Integrated Country Strategy

Poland
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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Poland is a staunch U.S. ally. Our relationship is founded on shared democratic values, cultural affinities, and growing economic ties. In the period 2018-2021, the United States will support Poland’s ambition of becoming a top-tier NATO partner and a strong voice within the European Union favoring Trans-Atlantic values. The United States’ priorities in Poland are to: 1) intensify our security cooperation; 2) increase our trade and investment with Poland, with particular focus on increased energy diversification and security; 3) reaffirm the need to uphold common democratic values and strong democratic institutions; and 4) secure the future of our relationship by strengthening people-to-people ties between our countries.

Since Poland threw off the shackles of communism in 1989, the United States has led efforts to integrate Poland into Euro-Atlantic structures and to support its efforts to defend itself. Poland is a NATO Ally and has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in Afghanistan and Iraq. Poland is in the midst of a multi-year, USD 133 billion military modernization process, and is one of only a handful of Allies meeting NATO guidelines to spend two percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of defense spending on modernizing equipment and infrastructure. Since January 2017, a rotational U.S. Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) on a regional deployment has been headquartered in western Poland. A U.S. battalion leads NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) deployment in northeastern Poland. Demonstrating its willingness to invest in its security, Poland in 2018 offered to spend USD 2 billion to support a permanent American troop presence in Poland. In 2019, the United States and Poland broadly agreed on the nature of a rotational presence to include an expanded U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force presence. In 2020, the United States and Poland mapped a way forward on further bilateral security cooperation and set the conditions for an enduring U.S. military presence. The U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which entered into force November 13, 2020, establishes a detailed framework for the future U.S. military presence in Poland and lays out burden-sharing support Poland will provide to U.S. forces. The agreement will enable both greater flexibility in U.S. troop deployments and the ongoing move of the V Corps Headquarters-Forward to Poznan in 2021. In early 2018, Poland signed a USD 4.63 billion letter of acceptance for the first phase of a two-phase purchase of the PATRIOT air and missile defense system – its largest military procurement ever. Shortly afterward, in 2019, Poland signed a USD 417 million letter of offer and acceptance for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). In early 2020, Poland again demonstrated its commitment to security by signing a USD 4.587 billion letter of offer and acceptance for 32 F-35 fighter aircraft. In 2022, the Aegis Ashore missile defense site in northern Poland is scheduled to reach operational status. Poland’s leadership in defending NATO’s Eastern Flank will also allow the Polish military to take on greater responsibility confronting other global priorities in other theaters, including select Special Operations Forces (SOF) contributions to U.S. and Alliance efforts.

Our bilateral engagement with Poland’s security and law enforcement bodies will continue to focus on counterterrorism, border security, transnational organized crime, and combating cyber threats. Poland’s cyber capacity is growing, and will help improve the Polish government’s nascent preparedness for potential domestic and transient attacks. Enhanced cooperation in these areas between our two countries will address traditional and emerging criminal threats.

Our economic relationship with Poland is positive, but not yet as deep or comprehensive as our security ties. Trade has increased significantly in recent years and Poland is on the cusp of joining the G20. As of 2019, Poland is now our 39th trading partner (up from 54th only a few years ago). The United States is Poland’s top non-EU investor; U.S. exports to Poland are at an all-time high; opportunities abound, particularly as Poland seeks to demonstrate its close U.S. ties and reduce overreliance on EU trade. Mission Poland intends to leverage Poland’s leadership in the Three Seas Initiative to increase U.S. exports and investments. We will also use private sector partnerships and government outreach to help

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expand both traditional export sectors and investment in key growth sectors, namely defense, energy, digital technologies, and agriculture. Encouraging Polish investment in the United States, currently approaching one billion dollars, is another notable opportunity to promote our prosperity. We will also push to ensure a stable and predictable business climate and advocate strongly for American companies facing challenges.

Energy security is national security and the United States is committed to partnering in all aspects of Poland’s quest to diversify its sources and suppliers of energy and to contribute to Europe’s overall energy security. The United States is well positioned to support Poland across the entire spectrum of energy solutions. Diplomatically, we will work with Poland through our strategic energy dialogue to support initiatives within the EU and elsewhere that advance European energy security. Commercially, the Embassy will continue to support the U.S.-Polish cooperation on nuclear power and American exports of renewable energy technologies as well as Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to Poland. We will also continue to encourage cross-investments between Polish and American energy firms as a way to reinforce our common strategic objectives.

Poles traditionally have strong affection for the United States stemming from centuries-long cultural ties and shared worldviews. But we cannot be complacent; Poles now coming of age have no personal recollection of the U.S. role in Poland’s history and its democratic transition. To preserve our soft power, we will further develop our people-to-people ties - especially engaging youth and women - and those who may be more focused on the EU or more skeptical of the status quo (including the U.S.-Polish relationship). Beginning in 2020, the Mission has focused on the start of the second century of diplomatic relations with Poland by building relationships with younger Polish generations, and expanding people-to-people exchanges throughout Poland and at all levels of society. We will continue doing this by focusing on that generation’s priorities, including promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation.

