Functional Bureau Strategy

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Approved: February 2, 2022
Table of Contents

1. Executive Statement and Mission Statement .......................................................... 1
2. Bureau Strategic Framework .................................................................................. 4
3. Bureau Goals and Objectives .............................................................................. 5
4. Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective.................................................... 21

Approved: February 2, 2022
1. Executive Statement and Mission Statement

ISN’s mission is to protect U.S. national security by preventing, disrupting, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical, their systems of delivery, and destabilizing conventional weapons. We take our lead from the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) issued in March 2021. As noted in that document, to meet today’s and tomorrow’s national security challenges, the United States must reassert strong leadership in the world community, develop bold initiatives, and engage with existing and new alliances and partnerships to generate collective action. ISN will respond to that mandate, as outlined in this Strategy.

"This work is urgent, because the alliances, institutions, agreements, and norms underwriting the international order the United States helped to establish are being tested." - INSSG

ISN’s most fundamental task, and this Strategy’s first Strategic Goal, is to ensure the continued viability and credibility of the global nonproliferation regime by strengthening the two of the three fundamental norms underwriting that regime: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance is responsible for the third norm, the Chemical Weapons Convention. The regime is put at risk by: chemical and biological weapons development and use; Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions; and challenges by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia to U.S. and Western leadership and the current rules-based international order. The peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology provides benefits to millions around the world, especially in the face of climate change, but it must be developed and used with the highest safety, security, and nonproliferation standards. ISN works to promote nuclear cooperation with key allies and partners based on those standards. We must also ensure the continued effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency and strengthen its global nuclear safeguards regime that serves as the verification arm of the NPT.

"We will revitalize and expand global health and health security initiatives...to reduce the risk of future biological catastrophes, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate." - INSSG

The severe loss of human life and economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is tempting terrorists and other nefarious actors to further consider weaponization of high-consequence pathogens. While biological safety and security, and countering biological terrorism, have always been part of ISN’s focus, we must respond to the pandemic’s wake-up call and give urgent attention to preventing access to, and acquisition of, biological agents by malign actors, and improve international capabilities to respond to a biological terrorism act. Countering biological threats is therefore our second Strategic Goal. Ironically, this task has been complicated by the world’s frenzied response to the pandemic. For example, more high
containment laboratories are being built and many thousands of mobile labs have been set up to handle samples, at times without regard to high biosafety and biosecurity standards; and much advanced research on viruses and related issues has been shared in the public domain, often without security oversight.

"Both Beijing and Russia have invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world." "...we will reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world....and widen the circle of cooperation." - INSSG

ISN’s work to win the strategic competition with the PRC and Russia is our third Strategic Goal. Over recent decades, Beijing has acquired by illicit or legitimate means advanced U.S. and Western technologies to modernize its military and technological base and to further legitimate its authoritarian style of governance as a model for the world. ISN has developed new tools, programming, and partnerships to counter Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy and predatory practices. ISN is responsible for implementing sanctions to disrupt Russia’s arms sales that provide revenue for its malign activities and in response to Russia’s use of chemical weapons in assassinations or attempted assassinations, and we counter Russian malign activities on its periphery. ISN is increasing or deepening its cooperation with the G-7 and ASEAN, will support nonproliferation or other national security cooperation with other like-minded states, such as NATO and the QUAD (Australia, India, Japan and the United States), and will ensure that implementation of the security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, known as AUKUS, is fully consistent with our respective nonproliferation obligations.

"The world’s leading powers are racing to develop and deploy emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing...." "Emerging technologies remain largely ungoverned by laws or norms designed to...establish guardrails against misuse or malign actors." "Regional actors like Iran and North Korea continue to pursue game-changing capabilities and technologies, while threatening U.S. allies and partners and challenging regional stability." "We will work...to disrupt al-Qaeda and related terrorist networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence...." - INSSG

Our fourth Strategic Goal covers ISN’s counterproliferation and counterterrorism work not addressed by the preceding Goals. We need to ensure that the four multilateral export control regimes keep up with emerging technologies and persuade all states to adopt laws and regulations consistent with these regimes’ control lists. We will continue to review applications for export licenses, visas, and foreign investment in the United States to prevent proliferation and preserve U.S. national security. ISN will provide expert support to efforts to reach negotiated settlements with Iran and North Korea but will also continue its impactful diplomatic and programming efforts to disrupt the supply and financial networks that support these countries’ WMD and ballistic missile programs. We will continue our work to counter
WMD terrorism and improve international capabilities to respond to an act of terrorism involving WMD materials.

