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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The U.S. government supports the aspirations of the Libyan people to vote for a national government that governs in a unified, transparent, and accountable manner for all Libyans. This will continue to be a priority for U.S. engagement in Libya. To this end, the United States will continue to work with diverse Libyan stakeholders—including those in government, civil society, and the private sector—to support Libya’s political transition through reforms and actions that solidify its democracy, accountability, and inclusion. This includes ensuring that diverse Libyan stakeholders and communities, including women, youth, and other traditionally marginalized groups, have active buy-in during the political transition process to advance community cohesion and reconciliation. Our foreign assistance programs will support national and local governance institutions to effectively perform their core mandates and accountably deliver services to all Libyans, including those still displaced or otherwise affected by conflict.

The presence of malign foreign and internal actors pursuing their own agendas at the expense of the Libyan people continues to threaten longer-term peace and stability. The United States will partner with civil society, the media, and others to counter hate speech and disinformation in favor of inclusion, reconciliation, and unity, as well as to facilitate the dissemination of accurate information on U.S. policy and initiatives in the Libyan information space.

The identification of Libya as a priority country under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, 2020 is an opportunity to take a longer-term view to U.S. engagement, ensuring U.S. diplomacy, development, and security sectors are well integrated to foster long-term peace and stability. U.S. programs will build upon and strengthen constructive partnerships with reform-minded local actors in government, civil society, and the private sector and elevate local voices to jointly seek on-the-ground solutions to prevent conflict. Our approach is informed by the principles identified in the inter-Agency Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018 and with key U.S. policy frameworks, including the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 2021; U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, 2019; the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018; and others. Further, as the integration of diverse voices is essential to a durable political transition, the United States will ensure that

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considerations related to equity, inclusion, diversity, and accessibility are embedded across our work in Libya.

Recognizing that security is fundamental to a vibrant society and economy, the United States will continue to support Libya’s efforts to develop unified national, civilian-led defense, security, and justice institutions that protect and serve citizens and are accountable to civilian authority. These institutions serve as important partners in domestic, regional, and international security and counterterrorism efforts and are vital to prevent the large-scale reemergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or other extremist groups. We will also continue to support Libya’s ability to contribute to regional security and defense initiatives, including counterterrorism efforts and the departure of foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries.

Looking ahead, it is clear Libya’s economy has tremendous potential to serve as a driver of prosperity and stability. Strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, and endowed with vast natural resources, Libya can serve as a major hub for trade and investment as well as an economic anchor in the region. Libyan oil production and revenues continue to increase, and Libya has taken promising steps to unify key institutions, like the Central Bank of Libya, and produce a consolidated budget. A stable, democratic Libyan government will find eager partners in the international community and private sector. The United States will continue to support equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth and opportunity, including through technical support to key economic institutions to enhance the transparent and accountable public financial management of Libya’s resources. We will continue to partner with Libya to foster a vibrant private sector environment for trade and investment, including increased opportunities for U.S. businesses.

Even while focusing on immediate political and security imperatives, we need to be mindful of emergent challenges. Climate change, for instance, poses a threat to stability and risks undermining key gains in other areas. Libya is highly susceptible to the negative effects of climate change, such as water shortages, further desertification, and extreme weather events.

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In line with the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE), the United States will seek opportunities to support Libya to mitigate the impacts of climate change, including by increasing adoption of renewable energy and taking concrete steps to improve energy efficiency.

As of the development of this strategy, the full impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are still to be seen. The United States has been an active partner in Libya’s efforts to combat the pandemic. To date, the United States has provided over $20 million to strengthen the response capacity of Libya’s health sector and respond to the urgent health needs of vulnerable populations, including those that continued to be displaced by conflict. In addition, the United States, via COVAX, has increased the availability of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines in Libya. We will continue to support Libyan institutions to respond to the crisis and be better prepared in the face of future unexpected events. Our foreign assistance programs will also be mindful of the second-order effects of COVID-19 across society and the economy.

We are aware of the challenges. The political environment in Libya remains dynamic. The effectiveness of our approach is shaped by the strength of our partnerships with committed individuals across government, civil society, and the private sector who share our values. Malign actors internal and external to Libya threaten gains and work counter to inclusion, political reconciliation, and unity. The United States is also limited by lack of a permanent diplomatic presence in Libya, as it continues to primarily operate offshore from Tunis.

Despite these challenges, U.S. strategic interests call for our continued engagement with Libya as a political, economic, and security partner. The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability requires that we look beyond the four-year objectives in our Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) to the 10-year vision of U.S. engagement in Libya. Our approach will necessarily be locally led, implemented in partnership with our Libyan counterparts, and driven by lessons learned. To ensure that our ICS objectives remain timely and relevant to our short-and long-term strategic objectives, the U.S. Mission to Libya will review them at least annually through an inter-Agency process.