The next three years will be critical in determining the future of Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. partnership with Poland can serve as a force to shape these developments to maximize the benefits to America’s security and prosperity.

### 2. Mission Strategic Framework

**Mission Goal 1:** Poland is prepared for and actively engages on global and regional security challenges.

**Mission Objective 1.1:** Poland and the United States deepen bilateral military and security cooperation through a military modernization process that builds a capable, interoperable, and deployable force that successfully deters aggression and participates in out-of-area operations.

**Mission Objective 1.2:** Poland’s civilian, security and law enforcement bodies engage with the United States and other partners to address cyber threats, disinformation, counterterrorism, border security, export control and proliferation, counter-narcotics, and transnational organized crime.

**Mission Goal 2:** Poland’s economic development is environmentally sustainable, well-balanced, expanding, and contributes to U.S. economic growth and prosperity.

**Mission Objective 2.1:** Increase bilateral trade and investment by promoting U.S. commercial interests and opportunities in Poland and removing barriers to doing business.
Mission Objective 2.2: Facilitate and encourage legitimate travel to the United States to expand and deepen Polish-American economic, cultural, social, and educational ties.

Mission Objective 2.3: Strengthen Poland’s commitment to more secure, more diverse, and cleaner energy sources for Poland and the EU.

Mission Goal 3: Poland continues to respect the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, media, and other democratic institutions at home; uses its transition experience to promote democracy abroad; and shows greater respect for and acceptance of minorities and socially marginalized groups within its borders.

Mission Objective 3.1: Effectively engage with the Polish government to maintain respect for rule of law and the independence of courts and judges; protect space for journalists, academics, and non-governmental organizations to operate free of government interference or pressure.

Mission Objective 3.2: Enhance Poland’s capability to fulfill democracy promotion programs abroad.

Mission Objective 3.3: Polish society shows greater respect for and acceptance of minority groups.

Mission Goal 4: Poles understand and value the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship, including the people-to-people ties at the foundation of the U.S.-Poland alliance.

Mission Objective 4.1: More Poles participate in programs entailing the exchange of people, ideas, and culture with Americans.

Mission Objective 4.2: Mission programs and activities reach more young Poles with products and services meeting their needs and interests.

Mission Goal 5: The Mission provides high-quality consular services to American citizens and collaborates closely with the American community and U.S. companies to advance shared goals.

Mission Objective 5.1: The Mission protects and supports the welfare and interests of American citizens living in or visiting Poland and collaborates closely with the American community and U.S. companies in Poland to advance shared interests.

Management Objective 1: The management platform is sufficient in size, structure, and expertise to fully support the Mission and enable goal accomplishment.

Management Objective 2: The Mission’s facilities and housing are safe, secure, and adequate. The status of the American School of Warsaw (ASW) and International School of Krakow (ISK) is finalized with the Government of Poland, ensuring Mission children have access to top-notch education for years to come.
3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1: Poland is prepared for and actively engages on global and regional security challenges.

Description and Linkages:

This goal reflects the 2017 National Security Strategy pillars 1 and 3, to protect American people, homeland, and way of life, and to preserve peace through strength. It also supports the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 1, Objectives 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4. This goal also supports the 2019 EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan. Consistent with the National Security Strategy, State, and EUR Regional Strategies, the Mission will continue to work with Poland – an important NATO ally that meets NATO guidelines to spend two percent of GDP and 20 percent of defense spending on modernizing equipment and infrastructure – to support its military modernization efforts so that Poland will become an even more effective partner in addressing global and regional security challenges.

Mission Objective 1.1: Poland and the United States deepen bilateral military and security cooperation through a military modernization process that builds a capable, interoperable, and deployable force to successfully deter aggression and participate in out-of-area operations.

Justification:

Security remains a fundamental pillar of our bilateral relationship and is an area where we have made great strides over the past thirty years. In response to Russian aggression, at the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit the United States declared it would serve as the framework nation for the NATO multinational Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle group in Poland, a commitment it is now fulfilling with the contribution of a light-armored battalion. Additionally, the United States in 2016 committed to a bilateral deployment to Poland consisting of heel-to-toe persistent rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The U.S. Army also moved its Infantry Division Mission Command Element from Germany to Poznan to support U.S. Army deployments to Poland and movement throughout the region. Starting in 2017, the 143rd Combat Sustainment Support Brigade and Combat Aviation Brigade also rotate troops and equipment at Powidz airbase in support of Atlantic Resolve in Poland and throughout the eastern flank. In 2018, the U.S. Air Force deployed U.S. Detachment 2/52nd Operations Group (DET2) to Miroslawiec Air Base to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft flights. Since 2012, U.S. Detachment 1/52nd Operations Group has been stationed in Poland on an enduring basis to support quarterly rotations of F-16s and C-130 aircraft to train with Polish Air Forces. The U.S. Navy is overseeing the construction of a U.S. missile interceptor base at Redzikowo as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that will accommodate upwards of 200 additional U.S. personnel. In June and September 2019, Presidents Trump and Duda signed joint declarations on defense cooperation to increase the U.S. military presence in Poland by approximately 1,000 troops. The two leaders agreed to establish a Combat Training Center for joint use in Drawsko Pomorskie, a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance squadron in Lask, an aerial port of debarkation in Wroclaw-Strachowicz, additional U.S. Special Operations Forces in Lubliniec. The agreements also upgraded the Mission Control Element in Poznan to a Division Headquarters (Forward) and established an area support group in Poznan to support current and future U.S. forces in Poland. Our increased military presence in Poland will provide opportunities for new and
innovative bilateral training engagements that can increase Polish military effectiveness and NATO interoperability.

