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Finally, Khulisa appreciates the time and effort by all who participated in the evaluation, without which this evaluation would not be possible, including the subject matter experts and local consultants who contributed to every stage of the evaluation – development, data collection, data analysis, and reporting.

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Executive Summary

This report presents Khulisa Management Services’ final evaluation of the State Department’s Community Policing Program (CPP) in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. We conclude that the CPP has been highly effective in building trust between local police and the populations they serve, and has also served as an effective platform for delivering US Government policy objectives in the region, including countering violent extremism, promoting democracy and good governance, and bolstering the rule of law.

The evaluation findings are based on analysis of program reporting between 2012 and 2018, and five weeks of mixed methods research that examined a combined 15 Community Policing Centers (CPCs) across both countries. The qualitative component of the research consists of 57 in-depth interviews with key informants, including implementers, police officials, and members of Community Policing Partnership Teams (CPPTs). The quantitative component consists of a survey of 15 Likert scale items that was administered to all key informants and focus group participants except police and implementers – 61 respondents in total. Unfortunately, limitations on data collection in Tajikistan prevented Khulisa from using the survey there. As a result, quantitative results are limited to Kyrgyzstan.

Findings

CVE: CPCs perform effective preventative work in their communities to counter the spread of violent extremism. CPCs address pull factors such as the spread of foreign propaganda in the community, and mitigate push factors such as disaffection among youth. Nevertheless, in many locations CVE activities focused on public awareness campaigns, while neglecting to monitor and intervene with at-risk families.

Trust: CPCs are effective at building trust between the police and the local community in rural settings. This is particularly true among youth and women, who may otherwise not seek assistance from police out of fear or a lack of faith that law enforcement will solve their problems. Success at building trust is heavily contingent on local members of the CPPT, however, who are subject to regular turnover.

Petty corruption: CPCs are not effective at combating petty police corruption or abuse of power, nor do CPPT members view this goal as part of their mandate. Nevertheless, community policing can contribute to broader anti-corruption efforts by building greater familiarity and trust between police and the public.

Sustainability: INL and Saferworld have established CPCs that will continue their crime prevention activities after the completion of the program. CPCs have become a platform for civic engagement in their communities, to a large degree because of the physical structure itself. CPCs also serve as active sites of local training. Once established, CPCs require relatively little funding to operate.

Mainstream Behavior: Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have demonstrated a commitment to shifting away from a Soviet model of law enforcement, and toward a crime prevention model in which community policing could play a crucial role. Nevertheless, crucial roadblocks remain to the realization of this goal, including obstacles to deeper partnership with INL and other strategic partners.

Adaptation to Local Conditions & Cultures: Though Saferworld implements a consistent community policing model across project sites, the CPCs themselves respond to local needs and conduct local conflict mapping activities. Respondents consistently described CPCs as responsive to local concerns, including problems facing women and youth, recruitment by VE groups, ethnic tension, and border tensions.

Best Practices

1. Physical space for CPPTs: The physical spaces built for CPCs have become key centers of civic life, enhancing the impact of community policing in most of the rural communities studied.

2. Fundraising capacity: The directors of the most sustainable CPCs we encountered were all trained in fundraising. These directors had secured funding by applying for grants or petitioning the local self-government for a small budget.

3. Venues for exchange of experience: Saferworld has provided numerous venues for more established CPPTs to share their experience with less established or successful CPPTs.
4. **Collaboration across embassy missions**: In Tajikistan, the success of the community policing program and other initiatives has been facilitated by a strong culture of collaboration and coordination across missions in the US Embassy in Dushanbe, exemplified by the CVE Working Group.

**Lessons Learned**

1. **Regular turnover**: CPCs are subject to regular turnover, which can impact their performance. Trainings and exchanges of experience between CPCs should focus on sharing the practices of CPCs that have most effectively sustained their activities in the course of regular turnover.

2. **Effective monitoring**: In at least one site in Kyrgyzstan, the local government and police had appropriated the CPC exclusively for police use. INL should develop an action plan for assisting Saferworld with its monitoring activities in such circumstances.

3. **Vertical integration**: In Tajikistan, province-level Public Councils a composed of local stakeholders from the provincial capital, with no participation from members of district-level CPPTs.

4. **Conflicts of interest with implementers**: In Tajikistan, the directors of implementing partners are also members of CPPTs/Public Councils, creating potential for conflicts of interest.

5. **CVE through information and intervention**: In many, but not all locations, CPPTs focus their CVE efforts on public awareness campaigns, and spend minimal effort identifying and intervening with at-risk individuals and families — even in communities that had produced a high number of foreign combatants.

**Recommendations**

1. **Continued DoS Support in the Short to Medium Term**: Continue to support or increase programming in the short to medium term to take full advantage of the current windows of opportunity in each country – afforded by a new criminal code in Kyrgyzstan and a favorable Minister of Internal Affairs in Tajikistan.

2. **Sustainable Funding**: Continue trainings and capacity building in fundraising. Clarify the legal standing of CPCs in both countries to apply for grants and petition local government for funding from the local budget. Work with CPPTs to explore the resulting funding options and share best practices for fundraising in both the public and private sector.

3. **Exchange of Experience**: Continue support for venues for sharing experience among CPPTs, including peer-to-peer mentoring. Assist established and proven-sustainable CPPTs to mentor newly established or struggling CPPTs, especially through grants for travel and trainings. Such exchanges of experience are particularly important for CPCs’ CVE efforts, which tend to emphasize public awareness over monitoring and intervention with at-risk families.

4. **Integration and Coordination**: CPCs would be able to exchange experience and coordinate their efforts more effectively if their directors participated in province-level councils that partnered with the provincial government. This goal would require sufficient infrastructure and sustainable funding for CPC directors to meet regularly, either in person or virtually.

5. **CPCs as a platform for delivering programming and services**: CPCs offer a unique and effective tool for delivering a variety of programming to local populations. As key civic institutions affiliated with local self-government, CPCs have a greater public mandate and legitimacy than NGOs and can deliver DoS programming with a relative degree of autonomy from government policy and bureaucracy. INL/ACE should thus explore ways to build out this platform to other areas of programming.

6. **Gender Mainstreaming**: Continue support for increasing gender mainstreaming in the police force, including offering trainings, which in turn could help fast-track the number of women serving in CPCs and in command positions.

7. **Expand media efforts to counter extremist propaganda**: Continue to support the CVE activities of CPCs by providing sub-grants for creating materials that counter the extremist groups’ recruiting propaganda. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, this objective may require the creation of a CVE working group at the US Embassy in Bishkek similar to that operating at the US Embassy in Dushanbe.
# Table of Contents

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ vii

Introduction and Background ........................................................................................................... 1

1 Scope and Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 3

2 Findings .................................................................................................................................................. 6

2.1 Countering Violent Extremism ........................................................................................................ 8

2.2 Trust .................................................................................................................................................. 11

2.3 Petty Corruption and Abuse of Power ............................................................................................... 15

2.4 Sustainability ..................................................................................................................................... 17

2.5 Mainstream Police Behavior and Training ....................................................................................... 20

2.6 Adaptation to Local Conditions & Cultures .................................................................................... 23

2.7 Lessons Learned and Best Practices ............................................................................................... 30

3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 32

4 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 33

Annex A: Team ........................................................................................................................................ 35

Annex B: Evaluation Approach and Methodology ............................................................................... 36

Annex C: Research Instruments ............................................................................................................. 38

Annex D: Data Collection and Project Site Selection .......................................................................... 47

Annex E: Documents Reviewed ............................................................................................................. 51

Annex F: Statement of Work .................................................................................................................... 53
List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Total Number of Respondents to Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions .......... 4
Table 2: Quick-Fire Survey Demographics .................................................................................................. 4

Figure 1: Map of Local Crime Prevention Centers in Kyrgyzstan .................................................................. 1
Figure 2: Map of Crime Prevention Centers in Tajikistan ........................................................................... 2
Figure 3: Response to the Statement, "My community supports its Local Community Policing Center." ... 6
Figure 4: Response to the Statement, "The Local Community Policing Center in my community responds
to the needs of community residents." ....................................................................................................... 7
Figure 5: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Violent Extremism ......................................................... 9
Figure 6: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Public Trust in Police ................................................... 13
Figure 7: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Police Corruption ......................................................... 16
Figure 8: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Public Safety and Domestic Violence, Broken Down by
Gender ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 9: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Public Safety and Ethnic Tension, Broken Down by
Ethnic Group ................................................................................................................................................. 29
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Community Based Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Community Policing Center / Crime Prevention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Community Policing Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPT</td>
<td>Community Policing Partnership Team (term primarily used in Tajikistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTI</td>
<td>Foundation for Tolerance International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOT</td>
<td>Government of Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Country Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Joint Regional Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPC</td>
<td>Local Crime Prevention Center (term primarily used in Kyrgyzstan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Most Significant Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFQ</td>
<td>Request for Quotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Records Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEG</td>
<td>The Emergence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNP</td>
<td>Tajikistan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction and Background

Since 2012, the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) together with Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance for Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) have supported both Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic in building community policing as a strategy for improving the trust between the police and the public. Working with Saferworld and additional implementing partners, INL/ACE have built and supported Local Crime Prevention Centers (LCPCs or simply CPCs) in rural areas and small cities, which function as a bridge between police and the communities to help identify and solve local problems of crime, conflict, and insecurity. This community policing initiative is also intended to address multiple US Government policy objectives in the host countries, including countering violent extremism (CVE), promoting democracy, and strengthening the rule of law.

Kyrgyz Republic. The community policing program represents both a core INL and EUR/ACE initiative and also a platform for achieving many of the above-stated objectives. The program serves to realize a structure that is already legally instituted at the national level but whose implementation suffers from a lack of resources and political will. There are over 500 Local Community Policing Centers across the country, each of which is intended to bring police inspectors and juvenile inspectors together with representatives of the local elder court, women’s council, and youth committee.

Local Crime Prevention Centers (LCPCs) as a formally mandated structure at municipal (aiyl-okmotu) level is a unique coordination mechanism that helps address the government-community interface challenges that are usually named as the very core of discontent that fuels crimes including core drivers of radicalization and violent extremism.¹

Most of these LCPCs exist on paper only and have minimal activity or impact. Through the work of Saferworld and FTI, the Community Policing Project (CPP) has supported LCPCs in 27 locations, helping local police and community activists to fulfill the mandate of these centers. INL and EUR/ACE funding has enabled Saferworld to build centers that house the LCPCs and to conduct trainings and other capacity-building activities that facilitate community engagement.

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¹ Saferworld, “Promoting a sustainable and locally-led community based policing in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
Tajikistan. The Tajikistan Community Policing program brings together community members and law-enforcement officers in communities across Tajikistan in Community Policing Partnership Teams (CPPTs) to improve public safety and address community concerns. An MIA-approved concept of community policing in Tajikistan states that:

The program has established sustainable, collaborative problem-solving partnerships—composed of police officers, local government representatives, religious and civil society leaders, and community members, including women and youth—for identifying and addressing local community concerns.\\(^2\\) Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the government of Tajikistan has not enacted national legislation to institutionalize community policing, though CPCs do enjoy official recognition by the MIA and local government. As Colonel Murillaev, Deputy Chief of Khatlon province MIA Department, stated, “in order for CPPTs to become a sustainable entity the project team has to advocate for giving CPPTs official status that similar groups have in Kyrgyzstan.”\\(^3\\)

In this context, INL, EUR/ACE, and implementing partners have worked to develop Community Policing Centers (CPCs) and CPPTs that provide a platform for a variety of programming. These district-level CPCs are being actively developed in conjunction with state and civil society, and are meant to coordinate their work with province-level Public Councils that had previously been established by the OSCE.

Key events during the past five years indicate significant government support for the community policing program. This support is most notable in terms of government response to unrest in Khorog in 2015 and 2018, and in Vahdat in 2015. Khorog experienced popular protests against the regional government in both 2015 and 2018, often prompted by oppressive police action. Similar unrest in 2012 had resulted in an oppressive response from security services and militarized police. As diplomatic cables from October 2015 and November 2018 recount, however, the government chose to respond to the unrest in 2015 and 2018 using community policing—both the CPPT infrastructure and the principles of community policing—rather than respond with suppression and overwhelming force.\\(^4\\)

It must be stressed that despite these successes, the government’s decision to resolve these events without civilian repression or death likely reflects a variety of factors in addition to INL’s CBP programming. Factors such as the greater

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2 Annex: Concept of interaction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs departments and civil society (Community Policing Concept).
penetration of social media in Khorog in 2015 vs. 2012, and the greater visibility brought by social media, may have played a role, as well as shifting momentum in the power struggles between the MIA and various state security agencies, whom the administration often deliberately pits against each other for the sake of maintaining control. Nevertheless, these points should not detract from the point that these events were resolved specifically making use of the community policing methods and infrastructure implemented by INL and EUR/ACE programming in Tajikistan.

1 Scope and Methodology

This evaluation assists INL to 1) assess the effectiveness of INL and EUR/ACE-supported community policing programs in the two countries in meeting specific goals and targets, and 2) provide data-based evidence to INL and EUR/ACE program managers and policy makers for determining what worked and did not work for current and past programs for the purposes of future programming. The evaluation also focuses on the programs’ contribution to each country’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and the Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) goals and objectives.

The evaluation aims to answer seven key questions (per the text box below). The evaluation’s main audience is INL and EUR/ACE in Washington, DC, and associated program managers in each country. Additional audiences include host country governments, local NGOs, and citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Evaluation Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent have these programs helped combat violent extremism, and how has it been measured?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent have the community policing programs built trust between the public and the police, and what is the evidence for this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent, if any, have these programs reduced petty corruption by law enforcement personnel, and how is this being measured?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What commitments are in place to ensure that the local crime prevention centers will be sustained by communities and/or local governments after the project ends?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. In what ways, if any, have police behavior and mainstream police training changed as a result of the community policing projects, and what is the evidence for these changes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In what ways have community policing techniques been adapted to local conditions and cultures, and what evidence exists on which of these adaptations are best practices?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What lessons can be learned from INL’s past and current community policing programs in Central Asia, and what are the implications for future community policing programming there and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To answer these questions, Khulisa used a mixed qualitative and quantitative design to assess impact and achievements against pre-defined targets and objectives. The qualitative component involved focus groups with local stakeholders and key informant interviews with INL/ACE staff, strategic partners such as the OSCE, UNODC and NGOs, and participants of community policing partnership teams (CPPTs). The latter included local police inspectors and juvenile inspectors, CPC directors, and representatives of the public councils that contribute to the CPC — the elder court (Kyrgyzstan) or elder council (Tajikistan), the women’s council, and the youth council.

The qualitative component of the research consists of 57 in-depth interviews, and 18 focus group discussions with a total of 129 participants. The evaluation team analyzed qualitative data according to content and noted emerging themes arising from the data analyses. Additionally, we used member checking and debriefs between our team members during and after each data collection activity to achieve agreement on our findings. The total breakdown of respondents by location is as follows:
Table 1: Total Number of Respondents to Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Category</th>
<th>Number of KIIs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Number of FGDs (Respondents)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Informant Interviews</strong> (INL and EUR/ACE in Washington, DC and in-country)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL and EUR/ACE Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11 (including Washington DC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Informant Interviews</strong> (in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Host Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 (14)</td>
<td>4 (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Partners (IPs)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Representatives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC &amp; Community members</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6 (46)</td>
<td>9 (78)</td>
<td>14 (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6 (46)</td>
<td>13 (92)</td>
<td>18 (129)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative component consists of a survey of 15 Likert scale items that was administered to all key informants and focus group participants except police and implementers – 61 respondents in total. Unfortunately, limitations on data collection in Tajikistan prevented Khulisa from using the survey there. As a result, quantitative results are limited to Kyrgyzstan.

Table 2: Quick-Fire Survey Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Amir-Temur</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>Yrysk</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tepe-Korgon</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kyzyl-Kiya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>Suzak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Jalalabad City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kara Suu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Valid, 2 Missing (no demographic data given)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nookat</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We utilized the key principles and standards of informed consent for all data collection efforts, and ensured the confidentiality of respondents, and that no specific quotes would be attributed to them.
The data were collected in 4 project locations, as well as in Bishkek and Osh City. Project sites were selected to address a variety of program initiatives and social issues, including CVE, gender-based violence, ethnic tension, youth issues, and cross-border issues. The evaluation visited four locations in the south of Kyrgyzstan where CPCs had identified one or more of these issues as a key focus of their activities. Project sites were selected in Tajikistan with a similar goal of covering a variety of issues, and also to cover the wider geographic spread of CPCs across the western half of the country.

1.1 Limitations

Data collection in Tajikistan faced a number of obstacles due to the political sensitivity of police reform and law enforcement in the country. For the purpose of both security and access, INL accompanied the evaluators to all project sites, and attended interviews and focus group discussions. Their role was that of a facilitator. They did not impede or otherwise seek to influence the course of interviews or focus groups.

Most observations of local stakeholders occurred in focus group discussions rather than in-depth interviews. Given that anonymity is difficult to ensure in such small communities, INL Dushanbe deemed it essential to their mission and to the solidarity of the CPPTs themselves that team members speak openly and collectively, rather than confidentially and individually. Key informant interviews were limited to local government officials, police commanders, and in some cases, heads of CPPTs.

