Functional Bureau Strategy

Bureau Of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

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Approved: January 18, 2022
1. Executive Statement and Mission Statement

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) is dedicated to revitalizing U.S. alliances and partnerships to prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts and address international security challenges as reflected in the FY2022-2026 DOS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). Through the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of verifiable arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, AVC seeks to counter and reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The Bureau’s role is prescribed in 22 U.S. Code § 2652c and detailed in 1 FAM 441.1. The Bureau contributes to the Department’s role in implementing the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and forthcoming National Security Strategy, as well as other relevant reviews and plans related to arms control, risk reduction, defense policy, and deterrence. Using the most current and effective scientific and technological tools, analysis, and expertise available, AVC brings to bear the best information and insights available to form new policies to reduce threats posed by WMD and to ensure stringent compliance with existing WMD-related agreements and commitments. Going forward, AVC will continue to build on cooperative arrangements and strong relationships throughout the Department, the Intelligence Community, the interagency, and the academic and scientific communities to address the threats posed by WMD and their systems of delivery and help protect Americans and American interests world-wide.

The AVC Bureau also hosts the National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NNRRC), which was renamed pursuant to National Security Presidential Memorandum-34 to reflect its expanded mandate. The NNRRC provides 24/7/365 secure communication notification linkages with over 50 international partners on issues ranging from nuclear and conventional arms control, ballistic missile launch notifications, chemical weapons destruction, and international cyber incidents.

It is critical to U.S. national security to ensure that the obligations and commitments contained in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments are clear and verifiable, that their terms are fully met, and that effective steps are taken to induce countries to return to compliance when this is not the case.

Failure to address the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems would jeopardize the security of the American people, as well as our allies and partners around the world. Additionally, failure to address compliance and adherence concerns with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments weakens established global norms in these areas, may erode U.S. and allies’ security, and would lead to greater instability. For all these reasons, it is critical to ensure that AVC is fully funded to meet our national security requirements.
While fulfilling all its functions, the Bureau will also prioritize efforts to broaden public engagement, diversify its staff, and advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, in accordance with its obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325.

As reflected in the JSP’s Strategic Objective 1.4 on Peace and Security, the AVC Bureau addresses the security challenges of today and tomorrow, by promoting international security cooperation and a rules-based international order. In this regard, the Bureau contributes to strategic stability by leading the Department’s efforts to negotiate, conclude, and verify arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. The Bureau also supports the Department’s work to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives, develop shared understandings of security threats and deterrence policies, build the capability and willingness to address common threats, and lead with our allies and partners to address emerging security threats, including by bolstering security in outer space.

The Bureau’s primary Goal: **Pursue and Strengthen Verifiable Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments to Bolster U.S. National Security**, aligns with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance goal of re-establishing U.S. credibility as a leader in arms control. Addressing the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and the severe challenges posed by chemical, biological, conventional, space, and emerging threats is essential to the safety and well-being of the American people and our allies. The Bureau supports U.S. efforts to engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on a range of emerging military technological developments that affect strategic stability and, where appropriate, pursue new arms control arrangements or confidence-and-security-building measures that strengthen transparency of military activities and increase stability. In that process, the Bureau will also develop effective verification tools that confirm that countries are complying with agreements and commitments and inform policy options to ensure that instances of non-compliance do not damage U.S. national security, including through support of novel verification technology studies to enhance monitoring of future arms control initiatives. AVC will also work to hold countries accountable for violations of their arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, including through the publication of the Congressionally-mandated Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, and by working to bring non-compliant countries back into compliance. AVC will also coordinate U.S. interagency activities in support of these efforts, including preparation for arms control delegations.

The Bureau’s second Goal: **Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships to Minimize WMD Threats**. As outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, diplomacy should be one of the leading instruments of American foreign policy. As such, AVC will strengthen consultations with allies and partners to develop shared understandings of the security environment and better
deter adversary aggression to assure allies and partners of continuing U.S. security commitments, and to enhance cooperation on WMD defenses and risk reduction. The Bureau serves as the Department’s focal point for cross-agency development and implementation of U.S. nuclear force posture and policy guidance across the WMD domain, including for developing and implementing U.S. chemical weapons (CW) deterrence policy. Further, AVC will seek to expand missile defense cooperation, which enhances our extended deterrence and reassurance missions. These cooperative efforts are intended to address and defend against enhanced ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that threaten the United States and our allies. As the lead for extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific within the Department, AVC will work with allies in East Asia, including Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to ensure that these Alliances maintain a robust capability to deter aggression and promote stability. As the missile defense policy lead within the Department, AVC is seeking to continue and strengthen missile defense cooperation with allies such as the ROK and Japan, as well as Israel and other partners in the Middle East. We will also continue our engagement on missile defense in Europe to ensure that our Allies and U.S. forces stationed in Europe are better protected from missile threats. Through the Australia-United Kingdom-United States commitment, AVC will also support efforts to strengthen the ability of each to support our shared security and defense interests, building on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties.