On November 13, 2020 the U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into force. The agreement establishes a detailed framework for the future U.S. military presence in Poland and lays out burden-sharing support Poland will provide to U.S. forces. The agreement will enable both greater flexibility in U.S. troop deployments and the ongoing move of the V Corps Headquarters-Forward to Poznan in 2021. The EDCA’s core articles set out the legal, regulatory, and logistical conditions for U.S. forces in Poland. The Agreement lays out facilities the two countries have agreed either will or could host U.S. forces and equipment and the burden-sharing support Poland agrees to provide for the U.S. presence in the form of infrastructure and logistics support. Most U.S. troop increases expected in Poland after the EDCA’s entry into force depend on the completion of infrastructure for two projects: the U.S. Air Force MQ-9 drone squadron at Lask and the Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) in Wroclaw. Construction of these facilities will be a multi-year process. Meanwhile, 30 personnel of V Corps established the Forward Command Post in Poznan on November 20, 2020. V Corps will staff its forward headquarters with approximately 200 personnel on a rotational basis. The V Corps Headquarters will conduct operational planning, mission command, and oversight of U.S. rotational forces in Europe. Negotiations between Poland and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) on the EDCA’s implementing arrangements began in February 2021.

Meanwhile, Poland’s military is emerging from a Cold War-era army based on conscription to a modern, agile, and professional all-volunteer force capable of expeditionary missions as well as conventional operations. Poland’s military gained valuable experience first in Iraq and later in Afghanistan. Poland is committed to continued presence in Afghanistan in support of Resolute Support Mission (RSM). In particular, Poland’s Special Operations Forces have proven to be world-class and highly interoperable with their U.S. counterparts. Continuing and expanding partnerships and training between Polish Special Operations Forces will pay long-term dividends as it will enable Poland to successfully participate in out-of-area operations and support bilateral objectives.

Poland is several years into a military modernization process to create a larger, more capable, and flexible 21st century military force. In February 2019, the government updated its modernization plan to spend more than USD 130 billion from 2021-2035. In addition, national law now mandates that Poland allocate two percent of its GDP to defense spending, and reach two and a half percent by 2030. Using our bilateral policy mechanisms, like the High-Level Defense Group and U.S. European Command -led Joint Commission, we can leverage opportunities to advise and provide expertise to guide and prioritize Poland’s military modernization process. A more capable Polish military partner will help the United States realize our foreign and security policy priorities within the broader NATO Alliance and will continue to contribute to success in combating global and regional security threats.

Mission Objective 1.2: Poland’s civilian, security and law enforcement bodies engage with the United States and other partners to address cyber threats, disinformation, counterterrorism, border security, export control and proliferation, counter-narcotics, and transnational organized crime.

Justification:

Poland is an important partner on regional security and law enforcement issues. Significant U.S. capacity building efforts have helped Poland develop professional services capable of combating security threats.
As these services continue to mature, opportunities exist for greater operational cooperation with the United States.

Polish security services have identified cyber capabilities as their greatest need and opportunities exist to support development of this area. Terrorists and other actors increasingly utilize cyber systems for recruitment, communication, and to facilitate organized criminal activity. U.S. efforts to build Polish cyber capacity will increase cooperation and support investigative activity and information sharing on multiple domestic and transnational threats.

As Poland grapples with how to create a 5G network free of threats and challenges, they will benefit from U.S. knowledge and expertise. Poland's signing of a 5G joint declaration with the United States shows a strong willingness to partner with the United States and highlights the potential for greater government cooperation.

Under the auspices of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the Ministry of the Interior and Administration and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Poland Concerning Cooperation to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material signed 8 January 2009, the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program strengthens Poland’s capabilities to deter, detect, and investigate the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials by providing the expertise and tools needed to respond to smuggling events.

Malign Russian and Chinese influence and disinformation in Poland is a growing threat, and cooperation to counter this malign influence benefits the U.S. and Polish governments. As Polish need for, and U.S. funding to support, additional U.S. training for Polish law enforcement and security services declines, we recognize the opportunity to encourage the Polish services to take a leadership role throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Polish agencies have expressed an interest in participating in training exchanges, which serve the dual purposes of increasing Poland’s capacity and enhancing regional security.

