Integrated Country Strategy

New Zealand
# Table of Contents

1. Chief of Mission Priorities ................................................................. 1
2. Mission Strategic Framework ............................................................. 2
3. Mission Goals and Objectives ............................................................. 4
4. Management Objectives ..................................................................... 8
1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The outcome of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region will determine the future of the world’s security and prosperity. New Zealand sits at a pivotal place in that region and in our Indo-Pacific Strategy, making Mission New Zealand’s role in the political, economic, and cultural path its government chooses increasingly essential. 2020 marks the 182nd year of friendly relations between the United States and New Zealand, since the first U.S. Consul arrived here in 1838. Over the last three years, the relationship has grown ever stronger, pushed in part by the New Zealand government’s actions to defend its values and independent foreign policy. We now look to the government of New Zealand for leadership and partnership as we educate the business and academic communities and the general public about growing threats to our shared values. In doing so, we will continue to strengthen and deepen the bilateral relationship in the security, economic, intelligence, and global health spheres. This will require expanding the Five Eyes relationship fully into the diplomatic and economic realm, as well as developing other coalitions based on shared concerns, and working together to confront the economic and political fallout from COVID-19. It will also mean defending the rules based international order and making difficult decisions with long term consequences as we protect New Zealand and the Pacific’s sovereignty.

The U.S.-New Zealand trade and commercial relationship is the best it has ever been. As New Zealand’s view of its place in the world rapidly evolves, we see opportunities to do even better. The region is at the center of world commerce, not just the existing flow of goods and services, but also as the framework for the future of the world’s economy. Our trade relationship is healthy and broad, and we seek to expand it even further. We will work with the government to find ways to increase two-way trade and investment in both economies, including through our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), with the prospect of a full FTA or regional agreement to follow from a Digital Trade Agreement. We will continue to promote the Kiwi Act as the best vehicle for New Zealand investors to enter into the U.S. market.

Most importantly, we will increase our cooperation in the innovation sector, especially tech, entertainment and space cooperation, ensuring that the United States remains New Zealand’s partner of choice in these fields as we seek to diversify New Zealand’s economy. We will also work with the New Zealand government to protect intellectual property, ensure that dual-use technology is properly protected, and educate Kiwi business on IPR protections. We will leverage New Zealand as a valuable partner in our shared pursuit of trade liberalization, a level playing field, and the promotion of rules-based, high-standard regional economic and trade architecture. This will pay strategic dividends as well as economic ones. Lastly, we will work with New Zealand to educate and protect Pacific partners from corruption, elite capture, and the dangers of debt trap diplomacy.

Keeping the region free and open for trade and governance also means defending against the darker side of global connectivity – the proliferation and threat of weapons of mass destruction, the illicit trade in drugs, the expansion of terrorist groups, and the exploitation of the world’s most vulnerable by trafficking and smuggling. Together, we will enforce United Nations sanctions and bolster the rules based international order – at the United Nations and its affiliates, in North East Asia, and throughout the Pacific and Antarctica. To facilitate the growth and effectiveness of New
Zealand’s contributions to future shared security goals – including international coalitions and peacekeeping – we will prioritize steady increases in interoperability, including through joint exercises, training, and security assistance. We will continue our strong security collaboration in New Zealand’s backyard, from Antarctica to the Pacific.

One of the many ways in which we will strive to make our expanded partnership sustainable is through broad, considered engagement with the political opposition, and outreach to the full spectrum of the diverse society in New Zealand, including Maori, Pasifika, diaspora, youth, and other communities. That will intensify use of both classic public diplomacy and social media tools, as we push ever deeper and wider into New Zealand society and culture. We will increase people-to-people programs and cultural ties through expanding educational and professional exchanges as well as sports diplomacy. We will increase New Zealanders’ awareness of the many values, cultural riches, and policy priorities we share -- engendering stronger support for our policies. And we will shine a light on malign influences domestic and region in order to inform and prepare the people, universities, and businesses of New Zealand.

The breadth of our partnership and Mission staff required to nurture it have continued to grow steadily. The management platform will continue to adapt and grow to maintain a high level of customer service. Finding ways to attract and retain quality local staff will continue to be a challenge.

