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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The Somali people and their leaders have achieved progress toward a peaceful and prosperous future, considerably recovering from the depths plumbed in the 1990s. There remains much more to accomplish before progress is self-sustaining and Somalia becomes a net contributor to regional peace and prosperity.

We have two immediate goals. First, we work with Somalia’s state and federal government leaders and with its other security partners to reduce threats posed by Somalia-based global terrorist groups. Second, as an expression of the humanitarian values of the American people, we respond to the various shocks that threaten the lives of Somalis throughout the country, including hunger, disease, and displacement. Our longer-term goal is to work with Somalia’s state and federal government leaders and with other international friends of Somalia to implement security, economic, and governance policies that aid the Somali people to thrive, as ethnic-Somali communities thrive around the world. These goals are mutually supporting.

Security: Al-Shabaab, al-Qaida’s largest, wealthiest and most deadly affiliate, which has murdered thousands of people in Somalia and the region, including Americans, operates with impunity in a significant portion of Somalia’s territory. It commits various crimes like extortion and smuggling to fund its armed insurgency, terror attacks, and administration. ISIS-Somalia is also present and active. Both terror networks harm our interests, the interests of our Somali partners, and the interests of our international partners. They attack Americans and intend to continue doing so. We apply the full range of tools to help Somalis defend themselves and to reduce the capacity of these groups to harm us. Greater security coordination among various Somali forces and their international partners can reduce the threat posed by Somalia-based global terrorist networks.

The African Union’s peacekeeping operation in Somalia has been vital to Somalia’s revival. It has now begun gradually turning over its security responsibilities to Somali forces. The United States is an important partner in preparing Somali forces to take on these tasks. Our efforts are guided by the goal we share with the Somali government: more operationally effective and professional Somali security forces that respect human rights, protect civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for abuses.

Prosperity: Somalis confront a variety of natural calamities, insecurity, economic dysfunction, and deficient public services. These dire circumstances contribute to life-threatening levels of hunger, disease, and poverty, which drive displacement. Our humanitarian, development, and economic professionals work to reduce these threats, in coordination with Somalia’s state and federal authorities (including the administration of the Somaliland region), international organizations, and like-minded donors. They provide aid from the American people to Somalis in need; increase household and community resilience to shocks; and promote adoption and implementation by the Somali government of key reforms leading to further debt relief, greater
private sector-led inclusive economic growth, increased food security, and reduction in corruption and other financial crimes.

**Governance:** We work with Somalia’s federal and state governments (including the administration of the Somaliland region) and with civil society, regional organizations, and like-minded international partners to promote peace and stability. Specifically, we buttress areas recently recovered from or under threat of domination by terrorist forces, expand public education and health services, and support governance reforms that advance peace and stability. Among these reforms, we encourage Somali leaders to agree on a clear and consistent framework for relations between the federal and state governments; reconciliation with the Somaliland region; inclusive democratic processes; and respect for human rights at the federal, state, and local levels. While these reforms can be enacted piecemeal under the current provisional constitution, Somalia’s long-term stability is best served by institutionalizing these measures through a permanent constitution.

**Our Presence:** The U.S. Mission to Somalia is made up of colleagues based in Mogadishu, Somalia, and in Nairobi, Kenya. U.S. Embassy Nairobi provides services to our colleagues based in that city. U.S. Embassy Nairobi’s consular section provides coverage for Somalia. We request the Department develop, fund, and execute a project for a new embassy compound and residential facility that meets relevant standards, accommodates anticipated staffing, incorporates consular facilities, and enables the closure of the U.S. Mission Somalia office at U.S. Embassy Nairobi. This will likely be a lengthy process. Meanwhile, we are grateful for the support we receive from our U.S. Embassy Nairobi colleagues.