Nearly all Polish mainstream political actors agree that the U.S.-Poland relationship is the bedrock of Poland’s foreign policy, a sentiment mirrored widely throughout Polish society. Poland concluded its non-permanent membership on the UN Security Council in 2019, where it regularly supported U.S. positions. In February 2019, the Secretary of State co-hosted with his Polish counterpart in Warsaw a ministerial on Middle East peace launching the Warsaw Process and illustrating that Poland is willing to step up and take greater leadership roles in Europe and beyond. The Vice President and Polish Prime Minister signed a joint declaration on using trusted vendors in 5G networks in September 2019, becoming a model for other European partners. Poland continues to lead on support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in light of Russian aggression and has approached the Chinese presence in Europe with a healthy dose of skepticism, while actively pushing back on Xi Jinping thought. We will work closely with the Polish government to ensure their continued support for U.S.-supported candidates to international organizations, the U.S.-proposed Middle East Peace plan, stabilization of Syria, support of democratization in Belarus and Venezuela, North Korea and Russia sanctions, human rights policy and humanitarian assistance.
Mission Goal 2: Poland’s economic development is environmentally sustainable, well-balanced, expanding, and contributes to U.S. economic growth and prosperity.

Description and Linkages:

This goal reflects the second Pillar of the 2017 National Security Strategy, to promote American prosperity. It also supports the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 2, Objectives 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, and the EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan 2015-2018 Goal 4. Consistent with the National Security Strategy, State and EUR Regional Strategies, the Mission will promote American prosperity by promoting increased exports to Poland and supporting U.S. business to ensure a level playing field and fair access for all U.S. exports and investors as well as promoting Polish investment in the United States.

Mission Objective 2.1: Increase bilateral trade and investment by promoting U.S. commercial interests and opportunities in Poland and removing barriers to doing business.

Justification:

Poland is one of the 25 largest economies in the world, but it is the 44th largest export market for the United States as of the end of 2017, and its foreign direct investment in the United States, though growing, has greater potential. Poland’s real GDP growth over the last decade has averaged 3.6% annually, including by 4.6% in 2017. The size of the Polish market and Poland's strong desire to reduce its reliance on EU partners by expanding commercial relations outside of the EU represent a substantial opportunity for the United States to increase its trade and investment relationship with Poland. The bilateral trade relationship continues to break records annually, with more than USD 14 billion in two-way trade in goods in 2019.

Combining the tools of State Department economic statecraft with those of the Foreign Commercial Service and Foreign Agricultural Service (including matchmaking services, trade missions, corporate promotional events, international buyer programs, and tailored market research), the Mission will pursue the objectives of the President's National Security Strategy and continue to significantly grow U.S. exports to Poland. (Note: In 2019, Mission Poland was a runner-up for the Benjamin Joy Award for collaboration between the Departments of State and Commerce on export promotion.) Achieving this goal will require increases in traditional U.S. exports as well as a focus on the key growth export sectors including defense, information technology, infrastructure, energy, smart cities solutions, food products, and energy efficient building products and technologies. We will advocate for agricultural trade and regulatory policies which are transparent, science-based, and consistent with international obligations. We will deepen cooperation with Poland’s private sector, particularly as a way to promote women innovators and entrepreneurs, in order to ensure Poland is developing new markets for U.S. investment and exports. We will employ the SelectUSA program to showcase the United States as an attractive investment destination for the Polish private sector. We will develop our relationship with Polish ministries, agencies, local governments, and business organizations not only as partners in promoting increased trade and investment, but also in order to ensure that the Polish government will address issues of market access and impediments to doing business. We will also take advantage of Poland’s membership in the Three Seas Initiative, which comprises 12 central and eastern European member states of the EU to strengthen north-south investment and economic connectivity, and which provides opportunities for U.S. exports and investment in cross-border infrastructure and service contracts.
Mission Objective 2.2: Facilitate and encourage legitimate travel to the United States to foster Polish-American economic, cultural, social, and educational ties.

Justification:

On November 11, 2019, Poland became the 39th member of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. It is now possible for Polish tourist and business travelers to travel to the United States without visas for periods of up to 90 days. Poland’s entry into the program removed a long-standing irritant in bilateral relations—something the Poles complained about at all levels of engagement for many years.

Poland’s entry into the Visa Waiver Program presents opportunities to increase travel, tourism, and investment in the United States. The Mission will continue efforts to promote travel under the program, increase people-to-people ties through targeted campaigns, and to help Poles, in the first full year of membership, understand the do’s and don’ts of visa-free travel.

To those Poles who still require visas to travel to the United States (such as students, exchange visitors, academic researchers, performers) the Mission will maintain a high level of service and maintain low wait times.

Mission Objective 2.3: Strengthen Poland’s commitment to cleaner, more secure, and more diverse energy sources for Poland and the EU.