As the relationship with New Zealand continues to grow and develop, encompassing an expanding variety of regional and multilateral issues, we will meet that rising demand by better positioning and augmenting our staffing. We will seek to add an additional U.S. direct hire Political/Economic officer in Wellington and/or Auckland, as well as a local Public Affairs staffer in Wellington to manage policy and messaging opportunities and counter misinformation. Platforms are important too and we will seek to increase our presence on the South Island and our support for Antarctica by establishing a consulate in Christchurch and adding an additional floor to our Consulate-General in Auckland. These addition will allow us to function more effectively and broaden all facets of our relationship with the people and government of New Zealand as well as our regional partners.

At a time of global upheaval, in a world desperate for U.S. leadership, where alliances and partnership are crucial to the continued success of the rules-based international order, New Zealand has an important role to play. Our shared values and common goals will pave the way for expanded opportunities, enhanced cooperation, and a broad and strong partnership now and for the future. We know that we have a strong partner in New Zealand and we will look to upgrade that partnership – and the relationships that undergrid it – in every facet of our diplomatic engagement. The U.S.-New Zealand relationship has never been stronger on the issues that matter most, and we will strengthen that relationship across all of Mission New Zealand as we move forward.

2. **Mission Strategic Framework**

**Mission Goal 1: Leverage Alignment on Pacific and Global Issues**

Originally Approved: August 8, 2018
Reviewed and Updated: January 12, 2021
Mission Objective 1.1: Coordinate U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific efforts and resources. Leverage the Mission’s ability to convene, facilitate, and coordinate projects and resources with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including the French Pacific.

Mission Objective 1.2: Cooperate on global shared interests and support GNZ’s rising leadership role in multilateral forums, including UN/IO issues, TIP, human rights, and the DPRK.

Mission Objective 1.3: Advance U.S. leadership on outer space, Antarctica, oceans, environment, science, and health.

Mission Goal 2: Build the Modern U.S.-New Zealand Security Partnership

Mission Objective 2.1: Enable informed defense and regional security decision making

Mission Objective 2.2: Enhance key capabilities for integration and interoperability, including bilateral training and operations that strengthen the international rules-based order and safety and security for Southern Pacific partner nations.

Mission Goal 3: Diversify the U.S.-New Zealand Economic Relationship

Mission Objective 3.1: Enhance the overall and bilateral trade relationship

Mission Objective 3.2: Build key sectors for growth

Mission Objective 3.3: Increase Awareness Across New Zealand and Pacific Business Community of New Commercial and Economic Threats

Mission Goal 4: Promote the United States as New Zealand’s and the Pacific region’s Partner of Choice

Mission Objective 4.1: Build partnerships to combat disinformation and state malign influence

Mission Objective 4.2: Promote shared values and understanding of the United States as a valuable long-term partner

Management Objective 1: Align financial, physical, and human resources to appropriately support Mission’s bilateral and regional support platform goals.
4. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1: Leverage Alignment on Pacific and Global Issues

Description and Linkages: This is a multi-agency broad-based goal that touches on every aspect of our work and the bilateral relationship and extends to the entire Pacific. It has linkages to the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 Indo-Pacific Strategy, State-USAID Joint Strategic Plans, EAP/ASIA Joint Regional Strategy, and 2018 Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan for Mission New Zealand.

Mission Objective 1.1: Coordinate U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific efforts and resources. Leverage the Mission’s ability to convene, facilitate, and coordinate projects and resources with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including the French Pacific.

Justification: The Pacific and Antarctic region is facing its most contested time since the Second World War, and the largest economic crisis in decades with the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic. The Pacific is the U.S. “gateway” to the Indo-Pacific and a region of significant U.S. legacy and engagement. The region is more important than ever due to challenges to maritime norms, pressures on EEZs, vulnerable and developing states, foreign influence, and more.

Risks: Without concerted efforts to partner with Pacific nations, the region risks an influx of malign influence from other foreign partners which may corrupt democratic values and entrap Pacific countries in political and debt entanglement.

Mission Objective 1.2: Cooperate on global shared interests and support GNZ’s rising leadership role in multilateral forums, including UN/IO issues, TIP, human rights, and the DPRK.

Justification: With malign influence challenging the existing norms in various multilateral bodies, U.S.-New Zealand coordination and alignment on global issues are more important than ever to ensure continuity of the established institutional norms and universal human rights.