“...it is essential to invest in our national security workforce, institutions, and partnerships, inspire a new generation to public service, ensure our workforce represents the diversity of our country....” – INSSG

Our Management Objective will record ISN’s progress toward greater diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility in accordance with White House and Department of State mandates and objectives. Our nation’s diversity is a unique source of strength and gives us a significant competitive advantage on the world stage.
2. Bureau Strategic Framework

Bureau Goal 1: Strengthen Global Nonproliferation Norms

- **Bureau Objective 1.1**: Strengthen the NPT and IAEA
- **Bureau Objective 1.2**: Promote U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Bureau Goal 2: Counter Biological Threats to U.S. National Security and International Public Safety

- **Bureau Objective 2.1**: Strengthen the BWC
- **Bureau Objective 2.2**: Support the Development of Foreign Partners’ Capabilities to Prevent, Detect, Investigate, and Respond to Biological Threats
- **Bureau Objective 2.3**: Advance Standards of Safe, Secure, and Transparent Biological Work Worldwide

Bureau Goal 3: Advance U.S. Strategic Interests and Protect Against Threats from the PRC and Russia

- **Bureau Objective 3.1**: Counter the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy
- **Bureau Objective 3.2**: Build Partner Resilience Against Russian Malign Influence and Exploitation
- **Bureau Objective 3.3**: Promote Global and Regional Stability to Advance U.S. Interests and Those of U.S. Allies and Partners

Bureau Goal 4: Prevent and Respond to Proliferation of WMD, Missiles, and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons and Technologies

- **Bureau Objective 4.1**: Disrupt or Deter Proliferation by State or Non-State Actors that Threaten International Security
- **Bureau Objective 4.2**: Strengthen Other States’ Capabilities to Counter Proliferation
- **Bureau Objective 4.3**: Strengthen the Multilateral Export Control Regimes and Promote Global Nonproliferation Action

Bureau Cross-Cutting Objective 1: Promote Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in Bureau Operations and Programs
3. Bureau Goals and Objectives

Bureau Goal 1: Strengthen Global Nonproliferation Norms

- **Bureau Goal 1 Description**: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), both of which entered into force in the 1970s, are two of the three flagship legally binding instruments establishing norms and standards for global WMD nonproliferation behavior. Every five years, the NPT and the BWC States Party hold Review Conferences (RevCons) to reaffirm the importance of the treaties, assess progress made, and address future work. ISN also contributes to the third norm, the Chemical Weapons Convention, for which the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance has responsibility.

The three mutually reinforcing ‘pillars’ of the NPT — nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- remain important and beneficial for all NPT Parties. Strengthening nuclear nonproliferation makes all states more secure and provides the foundation for progress on nuclear disarmament and cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with NPT provisions and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. This foundational bargain has been challenged by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and by Iran’s provocative nuclear posture, including its failure to provide the IAEA the necessary cooperation to resolve IAEA concerns related to possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, as required by Iran’s NPT-related Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. ISN is undertaking several initiatives to bolster international support for the NPT. The Tenth NPT Review Conference, originally scheduled for April 2020, has been repeatedly postponed due to the COVID pandemic; we hope it will be rescheduled later in 2022. It is important to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and authorities to carry out its missions, especially regarding nuclear safeguards to verify NPT nonproliferation obligations. ISN urges all NPT Parties who have not yet done so to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol. ISN will have a leading role as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) work together to provide Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability consistent with the three countries’ respective NPT and IAEA obligations.

The BWC effectively bans biological and toxin weapons by prohibiting their development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use. At the 2022 BWC RevCon, ISN will seek to break a longstanding political deadlock and reach agreement on a set of near-term specific measures to strengthen the BWC and on launching an intensive effort to explore options to increase transparency, strengthen implementation, and enhance assurance of compliance. Because strengthening the
BWC is a major element of the U.S. effort to counter biological threats, this nonproliferation norm is discussed under Goal 2.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Act (as amended) establishes nine nonproliferation criteria for peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements (known as 123 Agreements), which allow the United States to engage in nuclear commerce with partners. These agreements legally obligate our partners to observe specific standards in such areas as IAEA safeguards and prohibit enriching, reprocessing, or transferring U.S. material and equipment without U.S. consent. They also require partners to adhere to U.S. standards on nonproliferation, which are the most stringent and rigorous in the world. However, these legally binding agreements often take years to negotiate. To promote the U.S. nuclear industry and open new opportunities for peaceful nuclear cooperation, ISN has also developed non-legally binding instruments for use with select countries as a first step in cooperation and a prelude to 123 Agreements.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) establishes the highest possible international standards for regulating international trade in conventional arms, largely based on U.S. standards, in order to reduce the risk that international arms transfers will be used to commit atrocities, without impeding the legitimate international arms trade. The United States is not a signatory or party to the ATT, but ISN works closely with parties to ensure U.S. interests are taken into account.

