in the country is getting worse; that is, corruption has been increasing (refer to [Table 2](#)). They (46%) hold the view that State agencies have gradually gotten worse over the “last few years” in fighting corruption. Just about the same proportion of people (45%) says that the two major political parties are “gradually becoming less accountable to voters, and their financial affairs getting less transparent than before.”

These views reflect the majority opinion and do not vary with demographics covered in the survey except for monthly household income. Specifically, those who believe the overall corruption level improved were most likely to be in households earning more than \$50,000 monthly.

Table 2: Perception of overall trend in corruption and the work of state agencies and political parties against corruption

Trends in Perception of Corruption		%	Count
(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending	Getting better - that is, corruption has been decreasing - over the past few years	14%	82
	Staying about the same, not much change, one way or the other	22%	136
	Getting worse - that is, corruption has been increasing - over the past few years	64%	387
	Total	100%	605
(q3) Perception of How Well State Agencies Have Been Fighting Corruption	Gradually getting better, taking more effective steps, and more deserving of your trust	21%	126
	Their work, the steps they are taking, are about the same as before, and my attitudes toward them have not changed much	33%	201
	Gradually getting worse, taking less effective steps, and less deserving of your trust	46%	278
	Total	100%	605
(q4) Perceived Trend of Accountability of Two Major Political Parties to Voters	Gradually becoming more accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting more transparent over this time	14%	85
	Staying about the same as they have been, not much more or less accountable to voters or financially transparent than be	41%	247
	Gradually becoming less accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting less transparent over this time	45%	272
	Total	100%	604

People tended to perceive the anticorruption work of the state agencies and the two major political parties the same way as the do the direction in the overall level of corruption in the country. Hence, those who thought corruption was “getting better” overall were at least twice more likely than everyone in general to say state agencies and the two major political parties were gradually getting better in standing against corruption (see [Table 3](#)).

Table 3: Perceived performance of state agencies and major political parties in the fight against corruption by Perception of trend in overall corruption

Trends in Perception of How Groups are Fighting Corruption		(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending			Total
		Getting better - that is, decreasing	Staying about the same	Getting worse - that is increasing	
(q3) Perception of How Well State Agencies Have Been Fighting Corruption	Gradually getting better, taking more effective steps, and more deserving of your trust	57 67.9%	37 26.8%	32 8.3%	126 20.7%
	Their work, the steps they are taking, are about the same as before, and my attitudes toward them have not changed much	18 21.4%	76 55.1%	108 27.9%	202 33.2%
	Gradually getting worse, taking less effective steps, and less deserving of your trust	9 10.7%	25 18.1%	247 63.8%	281 46.1%
Total		84 100.0%	138 100.0%	387 100.0%	609 100.0%
(q4) Perceived Trend of Accountability of Two Major Political Parties to Voters	Gradually becoming more accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting more transparent over this time	33 39.3%	22 15.9%	32 8.3%	87 14.3%
	Staying about the same as they have been, not much more or less accountable to voters or financially transparent than be	32 38.1%	76 55.1%	139 36.0%	247 40.6%
	Gradually becoming less accountable to voters, with their financial processes getting less transparent over this time	19 22.6%	40 29.0%	215 55.7%	274 45.1%
	Total	84 100.0%	138 100.0%	386 100.0%	608 100.0%

Public Awareness of Corruption

Most people (70%) are more aware of corruption now than they were before (

Table). The awareness did not vary with demographics – hence, regardless of their background respondents were likely to be more aware now of corruption.

Those who were more aware tended to say the overall level of corruption in the country is getting worse (74 vs. 63%) (see Table 5). However, for the respondents who believe corruption was “getting better”, changes in their awareness did not matter.

Table 4: Public awareness of corruption last 2-3 years

(q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption	%	Count
More aware of corruption than you were before	70%	421
Awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other	27%	164
Less aware of corruption than you were before	3%	20
Total	100%	605

Table 5: Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending by Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption

Perception of Trends in Overall Corruption		(q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption			Total
		More aware of corruption	Awareness has not changed	Less aware of corruption	
(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending	Getting better - that is, corruption has been decreasing - over the past few years	60 14.2%	20 12.1%	4 19.0%	84 13.8%
	Staying about the same, not much change, one way or the other	50 11.8%	77 46.7%	12 57.1%	139 22.8%
	Getting worse - that is, corruption has been increasing - over the past few years	313 74.0%	68 41.2%	5 23.8%	386 63.4%
Total		423 100.0%	165 100.0%	21 100.0%	609 100.0%

Factors Shaping the Perception of Corruption

The survey finds that for most people (56%) the media was the most important factor in influencing their perception of corruption (Table 6). Otherwise, respondents (20%) mentioned their personal experience with state agencies when doing regulatory transactions (e.g., motor vehicle licencing) as the biggest factor in shaping their views on corruption⁴¹. Demographics did not predict what factors people say shaped their perception of corruption.

Table 6: Most influential factor on the perception of corruption

Influential Factors	Count	Table N %
(q5) Most Influential Factor on the Perception of Corruption		
How the media (TV, radio, newspapers, Internet sites, blogs) cover these issues	346	56.6%
My own discussions with friends, church/community members, school and workmates about these issues	66	10.8%
Official statements and platforms of political leaders and parties, whether national, parish or local	57	9.3%
My personal experience dealing with statutory agencies (police, courts, vehicle licencing/inspection facilities, getting	123	20.1%
How Jamaican civil society and human rights organizations cover these issues	16	2.6%
Other	3	0.5%
Total	611	100.0%

The most influential factor on their perception does not predict whether they believe corruption overall trended up or down in the past few years. That is, the correlation was not statistically significant ($cc=.147$, $p=.198$). However, what they say influenced their perception had something to do with how their awareness of corruption changed in the last 2-3 years ($cc=.201$, $p=.004$). For people who say they were more aware nowadays, they were most likely to take cues from how the media cover these issues (74 vs. 69%). From those who say they were less aware, their perception tended to be influenced by how the civil society organisations covered the issues (20 vs. 3%). See Table .