**Implementation:** Achieving our ambitious goals on behalf of the American people requires that we engage with Somalia’s 16 million citizens and their leaders throughout this country with a territory the size of Texas and a 2,000-mile Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden coastline. Severe security challenges require that we do so in a highly deliberate, cautious manner, seizing opportunities to advance our interests and goals throughout the country whenever security and logistics conditions permit. Our dynamic interagency team takes a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to advancing U.S. strategic priorities in Somalia. The U.S. Mission to Somalia is run on a goal-centric, “One Mission, One Team” basis.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Increase security for the United States and Somalia.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Enhanced security coordination among Somali forces and international partners reduces risk of Somalia-based global terrorism.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Focused security assistance increases the effectiveness of Somali forces, leading to a reduction in terrorism, terrorism financing, insurgency, and violent crime.

Mission Goal 2: Respond to recurring humanitarian needs while supporting inclusive and resilient economic growth.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Assistance saves lives while building resilience of households and communities. (Links to CDCS Development Objective 2: Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.)
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Support reforms that enable full debt relief, spur private sector-led growth, and reduce financial crimes.

Mission Goal 3: Promote peace through stable, effective governance.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Governance and public services are strengthened in areas recently recovered from or under threat of domination by violent groups. (Links to CDCS Development Objective 1: Targeted local institutions govern in a more legitimate manner, diminishing influence of violent extremist organizations.)
- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Access to education and health services expands significantly throughout government-controlled Somalia, inspired in part by USAID targeted programs. (Links to CDCS Development Objective 2: Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.)
- **Mission Objective 3.3:** Facilitation promotes reconciliation and contributes toward Somalia implementing a constitution that provides a framework for stable, effective governance.

Management Objective: The Department develops, funds, and executes a project to build an embassy and residential compound that meets DS, OBO, and Greening Diplomacy Initiative requirements; accommodates anticipated staffing; incorporates consular facilities; and enables the closure of the U.S. Mission Somalia office at U.S. Embassy Nairobi. (Links to OBO Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS) Goal 1, Enhance the security, safety, functionality and resilience of facilities and residences through the design and construction program, and DS FBS Goal 1, Secure U.S. foreign affairs activity in all operating environments, domestically and abroad, to advance U.S. diplomacy)

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3. Mission Goals and Objectives

**Mission Goal 1** | Increase security for the United States and Somalia.

**Description** | The al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia terrorist groups threaten Somalia’s long-term peace, security, and stability. They also launch attacks in the region, including attacks on Americans. They aspire to launch attacks beyond the region. Al-Shabaab is a particularly formidable threat: it controls or influences territory and populations throughout the country, continues to launch deadly attacks on “soft targets” and civilians, maintains the ability and intent to strike beyond Somalia’s borders, and extorts millions of dollars in revenue annually from individuals and businesses that it uses to fund its terrorist efforts. Somalia’s security forces must effectively coordinate with international partners and build their own operational capacity to take full responsibility for the country’s security and prevent and respond to terrorism and crime, putting the terror networks on the defensive, thereby decreasing attacks. Somali authorities also must minimize opportunities for al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia to establish a presence, recruit members, and exert persistent influence by addressing the root causes of violent extremism and community grievances that terrorist groups exacerbate and exploit.

**Objective 1.1** | Enhanced security coordination among Somali forces and international partners reduces risk of Somalia-based global terrorism.

- **Justification** | Countering violent extremism in Somalia has been a combined effort of the Somali government, the African Union, the UN, and the United States and other international donors. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has played a major role in providing security and reducing terrorist threats from al-Shabaab. Strengthening coordination between the Somali National Army (SNA) and international partners is vital to long-term success, especially given plans to transition primary responsibility for the country’s security from AMISOM to the Somali Security Forces. Greater coordination within various elements of Somalia’s security forces and among the donors that support them is also critical to ensure an effective, united response to the threats posed by al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.

- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objectives 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4; JRS Objective 1.2; the U.S. National Security Strategy; and Objectives 2 and 3 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

- **Risks** |
  - Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia continue to threaten U.S., Somali, and partner countries’ security and interests.
  - Stakeholder fatigue sets in, forcing the United States and partner countries to reconsider additional security-related commitments to Somalia.
  - The FGS fails to make the essential investments and accountability improvements needed to build upon stakeholders’ security-related investments.
Continued political competition further diminishes political elites’ will to prioritize counterterrorism initiatives over efforts to maximize their own political and economic power.

We will continue to mitigate these risks through intensive diplomatic engagement with key political actors to encourage credible electoral processes at all levels that result in broadly accepted outcomes and lead to a peaceful political settlement between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS).

**Objective 1.2** | Focused security assistance increases the effectiveness of Somali forces, leading to a reduction in terrorism, terrorism financing, insurgency, and violent crime.

- **Justification** | While support from the United States and other partners has strengthened Somalia’s security capabilities, the SNA and the Somali Police Force (SPF) lack the capacity to adequately provide for Somalia’s security or counter threats posed by al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia to U.S. and partner countries’ interests. Strengthening this capacity is especially important given plans to transition primary responsibility for the country’s security from AMISOM to the SNA. Continued U.S. assistance to the SNA Danab (“Lightning”) Advanced Infantry Brigade through training and equipment provision and to the SPF Counterterrorism and Intelligence Division and Explosive Ordnance Division through training, equipment, and advisory support will help reduce terrorist groups’ ability to conduct attacks within Somalia or use the country as a haven to support external terrorist operations that threaten the security of the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests in East Africa. Continued U.S. support to Somalia’s military and police to enable greater professionalism and accountability also will enhance their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist threats and crime.

- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objectives 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4; JRS Objective 1.2; the U.S. National Security Strategy; and Objectives 2 and 3 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

- **Risks** |
  - Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia continue to threaten U.S., Somali, and partner countries’ security and interests.
  - Stakeholder fatigue sets in, forcing the United States and partner countries to reconsider additional security-related commitments to Somalia.
  - Security forces are unwilling to apply training, and the FGS fails to make the essential investments and accountability improvements needed to build upon stakeholders’ security-related investments.
  - Continued political competition further diminishes political elites’ will to prioritize counterterrorism initiatives over efforts to maximize their own political and economic power.
  - We will continue to mitigate these risks through intensive diplomatic engagement with key political actors to encourage credible electoral processes.
at all levels that result in broadly accepted outcomes and lead to a peaceful political settlement between the FGS and the FMS.

**Mission Goal 2 |** Respond to recurring humanitarian needs while supporting inclusive and resilient economic growth.

**Description |** For decades Somalia has faced large-scale humanitarian needs, with millions of people struggling with hunger, disease, poverty, and displacement. Reducing these needs and achieving long-term prosperity is contingent on Somalia’s ability to provide security (see goal 1) and create an environment conducive to private sector-led economic growth, including by minimizing corruption and other financial crimes. Sustainable economic growth must be inclusive of previously marginalized communities and ensure households can withstand climate shocks, disease outbreaks, and natural and man-made disasters. Climate change, including severe droughts, is increasingly seen as a driver of conflict and poses a serious threat to stability in Somalia. A more resilient economy will help communities more effectively manage disruptions and reduce the cost to U.S. taxpayers of the United States’ substantial annual humanitarian response efforts.

**Objective 2.1 |** Assistance saves lives while building resilience, food security, and nutrition of households and communities. (Links to CDCS Development Objective 2: Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.)

- **Justification |** An estimated 70 percent of Somalis live in chronic poverty with little capacity to endure the severe environmental and man-made shocks that recur frequently in Somalia, including droughts, floods, locust infestations, conflict, and displacement, all exacerbated by the continuing COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the need for humanitarian assistance remains high year after year, with the U.S. government’s provision of more than $400 million annually in humanitarian aid in each of the last five years meeting only part of that need. To escape this cycle of humanitarian need, the resilience of both rural and urban vulnerable households, especially marginalized groups, must be strengthened.