The evaluation was not allowed to record any meeting. As recording audio surreptitiously is proscribed by the team’s ethics of research conduct, the team relied on shorthand notes taken during the interviews. The team hired an additional Tajik translator to assist, permitting up to three researchers to take notes simultaneously during focus group discussions. These notes were later compared by the evaluation team to reconstruct the conversation. On some occasions, the team would split larger CPPTs into two separate FGDs with representatives of the police and representatives of the community. In these cases, the translators primarily worked to facilitate interviews, while the evaluators took written or typed notes. We were also told not to employ the survey, which eliminated the quantitative component of the research.

While these limitations could have influenced the reliability and validity of the data collected, we believe that any possible impact was minimal and would not invalidate our evaluation or conclusions. While a precise transcript will represent an accurate record of a respondent’s words, a researcher’s careful observation of the respondent’s tone, posture and non-verbal cues will provide invaluable context for the response, whether that response is recorded in an audio file or captured by the interpreter’s/researcher’s shorthand notes of the interview. Based upon these factors, we have high confidence in the shorthand note-taking and observed responses approach.

The reliance on FGDs for data collection and the presence of INL during data collection impacted validity but not reliability. CPPT directors or community elders in many cases dominated focus groups, while youth and individuals with lower standing often declined to contribute to discussions. This limitation likely skewed results toward the perspective of stakeholders who are deeply invested in the work of CPPTs — but this skewing does not invalidate our findings. We have seen no evidence in any location that the more active members of CPPTs had an agenda or interests that would be antithetical to those of their broader community.

Were there systemic discrepancies between the interests of the CPPT and those of the community they serve, data from focus groups would likely promote the agenda of the former at the expense of the latter. But we have consistently observed that community policing had been implemented with safeguards against corruption, and that it has served as a platform for representing the needs of the community to the police that serve them. Therefore, we estimate that the predominance of focus groups did impact the validity of our data, but not to a degree that would invalidate our findings.
2 Findings

The findings presented in this section reflect the different national contexts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have influenced both the community policing program itself and the evaluation process. On the latter point, the restrictions on data collection encountered in Tajikistan limited our capacity to report the precise responses of local stakeholders. This created a large gap in both the variety and fidelity of data that we were able to present on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Given the predominance of the data collected in Kyrgyzstan, we wish to note the points on which our findings from both national cases correspond to each other, and the points on which they differ.

The CPC model: The basic model of the Local Community Policing Centers and the partnership teams that operate them is highly uniform across project locations in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These teams are generally composed of a 1) director from the local community, 2) police inspectors and juvenile inspectors, 3) members of the court of elders (KG) or public council of elders (TJ), 4) members of the women's council, and 5) members of the youth committee. As Figure 3 demonstrates below, the stakeholders surveyed expressed strong communal support for this model.

![Figure 3: Response to the Statement, "My community supports its Local Community Policing Center."](image)

The highly positive responses reported in Kyrgyzstan are corroborated by the narratives offered during interviews in those same project sites, and are supported by the positive narratives offered in Tajikistan. Thus, we feel confident that the survey would have reported similar results and we been able to conduct it in Tajikistan.

The primary difference between the countries is that this structure is nationally codified through legislation in Kyrgyzstan, where over 500 LCPCs operate on the books, whereas CPPTs are established through MIA policy through local governments in Tajikistan. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, INL and Saferworld are implementing a structure that the national government had already instituted but has generally neglected, whereas in Tajikistan INL and Saferworld are establishing CPPTs in partnership with national and local government.

The local issues addressed by CPCs: In both countries local stakeholders consistently identified several key local issues that CPCs addressed: 1) gender-based violence and abuse, often in conjunction with early
marriage, 2) bullying and racketeering\(^5\) in schools, as well as “turf wars” between schools, 3) problems stemming from youth idleness, including ethnic and border tensions stemming from youth unemployment and limited job opportunities, and 4) religious radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups. Figure 4 presents the survey results for the responsiveness of LCPCs to local issues. Again, these results are supported by the positives narratives offered by respondents in Tajikistan.

![Figure 4: Response to the Statement, "The Local Community Policing Center in my community responds to the needs of community residents."]

Respondents across project sites in both countries consistently listed these issues as the jurisdiction of CPCs. They saw these issues as community concerns in which the community policing members have legitimate authority to act, and for which the community-based crime prevention approach can achieve better outcomes in comparison to repressive law enforcement strategies. Furthermore, respondents consistently listed these issues as the primary motivation for members of the community themselves to come to the CPC for assistance.

**Local Implementing Partners:** INL and Saferworld worked through local NGOs to develop CPCs in both countries, but the implementing partners differed. In Kyrgyzstan, Saferworld worked through one implementer — Fund for Tolerance International, a local NGO that oversaw all project regions. In Tajikistan, in contrast, Saferworld partnered with numerous local NGOs that often operated exclusively in one locality.

**Management:** The key area in which the community policing project differed in Kyrgyzstan vs. in Tajikistan is in the degree of management -- both by INL and by the host governments’ Ministries of Internal Affairs. In Kyrgyzstan, Saferworld and FTI implemented the program with little direct involvement by INL in day-to-day affairs. Similarly, the MIA largely allowed the LCPCs to operate though local partnerships, and did not actively direct the substance of those partnerships. In Tajikistan, in contrast, both INL and the MIA were actively involved in the local implementation of the program. INL and the MIA also worked closely to develop a country-level strategy to make community policing a successful and sustainable model for crime prevention in Tajikistan.

These, therefore, are the main points on which the community policing program correspond and differ in the two national contexts. Due to the highly similar programming implemented by Saferworld on the local level, and the relative similarity of these rural communities across both countries, most of the findings from

\(^5\) In the present context, the term "racketeering" is commonly used to denote gang activity, which overlaps with genuine criminal rackets. The lawlessness of the 90s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the rise of pervasive racketeering, in which school gangs, boxing gyms, and other youth groups became actively involved. We choose to use the term racketeering throughout the report, in keeping with this convention.
Kyrgyzstan were mirrored in Tajikistan. We can thus assert with confidence the richer and better-preserved data from Kyrgyzstan corresponds closely with the narratives offered by local stakeholders in Tajikistan. Above the local level, however, the two national cases differ significantly both in terms of INL management and the will of the host government to support community policing as a national model for crime prevention going forward. The findings we present below should thus be understood in these terms.

2.1 Countering Violent Extremism

**Evaluation Question 1: To what extent have these programs helped combat violent extremism, and how has it been measured?**

There is significant evidence that CPCs perform effective preventative work in their communities to counter the spread of violent extremism. CPCs address pull factors such as the spread of extremist values and foreign propaganda in the community, and mitigate push factors such as disaffection among youth. Nevertheless, in many locations CVE activities focused on conducting presentations and other forms of outreach in schools, mosques, and at the CPCs themselves, while neglecting to monitor and intervene with at-risk families.

**Key Points:**

- We find that the CPCs and CPPTs are a good platform for delivering programming to counter violent extremism, but we found inconsistent results of their efficacy at monitoring VE propaganda and recruiting in their communities.
- In certain locations such as Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, and Norak, Tajikistan, however, CPPT members actively monitor and intervene with families deemed at-risk for violent extremism. In most locations, however, CPCs focus on public awareness campaigns.
- In at least one location, Amir-Temur, Kyrgyzstan, the CPC noted that the majority of recruits to violent extremist groups were not local men who had travelled abroad as combatants, but rather local women who had travelled to Syria and other locations to marry ISIL combatants.
- In many locations, respondents asserted that local recruits to violent extremist groups were labor migrants who had been radicalized while working abroad (primarily in Russia).

**Kyrgyzstan**

All of the locations visited had seen significant recruitment to violent extremist groups in recent years. Respondents in Amir-Temur, Yrys, Tepe-Korgon, and Kyzyl-Kiya all noted that local men and women had joined insurgent groups in Syria and elsewhere — upward of 65 individuals in the case of Yrys.\(^6\) Overwhelmingly, respondents connected violent extremism to radicalization of youth, and discussed CVE efforts primarily in relation to youth:

> Nowadays, youth are easily deceived such as through text messages and web-based resources, which can be accessed through smartphones. Jointly with the LCPC, we carry out awareness raising events in general secondary schools, as well as discussions on the prevention of violent extremism across our community.\(^7\)

LCPCs addressed this challenge by engaging with parents, schools, religious leaders, and other key actors in the lives of local youth. Speaking of her joint work with the CPC in Kyzyl-Kiya, one police inspector stated:

> To prevent recruitment of our youth, we partner with the CPC to conduct joint sessions, workshops and information campaigns with parents. We believe that parents can be most effective in educating

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\(^6\) FGD, LCPC and community members, 11 Participants, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.

\(^7\) KII, Police Commander, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
their children and instilling some sense into them. We also partner with local religious leaders (i.e. imams) and carry out numerous sporting events. Our campaigns often include design and distribution of information booklets and brochures, and FTI helps us financially to accomplish this.\(^8\)

In all of the communities examined, LCPCs effectively deliver a variety of programming related to CVE. Police, community members, and civil society representatives all viewed LCPCs as fulfilling their role as a bridge between law enforcement and the public in the conduct of CVE activities. Local perceptions of the effectiveness of these CVE activities are summarized in Figure 5 below. Note that the survey items asked respondents only to assess whether the CVE work of the LCPC is effective, not to measure magnitude of its impact.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Strongly disagree & Disagree & Neither agree nor disagree & Agree & Strongly agree \\
\hline
\begin{itemize}
\item If the son of my friend was being recruited as a violent extremist, I would encourage my friend to talk to the LCPC.  
\item The LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering the incidence of violent extremism in my community. 
\item The LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering the incidence of violent extremism in Amir-Timur. 
\end{itemize}
\hline
\textbf{LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering the incidence of violent extremism in my community.} & 2\% & 4\% & 8\% & 32\% & 54\% \\
\hline
\textbf{LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering the incidence of violent extremism in Amir-Timur.} & 2\% & 10\% & 42\% & 46\% & \\
\hline
\textbf{If the son of my friend was being recruited as a violent extremist, I would encourage my friend to talk to the LCPC.} & 2\% & 2\% & 5\% & 30\% & 61\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Significantly, respondents in Amir-Temur noted that most of the people who had left to Syria were women, not men, and were recruited as wives rather than as combatants. According to a representative of the Elder Court, many were divorced women who have few prospects for remarriage and communal esteem in their local setting. “Aggrieved and abandoned women exposed to domestic violence tend to leave abroad.”\(^9\)

Once recruited, these disaffected young women can become further stigmatized in their community, preventing reintegration into their home community if they return to Kyrgyzstan:

> It is rare that women and children who happen to be relatives of those who have been recruited by extremist and radicalized groups, return back home. Many choose not to return for fear of being stigmatized and marginalized, and generally not accepted by their communities. The government policy is not conducive to reintegration of families of military combatants back home, and has not viewed them as victims.\(^10\)

Thus, in most cases, the LCPC has worked to intervene in the communal push factors by counseling divorced women, hosting cultural and sports events to enhance communal life, and monitor families and individuals that they consider most at risk.

LCPC teams and police were universal in linking VE with religious fundamentalism. We heard numerous accounts of LCPCs being used to bring together Police, the Council of Elders, Imams, Division 10\(^11\) and

\(^8\) KII, Police Inspector, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.

\(^9\) KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.

\(^10\) KII, NGO Director, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.

\(^11\) Division 10 is a division of the MIA which is dedicated to the problem of violent extremism. Division 10 has an active measures aspect, an intelligence aspect and a preventative aspect. We limited our focus to the final aspect of their mission.
the Women’s Council to reach out to young people and promote a moderate, non-violent version of Islam as non-violent, and to convince young people that Syria is not their concern.

Jointly with the CPC and imams, we have carried out information sessions on the prevention of religious extremism. We show video clips on tolerance on the CPC premises, and hold discussion sessions with our aksakals [community elders] and local religious leaders.\(^2\)

Such activities, however, reveal a preference for information and public awareness campaigns. We found that most LCPCs sought to combat violent extremism by disseminating information and delivering seminars, and were less active in monitoring and intervening with at-risk families. A police commander in Osh noted similar kinds of CVE programming that the police deliver in partnership with LCPCs, focusing on public awareness:

> We carry out information sessions on radicalism and extremism, speak with children to warn them about the causes and consequences of recruitment. These prevention efforts are being carried out jointly with local aksakal courts [based in the LCPC] and neighborhood block associations. In turn, imams (i.e., local religious leaders) communicate through their channels in mosques.\(^3\)

Returned combatants have also produced video clips, often from jail, where they discredit the claims of recruiters as to a high quality of life and meaningful work as members of ISIL, and also warn potential recruits of the social and legal consequences of leaving Kyrgyzstan to fight abroad.

While such public awareness campaigns can be effective, they also have limitations. Despite the emphasis on community-based crime prevention, we found that many LCPCs relied heavily on public awareness campaigns, at the expense of active monitoring and intervention with at-risk families. The major exception was Kyzyl-Kiya, where a highly active LCPC regularly engaged in home visits to monitor and counsel families deemed at risk. According to the LCPC Chair, Kyzyl-Kiya was the number one jihadi recruitment site in Kyrgyzstan in 2015, but has ceased to be a major site of recruitment or source of combatants owing to the efforts of the LCPC.\(^4\)

A final factor that contributes to recruitment to violent extremism is migration and the lack of local economic opportunity. Based on the information gleaned from the document review, we postulated that socio-economic factors played a significant role in contributing to the spread of VE. However, members of the LCPCs and the broader public whom we interviewed noted that this relationship is indirect. Rather than stemming from economic need, recruitment to violent extremist groups and ideals is driven by idleness and alienation — themselves a function of high unemployment and lack of recreational or extracurricular activities in rural areas.\(^5\)

These same factors are a cause of labor migration, which impacts both the migrants themselves, and the families they leave behind. The LCPC in Kyzyl-Kiya, again, among the most active we examined, has engaged directly with the families of labor migrants to monitor children and intervene when they see a risk:

> We visit households to identify children of migrants that are left behind under the guardianship of relatives. We create a database and frequently visit those families and inspect how they are being treated, if detected we work closely with those who are at risk of domestic violence. There are also counselors at school, they work with children too.\(^6\)

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\(^2\) KII, Police Commander, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
\(^3\) KII, Police Commander, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.
\(^4\) FGD, LCPC and community members, 8 Participants, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
\(^5\) FGD, LCPC and community members, 11 Participants, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019; FGD, LCPC and community members, 8 Participants, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
\(^6\) KII, Civic Activist, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
No other LCPCs we evaluated had taken such active measures to monitor and work with the families of labor migrants. A second issue involves the migrants themselves, who according to respondents, are frequently radicalized abroad:

The first problem is that records of at-risk migrants in Russia are neither accurate nor credible. The tracking systems to support prevention mechanisms are hamstrung by the poor quality of data on labor migrants. The second problem is the fact that many of these migrants are unable to immediately find jobs upon arrival in Russia. This makes such individuals increasingly more prone to deception and subsequent recruitment [by extremist groups]. There are examples of migrants being offered $300-$500 to travel to Turkey, which sets the path to cross the Syrian border soon after.17

Many respondents spoke of the migration experience as contributing to radicalization. Though we have no reason to doubt the credibility of such narratives, they may be motivated in part by a desire to distance and exonerate the local community from processes of radicalization.

**TAJIKISTAN**

Nearly all CPPTs reported during our visits that the formation and recruitment of violent extremists was either greatly diminished or eliminated. As the GOT likely regards these statistics as a closely held secret, we could not quantify this result. The only GOT bureau that we feel could offer meaningful qualitative data would be the GKNB, to which we had no access.

As in Kyrgyzstan, nearly all who were interviewed and chose to speak on the subject indicated to us that the process of radicalization rarely occurs inside Tajikistan; rather it occurs almost in Russia where many young Tajiks are employed as labor migrants in poor living conditions. There was a hint at recruitment via the Internet, in places such as Simiganj where the CPPT and police actively monitored Internet cafes for “truancy.”18

We did learn of the GOT’s official policy of amnesty for those returning from Syria. Specifically, if one “did not violate the law,” which we construed to mean having participated in war-like conduct, that person would not be prosecuted for their activities in Syria.19 Given the aggressiveness of the GKNB, we can only surmise that these returnees and those considered to be “at risk” for VE receive special attention. We believe that CPPTs are used as a source of information for putting families on a government watch list.

In many locations, respondents asserted that local recruits to violent extremist groups were labor migrants who had been radicalized while working abroad (primarily in Russia), and in many cases had joined these groups and travelled directly from their host country rather than from their home country. Though the anti-migrant and anti-Muslim sentiment in Russia may certainly contribute to extremism among migrants, it is also possible that respondents blamed radicalization on the migration experience in order to exonerate their community.

### 2.2 Trust

**Evaluation Question 2: To what extent have the community policing programs built trust between the public and the police, and what is the evidence for this?**

The evaluation consistently found that community policing had built considerable trust between the police and the public in communities where the program has been implemented, but not beyond the local level.

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17 KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
18 FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.
19 Ibid; FGD, Police members of Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
KEY POINTS:

- CPCs become key parts of civic life. Residents frequently come to CPCs to consult with the elder court, women’s council, or youth committee, which subsequently involve local police inspectors on a case-by-case basis.

- Local residents report greatly increased trust in the police as a result of the work performed by CPCs. Women and youth in particular report greatly increased trust in the police and willingness to report problems to the police through the CPC.

- CPCs engage in public outreach together with the police, particularly in schools, mosques, local self-government institutions, and other areas of civic life.

- The success of CPCs is highly contingent on the will of key local actors, including local police inspectors and regional commanders, the heads of local self-government, volunteers from public councils, and the directors of CPCs themselves.

