



**Report to Congress on  
Implementation of the New START Treaty  
Paragraph (a)(10) from Declaration (13) of Senate Executive Report 111-6  
accompanying the New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111-5)**

**NEW START TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT**

This report is transmitted in response to Condition (a)(10) of the December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the “New START Treaty”). The New START Treaty was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Condition (a)(10) of the New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification calls for the President to submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, providing:

(A) details on each Party’s reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year;

(B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;

(C) a certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or -

- (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and
- (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case;

(D) an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including -

- (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
- (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information; and

(E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated authority to submit the Report to the Secretary of State. On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. This Report is divided into sections covering each of the items listed in Condition (a)(10).

**A. Details on each Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms subject to the New START Treaty between January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2020.**

Below are each Party's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as of September 1, 2020, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties.

**NEW START TREATY  
AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS**

<b>Category of Data</b>	<b>United States of America</b>	<b>Russian Federation</b>
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<b>Deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Deployed Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Deployed Heavy Bombers</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>510</b>
<b>Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers</b>	<b>1,457</b>	<b>1,447</b>
<b>Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>764</b>

The New START Treaty obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their forces so that seven years after entry-into-force of the treaty, that is, by February 5, 2018, and for the remaining duration of the treaty, each Party's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as counted in accordance with the treaty do not exceed: 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

As of February 5, 2018, and continuing through 2020, the United States and the Russian Federation met the Article II central limits for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and counted-for deployed heavy bombers, and deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers. While remaining below the New START Treaty

central limits, the Russia Federation continued the modernization of its strategic forces in 2020. Russia's head of its Strategic Rocket Forces publicly said in December 2020 that the modernization of Russia's strategic missiles is now 81 percent complete as older systems are replaced with newer ones. Although the newer systems have greater warhead-carrying capacity, the Russian Federation is not fully loading new delivery systems with warheads and is, thus, remaining below the treaty limits.

**B. Certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation.**

Based on the information available as of December 31, 2020, the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty.

The United States has raised some implementation-related questions with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Discussions of these questions were ongoing as of December 31, 2020. The New START Treaty established the BCC to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the treaty. This confidential forum for resolving questions relating to implementation and compliance consists of members from both the United States and Russian Federation. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and the Russian Federation opted not to convene a BCC session in 2020; however, both sides continued to raise and address New START related implementation issues through diplomatic channels. For a detailed discussion of issues the United States has raised with the Russian Federation between January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2020, and updates on issues raised previously, please see the classified version of this Report.

**C. Certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or – (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case.**

During the course of this reporting period (January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020), no conversion or elimination procedures have been adopted pursuant to Article VI of the treaty and Part Three of the Protocol.

**D. An assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s transparency mechanisms, including – (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information.**

The New START Treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but no more than five per calendar year. The provisions of the New START Treaty’s Annex on Telemetric Information state that the Party conducting a launch of an ICBM or SLBM that it intends to consider for provision of telemetric information to the other Party shall, in a notification of such a launch, specify all frequencies and modulation methods to be used to broadcast telemetric information subject to provision to the other Party. The Party conducting such launches shall not take any measures to deny access to the telemetric signal broadcast, and shall not encrypt telemetric information that may be provided to the other Party.

Although BCC-XIX was not convened as planned in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the two sides agreed on March 30, 2020 through a decision signed by both BCC Commissioners to exchange, in 2020, telemetric information on one launch of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each Party during the period from January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019. That exchange was accomplished on May 29, 2020.

For an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s transparency mechanisms, please see the classified version of this Report.

**E. An assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.**

The United States does not currently assess that there is a strategic imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation. Both U.S. and Russian New START-accountable forces are below the central limits of the treaty. The United States continues to monitor the strategic implications of Russia’s development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms, and conducted discussions with Russia in 2020 about a potential commitment to cap and verify the number of

all Russian nuclear warheads at the existing level, whether those warheads are subject to New START limits or currently unconstrained by New START.

The United States also discussed with the Russian Federation the U.S. position that the People's Republic of China must be included in nuclear arms control, recognizing that China's unconstrained and rapid buildup of its nuclear and missile forces, which will likely more than double in the coming decade, will have growing implications for U.S. and Russian nuclear force planning, policies, and posture.