

TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL
AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

TRANSMITTING

THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION,
PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 87-256



JUNE 10, 1974.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION,
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., June 6, 1974.

HON. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In accordance with Section 107 of Public Law 87-256, I submit herewith the Tenth Annual Report of the Advisory Commission. This report covers a period prior to the time that I became Chairman of the Advisory Commission, and I am transmitting it on behalf of those members of the Commission who served during 1973.

Sincerely,

LEONARD H. MARKS,
Chairman.

THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Leonard H. Marks, Chairman—Washington, D.C.
Harry S. Flemming, Vice Chairman—Alexandria, Va.
Leo Cherne—New York, N.Y.
Thomas B. Curtis—Clayton, Mo.
David R. Derge—Carbondale, Ill.
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Mrs. Rita E. Hauser—New York, N.Y.
William French Smith—Los Angeles, Cal.
William C. Turner—Phoenix, Ariz.
Mrs. Margaret G. Twyman, Staff Director, Advisory Commission
Secretariat, Washington, D.C. 20520

COMMUNICATION: IN A QUIETER TIME

INTRODUCTION

It is essential that advisory groups periodically examine the mandate under which they operate and their ability to fulfill the requirements in the light of changing reality. In the case of this Advisory Commission, such a reexamination led to significant initiatives in 1973.

After a series of meetings in which the members explored the meaning of their mandate under P.L. 87-256, against this backdrop of significant changes in the world, they initiated the important study described in the text of this report. To assure the conduct of the study they thought necessary, they proceeded to raise a large portion of the necessary foundation funding; obtained the cooperation of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; and delegated responsibility for completion of the project to a distinguished research organization with particular competence in the study of international affairs.

The members of the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, therefore, submit with great pride this report which capsulizes the background and the significant actions taken during 1973, a uniquely productive year.

On February 25, 1971, in this State of the World Message to Congress, President Nixon said: "... The post-war order of international relations—the configuration of power that emerged from the Second World War—is gone. With it are gone the conditions which have determined the assumptions and practice of United States foreign policy since 1945." This statement was almost totally unnoticed at the time. Many months later the opening of relationships with the People's Republic of China, as well as the visits by the President to the PRC and to the Soviet Union, provided dramatic evidence that the President's observation in his message was not hyperbole.

The world is now multipolar and our international relations policies reflect that fact. The United States has sought detente in the relations with former adversaries. These factors have led, in turn, to a significant reduction in hostile rhetoric, a lowered international U.S. profile, moderated military and related obligations, and the beginnings of a much more active multilateral approach to the interests and needs of the world community.

Since the assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy today have changed dramatically, this Commission believes (and so reported a year ago) that the time is ripe to reexamine the traditional assumptions underlying U.S. international information, education, and cultural activities as well.

Any programs of the U.S. Government which in any way deal with information, educational or cultural exchange, and diplomacy must be consistent with the foreign policy they reflect, express, or

support. Therefore, it is not only desirable but obligatory that all of these activities, and the institutional arrangements designed to foster them, be examined so as to determine whether programs and policy are consistent, and whether new opportunities for intercultural communications are being cultivated.

What is it that our government is trying to accomplish in this exchange of information and people? What has occurred in the private sector (i.e., growth of multinational companies, international programs of foundations and other non-profit organizations, etc.) which directly affects our government's role in these matters?

Within the last year it has become even more clear to us that not only do the new approaches in U.S. foreign policy strongly suggest a re-examination of our directions and capacities for intercultural communication, so also do the new technologies which have accelerated dramatically in number in the last two decades. Television, satellites, and the multitude of refinements in the technology of communications *demand* that we redefine our goals and how they may best be achieved. We must consider such fundamental questions as, "Is cultural invasion by communications satellite a threatening possibility?" It is vital that we gain a deeper understanding of these technologies so we can with greater skill not only clarify our new goals but also improve the methods utilized by our intercultural missions.