⁴¹ This survey item was a closed-ended question with an unforced aided-response set.

Table 7: (q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption by (q5) Most Influential Factor on the Perception of Corruption

(q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption	(q5) Most Influential Factor on the Perception of Corruption								
	How the media cover these issues	My own discussions with friends etc. about these issues	Official statements etc. of political leaders	My personal experience dealing with statutory agencies	How Jamaican civil society etc. cover these issues	Other	Total		
More aware of corruption than you were before	74%	62%	54%	69%	53%	67%	423	69%	
Awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other	23%	32%	42%	28%	27%	33%	165	27%	
Less aware of corruption than you were before	2%	6%	4%	3%	20%	0%	21	3%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	609	100%	

Expectations about the Anti-Corruption Effort Confidence in the Fight by State Agencies and Civil Society

The public generally (39%) does not expect in the next few years to change their opinion about the ability or willingness of state agencies to fight corruption (Table 8). The minority (29%) were more optimistic.

There is no clear view or trend regarding public expectation in the next few years of the willingness or ability of civil society to fight corruption. That is, all the major views are equally likely or the frequencies were only marginally different. One-sample chi square test confirms the proportions are statistically equal (sig=.115).

Table 8: Expectations of the near future about willingness and ability of groups to fight corruption

Major trends in expectations		Column N %
(q6) Expectation for Next Few Years of Willingness and Ability of State Agencies to Fight Corruption	More confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past	29%
	Don't expect my opinion of the ability or willingness of government or state institutions to change much	39%
	Less confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past	32%
	Total	100% (609)
(q7) Expectation for Next Few Years of Willingness and Ability of Civil Society to Fight Corruption	More confidence in their ability to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption	36%
	I don't expect my opinion of their ability to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption to change	34%
	Less confidence in their ability to monitor state and Government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years	30%
	Total	100% (609)

Except for monthly household income and area of residence, confidence did not change by demographics. The households earning \$80,000 to \$120,000 were most likely to be more confident, and those over \$250,000 less confident, in the next few years in state agencies. For the activism of civil society groups, the public with household monthly income between \$50,000 and \$120,000 were most likely to be more confident, and those with over \$180,000 less confident, in the next few years. Rural area residents showed more tendencies to be confident about civil society groups than do urban area residents.

Those who tended to think corruption overall is trending downward were the ones who expect to be more confident in the next few years of the ability and willingness of state agencies to fight corruption (63 v. 29%) (see [Table 9](#)). There were no significant variances in their expectation about civil society based on whether they believed corruption overall was getting better or worse (sig=.107).

Table 9: Expectations about willingness & ability of state agencies to fight corruption by Perception of overall corruption trend

Major trends in expectation		(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending			Total
		Getting better	Staying about the same	Getting worse	
(q6) Expectation for Next Few Years of Willingness and Ability of State Agencies to Fight Corruption	More confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past	63%	30%	21%	29%
	Don't expect my opinion of the ability or willingness of government or state institutions to change much	27%	48%	38%	39%
	Less confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past	11%	22%	41%	32%
	Total	100% (83)	100% (139)	100% (385)	100% (609)

Signs of Progress in the Fight against Corruption

What would most impress the public in the fight against corruption is either that they see the government is facilitating economic growth with jobs and business investment (30%), or the ‘big fish’ is prosecuted, assets confiscated or even being sent to jail (27%). The few things that would impress the many would be those events mentioned above, plus having a ‘clean’ police force (21%) and new laws creating an independent anti-corruption agency with prosecutorial powers (7%). See [Table 10](#) below. Figure 1 shows the Pareto chart reflecting the cumulative frequencies starting with the ‘big ticket’ anticorruption signs.

Household monthly income influenced these views. Households earning under \$50,000 were most likely to highlight action for a clean police force (25% for group v. 20% overall). Households earning between \$80,000 and \$120,000 were most likely to highlight action for access to government services without need for a bligh (14 v 7%).

Table 10: Most significant sign country is on right track to fight corruption

Most Significant Signs of Anti-Corruption Progress		Column N %	Count
(q8) Most Significant Sign that Country on the Right Track to Fight Corruption	Seeing 'big fish' successfully prosecuted, their assets confiscated, or even being sent to jail	27%	166
	Getting a driver's license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport etc. quickly without a need for bligh	6%	38
	Having a 'clean' police force that doesn't abuse its authority and respects people	21%	130
	New laws that will create an independent anti-corruption agency with the power to prosecute wrong-doers	7%	42
	A Government that helps the economy to grow, with jobs and investment	30%	180
	A moral society where personal integrity, and high ethical standards are increasingly valued	7%	41
	Other	1%	9
	Total	100%	606




Figure 1: Top 3 signs of an anti-corruption agenda that would impress roughly 80% of the public

The signs of progress that people use for the anti-corruption agenda influences their perception of where the overall corruption level in Jamaica is going. In particular, those who say the country is getting better were most likely to highlight their experience at getting official documents (e.g., TCC) without the need for a 'bligh' (34 v. 14%) (Table 11). The differences between the sign highlighted were marginal for people indicating the other trends for the overall corruption level.

Table 11: Perception of how corruption overall is trending by Most significant sign of anti-corruption progress

		(q8) Most Significant Sign that Country on the Right Track to Fight Corruption							Total	
		Seeing 'big fish' successfully prosecuted etc.	Getting a TCC etc. quickly without a bligh	Having a 'clean' police force etc.	New laws that will create an independent anti-corruption etc.	A Government that helps economic growth with jobs and investment	A moral society where personal integrity, etc. are increasingly valued			
Major trends										
Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending	Getting better	17%	32%	12%	12%	12%	5%	14%	84	
	Staying about the same	23%	30%	21%	31%	20%	26%	23%	137	
	Getting worse	60%	38%	67%	57%	68%	70%	63%	380	
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	601	

Personal Responsibility in the Anti-Corruption Agenda

Most people (71%) feel some responsibility for creating a ‘cleaner future for the country’. Eighteen percent (18%) feel ‘a lot of personal responsibility’, 31% feel ‘some’ and 22% feel ‘only a little’. See [Table 12](#).