KYRGYZSTAN

Our interviews revealed a high level of trust built in the Police through the LCPC Program. Respondents freely recounted the aggressive and predatory behavior of police before the support of Saferworld and FTI, and drew strong contrasts with the work of Neighborhood Police Inspectors and Juvenile Police Inspector after the support of the implementing partners to develop the LCPC. The Chairman of the Elder Court in Amir-Temur states:

The CPC was created in 2015, but trust was at an all-time low. Over time, information campaigns and joint meetings have improved trust and understanding among local community residents that the CPC is here to help. The CPC needed about a year to improve trust between police and the population, and the joint resolution of several high-profile cases has helped to strengthen this trust.20

The LCPC Chair in Yrys similarly noted:

The population at large, especially youth, had previously avoided any contact with local police. We have organized several "tours" to local police departments for youth and facilitated joint discussion sessions, which improved understanding of the role of police in local community life. Sporting events, tours and facilitated discussions have improved trust.21

A police commander in Osh spoke to similar efforts made by local police to build trust within the framework of the LCPC program:

Trust by the population was previously low. We have joined efforts with quarterly committee and went door-to-door, handing out business cards and explaining what we can do to help. The local militia officer was there as well so that all residents know him personally and are aware of their first point of contact in law enforcement.22

These efforts to build trust, as evidenced by Figure 6. Local stakeholders reported generally high willingness to report crimes to the police, as well as to report police corruption through official channels. On the last point, though residents may not have full confidence that reporting corruption will lead to punitive action, their confidence indicates that they do not fear reprisal for reporting police corruption.

20 KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
21 KII, LCPC Representative, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
22 KII, Police Commander, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.
This trust is bolstered by the fact that LCPCs have become key nodes of civic life, and “a joint discussion platform between the population and local police,” in the words of a member of the Women’s Council from Amir-Temur. LCPCs provide a space for the public to meet with representatives of the Elder Court, Women’s Council, and Youth Committee, as well as with local police inspectors. An advisor to the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs described this structure:

According to legislation, CPC is chaired by ayil okmotu [local self-government] and membership is composed of local militia officers and the Aksakal Counsel [Elder Court], among others. Action plans developed by the CPC are quarterly, semi-annually and annually.

In addition, LCPCs and local police conduct outreach with religious leaders and other key local figures.

Despite these successes, LCPCs rely on local public and political support, which varies. In certain locations, the local self-government [aiyl okmotu] are not interested in supporting the LCPC, either because they have other priorities or do not believe in the goals of the LCPC. Without political support from the ayl okmotu, which is subject to regular democratic turnover, LCPCs lack the local influence to implement their action plans. The ayl okmotu also has the authority to select the directors of LCPCs, giving them a significant hand in determining the success or failure of their LCPC.

Success also relies heavily on police chiefs, who have many ways to determine the degree and quality of coordination between law enforcement activities and the LCPC. In at least one case – Suzak – the police expelled all members of the LCPC and used the building as their own headquarters, fundamentally reneging on their obligations. This was made possible because the ayl okmotu in Suzak had not selected a director of the LCPC, and thus there was no official with the authority to ensure the proper functioning of the LCPC. A member of the Yrys Youth Committee summed up the situation thusly:

Although local government officials are unaware of the CPC, we have started disseminating information about our activities and explaining that we are there to help. However, trust in the police is still low and community residents are still reluctant to come to us with their problems.

Through the efforts of Saferworld, the ayl okmotu eventually selected an LCPC director, and the police have been forced to share the facility and adjust to working within the LCPC framework. To address these issues, Saferworld and FTI have worked intensely to advertise the value of the LCPC to ayl okmotu officials.

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23 FGD, Women’s Council members, 6 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
24 KII, MIA Advisor, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/18/2019.
26 KII, Youth Committee Member, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
and local police. Ultimately, however, the success of LCPCs is subject to the regular turnover in aiyl okmotu officials and local police.

**TAJIKISTAN**

We saw similarly strong evidence of trust and partnership in Tajikistan among members of the CPPTs and the communities they serve. In Khulob, Chorkuh, and Norak, CPPT members spoke extensively of the level of trust they had built with the community, despite initial skepticism by population that they were simply colluding with the police.\(^\text{27}\)

Skepticism from the police also presented an initial obstacle. In Ayni and Tursunzoda, CPPT members spoke openly of initial mistrust between CPPT and police. In Ayni in particular, the CPPT Chair noted that she and her colleagues only managed to build trust over the course of the full 7 trainings conducted by The Emergence Group during their startup period.\(^\text{28}\)

Multiple police interviewees who were in service prior to the beginning of this program can easily recall and express how the public viewed police officers before Community Oriented Policing took hold in Tajikistan. Some described a general lack of trust within the communities that they worked in, while others used a much stronger term - “hatred” - to describe the community’s reaction towards them.\(^\text{29}\) This is hardly surprising given the culture of law enforcement that has existed since the Soviet period, and the role that police played in maintaining public order during the Civil War in which many civilians were killed or displaced.\(^\text{30}\)

This attitude appears to be changing in communities where INL and Saferworld have established CPCs. The number of crimes reported provides one important indicator of the increased trust in police and CPPTs. According to discussions with local police, very little domestic violence was reported in Hamadoni prior to the establishment of the CPPT. Reports of domestic violence have increased after the establishment of community policing, and nearly all complaints of family and gender-based violence come through the CPPT.\(^\text{31}\) An auxiliary group of civilian police volunteers assist the police in addressing and solving and monitoring the outcome of family violence interventions.\(^\text{32}\)

Under the initiative of the current Minister of Internal Affairs, sport has come to play a major role in community outreach.\(^\text{33}\) In Hamadoni and Norak, where the local CPPT attained financial support from grants and the business community to build soccer fields, local police officers act as both coaches and referees at the youth soccer matches.\(^\text{34}\) Police officers similarly engage in youth outreach in Khulob by acting as referees during youth sporting events. Both sides expressed satisfaction at this change in how the police are viewed within local society.

Thus, we saw a sharp increase in public trust toward the police as a result of the community policing program. Notably, this increase cannot be attributed merely to increased familiarity between police and

\(^{27}\) FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019; FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team, 11 participants, Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.

\(^{28}\) FGD, Rahmon Community Policing Partnership Team, Tursuzoda, Tajikistan, 02/12/2019; FGD, Ayni Community Policing Partnership Team, 12 participants, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019; KII, Member of the Ayni Public Council, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.

\(^{29}\) FGD, Marshal Community Policing Partnership Team, 7 participants, Mashal, Tajikistan, 02/07/2019; FGD, Police members of Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Police members of Ayni CPPR, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.

\(^{30}\) FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.

\(^{31}\) FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) KII, General Shodmonzoda, Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Reform Coordinator, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019; KII, NGO Director, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.

\(^{34}\) FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.; FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team, 11 participants, Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.

\(^{35}\) FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019.
members of the community, as most police officers live in the community they serve. Rather, both police officers and CPPT members report that the CPP has built trust between the community and the police.

2.3 Petty Corruption and Abuse of Power

**Evaluation Question 3: To what extent, if any, have these programs reduced petty corruption by law enforcement personnel, and how is this being measured?**

There is little evidence that CPCs alone have a significant impact on police corruption or that CPCs alone could be developed into an effective anti-corruption mechanism. Nevertheless, both community residents and Minister of Internal Affairs (MIA) officials view community policing as contributing to broader efforts to rein in police corruption and abuse of power.

**Key Points:**

- Local stakeholders do not generally view CPCs as having an anti-corruption mandate, or as having the ability or means to effectively monitor police corruption, abuse of authority, or use of excessive force.
- CPCs do indirectly contribute to reducing police corruption, abuse of authority, and use of excessive force by building familiarity between individual police officers and the community and by increasing visibility of police activities, but this impact is limited.
- MIA officials view CPCs as contributing to broader anti-corruption measures that include electronic crime reporting systems, anonymous hotlines and emails for reporting police abuse of authority, and reporting results to the local public on a quarterly basis.

**Kyrgyzstan**

We uncovered very little evidence that the program has made an impact on petty corruption or abuse of power, either in terms of its occurrence or being reported to the LCPC or to the authorities. MIA officials in Bishkek did see LCPCs as a key factor in reducing corruption, and regional commanders asserted that LCPCs had, "not really dealt with the issue of corruption." Rather, they asserted that the public benefits from more traditional anti-corruption measures, including hotlines and email accounts for reporting corruption, and quarterly police reporting to the public.

A police commander from Kyzyl-Kiya summed up this lack of an anti-corruption mission by stating, "Corruption is generally dealt with by the [KNP] anti-corruption service. Corruption in law enforcement agencies is outside the remit of what we [local police] do. Our main task is the prevention of crime." Members of the community tend to share the same view. We saw no evidence that acts of official corruption such as bribe solicitation, extortion or protection rackets are reported to LCPCs. Although they are well meaning, LCPCs are simply uninformed about these activities. As a result, "There is little room for the LCPC to detect bribery, especially petty bribery unless it is unconditionally disclosed [by a citizen]."

That said, LCPC members do have some capacity to monitor the police with whom they work and ensure that they are not taking bribes or abusing their power. Functioning LCPCs thus have had a limited impact on petty corruption, simply by putting local police inspectors in greater proximity to the public and thereby taking away anonymity. As the director of the Amir-Temur LCPC stated, "Local police know everyone in our respective community, including those who attend marriages or funerals, who are friends with each other, and so on. In such environments there is little room for corruption."

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36 KII, Police Commander, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.
38 KII, LCPC Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
39 Ibid
Respondents reported mixed attitudes about the effectiveness of the LCPC in reigning in petty corruption and abuse of power, as shown by the survey results summarized in Figure 7. Though most respondents indicate positive attitudes, there are a significant number of respondents who either disagree or strongly disagree with the notion that the LCPC has been effective in reducing petty corruption and abuse of authority.

Thus, we cannot conclude that the LCPCs are an effective anti-corruption measure, but can report limited success in reducing petty corruption and abuse of power in the limited area of activity where the police and partnership team work closely.

TAJIKISTAN

Our observations and lines of inquiry into petty corruption were limited in Tajikistan due to diplomatic and host-nation sensitivity on the topic. From the outset, we were told not to bring up the topic unless others brought it up first. Based on our limited observations, however, we have seen no evidence that CBP is an effective check on police corruption in Tajikistan, for the same set of factors described above with regard to Kyrgyzstan.

One direction that INL has been exploring to combat police corruption and the public perception of corruption in the context of Tajikistan is an EPolice Records Management System ("RMS") program. An RMS can help to create effective inroads into the issue of petty corruption by creating an indelible digital footprint of each act of criminality reported by a citizen. When properly designed and secured, an RMS virtually guarantees that a crime is registered and is very difficult to erase without leaving behind a digital footprint. Therefore, we recommend supporting such an RMS, provided that proper design, execution and oversight of the project can be put in place given budget constraints.

An RMS also has the potential to assist INL in their efforts to implement community policing in urban settings, which has met with significant shortcomings. The only urban CPPT the evaluation was able to visit, in the Mashal district of Dushanbe, represented a failure by most accounts. Though the CPPT meets regularly, they noted the difficulty of generating trust between police and the community in an anonymous and densely populated urban neighborhood. In such a setting, an RMS can enhance police response and make it far more efficient, effective and transparent. An RMS also allows for the police to work together with the community to analyze geo-spatial crime trends in and develop solutions to the underlying problems that cause them.

40 FGD, Mashal Community Policing Partnership Team, 7 participants, Mashal, Tajikistan, 02/07/2019.
Thus, we view the development of an RMS as potentially contributing to a broader effort to combat corruption and introduce community policing in urban settings, particularly Dushanbe. We recommend combining RMS with a variant of the core CPC/CPPT initiative adapted for an urban policing environment, much like its counterpart in the US.

Designed in the US during the early 1990s, the Safe Neighborhood Initiative (“SNI”) conceived by the US Bureau of Justice Assistance (“BJA”)\(^4\) offers an example of how facilitated mass-community meetings lead their participants in identifying and prioritizing problems in a given police jurisdiction. The facilitators in turn bring back the identified problems and community insight to a core district-level steering committee, which functions much like a CPC. The steering committee includes police command, justice, political, business and youth stakeholders. It is this steering committee (or in the case of Tajikistan, the CPPT) that develops interventions to lessen or eliminate the problems identified by the large group. SNI results are reported at the next mass-community meeting for review and critique of the community at-large. An RMS that generates heat maps of identified crimes can supply compelling evidence indicating the impact of these results.

2.4 Sustainability

**Evaluation Question 4: What commitments are in place to ensure that the local crime prevention centers will be sustained by communities and/or local governments after the projects end?**

We are highly confident that INL and Saferworld have established CPCs that will continue their crime prevention activities after the completion of the program. In communities such as Uch Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, and Ayni, Tajikistan, CPCs have already become self-sustaining and operate without additional funding from Saferworld. Sustainability is contingent on a number of factors, however, not all of which have been obtained consistently across project sites.

**KEY POINTS:**

- Physical Site: CPCs have become a platform for civic engagement in their communities, to a large degree because of the physical structure itself. By housing the elder court/council, women’s council, and youth committee, CPCs become essential nodes of civic life.
- Trainings and events: CPCs serve as active sites of local training. Saferworld and its implementers leave each CPC with an experienced team that has undergone significant training in community policing, and continues using the CPC as a vehicle for capacity-building after program funding has ended for that location.
- Positive Feedback Loops – CPCs feed off their own incremental successes, which in turn builds community support for the program.
- Financial: Once established, CPCs require relatively little funding to operate. A number of CPCs have achieved financial sustainability by securing funding from grants and/or the local government budget. At present, however, most CPCs in both countries have not achieved full financial sustainability, and more capacity-building is required.
- Legal standing for fundraising: One challenge to financial sustainability stems from CPCs’ ambiguous legal standing. CPCs are neither government agencies nor conventional NGOs. As such, they struggle to secure grants and funding from the local government budget. Nevertheless,  

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\(^4\) While SNI has undergone multiple changes in the ensuing 25 years and now tends to narrowly focus on youth violence and firearms, we refer to its earliest iteration (Boston, mid 1990s) where it was a broadly focused community policing tool used to address many different types of community security and crime issues.
numerous CPCs have succeeded in securing grants and government funding, demonstrating that this obstacle is surmountable.

KYRGYZSTAN

The LCPCs we visited have become key platforms for civic engagement in their local communities, to a large degree because of the physical structure itself. In most cases, the civic institutions that constitute the LCPC – the Elder Court, Women’s Council, and Youth Committee — lacked a place to meet with the public before the construction of the LCPC. Now, the buildings house the heads of all of these constituent organizations, and the conference room gives them all a place to hold meetings, independently or collectively.\(^{42}\) For this reason, respondents generally expressed high confidence in the sustainability of LCPCs:

The CPC is a very good and robust structure. Even if external financing will end, although I am against it, I believe it will continue functioning. The program is interesting and will perform well for a year or two, but staff need continuous training, funding and support. We need the CPC in our community.\(^{43}\)

As this quote demonstrates, however, local stakeholders are keenly interested to achieve financial sustainability. A member of the Youth Committee in Yrys stated that:

Sustainability is our number one priority. We plan to pay a salary to members of women councils, youth councils, and courts of aksakals. Financing is expected to come from the budgets of local self-government bodies. In addition, we would like to provision mandatory renovation and maintenance expenses every 1-3 years for each CPC premise. Nearly all large projects and initiatives are now being carried out jointly with the CPC, which is why ayil okmotu should be in a position to support the CPC financially.\(^{44}\)

The issue of funding touches on the legal status of CPCs. Respondents offered a variety of opinions on the legal standing of CPCs to apply for funding via grants, or to lobby for state funding. Some respondents asserted that as state-sanctioned civic institutions, CPCs are not eligible to apply to grants for which NGOs are eligible. Others asserted that CPCs can and have secured funding through grants:

About 60-70 percent of these organizations will seek other funds and will know how to submit grant applications, how to raise funding from akims and sub-national governments. Therefore, the CPC can make use of this knowledge and skills which will allow it to continue to be sustainable even after Saferworld or FTI transition out of this space.\(^{45}\)

LCPCs are legally entitled to state support in Kyrgyzstan, but this avenue of funding is closed off in many cases by the limited state budget. As respondents from Kyzyl-Kiya noted, “In the long term, sub-national budgets will find it difficult to continue to support the CPC.”\(^{46}\) A dictate from the central government requires that LCPCs receive at least minimal financial support for programming from the local governance budget. This dictate is often not enforced, however, leaving many LCPCs unfunded.

Despite these obstacles, however, we have seen that LCPCs that have been supported by Saferworld/FTI often have gained the capacity to find ways of getting funding by applying for grants from the local government and/or other sources. A respondent from Amir-Temur noted that trainings on fundraising and general sustainability were part of the capacity-building exercises conducted by Saferworld.

One of the two-day training courses provided to 32 CPC members was on the topic of sustainability. By February 2016 we would like to have a CPC which develops its own strategy and actively

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\(^{42}\) KII, LCPC Representative, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019; KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.

\(^{43}\) YouthCommittee_Akmatalieva_Yrys

\(^{44}\) KII, LCPC Chair Representative, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.

\(^{45}\) KII, NGO Director, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.

\(^{46}\) KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
engages with local self-government, local kenesh, and has sufficient resources from local sources. The CPC should also be registered as a public fund to enable it to receive such funding.  

In the present context of funding insecurity, trainings in fundraising capacity are a clear best practice, and may help CPCs to circumvent various obstacles to sustainable donor and state funding.

