GOVERNMENT, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A CRISIS IN IDENTITY

LETTER

FROM

THE CHAIRMAN, THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

TRANSMITTING

A SPECIAL REPORT ON "GOVERNMENT, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A CRISIS IN IDENTITY," PURSUANT TO SECTION 107 OF PUBLIC LAW 87-256

By Professors WALTER ADAMS and ADRIAN JAFFE of Michigan State University

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,

May 4, 1967.

Hon. John W. McCormack,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Speaker: Transmitted herewith, in accordance with section 107 of Public Law 87-256 (The Fulbright-Hays Act), is a special report to the Congress.

This report was prepared by a member of the Commission, Prof. Walter Adams, of the Michigan State University Department of Economics, and his colleague Adrian Jaffe, professor of comparative literature at Michigan State University.

The Commission sends forward this report for the consideration of the Congress because it believes that the issues raised in it deserve wide discussion.

One of the persistent problems of this Government’s international educational and cultural programs, as this Commission has noted in other reports, concerns their integrity. Recent revelations of the covert support of similar programs by the Central Intelligence Agency and the use of educational institutions as weapons in carrying out the goals of American policies, have dismayed the Commission greatly. Thus we are pleased to note in the body of this report, as well as in some of the material referred to, constant references to the importance of maintaining the integrity of these programs and the instruments in the private sector chosen to carry them out.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs emphasizes for example, on page 13, that international educational and cultural programs are likely to be embarrassed and compromised when they are too closely and visibly associated with programs of information and propaganda. We agree. This is not to say that the latter programs are themselves wrong or unimportant to the Nation. It is to say, however, that, just as educational and cultural programs must be divorced from any taint of their use as instruments of intelligence, by the same token they must be divorced from programs devoted solely to information and propaganda.

We commend to you and to the public this report of Professors Adams and Jaffe.

Sincerely yours,

Homer D. Babbidge, Jr., Chairman.
U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Homer D. Babbidge, Jr., Chairman; President, University of Connecticut.
Roy E. Larsen, Vice Chairman; chairman, Executive Committee, Time Inc.
Walter Adams, professor of economics, Michigan State University.
Luther H. Foster, president, Tuskegee Institute.
Rufus C. Harris, president, Mercer University.
Walter Johnson, professor of history, University of Hawaii.
Arnold M. Picker, executive vice president, United Artists Corp.
Joseph R. Smiley, president, University of Colorado.
Miss Pauline Tompkins, general director, American Association of University Women.

* * *

James A. Donovan, jr., staff director.
GOVERNMENT, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A CRISIS IN IDENTITY

"A university is not outside, but inside the general social fabric of a given era * * * (It is) an expression of the age, as well as an influence operating upon both present and future."—ABRAHAM FLEXNER

"* * * a university should reflect the spirit of the times without yielding to it."—JAMES BRYCE

By

Walter Adams, Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, and Member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

and

Adrian Jaffe, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Michigan State University
GOVERNMENT, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A CRISIS IN IDENTITY

By Walter Adams and Adrian Jaffe

I. THE MALAISE

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

Psychologists tell us that identity is the nucleus of the individual's belief system, which serves, in turn, as his blueprint for relating to his physical and social environment. When it is lost, the individual finds it difficult to live with himself, or to adapt to the reality around him. If he is ever to function viably, he must find the answers to three related questions: (1) "Who am I?" (2) "What is the nature of the society and of the world in which I live?" (3) "How can I relate to it?" The restoration of lost identity is of crucial importance to personal survival.1

Organizations and social institutions also require a clear sense of identity. Without it, they can no more function effectively than can individuals. If they are to play a purposeful role in conjunction with others, if they are to relate meaningfully to society and to other institutions, they must preserve their identity by keeping intact an unambiguous system of beliefs. They must, in short, know who they are, and they must have a continuing commitment to an integral system of values.

IDENTITY AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

The loss by the American university of a sense of its identity reached serious proportions at the time that it became, in Clark Kerr's felicitous phrase, a "multiversity." But the process had been going on for a long time, and many of its aspects were inherent in the nature of the institution itself: an organization of individuals whose primary purpose is to interact in order to change each other, the state of knowledge, and society itself. The university—"a community that thinks," as Robert Hutchins put it—rests on the assumption that society requires an organization which is engaged in a continuous search and conversation "aimed at truth."2

As early as the 18th century, however, men like Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Rush recognized that education must serve the community in practical ways, and that the university could not be an ivory tower removed from the world of action. On the contrary, since anything worth thinking about has consequences in the practical order, the university had to be involved in the world, and not separate. This understanding, and conviction, was shared in the 19th century by university presidents such as Eliot of Harvard and Gilman of Johns Hopkins, as well as by their colleagues in the State universities.

and the land-grant colleges, and in our own time by John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead, who insisted that "celibacy does not suit a university. It must make itself with action."

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLVEMENT

In its effort to "mate itself with action," the American university has displayed organizational skill and operational flair. It has offered itself as possessing certain special attributes which serve to make it attractive to potential clients in the government and industry. Turning its unique characteristics to advantage and losing sight of the original role of the "community that thinks," the university proclaimed its "capacity to move swiftly, flexibly, and imaginatively into a new area of critical need: the power to arrive at a disinterested, objective appraisal of a situation free of political influence; the freedom to engage in controversial activities; the ability to experiment in an unfettered manner—and if need be fail; and finally the capacity for sympathetic personal attention to the variety of human problems that beset our increasingly dehumanized world." 1 The university converted its natural mandate to participate in society into an eager solicitation of clientele, and in the process not only became a "multiversity," but began to forget what it was, what it served, and what its belief system consisted of.