The Bureau’s third goal: **Address Emerging Security Challenges.** New regional challenges and potentially disruptive technologies in domains such as outer space, undersea, and in cyber are changing the way the United States, our allies, and our competitors operate. These changes bring significant risks, as well as opportunities, and are an area of increased focus for the entire Department. AVC leads or supports other elements of the Department in policy formulation and engagement regarding these emerging and disruptive technology security issues in order to protect U.S. national and economic security. The Bureau will work with the interagency to counter these efforts, including through the development of norms of responsible behavior. The Bureau will also coordinate closely with other elements of the U.S. Government, including the National Security Council, National Space Council, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and various elements of the Intelligence Community. AVC will hold bilateral meetings with key allies and partners to exchange views on these issues, enabling cooperation to advance common goals and denying allied and partner resources to adversaries and competitors. To that end, AVC will continue to establish relationships with other government agencies, academia, think tanks, and industry to exchange information on the status of technology developments and issues and to leverage technical resources. As part of the increasing role AVC plays in emerging technology and domains, the Bureau plans to devote additional personnel to these issues.

The Bureau’s fourth goal: **Enhance Verification Capabilities and Lead on Verification Issues in the International Arena.** AVC leads efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government, by partnering with the Department of Energy.
Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, academia, the scientific community, Non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others. As foreign denial and deception capabilities evolve, and new military technologies are developed, the United States must maintain its technical edge to effectively verify compliance with existing and new international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments to which the United States is a party, including future agreements which may limit varying types of nuclear warheads and will require newer verification and monitoring capabilities than those used in previous nuclear arms control treaties. To this end, AVC utilizes verification tools, techniques, and technologies, assesses information from all sources, and advocates for critical intelligence assets, sensor programs, and enhanced analytical capabilities to bolster our verification and transparency posture and better inform policy decisions. AVC also seeks to expand the public reach and budget of the Key Verification Assets Fund (V Fund), engaging a broader set of academic, scientific, and technical experts for focused, impactful proposals/projects.

The Bureau’s Cross-Cutting Management Goal: Build a Reinvigorated and Diverse Bureau. Facing a broad array of challenges and contending with attrition and retirement, the Bureau will ensure it is adequately structured to address the longstanding and emerging security challenges of the 21st century. Key to this process is building an engaged and efficient staff that has both the appropriate expertise and is reflective of the diversity of the United States. A focus will also be placed on professional development and continuous learning opportunities for staff at all levels, rotational and telework arrangements, with the goal of achieving a more flexible and efficient work force, and a better work-life balance while ensuring employee retention. A more robust public engagement plan will be designed and implemented to better familiarize Americans and the global public with challenges and opportunities in the field of arms control. The plan will include mechanisms and outreach tools to better attract new personnel from across the country. The Bureau will also work to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, in accordance with its obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and UNSCR 1325.
2. Bureau Strategic Framework

**Bureau Goal 1:** Pursue and Strengthen Verifiable Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments to Bolster U.S. National Security.

- **Bureau Objective 1.1:** Engage Russia and the PRC in verifiable arms control and risk reduction efforts and measures.
- **Bureau Objective 1.2:** Deter development and use of chemical and biological weapons and mitigate the chemical terrorism threat by state and non-state actors.
- **Bureau Objective 1.3:** Build up the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s verification regime.
- **Bureau Objective 1.4:** Ensure compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and increase support for related confidence-building measures.

**Bureau Goal 2:** Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships to Minimize WMD Threats.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1:** By 2022, develop cross-agency nuclear policy (Nuclear Posture Review) and policy related to Weapons of Mass Destruction guided by prioritization of arms control objectives.
- **Bureau Objective 2.2:** Consult and cooperate with U.S. allies to strengthen extended deterrence policies.
- **Bureau Objective 2.3:** Implement the Ballistic Missile Defense mission and enhance missile defense cooperation with NATO, allies and partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.
- **Bureau Objective 2.4:** NNRRC fulfills its vital crisis prevention role as technologies and cyber threats evolve.

**Bureau Goal 3:** Address Emerging Security Challenges

- **Bureau Objective 3.1:** Shape the Space Domain in the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.
- **Bureau Objective 3.2:** Deter potential adversaries from threatening the undersea security of the United States.
- **Bureau Objective 3.3:** Address the national security challenges posed by growing threats in critical and emerging technologies.
**Bureau Goal 4:** Enhance Verification Capabilities and Lead on Verification Issues in the International Arena.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1:** Enhance verification capabilities through targeted projects under the Verification Assets Fund.
- **Bureau Objective 4.2:** Develop and coordinate verification frameworks for potential future arms control agreements with Russia and the PRC addressing all nuclear weapons.
- **Bureau Objective 4.3:** Strengthen monitoring and verification capabilities through AVC-coordinated advocacy and lead interagency and international verification activities.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1:** Build a Reinvigorated and Diverse Bureau

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1:** Bureau staff have the appropriate expertise and reflect the diversity of the United States.
- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2:** Bureau personnel are equipped with the knowledge, expertise, and experience to meaningfully address the existing and emerging security challenges of the 21st century during their careers in AVC.
- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3:** Bureau creates and implements a robust public engagement plan to better familiarize Americans and the global public with challenges and opportunities in the field of arms control.
- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.4:** Bureau implements its plan to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, in accordance with its obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and UNSCR 1325.
3. Bureau Goals and Objectives

**Bureau Goal 1:** Pursue and Strengthen Verifiable Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments to Bolster U.S. National Security.