**TAJIKISTAN**

We saw many examples in Tajikistan of CPCs that had achieved a high level of self-sufficiency. Three main factors play a role in this high level of sustainability: MIA support, Saferworld programming, and a strategic vision that puts the onus on CPPTs to choose their own agendas, own them, and work out the details for themselves.  

Though we encountered an expected amount of variation in sustainability, most of the Public Councils and CPPTs that we evaluated demonstrated a strong commitment and capacity to engage in crime-prevention activities, and to build capacity in others. CPPTs like those in Ayni and Chorkuh remain extremely active, despite having little direct attention and virtually no funding from INL and Saferworld in recent years. Any reports that their CPC carries out outreach in 12 different jamoats, some of are located up to 200km away and quite isolated. The Chair of their CPC reports having regular interactions with the GOT, including participating in a conference with the Deputing Minister of Internal Affairs, at which she represented the interests of both her community and the CPC.

The general strategy of the INL Senior Police Advisor in Tajikistan is to make CPPTs choose their own agenda and figure out how to implement it, with minimal direct management from Saferworld. We estimate that this approach has significantly contributed to the sustainability of established CPPTs, some of which even expressed interest to expand their operations. In Guliston, members of the district-level CPPT informed us that they had the capacity to train up four village-level CPPTs to reach isolated parts of their district. They demonstrated that they had both the facilities to serve as a CPC, and the capacity to identify and train potential members. In their estimation, they only lacked a small investment for furniture. This capacity, not only to sustain their own activities, but to expand and train other CPPTs, provides a strong indication that CPPTs are highly sustainable and require minimal input once successfully established.

In the context of Tajikistan, sustainability hinges on the support of the state. This CPPT model is sustainable to a large degree because it has the backing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Presidential Administration. In the aftermath of the unrest in Smimiganj, it was the Minister of Internal Affairs who decided to use the CPC to address the insurgency. The Minister instructed the CPC to reach out to the families of insurgents to see if they needed food or other necessities. In Hamadoni, likewise, respondents invoked the words and name of President Rahmon as a principal explicate as to why community policing is sustainable in the country and in their community. According to the interviewees, the work of the CPC/CPPTs is part of the President’s desire to intensify youth and police activities to address the problems facing young people.

Support from the MIA has contributed to sustainability through the activity of local government and police as well. In Chorkuh, police officers have demonstrated the ability to offer COP training to their peers without

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47 KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.  
48 KII, MIA Official, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019; KII, Saferworld Manager, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019; KII, James Berg, INL Senior Police Advisor for INL, US Embassy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.  
49 FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Ayni Community Policing Partnership Team, 12 participants, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.  
50 FGD, Guliston Community Policing Partnership Team, 7 participants, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/09/2019.  
51 Ibid.  
52 FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, 5 participants, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.  
53 FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.  
54 FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
any support from implementers. In Khulob respondents recounted that representatives of the local self-government (the *khukumat*) have attended CPC meetings. Local government representatives initially came at a precautionary measure – to see what the CPC does. Later, however, representatives attended these meetings out of genuine interest in and commitment to helping CPCs work closely with local communities. Despite these positive signs, however, in Khulob we also heard the Deputy Police Chief give voice to the truth that true police reform takes from 5 to 20 years to be implemented.

2.5 Mainstream Police Behavior and Training

*Evaluation Question 5: In what ways, if any, have police behavior and mainstream police training changed as a result of the community policing projects, and what is the evidence for these changes?*

Mainstream change in police behavior requires strong integration across regions, throughout the police command structure, and among numerous strategic partners. One of INL’s key objectives for the CPP has been to foster deeper integration within the MIA and among strategic partners. These efforts have met with mixed success, but roadblocks to cooperation have hindered INL ability to coordinate their efforts with other international actors, with the MIA of each country, and with local government. As a result, the positive impact of community policing is largely limited to the local level. Nevertheless, both countries are currently taking steps to integrate top-down and bottom-up approaches to police reform. These efforts warrant further INL support in the short to medium-term future.

**KEY POINTS:**

- There remains a disconnect between top-down and bottom-up efforts to reform police. INL has sought to coordinate the community policing program with the work of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC), which have pursued reform through national legislation, but these efforts have been not been reciprocated consistently.
- The governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both actively working to shift away from the Soviet-style law-enforcement strategy of policing to one of proactive crime prevention, in which community policing plays a key role. In both countries, however, these efforts run up against limited resources and insufficient political will to fully change the established culture of policing.
- Community policing has been introduced into the police academy curriculum in Kyrgyzstan by the OSCE, but INL has had little input into this training and is generally unaware of how it is being taught. Community policing has been introduced soon into the police academy in Tajikistan, and the MIA is seeking to expand community policing as an overarching approach policing with INL and OSCE support in the curriculum overhaul planned for 2019.
- Our initial review of program materials indicated that INL had sought to establish a Central Community Policing Hub or Community Policing Think Tank in Tajikistan, which would serve as a knowledge base and point of coordination for police and CPPTs. However, our interviews and focus groups with CPPT members and police found no evidence that this Think Tank was functioning.

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56 FGD, Police members of Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
57 FGD, Kulob Public Council, 10 participants, Kulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019.
58 KII, Police Commander, Kulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019.
**Trainings in Community-Based Policing**

**In Kyrgyzstan,** Community Policing appears to be taught in the Police Academy as a standalone course, but not as a full track in the curriculum or an overarching mission philosophy across tracks. According to a police commander from Yrys, “The Academy has institutionalized courses such as ‘Tactics of Community Policing,’ which offers insight on the communication and interaction with population.”\(^{59}\) We were unable to obtain consistent information on the number or content of these courses, however, which according to a police Captain from Amir-Temur “offer plenty of theoretical knowledge, but practical sessions were few and far between.”\(^{60}\)

Furthermore, officers expressed skepticism that any community policing courses were offered at the lower police schools for enlistees. Local police inspectors’ knowledge of community policing may therefore be limited to on-the-job training:

> Training on community policing was carried out by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). We have a practice day on the first Wednesday of each month where we learn the crime prevention tools.\(^{61}\)

Finally, we have seen no evidence of an MIA Mission Statement, Vision Statement or Statement of Values that effectively institutionalizes Community Policing. Thus, though we can verify that a specialty course in community policing is being delivered by the MIA, we cannot speak to the content or quality of the rest of their curriculum and whether or not community policing is an overarching principle of same.

**In Tajikistan,** we have seen mixed results on the level of training that officers receive from MIA concerning community policing. Many graduates of the MIA Police Academy, more recent graduates in particular, report that they have received some sort of specialized training at the Academy.\(^{62}\) Other officers, such as those assigned to the urban CPPT in Mashal, apparently received no training at all.\(^{63}\)

A visit to the MIA academy confirmed that Community Policing is taught as a specialized track within the current curriculum, but the MIA aspires to incorporate these principles as an overarching philosophy that touches many related topics. The MIA seeks to incorporate CP principles into the entire curriculum to institutionalize the concept, and will look to INL to identify the right SME to help them design the curriculum. Officials at the academy expressed their openness to looking to their own CPPTs and CPCs for best practitioners upon whose knowledge this curriculum could be based.\(^{64}\)

In addition to community policing, MIA Police Academy officials acknowledged the need to increase female participation in the police force. There are presently 3000 students enrolled the MIA Police Academy’s four-year program, of which 160 are women. According to the officials, recruitment of women is difficult due to the traditional role of women in Tajik culture.\(^{65}\)

**Strategic Partnerships**

**In Kyrgyzstan,** our interviews with Saferworld, FTI, and partners such as UNODC have determined that the OSCE has long been the leading organization to implement top-down reforms form within the MIA, including within the police academy curriculum. However, all those interviewed also emphasized that the OSCE mission in Kyrgyzstan has largely been uninterested in coordinating their efforts with the INL

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\(^{59}\) KII, Police Commander, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.

\(^{60}\) KII, Police Inspector, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.

\(^{61}\) KII, Police Commander, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.

\(^{62}\) FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.

\(^{63}\) FGD, Mashal Community Policing Partnership Team, 7 participants, Mashal, Tajikistan, 02/07/2019.

\(^{64}\) KII, Official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Academy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/12/2019.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.
EUR/ACE program. We were unable to interview with the OSCE mission in Kyrgyzstan to verify this account.

We feel that such partnership would be an important step in linking institutional changes at the national level to community policing practices at the local level, guaranteeing that Community Policing principles guide every aspect of the police mission in the Kyrgyz Republic. According to INL officials and other strategic partners, however, such coordination is limited primarily by the OSCE mission itself.

The MIA of Kyrgyzstan generally eschewed partnership with INL during the Atambaev administration, but may be more open to cooperation under the Jeenbekov administration. In particular, recent changes to Kyrgyzstan’s criminal code may create opportunities for greater cooperation with the government of Kyrgyzstan. This new legal code, which took effect in January of 2019, shifts a significant number of offenses out of the criminal framework and into the crime prevention framework as misdemeanors. According to a police commander in Yrys, this shift toward crime prevention will also affect how local police’s performance is evaluated:

Since the 1st of January, our salary no longer depends on the absolute number of crimes detected [e.g. arrests made]. Our supervisors have previously demanded better crime detection, but now we also carry out a lot of crime prevention work. We are happy with these changes.

This new legal code places significant obligations on the state to provide social services to offenders who have committed misdemeanors – a mandate for which the state is ill equipped. To this end, LCPCs and the civic institutions that constitute them could serve as a crucial mechanism for facilitating this mandate. We shall address this in our recommendations that follow.

In Tajikistan, the MIA has supported INL and OSCE efforts to implement community policing at the district and province levels, respectively. However, the district-level CPPTs established by INL and Saferworld remain largely disconnected from the province-level Public Councils established by the OSCE. No doubt this structure is largely due to the expediency of constituting public councils from local civil society representatives from provincial capitals. Furthermore, we uncovered no evidence that the Community Policing Hub or Think Tank that had been proposed in program materials had been implemented.

Despite this degree of disconnect between the various levels of the program, however, the evaluation uncovered extensive evidence that local success in changing police is helping to reinforce the MIA’s top-down push for community policing. INL and EUR/ACE should thus remain cognizant of the American experience in embracing a shift to community policing. In many jurisdictions across the US, meaningful change occurred only after decades of pushing the principles of community policing from the top down, from the bottom up and by creating expectations for meaningful change within the community itself.

We recommend that INL seek to create greater integration between district CPPTs and Provincial Public Councils, as well as creating a national Community Policing Council that would serve as the proposed hub and think tank. The Senior Police Advisor for INL in Tajikistan has suggested that provincial Public Councils

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66 KII, Timur Shaihutdinov, Director of the civil union "For Reform and Results", Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/16/2019; KII, UNODC Expert, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/17/2019.


70 KII, Police Commander, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.

71 KII, James Berg, INL Senior Police Advisor for INL, US Embassy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019; KII, Saferworld Manager, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.

72 FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019; FGD, Police members of Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
be composed of the directors of district-level CPPTs, and a national council be constituted from the heads of provincial public councils.73

We agree that this structure would both help coordinate the efforts and share best practices among community policing centers, and also streamline coordination with hierarchical structures of the MIA regional and local governments. At the same time, we recognize that CPC directors have limited means to meet in provincial capitals regularly to fulfill the obligations of the province-level Public Councils. Therefore, this proposal is contingent upon sustainable funding and infrastructure for district-level CPC directors to meet regularly in person or virtually.

2.6 Adaptation to Local Conditions & Cultures

**Evaluation Question 6: In what ways have community policing techniques been adapted to local conditions and cultures, and what evidence exists on which of these adaptations are best practices?**

We have heard many accounts of CPCs adapting to cultural, religious and ethnic particularities of the communities in which they are situated. Though Saferworld implements a consistent community policing model across project sites, the CPCs themselves respond to local needs and conduct local conflict mapping activities:

The CPC performs good work such as educating youth, lending social assistance to low-income households, strengthening patriotism among the population, carrying out excursions to museums, picnics and sporting events, and in this way contribute to strengthening peace and friendship.74

Respondents consistently identified concerns brought by local women and youth as the primary issues they address. In areas where ethnic or border friction exists, CPCs are aware of it and are proactively seeking to bring people together within the community, as demonstrated in Figure 8 below.

**KEY POINTS:**

- Respondents consistently listed domestic issues as the primary area that CPCs address. Local residents come to the CPC most frequently to address domestic abuse, gender-based violence, early marriage, and contested divorces.

- Both countries, and in particular Tajikistan, have become more sensitive to the role of women in policing. We have heard of many examples of increased representation of women in Tajik CPPTs, especially in the role of juvenile police inspectors. Many CPPTs interviewed rely on women officers to work with the Women’s Council in addressing family abuse and violence. The MIA Academy is currently focused on recruiting women to add to the 160 female students presently enrolled there.

- In many cases, residents are not familiar with the community policing program, but come to CPCs to consult members of the women’s council or elder court. Most issues are addressed without involving the police, but CPC members involve police inspectors when warranted.

- Respondents frequently mentioned youth issues as a focus of community policing. CPCs partner with local juvenile inspectors to address bullying in schools, as well as turf wars between school groups.

- Respondents consistently named youth unemployment and general youth idleness as drivers of ethnic tension, border incidents, and religious radicalism. CPCs have sought to address this issue through ad hoc sport leagues and other activities for youth, but funding is often lacking for such activities to match local needs.

73 KII, James Berg, INL Senior Police Advisor for INL, US Embassy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
74 KII, Police Commander, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• In communities with large minority populations, ethnic divisions have the potential to exacerbate relations between the police and the public. In communities such as Amir-Timur in Kyrgyzstan and Tursunzoda in Tajikistan, the CPCs have played an important role in restoring trust between the predominantly Uzbek populations and predominantly Kyrgyz and Tajik police.

2.6.1 GENDER AND WOMEN’S ISSUES

In Kyrgyzstan, community members frequently identified early marriage, gender-based violence, and divorce as among the leading problems in their community. They noted that the LCPCs had become highly active on these issues, ensuring that young women attend school, are not forced into early marriage, and register for civil marriages in addition to performing a religious ceremony. The director of FTI in Osh noted:

When it comes to violence it is not only physical violence this is about violation of rights, limited access to education, limited access to employment as well as they are denied of access to rights and entitlements, e.g., official registration of marriages, which protects their property rights, economic rights. We try to tackle these issues under this project.75

For all of these issues, LCPCs have become a key site where women can express and redress their grievances. This is especially valuable for young married women, who may be cut off from other sources of support, and frequently suffer abuse from their mothers-in-law:

Local mentality prevents the daughter in law, "kelinka", from seeking her mother's help or applying for any assistance whatsoever. Women's Councils can be of help and counsel these women in friendly environment conducive to sharing all troubles and problems, thus women's councils act as a family counselor.76

At the same time, we have seen that women’s committees can be constituted of elderly women with conservative worldviews, and who may advise women to tolerate domestic violence. Nevertheless, the LCPCs have come to serve as outlets for women with all manner of domestic concerns, and have helped to increase reporting of gender-based violence by working to address the issue first on a communal level.

![Figure 8: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Public Safety and Domestic Violence, Broken Down by Gender](image)

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75 KII, FTI Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
76 KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
LCPC members spoke of a variety of actions they had taken, from information campaigns to direct intervention with families:

This year we conducted the information campaign “I have an opinion.” Through the forum of theater, young women spoke against domestic violence, early marriages, and expressed their need to receive education before starting a family.\(^{77}\)

The husband and mother-in-law of a pregnant woman would not allow her to deliver the baby in a hospital because of the male obstetrician. As a result of the LCPC’s intervention, the women eventually was able to safely deliver her baby in the hospital.\(^{78}\)

LCPCs have taken a particularly active role in ensuring that couples officially register their marriages with the state, as opposed to just performing a religious ceremony in the village: “A woman without official registration of marriage and getting divorced through religious rituals is left with no rights whatsoever.\(^{79}\)” A female police officer from Kyzyl-Kiya noted the role that the LCPC had come to play in addressing the issues of women in her community:

Together with LCPC we work with women. We address gender related issues, organize meetings dedicated to prevention of domestic violence against women and children. In cases where domestic violence occurs, the LCPC always invites me, because women-survivors of violence trust another woman more than a man. They can discuss the problem openly, and together with the Women's Council, the LCPC tries to help resolve this issue.\(^{80}\)

Incidently, we saw anecdotal evidence of increased numbers of women in policing. We encountered young female police officers in most of the locations visited. As was the case in the US prior to the 1970s, however, most of these female officers had been assigned to deal with young people in the role of juvenile inspectors.

**In Tajikistan**, local stakeholders identified domestic violence as the number one issue addressed by CPCs in virtually all locations. As in Kyrgyzstan, young married women are the most frequent recipients of abuse, often at the hands of their mothers-in-law. CPPTs have responded to this issue with a variety of forms of community engagement – from raising awareness of the problem and women’s rights, to hands-on interventions with at-risk families. Among the most significant awareness-raising activities was a theatrical presentation on abuse of daughters-in-law that the evaluators viewed in Chorkuh.\(^{81}\)

Domestic violence reporting appears to have increased in locations where CPPTs are deployed and in most cases the victim chooses to report the abuse directly to the CPPT — often through the Women’s Council. The Women’s Council members, in turn seeks to resolve the issue through mediation, possibly involving police officers and other community figures to address the root cause of a particular case.\(^{82}\) As in Kyrgyzstan, we noted a large role for female police officers in receiving and addressing reports of domestic violence, which may have otherwise gone unreported.\(^{83}\)

We also noted several examples of imams and mullahs participating in CPPTs or as auxiliary to the police to intervene and help families solve a domestic violence problem.\(^{84}\) In rural areas and on the communal level, we observed imams playing an active and complimentary role to CPPTs in addressing domestic violence.