Except for household income, demographics did not influence these views. It was persons in households with income between \$180,000 and \$250,000 who were most likely to not feel any personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt (35% v. 14%). And those who were not sure of what their own responsibility is in this regard were most likely to have household income of under \$50,000 (22% v.15%).

Table 12: Sense of personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt

Major trends		Column N %
(q9) Sense of Personal Responsibility in Helping Country to Become Less Corrupt	I feel I have a lot of personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	18%
	I feel I have some personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	31%
	I feel only a little personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	22%
	I don't feel I have a personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	15%
	I'm not sure what my own responsibility is in this regard	15%
	Total	100% (611)

Based on the integration logic between the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project, and IR 1 and IR 2 of the AO1 of USAID for CAS, the sense of personal responsibility for a ‘cleaner future for the country’ is an indicator of public demand for action against corruption. This public demand is one of the project outcomes. The highest expression of this responsibility, in terms of the activism and directness that an individual is committing to, is to say “I feel I have a lot of personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt.” The more persons tending towards this attitude, the stronger is the momentum for the anti-corruption agenda.

How their level of awareness of corruption changed these last few years, and the direction they feel the overall corruption level is heading does not predict what level of personal responsibility the public feel for stopping corruption⁴². In other words, the data does not support the point that people who were more aware, or who believe corruption is getting better or worse, were more likely to feel any particular level of personal responsibility to help stop corruption.

The best way most of the public (23%) feel they can contribute to the corruption free society is by “speaking out more on this subject with my friends, family, school, workplace or church” ([Table 13](#)). The answers were selected from a list. Probably the most passive response is to say “I would follow the news...” Most persons (31%) indicated they were willing to contribute in all the ways listed.

⁴² The sig. >.05 for the ordinal by ordinal measures of association

Table 13: Best way persons feel they can contribute to fight corruption

Ways of contributing		Total	
(q10) Best Area for Personal Capacity to Contribute to Fight Against Corruption	I would consider joining an anti-corruption or similar civil society organization	13%	76
	I would consider speaking out more on this subject with my friends, family, school, workplace or church	23%	138
	I would consider signing a petition; voting or joining the campaign of a politician promising steps to fight corruption	15%	88
	I would follow news/ information more carefully in the media about anti-corruption efforts of the public/ private sector	18%	106
	Some or all of the above	31%	187
	Other	1%	5
	Total	100%	600

Project Contribution to the Anti-Corruption Public Demand

Notes on Project Contribution Tests

The project contribution or impact assessment uses one sample test of differences between the target and control parishes for outcome indicators. The significance level for the tests is .05. Depending on the properties of the variables, the tests ran the Chi square based contingency coefficient or the ordinal by ordinal measures. Essentially, the tests decide whether, for any differences observed, there is any statistical basis to claim attribution to discriminating events - such as this project - between the target and control parishes. There is nothing to stop interaction between a target and control parish, or for the benefits of the project to permeate nationally rather than just at a parish level. The analysis recognises there are interaction effects that can explain or confound the project effect and complicate attribution.

Three indicators of project outcomes were identified. First, the awareness levels about corruption; and secondly, the personal responsibility against corruption. Questions 1 and 9 are indicators of these outcomes, respectively. These are linked directly to project activities such as “the use of the media as an important channel of public awareness building...” Thirdly, the project aims for grand corruption levels to decline; Question 2 is an indicator of this derived outcome.

Project Attribution and Public Awareness

Awareness of corruption varies significantly between target and control parishes ($cc=.151$, $sig=.001$). There is a greater chance (77%) to find people who say they are now more aware of corruption in control compared to target parishes (64%). The people whose awareness level did not change much were the ones most likely to be in the target parishes. The finding suggests there is little if any discriminatory effect of the awareness building activities in the target parishes.

Table 14: (q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption by Intervention vs. control parishes

Trends in Public Awareness		Intervention vs. control parishes		Total
		Intervention parishes	Control parishes	
(q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption	More aware of corruption than you were before	230 64.1%	194 77.0%	424 69.4%
	Awareness of corruption has not changed much, one way or the other	118 32.9%	48 19.0%	166 27.2%
	Less aware of corruption than you were before	11 3.1%	10 4.0%	21 3.4%
Total		359 100.0%	252 100.0%	611 100.0%

Project Attribution and Personal Responsibility against Corruption

Personal responsibility to fight corruption varied significantly between target and control parishes. More persons who indicate a high level of personal responsibility for a corruption free Jamaica were found in the target vis-à-vis control parishes (22 v. 12%). For all the other levels of personal responsibility, the differences between the target and control parishes were marginal. The finding suggests factor or factors are at work to build ownership of the fight and public demand against corruption in target parishes compared to control parishes. The project is included in the consideration of what could be these factors. The correlation between personal responsibility to fight corruption and the project area is significant but weak (cc=.143, sig=.012).

Table 15: (q9) Sense of Personal Responsibility in Helping Country to Become Less Corrupt by Intervention vs. control parishes

Levels of Personal Responsibility		Intervention vs. control parishes		Total
		Intervention parishes	Control parishes	
(q9) Sense of Personal Responsibility in Helping Country to Become Less Corrupt	I feel I have a lot of personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	80 22.3%	29 11.5%	109 17.8%
	I feel I have some personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	103 28.7%	86 34.1%	189 30.9%
	I feel only a little personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	79 22.0%	54 21.4%	133 21.8%
	I don't feel I have a personal responsibility to help the country become less corrupt	48 13.4%	41 16.3%	89 14.6%
	I'm not sure what my own responsibility is in this regard	49 13.6%	42 16.7%	91 14.9%
	Total	359 100.0%	252 100.0%	611 100.0%

Project Attribution and Overall Corruption Trend

There was partial relationship between how people view the direction corruption was heading and the project area. More people who believe overall corruption level was getting better or staying relatively unchanged were likely to be the target versus control parishes. See [Table 16](#).