It has also become more clear that our government's international cultural, educational, and informational programs are presently being inadequately funded and perhaps inefficiently and unwisely administered. So that we might better understand the strengths as well as the deficiencies of these programs, this Commission has turned repeatedly to experienced professionals for information, judgment, guidance, and above all, perspective. (Dr. Wayne Wilcox, then Cultural Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in London, for instance, provided a series of reports and judgments, the essence of which are contained in the Appendix.)

The two agencies most directly concerned with information, educational, and cultural communications are the United States Information Agency and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State. Within the United States Information Agency there are three broad and somewhat separate thrusts. The first involves the broadcasting activities of the Voice of America. The second involves cultural and educational exchanges and presentations supervised by Cultural Affairs and Public Affairs Officers overseas. The third involves a large and heterogeneous group of publications, exhibits, and programs that are informational and explanatory and conducted in support of U.S. foreign policy.

The programs of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs emphasize exchange-of-persons and other people-centered cultural relations programs. The mission as defined by CIU's management is mutual understanding through two-way dialogue favorably affecting the environment of U.S. foreign policy.

Our deepening interest in conducting a re-examination of the content of our overseas communications, as well as the institutional means for best advancing them, was further accelerated by two related events:

1. The most recent of these was what amounted to a Congressional ultimatum directed to the United States Information

Agency that it come before the next Congress with an altered conception of its proper functioning more consistent with the new foreign policy, or suffer the budgetary consequences. This Congressional instruction suggested that some of the activities presently conducted by USIA might in fact be dropped and others separated by simply placing them elsewhere or made independent of each other.

2. The second development which led us to the conclusion that we must act promptly actually preceded the expression of Congressional impatience. The members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information last year and for several years prior had been urging changes in the focus and weight of the various programs conducted by the USIA overseas. In addition they had been suggesting for some time that greater emphasis be placed on cultural and educational programs (and other activities related to the longer-run purposes of our foreign policy), and that lesser weight be placed on the shorter-range informational aspects designed specifically to be supportive of immediate foreign policy needs.

These and other pressures and perceptions, therefore, crystallized for us in the spring of 1973 and led us to initiate a study with a view to the formulation of recommendations to the President and to the Congress. The following action resolution was passed on July 20, 1973:

JULY 20, 1973.

Resolved: The Advisory Commission has been obligated by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 to examine those international educational and cultural exchange activities which fall within the purview of that Act.

Historically, two agencies have played a particularly significant role which brings them into relationship with each other—the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency. This has been a close and useful relationship. It has also involved a joint partnership which has occasioned certain problems and misunderstandings.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information has several times, in addressing itself to the Congress, suggested a re-examination of the proper distribution of functions performed by the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of State. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its report dated May 27, 1973, has most recently expressed itself as inclined toward a redistribution of functions.

And, our own Advisory Commission has frequently questioned the arrangement of placing responsibility for carrying out the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs programs in the field through officers of the U.S. Information Agency.

We therefore, recognizing our responsibility, agree to devote a substantial portion of our time and energy during the coming months to a study of the similar and related functions performed by the U.S. Information Agency, its overseas information service, and the Department of State, with

a view to recommending to the President, to the Congress, and to the agencies involved any rearrangements more suitable to the effective performance of these programs and more in keeping with the changing directions of U.S. foreign policy.

Acting Chairman Leo Cherne sent the following letter with a copy of the resolution to the officials listed below :

JULY 27, 1973.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At the July 20, 1973 meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the attached resolution was adopted. The sense of the resolution and the goal of the Commission is to study in depth the relationships between the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the United States Information Agency in today's rapidly changing world.

It is the desire of this Commission to work closely with all of those who are directly involved with the existing system. Either I or one of the other members of the Advisory Commission will of course be available to meet with you, should you wish it at this early stage, to discuss our proposed study.

: With warm regards,
Respectfully,

LEO CHERNE,
Acting Chairman.