- **Linkages |** This objective supports JSP Objectives 2.2, 3.1, and 3.4; JRS Objectives 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4; and Objective 5 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

- **Risks |**
  - An additional shock, such as a fourth failed rainy season or an outbreak of widespread violence, leads to devastating increases in population displacement, asset depletion, and hunger.
  - Addressing immense immediate needs overwhelms the ability to make longer-term investments to address the underlying factors that foster resilience.
  - We will continue to mitigate these risks by seeking better ways to integrate humanitarian resources and development approaches to meet emergency needs.
in ways that also strengthen resilience and prevent populations from losing their livelihoods.

**Objective 2.2 |** Support reforms that enable full debt relief, spur private sector-led growth, and reduce financial crimes.

- **Justification |** Widespread corruption, weak financial institutions, the lack of an enabling regulatory environment, and constrained access to international finance due to outstanding debts and concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing continue to rob Somalia of critical resources and stifle private investment. These constraints must be addressed to achieve the inclusive economic growth needed to build the resilience of vulnerable households and communities.

- **Linkages |** This objective supports JSP Objectives 2.1 and 2.3, JRS Objectives 2.1 and 3.1, Objective 4 of the Somalia Policy Framework, and the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption.

- **Risks |**
  - Somalia fails to achieve the level of inclusive economic growth needed to meaningfully reduce its substantial dependence on U.S. humanitarian assistance.
  - Somalia fails to achieve full debt forgiveness.
  - Political will to effectively counter corruption remains elusive.
  - We will continue to mitigate these risks through continuous, intensive diplomatic engagement to encourage peaceful, stable political settlements and the adoption of critical reforms. We also will consider pursuing sanctions or other punitive measures against corrupt actors.

**Mission Goal 3 |** Promote peace through stable, effective governance.

**Description |** Somalia’s future as a peaceful, democratic state is contingent on the establishment of representative administrations at the national, FMS, and local levels that can reduce the negative effects of the country’s clan-related and political divisions; resolve outstanding resource-related disputes; meet the needs and respect the rights of all communities, including previously excluded groups; and provide essential services, including health and education.

**Objective 3.1 |** Governance and public services are strengthened in areas recently recovered from or under threat of domination by violent groups. (Links to CDCS Development Objective 1: Targeted local institutions govern in a more legitimate manner, diminishing influence of violent extremist organizations.)
• **Justification** | Al-Shabaab effectively exploits clan divisions and community grievances created by government systems that are perceived as ineffective, undemocratic, corrupt, or even predatory to recruit members and shore up its legitimacy. While al-Shabaab maintains control of areas in large part through violence and coercion, the group reinforces its hold on territory and communities by offering limited services like security and justice that the government does not effectively provide and by playing to perceptions of corruption and injustice connected to state authority. While al-Shabaab’s justice is harsh, it is less corrupt and more efficient, predictable, and enforceable than the justice provided by the state. In addition to military intervention, effectively countering al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia hinges on providing accountable and transparent governance, credible judicial and conflict mitigation processes, and more equitable distribution of economic and social resources. This in turn depends on strengthening legitimate, local systems and institutions and creating inclusive livelihood opportunities for marginalized populations most at risk of succumbing to the influence of violent extremist organizations.

• **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objective 1.3, JRS Objectives 1.1 and 3.1, the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National Strategy and Gender Equity and Equality, and Objective 5 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

• **Risks** |
  - Al-Shabaab further enhances its credibility as a de facto state and continues to exploit clan divisions, sustain predatory recruitment practices, and increase its financial reserves through extortionary practices.
  - Historically dominant clans and groups that took hold of key areas through force following Somalia’s state collapse in 1991 further entrench their power, continue preventing community decision-making processes, and continue denying access to justice for marginalized populations.
  - We will continue to mitigate these risks by identifying and collaborating with partners who embrace the principles of inclusive politics, understanding that these partners will differ in each targeted geographic area and community.
Objective 3.2 | Access to education and health services expands significantly throughout government-controlled Somalia, inspired in part by USAID targeted programs.