Table 16: (q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending by Intervention vs. control parishes

Trends in Level of Corruption Overall		Intervention vs. control parishes		Total
		Intervention parishes	Control parishes	
(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending	Getting better - that is, corruption has been decreasing - over the past few years	60	24	84
		16.7%	9.5%	13.7%
	Staying about the same, not much change, one way or the other	96	43	139
		26.7%	17.1%	22.7%
	Getting worse - that is, corruption has been increasing - over the past few years	203	185	388
		56.5%	73.4%	63.5%
Total		359	252	611
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The finding suggests a greater likelihood for the public in, vis-à-vis outside, the project area to feel optimistic about how grand corruption is trending in recent years.

In consideration of the positive valence of this result, the analysis recalls that there is no evidence in the data to suggests people who feel corruption overall is getting better, compared to those who disagree, were more likely to own the personal responsibility to fight corruption (see p60 above). Also, the most significant sign of progress in the fight against corruption for people who believe corruption in the country was improving was most likely to be getting government services without need for a ‘blich’ (refer to p59).

Discussion

The public generally agree on key issues of corruption, including how the incidence is trending, level of confidence in the anti-corruption agenda work of state agencies, political parties and civil society; and ownership of personal responsibility to fight corruption. Hence, there were few instances of statistically significant differences within the sample by demographic categories on these issues. Household monthly income, which can be a part of a complex indicator for social class, was one of the few ways the sample varied in their perceptions. One pattern was that persons from middle income households (between \$80,000 and \$120,000) placed positive valence on initiatives that make the need for a ‘blich’ unnecessary when accessing government services. This should reduce the compliance cost for regulations. For persons from households earning under \$50,000 per month, the importance was on signs that the police force was clean and respectful to human rights.

Corruption overall is perceived to be trending in the wrong direction, and most persons say they are now more aware of corruption (or corruption issues). People tended to think the same way about the efforts of state agencies, political parties and civil society as they do about the direction they think corruption overall is trending. The media is the main shaper of their perceptions. However, their views about the direction corruption overall is trending, and whether their awareness changed over the recent years, was no indicator of their personal stand and hence, the public demand for action, against corruption. Hence, increases in the level of public awareness should not by itself be an outcome as much as an intermediate step towards personal responsibility against corruption.

There were desirable results in the differences between the project and control areas. Namely, there was more likelihood to find people with high level of personal responsibility against corruption in the project areas than outside. Similarly, the target areas had a higher proportion of people who say corruption overall has been trending downward. Project impact cannot be isolated to clarify the attribution for desirable outcomes using this data. However, the project can claim to be part of the set of factors for such an outcome. On other issues, namely public awareness levels, the result is complicated. More specifically,

public awareness was higher for a larger percentage of people in control rather than target areas. This could mean the penetration of public awareness activities by the project was not discriminatory to target areas; or such activities were not exclusive to the project. Also, there is the ambiguity that higher public awareness could mean more corrupt events now than before. In general, whether or not the target areas show differences in anti-corruption outcomes, the correlation with predictor variables was weak. That is, the project area was not a reliable predictor of an outcome.

The project activities are logical and linked to desirable outcomes under the IR 1 and IR 2 of the AO1 for the CAS of the USAID for Jamaica. The critical mass threshold for impact may require sustained action over time. The survey results are encouraging in that some key indicators – viz., public demand for the anti-corruption campaign, is in the right direction. It was also clear who are the people the project needs to target to build this momentum: persons who feel no responsibility or who do not know what their responsibility could be (inclusive). Signs that the public emphasises is a cue for a few high-impact strategies/ activities – viz., cleaning up the police force and successfully prosecuting the ‘big fish’. The survey validates the project strategy of using the media to build the anti-corruption coalition. Future versions of the survey could consider a distinction between public awareness of corruption affairs vis-à-vis ways of corruption avoidance. There is no ambiguity that the latter is desirable.

Survey Appendix

Table 17: Indicators of Corruption Issues by Demographics

		(q1) Trend the Last 2-3 Years in Public Awareness of Corruption	(q2) Perception of How Corruption Overall is Trending	(q9) Sense of Personal Responsibility in Helping Country Become Less Corrupt	
Contingency coefficient (Nominal by nominal)	Gender	Correlation Coefficient	.013	.074	.038
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.747	.059	.295
		N	605	605	605
Kendall's tau_b	Age group	Correlation Coefficient	-.064	.007	-.043
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.077	.834	.197
		N	609	609	609
Kendall's tau_b	Education - Highest Level	Correlation Coefficient	.019	-.071	-.060
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.605	.051	.078
		N	599	599	599
Kendall's tau_b	Household monthly income	Correlation Coefficient	-.002	-.198**	-.105**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.957	.000	.002
		N	564	564	564
Kendall's tau_b	Urban status	Correlation Coefficient	-.042	-.002	.029
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.290	.964	.420
		N	611	611	611

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix E – Jamaica Governance Scorecard 2012 - 2013