Enclosure: Resolution.

RECIPIENTS

President Richard Nixon
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
James I. Keogh, Director, USIA
Hobart Lewis, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Information
Robert Murphy, Chairman, Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Little Hoover Commission)
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
Senator George D. Aiken, Committee on Foreign Relations
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman William S. Mailliard, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Wayne L. Hays, Chairman, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Vernon W. Thompson, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Roy L. Ash, Director, Office of Management and Budget
Lewis Olom, Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Recognizing the particular desirability of joining the interests and capabilities of this Advisory Commission with those of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information in carrying out the study, full assurance of cooperation was obtained from Hobart Lewis, Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Information.

Two additional important decisions were made, both of which related to the need for this study to be totally objective. One was a decision that no government money would be requested to pay for the study. Instead, it was decided that funds be obtained from a consortium of foundations. This proved to be a successful effort. The second decision was to ask an appropriate and reputable independent agency to conduct the research and prepare the report of the findings. The Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University was selected to undertake the project and to employ appropriate staff to direct it. Walter R. Roberts, former Director of the Office of Research and Assessment of the U.S. Information Agency, accepted the post of Project Director.

The project is being directed by a panel, the "Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations," which includes, among others, all members of both Commissions.

The Acting Chairman of this Commission secured the tentative willingness, later confirmed, of Dr. Frank Stanton to serve as Chairman of the Panel. The project is now well under way.

The last Annual Report of this Commission, "Coming of Age? Educational and Cultural Exchange in 1972," was devoted entirely to raising what we believed to be some of the fundamental questions relating to the public diplomacy conducted by our government and by a multitude of private institutions and organizations.

It is our hope that when the Advisory Commission submits its Annual Report in 1975, the current study will have been completed and the first steps toward implementation of its recommendations will already have been taken. At that point in 1975, it is our judgment that it will be seen that the Annual Reports of this Advisory Commission for the years 1972 and 1973 are in fact two stages of a consecutive, integral undertaking.

* * * * * *

At a meeting of this Commission on September 8, 1972, the members reviewed the findings of a readership survey of *International Educational and Cultural Exchange* magazine, the Commission's quarterly publication. This had been carried out by the Commission's Secretariat staff in response to an earlier request that the publication be evaluated in terms of its present and future usefulness as a vehicle for "making reports to the public in the U.S. and abroad to develop a better understanding of and support for the programs authorized by this Act" (Section 107, P.L. 87-256).

Based on the survey and considerable discussion, the members recommended unanimously that the Commission's Secretariat staff devote a major portion of its time and effort in 1973 to redesigning the magazine in both editorial content and format. This effort was described by the Acting Chairman as follows:

The revised format of Exchange magazine intends a great deal more than an improvement in design and appearance.

It is the hope of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs that this quarterly publication not only reflect a contemporary appearance, but also some of the radically changed realities in which education and cultural exchanges occur. *Exchange* will hopefully be a refreshed instrument . . . will report what is and what is to be . . . will convey success and failure, achievement and disappointment, the urgent need for wider understanding and our all-too-human capacity to misunderstand.

The first issue of the "new" *Exchange* was published on December 20, 1973.

APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

There were many highly qualified people to whom this Commission turned for guidance and facts over the past two years. Each contributed greatly to our bank of information, to our perspective, and to our efforts to crystallize more specifically the nature of the problem to which we had turned our attention. One of these people was Dr. Wayne Wilcox. For the two and one half years just preceding his untimely death in the crash of a Turkish airliner near Paris on March 3, 1974, Dr. Wilcox had served as Cultural Attache in the U.S. Embassy in London.