In its increasing reliance upon "outsiders" to buy its services and to support its projects, the university found an effective means of cementing its organic integration into contemporary society, but this was neither painless nor free from serious cost. Ancient bonds were broken, traditional relationships were shattered, and customary functions were transmuted. The need to serve many clients often resulted in the neglect of the original clients, the students; the primary conception of the university as an "instrument of rationality * * * dedicated to reason" became blurred under the weight of conflicting pressures. 2 The introduction into the university of new systems of values was confusing; the natural dualism of the university's role, instead of being a source of strength, became a source of ambiguity and hence of weakness. The continuing sense of selfhood was lost, and with it there often came, as in human schizophrenia, a frantic denial of the old symbols and a baffled, random, and ineffective assumption of a large and unsatisfactory range of ad hoc roles.

As it began increasingly to relate to coordinate but divergent segments of society, the university tended to abandon its traditional guidelines without finding new ones of relevance. "Wavering between the profit and the loss, in this brief transit where the dreams cross," the university moved toward a future of greater, not lesser problems—problems of identity. In the words of John Gardner, "* * * as industry and government, with their huge research and education programs, come to look more and more like universities, and as the universities with their worldly interests come to look more and more like the rest of society, we shall achieve a condition in which no one will be quite sure what is university and what is nonuniversity, and no one will have the faintest idea what is organized around what." 3

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The illness which Gardner predicted has already infected the patient. We can call it "crisis of identity," which it certainly is; it is useful, however, to examine some of the symptoms.

II. The Symptoms

The crisis of identity, like so many illnesses, had innocent and understandable origins. Although it has brought about a serious condition at present, the relationship between Government and the universities, in its early form, was of formidable benefit to both. No responsible educator can fail to acknowledge the enormous debt which universities have to Government for their growth, their ability to provide education to increasingly large numbers of students, and for their capacity to engage in important research. Nor would any governmental official wish to deny the great extent to which university cooperation has been beneficial to the country's interests.

At the close of World War II, the desire of the universities actively to engage in the practical world coincided with the needs of Government to a remarkable degree. The Government wished to avoid building large in-house facilities for research; it wanted to "farm it out" to fiscally responsible institutions which had existing facilities and demonstrated capabilities; it wanted to give these tasks to nonprofit, non-controversial organizations which would help it to avoid congressional criticism. For their part, the universities did not want the Government to build in-house facilities which might compete with them or draw talent from the campuses; they did not want university talent to flow into governmental organizations like Rand, from which there would be no direct feedback to the instructional programs. In addition, the universities wanted a source of funds for the kind of basic research which they knew had to be done, but which could not be supported from relatively meager internal resources. It was, in short, a marriage of almost perfect convenience, and one which has worked remarkably well, producing often spectacular results.

The relationship between Government and universities, however, grew in a topsy-turvy fashion which brought about some fundamental problems and highlighted some points of danger. Many of these have been identified by responsible critics of the Government-university contract system, and may be regarded, in this context, as symptomatic of the organic disease. Although they differ in scope, all of the criticisms have in common the implicit confusion of belief systems and the consequent confusion of roles besetting both partners. The criticisms fall into a number of general patterns.

THE COMPLIANCE OF THE UNIVERSITIES

If the Government has offered various blandishments to the universities to engage in contractual projects, the universities, like Barkis, have been "willin'." The French put it well in their saying, "chose que platt est à demi vendue," but even more succinct is this limerick written by Don K. Price, dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard:

H. Doc. 120, 90-1—2
There was a young lady from Kent,
Who said that she knew what it meant,
When men took her to dine
Gave her cocktails and wine.
She knew what it meant—but she went.

In the same vein, Richard M. Morse, professor of history at Yale University and chairman of its Latin American studies, underscores the essentially passive posture of universities in responding to extramural Government initiatives. Morse writes:

American universities, often ensconced on comfortable land grants, have been singularly docile in taking leads from the Federal Government. They never bite the hand that feeds; at best they glower before eating. They dutifully produce atom bombs and Tagalog speakers. When the chill winds of McCarthyism blow from Washington, they philosophically hunch their shoulders against them. When the calls to New Frontiers and Great Societies are issued, they respond with cautious sympathy.7

This receptivity to outside stimuli—this willingness to become a Federal grant university—is especially marked in the international field. As John Gardner told the American Council on Education some 8 years ago:

When a Government agency with money to spend approaches a university it can usually purchase almost any service it wants *. * *. When the International Cooperation Administration began to write contracts with the universities for overseas service, it conceived the relationship as basically a purchase of services, and unfortunately many universities acquiesced. A good many of the universities did not ask whether the activities in question * * * were a wise expenditure of effort in terms of the total mission of the university, whether they would leave any increment of growth for the institution itself.