 JAMAICA GOVERNANCE SCORECARD 2012-2013				SUMMARY OF FINDINGS											
<p>Black Jamaica's sluggish development is due to a lack of accountability in the management of the country's affairs. The increasing public discourse about good governance is therefore both welcome and necessary. The discussion would become more meaningful if all stakeholders were more aware of what is to be done, what is actually being done, who is to do it, when it is to be done, and the roles that govern the process. Such information makes it possible to monitor and evaluate the progress being made. A truly functioning Democracy requires this.</p> <p>All the start of each financial year the sitting Administration outlines in Parliament what it intends to achieve. Jamaica has come to the end of its 2012/13 financial year and a new set of announcements has been made for the financial year 2013/14. An citizens' focus to the new promises and plans it is important to ask ourselves - WHAT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN FULFILLING THE PROMISES AND PLANS OF THE YEAR JUST KICKOFF?</p> <p>In seeking to answer this question, and, in keeping with its mission to deepen citizens' participation in governance, the Jamaica Civil Society Coalition, with the support of The National Integrity Action is presenting this Governance Scorecard. It is the first in a series and is intended to function both as an on-going communication and performance evaluation tool.</p> <p>The scorecard does not attempt to capture every promise or achievement made by members of the government. Instead, as a first step, it highlights (1) the promises and plans of the Government as outlined in the Governor General's Throne Speech for the 2012/13 parliamentary year, (2) the relationship of these plans to the promises made in the PNP Manifesto 2011 and (3) the actions that have been taken, or taken or are in progress up to MARCH 24, 2013.</p> <p>We have now entered into our 2013/14 Financial Year. Another Throne Speech has been delivered and budget resolutions are being made setting out the Government's new work agenda. These will form the basis for the next performance assessment, and of March 2014. Until then, the JCSC invites you to read and use this Scorecard, discuss the findings with family and friends, citizen associations, NGOs etc., as you assess for yourselves, the performance of YOUR EMPLOYERS - the public servants and elected representatives, charged with the responsibility for steady and effective management of our affairs in order to realize a better Jamaica for us all.</p>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td>No. of promises</td> <td>- 35</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Promises Kept</td> <td>- 9 (26%)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Promises Broken</td> <td>- 15 (43%)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Promises in the Works</td> <td>- 11 (31%)</td> </tr> </table>				No. of promises	- 35	Promises Kept	- 9 (26%)	Promises Broken	- 15 (43%)	Promises in the Works	- 11 (31%)
No. of promises	- 35														
Promises Kept	- 9 (26%)														
Promises Broken	- 15 (43%)														
Promises in the Works	- 11 (31%)														
PROMISES 2012/13 THRONE SPEECH	RELATED PROMISES IN PNP MANIFESTO	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS	PROMISES 2012/13 THRONE SPEECH	RELATED PROMISES IN PNP MANIFESTO	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS								
THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA															
1. We will pass an Act to establish a single unit compliance agency to reformulate Jamaica's institutional arrangements for fighting corruption.	We will lead in the fight against corruption by example, by the proper use of Parliamentary oversight and by public education.	Central based Advisory Committee established. Report submitted to Cabinet. Bill to be tabled in the 2013/14 legislative year.	Promises in the Works	19. We will rationalize the transportation system as a means over the medium to longer term, of reducing the use of fuel per capita.	We will actively worked in improving the public transportation system to make it more energy efficient.	Not done to date	Promises Broken								
2. We will facilitate the use of DNA evidence in the criminal justice system.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	1st draft of Bill submitted to Minister of National Security Nov 2012, circulated for comments, 2nd draft in before Chief Parliamentary Counsel.	Promises in the Works	20. We will ensure greater efficiency in the distribution of electricity.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	No substantial progress. Government signed and funded over 11 schemes for fuel meters to enable distributed generation in Jamaica for the first time however only two people have been connected to date.	Promises Broken								
3. We will amend the Trafficking Act to allow video-recorded evidence particularly useful for child victims of sexual abuse and evidence from remote locations via a live link.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Passed in the House of Representatives December 4, 2012 & received the Gov's assent on Dec 24, 2012.	Promises Kept	NATIONAL SECURITY AND JUSTICE											
4. We will pass an Act to establish the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as Jamaica's final Court of Appeal. This process will involve further dialogue with the Opposition.	We will complete the long process of de-linking from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as our final Court of Appeal and fully embracing the jurisdiction of the CCJ.	No Bill tabled to date	Promises Broken	21. We will continue to fight relentlessly against the scourge of crime and violence.	We will relentlessly target organized crime and gangster turf between the critical stakeholders.	The Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption (MOCA) task force was launched in June 2012 to remove the profit from crime and provide challenges.	Promises in the Works								
5. Anti-gang legislation will be passed to more effectively target criminal gangs and organized criminal groups, which are responsible for 70% of all murders in Jamaica.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Current draft approved by Cabinet and the Attorney General's Department. Now scheduled for the 2013 Legislative Year.	Promises Broken	22. Development will be pursued through a Community Renewal Programme.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Project to target the 5 parishes with most troubled communities. Pilot project rolled out in 1 community.	Promises in the Works								
6. We will pass a Second Transactive Act to overhaul Jamaica's antiquated system for taking security over collateral other than real estate.	This Act will be pursued, to introduce a modern system for taking security over assets other than land, and to provide certainty as to available remedies.	No bill tabled to date	Promises Broken	23. We will complete the new National Security Policy which will provide a comprehensive framework to guide the national security apparatus and criminal justice system.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Policy approved in December 2012.	Promises Kept								
7. A new Planning and Design Act will be passed to provide a modern framework for investment.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Bill being drafted as at Oct 2012	Promises in the Works	EDUCATION - EARLY CHILDHOOD											
8. The Government will be proceeding in preparing and passing an Act to establish Jamaica as a Republic within the Commonwealth of Nations.	We pledge to lead the process for Jamaica's detachment from the Monarchy and for our country to assume the status of a Republic.	Not done to date	Promises Broken	24. In regard to Early Childhood Education, the CSME Fund will be increasing more money into training of teachers for the level of education.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Fund for the Poor Jamaica, the Early Childhood Commission and the PAMT Trust/JICA has signed a partnership agreement that will allow for the training of 500 early childhood education teachers over the next five years.	Promises Kept								
STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH & JOB CREATION															