Dr. Wilcox was a brilliant professional. After graduation from Purdue University as an engineer, he pursued graduate studies in political science, and received his master's and Doctor's degrees from Columbia University. He served as a Navy Gunnery Officer in the Antarctic. At the time Wilcox joined the ranks of our Foreign Service, he was head of the Political Science Department of Columbia University—at age 38. He became a South Asian specialist. He was a scholar, a writer, an urbane social critic of all that surrounded him. He was a poet, an artist, and a lover of music. He is described as a man who loved people perhaps most of all and wrote a friend very recently and prophetically, "Enjoy people if and when you can—it's a short trip."

But, in addition to our high regard for his academic and professional credentials and achievements, we enjoyed his presence. He had a rare ability to speak artfully, with consummate wit and a certain naive frankness, about many subjects. And in our search for cold facts and dispassionate honesty in the areas of our special concern, we found he could speak equally artfully about certain complex and painful truths—always colored with a certain Hoosier-tinted grace.

The members of this Advisory Commission voted to include in the Appendices of this year's Annual Report the following excerpts and/or whole texts from some of Dr. Wilcox's many contributions to our deliberations of the last 24 months.

* * * * *

I. Text of a letter from Wayne Wilcox to Commission member William C. Turner, May 30, 1972:

DEAR BILL: You asked for some preliminary and personal thoughts on the organization of the overseas management of American cultural and educational efforts. Somewhat tardily, here they are. With mock humility may I ask you to remember that they reflect the observations of the "new boy," and are not congealed wisdom. Moreover, London

is a unique post, I occupy the role somewhat humorously described as a "Super-CAO," (meaning rank, not ability) and this is my first exposure to a foreign service life.

First and foremost, this is an absolutely wonderful job. It offers an active intellect stimulation and opportunities for expression; it offers an academic a chance to rediscover the arts and aesthetics in a professional way; it offers a welcome respite from being an American in favor of interpreting America for the doubting Thomases of Britain. I need say nothing about the gentle pleasures of British life or London's appeal as a great city.

I was not sure how my British academic peers would take my new "official" status, but the irrepressible urge of many of them was to assume that I was a professor "sent abroad to lie for his country." In fact, since the status was temporary, the embassy "leash" quite long and the British quite sophisticated, it proved no problem at all. Indeed, I think envy was a more powerful emotion than suspicion in most cases. With non-academic contacts and associates, the embassy rank of cultural attache has been a definite asset.

As I understand it, cultural and educational programs are those long-term aspects of our foreign relations that are directed to the intelligentsia and the artistic community of other nations. The outreach is both altruistic—the search for truth and beauty are universal human goals, and are furthered by international cooperation—and nationalistic—foreign intellectuals and artists shape their nation's prejudices and preferences, and if they have an empathy for America, the opinion environment in which foreign governments work will be pro-American over the long term. While these observations strike me as self-evident, they lack explicit recognition in the *structures* of the foreign service.

It is fair to say the USIS has struggled with the problems of integrating information and culture/education since it was burdened with that task. Congressional desires have led to some functions being administered by CU in Washington, and USIS in the field. The USIA career officer ranks have been filled with men and women with diverse interests and aspirations, the information-oriented career officers and their cultural bretheren have not always seen eye to eye on program, policy or promotion. This is a much studied problem, and I have little to add to it since I am an outsider.

In general, however, I think the very difficult task of organizing an "interface" between aspects of foreign life as complicated as education and culture ought to be entrusted to people with the values, talents and tastes necessary to build empathy regardless to the political environment in which they work. That suggests that the personnel system and the Washington "back-up" should be explicitly designed to reward and nourish them. My guess is that at present, most cultural officers feel rather like stepchildren in a large family fathered by a press baron. Some of the very best people in USIA have come up the cultural "ladder" (my PAO included) but my impression is that they are a distinct minority of extraordinarily gifted people who could manage both cultural and informational programming. To rise in the service, they had to satisfy criteria established as much by information needs as by their own, chosen, specialty. I understand that USIA has recognized this problem, and

has wrestled with it over the years, but it would be unnatural for the top management of any government agency to be chosen on the basis of experience in only one of its functions.