- **Bureau Goal 1 Description:** This Bureau Goal is directly linked to the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance which states the United States will lead on arms control and work to reduce proliferation threats. The formulation, negotiation, and sustainment of verifiable arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments will be critical areas of focus for AVC. The Bureau is statutorily the principal policy community representative to the intelligence community for verification and compliance matters, including those relating to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments to which the United States is a party. The Bureau prepares the Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Additionally, the Bureau administers the Key Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) to preserve critical verification assets and support efforts to retain, research, develop, or acquire technologies, or programs related to the verification of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments.

**Bureau Objective 1.1:** Engage Russia and the PRC in verifiable arms control and risk reduction efforts.
• **Bureau Objective 1.1 Justification and Linkages:** Continued implementation of New START is a key part of our effort to show Russia the benefits of cooperating with the United States to manage arms competition and preserve the existing international order. The treaty also contributes to the predictability and stability between our two countries and provides assurance to allies and partners. New START is a continuation of the international arms control and nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to build and strengthen for the last 50 years. It is designed to limit the threat to the United States posed by Russian strategic nuclear forces and provides ongoing transparency and predictability regarding Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is comprised of more than just the weapons subject to the Treaty’s limits and verification regime. It has been a longstanding bi-partisan objective—one referenced in the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of New START—to address Russia’s estimated 1,000 to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. Upon the U.S.-Russian agreement in February 2021 to extend New START, the Secretary of State highlighted the enduring U.S. objective to address all of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, Russia and the PRC are adding new kinds of nuclear weapons to their arsenals, operating active nuclear weapon production enterprises, and are both projected to grow their nuclear forces. As their forces grow and become more diverse, Russia and the PRC may miscalculate their ability to leverage nuclear capabilities to pursue policies inimical to U.S. and allied security interests. A more emboldened PRC and/or Russia could increase the potential for crisis and conflict. Coupled with their growing capabilities, the consequences could become even more costly and potentially catastrophic.

• **Bureau Objective 1.1 Risk Considerations:** Russian violations of potential agreements would undermine potential benefits to U.S. security and undercut the prospect of continuing nuclear arms control with Russia. Russian violations would also imperil decades of bilateral restraint on strategic nuclear forces and risk igniting an arms race that would be expensive and destabilizing. Russia could also refuse to engage in discussions and negotiations addressing all of its nuclear weapons. Domestically, some in Congress will criticize any bilateral arms control with Russia when the PRC is rapidly building up its nuclear capabilities. Failure to secure a successor agreement to New START would mark the first time since the 1970s that Moscow’s and Washington’s strategic nuclear weapons would be unconstrained, risking an arms race and the potential consequences of crisis and conflict. One or both countries could refuse to engage substantively with the United States, increasing the potential for crises, conflict, and escalation. As a result, allies and partners could feel less safe and either seek to accommodate Russia and/or the PRC, lessen defense and deterrence cooperation with the United States, or elect to pursue capabilities and strategies independent of the United States that only further aggravate regional and/or global tensions, undermine the international order, and erode long-standing U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
Bureau Objective 1.2: Deter development and use of chemical and biological weapons and mitigate the chemical terrorism threat by state and non-state actors.

- **Bureau Objective 1.2 Justification and Linkages:** The Assad regime has used chemical weapons against the Syrian people repeatedly since it acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism confirmed Syria was responsible for three uses of chlorine as a chemical weapon and one use of the chemical weapon sarin. The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) confirmed that Syria was responsible for four CW uses; confirmed as use or likely use by the OPCW Fact-finding Mission. Further, Syria has not provided a complete or accurate declaration of its chemical weapons program to the OPCW. In 2014, the OPCW Director-General established a Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to work with Syria to address questions and concerns with Syria’s CWC declaration. As a result of that effort, the list of questions and concerns has grown over time. Identifying tools to attribute Syrian CW use to Syria and to hold Syria accountable for its use and continued CW program will allow the United States and the international community to continue to highlight Syria’s violation of the CWC, as well as pressure Syria to return to compliance. Russia, in addition to attempting to shield Syria from accountability, has carried out its own attacks using chemical weapons on multiple occasions. Other countries such as Burma and Iran are also in non-compliance with the CWC, and the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications. The United States has concerns that Iran and Russia are also pursuing these chemicals for offensive purposes. In October 2017, the OPCW unanimously adopted an Executive Council decision on practical steps the OPCW and States Parties can take to address the threat posed by non-State actors. The United States will seek effective implementation of this decision. Article X, paragraph 4 of the Chemical Weapons Convention specifies that each State Party should have a national chemical protection plan. Such plans can significantly reduce opportunities by non-State actors’ acquisition of chemicals by theft and protect chemical facilities from sabotage. The OPCW TS has been working in Africa to produce national chemical protection plans in several sub-Saharan nations. Technical, political, and financial support will accelerate and universalize the effort. The United States also finds that Russia is in non-compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the PRC’s dual use research into toxins raises questions of compliance with the BWC.
Bureau Objective 1.2 Risk Considerations: Pursuing CW and BW deterrence and accountability remains a U.S. priority and diplomatic risks are minimal given the near universality of the Conventions. Risks include continued and increased disinformation campaigns by Russia to deflect attention from its CWC and BWC non-compliance, and similar efforts from the PRC related to U.S. questions regarding its compliance with both Conventions. This could also include attempts to raise U.S. non-compliance given the continued U.S. CW destruction operations in Pueblo and Blue Grass and its Cooperative Threat Reduction biodefense support to numerous countries. Other risks include strained bilateral relationships with some countries that do not want to assert their leadership role at the UN, OPCW, or in Geneva related to Syria, Russia, Iran, and/or the PRC CBW issues. There are limited risks associated with pressing for OPCW action about chemical terrorism. Russia could continue to message for its Chemical Terrorism Convention.