Justification:

Poland needs to diversify its energy mix in order to improve energy security as well as to provide for a cleaner environment (a growing priority for the Polish government due to increasing pressure from the European Union and Poles’ increasing concern over smog). Poland’s investments in innovative energy technologies such as nuclear power, energy efficiency, renewable energy (especially offshore wind), LNG, and cleaner coal could provide more secure energy sources. Poland’s potential partnership with the U.S. to develop large-scale nuclear power plants with U.S. technology could result in $40 billions of dollars in U.S. exports and strategically tie our two countries even more tightly together over the coming century. The U.S. is already expected to be a major supplier of offshore wind technology, and U.S. solar companies are coming increasing closer to competing with Chinese suppliers. The successful delivery of U.S. LNG to the Polish LNG port at Swinoujscie as well as the 2018 signing of multiple long-term contracts for U.S.-sourced LNG represents a new energy relationship. In order to meet its security and environmental objectives, Poland is trying to improve energy efficiency, increase the transparency of energy markets, integrate more fully into the European energy network (including Harmony Link with the Baltic countries), and diversify its suppliers and the routes that energy sources take to market.

American energy companies and academic and research institutions, as well as other USG entities, including the Department of Energy and its network of laboratory facilities, can leverage our support in the research, development, and deployment of diversified and efficient energy to increase Poland’s (and NATO’s) energy security, as well as reduce problems caused by air pollution that can weaken our largest ally on NATO’s eastern flank.
Mission Goal 3: Poland respects the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, media, and other democratic institutions at home; uses its transition experience to promote democracy abroad; and shows greater respect for and acceptance of minorities and socially marginalized groups within its borders.

Description and Linkages:

This goal reflects all four of the 2017 National Security Strategy Pillars as Poland’s commitment to the rule of law and democratic institutions will functionally influence its ability to be a reliable security partner and desirable market for U.S. exports and investments. It also supports the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 1, Objectives 1.3, and Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4. This goal also supports the 2019 EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan Goal 3, Objectives 3.2 and 3.3, and Goal 4, Objectives 4.1 and 4.5. Consistent with the National Security Strategy, the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan and the EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan 2015-2018 objectives, the mission will continue to engage Poland in protecting and strengthening democratic institutions so that Poland can be an effective security partner, an attractive market destination for U.S. exports and investments, and an advocate for the continued strengthening of the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Mission Objective 3.1: Effectively encourage the Polish government to maintain respect for rule of law and the independence of courts and judges; protect space for journalists and non-governmental organizations to operate free of government interference or pressure.

Justification:

In December 2017, the European Commission launched Article 7 proceedings against Poland, related to concerns about rule of law and Poland’s judicial reform efforts. On July 2, 2018, the European Commission started infringement proceedings against Poland related to its revised Supreme Court law. Additional infringement proceedings were launched in 2019 and 2020 regarding changes to the disciplinary procedures for judges and a “Muzzle Law” that restricts judges’ freedom of expression and association. The government argues the changes are necessary to depoliticize the judiciary and improve judicial efficiency. The political opposition, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Venice Commission, some legal experts, and some NGOs argue the changes amount to political control of the judiciary. The parliament also passed a law that allowed the government to select directly the heads of public media. Members of the opposition and some members of civil society say that public media is now totally controlled by the government and is no longer credible.

The government has also adopted an “extraordinary appeals” mechanism allowing for final decisions made over the past 20 years to be reversed in cases of alleged grave injustice. The government argues that this is a social justice measure. International organizations such as the European Commission and the Venice Commission, as well as many legal experts, view this as a significant threat to the integrity of the justice system. The newly created Urgent Appeals Chamber will also hear all election law challenges. The political opposition and some legal experts maintain that the chamber could be vulnerable to political influence in resolving future election disputes. In February 2020, the government adopted a new law that would allow judges to be removed for questioning the legitimacy of other judges and instituted new appointment procedures for the Supreme Court Chief Justice.
The government’s actions on the judiciary, as well in areas of media freedom and freedom of expression, have raised concerns about its commitment to judicial independence, democratic institutions, and separation of powers. In 2018, the government passed amendments to the Institute of National Remembrance law expanding the actors allowed to bring civil suits for alleged defamation of the Polish state or nation. Organizations such as Yad Vashem have said the provisions could have a chilling effect on historical debate and research related to the Holocaust and World War II. The Mission will work to help Poland continue its strong history of success with democratic institutions, rule of law, and media freedom, as a NATO ally and a democratic, economic example for Europe and the world.

Mission Objective 3.2: Enhance Poland’s capability to fulfill democracy promotion programs abroad.