On the personnel side, improvements could be made within the present structure, or by incorporating culture/education within the State Department (leaving a residual American Information Service), or by creating a quasi-governmental corporation with its own career or contract service. The essence, in personal terms, of what should be accomplished is that specialist officers dealing with cultural and educational affairs should have promotion opportunities associated with their work performance independent of information service criteria, and that their work environment in the field offer maximum autonomy for long range work with the intelligentsia and artistic communities of their host countries. In large posts like London, this can be done by the internal division of labor, considerable PAO tolerance, and the natural "clout" of a big, prestigious operation. In other places it would be much more difficult.

On the program side, the association of the cultural section with the information effort can produce problems of the generic "official" variety. Any American effort in a sensitive area or country will be accused of being "CIA" activity. Intellectuals and artists, often professionally paranoid, are much given to these kinds of suspicions. It does not seem to me that the link between propaganda and culture is as salient as that between official and non-official activities. If the cultural and educational program is to be managed officially, we will have to live with the sensitivities involved. These can only be minimized by the establishment of trust, and the recruitment into the service of men and women capable of asserting their essential independence and high-mindedness. In Britain and most of Western Europe, the official status of the effort is understood and appreciated. In most of the less developed countries I have studied, no amount of "letterhead independence" could convince the local intelligentsia that, say, "The American Council" was anything other than a CIA front. Few countries in the world have a genuinely plural society, and the non-governmental, non-profit, charitable foundation remains a bafflement to most foreigners observing the U.S. scene.

Would the whole operation be more effective in the hands of academics, recruited for contract terms of perhaps 5-10 years? Without betraying too much parochialism it is difficult to give an unbiased answer. Some academics in some situations would be much better than serving officers in the USIS cadre; but alas, some would be much worse. There are only a few of the top-notch academics in the United States who would be willing to leave their profession, and change roles from being a *principal* (independent, in their own view, and assertive of their views) to being an *agent* (dependent, under someone's authority, and facilitative in their actions on behalf of others). It occurs to me that some of the same benefit might be derived from taking the officers from a recruitment strategy that favored academics of such disposition. For example, if Robin Winks (my predecessor; Professor of History, Yale) could be attracted into the service and assured that his talents, attitudes and tastes would assure promotion as a cultural/educational officer, it would serve to add highly trained, personally equipped, persons to a career service that would be its

own "talent pool"; less dependent upon resources gathered and shipped from the Republic.

My last observation is that of a political scientist. It seems to me that any workable system has to fit into three quite different structures: Congress, bureaucratic Washington, and the Field. Most operating officers can adjust to almost any bureaucratic thicket, but one that encourages perjury or establishes contradictory or dysfunctional personnel policies carries a high internal cost.

The present system appears to me to follow a practice of maximum Congressional support, dysfunctional bureaucratic relationships in Washington, and some measure of adaptation in the field.

Our choices:

(1) Improve the present system by developing an explicit, shared, Washington commitment to the autonomy and value of educational and cultural work in foreign affairs, and develop a personnel system that regards the culture/education specialty, either within FSIO or FSS structures, as wholly valid. Create a staffing pattern that uses such officers in the field, CU and USIA Washington if culture/education continue to be shared jurisdictions.

(2) Divide culture/education from information, and integrate the former into the foreign service, perhaps as FSS on the model of the political/economic/counselor divisions of State. Recruit from the Universities where possible and desirable, but consider CU assignments a possibility for FSOs.

(3) Divide culture/education from information, and transfer it to a new public corporation, or as a function of an existing public corporation on the model, perhaps, of the British Council. Recruit contract staff from the universities and research organizations, and administer the system with a management drawn either from such sources, or the public body to which it is attached.

I need not say anything about the struggles that ensue whenever program "turf" is involved. * * * The modalities of all this I leave to wiser men than me.

Sincerely,

WAYNE WILCOX.