Bureau Objective 1.3: Build up the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s verification regime.

Bureau Objective 1.3 Justification and Linkages: The Administration supports the CTBT and its entry into force. The continued funding and payment of the full U.S. annual assessment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s Preparatory Commission provides the clearest demonstration of U.S. support for the treaty and reinforces the U.S. commitment to global nuclear test monitoring and detection. A key element for both U.S. ratification of the Treaty and eventual implementation is an effective verification regime. The CTBT has a highly capable verification regime defined within its text, and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (PrepCom) has made great progress in establishing this regime. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is nearly complete and is undergoing test operations along with the International Data Centre (IDC). In addition, a significant amount of development has been done on the on-site inspection capability. Work remains to be done to bring these systems to operational status. The United States contributes approximately 22.5% of the PrepCom’s regular budget. This funding is used to continue building up the verification regime for the use in detecting nuclear explosions worldwide at entry into force of the CTBT. The data and products produced by the International Monitoring System (IMS) serve as an important supplement to U.S. National Technical Means (NTM). Additionally, the United States has undertaken targeted projects and made targeted voluntary contributions to further bolster this work. The CTBT is an important element of our broader non-proliferation strategy.
• **Bureau Objective 1.3 Risk Considerations:** A reduction in this funding risks undermining the most visible demonstration of U.S. support for the CTBT. In addition, a reduction of the U.S. contribution would negatively impact the ability of the PrepCom to complete the IMS, thereby undermining the only global nuclear explosion detection system, and denying a key supplementary source of information supporting U.S. NTM.

**Bureau Objective 1.4:** Ensure compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and increase support for related confidence-building measures.

• **Bureau Objective 1.4 Justification and Linkages:** The United States and all other NATO Allies have agreed on a unitary proposal. The unitary proposal contains a series of revisions to the Vienna Document that address concerns about the erosion of predictability and trust in the current European security environment and are designed to provide increased transparency on Russian “snap” military exercises and strengthen European security. The changes contained in the unitary proposal would increase transparency and predictability, including through the enhancement of military cooperation and contacts and an increase in cooperative sharing of information on military exercises and activities. The unitary proposal is currently under consideration by the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States in Vienna. To date, 34 participating States have announced support for the unitary proposal. Regarding the Antarctic Treaty, although the United States has conducted more inspections than any other Party across the life of the Treaty, the United States had a long gap of inspections between 2012 and 2020. The informal U.S. policy had been to conduct broad-based inspections of research stations at least every five years. Inspection delegations are led by OES and require extensive logistical support from the NSF in order to effectively review comprehensive compliance with the Antarctic Treaty System’s obligations, including as relates to the environment, science, and arms control. AVC provides the delegation with an inspector for the arms control provisions and facilitates intelligence community and DoD inputs within the inspection planning process. In February 2020, the United States conducted its first inspection in nearly eight years, including the inspection of a PRC research station under construction. The last U.S. inspection of a Russian research station was in 2006.
• **Bureau Objective 1.4 Risk Considerations:** The pursuit in multilateral fora of bringing Russia and other OSCE participating States who oppose or have reservations about supporting Vienna Document modernization and returning CFE States Parties back into full compliance and implementation may conflict with or be subordinated to U.S. objectives in bilateral discussions, such as the Strategic Security Dialogue with Russia. There is also the possibility that the United States, along with its Allies and partners, will not be successful in persuading Russia to modernize the Vienna Document, potentially resulting in lost diplomatic capital. Regarding the Antarctic Treaty, inspections could be delayed a year or more due to the time necessary to return to normal Antarctic operations from COVID-related staff reductions and COVID-related protocols. Inspections of coastal research stations rely on the operational status of the 45-year-old U.S. Coast Guard’s only heavy icebreaker, the USCG Cutter POLAR STAR (WAGB-10), and indirectly the schedule for its replacement vessel, U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter. NSF funds the U.S. inspection activities in Antarctica and their budget allocations from Congress is a risk consideration.
Bureau Goal 2: Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships to Minimize WMD Threats.