Risks: Preserving the integrity of the multilateral system requires close coordination with New Zealand. Without close coordination with New Zealand and our Pacific partners, we risk the further degradation of internationally established systems.

Mission Objective 1.3: Advance U.S. leadership on outer space, Antarctica, oceans, environment, science, and health.

Justification: Mission New Zealand should utilize existing cooperation and build new programs to promote U.S. interest in Antarctica, space, as well as other environmental, science, and health cooperation. The U.S. Antarctic Program (USAP) bases logistical operations in Christchurch, and the Mission should work with New Zealand to ensure continuous operations as well as global respect for operational norms in Antarctica established by the Antarctica Treaty System. The Mission should collaborate with New Zealand to ensure all countries in Antarctica
respect the existing Antarctica Treaty system. Science and technology are also critical. With the growth of the public and private space partnership, the Mission should facilitate greater cooperation on outer space, including formalized cooperative agreements and bilateral dialogue, and bolster private partnerships in the sector. New Zealand is a leader in the pandemic response, and the Mission should partner with the government here to further cooperation.

**Risks:** Without close polar and space coordination, established treaty systems governing Antarctic and outer space face further challenges without retribution. We need to partner with New Zealand to ensure both realms continue peaceful cooperation focused on scientific advancement.

**Mission Goal 2: Build the Modern U.S.-New Zealand Security Partnership**

**Description and Linkages:** This goal reflects Pillar 1 of the 2017 National Security Strategy; the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 1, Objective 1.4; and Goal 1 of the EAP/ASIA Joint Regional Strategy. It also supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the US INDOPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan for 2020. Consistent with the National Security Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy, the mission will seek to expand defense and security relations.

**Mission Objective 2.1:** Enable informed defense and regional security decision making

**Justification:** Information sharing is a key component of developing a common understanding of regional and global security threats, as well as opportunities, and requires constant attention to improve processes.

**Risks:** The U.S. would lose a partner led solution to address regional malign actors. This is mitigated by strengthening U.S. bilateral relations with individual Pacific island nations (PIC).

**Mission Objective 2.2:** Enhance key capabilities for integration and interoperability, including bilateral training and operations that strengthen the international rules-based order and safety and security for Southern Pacific partner nations.

**Justification:** Integration and interoperability of defense and security capabilities is a key component of regional and global defense cooperation and allows our military services to work together seamlessly in conflict or pre-conflict operations.

**Risks:** U.S. and NZ resource requirements increased for the maintenance of the international rules-based order. This is mitigated by rescoping engagements and activities to be focused specifically on the safety and security of Southern Pacific partner nations.

**Mission Objective 2.3:** Strengthen public support for defense collaboration

**Justification:** Utilize traditional media and social media engagement to strengthen public support for U.S. military cooperation with New Zealand and activities in the region. Highlight benefits of defense cooperation and shared values, key military anniversaries, and joint military activities. Support and highlight military cooperation related to joint exercises, work with local
organizations to commemorate important anniversaries and events, strategically use our local USMC MSG force to build goodwill with the public, partner with key local NGOs, such as the Kapiti U.S. Marines Trust, to continue emphasizing our shared history and values related to World War II, and regularly message on humanitarian relief missions.

**Risks:** U.S. appears overbearing or not present in a manner that benefits partner nations, making it more difficult to conduct operations in support of national security objectives. This is mitigated by countering narratives that seek to undermine U.S. presence and security efforts in the region.

**Mission Goal 3:** Diversify the U.S.-New Zealand Economic Relationship

**Description and Linkages:** In addition, Mission New Zealand will need to serve as a broker between Administration policy on WTO, OECD, and other multilateral trade objectives – as well as the deployment of a global COVID-19 vaccine – in order to ensure New Zealand’s buy-in and best possible participation.

**Mission Objective 3.1:** Enhance the overall bilateral trade relationship

**Justification:** Mission New Zealand will be ambitious and push both the new government in New Zealand and Washington agencies to finalize an FTA in discussion for the last 70 years. This will require continued Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meetings, an initial Digital Trade Agreement, and close coordination to lay the groundwork and deliver the political will to move past parochial corporate interests to take into account geo-political interests, with an eye to building our network of alliances and partnerships.

**Risks:** No progress will lead New Zealand to greater reliance on China. Failed talks could anger the New Zealand public or lead to charges of U.S. protectionism and hypocrisy.