Justification:

Poland is seeking to export the model of its own democratic transformation success story. In this effort, Poland has played a strong role in focusing the EU’s attention on the Eastern Neighborhood. We will support Poland’s efforts to integrate these Eastern neighbors into EU structures and assist them in their democratic transitions. We will encourage Poland to develop its youth and education exchange programs with Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine as a means to promote understanding and foster the development of civil society. We will seek to leverage U.S. and Polish development assistance funding and encourage further bilateral cooperation on democracy and rule of law promotion within Eastern Partnership countries by actively encouraging the Polish MFA to sponsor projects under the Emerging Donor Challenge Fund. We will work with the Polish government on programs to counter Russian disinformation campaigns that undermine the political will and personal European aspirations of Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and other peoples in the former Soviet Union, and support efforts to strengthen a more pluralist, unbiased and independent Russian language media environment in the region.

We will encourage Poland to help lead the Warsaw-based Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies (CoD) as it further defines its mission and seeks out stable funding sources. The Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the newly formed European Endowment for Democracy will be important external partners.

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<th>KEY ACTIVITY</th>
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<th>DATE</th>
<th>INDICATORS/MILESTONES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working with Solidarity Fund PL, Poland and the United States jointly fund projects for Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.</td>
<td>EXEC, PAS, POL, ECON</td>
<td>2020-2022</td>
<td>Poland continues support of Eastern Partnership projects and diversifies their areas of implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate closely with Poland on our Belarus engagement strategy to implement joint projects using the Donor Cooperation Partnership (DCP), formerly known as the Emerging Donor Challenge Program.</td>
<td>POL, ECON, PAS</td>
<td>2020-2022</td>
<td>The United States supports</td>
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<td>KEY ACTIVITY</td>
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<td>one Belarus-focused DCP project jointly with Solidarity Fund PL.</td>
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<td>The United States supports two Belarus-focused projects out of PAS funded by EUR/ACE and continues English Language programming with Belarus House.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland sponsors at least two Emerging Donor Challenge Fund projects in Belarus by 2022.</td>
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**Mission Objective 3.3: Polish society shows greater respect for, and acceptance of, minority groups.**

**Justification:**

For the vast majority of its history, Poland has been home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities, including Germans, Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Roma, and Jews. The Second World War and the Holocaust resulted in the near extermination of over one thousand years of Jewish life and the near annihilation of Roma. The ensuing post-war changes in Polish borders culminated in the expulsion of Germans and the movement, and in some cases removal, of entire ethnic populations. The end result was a nation and a society almost completely ethnically and religiously homogenous.

As Poland emerged from communism, Polish society was forced to confront painful chapters of WWII history in order to completely transition to a democratic system of governance which respected the rights of all its citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual orientation/identity. In recent years, new minority ethnic groups, such as Ukrainians, Chechens, East and South Asians, and Africans, have made Poland their home. While legal frameworks exist to protect minority groups, in practice these
groups are not always protected as intended under the law. Following the adoption of amendments to the IPN law in 2018, the level of anti-Semitic speech in mainstream media rose significantly. Before and after the 2019 European parliamentary and national parliamentary election campaigns, there was also language in media targeting the LGBT community. How Poland learns to tolerate, understand, accept, and respect all these groups, both new and old, is essential to not only overcoming past grievances, but fully transitioning to a society where all its members are treated without bias, prejudice, or hate. A country secure with its identity and comfortable with diversity is more resilient and a better partner.

**Mission Goal 4: Poles understand and value the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship, including the people-to-people ties at the foundation of the U.S.-Poland alliance.**

**Description and Linkages:**

This goal reflects Pillar 1 of the 2017 National Security Strategy. It also supports the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 2, Objectives 2.2, Goal 3, Objectives 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. This goal also supports the 2019 EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan, Goal 3, Objectives 3.2 and 3.3, and Goal 4, Objectives 4.1 and 4.5. The Mission will engage in a dynamic and strategic public diplomacy approach, communicating to the average Pole the benefits of supporting the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship.

**Mission Objective 4.1: More Poles participate in programs entailing the exchange of people, ideas, and culture with Americans.**

**Justification:**

As Poland has transitioned to a democratic and free market society, becoming a member of both NATO and the EU, its relationship to the United States has also evolved. While our deep historical ties and cooperation on security matters remain strong, most Poles, particularly those of the younger generation, have thought of themselves as a rising power within the framework of a united Europe. Although the importance of the country’s relationship with the United States is widely acknowledged, and positive views of the U.S.-Poland alliance have further solidified since the Russian occupation of parts of neighboring Ukraine, Poles are far more likely to visit, study in, trade with, and identify with their EU partners than the United States. As well as helping to build Polish infrastructure, the EU has also invested heavily in education and the cultural development of Poland, including through exchange programs. Most significantly, Poles have the right to live and work in other EU countries. About two million are currently doing so.