- **Bureau Goal 2 Description:** This Bureau Goal supports the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in that it enables the United States, with its allies and partners, to more effectively deter and defend against threats in the WMD domain. AVC will strengthen allied and partner consultations, such as through the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, to develop shared understandings of the security environment and deterrence policies, to assure allies and partners of U.S. security commitments, and to enhance cooperation. This will include adapting Alliance roles and capabilities to a more challenging threat environment. The Bureau will serve as the Department’s lead for cross-agency development and implementation of U.S. nuclear force posture and policy guidance across the WMD domain to ensure that a credible deterrent is informed by homeland and regional security requirements. Further, the protection of the United States from the threat of missile attack (e.g., ballistic and cruise missiles) continues to be a priority. The threat to our deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly. Current global trends indicate that missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. AVC leads the Department in establishing missile defense cooperation policy, in close consultation with the European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP), and Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) bureaus. The Bureau consults with a number of regional allies and friends in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, and has a leading role in implementing missile defense cooperative agreements. The implementation of these agreements requires close coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our regional military commands.

**Bureau Objective 2.1:** By 2022, develop cross-agency nuclear policy (Nuclear Posture Review) and policy related to Weapons of Mass Destruction guided by prioritization of arms control objectives.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1 Justification and Linkages:** The Bureau led the State Department’s participation in the 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR). For these efforts, AVC coordinated with regional and functional counterparts in the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and the National Security Council and held close consultations with allies and partners. AVC serves as State lead in messaging the key themes of the Administration’s arms control policies to the U.S. public, Congress, and the international community. AVC will lead State input into development and implementation of new nuclear policy and doctrine in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.
• **Bureau Objective 2.1 Risk Considerations:** NPR results upset or alienate allies and partners, leading to weakened alliances or a loss of confidence by allies in the United States. Adversaries’ behavior does not change or worsens without a countervailing policy response from the United States and allies, further deteriorating the security environment.

**Bureau Objective 2.2:** Consult and cooperate with U.S. allies to strengthen extended deterrence policies.

• **Bureau Objective 2.2 Justification and Linkages:** The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance makes clear that the Department will reinforce existing regional security networks and alliances, including those with Japan, Australia, and the ROK. The Bureau has supported these missions since 2010 through regular consultations with our allies on nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and arms control. Our allies place high priority on formal dialogues as vehicles for insights into U.S. nuclear policy and security strategy. AVC participates in Office of the Secretary of Defense-led nuclear related consultations at NATO. AVC co-chairs with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD/P) the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), serves as the lead bureau for organizing the Under Secretary-level U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and co-chairs with OSD/P the Deputy Assistant Secretary-level U.S.-Australia Strategic Policy Dialogue (SPD). AVC also plays the lead State role in the DoD-led Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) with the ROK.

• **Bureau Objective 2.2 Risk Considerations:** Regular consultations take on a routine or scripted feel in which neither side engages substantively. Allies and partners might judge the United States is not being responsive to or dismissive of their concerns and interests. As a result, allies and partners feel less safe and either seek to accommodate Russia and/or the PRC, lessen defense and deterrence cooperation with the United States, or elect to pursue capabilities and strategies independent of the United States that only further aggravate regional and/or global tensions and undermine the international order.
Bureau Objective 2.3: Implement the Ballistic Missile Defense mission and enhance missile defense cooperation with NATO, allies and partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Justification and Linkages:** Effective missile defenses help support U.S. security commitments to allies and partners and strengthen regional deterrence against states seeking to acquire or possessing WMD. They provide reassurance that the United States will stand by those commitments despite the growth in the military potential of regional adversaries. Missile defenses also aid the United States in maintaining military freedom of maneuver by helping to negate the coercive potential of regional actors intent on inhibiting, disrupting, and otherwise denying U.S. military access in their regions. Implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will serve as the voluntary U.S. national contribution to NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) mission. We have been working diligently to implement it since it was announced in 2009. Russia continues to develop, test, and deploy air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missile capabilities that hold at risk key Alliance assets and facilities. EUCOM is developing a response but will need political support from the Department of State to obtain NATO political agreement to acquire and deploy the required capabilities as part of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) mission. In the Asia-Pacific region, we are continuing missile defense cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. Our engagement with Japan and the ROK on missile defense cooperation will help address the burgeoning threat from North Korea’s ballistic missiles and WMD, enhance extended deterrence in East Asia, and make a significant contribution to the U.S. rebalance toward East Asia and the Pacific.

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Risk Considerations:** Our ability to conduct outreach to support this objective remains significantly degraded by the pandemic (including various domestic and foreign travel restrictions).
Bureau Objective 2.4: NNRRC fulfills its vital crisis prevention role as technologies and cyber threats evolve.

- **Bureau Objective 2.4 Justification and Linkages:** The core mission of the NNRRC is to help prevent armed conflict that could arise from misunderstandings, miscommunications, or miscalculations. The ongoing importance and relevance of that mission was underscored in National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-34, signed in January 2021. In addition to codifying the Center’s ongoing importance to national security, NSPM-34 requires the Department to maintain full capability at redundant locations, a requirement that is currently unmet. Since its inception, the NNRRC has established the capability to integrate additional notification formats, translate more languages, and establish new dedicated communication lines more easily. A key element of the Center’s ability to adapt to new requirements and prepare for future ones has been its commitment in recent years to consistent modernization of its IT infrastructure. In recent years the NNRRC has invested in key technologies and supporting services to modernize network and application infrastructure. This initial investment improved sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and classified data and communication lines’ availability, integrity, and confidentiality. The investments also provide the technologies and expertise to maintain continuity of operations (COOP) for the NNRRC’s 24/7/365 operating schedule. As treaties and agreements expanded, the investments increased the scope and complexity of networks and sites managed. Those increases included capital expenditures for equipment that must be replaced on regular refresh cycles to keep the communication lines active and maintain treaty compliance.