**Mission Objective 3.2:** Build key sectors for growth

**Justification:** With the goal of increasing New Zealand FDI into the United States and adding U.S. jobs, we will work to strengthen U.S.-New Zealand innovation economy ties – in tech, entertainment, and space – so that New Zealand continues to have the best market to diversify its economy away from the PRC and the United States remains the partner of choice in the innovation field. This includes the Space Framework Agreement and possible inclusion in the NASA Artemis Program, continued E1/E2 visa implementation, SelectUSA promotion, and helping build an ecosystem of investors and corporate collaborations. We will encourage New Zealand to consider a Milken or Davos-like conference for the region or the world to bring in private equity and showcase New Zealand as an open area for piloting new technology. In this, we will work with the New Zealand Consulate in Los Angeles and MFAT counterparts as well as the private sector across the Pacific. As circumstances allow, we also look to continued sales and interoperability in the defense sector. In addition, we look to opportunities for supply chain opportunities for US industry and diversify New Zealand’s supply chain options.
**Risks:** Unable to deliver on needed capital will lead New Zealand to turn to other regions. It could also lead to compromised IP for New Zealand businesses.

**Mission Objective 3.3:** Increase Awareness Across the New Zealand and Pacific Business Communities of New Kinds of Commercial and Economic Threats

**Justification:** Encourage further awareness among New Zealand business, academics, and civil society on the dangers of IP theft, tech transfer, supply chain risk, and cyber intrusion. Partner with New Zealand on protecting Pacific Island nations from IP theft, cyber intrusion, and dependence on unsecure networks. This includes working with New Zealand to promote good governance and fight corruption and elite capture across the Pacific in line with the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

**Risks:** Overly intrusive USG action could be deemed interference by GNZ or Pacific counterparts and/or alienate academics and others, burning bridges and outreach.

**Mission Goal 4:** Promote the United States as a Partner of Choice for New Zealand and the Pacific Region

**Description and Linkages:** The Mission will strengthen the perception of the United States as a valuable partner of choice with a shared history and a shared commitment to democratic values. By emphasizing our common regard for the protection of diversity, human rights, rule of law, and entrepreneurship, we will highlight the strength and depth of the U.S. partnership with New Zealand and the Pacific region. The Mission will build local and regional programming that targets audiences and use public engagement strategically. Mission programs will seek to increase public support for counter malign state program efforts and stronger Pacific region engagement by raising awareness of how authoritarian regimes flaunt international norms and do not share our values.

**Mission Objective 4.1:** Build Partnerships to Counter Disinformation and Malign State Influence

**Justification:** Working in concert with partners in government, civil society, and the media, Mission New Zealand seeks to raise awareness of disinformation as a global challenge we share and increase public support for counter malign state influence programs. The Mission will increase linkages with U.S. institutions and support increased training opportunities for partner institutions. By leveraging tools, including exchange programs, media reporting tours, access to USG officials, and media literacy programs, the Mission will raise awareness of the malign goals of authoritarian regimes in the region. Increased public support for countering state malign influence will increase New Zealand and the Pacific partnership in counter malign state actor action in the region and globally.

**Risks:** Failure to raise awareness of malign state influence as a global challenge and failure to fund opportunities to engage with the United States and other like-minded partners as an alternative could lead to further entrenchment and reliance on the programs and resources offered by authoritarian regimes in the region.
Mission Objective 4.2: Promote shared values and understanding of the United States as a valuable long-term partner

Justification: Mission New Zealand seeks to build long-term relationships and understanding based on our shared commitment to democratic values that stand in stark contrast to malign state actors who seek to increase their influence in the region. The targeted and focused support of a variety of public engagement programs including in tech, innovation, climate, and cultural endeavors in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands will tie into U.S. social values and highlight our shared belief in international norms and human rights. Programs will emphasize the strength of our history and relationship by promoting the mutual pursuit of common interests including in the fields of STEAM (Science Technology Engineering Arts Mathematics) and entrepreneurship, particularly in the innovation and startup field. The Mission will build upon and leverage USG education and exchange programs to highlight our commitment to New Zealand the Pacific region.

Risks: Failure to connect our people through our share democratic values could create space for authoritarian regimes to increase malign influence programs in the region.