The United States nonetheless maintains a leading role in the estimation of Poles in the areas of culture, academics, trade, and technology. The success of American brands and technology is admired and emulated in Poland. American movies and television entertainment are enjoyed widely. American music, from pop to jazz to rhythm and blues and hip hop, can be heard everywhere. Exhibits by American artists are common at Polish museums and galleries. American sports are increasingly popular – American football is now the fastest-growing participant sport in Poland. The increasing percentage of Poles who speak English has also raised demand for American authors, magazines, and websites – and for direct communication with Americans engaged in all areas of academic, cultural, economic, and social endeavor.
While it is unlikely we will be in a position to compete with Poland’s European partners in terms of the level of financial investment in Poland, in the market of ideas and culture we still hold a significant comparative advantage. The Mission must capitalize on that advantage by increasing people-to-people exchange activities between Americans and Poles at all levels of society, and fighting disinformation attempts by malign actors designed to splinter the strong U.S.-Poland relationship. We intend to increase the number of U.S. speakers from within and outside the Mission, particularly leveraging U.S. troops in Poland as speakers, addressing topics such as the NATO alliance and deterrence, migration, cybersecurity, American culture, sports, and African-American History Month. We will also program speakers promoting inclusion of people with disabilities, addressing environmental issues in the context of entrepreneurship and innovation, energy security, and Polish-Jewish relations and acceptance. We will engage with a broad variety of audiences, including youth, at Polish schools and universities; NGO, media and business representatives; and government officials at all levels, and will particularly seek opportunities for two-way dialogue benefitting both our nations as we begin the second century of diplomatic relations with Poland in 2020. The Centennial of the Battle of Warsaw, Defender Europe 20, and the 75th Anniversary of the Liberation of Auschwitz are major opportunities to engage on these issues.

Mission Objective 4.2: Mission programs and activities reach more young Poles with products and services meeting their needs and interests.

Justification:

Unlike their parents, the younger generation of Poles has no personal recollection of the role the United States played in Poland’s transition from communism to democracy. Thanks to Poland’s EU membership and growing wealth, younger Poles are now more connected and integrated into Western Europe than ever before, although increasingly there is an urban/rural divide of EU support vs. increasing nationalism. The United States faces competition for the attention of this demographic group, which is more inclined to identify with the EU than with the United States. Attitudes and opinions of younger Poles are less formed than those of their elders, and influencing them represents a major opportunity for the United States. The Mission must engage and influence young Poles and emerging Polish leaders under 30 on subjects of their interest, while still underscoring respect for Polish history and accomplishments – particularly science and technology, important employment generators of the present and future – and encourage participation by more young leaders in exchange programs, cultural activities, alumni networks, educational opportunities, and other Mission efforts. We will continue to promote and expand Polish participation in the Summer Work Travel and Camp Counselor programs and to boost our significant presence on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other social media outlets where young Poles (and the opinion-makers who influence them) are increasingly active. The quality of our future relations with Poland will be influenced by the contact that Poland’s up-and-coming leaders in government, business, academia, culture, and civil society have with America and Americans during their youth and early professional life.

The United States is world-renowned for the quality of its institutions of higher education. Studying in the United States gives students the opportunity to experience America first-hand and develop a deeper appreciation for U.S. history and culture. Unfortunately, the number of Poles studying in the United States lags behind the European average. As members of the EU, Poles have more choices for quality education in Europe than they did in the past, often at a far lower cost than in the United States. Competition for Polish students is also getting tighter as the number of Poles aged 19-25 is steadily declining. We will seek to increase the number of Poles studying in the United States through our EducationUSA network of student advisors at the Fulbright Commission and at American Spaces across
Poland; through continued Mission participation in the best-attended student fairs; and by collaborating with educational institutions to develop new opportunities for Polish students. Both Poland’s growing participation in the flagship FLEX program, which sends top foreign high school students to the United States for a junior year of study, and the Polish government’s new grant program for exceptional graduate students, which pays for them to study at top-ranked international universities (26 out of 30 are American institutions), will provide new impetus for the Mission to expand its educational advising outreach to young Poles.

Mission Goal 5: The Mission provides high-quality consular services to American citizens and collaborates closely with the American community and U.S. companies to advance shared goals.

Description and Linkages:

This goal reflects Pillars 1 and 2 of the 2017 National Security Strategy. It also supports the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 1, Objective 1.3, and 1.5, Goal 2, Objectives 2.1, and 2.2, Goal 3, Objectives 3.3, and 3.4, and Goal 4, Objectives 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. This goal also supports the EUR, Joint Regional Strategy Plan 2015-2018, Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, and Goal 4, Objectives 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4. Consistent with the National Security Strategy and the State and EUR strategies, the Mission will utilize all Consular resources and activities to protect American citizens and advance U.S. interests in Poland.

Mission Objective 5.1: The Mission protects and supports the welfare and interests of American citizens living in or visiting Poland and collaborates closely with the American community and U.S. companies in Poland to advance shared interests.

Justification: The U.S. presence in Poland positively influences Poland’s economy, society, and culture. Thousands of successful, productive U.S. citizens live in Poland and contribute to Polish society. American businesses were among the first to enter Poland following the fall of communism and continue to expand, taking advantage of Warsaw’s central location to establish regional hubs for their worldwide brands. There is an opportunity to more effectively engage with and leverage the positive influence of U.S. citizens and businesses in Poland to achieve our goals relative to security, economic prosperity, democracy and human rights promotion, and, especially, helping Poles value their relationship with the United States.