9. Jamaica intends to strengthen its relations with South and Central America to open new avenues for trade, investment and business ties and to extend functional cooperation and cultural exchange.	We will "revise our External Trade Policy and continue our advocacy of the multilateral level for a rules-based system in the World Trade Organization (WTO)... in the search for investment."	Not done to date	Promises Broken	25. Additional trained teachers will be placed in early childhood institutions and many primary schools will also be utilized to strengthen the delivery of early childhood education.	In the shortest possible time, reduce the provision of at least one Trained teacher for each Early Childhood institution.	200 trained teachers have been employed to work in the early childhood sector.	Promises in the Works								
10. Infrastructure projects will be implemented. They will include the resumption of work on the widely-needed North-South leg of the Highway 2000 project.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Contract signed with China Harbour Engineering Company to complete unfinished highway.	Promises Kept	26. We will commence construction of more than 50 new infant schools.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Fund for the Poor has completed 2 of the 50 new early childhood institutions.	Promises in the Works								
11. The Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP) activities under JEEP will range from their training works; repairs to gutters and drains; road repairs; the installation of traffic lights etc.	We will "create meaningful jobs using existing resources available to the Government, beginning with the Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP)"	Programme continued until 2013. Phase 1 & 2 completed. Government figures for jobs created at 10,300. Work focused on infrastructural maintenance projects.	Promises in the Works	27. Improvements will also be made to the cabinet for our governments.	Provide a policy on Nutrition of Children in Public Schools, to improve dietary offerings and making use of local produce and products.	Arrangements in place for Nutrition Programs for a healthy childhood of millions from local ground food. 4 of local food plots. 1400 tons allocation also increased from \$05 to \$100.	Promises Kept								
12. "To encourage new investments by stabilizing firms, which create additional employment with a special JEEP tax incentive that will be maintained for an initial period of three years..."	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Not done to date.	Promises Broken	FOOD PRODUCTION											
13. We will implement a Tax Reform Programme, among other things (a) widen the tax net, (b) introduce cross equity in the system, and (c) stimulate investment, growth and employment.	No integral part of reform is the broadening of the tax net and the widening of the incentive regime as a tool to stimulate growth.	A White Paper on tax reform, tabled in Parliament on November 2012 "to ultimately correct the fiscal imbalance and unsustainable level of debt."	Promises in the Works	28. Domestic and ginger production will be supported on approximately 450 acres of agricultural land.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Production projects launched. 150 acres of additional ginger and 200 acres of banana, engaging over 300 farmers.	Promises Kept								
14. To achieve better management of the Fiscal budget, over the medium to long term, the pension and leave systems in the Public Sector will be reform.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	Not done to date.	Promises Broken	Assessing the performance of our Government in context of the promises made, must include those commitments arising from challenges encountered during the course of the financial year. The results in a key source for highlighting and tracking these losses on day develop. The following are those that not only generated significant public interest during the 2012/13 period but also reflected a commitment from Government.											
15. Government will maintain tight expenditure controls.	We will provide a clear realistic path for the improvement of the open debt ratios, based on tight expenditure management.	The Central Treasury Management System was activated in 2012 which will manage all cash, government bank accounts, financial planning and forecasting of cash flows, public debt management, administration of foreign grants and counterpart funds from international lenders and donors for the entire public sector.	Promises in the Works	Trailgate Investigation	29. We have nothing to hide on anything that can clear the air on Trailgate, which was a contribution to a political party.	Commission of Enquiry of undertaken and case before the Constitutional Court is ongoing.	In Sept 2012 the PNP challenged an order for members to answer questions in Court, claiming diplomatic immunity for Cabinet Ministers. PNP attorneys were also instructed to request that investigations not be conducted in open court to protect safety of the PNP members. Recommendations enjoined in Office of the DPP in Nov 2012. Legislative process was completed in record time of 4 months.	Promises Broken							
16. Substantial effort will be made in ensuring better compliance and enforcement of the tax laws in particular, making it easier to pay taxes.	Unmentioned in Manifesto	The Administration Department has increased its compliance strategies and on-line payment services.	Promises in the Works	30. To pass an Anti-Corruption Act. To curtail the illegal activity and give the police legislative powers to prosecute persons involved in info scanning.	Law Reform (Fraudulent transactions) Special Provisions Act of 2012 passed in March 2013.			Promises Kept							
17. We will attack the energy problem with the replacement of fuel oil with natural gas and reform for the banks/ electric and electricity generating sectors.	We will accelerate decision-making on the choice of fuel sources with the principal objective of reducing energy costs for all sectors of the economy.	In Jan 2013 the GJ decided to abandon the option of using LNG. No clear plan yet in place.	Promises Broken	Improving Electrical Process	31. To pass a Registration of Political parties Bill to ensure greater scrutiny and transparency in the election process.	Electoral Office of Jamaica recommendations completed in March 2012. Details on report commenced in the Lower House, March 2012.	Bill is scheduled for the 2013/14 legislative agenda. This is a discussion recommendation dating back to 2005.	Promises Broken							
18. We will attack the energy problem by accelerating an ethic of conservation, with the State leading by example.	The PNP will lead a national public education campaign in the reduction of the use of electrical energy.	In May 2012 the GJ launched an E20 funded Energy Efficiency & Conservation (4-yr) Programme in Jamaica.	Promises in the Works	32. To pass a Campaign Funding Disclosure Bill. To ensure greater scrutiny and transparency in the election process.	ECJ report and recommendations debated and adopted in April by Parliament "with caveats" submitted to ECJ.	Process stalled. No Bill yet in parliament. On the legislative agenda for 2014-2015.		Promises Broken							
		In Dec 2012 Cabinet approved the introduction of policy standards for street lights, the goal being to install LED street lights across Jamaica. Installation has begun in some areas.	Promises in the Works	Trawl Vessels Insurance Report & Enquiry	33. The Office of the Public Defender retained an independent probe, after 73 citizens were killed during the operation by the security forces, to serve a warrant on commercial crime boss Christopher "Dudus" Cooke.	No report submitted to Parliament after conduct deadline passed.	Standing Finance Committee Meeting of April 5, 2013. Member of Finance advised that he was "unaware of any financial implications caused by an absence of resources" which might have impacted the work of the Office of the Public Defender. In said meeting, Yvonne Spinks committed to a new deadline "before April 30".	Promises Broken							
				Retail on Electricity Costs	34. We will more immediately to ease the burden of the General Consumption Tax (GCT) on:- 24. Roadblocks, and 25. The production sector.	GCT on JPS bills rolled back on sentence in June 2012.	Promises Kept GCT was reinstated on the JPS bills of the production sector.	Promises Broken							