One may criticize the ICA for using the universities in this fashion. But as long as the universities have no conception of themselves other than the supermarket conception, they will have to resign themselves to the fact that people will walk in off the street, buy a box of Wheaties, and walk out.*

This relationship between an interested Government and a compliant university results not so much, as many fear, in Government control and domination, as in Government influence. As Clark Kerr, then recently president of the University of California, expressed it:

The real problem is not one of Federal control but of Federal influence. A Federal agency offers a project. The university need not accept; but as a practical matter, it usually does * * *. Out of this reality have followed many of the consequences of Federal aid for the universities; and they have been substantial. That they are subtle, slowly cumulative, and gentlemanly makes them all the more potent.9

**THE UNIVERSITY AS MENDICANT**

These criticisms direct attention to the general passive willingness of universities to accept what is offered to them, but this passivity is matched by an extremely active program of seeking out grants and projects. As a seeker of grants, the university, like commercial firms with products to sell, uses aggressive advertisement in the promotion of its wares and—in some cases has not only a series of professional promoters on campus, but an office in Washington as well. The president of the University of Rochester, W. Allen Walls, observes in this connection that—

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† "The University in Our Civilization," reprinted in "Brademas Compendium," pp. 41, 44.

universities, besides trying to preserve their traditional role, have become important wheelers and dealers in affairs large and small. They accept, indeed seek, assignments (if accompanied by funds) from businesses, government, foundations, or individuals to carry out specified missions on stated schedules. At times, they even agree to keep the results secret, for the exclusive benefit of the client. Only a little money they accept. \[10\] is for purposes as broad as those traditionally associated with universities.

As a result, concludes Wallis, the university's role is "in danger of becoming something like that of hotelkeeper for transient scholars and projects."

The zeal for pursuit of grants by the mendicant university has another unfortunate result: the development on the campuses, of marginal personnel, distinct from the traditional faculty, whose exclusive skills are in the grant-handling processes and who frequently negotiate contracts and commit their institutions without the involvement or the consent, and often without the knowledge, of the faculty directly and professionally concerned. The lack of faculty involvement in the phases of contract negotiation explains why, on most university campuses, Government projects are almost totally segregated from the academic enterprise of the university, to which they stand in the relationship of a sideshow. Paul A. Miller, former president of the University of West Virginia, and now Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, remarks, for example, that—

Apart from the inappropriateness, on campuses, of this new and extensive class of ancillaries, they pose another serious problem. While within the academic profession it is not difficult to distinguish between the professional and the nonprofessional, the distinction is seldom clear to persons in other fields, who assume, quite understandably, that everybody on a campus is part of the "faculty," and doing about the same sort of thing. This assumption is made more likely when the "same titles and ranks" are shared by all, regardless of primary function. It thus often happens that Government, for example, may be under the impression that it has the approval of the entire university, and its wholehearted support, when in fact it may have the approval of only a special group of administrative officers who neither know nor consider the wishes of the professorial staff in the older sense of the term. Such a situation serves not only to make a reasonable dialogue harder, it often produces acute embarrassment and serious misunderstanding.

Robert M. Rosenzweig, associate dean of the graduate division at Stafford University, is well aware of this situation. "One of the dismal sights in American higher education," he writes, "is that of administrators scrambling for contracts for work which does not emerge from the research or teaching interests of their faculty. The result of this unseemly enterprise is bound to be a faculty toered or seduced into secondary lines of interest, or a frantic effort to secure nonfaculty personnel to meet the contractual obligations. Among the most puzzling aspects of such arrangements is the fact—"
that Government agencies have permitted and even encouraged them. Not only are they harmful to the universities—which is not, of course, the Government's prime concern—but they insure that the Government will not get what it is presumably buying; namely, the intellectual and technical resources of the academic community. It is simply a bad bargain all the way around.1

Dean Rosenzweig might have gone on to point out that many of the nonfaculty personnel who are thus recruited end up with faculty rank, making it impossible thereafter to identify or to distinguish them. This may be one of the reasons why Government seems to have encouraged this sort of arrangement; while it certainly is Government's concern that universities should not be harmed, it has no reason to question the internal operation of a university, nor does it have the knowledge or the vocabulary; if it is fooled, it is no more so than the large numbers of people who assume that he who wears a white coat is a physician.

THE SHORT-CHANGING OF GOVERNMENT

Since it is only seldom that external projects become an integral and coherent part of the academic community, the Government does not get what it thinks it is buying, and what it often pays for most generously: the technical and intellectual resources which the university, in theory, is supposed to supply. It is, to put it bluntly, short-changed, and no one who has the country's interests at heart can look at this without regret and alarm. The eagerness of university administrations to undertake stylized, Government-financed projects has caused a decline in self-generated commitments to scholarly pursuits, has produced baneful effects on the academic mission of our universities, and has, in addition, brought forward some bitter complaints from the disappointed clients. According to one reliable report, the Agency for International Development claims that—

[* * *] universities have often acted irresponsibly—sending third-rate personnel overseas, neglecting the needs of the host country while they concentrate on what they want to do, engaging in aggressive tactics to get contracts, taking on tasks they are not equipped to do.** Some AID officials add that no U.S. university ever willingly terminated a contract program, no matter how valid the reasons for doing so.1

Some of these charges are exaggerated and the denunciation is too sweeping; yet they tend to suggest that from the Government's point of view, the university contract system, as presently operated, is not by any means, the most satisfactory way for an agency to accomplish its mission and to discharge its responsibilities. William J. Nagle, former Director of the Office of External Research of the Department of State, finds the Government-university contract system a defective instrument for serving the needs either of Government or of the total society. He observes a singular tendency on the part of American social scientists to permit operations to dominate purposes and to refuse to act, perhaps in the hope of landing future contracts, as "responsible critics of Government policy." He finds them unwilling or unable to challenge conventional wisdom or to question some of the myths on which some aspects of policy might be based. Nagle puts it this way:

Although I spent my 3 years at State in a sincere and sometimes spirited defense of our own and of other agencies' contract research programs, I must admit that there were very few of the more than 40 studies contracted during my tenure there that really proved very useful to the Department's policymakers or even to the Department's researchers. * * * Most contract researchers whose products came across my desk failed to meet the standards and needs of the Government or the academy. * * * I began to worry that I, a contract research administrator, was in fact contributing very little either to the needs of Government or to the larger society's pursuit of knowledge and truth.10