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\(^{77}\) FGD, LCPC and community members, primarily youth, 7 Participants, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.

\(^{78}\) KII, Elder Court Representative, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.

\(^{79}\) KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.

\(^{80}\) KII, Police Inspector, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.

\(^{81}\) FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.

\(^{82}\) FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.

\(^{83}\) FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.

\(^{84}\) FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team, 11 participants, Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019; FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
violence. In rural areas and on the communal level, we observed imams playing an active and complimentary role to CPPTs in addressing domestic violence, which implementors have found correlates positively with other forms of violence, including Violent Extremism. As with Kyrgyzstan, however, the established community figures who address the issues of early marriage, domestic violence, and divorce may hold to older sensibilities that downplay the rights of women.

2.6.2 YOUTH ISSUES

Youth face a number of significant challenges in both countries. Youth respondents typically identified youth unemployment and lack of recreational activities as the leading problems facing the youth, and saw these issues as contributing to successful recruitment by extremist groups. Respondents also note frequent problems with bullying within schools and fighting between students from neighboring schools. Members of the youth committees and the broader community strongly supported the work that the LCPCs have done among the youth in their communities. As one youth committee member from Yrys, Kyrgyzstan stated, “I can confidently say that before there was nowhere to go to address problems of youth.”

**Trust in Law Enforcement:** In both countries, young people “express a certain distrust toward law enforcement officers,” to put it mildly. Young people, especially young men, encounter frequent harassment by police. The primary crime prevention technique used by police among youth, dating to the Soviet period, is to put problematic youth “on the list,” i.e. under observation in their schools and by juvenile inspectors. The community policing program has made a number of efforts to change this culture of policing and create stronger bonds of trust between youth and the police:

Two years ago we conducted a project with children in cooperation with Saferworld and FTI called “Young Police Officers.” For one month, 12 police officers worked with one girl and one boy each. Children got to know how police officers work, while police officers got to know more about what students do at school and after school.

Programs like this are part of a broader effort by CPCs to create and strengthen ties between youth and the broader community, and use these ties to address problems:

Together with youth committee we resolve issues through conducting sporting events between schools. When there is a fight, LCPC members and elder men go there, boys feel more accountable and feel ashamed. They know that LCPC will protect their rights.

**Bullying and Racketeering:** One of the most prevalent youth problems is the use and threat of physical violence, which ranges from bullying and gang activity, to turf wars between schools, and even recruitment into criminal rackets. The brazen criminality of the 90s in the aftermath of Soviet dissolution, in which youth gangs played an active role in protection rackets, has led many locals to lump these various phenomena under the term “racketeering.” Respondents in both countries thus made frequent statements to the effect of, “In our schools, the most significant problem is school racketeering.” In the rural areas examined by Khulisa, however, this activity was limited to low-level gang activity such as bullying and petty extortion in schools.

CPCs have taken a number of steps to address this issue. In Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, for example, the LCPC has taken active steps to identify and intervene in the schools:

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85 KII, Youth Committee Member, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
86 KII, FTI Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
87 KII, LCPC Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
89 FGD, LCPC and community members, exclusively women, 9 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
90 The term “racketeering,” as commonly used in the United States, refers to extortion or protection schemes under a large umbrella organized crime group such as La Cosa Nostra. We wish to emphasize that these connotations do not apply to our Central Asian observations, in which racketeering is ad hoc, highly localized and not directed by any national level organization.
We find children that engage in racketeering and bullying, get them registered and conduct outreach activities among parent's committees and teachers. The important factor is that after registering those children, we analyze their concerns and living conditions. We conduct activities to guide them in the right direction, to avoid double delinquency.91

In other locations such as Suzak, youth committees have organized cultural events to bring students together and address clashes within and between schools:

There was open hostility between schools; the youth was divided into districts. We organized a number of school events, including a forum-theater with the participation of children who fought, and held training on rights to raise awareness about their responsibilities. We also usually hold conferences with the participation of parents and schoolchildren, and do intellectual games so that they have a motivation to study.92

LCPC teams are often acutely attuned to these problems due to the participation of youth committees, to their work with youth inspectors on the police force, and lastly due to the fact that in most locations the LCPC team contains a large number of teachers. In dealing with youth, we feel that having teachers on the LCPC is a best practice.

**Radicalism:** Youth radicalism presents another common problem in communities spread across Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Young people who feel disaffected with their community may be susceptible to radical and intolerant ideas. Respondents in both countries noted that youth might be at increased risk of both religious radicalism and ethnic intolerance.93 Members of the Women's Council in Amir-Temur, Kyrgyzstan stated:

It's hard to work with youth. We explain young people that we still have a secular state, and we must obey both constitutional and religious laws. Many young people who go to Friday prayer [are absent from] school. We conduct outreach activities with them.94

In locations like Tepe-Korgon, LCPC members have worked to prevent the rise of religious and ethnic intolerance:

The LCPC helped to arrange various debates. We conducted a project called “Alley of Tolerance,” where we refurbished an abandoned building and established a space for youth to share their ideas and opinions. The LCPC contributed a lot.95

In addition to conducting such activities, we saw repeatedly of CPCs used as safe spaces where minority communities felt secure to voice their concerns. In Tajikistan in particular, CPPTs developed numerous interventions to address youth radicalism, from secular and religious interventions conducted by state and religious officials,96 to organizing sport and cultural programs to occupy the youth in positive outlets.97

**Opportunity:** We saw near universal agreement among respondents that the root cause of these youth issues was unemployment and limited opportunities. Respondents asserted that unemployment either

91 FGD, LCPC and community members, 8 Participants, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
92 KII, Youth Committee Member, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
93 FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team, 11 participants, Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Women's Council members, 6 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
94 FGD, Women's Council members, 6 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
95 FGD, LCPC community members, primarily youth, 7 Participants, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
96 FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019; FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Ayni Community Policing Partnership Team, 12 participants, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.
97 FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019; FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019; FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team, 11 participants, Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.
caused or exacerbated other social problems primarily through youth idleness and labor migration, the latter of which impacts both the youth who migrate for work and the youth left behind by labor migrant parents:

The biggest problem is employment. Even after graduating from university, people cannot find jobs. Every family has a migrant worker. Migration in turn causes many other issues. If you don't work you can't get married and can't afford housing.\(^{98}\)

To address these issues, the LCPCs have worked extensively in the schools to address the needs of youth. Some LCPCs have even organized vocational training events and led excursions to local colleges, demonstrating the capacity of the LCPC model to serve as a broader platform of social support and civic life.

We constantly conducted outreach activities, tried to focus on vocational guidance. For example, we organized sports events between schools, and discussed the criminal code.\(^{99}\)

The LCPC in Yrys even organized an excursion for secondary school children to regional university campuses. The excursion targeted young women in particular, encouraging them to apply to institutions of higher education rather than marry and cease their career growth.\(^{100}\) Saferworld and FTI have similarly helped other LCPCs in Kyrgyzstan bring families together with educators to encourage students to pursue a degree.

Under the project, we invited representatives of universities, parents and students. They learned about study opportunities, how to find jobs independently. Professors inspired them to continue studying.\(^{101}\)

Although we have heard that a higher education degree is no guarantee of finding employment, these efforts nevertheless demonstrate that LCPCs have taken active measures to address youth unemployment.

2.6.3 ETHNIC AND BORDER ISSUES

At the time of this writing, clashes have wracked the border between Batken, Kyrgyzstan and Sughd, Tajikistan. Tensions over road construction by Kyrgyzstan near Chorkuh, Tajikistan escalated into stone throwing, and eventually small arms fire between ethnic Kyrgyz and Tajik men across the border.\(^{102}\) Just weeks earlier, the research team had visited Chorkuh, and took note that the town is only accessible by a road that passes between Kyrgyz and Tajik territory. At the time, these border crossings seemed inconsequential: the gates were up, and the border guards mostly waved traffic through. That relative peace could deteriorate so rapidly because of local frustrations demonstrates the significance of local ethnic and border tensions to overall security.

For the most part, local stakeholders saw border issues as the jurisdiction of the military and border patrol, rather than of local police or CPCs, as seen in Figure 9 below. Few respondents saw the CPC mission to build trust as extending to trust with neighboring communities across international borders. Recent events, however, reaffirm that ethnic and border divisions require preventative work within the affected communities.

In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic divisions have the potential to exacerbate relations between the police and the public. In communities such as Amir-Timur, police almost exclusively represent the Kyrgyz ethnicity, while Uzbeks constitute an overwhelming majority of local residents.\(^{103}\) This division is only expected to intensify.

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\(^{98}\) KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.

\(^{99}\) KII, MIA Advisor, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/18/2019.

\(^{100}\) FGD, LCPC and community members, 11 Participants, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.

\(^{101}\) KII, FTI Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.


\(^{103}\) KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
in the coming years, as Uzbeks are increasingly likely to seek alternative service for their sons, rather than allowing them to be conscripted into the army, from whose ranks most police are drawn.\textsuperscript{104}

Under such circumstances, LCPCs have played an important role in restoring trust between the police and the predominantly Uzbek population. Respondents in Amir-Timur noted that relations have improved significantly since their low point after the 2010 ethnic clashes across Osh and Jalalabad.

LCPC's work had positive impact on relations between Kyrgyz police and local Uzbeks. Although, the credit also goes to local government. They organize sport events between schools; all people participate in their activities.\textsuperscript{106}

Nevertheless, the local Uzbek population still mistrust Kyrgyz authorities in many cases. One respondent from Tepe-Korgon, a predominantly Uzbek village on the very edge of the border with Uzbekistan, noted that “The Uzbek population still fear interacting with the police; [Uzbeks] can be taken away and fined.”\textsuperscript{106} The results of the quick-fire survey presented in figure 9 demonstrate that Uzbeks remain marginally more skeptical about the security and responsiveness of LCPCs to their needs:

![Figure 9: Response to Quick-Fire Survey Items on Public Safety and Ethnic Tension, Broken Down by Ethnic Group](image)

Respondents took note of the “unresolved problems related to the border” particularly in “Batken Oblast, which borders both with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.”\textsuperscript{107} One resident of Kyzyl-Kiya in Batken noted the potential for such unresolved issues to create tensions, noting, “I don't feel secure because I don't know what could happen; something might explode or someone can attack us. Living in border area is difficult and causes this distress.”\textsuperscript{108}

Nevertheless, respondents generally did not view LCPCs as a primary means to address these issues. Despite the potential for LCPCs to conduct preventative work across borders, they appear to have done so only in cases where the police have already taken an active role in maintaining peace, as a police inspector in Kyzyl-Kia related:

104 KII, NGO Director, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
105 KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
106 KII, Community Member, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
107 KII, FTI Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
108 KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
Some regions in Batken oblast border with neighboring countries. In some villages students have
to go to school using the same path Tajik students use, and in order to avoid conflicts we arrange
special police squads that maintain control over the road and students. The issues of terrorism and
extremism are not so acute now; more disputes arise over land, irrigation water and other domestic
issues. We are trying to strengthen relations between nations. Through FTI and the LCPC we hold
various event with representatives of different nationalities, with children — "Friendship" events.109

In Tajikistan, respondents generally indicated that ethnic tensions had generally been resolved. Residents
expressed strong confidence in the police in Tursunzoda, a village like Amir-Timur or Tepe-Korgon in
Kyrgyzstan, in which the population is predominantly Uzbek while police are primarily Tajik. There were
indications that ethnic tensions remain in certain locations, however, such as Guliston, where tensions were
reported between Uzbek and Tajik schoolchildren.110 These students had previously attended separate
schools that offered education in students’ home languages, but were later merged into one general
secondary educational facility with limited support for Uzbek speakers.

Though respondents in Tajikistan placed less emphasis on ethnic tension than the counterparts in
Kyrgyzstan, they placed a greater emphasis on border security, especially along the southern border with
Afghanistan. CPPT members in Hamadoni could not recount any cross-border initiatives, however, and
their concerns seemed primarily limited to detecting the presence of foreigners in their communities.111
According to Tajik officers, police agencies on both sides of the border engage in regular communication,
such as sharing basic incident reports. There is no coordinated strategy or sharing of best practices across
the border, however.112

Stakeholders to the north in Chorkuh noted the border tensions that affected their communities, rooted in
disputes over road construction, water usage, and even wandering cattle along the Kyrgyz border.113 Here,
however, the work of Saferworld in communities on both sides of the border offers significant opportunities
to use CPCs as a platform for cross-border engagement.

At the time of data collection, but before the recent border clashes, MIA officials had initiated a conversation
with Saferworld’s implementing partner in Guliston to hold a youth sporting event near Chorkuh to address
the border tension.114 The event was to take place in multiple locations along the border, involving football
and chess tournaments, as well as a series of lectures and information events. The goal, in the words of
the MIA officials, was to ameliorate tensions by increasing interaction and familiarity across the border,
especially among the youth. Representatives of Saferworld and their implementing partner were very
receptive to the idea. The first iteration of this cross-border concept is even more significant after the recent
border clashes. The increased tensions do complicate the chances of success, however.

2.7 Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Evaluation Question 7: What lessons can be learned from INL’s past and current community
policing programs in Central Asia, and what are the implications for future community policing
programming there and elsewhere?

110 FGD, Guliston Community Policing Partnership Team, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/09/2019.
111 FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019; FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team,
20 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
112 KII, Subhon Miralizoda, Khulob Police Chief, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019; FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants,
Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
113 FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019; FGD, Police members of
Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
114 KII, NGO Director, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
The evaluation encountered a wide variety of best practices that can be expanded and reinforced in the current program, as well as adapted to other programs and regions. The evaluation also identified a number of lessons learned that require attention and possible revision.

**Best Practices:**

5. **Physical space for CPPTs:** In most of the rural communities studied, the public councils that constitute CPPTs (the elder court, women’s council, and youth committee) lacked a physical space to meet with the public before the CPC was built. The CPC has brought these civic institutions under one roof, together with local police inspectors. Local residents may be unaware of the community policing program, but come to CPCs to consult members of one of these councils. Furthermore, the directors of CPCs are often active public figures in these communities. For all these reasons, the physical space itself becomes a key center of civic life, enhancing the impact of community policing.

6. **Fundraising capacity:** The directors of the most sustainable CPCs we encountered were all trained in fundraising. These directors had secured funding by applying for grants or petitioning the local self-government for a small budget. Not all implementing partners appear to have conducted trainings in fundraising capacity, and may CPC directors were unaware that they could even engage in fundraising, given that CPCs are not traditional NGOs. Saferworld should clarify and classify the legal standing of CPCs, thus allowing them to fundraise via grants and local government budgets. Directors of CPCs should be trained to seek out all legitimate sources of funding.

7. **Venues for exchange of experience:** Saferworld has provided numerous venues for more established CPPTs to share their experience with less established or successful CPPTs. CPPT members have participated in country-wide symposia for sharing their own best-practices, and CPPT leaders from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all gathered for a joint summit in Osh in 2015. The Leadership of experienced CPCs have also visited newly-established CPCs in a mentoring capacity.

8. **Use of media to counter VE narratives:** Media has played an important role in countering extremist propaganda in both countries, but not within the framework of community policing. The 10th Division of Kyrgyzstan’s MIA has produced video confessions in which imprisoned returned combatants from Syria belie ISIL propaganda by describing their actual lives as insurgents. The public relations mission in the US Embassy of Dushanbe has also produced a media campaign to counter ISIL propaganda and other extremist narratives. However, none of these media campaigns have utilized the latent social media capacity of CPPTs, as we recommend below.

9. **Collaboration across embassy missions:** The evaluation encountered a strong culture of collaboration and coordination across missions in the US Embassy in Dushanbe. In the case of the present analysis, this collaboration was facilitated by the CVE Working Group, which was attended by representatives of INL, Public Relations, the Defense Attaché, and other Mission stakeholders. It was clearly evident that this culture and practice of collaboration had contributed to the success of the community policing program and other initiatives. We strongly encourage the US Embassy in Bishkek to implement a similar working group to CVE activities across sections and programs.

**Lessons Learned:**

6. **Regular turnover:** CPCs are subject to regular turnover, which can impact their performance. Directors are generally appointed by the local government, and can change based on the outcome of local elections. Heads of elder courts and councils, women’s councils, and youth committees also change periodically, altering the composition of the CPPT. Finally, regional commanders also regularly rotate police inspectors. Trainings and exchanges of experience between CPCs should focus on sharing the practices of CPCs that have most effectively sustained their activities in the course of regular turnover.
7. **Effective monitoring:** In at least one site in Kyrgyzstan, Suzak, the local government and police had compromised the CPC. The head of the local government (aiyl okmootu) had refused to appoint a head of the CPC, and the police had subsequently ejected all members of the LCPC from the premises. Saferworld and FTI intervened, but only followed up with announced visits due to the delicacy of monitoring host government activities. At the time of the evaluation, a representative of the youth committee asserted that he was still being denied access to the CPC, and Saferworld could not state with certainty that the issue had been fully resolved. INL should develop an action plan for assisting Saferworld with its monitoring activities in such circumstances.

8. **Vertical integration:** In Tajikistan, INL staff voiced concern with the disconnect between district-level CPCs established by Saferworld, and province-level Public Councils that had been previously instituted by the OSCE. At present, there is no overlap in the membership of CPPTs and Public Councils, and little coordination of their activities. Province-level public councils are currently composed of civil society representatives from provincial capitals, with no direct participation from directors of district-level CPCs. This structure allows these Public Councils to meet regularly and coordinate with the provincial government, but also creates a disconnect with district-level CPCs.