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Whether based in Tunis or Tripoli, the U.S. Mission will continue to be deeply engaged in supporting Libya’s stabilization, reconciliation, and political transition.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

**Mission Goal 1:** A more sovereign Libya is governed by a unified, democratic, and domestically and internationally recognized authority capable of inclusively representing Libyan citizens and partnering with the international community on common priorities.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Libya advances its political transition through reforms and actions—including presidential and parliamentary elections—that solidify its democracy, accountability, and inclusion while countering malign influence and disinformation. (USAID Development Objective (DO1))

- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Libya has more unified national and local governance institutions with increased ability to effectively perform their core mandates and accountably deliver services to all Libyans, including those still displaced or otherwise affected by conflict. (USAID DO1)

- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Diverse Libyan stakeholders and communities have active buy-in during the political transition process to advance community cohesion and reconciliation, promote accountable and inclusive governance, and mitigate drivers of instability. (USAID DO2)

**Mission Goal 2:** Libya develops unified national, civilian-led defense, security, and justice institutions that act as better contributing partners in domestic, regional, and international security and counterterrorism efforts.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Libya develops more professional and effective civilian-led security and justice institutions to better protect and serve citizens.

- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Libya’s security institutions regain a monopoly on force by gradually disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating demobilized armed groups into state security structures that are accountable to civilian authority.

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• **Mission Objective 2.3:** Libya establishes a unified military structure under a single Ministry of Defense able to contribute to regional security and defense initiatives, including counterterrorism efforts and the departure of foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries.

**Mission Goal 3:** Libya’s economic and governance environment supports equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth and opportunity.

• **Mission Objective 3.1:** Libya improves the capabilities of key institutions to enhance the transparent and accountable management of Libya's resources (economic, financial, energy, and climate/environment) and mitigate opportunities for corruption. (USAID DO1)

• **Mission Objective 3.2:** Libya’s economic and business environment fosters more private sector development, including through enhanced economic opportunities for diverse groups, and increased U.S. investment and trade. (USAID DO2)

**Mission Goal 4:** The Libya External Office (LEO) increases its support to U.S. citizens and facilitates legitimate travel by Libyans to the United States.

• **Mission Objective 4.1:** Improved coordination with Libyan officials to better serve American citizens in distress.

• **Mission Objective 4.2:** Reinforce processes and safeguards related to visa security and streamline communication with Libyan officials on appropriate visa procedures and travel policies.

**Management Objective 1:** Expand the LEO’s operational footprint in Libya to ensure that the mission has the assets and personnel capabilities on the ground to support full diplomatic engagement and advance the 2 FAM 410 process for reopening an embassy.

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Management Objective 2: Increase the engagement of the LEO Locally Engaged Staff in support of evolving mission requirements in Libya.

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3. Mission Goals and Objectives

**Mission Goal 1 |** A more sovereign Libya is governed by a unified, democratic, and domestically and internationally recognized authority capable of inclusively representing Libyan citizens and partnering with the international community on common priorities.

**Description |** As the United Nations-brokered political negotiation process continues to unfold, the United States will support national-level institutions to advance Libya’s transition and will support the increased participation of citizen groups in political processes. To advance Libya’s long-term democratic political transition, it is essential that this commitment to representative, inclusive, and effective governance extends to the local level. As such, U.S. policy and programs will also continue to support responsive governance, stability, and citizen participation at the municipal and community level. To support an inclusive political transition, the United States will ensure that programs specifically target groups traditionally underrepresented in Libya, including women, youth, indigenous groups, and persons with disabilities, to increase their voice and representation in political processes and civic life.

**Objective 1.1 |** Libya advances its political transition through reforms and actions—including presidential and parliamentary elections—that solidify its democracy, accountability, and inclusion while countering malign influence and disinformation.