Nagle reports that his disappointment and disenchantment with the contributions of academia was shared by some of the most sensitive and capable officials in Washington. Daniel P. Moynihan, an architect, when he was Assistant Secretary of Labor, of the domestic Great Society programs, was most unhappy at the poverty of ideas from the universities. Richard Goodwin, before leaving the White House, was disheartened by academia's answers to the "crisis of American public life." And Arthur Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, devoted an entire speech to the Washington chapter of the International Studies Association to "the failure of American intellectuals to contribute new ideas to American foreign policy. I believe the potential for courageous, intelligent intellectuals concerned with political affairs * * * has never been greater, but the response has been inadequate to the challenge."11 What Julien Benda called the "treason" of the intellectuals may be taking the form, 35 years later, of the "failure" of the academic community.

THE ETHICS OF SPONSORED RESEARCH

It is largely, but not exclusively, in projects involving overseas research that an ethical problem arises and intrudes. Questions of ethics are often swept under the rug; but they have a way of coming out again in the course of time, and Project Camelot is a case in point. Camelot was a $6 million research project sponsored by the U.S. Army under the aegis of an accredited American university. It involved the highly flammable subjects of counterrevolution and counterinsurgency in Latin America, and was, in effect, an effort to use "software" research in support of, or as a substitute for, "hardware" systems.

In response to criticisms in the Department of State, the Congress, and the academic community, Secretary of Defense McNamara eventually canceled the project. The reasons for the cancellation are less important than the question which the project raised of the propriety, in the first place, of the acceptance by a university of an assignment under the specified conditions and terms. Prof. Irving Louis Horowitz, of Washington University, reports:

One of the cloudiest aspects to Project Camelot is the role of (the contracting university). Its actual supervision of the contract appears to have begun and ended with the 25 percent overhead on those parts of the contract that a university receives on most Federal grants * * *. From the outset, there seems to have been a "gentleman's agreement" not to inquire or interfere in Project Camelot, but simply to serve as some sort of camouflage.12

That "the relationship between sponsors and researchers was not one of equals, but rather one of superordinate military needs and

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11 Citid ibid., p. 317.
subordinate academic roles" did not appear to trouble the contracting university nor cause it any crise de conscience. That the Army was "respectful and protective of free expression" seemed to be a sufficient condition for undertaking the contract. Nonetheless, in Horowitz's view, this left a fundamental ethical question unresolved:

The propriety of the Army to define and delimit all questions, which Crazek should have had a right to examine, was never in doubt. This is a tragic precedent; it reflects the arrogance of a consumer of intellectual commodities. And this relationship of inequality corrupted the lines of authority, and profoundly limited the autonomy of the social scientists involved. It became clear that the social scientist savant was not so much functioning as an applied social scientist as he was supplying information to a powerful client **. The sponsorship of a project, whether by the U.S. Army or by the Boy Scouts of America, by itself neither good nor bad. Sponsorship is good or bad only insofar as the intended outcomes can be predetermined and the parameters of those intended outcomes tailored to the sponsor's expectations.16

In fact, the issue is pragmatic as well as ethical. A project which lacks inherent intellectual or scientific validity is not worthy of a university's effort; but at the same time the results of such a project will fail to give to its sponsor the value he paid for. The Government is shortchanged, and the university is compromised. The corruption and impoverishment of society's value system is not only deplorable in itself, but quite in vain.

The gist of these criticisms can be found in the conclusion of Clark Kerr, that American universities have "always responded, but seldom so quickly as today, to the desires and demands of external groups—sometimes for love, sometimes for gain, increasingly willingly, and, in some cases, too eagerly." And however eager or willing the response may have been, it has been such as to call the whole relationship of Government and universities into question; to cast doubt upon the integrity of some institutions and their faculties, to open the educational functions of universities to the arrows of Philistines, and to suggest the possibility to a world—never adverse to prejudice—that academic honesty is no less marketable than a box of detergent on the grocery shelf:

III. Diagnosis

PRAGMATIC VERSUS IDEALISTIC INSTITUTIONS

The failure of the universities to continue their traditional functions and to reaffirm their traditional ideals has led to an unusually keen sense of despair; in good measure because of the general appreciation of the fact that they are special kinds of institutions, idealistic rather than pragmatic. It offends us that they should "sell" their services—and, perhaps, themselves.

Most institutions are necessarily pragmatic, devoted to the achievement of certain important purposes—the production of goods, the defense of the realm, the provision of medical care. As pragmatic institutions, they may be judged in accordance with how effectively they operate. If they fail to provide what they are designed to provide, they may be modified or abolished. In this context, the "good" institution is the one which works, the "bad" institution is the one which does not. "Pragmatic" is not, however, a pejorative adjective:

16 Ibid., p. 901.
17 Kerr, op. cit., p. 94.
pragmatic institutions function to make possible the environment in which people live; they are the operative structures of social organization.

Some institutions, though, are designed to accomplish another order of result; an order which relates to a transcendental system of values. These institutions, notably the educational and the religious, are concerned with another part of the dream, that which offers as the purpose of life something more than survival: the search for truth and the pursuit of happiness.

The presence of these two classes of institution—the pragmatic and the ideal—reflects a dichotomy which may be seen in all societies; but it is more critical in our own. Historically, American culture has prized two contradictory sets of values: self-reliance and initiative on the one hand, cooperative goals on the other. The assumption that material success brings spiritual rewards has exacerbated the ambiguity of the American dream. As a result, we wish to accomplish political ends but also wish to be loved for doing so; we are impelled to act in one way, but to offer justification for our action in another. We have a tendency to apply contradictory sets of standards to our behavior, and we often suffer as a result. It would be useful to consider that instead of continuing to see the dichotomy as inevitable, we should think of it as a set of complementary values, going hand in hand.