ISN works to ensure the continued viability of the above nonproliferation norms through bilateral diplomatic engagement. We have established strategic non-proliferation and counter-proliferation dialogues with a number of key countries that allow for in-depth exchange of views, for persuading countries to support U.S. nonproliferation policies, and for forging common approaches to key challenges. ISN also seeks to improve cooperation with moderate Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries and those that generally support NAM positions to better enable progress in multilateral nonproliferation treaties and agreements, increase consensus on nonproliferation norms and issues, and enhance partner capacity to prevent WMD proliferation. For example, we have productive dialogues with Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, and Peru, seek to engage Mexico and Ghana, and aim to re-engage with South Africa. Another ISN focus of attention is dealing with strategic stability among nuclear-armed states, most particularly, between India and Pakistan, both through government-to-government consultations and informal forums where discussion is more candid.

Nonproliferation norms must evolve to govern emerging technologies that can advance weapons programs of concern or in other ways impact U.S. national security, such as biotechnology, telecommunications (5G) infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and future technologies that we cannot yet predict. ISN is working to adapt existing international norms to address such emerging technologies and will consider establishing new nonproliferation norms to counter novel proliferation threats if needed.
**Bureau Objective 1.1: Strengthen the NPT and IAEA**

- **Bureau Objective 1.1 Justification and Linkages:** The NPT has been under stress as a result of Iran’s expansion of nuclear activities and North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons as well as by authoritarian governments’ attempts to reshape the international system in their favor. It has also endured challenges from a broad constituency of countries and civil society frustrated by a perceived lack of sufficient progress on nuclear disarmament. At the Tenth NPT Review Conference, whenever it is held, we will seek a reaffirmation of support for the NPT as the vital core of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for progress across all three pillars. To promote international support for the NPT, ISN is creating a new multilateral effort, called the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, that advances international awareness of the important benefits derived from peaceful uses assistance and cooperation as envisaged under the NPT and to identify new opportunities to enhance international engagement in this field. We will demonstrate U.S. commitment to dialogue and progress on nuclear disarmament, including through our initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), which provides a unique and informal venue for states to discuss ways to improve the international security environment in order to enable further progress toward nuclear disarmament. ISN will work to foster a productive environment, to include implementation of a strategic communications plan to engage governments, civil society, academic experts, and other key partners. We also aim to make progress in overcoming the obstacles to nuclear weapon State signature of the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok (the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone). The IAEA must have the resources needed to ensure its ability to carry out missions critical to U.S. national security, including strengthening its safeguards program, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and promoting the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear technologies. We will also follow the highest nonproliferation standards in carrying out our commitment to provide Australia with conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the new AUKUS partnership. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4.

- **Bureau Objective 1.1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to sustain the credibility of the NPT would risk unraveling a core component of the current rules-based international security order the United States helped to establish with far-reaching and dangerous implications. Failure to sustain IAEA authorities and resources risks eroding international verification of countries’ compliance with NPT and IAEA obligations and commitments. Failure to bolster these nonproliferation norms would be a big win for Russia and the PRC as they attempt to undermine the post-WWII rules-based international order.
Bureau Objective 1.2: Promote U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation

- **Bureau Objective 1.2 Justification and Linkages:** Promoting U.S. civil nuclear cooperation creates the opportunity for the United States to extend its strong nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards to other countries and to strengthen bilateral relationships while preventing authoritarian governments from using nuclear exports and associated financing to achieve their often malign strategic goals. The United States concludes formal civil nuclear cooperation agreements (“123 agreements”) in accordance with Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. These 123 agreements require partners to adhere to a set of nonproliferation obligations in order to receive U.S. nuclear material and equipment for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Given the substantial time, resources, and political commitment to conclude a 123 agreement, and the severe loss of market share by the U.S. nuclear industry in recent decades, ISN, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, created the less formal Nuclear Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (NCMOU). This instrument allows the United States to engage with additional partners as a first step toward achieving our foreign policy goals while building nuclear nonproliferation norms. To strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and security norms through capacity-building and engagement, ISN also created the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program and now leads this U.S. interagency effort. FIRST engagement strengthens the capacity of partner countries to prioritize nuclear nonproliferation and security from the outset in technology selection. This Objective supports JSP Objectives 1.4 and indirectly 2.3.