- **Bureau Objective 2.4 Risk Considerations:** For the NNRRC to maintain this infrastructure and stand ready to support additional bilateral or multilateral diplomatic communications channels, the NNRRC requires a sufficient and predictable budget. The risk of the NNRRC not being on a sustainable budget footing could at a minimum result in a degradation of service and hinder the ability to modernize the Russia line and adopt new requirements. At worst, without a sufficient and stable budget, the NNRRC could experience a protracted loss of its connection to Russia and other partners.
Bureau Goal 3: Address Emerging Security Challenges

- **Bureau Goal 3 Description:** [Insert Description paragraph] Our nation’s economy, society, and security depend on open, interoperable, and secure information and telecommunications technologies, including across satellite and undersea fiber-optic communications networks. However, the connectedness of worldwide communications infrastructure can allow foreign actors to discover network vulnerabilities that a range of actors could then seek to exploit. Threats to these systems have or are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact. U.S. policy guidance on these interconnected issues is drawn from multiple Presidential directives and other national-level policies, several of which are classified. The Bureau leads or supports other elements of the Department in policy formulation and engagement regarding these interconnected issues to enhance U.S. national and economic security. As much of this infrastructure is owned by the private sector rather than the U.S. government and many pieces exist beyond our borders, the United States must work with partners, allies, and the private sector to enhance resilience, enable the protection of, and defend this important infrastructure. The Bureau must also coordinate closely with other elements of the U.S. government, including the National Security Council, National Space Council, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and various elements of the Intelligence Community.

**Bureau Objective 3.1:** Shape the Space Domain in the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Justification and Linkages:** The United States considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. The space domain is becoming increasingly congested, and this trend will continue due to a significant increase in the volume and diversity of commercial space activity. In accordance with the guidance provided to the Department under the current National Space Policy, the Bureau supports U.S. vital interests in outer space, including efforts to:
  - strengthen the security, safety, stability, and sustainability of space activities;
  - support deterrence and the defense of the national security interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners; and
  - limit potential adversaries’ access to critical counterspace technologies and capabilities.

The Bureau leads the Department of State’s efforts to promote outer space security efforts, including norms of responsible behavior; transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) on all issues related to space arms control and military-related space policy issues, including bilateral Space Security Dialogues and multilateral issues. The
Bureau supports the formulation and implementation of military- and intelligence-related space policies as relates to space situational awareness/space domain awareness information sharing and maritime domain awareness activities. The Bureau supports the efforts at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, including advancement of technically based transparency and confidence building measures for spaceflight safety and sustainability. The Bureau supports the efforts to formulate Department of State positions on intelligence-related space policy issues, including verification and compliance matters relating to outer space arms control agreements, concepts, and proposals.

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Risk Considerations:** Our ability to conduct outreach to support this objective remains significantly degraded by the pandemic (including various domestic and foreign travel restrictions) and inadequate Department IT support.
Bureau Objective 3.2: Deter potential adversaries from threatening the undersea security of the United States.

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Justification and Linkages:** The U.S. Government recognizes the criticality of undersea cables for its economic and national security. Over 97 percent of all trans-oceanic communications travel by undersea cables. Despite protection measures, undersea cables are susceptible to disruption through inadvertent damage, component failure, natural disaster, and intentional targeting. Potential adversaries may also be looking for vulnerabilities in U.S. and allied undersea cables. In support of classified Presidential and other national guidance on this issue, the Bureau will engage with allies and partners to raise awareness of threats to and opportunities to enhance the security of undersea cables and related infrastructure. The Bureau leads policy development for the Department on undersea security issues, as well as consults with counterparts across the U.S. government to coordinate efforts to enhance undersea security, including on efforts to deter potential adversaries from threatening the undersea security of the United States and its allies. The United States also has a long history of antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare cooperation with many allies and partners but can expand or reinvigorate this relationship to address potential new threats to undersea cables. The Bureau has consulted with Euro-Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indo-Pacific allies and partners on undersea security issues and looks to deepen or build further relationships. The external engagements of the Bureau require close coordination with the National Security Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regional military commands, the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. government.

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Risk Considerations:** Ongoing restrictions on our ability to engage with allies and partners at appropriate classified levels will seriously degrade the progress we are able to make in this area. As with other areas, we have not been able to mitigate the effects of travel restrictions through video conferencing given the lack of adequate secure communications with which to engage the interagency, allies, and partners. Further, allied and partner capacity and resource prioritization of the issue vis-à-vis other regional threats may inhibit our ability to accomplish our goals. Opportunities to deliver deterrent messages in the appropriate fora are rare and subject to other competing priorities.

Approved: January 18, 2022
**Bureau Objective 3.3**: Address the national security challenges posed by growing threats in critical and emerging technologies.