Universities as Special Bodies

Universities are not essentially pragmatic institutions. They are devoted to the pursuit and transmission of knowledge, and they are founded upon the conviction that what they do has moral rather than expedient value. They are thus measurable by their ideals rather than by the immediate effect of what they do. Their special position is well recognized in society: universities are freely and generously supported by tax monies and in many States given constitutional autonomy. They are not fashioned to produce profit in monetary terms; they are meant to count their profit in the enrichment of life and in the preservation of ideals.

Given this special character of universities, it seems only natural to conclude that they are outside society, exempt from the need to provide for the general as well as the special welfare. The professor often draws up his gown whenever he sees a danger that practical mud might splatter it; he often sees himself as isolated in a tower, insulated from street noise, helpless in affairs of the world. Such a conclusion is false, and it is misinformed to think that universities can, or should, operate outside society. Moreover, once we recognize that Government is the fons et caput of social organization, we must also recognize that it is proper for Government to draw upon the resources of other institutions in society—including the universities.

The Responsibilities of Universities

Thus, it is misguided to argue that universities should remain aloof and should never enter the marketplace or the legislative halls. It is misguided, in the name of "purity," to suggest that universities should withhold from society the contributions they are uniquely fitted to make.
First of all, this kind of isolation is in any case impossible. Universities are composed of men and women who have lives in society—who are as political, economic, and active as anybody else. The bell which tolls for society tolls as loudly for them, and they may not renounce this basic responsibility for the character of their times. Second, universities exist in, and reflect their societies; and they cannot disentangle themselves from the social fabric in which they exist. The special place which universities have in society does not imply separation; it implies freedom from any restriction on their ability to carry out their special function. This is more than a theoretical demand. Without this freedom, universities cannot survive.

UNIVERSITIES AND GOVERNMENT

As a special body, therefore, the university must have a special relationship to government; one which reflects its idiosyncratic features but which does not isolate it. The university cannot and should not engage in any governmental activity which will compromise, modify, or destroy its special functions. As a corollary, however, it must and should engage in governmental activities which do none of these. Freedom has the other face of responsibility; unwillingness to accept one will surely destroy the other. Neither a university, nor any institution, nor any individual can have it both ways.

It is therefore proper for Government to make use of university resources in the pursuit of national aims; but it must understand, when it does so, that it is not merely adding another governmental organization to its existing structures. It has certainly been pleasing to the Government to find in universities the tables of organization and cadres which the Army admires, and to see in them the answer to urgent needs. It is convenient to draw upon organized concentrations of experts, and no government can be blamed which delights in this.

This governmental delight, however, has been matched by squeals of joy in the academy. The motives are varied, but among them can be noted the fact that government service provides a prestige which campuses do not; that the professor may get the feeling which universities tend to depress, that he is in the center of things; that the slow ascent of an upward mobile may be accelerated into exhilarating flight. If the Government tends to use the professor, the professor is often deferential, glad to be of use, willing to swell a scene or two. And so are the universities—for profit, for prestige, for the opportunities to orbit deans around the world. They should not be blamed; a little bit of this is in all of us.

THE INHERENT DANGERS

Comprendre, say the French, c'est tout pardonner. This may not be applicable in this instance, for the consequences of thoughtless and uncontrolled governmental use of universities are serious—for Government, for universities, and hence for the society of which they are important parts.

If universities are put to governmental use in an unlimited fashion, there can only result a tragic diminution of their special functions, which will no longer be carried out. When universities become merely

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an arm of Government, they begin to dispense conventional orthodoxy instead of pursuing free inquiry; to serve as advocates rather than analysts; to accept ritualistic answers instead of grappling with difficult questions; above all, to abandon their necessary and natural function as counterweights to the pragmatic evaluation normal in Government. When this happens, their occupation, like Othello’s, disappears, and the whole society is impoverished. Then, Government becomes monolithic, expedient, motivated only by its own empirical momentum. And, society’s pluralistic fabric is irreparably damaged.

An extreme example is the degradation of the Nazi state and the willingness of the German universities to give moral and intellectual color to the pragmatic programs of the leaders: they clothed apes in doctoral gowns and blessed them with their diplomas. By converting themselves from homes for philosophical diversity into propaganda centers for an official doctrine, they legitimized a totalitarian, monolithic regime and drained the moral and intellectual lifeblood from the German nation. And, after defeat, this depleted society was almost totally devoid of the leaders who could help rebuild a moral order. The example is extreme, but the lesson is clear: the collapse of universities can mean the collapse of a whole society, and since Government governs a whole society, it loses in the long run when it forces roles and functions to become blurred.

Neither expediency nor pragmatism implies, however, the absence of morality. It is a question of degree and emphasis. Universities can function most usefully by devoting themselves exclusively to their proper domains. In doing so, though, they may quite properly be helpful in other areas. What is required more than anything else is an honesty of purpose and an honesty of aim, on the part of Government and the universities together.

THE DEEPER DIMENSION OF THE CREDIBILITY GAP

In recent years, under the many pressures of modern society, we have witnessed a persistent degradation of values through their use for ulterior and expedient ends. The cynical use of values from one system to justify the purposes of another system can only result in the ultimate destruction of the values themselves, which cease to move men, and which are no longer capable of acting as guides to conduct. More important, this misuse causes a fundamental credibility gap.