- **Bureau Objective 1.2 Risk Considerations:** Failure to advance U.S. cooperation with others on civil nuclear energy could have significant repercussions: it could reduce support for the NPT if countries perceive there is no benefit to them as a Treaty Party; it would continue to undermine the U.S. nuclear industry and its global market share, potentially ceding the market to authoritarian, non-market economies; and it could reduce the amount of vital assistance needed by developing countries with regard to nuclear energy and nuclear techniques used in medicine, agriculture, and other fields.
Bureau Goal 2: Counter Biological Threats to U.S. National Security and International Public Safety

- **Bureau Goal 2 Description:** The COVID-19 pandemic has been a wakeup call, reminding us that biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin, are among the most serious threats facing the United States and the international community. ISN uses both its diplomatic leadership role and capacity-building programs to counter biological threats. The heightened awareness of biological threats engendered by the pandemic presents a special opportunity to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the global norm banning biological weapons, and reinvigorate international norm-setting around biological activities with dual-use potential. ISN is working to improve the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), strengthen governance and oversight of dual-use life sciences research and high containment biological laboratories, and encourage transparency and information-sharing about disease outbreaks.

The pandemic has highlighted gaps in outbreak prevention, detection, and response, as well as the absence of global, sustainable biosafety, biosecurity, and cybersecurity best practices necessary to ensure that pathogens, dual-use equipment, life sciences research, and biological data are handled safely and securely, and that laboratories are commissioned properly and hardened against intrusions including cyberattacks. The pandemic is also placing unprecedented strain on global border and points of entry authorities, exposing severe gaps in their ability to protect public safety and share critical information on COVID-19 case triage, risk mitigation, supply chain management, and integration with emergency operations and public health entities.

ISN’s foreign assistance programs help countries enhance biosecurity, biosafety, and biorisk management, strengthen bio-surveillance and diagnostic capabilities, strengthen export control processes for dangerous pathogens and their means of delivery to prevent terrorist acquisition of weaponizable pathogens, and improve capabilities to disrupt biological weapons plots. ISN also leads the WMD-related aspects of the Department’s foreign consequence management efforts.
Bureau Objective 2.1: Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

- **Bureau Objective 2.1 Justification and Linkages:** The BWC embodies an important norm: biological and toxin weapons are unacceptable. In addition, the BWC has demonstrated its potential as a multisectoral international forum that allows for exchanges of experiences and best practices across multiple communities. Unfortunately, for the past two decades, efforts to take meaningful international action under the BWC have been hampered by the legacy of the negotiations abandoned in 2001 about an additional legal instrument. A small number of States Party consistently obstruct most substantive action, insisting that the only way forward is a return to negotiations on an all-encompassing, legally binding protocol to the Convention. Through four iterations of an “intersessional work program” the BWC has served as a useful platform to exchange information and promote action at the national level, but nearly all proposals for collective action in support of the BWC have been stymied by supporters of this “all or nothing” approach. ISN is working with the interagency and other BWC Parties to advance commonly shared international and health security goals and to produce alternatives to breaking this impasse that is impeding the BWC from reaching its full potential. At the August 2022 BWC Review Conference, we will urge States Party to adopt a robust work program to strengthen national implementation of the BWC, increase transparency and accountability, and otherwise strengthen the BWC with increased institutional support and resources. This Objective supports JSP Objectives 1.1 and 1.4 and the National Biodefense Strategy.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to achieve this objective would potentially result in continuation of the status quo in the BWC despite the demonstrated devastating effects of a global disease outbreak. Efforts to address biological threats would likely shift to ad hoc groupings of interested countries, limiting their geographical scope and perceived legitimacy. The relevance of the BWC could decline, with implications over the longer term for the underlying norm against biological weapons.
**Bureau Objective 2.2:** Support the Development of Foreign Partners’ Capabilities to Prevent, Detect, Investigate, and Respond to Biological Threats

- **Bureau Objective 2.2 Justification and Linkages:** ISN supports foreign partner capacity-building activities that build national and regional capability to strengthen standards and practices for biosafety, biosecurity, border security, and oversight of research with high consequence pathogens. These activities include: threat assessments; hands-on technical trainings and limited equipment provision to enable safe and secure handling, storage, transportation, and inactivation of dangerous pathogen samples to prevent accidental or intentional releases; training on accurate detection of a high consequence disease outbreaks and the appropriate protective measures to prevent disease spread; and training and screening capabilities for customs and border officials to detect sensitive and advanced or low technology threats and prevent transfers to nefarious actors pursuing biological weapons proliferation. ISN works with partners to develop, operationalize, and institutionalize sustainable multi-sectoral approaches to identify, assess, and respond to biosecurity breaches or plots to engage in bioterrorism. ISN also works to improve international capabilities to investigate and respond to suspicious disease outbreaks or a biological weapons incident, to include operationalizing the biological weapons part of UN Secretary-General’s Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons Mechanism (UNSGM). The One Health Approach is a way of designing and implementing programs, policies, legislation, and research in which multiple sectors communicate and collaborate to achieve better public health outcomes. Controlling zoonotic disease is one area of work in which a One Health Approach is particularly relevant as these diseases occur at the human-animal-environment interface. This Objective supports JSP Objectives 1.1 and 1.4, the National Biodefense Strategy, and Objectives 10.1-10.3 of the America Pandemic Response Preparedness document.