By doing more to get to know the diverse American diaspora and business community throughout Poland and get them involved with Mission events and programs, we can better associate the United States with the great things private Americans are doing in Poland. By raising the profile of these American success stories, we can re-establish a perception among Poles, especially the younger generation, of the United States as a leader in opportunity, innovation, and freedom, which will make it easier to achieve our goals in our bilateral relationship with Poland.

Embassy Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow are prepared to provide American citizens the full range of routine and emergency consular services. Many of the estimated 38,000 long-term residents are older dual nationals. We continue to work with this aging U.S. citizen population to address tax issues and federal retirement benefits, with timely and efficient service for all applicants. Mission Poland’s large Federal Benefits Unit serves as a claims-taking hub for nine neighboring posts. We remain engaged to secure GoP cooperation to enforce return orders under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. We also work closely with GoP officials to improve and expedite the processing of U.S. extradition requests.

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Originally Approved: October 26, 2018
Reviewed and Updated: March 03, 2020; March 4, 2021
In June 2019, the United States and Poland signed an agreement to raise the rotational force of U.S. military personnel in Poland from 4,500 to 5,500. The increased troop presence will serve in several locations throughout Poland, including a division headquarters in Poznan, a new combat training center in northern Poland, and various NATO and Polish military installations.

Because this is a rotational force, the thousands of incoming U.S. troops will not have access to the full services that are offered on permanent U.S. bases, such as those in Germany. In addition, many of the incoming troops are young soldiers who are traveling outside of the United States for the first time, have never applied for a U.S. passport before, and require a range of citizenship services and assistance. The American Citizen Services Unit will ensure that the increased troop presence receives needed consular information and services.

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<td>Continue to liaise with the U.S. Army Forward Command and the Area Support Group in Poznan to arrange regular consular briefings for incoming U.S. troops. Ensure U.S. troops are able to access consular services at the Embassy in Warsaw, the Consulate in Krakow, and the Consular Agency in Poznan.</td>
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5. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1: The management section is sufficient in size, structure, and expertise to fully support the Mission and enable goal accomplishment.

Justification:

Mission Poland continues to grow to support the expanding bilateral relationship between Poland and the U.S. The Defense Attaché Office (DAO), Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Regional Affairs Office (RAO), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Embassy’s Health Unit have all expanded in the last two years or are in the process of expanding. Additionally, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have established offices in Warsaw, while the USAF Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) added two members to the Embassy team in 2020. Despite this growth in the customer base, however, the Mission’s Management staff—LES and USDAHs—has remained constant. In fact, Warsaw went from a three-USDH GSO section to a two-USDH section in 2014. We need to restore this third GSO position to serve this growing mission. Approximately one-third of the 50+ LES GSO section works out of an off-site warehouse (along with most of the Facilities Maintenance staff), without an on-site American officer to exercise oversight. Warsaw currently serves as a regional disposal hub for all of Europe, helping posts recoup money from auctions of excess/old furniture. These auctions occur quarterly and are time and labor-intensive. Without an additional American officer in GSO, post will reconsider this service and perhaps down-size its leased warehouse.

Post also needs to add another Management USDH to the 73-employee Consulate General in Krakow. Currently there is just one USDH leading the 22-LES Management section there. Similarly sized consulates (Milan, Naples, Munich, Recife, etc.) all have at least one additional American officer; some have two. The consulate is experiencing a growth in workload due to a new agency (DoD) and an increase in VIP visit support requirements. Lastly, our 03 Facility Manager is tasked with keeping two 60-year-old buildings running while managing a 40+ person staff, spread over two physical locations. The responsibility of this position, as well as the demands placed upon it, are commensurate with an 02 officer. The Facility Manager position should be upgraded.

Management Objective 2: The Mission’s facilities and housing are safe, secure, and adequate. The status of the American School of Warsaw (ASW) and International School of Krakow (ISK) is finalized with the Government of Poland, ensuring Mission children have access to top-notch education for years to come.

Justification:

Embassy Warsaw is in an ideal location within Poland’s capital, and though the Chancery building was built in 1963 and has many structural and space challenges, Warsaw is not scheduled for a NEC in the foreseeable future. Management faces the challenge of making the compound a secure, efficient, and environmentally sustainable area to work. Post will continue to work with OBO to obtain funding for needed improvements to both the chancery buildings and the aging USG-owned Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) and Deputy Chief of Mission Residence (DCR).

The same may be said for our Consulate General in Krakow, where work conditions are crowded and replete with occupational safety concerns.
The legal status of the American School of Warsaw and the International School of Krakow must be finalized with the Polish Government. Both schools continue to exist as they always have – essentially as a component of the U.S. diplomatic mission. This is an anachronistic status dating from the Communist era that the Polish government has challenged and wants to change. Reaching a final agreement on the school’s status will ensure that the school remains viable for the foreseeable future.