The term “credibility gap” is most often used to express the distinction between what is said and what is true: it rests on the circumstance that when, in a given situation, false or partial information is imparted, the conclusions cannot be believed. The cure for this, of course, may rightly be sought in the full disclosure of truth, and while this may not always be easy to accomplish, it is nonetheless a sovereign remedy at hand. With respect to the expedient use of values, however, the meaning of “credibility” changes. Instead of being related to the distance between truth and falsehood, it reflects a dishonesty of another kind, that which is an inevitable concomitant of any justification by moral principle of a program whose ends are...
only pragmatic and direct. It is no longer a matter of "truth," but an 
attitude.

The implication is not, certainly, that expedient ends are wrong or 
undesirable. It is rather that expedient ends should be justified in 
terms of themselves, not in terms of larger, universal principles. The 
elimination of disease, for example, may be justified in terms of moral 
good; it may also have the practical effect of producing a more efficient 
soldiery. If the purpose of the Government is to produce the efficient 
soldiery, that purpose should not be concealed under the alleged 
humanitarian aim; when this happens, the ostensible reason is seen 
as false and the Government runs the risk of being considered hypo-
critical.

Unfortunately we have sometimes missed this point in designing 
our assistance programs. Often, we have come to be accused of sub-
stituting cant for candor; and, to our loss, timeo Americanos et dona 
ferentes has become a pervasive slogan. Yet, failing to recognize the 
essence of the problem, we have frequently ascribed the weakness of 
some programs to the garb in which they were clothed, and have then 
changed the packaging rather than the product.

THE ULTERIOR CAN BE OSTENSIBLE

We may take note that other nations, such as France, equally con-
cerned with their national interests, can pursue them without 
adverse criticism and without adverse results. They project, although 
they do the same things, a different image.

The French have for many years, and openly, subsidized educa-
tional and economic programs all over the world. They have never 
denied that they have expected benefits to accrue to France: in the 
words of M. Jean Basdevant, Director General of Cultural and 
Technical Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "France 
intends to encourage the spread of the French language, that incom-
parable means of expression" and to assist in the "training of a foreign 
intelligentsia and cadres," and in the "spread of French culture in all 
its forms." 22 Two aspects of this program deserve special attention: 
(1) France expects to advance its national interests and to maintain 
a certain dominion; (2) France believes that the inherent values of 
its own language and civilization, without distortion, are such as to 
attract the permanent admiration of all who come in contact with 
them.

As a result, French overseas programs are within themselves beyond 
reproach: their educational standards are equal to those at home in 
curriculum and staff; those who engage in them are integrated into 
the regular French educational organizations and are not put into 
the subsidiary categories which our overseas professors often occupy. 
The difference between the French experience and our own lies in 
attitude. Where the French believe in the values they proclaim, we 
are ambivalent toward our own.

The ambivalence is not that of Government servants too often 
made into whipping boys: it is the fundamental ambivalence of our

Presse et d'Information, August 1966.
society. Since we see books at home as "useful," we see them in that light abroad; since we think at home in terms of images, we select our overseas materials accordingly. The holdings of the average American library abroad are not only small; they are, to put it bluntly, dull. Moreover, they reflect the basis of choice, showing not America as it is, but America as we would like it to appear. Since in our value system the concrete is more important than the abstract, we devote scant appropriations to books, heavy appropriations to tangible aids. Ideas, seen in many segments of our culture as objects to be manipulated, are exported, along with their professorial vehicles, as so many items. The typical bill of lading, says the cynic, contains one scholar, one set of texts, one trunk, one idea on the value of democracy, one insight, and two dependents. The ulterior becomes ostensible when we begin to believe in what we say we believe.

**THE PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT AGAINST CYNICISM**

What American universities and professors accomplish abroad, for the interests of their country, is not a specific task, but a general one of reflecting the values of the United States in their persons, their actions, and their attitudes. With due respect to other nations, these values are not inconsiderable; we have much to be proud of. Indeed, we are better than we permit ourselves to seem. When a professor, as an individual or as a member of a university team, is subsidized to accomplish a specific political goal, he not only fails, but traduces his real role at home and abroad. The recent involvement of a major university with the Ngo Dinh Diem government of Viet-Nam is sadly to the point. Foreign policy belongs to Government, not to universities; it belongs to officers of the State Department, not to departments of political science. A blurring of these distinctions results in a double failure: the professor fails as professor, and he fails as diplomat as well. The Nation gains virtually nothing.

Cynicism thus means failure. Success requires, at a minimum, an abiding belief by Government and the universities in what each is doing. University programs must therefore be impeccable in themselves, and not subject to modification to fit expedient ends. University programs cannot be used to implement transient policies unless these transient policies are in accord with their primary aims of advancing knowledge and alleviating distress. The pressures on the Government, being largely pragmatic, may cause it to approach universities pragmatically. Government should not be criticized for trying, but it should not always be encouraged to succeed. The officer of the Government and the university administrator must each judge his activities in terms of his primary adhesion to organizational goals; if he does not, he is ineffective. In short, the two roles, and the two functions,
must be kept apart, which is not to say that there can be no comple-
tementary area where both can work in harmony without loss. Afte-
all, wherever he works, every citizen is part of American society. He
will contribute best to its welfare by doing his own job as well as he
can, with respect for what others are doing. And, what is true for
Americans as individuals is equally true for American institutions.