- **Justification** | Three decades of violent conflict and the resulting disintegration of the government have severely damaged the state’s ability to provide services, especially education and health care. Three million of Somalia’s five million school-aged children are out of school, for example. International support to help the FGS and the FMS re-establish education and health services is critical for the formation of a legitimate government that can promote peace and stability, and USAID programs targeting specific regions will serve as models for approaches that can be scaled nationally.

- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objectives 1.3, 2.2, and 3.4; JRS Objectives 4.1 and 4.4; and Objective 5 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

- **Risks** | Climatic shocks or outbreaks of conflict lead to widespread population migration that makes it more difficult to provide education and health services and diverts both government and donor resources away from these sectors. We will continue to mitigate these risks by seeking ways to deliver humanitarian resources in ways that enable affected households to remain home instead of migrating.

Objective 3.3 | Facilitation promotes reconciliation and contributes toward Somalia implementing a constitution that provides a framework for stable, effective governance.

- **Justification** | Three decades of conflict have exacerbated clan-based divisions in Somalia and decimated the government’s ability to provide services. Competition over resources and clan-related grievances remain significant obstacles to building a more stable Somali state. To re-establish itself as a well-functioning government able to meet citizens’ basic needs, the FGS must achieve a sustainable consensus with FMS leaders and other key political stakeholders on power- and revenue-sharing arrangements; more democratic processes for electing leaders; and systems to guarantee basic human rights for all citizens, including establishing a national constitution. It is also essential that sub-national reconciliation processes are strengthened by identifying and addressing localized grievances. It is particularly important that these efforts meaningfully include minority groups, women, and youth. More than 75 percent of Somalia’s population is under the age of 30 and has little experience engaging with formal governance structures and investing in Somalia’s political and economic future.

- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objectives 1.2 and 1.3; JRS Objectives 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3; and Objective 4 of the Somalia Policy Framework.

- **Risks** |
  - Without reconciliation, key political actors continue to put narrow personal or clan interests ahead of national interests.
  - Clan divisions worsen, risking a resurgence of violence that could undermine efforts to promote political reconciliation, more democratic processes, and adherence to human rights principles.
We will continue to mitigate these risks through intensive diplomatic engagement, in close coordination with other international partners, to encourage key political actors to reach a stable, peaceful political settlement and conduct credible electoral processes.

4. Management Objective

Management Objective 1 | The Department develops, funds, and executes a project to build an embassy and residential compound that meets DS, OBO, and Greening Diplomacy Initiative requirements; accommodates anticipated staffing; incorporates consular facilities; and enables the closure of the U.S. Mission Somalia office at U.S. Embassy Nairobi.

- **Justification** | Since the December 2018 reestablishment of a permanent presence in Mogadishu, the number of U.S. government personnel in Somalia has increased substantially. To accommodate additional Mogadishu-based U.S. direct hire/Personal Services Contract (USDH/PSC) positions and begin hiring Mogadishu-based locally employed (LE) staff, transfer Nairobi-based USDH/PSC and LE staff positions to Mogadishu, provide consular services, establish a sufficiently robust management platform, effectively manage demands for increased diplomatic engagement, provide oversight of our substantial assistance programs, and keep our personnel and facilities safe and secure, it is essential that the embassy’s physical plant provide adequate living and working space and meet DS, OBO, and other relevant requirements and logistical issues for food, equipment, parts, and supplies be addressed, and adequate medical care be available.

- **Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Management Objective 1, OBO FBS Goal 1, and DS FBS Goal 1.

- **Risks** |
  - The Department decides a physical presence in Mogadishu is no longer worth the cost or security-related risks.
  - Funding constraints prevent the construction of a purpose-built embassy facility.
  - We will continue to mitigate these risks by seeking ways to minimize costs, ensure value for money, and strengthen security measures to protect U.S. personnel and facilities.