II. Verbatim comments made by Dr. Wilcox during informal meeting with Advisory Commission on September 8, 1972:

I think all good things are on the record and I think one of the advantages of having an amateur in a professional's job is that even if the amateur knows better he can pretend that he doesn't know better about stating things directly and publicly and candidly about his work and his public business. It is being paid for by the taxpayer. It is important to the national interest.

I think a body of informed public citizens who are already committed to the idea for which we were sent abroad ought to hear it "as it is," and I think discretion is the better part of valor in this life.

You have all seen the letter and, like you, I am still learning on my job. I think most of us try to deal with the structures into which we are put to do our job. The division be-

tween USIA and CU is irrational but historic and that means overseas officers find themselves between two competing and irrational structures which have different fortunes, depending on Congressional pleasure and the personalities involved. And good bureaucrats always hide in the thicket of the law, finding from whichever bureaucracy they can, the support for which they need to do their job.

* * * * *

I think in a good deal of the planning in Secretary Richardson's office and throughout USIA the same sorts of feelings which I expressed in that letter are widely held . . . a good deal of thought and hope that out of this there might come opportunities to eliminate some of the ambiguities which bedevil us. I would say in general that both USIA and CU understand that this ambiguity presents great problems in coherence and direction, and I think I can state this most boldly by saying that professors and journalists and artists don't have much to do with one another when trying to reach out to that part of the foreign community to which we are accredited—the intelligentsia and cultural and artistic community. And therefore we have to compete within our own mission abroad for resources, for people who do not share our idea of our constituencies.

* * * * *

* * * there is very little we can do in the field except try and keep control of the structural problems which are much more apparent to Washington-based people than they are to us. . . . and fight within the mission to get funds; and then we put them all together in what we consider to be something uniquely applicable to Britain and our job with the British.

Now, I am moved to believe that we could do a better job if more of our direction and more of our work was centered in and focused by the State Department. The cultural and educational functions, it seems to me, would grow in strength from that. I think with no increase in funds a structural change of that magnitude would give us more coherence and, in most countries in the world, it would give us a much stronger program on the cultural and educational side.

* * * * *

In the last promotion panel in USIA, of the 25 people promoted from Class 3 to Class 2, which is really where it is (I mean, that is how you reward people), five of the 23 were principally cultural and educationally trained officers. USIA abroad, which is the Agency into which we are all recruited and for which we work, USIA has 50 percent of the Ph. D.'s it had 15 years ago. This is going down in trained manpower, not up. I think there are very few government agencies in which this is the case.

* * * * *

* * * people who might be considering this as a career see the opportunities very bleak in a way; and this of course leads

to the self-selection of bureaucracy where the people who get ahead are people who are selected out of the press tradition. Well, that's okay for an information service, but there is no reason why culture and education ought to be boxed into that kind of a service.

* * * * *

"But I guess the last thing I would like to say for your guidance is that the backup that we get out of CU in Washington is really excellent. They don't have a lot of resources to provide us. * * * but the backup we get is first rate. * * * It makes our job easier.

III. Concept Paper:

At a meeting of the Commission with Dr. Wilcox on October 5, 1973, the members requested that he prepare for review a "Concept Paper" which would present a crystallization of some of his views. He agreed to do this and the following "Draft Concept Paper" was submitted not many weeks before his untimely death. It reflects the cogent nature of the thoughts and perspectives of this gifted man with whom the Advisory Commission was privileged to associate.

DRAFT CONCEPT PAPER

The New Environment for U.S. Foreign Policy.—It is now accepted by almost all shades of American opinion that our foreign policy should henceforth follow the logic of the Nixon doctrine—a foreign policy of peaceful engagement, detente where detente is possible, and a reduced military and economic posture in international relations. These changes in U.S. policy do not by themselves end competition and conflict because cooperation and harmony are not the natural order of world politics. They do require, however, the fashioning of new, longer range foreign policy instruments capable of sustaining American influence in a changed world.