- **Bureau Objective 3.3 Justification and Linkages**: Chinese strategic planners believe that dominance in C&ET is a zero-sum game that establishes national power and influence. They are pursuing three lines of effort to achieve dominance in C&ET: 1) Military-Civil Fusion: reorganize Chinese S&T to jointly advance economic and military development; 2) Made in the PRC 2025: upgrade manufacturing capabilities of Chinese industries; and 3) PRC Standards 2035: blueprint to set the global standards for the next-generation technologies in a way that favors Chinese industry. The PRC is also pursuing a strategy of supporting national corporate champions that achieve rapid market dominance across a range of technologies. Russia is also pursuing national technology initiatives that it expects will bring it both military and economic advantages. Dominance in C&ET is not only a significant asset in the geopolitical competition for influence, but it also has significant potential military advantages should armed conflict break out. Modern technologies increase the speed of military operations including the speed of decision-making putting diplomacy under even greater pressure. Most C&ET is dual-use and not amenable to traditional arms control approaches. It is difficult to establish serviceable definitions of what is to be banned – such definitions are invariably over-inclusive or under-inclusive. It would be impossible to verify and enforce compliance with any such control regime even if one could be developed. High-technology geopolitical competition therefore demands development and implementation of a new strategy to manage risk and preserve strategic stability.

- **Bureau Objective 3.3 Risk Considerations**: Ongoing restrictions on our ability to engage with allies and partners at appropriate classified levels will seriously degrade the progress we are able to make in this area. As with other areas, we have not been able to mitigate the effects of travel restrictions through video conferencing given the lack of adequate secure communications with which to engage the interagency, allies, and partners. Close interagency cooperation will be necessary to the success of these efforts which cut across Departments and Agencies as well as Department bureaus. The same level of interagency coordination will be required by our partners, who face even greater challenges.
**Bureau Goal 4:** Enhance Verification Capabilities and Lead on Verification Issues in the International Arena.

- **Bureau Goal 4 Description:** Increased Government-wide support is critical for maintaining and improving our ability to develop, negotiate, and implement verifiable arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, as well as monitor other countries’ WMD-related activities, and assess their compliance with such agreements and commitments over time, particularly, the PRC and Russia. Preserving and enhancing rigorous verification of current and future arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, and commitments is a core Bureau mission. In this regard, the New START Treaty has a verification regime in which National Technical Means play a central role. As foreign denial and deception capabilities evolve, it is critical to maintain our technical edge in effectively verifying compliance with the central commitments in the New START Treaty and other treaties. Potential future agreements -- most notably, with the PRC and Russia -- that call for numerical limits, qualitative restraints, reductions in, and/or elimination of unconstrained nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons will require the extensive collection of detailed monitoring information, and the development of new verification approaches that balance the need to protect sensitive information with the inherent difficulty of remotely detecting relatively small nuclear devices. Moreover, in order to monitor for the development of covert nuclear programs, as well as the activities of existing nuclear weapons programs, we will need continued improvement in seismic techniques and analytical capabilities to detect underground explosions at lower magnitude and to determine whether a detected underground explosion is nuclear or conventional.

Another important effort underway to strengthen verification is through support provided to the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism to improve its ability to conduct an investigation of future biological attacks.

Although less complex, similar capabilities will be needed to detect non-traditional CW agents not currently captured under the CWC. The Outer Space Treaty includes provisions that prohibit the deployment of WMD in space. New tools and technologies are required to assess and monitor possible violations of these provisions.

The AVC Bureau leads U.S. efforts to ensure the verifiability of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments through utilization of the Key Verification Assets Fund (V Fund). The V Fund was established by Congress in 1999 to support “retaining, researching, developing, or acquiring technologies, or programs related to the verification of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament...
agreements or commitments” (Section 1111 of P.L. 106-113). To meet mission priorities, V Fund projects are targeted to preserve critical verification assets and develop new technologies and capabilities to address current and future monitoring and verification challenges. Such projects cover the full range of nuclear, biological, chemical, space, and emerging technology requirements to support monitoring of activities of concern and verification and compliance.

Building increased support for verification activities and the development of new technology requires AVC to engage with a wide range of partners. AVC is continually seeking ways to reach out and involve entities and individuals inside and outside the government with expertise in technical disciplines that could support verification of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. In this regard, the Bureau also enhances verification through added support from other agencies to maximize results and impact.
Bureau Objective 4.1: Enhance verification capabilities through targeted projects under the Verification Assets Fund.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Justification and Linkages:** To meet the current and developing challenges of verifying arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, AVC seeks to develop new technologies and capabilities necessary to address critical verification requirements. AVC reviews existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments on an ongoing basis to assess compliance, determine if they can be implemented more efficiently and effectively, and ensure that they remain pertinent to the current threat environment. In order to maintain a high level of support for verification throughout the U.S. government, AVC reaches out to partner with the Intelligence Community, the Department of Energy, other agencies, academia, the scientific community, and private industry.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Risk Considerations:** Arms control verification relies on highly specialized technical disciplines/capabilities which reside in the operational monitoring agencies (typically in DoD), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) (e.g., the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons laboratories), R&D entities in partner agencies, academia, NGOs, and the private sector. In the nuclear test ban treaty mission area, for example, academia, Government research laboratories, and the private sector have been the pivotal sources of innovative analytical algorithms. In fact, very often, academia and the private sector are the key sources of national sensor data via cooperative projects with foreign partners for scientific purposes. If the level of funding support for academia and the private sector decreases, as we have seen in the seismic R&D arena, there is a high risk that the R&D community would be decimated, and U.S. verification capabilities degraded. The use of open-and-full competition such as Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) in soliciting proposals funded by AVC’s Key Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) is an effective way to mitigate this risk. This is particularly important given that the Department of Energy largely directs its seismic R&D funding to the nuclear weapons laboratories. As a result, the V Fund and the R&D program managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, are practically the only two sources of funding for academia and the private sector in the seismic arena.
Bureau Objective 4.2: Develop and coordinate verification frameworks for potential future arms control agreements with Russia and the PRC addressing all nuclear weapons.