THE SUM OF THE ARGUMENTS

It is to the advantage of both Government and the universities that
the distinction between their activities be kept clear. The society
which no longer has an autonomous university function within it has
lost its pluralist strength, and is therefore a poorer society. Universities,
however, cannot function without the pragmatic activities of Govern-
ment, so that, in effect, each needs the other, and each profits from the
other. Attempts to make universities into arms of political policy blur
this distinction and thus weaken the entire society.

In addition, however, such attempts have also been pragmatic
failures. We stand today at a curious point where morality and ex-
pedience, often mutually exclusive, in fact go hand in hand. If there
is no excuse, from a moral point of view, for an immoral program, there
is even less excuse for an immoral program which does not work.
Motive is less important than the actions it brings about: even for
those who have no wish to be pure in principle it is sensible to be pure
as a matter of practicality. The interests of the intellectual community
and those of the Government in fact coincide: by hewing to an honest
line, both how to an effective one. Honesty is good; but, in addition,
honesty pays. In short, it is possible to have the best of both possible
worlds.

IV. THE PRESCRIPTION

GOVERNMENTAL COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

In recent years our traditional commitment to the ideals of educa-
tion has been enlarged by an international dimension. President
Johnson articulated the new commitment eloquently and persuas-
ively—first in his Smithsonian address of 1965 and later in his special
message to Congress on February 2, 1966:

"Education lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes," said the
President. "It must be at the heart of our international relations *. *. *. Interna-
tional education cannot be the work of one country. It is the responsibility and
promise of all nations. It calls for free exchange and full collaboration. We expect
to receive as much as we give, to learn as well as to teach. Let this Nation play
its part."

The congressional response to this challenge was prompt and unmis-
takable. The International Education Act of 1966 endorsed the com-
mmitment, and provided the framework for implementing it. But it
was only the first step. It left a crucial question unanswered: whether
we would tolerate, as in international education efforts of the past, a
glaring gap between the expression of ideals and their realization—a
gap sometimes so large as to impeach, in skeptical minds, the sincerity
of the commitment itself.

Clearly, it is time to make reality conform to ideal, to allow "con-
duct to be an unspoken sermon," and to make practice congruent
with precept. The manner in which a nation allocates its scarce re-
sources, the manner in which it spends its public treasure, is the most revealing index of its values and priorities—the clearest reflection of the relative importance it attaches to the things in which it believes. If we mean what we say, therefore, if we adhere to the values enunciated by President Johnson, we must translate that conviction into the unambiguous dollar terms of governmental budgets. We must provide significant, massive, and comprehensive financial support for international education in its broadest sense; and this means support for American higher education on a scale unparalleled in history.

Some profess that universities cannot maintain their autonomy unless they have nothing to do with governmental activities. This is erroneous. In fact, universities' independence is greater when funds are available which enable them adequately to carry out their tasks, and few universities today have the requisite private resources to do so.

**CAPITAL AND SUSTAINING GRANTS**

In order to strengthen the universities for a role in international education, the Government should change the character and shift the emphasis of its financial support from mission-oriented project grants to sustaining capital grants. It should provide stable, long-range, continuing, and predictable funding for research and instructional programs in international education, so as to build up the universities' fundamental academic capabilities for discharging their international responsibilities. It should make an investment in the universities rather than merely buying services from them.

The idea of capital grants is by no means revolutionary. The Government has already made modest gestures in this direction with the new institutional grants of the National Science Foundation, the general research support and facilities grants to medical schools by the National Institutes of Health, the sustaining university grants of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Education grants to universities for buildings and equipment. The model exists; it remains to be elaborated, generalized, and systematized.

Unlike the "overhead" support from mission-oriented projects, a system of institutional capital grants provides "an economic and feasible way of enlarging the international competence of higher education in the United States" and gives "society at large a much greater reserve strength for its international commitments in the long run." Such support is aimed at the central nervous system of the universities—the academic and the scholarly. Such support does not require that universities change their roles or their belief systems, nor that the universities transform their character in order to qualify. Such support inhibits the growth on campuses of administrative units which merely ape their governmental counterparts. Such support slows the proliferation of administrative sheep in academic garb, and discourages the appearance of academic floorwalkers who pace the peripheries of the university world without knowledge or interest or concern. Instead, such support contributes to the growth and enrichment of intellectual disciplines, which have inherent validity as well as potential usefulness, such as international politics and diplomacy; comparative government and economic systems; population and public health; international trade and economic development;

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languages and linguistics; human development, education, and child development.

It is this kind of support which the Congress envisioned, with commendable breadth of understanding and principle, in the International Education Act of 1966; it is the kind of support which will make it possible for universities to be the places they should be—where it is possible, in the words of William Nagle, "to dream, to think, to act as intellectual gadflies in our society, to question ...". Such support will make the university commentator and critic, thinker and innovator, which can engage Government in that kind of dialog which brings about progress.

The country deserves no less. Whatever formula is finally adopted for allocating capital grants among the universities, this basic investment in education is far better in principle than the use of stylized contractual programs designed to accomplish specific, short-term aims and containing within them the seeds of serious liabilities. It is also far superior in practice.

**CAPITAL GRANTS AND THE COVETOUSNESS OF UNIVERSITIES**

The belief is not uncommon that in Government-university relationships it is the university which has been corrupted by deliberate and seductive blandishment. Such a belief is only partly true, and overlooks the fact that few seductions are successful where there has not been a similarity of values. A bait is refused which is not considered delicious. Certainly Government has attempted to make participation in its programs attractive to the universities, but it found a most ready willingness on their part. In some cases not much was required: the offer of access to an Embassy soda fountain has lured many a scholar from his lore; the vision of an expanded jurisdiction has entranced a score of deans. The fact is that universities have coveted what the Government has offered, and so long as they continue to see profit—in funds, buildings, enlargement or prestige—in Government programs, they will continue to covet them. The system of capital investments reduces this covetousness to normal proportions and channels it into constructive lines: where the major profit will be in terms of fundamental academic values, there can be no objection to a desire to have it.