   The INL PSC in charge of community policing has suggested that provincial Public Councils be composed of the directors of the CPPTs, and a national council be constituted from the heads of provincial public councils. This structure would both help coordinate the efforts and share best practices among community policing centers, and also streamline coordination with hierarchical structures of the MIA regional and local governments. A national council would also effectively serve as a Community Policing Hub/Think Tank, as envisioned by INL program documentation.

9. **Conflicts of interest with implementers:** In Tajikistan, Saferworld has worked with a series of local NGOs as implementing partners. In many cases, the directors of these NGOs are also members of the CPPT/Public Councils, creating potential for conflicts of interest. In Khulob, the director of the Public Council privately accused the director of the local implementing partner of manipulating the budget and directing funds to family-owned businesses. Saferworld staff demonstrated that these particular claims had no basis, but acknowledged that such cases of graft had occurred in the past, requiring a change in implementing partners. In our estimation, implementing partners should be involved in CPPTs in an oversight capacity, but not a decision-making capacity.

10. **CVE through information and intervention:** In many, but not all locations, CPPT members emphasized information over intervention in their CVE efforts. When asked about the substance of their CVE activities, many respondents recounted conducting presentations and outreach campaigns in schools, at mosques, and at the CPC itself. They spoke less frequently of steps taken to identify and intervene with troubled families — even in communities that had produced a high number of foreign combatants. In communities such as Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, and Norak, Tajikistan, however, CPPT members actively recounted proactive interventions with families deemed at-risk for violent extremism, domestic violence, or other problems. Though such engagement relies heavily on the voluntary commitment of CPC members, Saferworld may be able to encourage broader engagement by assisting more active CPCs in developing and sharing a set of best practices for intervening with at-risk families in their communities.

### 3 Conclusions

Based on the findings presented in this report, Khulisa has reached the following conclusions of the INL/ACE sponsored community policing program in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan:

**CVE:** CPCs perform effective preventative work in their communities to counter the spread of violent extremism. CPCs address pull factors such as the spread of extremist values and foreign propaganda in the community, and mitigate push factors such as disaffection among youth. Nevertheless, in many locations CVE activities focused on public awareness campaigns, while neglecting to monitor and intervene with at-risk families.
Trust: CPCs are effective at building trust between the police and the local community in rural settings. This is particularly true among youth and women, who may otherwise not seek assistance from police out of fear or a lack of faith that law enforcement will solve their problems. Success at building trust is heavily contingent on local members of the CPPT, however, who are subject to regular turnover.

Petty corruption: CPCs are not effective at combatting petty police corruption or abuse of power, nor do CPPT members view this goal as part of their mandate. Nevertheless, community policing can contribute to broader anti-corruption efforts by building greater familiarity and trust between police and the public.

Sustainability: INL and Saferworld have established CPCs that will continue their crime prevention activities after the completion of the program. CPCs have become a platform for civic engagement in their communities, to a large degree because of the physical structure itself. CPCs also serve as active sites of local training. Once established, CPCs require relatively little funding to operate.

Mainstream Behavior: Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have demonstrated a commitment to shifting away from a Soviet model of law enforcement, and toward a crime prevention model in which community policing could play a crucial role. Nevertheless, crucial roadblocks remain to the realization of this goal, including obstacles to deeper partnership with INL and other strategic partners.

Adaptation to Local Conditions & Cultures: We have heard many accounts of CPCs adapting to cultural, religious and ethnic particularities of the communities in which they are situated. Though Saferworld implements a consistent community policing model across project sites, the CPCs themselves respond to local needs and conduct local conflict mapping activities. Respondents consistently identified concerns brought by local women and youth as the primary issues they address. In areas where ethnic or border friction exists, CPCs are aware of it and are proactively seeking to bring people together within the community.

4 Recommendations

Based on the findings presented in this report, including the best practices and lessons learned outlined above, our evaluation offers a number of recommendations:

1. Continued DoS Support in the Short to Medium Term: In general, Khulisa recommends that INL/ACE continue to support or increase programming in the short to medium term to take full advantage of the current windows of opportunity in each country. In Tajikistan, INL and community policing enjoy the support of the current Minister of Internal Affairs, who may soon be replaced. The arrival of our new Ambassador to Tajikistan could present an opportunity to engage President Rahmon and ensure his support of community policing irrespective of any change in MIA leadership.

   Regarding Kyrgyzstan, we have learned that DoS is considering eliminating the INL Director in Bishkek after summer 2019, with the notional plan to have the INL section managed from the Political Section in Bishkek with oversight from a newly created Personal Services Contractor position in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. Given the success of the CP initiative in Kyrgyzstan, we recommend that INL/ACE continue or increase programming in the short to medium term to take full advantage of the unique opportunities presented by the new criminal code. Kyrgyz policing is in an important state of transition currently, and active LCPCs can help build momentum around crime prevention efforts to include community justice initiatives. We therefore recommend that INL consider having a full-time, qualified police advisor coordinating the CP initiative in Bishkek.

2. Sustainable Funding: Continue trainings and capacity building in fundraising. Clarify the legal standing of CPCs in both countries to apply for grants and petition local government for funding from the local budget. Work with CPPTs to explore the resulting funding options and share best practices for fundraising in both the public and private sector.

3. Exchange of Experience: Continue support for venues for sharing experience among CPPTs, including peer-to-peer mentoring. Assist established and proven-sustainable CPPTs to mentor newly
established or struggling CPPTs, especially through grants for travel and trainings. Such exchanges of experience are particularly important for CPCs’ CVE efforts, which tend to emphasize public awareness over monitoring and intervention with at-risk families.

4. **Integration and Coordination:** CPCs would be able to exchange experience and coordinate their efforts more effectively if their directors participated in province-level councils that partnered with the provincial government. At the same time, however, this goal would require sufficient infrastructure and sustainable funding for CPC directors to meet regularly, either in person or virtually.

In Tajikistan in particular, we recommend that province level Public Councils be restructured to address two challenges. First, we recommend that implementing partners do not directly serve on Public Councils, as this arrangement raises potential conflicts of interest, as we saw in Kulob. Second, we recommend that province-level public councils be composed of directors of district-level CPCs. INL should seek to increase the participation of local CPC directors in Public Councils, but possibly retain local civil society representatives from provincial capitals to serve as Public Council directors and in other key capacities.

5. **CPCs as a platform for delivering programming and services:** CPCs offer a unique and effective tool for delivering a variety of programming to local populations. As key civic institutions affiliated with local self-government, CPCs have a greater public mandate and legitimacy than NGOs, but can deliver DoS programming with a relative degree of autonomy from government policy and bureaucracy. INL/ACE should thus explore ways to build out this platform to other areas of programming.

Based on conversations with DoS staff, local civil society representatives, and other local stakeholders, we estimate that CPCs would be effective at delivering programming in the following areas: 1) cross-border security initiatives, 2) counseling and vocational training for rural youth, especially young women, using local volunteers, 3) USAID programming and other development programming from strategic partners, 4) trainings for single parents and foster grandparents who have been affected by high levels of labor migration from rural areas.

6. **Gender Mainstreaming:** Continue support for increasing gender mainstreaming in the police force, including offering trainings, potentially even US-based trainings directed specifically towards women officers, which in turn could help fast-track the number of women serving in CPCs and in command positions. Such support might even include sponsoring female superior officers to attend the FBI National Academy, provided that they meet language and physical requirements.

7. **Expand media efforts to counter extremist propaganda:** Continue to support the CVE activities of LCPCs by providing sub-grants for creating materials that counter the extremist groups’ recruiting propaganda. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, this objective may require the creation of a CVE working group at the US Embassy in Bishkek similar to that operating at the US Embassy in Dushanbe.

It would be essential that these materials come from local voices that authentically counter the narratives propagated by recruiters from Syria and other locations. To that end, sub-grants within the LCPC framework would be an ideal means of working through local voices. Social media campaigns about the realities of life as part of a violent extremist organization could provide an effective counter to the recruitment videos that go viral over social media. Such campaigns should also target women, who have constituted a significant portion of recruits to ISIL recruiters from each country.

In conclusion, Khulisa recognizes that INL must manage many competing geopolitical concerns, which go beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, we recommend a continuation or increase in programming and attention to community policing in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the current window of opportunity afforded by a new criminal code in Kyrgyzstan and a favorable Minister of Internal Affairs in Tajikistan. Given the success of the community policing program we have observed in both countries, we conclude that continued support in the short to medium term will produce strong and sustainable returns for US policy goals in both countries.
Annex A: Team

**Dr. David Levy, Team Leader**, is an international development researcher, expert and evaluator with 10+ years’ relevant sectoral experience including conducting research on government corruption, civil society, and religious and ethnic pluralism/inclusion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He has significant experience designing, leading, and implementing mixed-methods research in Central Asia that employ a variety of data collection methods. This experience includes serving as Co-Principal Investigator on a survey of religious and political attitudes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, interviewing religious and political leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan for his doctoral research, and collaborating on the collection of an oral history of the Civil War in Tajikistan. Much of this research has been done in partnership with the Academy of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Bishkek, where Dr. Levy served as a Visiting Research Fellow from 2012 to 2013.

**Donald S. Gosselin, Esq., Senior Research Consultant**, served as a highly decorated police commander for three decades in the Boston Police Department. He served as the first Fulbright Scholar of Policing to Latin America, later returning to the region as the first Police Development Advisor to the Republic of Panama (’04 – ’07). He completed his policing career in Boston as Director of Investigative Learning (’08-’13) while consulting part time on community policing and justice capacity building in Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Belize and Mexico. Upon retirement in 2013, he served full time as Senior Police Advisor to DoS/INL’s Central American Police Reform Initiative until November of 2017. He is currently a principal in Gosselin International Associates, based in Boston, MA. Mr. Gosselin attended the FBI National Academy, holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice as well as a Doctorate of Law and Jurisprudence from Suffolk University Law School.

**Ms. Jylidy Bekenbaeva, Senior Evaluator in Kyrgyzstan**, has 10+ years’ experience with DRG assignments in Kyrgyzstan, with a focus on gender inclusion. She has participated in diverse M&E and research assignments with various stakeholders including USAID, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and United Nations (UN) agencies such as Economic Commission for Europe (UNECO), UNODC, World Health Organization (WHO), UNDP, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), (UNESCO), and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Ms. Bekenbaeva has extensive experience collecting data, conducting research, analyzing data, and writing reports. She is fluent in Kyrgyz, Russian, and English and holds an MBA from the Higher Education Academy TeachEx.

**Dr. Shuhrat Mirzoev, Senior Evaluator in Tajikistan**, is a senior international development expert with 10+ years’ experience in donor-funded programming in Central Asia, specializing in governance reforms, public-private dialogue, demography, and gender mainstreaming. He brings high-level research and evidence generation experience including sampling and surveys, cross-sectional, panel and time-series data analysis, infographics, economic reporting, and statistical analysis. He also brings extensive knowledge on Central Asian cultures, ethnicities and its history of security problems. As DFID Central Asia Economic Adviser and World Bank Economist in Tajikistan, Dr. Mirzoev developed data collection instruments, drafted reports, and engaged with stakeholders around policy reforms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. He holds a PhD in Economics from Rutgers University and is fluent in Russian, Tajik, and English.

**Dr. Mark Bardini, Sr. Project Evaluation Manager**, will provide Task Order management, quality assurance, and oversight. He has 22+ years’ M&E and project management experience with DOS, USAID, DOD, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) in evaluating security, ROL, law enforcement, judicial reform, DRG, anti-corruption, and diplomatic projects. Other non-key personnel include Project Support and a Communications Specialists to support the core team in their respective areas of focus.
Annex B: Evaluation Approach and Methodology

This evaluation employed the Most Significant Change (MSC) approach to qualitative research, in which interviewers use methods such as in-depth interviews and focus groups to elicit narratives about the impact of the program. The MSC approach evaluates program impact by eliciting stories of change from stakeholders. In the case of the present evaluation, these narratives of most significant change will be drawn from in-depth interviews with key informants, and focus group discussion with members of the communities impacted by community-based policing.

5.1 The Most Significant Change Approach

The goal of this approach is that data on change is grounded in the narratives of respondents, rather than imposed on interviews by the interests of the researcher. As research advances, the researchers begin to define domains of significant change, which respondents themselves have noted in interviews.

In order to ensure that the evaluation elicits rich and grounded narratives from members of the community, we treated each interview and focus group as an independent observation. We did not rely on top-level officials to select and validate the narratives articulated by members of the community, nor did we ask lower-level stakeholders to select which narratives offered by top-tier officials best represent the program outcomes they have experienced. We instead focused on obtaining grounded accounts of the most significant changes that key informants have experienced due to the implementation of the community policing program.

5.2 Sampling

The Community Policing Project (CPP) evaluation made use of purposive sampling to engage with multiple project stakeholders and account for the diverse communities impacted by the project. Key Informant interviews were held with a variety of stakeholders, including:

1. INL and EUR/ACE staff in Washington DC and in both of the host countries.
2. Host government representatives, including officials in each country’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, officers in the police academies, and police officers stationed at Community-Based Policing Centers throughout both countries.
3. Staff at the project’s Implementing Partners: Safer World, FTI, TEG, etc.
4. Civil society representatives, including both community leaders and other community members who have been directly involved with the CPB centers at the local level, and representatives of NGOs that monitor policing behavior.

Focus group discussions and key informant interviews were held with members of the general public who have been affected by the project and can attest to any changes they have experienced in police behavior. Our goal in selecting participants for these FGDs was to draw a sample from among individuals who have had recent, and ideally regular contact with the police. Our primary concern was that many members of the general public have irregular interaction with the police, despite the often heavy-handed use of police force in each country, and therefore may have few observations to share about police behavior. We therefore worked with civil society members that have been directly involved with the CPB centers at the local level to recruit FGD participants who have interacted with the police.

For both the field groups and the in-depth interviews with civil society representatives, we used purposive sampling to address the diversity in the populations affected by CPB. In particular, our goal was to structure our interviews and FGDs so as to cover urban and rural populations, address gender, ethnic and religious
variation, and access border communities. Our FGDs in particular were structured so as to cover both regional and social diversity as efficiently as possible. Within each country, therefore, FGDs accounted for the following factors:

- Gender: At least one FGD was conducted in each country with only female participants of varying ages.
- Youth: At least one FGD was conducted in each country with only local youth, defined by UNICEF as between the ages of 14 and 28.
- Ethnicity: At least one FGD was conducted in each country involving participants drawn primarily or entirely from ethnic minorities.
- Rural vs. Urban Populations: The majority of FGDs in each country were held in rural locations; at least one FGD per country was conducted in an urban location.
- Border Issues: At least one FGD in each country was conducted at a project site near an international border.

Coordinating these various goals across a limited number of focus groups (only five in the case of Kyrgyzstan) was challenging, but in many cases these factors were reinforcing. Ethnic minorities are often present in border areas, and can be concentrated both in key neighborhoods within urban areas. Age, gender, ethnicity and religion are all cross-cutting categories, allowing us to account for diversity across all of them simultaneously.
Annex C: Research Instruments

The following annex contains a sample of the research instruments used to collect data. The evaluation used three main instruments: 1) a questionnaire for key informant interviews, 2) a questionnaire for focus groups, and 3) a quick-fire survey. Each instrument was adapted for multiple categories of respondents: local government, implementing partners, community members, etc. The annex presents one version of all three instruments.

Khulisa Evaluation of INL and EUR/ACE Community Policing Program

Questionnaire Form 5: Focus Group with Indirect Beneficiary Members of the Community

| Questionnaire # | ___ | ___ | — | ___ | — | ___ | — |
| (Country—Interview Number, e.g. KG—5—01) |
| Provence: | District: | Town/Neighborhood: |
| FGD Location: | Number in Attendance: |

| Date | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| Day | Month | Year | FGD Start Time | ___ | ___ | ___ | Hrs | Min |
| FGD End Time | ___ | ___ | ___ | Hrs | Min |

If necessary, appointment for visit – 2

| Date | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| Day | Month | Year | FGD Start Time | ___ | ___ | ___ | Hrs | Min |
| FGD End Time | ___ | ___ | ___ | Hrs | Min |

Name of Interviewer: _____________________ Signature _____________________

Instructions:
The researchers and the facilitator introduce themselves. The Facilitator asks the participants to answer one by one, and keep silence when others are speaking. The Facilitator asks questions according to the list and asks follow up questions to encourage participants. The Facilitator assists the group in keeping the discussion within the topic frames, takes notes on important points, and records the group’s presentation on a voice recorder.

WARM-UP QUESTIONS

1. What are some of the most important problems facing your community?
   a. Is crime to be a significant problem in your community? If so, which crime(s)?
2. Tell us your general impressions of police performance in your community in the last five years.
3. Are you aware of the community policing center in your community?
   a. If so, what do you know of their work in your community?
   b. Have you met any of the members of the LCPC?

Trust

4. Have you, or anyone else you know had an opportunity to visit a local community policing center?
   a. If so, tell me about your/their experience at the LCPC.
5. What is the most significant change in how the police operate due to the LCPC?
6. Has there been a change in how police and members of the public interact with each other since the LCPC was established in your community?
   a. Are people more willing to report crime through the LCPC than at a police station? If so, can you provide an example?