- **Justification |** Libya’s political transition remains at a nascent and fragile stage. Paramount to solidifying gains and combating backsliding will be empowering Libyan actors and institutions to take a lead role in supporting an inclusive and accountable political transition. The United States will support Libyan actors and diverse voices on key themes related to the constitutional process, elections, and reconciliation so that Libyans can chart a path forward that protects their sovereignty. Women, youth, indigenous groups, and persons of disabilities are among the groups

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that have been marginalized from political and social life in Libya. Their integration is important for an inclusive and durable political transition.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to the USAID/Libya Country Strategic Framework, 2021-2024 Development Objective One “Effectiveness of Key Libyan Governance Institutions Improved,” specifically Area 1.1 “Building Capacity to Advance Elections and Political Transition.” It also links with Joint Strategic Plan Goal 3, specifically Strategic Objectives 3.1, “Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens”; 3.2, “Advance equity, accessibility, and rights for all”; and 3.4, “Address the root causes of irregular migration collaboratively with our partners and enhance protections for refugees and displaced persons.” It also links to the Middle East and North Africa Joint Regional Strategy goal 4 “Advance accountable and responsive governance to strengthen democratic principles and fundamental freedoms” and its related objectives. It also aligns with the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability and the principles of the Stabilization Assistance Review.

- **Risks** | Achievement of this objective relies on Libyan actors continuing to respect the ceasefire and pursuing their vision for Libya’s governance and development through political and technocratic means. It also relies on Libyan citizens remaining committed to participating in Libya’s political and governance development as engaged citizens and community leaders, members of civil society organizations, voters, and candidates for national and sub-national elected offices. To mitigate these risks, programming will be fully coordinated with and informed by diplomatic engagements. In addition, activities will be actively monitored and adjusted to minimize programmatic risk and maximize opportunities for achievement.

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Objective 1.2 | Libya has more unified national and local governance institutions with increased ability to effectively perform their core mandates and to accountably deliver services to all Libyans, including those still displaced or otherwise affected by conflict. (USAID DO1)

- **Justification** | Weak and inequitable delivery of services decreases trust in government and fosters divisions in Libyan society. The technical assistance and training under this objective will help Libyan government institutions more capably respond to the needs of citizens through better governance and public service delivery that reflects citizen priorities, while building partnerships to combat public sector corruption. Activities under this objective will include advancing the implementation of Law 59 through concerted efforts to expand the reach of national services to the local level, connect citizens and government, and foster dialogue on the decentralization agenda. Building trust in government through improved services is critical to longer-term political reconciliation. This objective also focuses on improving institutional capacity to address current and emergent health and humanitarian crises, including COVID-19, and respond to the needs of Libyans that continue to be displaced by conflict. The presence of unified institutions that are more resilient to crisis will help prevent political, economic, and social capital from being diverted from the critical tasks of political transition and political reconciliation.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to the USAID/Libya Country Strategic Framework 2021-2024, Development Objective One “Effectiveness of Key Libyan Governance Institutions Improved,” specifically Area 1.2 “Enhancing Fiscal Transparency and Promoting Targeted Reforms,” and 1.3 “Strengthening Municipal Service Delivery and Financial Management.” It also links with Joint Strategic Plan Goal 3, specifically Strategic Objectives 3.1, “Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens”; 3.2, “Advance equity, accessibility, and rights for all”; and 3.3, “Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption,” in addition to Strategic Objective 1.3. “Reinvigorate U.S. humanitarian leadership and provide lifesaving protection and assistance

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in response to international disasters and humanitarian crises overseas.” It also links to the Middle East North Africa Joint Regional Strategy goal 1 “Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships and multilateral cooperation...” - specifically objective 1.2, as well as goal 4 “Advance accountable, responsive governance to strengthen democratic principles and fundamental freedoms” - specifically objectives 4.1. It also aligns with the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the U.S. Strategy to Combat Corruption, and the principles of the Stabilization Assistance Review.

- **Risks |** Achievement of this objective relies on Libyan elected leaders and government employees being committed to serving the public good regardless of political, ethnic, religious, tribal, or other affiliation, including respecting the need to use public resources for public purposes. Corruption is endemic in Libya and will continue to provide an obstacle to service delivery in the foreseeable future, but incremental improvements are possible particularly with popular support. Effectively addressing health and humanitarian crises requires the Libyan government to take necessary policy actions in a timely manner. To mitigate these risks, diplomatic and programmatic teams will assess opportunities and challenges and leverage key governmental and non-governmental partnerships. These collective efforts will inform diplomatic engagements and programmatic implementation to achieve the mission objective.

**Objective 1.3 |** Diverse Libyan stakeholders and communities have active buy-in during the political transition process to advance community cohesion and reconciliation, promote accountable and inclusive governance, and mitigate drivers of instability. (USAID DO2)

- **Justification |** If grievances that threaten political progress are addressed and the influence of spoilers and armed actors is mitigated, then diverse Libyan stakeholders and communities can have buy-in during the political transition. Social, economic, and political exclusion will continue to be a source of conflict if not addressed by the political transition. Exclusion can be exploited by elites, armed actors, and malign foreign actors to convince communities they are under
an existential threat and have grievances that need to be rectified (e.g., exclusion from national decisions or benefits from the state - economic, service, security, etc.). If communities are engaged in the political process, then they are less likely to be exploited by armed actors and spoilers, particularly if they see tangible results, such as equitable services and fair distribution of the country’s wealth. The more communities interact and become interdependent, the more willing they will be to engage with and accept reconciliation initiatives. Mission diplomatic engagements and programming activities are targeted to encourage positive public engagement in the political process. Additionally, USAID stabilization programs are tailored to the local and national contexts to address grievances that could threaten opportunities for political compromise.