It would be naive to suppose, however, that the capital grants we have proposed will eliminate completely the system of mission-oriented project contracts. This means that a mechanism must be developed which will provide the necessary safeguards against potential abuse. Criteria must be spelled out to guide government and the universities in their contract relationship. External checks must be established, on both Government and the universities, to achieve two basic objectives: the diminution of academic covetousness on the one hand, and the desire of Government for a precipitate satisfaction of immediate and transitory needs, on the other. Only through a selective application of these checks can a climate be created in which project contracts make a useful contribution—without compromising the Government-university relationship.

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*Nagle, op. cit., p. 317.

* One possibility is the formula proposed in the Miller bill (H.R. 675, 90th Cong.). Another alternative is to tie the capital grants to the site of an institution's research budget, the number of undergraduates it trains, and the number of advanced degrees it grants over a 5-year base period. Some allowance, of course, would have to be made for "smaller" institutions and for "newcomers" to the field of international education.
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO

1. Every project suggested for implementation by a university should, in the first instance, be submitted to a professional panel drawn from national associations such as the American Economic Association, the Modern Language Association, the American Hospital Association, and the like.²⁸

2. Each such project should be examined by the panel in order to determine:
   (a) whether the project is inherently valid in terms of professional criteria;
   (b) whether the project, even though professionally valid, is suitable for a university to undertake; and
   (c) which universities have the requisite resources in faculty and facilities to assure the probable success of the project.

3. Any project deemed unsuitable by the panel, for any of the above reasons, will be abandoned by the Government insofar as implementation by universities is concerned.

4. Any acceptable project will be offered by Government to the universities suggested by the panel in order of their competence for that project. Under these conditions the Government will know that it is approaching the "right" university; the university will have reasonable assurance that the project is professionally sound, and that its involvement will be free from reproach, taint, or ambiguity.

5. The Government will reimburse the university only for direct costs. There will be no overhead.

WHAT THE UNIVERSITIES MUST DO

The absence of overhead funds will, of course, have been offset by the extensive capital grants from Government which we have proposed. The "no overhead" rule, however, will produce another desirable result: it will weaken the university's temptation to apply other than academic standards to projects suggested by the Government. To put it unambiguously, the profit will have been taken out of the contract system, and the munificent fringe benefits will no longer be operative as attractive inducements. The university will then do what it must do:

1. Consider each project in the light of its own intellectual standards and capabilities.

2. Compute the cost of the project in terms of the diversion of staff and resources from its on-campus teaching and research functions.

3. Evaluate the project in terms of its internal value system, its intellectual priorities, and its multiple responsibilities.

4. Estimate the long-range contribution that the project is likely to make to the strengthening of the university as an educational institution.

5. Reappraise the value to the university of the contract promoters and project salesmen—and encourage these now-redundant mountebanks to seek more compatible climates.

²⁸ The rationale of this suggestion rests on the belief that the professions are an important safeguard against organizational bureaucracies, in an age of government. As John W. Gardner points out, "The loyalty of the professional man is to his profession and not to the organization that may house him at any given moment. "... The man the chemist thinks of as his colleagues are not those who occupy neighboring offices, but his fellow professionals wherever they may be throughout the country, even throughout the world." "Self-Renewal," New York: Harper & Row, 1964, p. 88.
In short, the absence of overhead will compel the universities to make their "cost-benefit" analysis of proposed projects in real terms rather than mony terms.

V. The Prognosis

GENERAL EFFECTS

This suggested prescription may be defended in terms of principle; it may also be defended as practical. Universities would be the great beneficiaries of such a change in policy, for in return for giving up the obvious and immediate advantages of overhead support, they would lay rightful claim to a support far more meaningful: financial backing for their real work in the form of general, capital investment grants by Government. By putting this money to use in the strengthening of the established disciplines and in the encouragement of new and imaginative fields of inquiry, the universities would reap genuine, not spurious, renown. By expanding intellectually rather than in the size of empire, the universities would divest themselves of unattractive personnel and come closer to a realization of their identity. The graduates of such universities would be better equipped to serve their country, in or out of Government. The universities would retain their autonomy and yet recognize their responsibilities to society. American pluralism would be reinforced—to the general benefit of all sectors of society, pragmatic and theoretical. And, in a world tending so greatly to fall under the sway of monolithic governments, a pluralistic America, with free dialog, and proper separation of functions, would stand as an important and powerful example.

SPECIFIC EFFECTS

In the course of time, the number and scope of contract programs would tend to diminish, and those which remained would be carefully selected. A certain number of programs, especially those unsuitable for universities, but necessary for Government, would have to be undertaken either by private or by governmental organizations; in any case, by appropriate organizations. The Government would receive full value from universities and not be shortchanged, through the circumstance of "buying" from them only that which they are fitted to "sell." The links between the professions and the Government would be strengthened, with a corresponding increase in understanding of the different standards and values. Graduates of universities would be better equipped to serve and our overseas programs would be increasingly free from the dichotomy which we have mentioned. A period of administrative readjustment would ensue, but along with it would come a reassessment and a reaffirmation of values, a clarification of identity, an openness of purpose, and an end to the ambiguity which has only served to create misunderstanding and to obscure the fact that most men, if given the chance to know and to appreciate who they are, are men of good will. A democracy can ask for no more to achieve success.