Petty Corruption

7. Since the LCPC was established in your community, has a police officer asked you for money to perform his or her duty? If so, did you report it? If so, what was the response?
8. What is the most significant way in which the LCPC has addressed issues of petty corruption? What was the outcome?
9. Do you know of any measures that have been put in place to address petty police corruption when it is reported or otherwise discovered? If so, what are these measures?

Police Training and Mainstream Behavior

10. Since the LCPC was established in your community, have you heard of any police trainings or activities that have made the police more responsive to the community?
11. If so, tell us what you know about these trainings or activities?
12. What was the most significant change in police behavior that you have observed that resulted from trainings or activities that promote community policing?

Adaptation to Local Context (refer back to any issues raised during warmup)
13. How have the LCPCs worked with civil society and residents to identify, and address community problems?

14. What efforts the LCPC made to respond to women’s issues and concerns in the community?
   a. Have you noticed more women police officers in your community?
   b. Are women in your community more comfortable in reporting crime and domestic violence to the police?
   c. What is the most significant change that the LCPC has made in gender issues in the police and in the community?

15. What are the biggest problems facing the youth of your community?
   a. What efforts has the LCPC made to address these issues?
   b. What is the most significant change that the LCPC has made in relation to youth issues?

16. Are there any ethnic or religious tensions in your community?
   a. If so, what efforts has the LCPC made to address these tensions?
   b. What is the most significant change that the LCPC has made in relation to lowering tensions?

CVE

17. Is religious radicalism or extremism a problem in your community?
   a. If so, can you provide any examples of individuals or groups who are engaged in VE or vulnerable to VE recruitment?

18. How does the LCPC work with police and community members to help people at risk of becoming radicalized?
   a. Can you provide an example where the LCPC intervened in the recruitment of community members to extremist groups?

19. (If in border region) During the last 5 years, how secure do you feel living in proximity to the border?
   a. Have you observed or heard of any cross-border spread of extremism in the last 5 years?
   b. Has the LCPC helped address the cross-border spread of extremism?
   c. What was the outcome of this help?

Sustainability and Local Ownership

20. How have members of the community contributed to the LCPC?

21. Have you observed or heard of any efforts to get community investment in the LCPCs?

22. What other organizations or groups would you like to see partner with or participate in the LCPC?

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

23. Tell us of an example where the LCPC made a positive impact in your community.
   a. Do you believe that this positive impact could benefit other communities?
24. What are some of the major difficulties that the LCPC has faced?
   a. What would be the best solution to these difficulties?
   b. How have the police or members of the LCPC changed their practices as a result of this challenge?

25. What would you change about the work of the LCPC if you could?
   a. What additional issues would you like the LCPC to address?
Khulisa Evaluation of INL and EUR/ACE Community Policing Program

Questionnaire Form 2: In-Depth Interview with Local Police/Government

Questionnaire # |__|__| — |__| — |__| — |__| — |__| — |__| (Country—Interview Number, e.g. KG—2—01)

Provence: District: Town/Neighborhood:

Name (if on record): Position:

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Name of Interviewer: _____________________ Signature _____________________

Trust

1. How has the LCPC affected the way that you work within your community?
   a. Would you consider the LCPC officers to be more proactive in solving community problems? If so, can you provide an example of a problem solved by the LCPC?

2. Do you feel that the community views you differently as an LCPC officer? If so, please tell us how.
   a. Do you feel that people are more comfortable reporting crime through an LCPC than at a police station? If so, why?
Petty Corruption

3. Do you know if petty corruption or physical abuse complaints against the police are registered and investigated, if so, then by whom?

4. Have complaints of bribery against the police increased or decreased since the LCPC was deployed? If so, why has this changed?

5. Have complaints of physical abuse against the police increased or decreased since the LCPC was deployed? If so, why do you feel this has changed?

6. Has your LCPC ever addressed issues of petty police corruption or abuse? If so, how?

Sustainability and Local Ownership

7. What investments have the government made in your LCPC?
   a. Have these investments come from the national government, local government or both?

8. Do you feel that the government is committed to sustaining your LCPC?

9. Has the local civil society or religious community invested in your LCPC? If so, how?

Police Training and Mainstream Behavior

10. Are you aware of any policy or institutional changes that the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the police force has taken to strengthen community policing policy and training?

11. Have you been trained in community policing?

12. Do you know if community policing has been integrated into the police academy curricula? If so,
   a. Is it taught as a separate course of study or is it contained within many courses of study?
   b. Who teaches community policing at the academy?

13. What are the most significant changes that have been introduced to police training to strengthen community policing?

Adaptation to Local Context

14. What efforts has your LCPC made to respond to women’s issues and concerns in your community?
   a. Do you feel that women in your community are more comfortable reporting crime and domestic violence to the police? What crimes, if any, would a woman feel more comfortable reporting to a woman police officer?
   b. Have you noticed more women police officers in your community?
   c. What are the most significant changes that the LCPC has made in helping solve women’s problems or concerns within your community?

15. What are the biggest problems facing young people in your community?
   a. What are the most significant changes that your LCPC has made in relation to a problem involving youth?

16. Does your community have problems involving ethnic tensions?
a. If so, what efforts has your LCPC made to address these problems?
b. What are the most significant changes that the LCPC have made to help lower ethnic or religious tensions?

CVE

17. Has your LCPC become aware of individuals or groups who are either engaged in extremism or vulnerable to recruitment as extremists?
   a. Does your LCPC keep data on the number of local people engaged in extremist groups domestically or abroad?
18. Has your LCPC worked with police and community members to help people at risk of becoming radicalized? If so, how?
19. Can you provide an example where the LCPC intervened in the recruitment of community members to an extremist group?
20. Since your LCPC was opened,
   a. Have you observed or heard of any cross-border spread of extremism?
   b. How did the LCPC help police work to address the cross-border spread of extremism?
   c. What was the outcome of this help?

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

21. Tell us of an example where your LCPC made a positive impact in your community.
   a. Do you believe that this positive impact could benefit other communities?
22. What are some of the major difficulties that the LCPC has faced?
   a. What would be the best solution to these difficulties?
   b. How have the police or members of the LCPC changed their practices as a result of this challenge?
23. What would you change about the work of your LCPC if you could?
   a. What additional problems would you like your LCPC to address?
   b. What other organizations or groups would you like to see partner with or participate in your LCPC?
On a scale of 1-5, 1 meaning you strongly disagree, five meaning you strongly agree, and three being neither agree nor disagree (a neutral rating), tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. I feel safer in my community as a result of the work of the Local Community Policing Center (LCPC) in my community.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Police in my community are less likely to accept bribes as a result of the work of the LCPC in my community.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Police in my community are less likely to abuse their authority as a result of the work of the LCPC in my community.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4. If I were the victim of a crime, I would report it to the police.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. If I witnessed a crime committed against someone else, I would report it to the police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. If I were asked to pay a bribe by a police officer or suffered abuse at the hands of a police officer, I would report it.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. My community supports its Local Community Policing Center.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. The LCPC in my community responds to the needs of community residents.</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>9. The LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering ethnic tensions in my community.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. The Local Community Policing Center in my community has been effective in lowering religious radicalism in my community.</td>
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11. If my friend was the victim of domestic violence, I would encourage her to report it to the LCPC.

12. The LCPC in my community has been effective in lowering the incidence of violent extremism in my community

13. If the son of my friend was being recruited as a violent extremist, I would encourage my friend to talk to the LCPC about the problem.

Section B: Demographics

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<tr>
<td>1) Male</td>
<td>1) KG</td>
<td>1) Primary (4 grades)</td>
<td>1) Student</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Female</td>
<td>2) TJ</td>
<td>2) Incomplete secondary (9 grades)</td>
<td>2) Employed</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) UZ</td>
<td>3) Complete secondary (11 grades)</td>
<td>3) Self-employed</td>
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<td>4) RU</td>
<td>4) Vocational (technical)</td>
<td>4) Unemployed</td>
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<td>5) Other (Specify):</td>
<td>5) Incomplete higher</td>
<td>5) Other</td>
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<td>6) Complete higher (B.A.)</td>
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<td>7) Advanced degree (M.A. <em>Kandidat Nauk</em>)</td>
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| | 8) Other (Specify) | }
Annex D: Data Collection and Project Site Selection

Data was collected at a variety of project sites in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These sites were selected based on the communal circumstances and priorities that each LCPC addresses. Given the range of issues that our evaluation seeks to address, it was essential that each research site allowed us to address at least two of the following issues: violent extremism, youth issues, gender and women’s issues (especially gender mainstreaming of the police force and prevention of gender-based violence), ethnicity, and cross-border trafficking and other border-related issues. Based on these criteria, we selected the following research sites:

4.1 Kyrgyzstan

Amir-Timur is an urban neighborhood in Osh where the LCPC focused extensively on gender issues in the community. Furthermore, the neighborhood is 90% Uzbek and has faced significant ethnic tensions as a part of a multiethnic Osh city. Youth radicalism has also been a problem. At this site we interviewed the Director of the LCPC, two other members of the LCPC, a focus group consisting of members of the Women’s Council, as well as five other civil society individuals representing the Youth Committee and three NGOs.

Yrys in Jalalabad province is an ethnically mixed rural community on the border with Uzbekistan. At these sites we were able to individually interview the LCPC Director, several members of the KNP, several members of KNP/Division 10 (not-for-direct-attribute) two members of civil society, two youth activists as well as a focus group consisting of an imam, five residents, and representatives of the Women’s Council and Youth Committee.

Tepe-Korgon in Aravan (Osh Province) is a border areas neighboring Uzbekistan that is known as a site for recruitment to extremist groups among the youth. Both lie along the border of Uzbekistan. At this site, we interviewed the Police Commander for the District, three separate members of the LCPC, two separate members of civil society and a focus group consisting of local teachers, members of the Women’s Council and the Youth Committee.

Kyzyl-Kiya in Batken Province is in close proximity to the border with Uzbekistan, and is known to be a site of youth radicalization. We were able to individually interview five activist members of civil society, the chairperson of the Youth Committee. We also conducted a focus group interview consisting of the local imam, the Chairman of the Council of Elders, Chairwoman of the Women’s Council, the LCPC Director and several members of civil society.

List of Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions in Kyrgyzstan

- KII, Zamira Isakova, Saferworld staff, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/12/2018.
- KII, Stefan Stoyanov, Director of Saferworld Osh Office, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/12/2018.
- KII, FTI Staff, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/16/2019.
- KII, NGO Director, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/16/2019.
- KII, INL Staff, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/17/2019.
- KII, INL Staff, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/17/2019.
- KII, MIA Official, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/18/2019.
• KII, MIA Advisor, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 01/18/2019.
• KII, Police Inspector, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
• KII, Elder Court Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
• KII, LCPC Representative, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
• FGD, Women’s Council members, 6 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/21/2019.
• KII, Youth Activist, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• KII, NGO Director, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• FGD, LCPC and community members, exclusively women, 9 Participants, Amir-Timur, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• KII, FTI Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• KII, Saferworld Administrator, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• KII, NGO Director, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/22/2019.
• KII, Civic Activist, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, Youth Committee Member, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, Police Commander, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, Youth Committee Member, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, Police Commander, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, LCPC Representative, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• FGD, LCPC and community members, 11 Participants, Yrys, Kyrgyzstan, 01/24/2019.
• KII, Women’s Council Members, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, Community Member, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, LCPC Chair Representative, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• FGD, LCPC and community members, primarily youth, 7 Participants, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, Elder Court Representative, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, LCPC Member, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, Police Inspector, Tepe-Korgon, Kyrgyzstan, 01/25/2019.
• KII, Police Commander, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.
• KII, Saferworld Manager, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 01/28/2019.
• KII, Police Commander, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
• FGD, LCPC and community members, 8 Participants, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
• KII, Civic Activist, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
• KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
• KII, NGO Director, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kyrgyzstan, 01/29/2019.
• FGD, LCPC and community members, 5 Participants, Nookat, Kyrgyzstan, 01/30/2019.
4.2 Tajikistan

We were somewhat limited by terrain and seasonal travel considerations, some of which were extreme. In addition, Tajikistan’s government has a proactive, internal intelligence-gathering organ, the GKNB, which could have had a limiting effect on the level of candor expressed by citizen and government interviewees. All of these factors influenced our approach to site selection and the collection of meaningful data. Understandably, no recordings were taken of these interviews. With violent extremism, youth issues, gender and women’s issues (especially gender mainstreaming of the police force and prevention of gender-based violence), ethnicity, and cross-border trafficking and other border-related issues in mind, we were able to enlist the Mission’s help to identify meaningful sites in which to conduct these inquiries. We agreed on the following sites:

Khulob in Khatlon Province is a highly ethnically diverse urban area (only 70% ethnic Tajik) where major area of LCPC work is gender mainstreaming and prevention of gender-based violence. We were able to meet with the Khulob CPC and separately interview the TNP Provincial Police Chief.

Hamadoni (Khatlon Province) is a rural area, which at its southernmost shares a border with Afghanistan and is the site of a key CPPT. The region faces issues of youth unemployment. The CPPT is involved in preventative work with the youth through vocational training, sport, and other activities. We were able to interview members of the Panjrud Jamoat CPPT, several local TNP police officials, and members of the Youth Issues Committee.

Bokhtar city in Kushoniyon (Khatlon Province) is an ethnically diverse urban setting where the LCPC addresses a wide range of community issues, including domestic violence prevention, CVE, and working with youth.

Mashal is the site of an urban iteration of a CPC that lies just outside the City of Dushanbe. We were able to interview several local TNP commanders, as well as conduct a focus group consisting of several purported members of the CPPT.

Simiganj in the Vahdat District is a semi-rural area that lies to the east of the City of Dushanbe and is of great interest due to the claims of the CPC being useful to prevent a violent government response to an attempted insurrection in 2015. We were able to interview members of the CPPT as well as the TNP commander for the area.

Norak is a semi-rural area, which lies to the southeast of the City of Dushanbe. We were able to conduct a focus group discussion involving 11 members of the CPPT there. The community is extremely poor and heavily dependent on remittances from migrants. As such, it bears many of the social problems caused by out-migration, especially among young men.

Guliston in the Sugd region is a semi-rural area to the east of Khujand City in most northern point of Tajikistan and thereby very close to the border with the Kyrgyz Republic. Guliston’s CPPT has been working on prevention of domestic violence and strengthening of community policing. We were able to interview various CPPT members at their CPC, which was located within the police barracks at Guliston.

Chorkuh, located within the Asfara District of Sugd is unique in the sense that it is contained within an artificial peninsula border with the southwest portion of Kyrgyz Republic on virtually all sides. The CPC there focuses on domestic violence and countering violent extremism. We were able to interview members of the local CPPT including the local mullah.

Ayni is located mid-point on the road from Dushanbe to Khujand and covers an extensive amount of rural and mountainous outlying areas. We were able to interview the CPC Director, the local police command staff as well as conduct a focus group with 12 members of the CPPT.
We selected the Rahmon CPPT for its proximity to Tursuzoda, an industrial city that lies close to the western border with Uzbekistan. The population is predominantly Uzbek, and the CPPT has addressed a number of ethnic and border issues.

While we had selected Gharm, a rural area lying approximately 160km to the east of Dushanbe, we were unable to reach it due to heavy snowfall and rockslides, which made the mountain passes extremely unsafe. After we encountered a major rockslide that had temporarily closed the only route to this destination, we opted to return to Dushanbe out of an abundance of caution.

List of Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions in Tajikistan

- KII, Nisha Pryor, INL Director, US Embassy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
- KII, Saferworld Manager, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
- KII, Saferworld Manager, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
- KII, MIA Official, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
- KII, MIA Official, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/04/2019.
- FGD, Khulob Public Council, 10 participants, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019.
- KII, Police Commander, Khulob Tajikistan, 02/05/2019.
- FGD, Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 20, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
- FGD, Police members of Panjrud CPPT, 3 participants, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
- FGD, Women’s Council from Panjrud Community Policing Partnership Team, 5, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
- KII, Government Official, Hamadoni, Tajikistan, 02/06/2019.
- KII, Dmitry Kaportsev, OSCE Community Policing Program Officer, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/07/2019.
- FGD, Mashal Community Policing Partnership Team (7), Mashal, Tajikistan, 02/07/2019.
- FGD, Simiganj Community Policing Partnership Team, Simiganj, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.
- FGD, Norak Community Policing Partnership Team (11), Norak, Tajikistan, 02/08/2019.
- FGD, Guliston Community Policing Partnership Team, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/09/2019.
- KII, NGO Director, Gulison, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
- FGD, Chorkuh Community Policing Partnership Team, 9 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
- FGD, Police members of Chorkuh CPPT, 3 participants, Chorkuh, Tajikistan, 02/10/2019.
- FGD, Ayni Community Policing Partnership Team, 12 participants, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.
- FGD, Police members of Ayni CPPR, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.
- KII, Member of the Ayni Public Council, Ayni Tajikistan, 02/11/2019.
- FGD, Rahmon Community Policing Partnership Team, Tursuzoda, Tajikistan, 02/12/2019.
- KII, Official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Academy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 02/12/2019.
Annex E: Documents Reviewed

The following annex lists all documents reviewed during the evaluation, including for the desk review and final report. All documents were provided by INL/ACE. Many documents were distributed internally among a limited group of peers, and as such may lack information as to authorship, date or a formal document title. All information that can be obtained for each document has been included into the list.


Annex: Concept of interaction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs departments and civil society (Community Policing Concept).


Berg, James, C5 Afghan regional cross border strategy, March 2018.

CivilFocus - Project Evaluation: Saferworld’s Community Policing Programme In Kyrgyzstan, dated March 2016.