- **Bureau Objective 2.2 Risk Considerations:** Failure to achieve this Objective would leave our partners vulnerable to intentional or unintentional biological threats and could also increase threats to the American people, since the effects of disease and biological threats do not respect borders. There is always the risk that focusing on one aspect of WMD threats, in this case biological threats, could pull attention and resources from other WMD threats.
Bureau Objective 2.3: Advance Standards of Safe, Secure, and Transparent Biological Work Worldwide

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Justification and Linkages:** ISN encourages other countries to develop and adopt appropriate oversight mechanisms for technology, research, or materials that could be misused for biological weapons purposes as well as the development and application of standards and best practices for safe work with biological materials that may pose a public or animal health or security risk. ISN works to raise the global bar for biosafety and biosecurity through multiple international forums. Such work centers on enhancing multilateral commitments to advance laboratory biosafety and biosecurity and can be political, institutional, or programmatic in nature. This Objective supports JSP Objectives 1.1 and 1.4.

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Risk Considerations:** Failure to achieve this objective, in whole or in part, could result in increased risk to U.S. and international security from both accidental and deliberate biological threats as larger numbers of facilities around the world work with dangerous pathogens and increasingly powerful technologies under potentially inadequate safety, security, and research oversight.
Bureau Goal 3: Advance U.S. Strategic Interests and Protect Against Threats from the PRC and Russia

- **Bureau Goal 3 Description:** The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become an increasingly more aggressive and assertive actor on the global stage, regularly taking action that threatens the national security of the United States and its partners and allies, in particular through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, a national-level strategy to achieve global economic and military dominance. The PRC exploits its global relationships to acquire advanced and emerging technologies, including for diversion to military programs, making it nearly impossible to be assured that science and technology collaboration is not driving military progress in the PRC. These actions undermine the norms that make possible open innovation and collaboration, as well as the competitiveness of American workers, researchers, and companies. Meanwhile, Russia threatens its neighbors with often remarkable directness, and uses transfers of advanced weaponry and associated technology to develop dependency among its clients, establish strategic relationships, and spread asymmetric military capabilities that can threaten U.S. interests. The PRC and Russia often work to diminish the effectiveness of international institutions from the inside, through obstruction and countering U.S. initiatives. To address these threats, ISN leads with diplomacy, prioritizing collaboration with our partners and allies to take coordinated action against these malign activities, to include engaging our partners to build their resilience against exploitation and proliferation threats and the resilience of sensitive supply chains. ISN plays an important role in the interagency and multilateral system in helping set the norms and standards that govern dual use technologies, and imposing costs on those who break the rules. ISN also has the important responsibility of implementing statutory and discretionary sanctions authorities and undertaking in other actions to counter Russian and PRC activities that threaten U.S. interests, to include implementation of Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanction Act (CAATSA).

ISN reviews export, re-export, and in-country transfer applications for potential diversion risks as well as potential effects on regional stability, crime control, proliferation, and human rights. Reviewers also consider whether a specific export might provide a material contribution to an adversary’s military capabilities or might provide an enabling technology that contributes to the PRC MCF strategy. ISN reviews Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) declarations and filings to determine the cumulative risks posed by a specific acquisition or investment, and more specifically, whether exports might mitigate the risk posed by adversarial investments in key technology sectors, including critical technologies such as quantum, artificial intelligence, robotics, and additive manufacturing. ISN also reviews thousands of visas annually to ensure students, researchers, and other foreign visitors to the
United States are not attempting to evade export controls or acquire technological expertise that could be used to advance weapons programs of concern.