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Appendix E – Evaluation Scope of Work

Section C – Statement of Work: Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Final Performance Evaluation

I. Introduction

The ‘Combatting Corruption in Jamaica’ project, implemented by National Integrity Action Limited (NIAL) since 2012, aims to bring about three outcomes: reduce the level of cynicism and increase the level of public awareness that exists among the citizenry of the country as it relates to perceived levels of grand (high level) corruption; strengthen key networks in the public sector, private sector and civil society towards combatting political corruption; and build public demand for action against corruption. This evaluation seeks to assess the performance of the ‘Combatting Corruption in Jamaica’ project in meeting the objectives put forward in the cooperative agreement between USAID and NIAL. The successful evaluator will review all components of the ‘Combatting Corruption in Jamaica’ project. Accomplishments, best practices, and gaps in implementation shall also be reviewed. The contractor shall employ an appropriate methodology, data analysis, work plan and schedule for a high quality performance evaluation meeting the standards set out in USAID’s Evaluation Policy¹, and answering specific questions in this Statement of Work.

II. The Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project

In 2012, USAID signed a three (3) year \$2,900,000 Cooperative Agreement (CA) with the National Integrity Action Limited (NIAL) to implement the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project. The CA built on the successes of two previous USAID-funded Fixed Obligation Grants (FOG) which served to set up NIAL’s office, conduct anti-corruption training for government officials, support the anti-corruption media campaign, and produce a Report on the Special Prosecutor Bill. (See Annex I for detailed information on the local context of the project.)

The project commenced under Assistance Objective 1 of USAID’s Country Assistance Strategy (2010 – 2014). AO 1 contributed to the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Priority Goal 1 of **“Increasing Peace and Security by Reducing Crime and Corruption,”** through the achievement of two Intermediate Results (IRs) (see Figure 1). These were IR 1, **“Safer communities, respecting rule of law and human rights,”** and IR 2 **“Improved Accountability and integrity in government.”** Under IR 2, USAID sought to support stronger corruption control measures in the police and other key institutions to reduce the incidence of misconduct. USAID planned to focus on the accountability framework, including greater emphasis on professional standards and ethics during training and coaching. USAID also aimed to encourage robust citizen participation and oversight, including through NIAL, as well as other initiatives that engage the public in community governance and that favor community input into use of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) for local economic development. The project has continued under IR 2: *Violence in CRP Communities Reduced* of the new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2014-2018) where it contributes to the achievement of sub-IR 2.3: Institutional Capacity of Community Based Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, Non-


¹ USAID Evaluation Policy, January 2011

<http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/USAIDEvaluationPolicy.pdf>

Governmental Organizations, and Ministries, Departments and Agencies Improved. Specific interventions implemented by NIAL include:

- Research and desk review to support the investigation and prosecution of high profile cases
- Capacity building training for the prosecutorial and judicial professionals
- Support and advocate for key anti-corruption legislation
- Building and consolidating key networks
- Building public demand for improved governance
- Building the multi-lateral donors into an anti-corruption force in Jamaica

Figure 1: AO 1 Results Framework



Critical Assumptions:

1. The GOJ will maintain its commitment to reducing crime, violence and corruption, as well as its commitment to reform of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.
2. The Community, Parish, and Regional Development Committees will continue as the model for participatory local government.
3. AO 1 focuses in part on police reform as part of a larger democracy objective. Donor programs focused on other justice institutions will advance so that the entire justice sector is strengthened in a coherent manner.

The current project seeks to ensure that the current national ineffectiveness in controlling corruption, particularly of a political nature, is challenged and public demand for action against corruption is deepened. The project works to enhance public probity, facilitate public engagement and build public demand for appropriate legislation to strengthen transparency and accountability in governance and the enforcement of law against the perpetrators of corruption. It

also works to facilitate the proper and effective functioning of anti-corruption agencies, as well as forming stronger ties with national and international partners in order to achieve more meaningful results towards a corruption-free Jamaica. It responds to the Intermediate Result aimed at strengthening civil society advocacy of public interest, which speaks to the need to build civil society capacity to represent community interests and serve as watchdogs against corruption. The project's design incorporated the following elements deemed essential for lasting change: research supporting the investigation and prosecution of high profile cases; building the investigative, prosecutorial and judicial capacity of key anti-corruption agencies; facilitating the implementation of key anti-corruption legislation; strengthening key anti-corruption networks; building public demand for change; and sensitizing Jamaica's multi-lateral donors and partners to the effects of corruption on the nation's development.

Target Groups:

The Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project uses moral suasion, popular support and targeted lobbying as methods to get **political officials** attuned to the need to enact broad-based changes to corruption legislation. It also encourages **anti-corruption agencies** to ensure enforcement. Additionally it works to enhance the access to information of **civil society, private and public sector actors**. The use of **the media** as an important channel of public awareness building, information dissemination and rallying of mass public support is very important in this regard. **Youth** have also been engaged via social media and other youth friendly medium. Training and other forms of capacity building activities provided to the **investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory arms of the state** have been very instrumental in advancing the objectives of the project. The mobilization of actors such as the **private sector, church groups, community based organizations and international donor partners, and international non-governmental organizations** in support of the anti-corruption agenda have ensured that the backlash against the project's lobby is minimized.

III. Evaluation Rationale

A. Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the performance evaluation of the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project is to assess the progress of the project since it commenced in August 2012, to make recommendations, and to review the validity of data collected. The results of this evaluation will be used to inform the development of a follow-on anti-corruption project. This project will be funded through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), with the overall goal of "Increased Citizen Safety throughout the Caribbean". The follow-on project will focus specifically on CBSI Development Objective 3: Social Justice Promoted through Justice Sector and Anti-corruption Reform; and Intermediate Results 3.4: Reduced corruption in public and private sectors.