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Justification and Linkages:** Russia and the PRC are adding new kinds of nuclear weapons to their arsenals, operating active nuclear weapon production enterprises, and are both projected to grow their nuclear forces. Arms control offers one pathway to address the threats posed by Chinese and Russian nuclear forces. Due to Russia’s past record of cheating on agreements and the PRC’s lack of transparency, verifiable arms control measures would be preferable in order to have confidence that obligations or commitments are being fulfilled. Incorporating a broader range of Russian capabilities, including potentially warheads in storage, or Chinese systems that have never been subject to arms control will demand more intrusive verification measures or those less susceptible to spoofing to have greater confidence, particularly in the context of the bilateral relationships with both countries worsening.

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Risk Considerations:** Russia and the PRC refuse to engage on verifiable measures or the Department of Defense and/or Department of Energy rejects potential for reciprocal measures, lessening the likelihood of Russian and Chinese agreement.

Bureau Objective 4.3: Strengthen monitoring and verification capabilities through AVC-coordinated advocacy and lead interagency and international verification activities.

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Justification and Linkages:** Participation by the United States in such initiatives is vital to demonstrating strong U.S. leadership in the field of nuclear disarmament verification. The contributions of U.S. experts to such efforts are important to building capacity for future verification activities that are grounded in reality taking into account vital safety and security requirements.

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Risk Considerations:** The conduct of voluntary activities like the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Quad risk alienating those countries which do not participate in them. Non-member states routinely complain that these efforts are discriminatory and lack the legitimacy that would come from being convened under a UN banner for example.
4. Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1: Build a Reinvigorated and Diverse Bureau.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1 Description:** Facing a broad array of challenges and contending with attrition and retirement, the Bureau will ensure it is adequately structured to address the longstanding and emerging security challenges of the 21st century. Key to this process is building an engaged staff that has both the appropriate expertise and is reflective of the diversity of the United States. Focus will also be placed on rotational, telework, and professional development opportunities for staff at all levels, with the goal of better employee retention. A more robust public engagement plan will be designed and implemented, with the purpose of better familiarizing the American and global public of the challenges and opportunities in the field of arms control. The plan will include mechanisms to better attract new personnel from across the country. The Bureau will also work to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, in accordance with its obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and UNSCR 1325.

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1: Bureau staff have the appropriate expertise and reflect the diversity of the United States.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1 Justification and Linkages:** In line with the White House and State Department direction to expand and diversify the federal workforce, AVC will work to bring in staff with subject matter expertise and demographic and experiential diversity.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1 Risk Considerations:** The time associated with bringing on each new, expert employee may mean attempts to reinvigorate and diversify the AVC workforce may not meet the timelines expected by the White House and State Department.

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2: Bureau personnel are equipped with the knowledge, expertise, and experience to address the existing and emerging security challenges of the 21st century during their careers in AVC.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2 Justification and Linkages:** We are working to build and enhance our training programs, broadening rotation opportunities, including long-term rotations to U.S. Embassies abroad, and taking advantage of mentoring opportunities, including travel with senior level officials to provide hands-on experience, and pass along knowledge and skills.
• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2 Risk Considerations:** Despite offering development opportunities, AVC may still struggle to retain adequate staff equipped to address existing and emerging security challenges.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3:** Bureau creates and implements a robust public engagement plan to better familiarize Americans and the global public: 1) with how the Bureau’s mission is critical to U.S. national security; and 2) on the challenges and opportunities the U.S. is facing in the field of arms control, verification, and compliance.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3 Justification and Linkages:** In line with the White House and Department of State work to build a foreign policy for the American middle class, AVC will need to strengthen its public engagement strategies.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3 Risk Considerations:** Despite offering development opportunities, AVC may still struggle to retain adequate staff equipped to address existing and emerging security challenges.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.4:** Bureau implements its plan to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, in accordance with its obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and UNSCR 1325.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.4 Justification and Linkages:** The Department is Congressionally mandated to implement obligations under the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 and UNSCR 1325. This work can strengthen AVC’s overall goals by increasing domestic and global participation of women in the field.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.4 Risk Considerations:** Systemic and cultural change is difficult to achieve. Despite AVC efforts to advance the cause of Women, Peace, and Security, the Bureau actions alone will not create a demographic shift in the field of international security. Moreover, countries that do not value gender equity to the same degree as the United States and the West will likely continue to stymie efforts to advance the WPS agenda in multilateral organizations.