Bureau Objective 3.1: Counter the PRC’s MCF Strategy

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Justification and Linkages:** Through its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the PRC is working to eliminate the traditional barriers between its national defense system and national economic systems so that advanced and emerging technologies further its commercial and military objectives at the same time. However, the PRC remains reliant on the international science and technology ecosystem. As such, it takes advantage of the international rules-based order and uses international collaboration to coopt emerging technologies for the fulfillment of the PRC’s goals. It does so through both licit and illicit means, involving trade, investment, joint research and development, and academic collaboration, as well as through intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer. These tactics undermine the rules the international community relies on to ensure that dual-use technologies are not inappropriately diverted to military end uses, and they challenge the ability of rule-abiding governments to protect their own intellectual property, companies, and individual workers. The PRC’s efforts directly threaten the integrity of international research collaboration and joint research and development, and erode fair global competition, directly hurting companies, institutions, and employees. ISN, along with others in the Department and the interagency, will work to strengthen the international ecosystem against threats posed by MCF implementation. This work includes equipping vulnerable sectors to assess their own MCF risk and mitigate it, sharing best practices with allies and partners, and assessing, refining, and helping implement relevant export controls. ISN will continue to review export control license, visa, and CFIUS applications. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4.

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to counter the PRC’s predatory actions to achieve military dominance will put at risk our ability to defend the homeland and U.S. allies, threaten the U.S. technological innovation base, and undermine the existing rules-based international order.
Bureau Objective 3.2: Build Partner Resilience Against Russian Malign Influence and Exploitation

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Justification and Linkages:** Russia threatens its neighbors with often remarkable directness and uses transfers of advanced weapons systems and associated technologies to develop dependency among arms recipients, earn revenue for its defense sector, establish or deepen strategic relationships, and spread asymmetric military capabilities to U.S. adversaries or competitors that can threaten U.S. interests around the world. Russia also engages in a range of other destabilizing and malign activities, including the provision of mercenary forces acting on the Russian Government’s behalf to regions of instability to expand Russian influence and access and undermine U.S. objectives. ISN will undertake multiple efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence and exploitation. These include continuing to lead the global diplomatic campaign to implement CAATSA 231, which requires mandatory sanctions on any person who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with the defense or intelligence sectors of the Russian government. A related but distinct line of effort involves implementing discretionary sanctions under Executive Order 14024 of 2021 entitled Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. These efforts aim to prevent, disrupt, delay, or deter Russian arms exports, which otherwise bring the Russian Government revenue, access, and influence that help enable its malign activities.

ISN will also work to establish alternative sources of “Russia-free” sustainment (maintenance and spare parts) for Russian-origin military equipment, of which there is a significant global inventory among U.S. partner states, to reduce Russian opportunities for revenue-generation, coercion, and exploitation. ISN will further work to disrupt Russia’s mercenary operations, including via diplomatic engagement to highlight the negative consequences for countries employing the services of these private military contractors. Finally, ISN will engage in various programmatic steps to harden the global supply chain against exploitation by Russia’s defense sector and create a “chilling effect” on Russian defense sector engagements in the global financial and business environment. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4.

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Risk Considerations:** Failure to achieve this Objective puts U.S. national security at risk as Russia continues to pressure NATO partners and other democratic countries on its periphery, especially in Eastern Europe.
Bureau Objective 3.3: Promote Global and Regional Stability to Advance U.S. Interests and Those of U.S. Allies and Partners

- Bureau Objective 3.3 Justification and Linkages: The global international rules-based order continues to face severe challenges, particularly in key regions, requiring strengthened efforts to promote the rule of law and territorial integrity, including through diplomatic engagement to prevent conflict and reduce the likelihood of use of WMD. We must reinvigorate existing alliances and partnerships – and create new ones as appropriate – to defend democracies in the face of authoritarian challenges and generate collective action in response to security threats.

In East Asia, we work to strengthen security cooperation with key allies and partners, including through bilateral and trilateral cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea. Cooperation with these two allies on nonproliferation and civil nuclear issues is strong and strengthening, but, given the historical political difficulties between the two, it remains a challenge to coordinate trilaterally in the face of real security threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. North Korea continues to pose a grave threat to the security of the United States and our allies, and ISN continues to support efforts to address its proscribed nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD capabilities. This work includes preventing proliferation into and from North Korea linked to its illicit programs and ensuring that partners have the capacity needed to do the same. We also continue to bolster existing security frameworks and arrangements, including ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). From 2022 through 2024, the United States will co-chair, with Sri Lanka and Thailand, the ARF’s Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, a venue through which ARF participants can share views on developments impacting nonproliferation and disarmament in the region, share best practices, and develop capacity collectively to meet common challenges. ISN also plays a central role in the implementation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral arrangement to facilitate Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to meet the 21st century strategic environment. Over the course of an 18-month period, ISN will lead efforts to ensure that the initiative is implemented in ways that promote global nuclear nonproliferation, as directed by President Biden. In South Asia, where the potential for conflict between nuclear-armed rivals remains high, ISN continues to engage bilaterally with relevant states to discourage further development of destabilizing capabilities and to promote restraint. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to pose a serious threat to regional security and U.S. interests in the region. These tensions further complicate broader nuclear diplomacy in the region, impacting decisions by other states over civil nuclear development and international efforts to ensure that nuclear developments are limited to purely peaceful purposes. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4 and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
• **Bureau Objective 3.3 Risk Considerations:** Failure to succeed in working with allies and partners to address security challenges and threats from Russia, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea would increase the severity of threats to U.S. and international security. In this time of global competition between democracies and authoritarian countries, we cannot risk defeat.