USAID/Jamaica intends that the evaluator shall review the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project as a package of interventions, including accomplishments, best practices, and gaps in implementation in order to achieve the following:

- To clarify what worked, what did not, and why;
- To inform USAID’s development of the follow-on anti-corruption project; and
- To contribute to USAID/Jamaica’s ongoing refinement of methodologies and approaches in enhancing citizen security.

B. Intended Users

- Anticipated users of this evaluation include:
- USAID/Jamaica Mission, to support its citizen security programming and to improve coordination with partners and stakeholders;
- Latin American and Caribbean Bureau, to inform regional programming, especially CBSI
- US Government agencies involved in CBSI, to incorporate best practices and lessons learned in the implementation of CBSI programming throughout the region;
- GOJ entities, including the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Justice, Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), Planning Institute of Jamaica, private and public sector entities, to further strengthen their understanding of the local anti-corruption landscape, and to improve coordination between the GOJ and the USG on security related programming; and
- International development partners, local and international civil society organizations and NGOs working in this area.

C. Evaluation Questions

The contractor shall address the following evaluation questions, listed in priority order.

Question 1

To what extent has the technical approach of the “Combatting Corruption in Jamaica” project effectively placed anti-corruption/integrity issues on the national agenda?

Question 2

To what extent has the project contributed to building the Jamaican public’s demand for change in countering the national ineffectiveness in controlling corruption? Is there a difference in demand between men and women?

Question 3

Which activities should be prioritized for a follow-on project and why?

Question 4

To what extent has the project (1) been responsive to gender issues; (2) integrated gender in activity implementation; and (3) enhanced gender equity

IV. Technical Requirements

A. Evaluation Design and Methodology

The methodology shall comply with the USAID Evaluation Policy (<http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation>). The methodology shall include an appropriate mix of quantitative and qualitative methods which will enable the contractor to answer the stated evaluation questions. The evaluation design may include some or all of the following methods. Methods need not be limited to those listed below.

- Desk Review of relevant background and project related information
- Statistically representative national survey on the effectiveness of the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica project's activities to build public demand for change
- Focus Groups of key target groups, such as government officials (training recipients), community/citizen's group, youth/students, etc.
- Key Informants/Elite Interviews with:
 - Director of Public Prosecution, Paula Llewellyn, C.D., Q.C.
 - Chief Justice, Hon. Zaila McCalla, O.J.
 - Minister of Justice, Senator Mark Golding
 - Minister of National Security, Peter Bunting M.P
 - Contractor General, Dirk Harrison
 - Former Head of the JCF Anti-Corruption Branch, ACP Selvin Hay
 - Leader of Government Business in the Lower House, Minister Phillip Paulwell M.P
 - Leader of the Opposition Andrew Holness M.P
 - Executive Director of National Integrity Action Limited, Prof. Trevor Munroe
 - Immediate Past-President of the Private Sector of Jamaica, Christopher Zacca
 - Former Contractor General, Greg Christie
 - Immediate Past-President of the Press Association, Jennifer Campbell
 - UK DFID Program Officer, Antonette Grant
 - Jamaica Civil Society Coalition, Rev. Paul Gardner
 - Social Development Commission Executive Director, Dr. Dwayne Vernon
 - Transparency International Secretariat Americas Department, Alejandro Salas
 - Past Chairpersons of the Electoral Commission of Jamaica, Prof. Errol Miller
 - Present Chairpersons of the Electoral Commission of Jamaica, Mrs. Dorothy Pine-McClarty
 - Managing Director of EWA Marketing Communications, Terry Williams
- Stakeholder Consultations
 - Members of Parliamentary Committees (dealing with specific anti-corruption legislations)
 - Journalists/Press Association of Jamaica
 - Civil Society Organizations
 - Training Experts/Facilitators
 - Key Anti-Corruption Agency Heads
 - National Association of Parish Development Committee/Parish Development Committee

- International Development/Donor Partners
- Private Sector Organization of Jamaica

The methodology shall seek the participation of stakeholders from the project's direct beneficiaries, the GOJ, and civil society organizations during the assessment process. The contractor shall engage directly with community and civil society organizations which have participated in the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica project, as well as with the leaders and members of key institutions involved in issues related to integrity, accountability and transparency.

The methodology must allow the contractor to fully answer each proposed evaluation question. Data collection shall be systematic and findings and conclusions shall be evidence-based. Where possible, data shall be disaggregated by gender, and other pertinent demographic characteristics. Data shall comply with the Data Quality Standards as outlined in USAID's Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS: Data Quality Standards.

B. Existing Data/Sources of Information

The following reports, data and other materials relevant to the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project evaluation shall be reviewed by the contractor:

- USAID Program Brief: Anti-Corruption and Police Integrity, Security Sector Reform Program, USAID, May 2007
- Regional Law Enforcement and Anti-Corruption Conference: Situational Analysis, April 2011
- Corruption Assessment for Jamaica, USAID, September 2008
- The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 2012
- Global Corruption Barometer 2013
- Jamaica's National Security Policy, 2013
- NIA FOG I Final Report
- NIA FOG II Final Report
- NIA Cooperative Agreement Annual Reports (3)
- DFID Annual Reviews of NIA (2)

V. Management

A. Logistics

As part of the project management, there shall be weekly progress meetings between USAID and the contractor. The contractor shall produce minutes of the meetings. The evaluation team shall be responsible for arranging resources needed to complete the evaluation, including: travel and transportation, meeting arrangements, office space and equipment, report preparation, and communication equipment.

B. Support to Evaluation Team

USAID will provide limited support to the evaluation team. This support will include:

- Assistance in arranging high level meetings;
- Access to US Embassy compound as necessary; and
- Copies of all reports, data and other relevant documents created by the Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Project.

END OF SECTION C