4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1: Align financial, physical, and human resources to appropriately support Mission’s bilateral and regional support platform goals.

Justification:

Personnel

As USDH and local staff numbers from other agencies increase, the ICASS platform may need to expand to adequately support the resulting increased workload. Fortunately, over the last two years, the ICASS Council has approved several new staff positions, which has relieved some of the heavy workload some sections were experiencing. We need to keep a close eye on increased personnel resources needs. For example, we will likely need to expand the HR section and hire a part-time Voucher Examiner to keep up with workload. Consulate Auckland plans to hire a new position in ICASS to support Management functions.

We believe we have maintained a good and transparent line of communication among the local staff, Management, and the Front Office through monthly meetings with the LE Staff Committee, the Management Officer (MO), and the DCM. The Human Resources Officer (HRO) attends these meetings as needed. Outside of these meetings LE Staff and USDHs generally seem to be able to share concerns. The LE Staff have received three salary increases over the last three years which has improved the number and experience of applicants for our positions, and increased satisfaction in working for the Mission. In the unfortunate potential unfortunate situation that salary increases stall in the future, this may again become a bone of contention for LE Staff. HR has worked closely with Global Talent Management (GTM) in Washington to improve certain benefits in the Local Compensation Plan (LCP), in line with local comparators, and we have just implemented an improvement in our benefits surrounding
parental leave. Post was recently offered a new USDH Financial Management Officer (FMO) position which we declined due to our highly experienced and competent LE Staff FMO Specialist who has recently completed two years in the position after serving 12 years in the FMO office (saving the U.S. taxpayer approximately $500,000/year).

On the USDH side, COVID-19 caused significant disruptions in bringing our diplomats, A&T, and TDY staff to post. Through excellent relations with MFAT and Washington, we have managed to develop a standardized process to allow our staff to enter the country, even while borders are closed to most foreigners, while adhering to local laws, the Vienna Convention, and DOS guidance. Now we need to focus on how to bring non-diplomats, equipment, and material into the country while working with our interlocutors. We must maintain this excellent relationship based on trust and transparency, and if there is a major spike in COVID-19, this may regress. Separately, Consulate Auckland is assessing whether they need an A/RSO position.

Post has reached out to the few USDH and LE Staff located in Christchurch so there is a little more communication than there had been.

Post has codified support and assistance provided by Mission New Zealand to Embassy Apia though a recently completed MOU.

**Physical Infrastructure**

Within the Mission, we plan on modernize the existing IT infrastructure to meet the demands of a mobile workforce. This includes implementation of enterprise Wi-Fi and the replacement of the legacy telephone infrastructure to support mobility and flexibility of the workforce. The embassy has a request out to Overseas Building Operations (OBO) to upgrade our HVAC system, which requires TDYers to come to Post to design, so has been put on hold due to COVID-19.

Regarding external facilities, Post recently purchased three apartment units in the Central Business District to diversity the locations of our Government Owned properties, and sold one of the houses in a suburb to continue to diversity the stock. Post is also working with OBO to actively pursue the purchase of a new property to become the new Marine Security Guard Residence (MSGR). The current MSGR is leased, and the detachment has outgrown it. The six-year seismic retrofit project was completed this year to the relief of all staff.

In Consulate Auckland, the Management staff are working with OBO to identify a new property to purchase as the Consul General’s Residence (CGR).Consulate Auckland continues to weigh the merits and challenges of building out a safe haven in the office, and was recently approached by OBO regarding potentially finding a location for a new consulate compound (NCC). Consulate Auckland continues to address increased staff footprint by renovating its existing space, ensuring costs are borne by the appropriate offices.

**Risks:** COVID-19 – With the uncertainty surrounding the virus, extra time and care must be taken to ensure proper documentation of every incoming traveler. If/when requirements increase, or GNZ alert levels change, a tremendous amount of time must be expended to follow up. Furthermore, alert levels
affect diplomatic pouch (classified and unclassified) and mail operations. If USG spending decreases due to increased debt, that might affect Mission operations.

Growth of embassy personnel – while not a risk, Management must ensure adequate resources (physical, human, and financial) are available to support new staff, including following up with agencies and sections to obtain funding.

Although the embassy has been upgraded to address seismic risk, any large earthquake (Wellington) or volcano activity (Auckland) may affect operations.