**Bureau Goal 4: Prevent and Respond to Proliferation of WMD, Missiles, and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons and Technologies**

• **Bureau Goal 4 Description:** Countries with illicit WMD programs and conventional arms programs of concern rely on acquisition of necessary equipment, components, and expertise from abroad, and on networks of unscrupulous individuals or companies (scientists, engineers, businessmen, shippers, brokers, and financiers) located in multiple countries. The diffusion of manufacturing capabilities increases sources of supply for sophisticated commercial and dual-use technologies that may have weapons applications. The speed and volume of the international trade environment, in which illicit cargo and payments can be concealed among legitimate shipments and financial transactions, adds to the complexity.

ISN places a high priority on ensuring that the guidelines and control lists of the four multilateral export control regimes keep pace with new technologies and proliferation trends; that the private sector is aware of and fully abides by export controls and sanctions on proliferators and their supporters; and that we have an active and forward-leaning operational posture for cooperating with foreign partners to prevent, disrupt, or interdict shipments and activities related to the proliferation of WMD, missile delivery systems, and conventional arms-related transactions of concern. In doing so, we help close the proliferation spigot and slow the pace, drive up the cost, and reduce the quality of illicit acquisitions. ISN works with states who are not members of the multilateral export control regimes to help them develop and implement laws, regulations, and systems of implementation and enforcement consistent with the control lists and best practices of the regimes.

The four multilateral export control regimes are:

• The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which regulates transfer of key equipment and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation;
• The Australia Group (AG) which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons;
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which regulates transfer of nuclear and nuclear dual-use technologies and improves safeguards on, and protection of, existing materials; and

- The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA).

Terrorists and non-state actors seek to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, including poisons, toxins, blister agents, nerve agents, and improvised nuclear devices. ISIS has elevated the WMD threat in recent years through its use of chemicals on the Middle East battlefield, and specific planning for the use of chemical and biological agents against Western targets. ISN addresses multiple counter-WMD terrorism domains, including securing weaponizable chemicals and high-consequence pathogens at facilities of concern; strengthening law enforcement capabilities to investigate and prosecute terrorist or non-state actor plots, smuggling, and acquisition of WMD materials; and enhancing capabilities to detect and counter evolving and emerging threats, including unmanned aerial systems and cyber attacks. ISN also acts as the United States Co-Chair, with Russia, of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations that are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

The collapse of the Afghan government in 2021 has increased the potential for malign actors to exploit its weak territorial integrity and reestablish bases of operations. ISN helps mitigate that risk by strengthening the ability of neighboring countries to monitor borders with Afghanistan to limit the movement of people and materials that could contribute to WMD development or export.

Bureau Objective 4.1: Disrupt or Deter Proliferation by State or Non-State Actors that Threaten International Security

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Justification and Linkages:** ISN works to ensure that U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and North Korea are implemented by all countries. These sanctions impede these countries’ WMD and missile programs and play a large role in giving Iran an incentive to accept limits on its nuclear program. ISN engages with international partners to alert them to North Korean and Iranian sanctions evasion activities occurring within their jurisdictions and often offers assistance in halting those activities. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4 and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to achieve this Objective will, in the absence of negotiated agreements, result in North Korea and Iran advancing their WMD and missile programs unimpeded, increasing the threat to regional and international security, and potentially forcing other countries to develop nuclear arsenals.

Approved: February 2, 2022
Bureau Objective 4.2: Strengthen Other States’ Capabilities to Counter Proliferation

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Justification and Linkages:** ISN supports foreign partner capacity-building activities that include providing training and equipment provision to customs and border officials to screen for, detect, and interdict sensitive technology transfers to nefarious actors. ISN engages industry, academic, and government representatives working at chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and other high-tech facilities to ensure that no sensitive material or expertise is diverted to support the production or use of WMD, their delivery systems, or advanced conventional weapons by state or non-state actors. The climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic are placing unprecedented strain on global border and points of entry authorities and infrastructure, adding to needs for ISN assistance. ISN assists partner governments and foreign private sector stakeholders in implementing and complying with UN Security Council Resolutions and other international frameworks seeking to counter state and non-state WMD proliferation, including through training to bolster abilities to detect and disrupt proliferator attempts to evade international sanctions and acquire sensitive technologies. We assess that terrorists and other non-state actors remain interested in WMD, including the use of poison, toxins, blister agents, nerve agents, radiological weapons, and improvised nuclear devices.