Other countries have experienced something like the transition facing the United States—notably France and Great Britain—and their examples are instructive. Both successfully adopted "compensatory" diplomacies that emphasized their great domestic strengths of education and culture, the British emphasizing the former and the French the latter. Very few observers in these countries regret the reconfiguration of their foreign policy emphasis, and both countries continue to exercise more influence than their residual power, wealth and diplomatic autonomy would alone justify, or even suggest.

Assets for the New Diplomacy.—The United States has greater vitality in the information-culture-education fields than either Britain or France. Historically, the United States has been more parochial in its interests than the former European imperial states, but growing interdependence and the internationalization of American education and commerce suggests that a new domestic environment is emerging. Given this growing recognition that international relations are part of national life, and that American social institutions will come to play a greater role in it, there is no evidence to suggest that the United States cannot now develop a foresighted and confident cultural and educational diplomacy.

There is some belief that it has not done so thus far. The scale of public resources devoted to international relations information, cultural exchanges and educational interchanges is very small. A survey is needed to establish the figure, and to portray it against the opportunities, the relative efforts of other states, and the assessments of its adequacy by professionals in the field.

There are also questions as to whether the officers who are charged with this work are trained for it, whether they are rewarded for such success as they accomplish, and whether they are adequately supported from Washington and other elements in local embassies. There is a need for data about such officers, and their attitudes and opinions about their calling.

As with most successful American ventures, cooperation between government and private organizations holds the key to effective action. The finest cultural organizations in the country are private or "local," and all universities—public and private—are relatively independent in their decision-making. The media are almost entirely nongovernmental. The new diplomacy that seeks to use these resources in the national interest in foreign policy must of necessity follow the ancient federal doctrine of "cooperation and coordination," but must now add "facilitation."

Federal resources and authority do not extend into these aspects of national life too deeply, but the growth of the National Endowments in the Arts and Humanities, international programs in agencies such as HEW, and the increasing support for USIA and CU budgets concerned with cultural and educational work testify to growing, if scattered, resources. A study is needed to explore the nature of these resources, and the possibilities of using them to facilitate, or sometimes catalyze, action on the part of private groups.

Management in the Field.—Much of the complexity of modern diplomacy is the product of very great differences in the field conditions under which diplomacy seeks to serve U.S. national interest. This is evident in the obvious differences between developed and under-developed countries; between allies and adversaries; between states in the same cultural tradition and those of great difference.

A less obvious aspect of this general problem is that embassies differ from place to place, time to time, person to person. One ambassador may believe this aspect of his mission is its most crucial; another that it is at best redundant and at worst an annoyance. In some posts, the sheltering of education and culture under information and public affairs advances it by providing assistance and support at the counsellor level; at other posts rivalries for budget between information and cultural-educational officers can lead to tension and low productivity. A study is necessary, based on the experiences of serving officers, as to the magnitude of the problem or its absence, and the degree to which "system changes" can reduce the inevitable differences of personal taste and interest that seem to be the last great freedom of ambassadors.

Management in Washington.—Field officers work with resources provided by Washington as well as those that by training and post location they can manage to mobilize themselves. All funds come from Washington, except those of the binational commissions and centers, and the ways in which funds are sought from the Congress and the

way they are mandated by the executive departments determine both the scale and autonomy of the effort.

Major changes in the magnitude and importance of this segment of diplomacy will have to be produced in Washington. Several aspects of the Washington part of the process deserve careful study; Congressional-executive relations and preferences, USIA-State Department (CU) relationships and jurisdictions, the priorities within USIA and with CU, and the role of other executive agencies in this field. These dimensions need to be explicated with analytical neutrality. Structural changes tend to produce more anxieties than results, but important shifts in scale, functions and management strategies must be accompanied by efforts to find the optimal command and control structure for decision-makers in foreign affairs. A study cannot pre-judge the issues, but it will almost certainly add some light to the debate about the "trade-offs" between one structure and another.