CivilFocus, Final project evaluation: Saferworld’s community security/community policing programme in Kyrgyzstan, 2016.

CivilFocus, Project evaluation: Saferworld’s community policing programme in Kyrgyzstan, March 2016.

Diplomatic cable, US Embassy Dushanbe, Charge GBAO Trip Report Cable, 5 Jun 16.


INL Community Policing Overview Fact Sheet, dated September 2018

Department of State Grant Agreements for Community Policing in Kyrgyzstan, 2016-2018

Diplomatic cable from INL Bishkek, dated April 2018.

INL Dushanbe, Performance Progress Report, Reference FAPD-2015, Designation of Grants Officer Representative, Quarter 1 (Oct. 1 to Dec. 31)


November Summary of Narrative, “Structured coordination and communication between CPPT and PCs in addressing safety and security concerns.”

Performance Progress Report, Quarter 4 (Jul. 1 to Sept. 30), Reference FAPD-2015, Designation of Grants Officer Representative.


Program from Regional conference on “Radicalisation and violent extremism in Central Asia countries and Afghanistan.”

Saferworld - Overview Kyrgyz Saferworld Programs 2018, 15 August 2018.
Saferworld - Promoting a Sustainable and Locally-Led Community Based Policing In The Kyrgyz Republic, dated 9 January 2016
Saferworld, “Promoting a sustainable and locally-led community based policing in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
Saferworld, Community Policing Activity Overview: Inter-Ethnic Issues Outcomes.
Saferworld, Quarterly Progress Report, Promoting a sustainable and locally-led community based policing in the Kyrgyz Republic, October 1 – December 31 2017.
The Emergence Group, Community Policing Gap Analysis, September 03, 2010.

Annex F: Statement of Work

Community Policing Programs in Central Asia: An Evaluation of U.S.-Funded Community Policing Projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Nature and Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the Community Policing Program evaluation was to assess the effectiveness of past/current community policing projects and to identify and apply lessons learned from past/current programs to future programming. This evaluation was a performance evaluation.

There was anecdotal evidence that the program had professionalized law enforcement and increased trust and cooperation between police and community members in locations where the program operates. Previous information on community policing programs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had purportedly uncovered anecdotal evidence of the programs’ ability to counter radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism (such as stories about stopping residents from leaving the country to join extremist organizations). This study identifies and qualifies the program results to the extent possible.

Background and Current Status of the Effort

This evaluation focused on activities stretching back to 2012, when funding to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Saferworld, and The Emergence Group to implement community-policing projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began up to the date of the country evaluation visits.

Tajikistan Projects

OSCE: Community policing in Tajikistan began to take shape in 2010 during the assessment phase for the police reform strategy. It was chosen to launch a pilot project designed after a community policing (CP) model used in post-conflict Kosovo. The project’s goal was to change the country’s security sector culture away from top-down, strongly and singularly enforcement focused to an approach adapted to the specific community context of Tajikistan. Another legacy from the Soviet era that persists within the security sector is a culture of corruption, and a mentality that sees the police as an extension of the security services that seek to monitor and control communities, as opposed to serving the communities in which they work. By the end of the pilot, significant changes were reported as having occurred in the pilot communities. Community assessments noted improved trust between the police and public, increased participation of women and youth in addressing issues of safety and crime, enhanced police-public partnerships and joint problem solving, a reduction of crime, insecurity, and conflict, and perceptions of improved safety and security. Because of the initial successes of the pilot project, collaboration with the OSCE and the Tajik government to develop a national CP program proceeded.

The Tajik government also engaged the OSCE to assist in developing an action plan for police reform, resulting in a new framework called “The Future of Policing in Tajikistan: Police Reform for 2013-2020.” This strategy served as the basis for drafting a new police law (which has yet to take effect) and establishing community policing as the foundation on which the government would base its law enforcement reform. The strategy and law outlined changes include:

- Establishing a legal basis for reform;
- Increasing interaction and enhancing trust between the police and the population, civil society and public organizations, and mass media;
- Limiting police powers by subjecting the chain of command to judicial oversight;

...
• Improving management, revising the code of conduct;
• Establishing an inspection mechanism for the police (Internal Affairs Department);
• Creating an efficient and effective system for registering crimes; and
• Adhering to the proper use of force rules.

The study analyzed the program’s effectiveness as a delivery platform to address numerous issues, including, but not limited to, combatting violent extremism (CVE), addressing family violence, and improving the rule of law. The study looked at community policing as having been the most effective grassroots model for addressing local conflicts and violent extremism in Tajikistan. The September 2015 violence and attacks on Tajik police stations linked to a failed insurgency were looked at closely by the evaluation team to attempt to prove that the MIA turned to community policing methods rather than repressive measures in order to engage the public during this crisis. This incident was considered a major signal that the Tajik Government had relied on community policing during a crisis response. U.S. government experts have witnessed a reduction in loss of life from these police responses while promoting human rights protections through involvement of civil society.

Currently there are four pilot CVE-specific projects occurring along the Afghan border. The goal of these pilot projects is to develop CVE implementation toolkits for use at the local, regional, and national levels without further international support. The village-sized communities are developing their own comprehensive response strategy (including assessments and action plans) to address root causes that drive radicalization and violent extremism, thereby tackling drivers of conflict and insecurity in their communities. Many other CP project locations also include CVE-related activities, for example youth engagement. This study examined most, if not all of these areas.

The estimated population of all communities with Community Policing Partnership Teams (teams of influential community members who cooperate with police and local community members to resolve issues of community concern; key implementers of CP programs, hereinafter CPPTs) is around 1 million. The CP program is based on local and regional implementation, with the regional Public Councils (groups of citizens providing citizen input/oversight for policing entities in their regions of operation, hereinafter PCs) covering the entire population of approximately 9 million. The study looked at CP in its three iterations; rural, semi-rural and urban.

As an expansion of the CVE pilot, five new CPPTs are planned along the Afghan border. Selected communities will be actively involved in identifying, prioritizing, analyzing, and addressing security concerns, including those related to the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism. Communities will strengthen their capacity and develop the tools needed to help them to identify, prioritize, analyze, and resolve local and sub-national level security concerns, including those related to violent extremism.

**Emergence Group:** A contract was signed, which started in March 2012 and expired in March 2015, to provide funding to the Emergence Group (TEG) of up to $2.4 million to carry out a community policing project. TEG worked on community policing from 2011-2015, training six newly created Community Policing Partnership Teams (CPPTs) and supporting 12 others. Together with MIA, TEG helped establish 32 Community Policing Centers (office spaces for meetings between community members and police).

Two main components of the TEG programming were:

1. Institutionalizing community policing and building the capacity of local stakeholders, including CPPTs, to work together to improve community-level security; and
2. Building community-policing partnerships to enhance problem solving at the local level.

The objectives of TEG program were:

• Contribute to the reform of the Tajik police into a more democratic, professional, representative,
responsive, and accountable law enforcement agency that works in partnership with the public;

- Improve trust between the police and the citizens they serve;
- Increase awareness of Tajikistan’s diverse communities, local governance, and police of their shared stake in crime-reduction, safety, and conflict prevention;
- Develop problem-solving skills and local strategies for reducing crime, increasing safety, improving quality of life, and encouraging the constructive and collaborative resolution of community disputes; and
- Develop sustainable community policing forums that can be mobilized to address nation-wide security concerns, including domestic violence, organized crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, violent extremism and radicalization, and terrorism.

**Saferworld:** Nearly $5.4 million in funding was provided to Saferworld in 2015, including cost extensions in 2017 and 2018, to implement community policing in Tajikistan from 2015 to 2020 to support greater community security, including in areas such as community policing, education, domestic violence response, gender equity, human rights, and radicalization and violent extremism prevention. Objectives of the project were to:

- Build the capacity of community level organizations (PCs, and CPPTs) to develop community security and crime reduction plans and implement them. Saferworld currently works with six Regional Public Councils and approximately 45 CPPTs;
- Strengthen knowledge of PCs and CPPTs in focus areas including domestic violence, gender inequality, and violent extremism;
- Equip PCs to expand the number of CPPTs in their region to new locations; and
- Complete a gender equity assessment of the police service to enable the hiring and retention of female police officers.

**Kyrgyzstan Projects**

**OSCE and UNODC:** In Kyrgyzstan, OSCE was funded in 2010-2012 ($763,000) and the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC) in 2015 to 2016 ($500,000) to implement community policing projects. The 2010-2012 project, the Community Security Initiative, was a multi-donor effort totaling over $3.5 million. The objective of the broader initiative was to support Kyrgyzstan police in addressing the specific security situation after the events of June 2010, and to contribute to the professionalism of the police in providing human security for all members and communities of the Kyrgyzstan population, irrespective of ethnicity. Specific goals of the project were:

- Respect for and protection of human rights, particularly those of the ethnic Uzbek minority, by the Kyrgyzstan police;
- Improved trust and confidence between local communities and the police, particularly but not exclusively involving the ethnic Uzbek community; and
- Strengthened police capacities to operate in a multi-ethnic environment and to integrate persons of ethnic minorities into the Kyrgyzstan police.

The 2015-2016 UNODC project focused on providing technical assistance and capacity development to four municipalities where local crime prevention plans had already been developed in 2014 and 2015 as part of a UNODC project, with an aim of supporting implementation of these plans. Specific objectives were to:

- Implement crime prevention plans;
• Increase the knowledge and skills of police, local government, and local crime prevention centers to work on crime prevention in a coordinated and comprehensive manner;
• Improve working conditions for police, local crime prevention centers, and other crime prevention practitioners;
• Raise awareness on corporate social responsibility in the area of crime prevention, and implement pilot initiatives;
• Enhance media involvement in crime prevention; and
• Increase youth involvement in crime prevention.

**Saferworld**: Saferworld began to collaborate with the aim of institutionalizing community policing and building partnerships between the police, local governments, and communities to solve problems together, with a focus that included addressing drivers of radicalization and violent extremism. The partnership was extended through a cooperative agreement with Saferworld for 12 months, adding $500,000 to its original funding of over $889,000 in 2015, with the cost extension extending activities to March 31, 2019. The total population in municipalities and cities where Saferworld operates the community policing program is currently 683,976 people. The number of direct project participants in activities (workshops, seminars, exchange of experience visits, outreach campaigns) for the last 6 months (October 2017 – March 2018) is 198,684 people.

The objectives of the cost extension were:

• To generate greater understanding and support for community-based policing among government officials and decision-makers in the police force. This is accomplished by: a) outreach and training for law enforcement and government officials, as well as b) a planned community policing course at the Law Enforcement Academy;
• To develop police-public problem solving partnerships in selected communities (this is actually establishing the Community Policing Partnership Teams); and
• To create a strategy that ensures sustainability of LCPCs beyond the duration of the project. To do this, Saferworld planned two study tours to assist local partners in developing a self-sustaining community policing program in Tajikistan.

**Evaluation Questions**

The study was designed to gain insight into the following main areas of interest:

1. To what extent have these programs helped combat violent extremism, and how has it been measured?
2. To what extent have the community policing programs built trust between the public and the police, and what is the evidence for this?
3. To what extent, if any, have these programs reduced petty corruption by law enforcement personnel, and how is this being measured?
4. What commitments are in place to ensure that the local crime prevention centers will be sustained by communities and/or local governments after the projects end?
5. In what ways, if any, have police behavior and mainstream police training changed as a result of the community policing projects, and what is the evidence for these changes?
6. In what ways have community policing techniques been adapted to local conditions and cultures, and what evidence exists on which of these adaptations are best practices?
7. What lessons can be learned from the client's past and current community policing programs in Central Asia, and what implications are there for future community policing programming there and elsewhere?
Evaluation Design and Data Collection Methods

The evaluation contractor, Khulisa Management Systems, selected an experienced Evaluation Team Leader who is an expert on performance evaluation methods and project design, knowledgeable about the ethnicities and cultures in Central Asia, and well aware of its history of security problems and lack of trust between the public and security personnel in the region. Khulisa also selected a Community Policing Expert who is expert in conceptualizing and building community oriented police agencies in developing countries, and who understands how to measure important community policing project outcomes such as public trust, lowering the incidence of petty corruption, increased transparency, progressive institutional change, and globalized community policing training initiatives. Khulisa also engaged local in-country experts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who helped identify any available data that pertains to measuring the changes and desired impacts identified in the evaluation questions above.

The evaluation was completed in three phases. In Phase 1, a desk review of baseline indicators, performance targets and other primary written materials was provided for review by the evaluators. Data about the extent to which measurable changes in police behavior and public response had been achieved in reference to the baseline data and program indicators was be collected by the in-country experts, and was be reviewed by the expatriate team members, who then documented their tentative conclusions and hypotheses as a desk study inception report prior to their travel to the field.

During Phase 2, the evaluation team’s fieldwork was divided between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Evaluation team members undertook a series of interviews and focus groups in each country to investigate the evaluation questions, and prove, disprove or alter their desk study hypotheses from the initial data review.

Khulisa proposed a detailed methodology for the fieldwork, consisting of field interviews and site visits that included fact finding and in-depth discussion with a representative sample of the following:

Local government officials, police supervisors, police officers both male and female; Leaders of relevant civil society organizations (including women leaders), community leaders (including leaders of the range of ethnic and religious populations in the project target areas), Members of the public who represent a sample of the community members and victims involved in preventing or resolving the typical range of community policing cases, including those of petty crime, domestic violence, recruitment of violent extremists, and other categories of public-police interaction.

The evaluation team summarized their initial tentative findings, conclusions and recommendations in a group briefing at post prior to their departure. Due to post considerations, one was conducted on paper, while the other was conducted in-person.

In Phase 3, the evaluation team will have conducted an oral debrief, drafted a full report on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and will have submitted this for review and comments no later than one month after return from the field. The Evaluation Team leader will have provided a debrief, which can be in-person, or via DVC or telcon, depending on the logistics involved. The client will review the draft report and provide consolidated comments within two weeks after receipt of the draft report. Khulisa will then respond to any feedback and will finalize the evaluation report within two weeks after receipt of the feedback on the draft version.

Timetable and Staff Time Allocations

The evaluation shall have been completed, with final report delivered, preferably within four months and no later than six months after an award has been made.
Deliverables

Khulisa was expected to produce the following deliverables:

- **Evaluation Plan**: On December 24th, the evaluation team submitted its Evaluation Plan.
- **Evaluation Design**: On December 24th, the evaluation team submitted its Evaluation Design.
- **Desk Inception Report**: On December 24th, the evaluation team submitted its Desk Inception Report.
- **Outgoing Reports (Debriefings)**: On January 22nd and on February 4th the evaluation team debriefed posts in Bishkek and Dushanbe, respectively.

Logistics Support

Stakeholders were forthcoming in providing the evaluation team with access to data and documents related to the projects of focus in this evaluation. Members of the Khulisa Team were able to obtain their own Tajik visas with a letter from post (Embassy, Dushanbe). In-country logistics including transportation, scheduling of appointments, and food and lodging were handled by Khulisa and its evaluation team in the Kyrgyz Republic and were graciously assisted by Embassy Dushanbe in Tajikistan. To the limited extent necessary, Embassy Dushanbe and Embassy Bishkek provided official contacts and contact information to the evaluation team for ministries, civil society groups, and representatives of the organizations as outlined above in the Background section. Security transportation facilities were not required in either country.

Contract Security Requirements

Personnel security clearances were not required for Khulisa personnel performing on this contract.

Standard Information Protection

Khulisa exercised the utmost discretion in regard to all matters relating to their duties and functions. They refrained from communicating to any person any information known to them by reason of their performance of services under this contract which had not been made public, except in the necessary performance of their duties. All documents and records (including photographs) generated during the performance of work under this contract are for the sole use of and become the exclusive property of the U.S. Government. No article, book, pamphlet, recording, broadcast, speech, television appearance, film or photograph concerning any aspect of work performed under this contract will be published or disseminated through any media without the prior written authorization of the contracting officer. These obligations will not cease upon the expiration or termination of this contract.

**Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information**: See 12 FAM 540 for guidance regarding the Handling, Access, Dissemination, and Release of SBU.

**Laptop and Data Protection Requirements**

Khulisa did not transmit unencrypted SBU data electronically across the Internet using email, FTP sites, or commercial web sites.

*THE ELECTRONIC PROCESSING MEDIA WAS ENCRYPTED USING* NIST approved product. (NIST approved products can be found at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) An overwrite utility software will have been used to remove all previous data in the following manner: A first overwrite pass using the number ‘1’; A second overwrite pass using the number ‘0’; and a third overwrite pass using ANY character.

Thumb drives, jump drives and other portable storage devices: No thumb drives, jump drives or other portable storage devices onto which project information could be downloaded, were used by Khulisa in performance of this contract.

Khulisa’s site office and all subcontractor site office individual computer hard-drives (including laptops) and server hard-drives were encrypted using any NIST approved product (found at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html). Khulisa’s office copiers, scanners and all other electronic media were password protected to prevent unauthorized use, access and downloading of SBU and project sensitive information by unauthorized users.

While on travel, laptops remained with the Khulisa’s employees and were not included in any checked baggage.

PLACE OF PERFORMANCE
The work to be performed under this task order was performed at the Khulisa’s site. Fieldwork was conducted in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
The COR has reviewed, for completeness, preliminary or draft documentation that Khulisa has submitted. Final approval and acceptance of documentation required herein shall be by letter of approval and acceptance by COR. Khulisa will not construe any letter of acknowledgment of receipt material as a waiver of review, or as an acknowledgment that the material is in conformance with this work statement.