ISN partners with at-risk foreign countries to counter terrorist WMD development and use. Our programs address multiple counter-WMD terrorism domains, including: securing weaponizable chemicals abroad and high-consequence pathogens at facilities of concern; insider threats by identifying radicalized or coerced personnel at key facilities with WMD material and WMD precursors; strengthening law enforcement capabilities to prevent, respond to, investigate, and prosecute non-state/terrorist plots, smuggling, and acquisition of WMD material; and, enhancing capabilities to detect and defeat evolving and emerging threats, including unmanned aerial systems and cyber-attacks. In addition, ISN supports activities of the GICNT to help build partner capacity to address radiological and nuclear security challenges and strengthen international cooperation in the areas of radiological and nuclear detection, forensics, and emergency response. ISN activities mitigate threats posed by illicitly trafficked WMD, conventional arms (including MANPADS and anti-tank guided missiles), and explosives by ISIS and other terrorists. This Objective supports JSP Objective 1.4 and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Risk Considerations:** Preventing the proliferation of WMD, their systems of delivery, destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, and other sensitive materials and technologies requires action by all countries, since proliferators will exploit the weakest links in strategic trade controls and border security.

Many countries do not have the resources to establish or implement such regulations, and ISN and the United States cannot help all countries. As long as there are weak links, proliferation will continue.
Bureau Objective 4.3: Strengthen the Multilateral Export Control Regimes and Promote Global Nonproliferation Action

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Justification and Linkages:** The multilateral export control regimes establish export control standards and best practices and promote robust but proportional controls on dual-use technology, enabling global trade and regional stability while preventing proliferation of weapons and sensitive technology. In this way, the regimes’ work provides an effective basis for building broad consensus to take action to impede acquisition of WMD, their delivery systems, destabilizing conventional weapons, and related technologies. Each regime meets regularly, providing a platform for sharing information on proliferation trends, exchanging licensing and law enforcement best practices, and coordinating policies. The regimes promote implementation of Catch-all and Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT) controls to prevent transfers of uncontrolled emerging technology items to support the development or enhancement of military capabilities of U.S. strategic rivals. We also work with the regimes to broaden their impact beyond the participating governments, for example, by conducting regular outreach with non-members, industries and academia. ISN will continue to lead U.S. engagement with partners to coordinate their national export controls through multilateral export control regimes to stem proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear, missile, and advanced conventional weapons goods and technologies. Through technical and policy consultations with regime members, ISN will promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of these and related dual-use items to support regional and international security and stability.

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Risk Considerations:** Failure to ensure the continued effectiveness and viability of the multilateral export control regimes would undermine U.S. and international efforts to ensure countries can regulate their own sensitive exports and coordinate their actions with other like-minded states to prevent potentially dangerous items or technologies from falling into the wrong hand.
4. Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1: Promote Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) in Bureau Operations and Programs

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1 Justification and Linkages:** In addition to its baseline nonproliferation duties and responsibilities that have spanned decades, ISN has become a leader in U.S. government efforts to reassert U.S. leadership in promoting international norms, addressing WMD and other international threats and challenges, and providing related capacity-building assistance. A key factor in global leadership is the inclusion of the widest possible group of partners in planning, actions, and programs to ensure a more complete understanding of the operating environment. To be most successful, this in turn requires a diverse and inclusive workforce in ISN, as well as ensuring our training and other programs promote diversity in our partners, so that they – and ISN – can be informed by and reach as many segments of a given population as possible.

ISN’s DEIA Council has been working on developing approaches across the Bureau to key issues, including recruitment and training. Our assistance programs, enabled by the COVID-required use of on-line learning and remote platforms, have seen initial improvement in the diversity of the groups trained. Program managers will emphasize diversity in presenters and press for diverse trainees. We seek to build on this momentum to institutionalize our DEIA principles and practices. ISN must become – and is now becoming – a more diverse, agile, adaptive, resilient, and “expeditionary” bureau, able to respond creatively to emerging threats or unanticipated challenges.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to diversify our workforce will have a negative impact on ISN’s ability to assess and address future threats related to proliferation and emerging technologies. We need the broadest range of perspectives possible, especially those that have been traditionally underrepresented in multilateral settings, the Department, and the Bureau.