- **Linkages** | This goal links to the USAID/Libya Country Strategic Framework 2021-2024, under both Development Objectives, but aligns most closely with Development Objective 2: “Libyans empowered to mitigate drivers of instability and conflict,” specifically Area 2.1 Engaging Civil Society to Support Inclusive Political Transition,” Area 2.3 “Preserving Moderate Spaces,” and Area 2.4 “Supporting Conflict-affected and Vulnerable Populations.” It also links to Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objective 1.4: “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.” It also links to the Middle East and North Africa Joint Regional Strategy goal 4 “Advance accountable, responsive governance to strengthen democratic principles and fundamental freedoms” - specifically objective 4.4 and goal 1 “Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships and multilateral cooperation...,” specifically objectives 1.1 and 1.2. Additionally, the LEO’s approach to stabilization is informed by U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability and the Stabilization Assistance Review.

- **Risks** | Libya’s political leadership has demonstrated an unwillingness to compromise, threatening the advancement of Libya’s political transition, including broad-based public participation in electing a unity government. Divisions are
exploited by the political elite to further entrench their interests. These factors contribute to fragmentation in the country and contribute to instability. To mitigate these risks, the LEO’s stabilization approach focuses on meaningful participation of citizens to be a counterweight to the entrenched status quo actors resisting positive political changes.

Mission Goal 2 | Libya develops unified national, civilian-led defense, security, and justice institutions that act as better contributing partners in domestic, regional, and international security and counterterrorism efforts.

Description | Libya remains critical to U.S. efforts to defeat violent extremism and address global competition from the PRC and Russia to protect U.S. security and economic interests. Security, both short term and long term, remains a critical national priority for the United States in Libya and the region. Currently, a lack of unified Libyan security and defense bodies and the presence of local and external armed actors undermine the political reconciliation process and providing ungoverned space for malign actors to operate and to use Libya as a base to project power and influence across the region.

Objective 2.1 | Improve the capabilities of Libyan security forces and criminal justice institutions to maintain internal stability, border security, disrupt terrorist and criminal networks while upholding the rule of law and human rights.

• Justification | A focus on professionalism and capacity building within Libya’s security, military, and justice apparatuses will support ongoing efforts to unify these institutions and help them gain legitimacy among the public while carrying out critical functions. These functions include countering internal and external threats, upholding the rule of law, and reducing the likelihood of violent escalation of conflict. In addition to ensuring security and accountability, consolidated security, military, and justice institutions under civilian authority will also create an enabling environment for elections, stabilization, and the viability of a unified, inclusive government capable of partnering with the United States. To achieve this, implementing partners will provide training through

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virtual platforms, at venues in Libya, and by facilitating travel to neighboring countries to engage in capability development. The LEO will identify and encourage the participation of appropriate stakeholders from throughout Libya’s fractured security, military, and justice institutions in bilateral trainings as appropriate. A lack of unified Libyan security and justice institutions allow malign domestic and international actors, transnational organized crime, and terrorist networks to operate inside of Libya, fueling corruption and hindering national reconciliation. The inability to effectively address these challenges is also undermining Libya’s sovereignty, security, rule of law, and democratic development.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to the Global Fragility Act of 2020, the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, particularly Strategic Objective 1.4, “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges [and competitors]; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.” It also links to the MENA Joint Regional Strategy Goal 1, “Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships, and multilateral cooperation to prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; counter terrorism; and address regional security and stabilization challenges.”

- **Risks** | There are inherent risks in working with Libyan security partners that may be infiltrated or allied with non-state organizations. Specific risks come from the fluidity of command-and-control over security institutions given the hybridization of standing legitimate institutions through the influence and presence of non-state armed groups and militias within various institutional settings. Key to mitigating this risk is steady and precise interaction with key players within these organizations from across Libya.
Objective 2.2 | Improve Libyan security institutions’ capabilities in regaining a monopoly of force and legitimacy by supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts.

- **Justification** | The DDR of non-state armed actors will decrease risks of violent conflict and instability. Without non-state armed group competition, an empowered Libyan security sector will contribute to long-term peace and stability, support the development of effective governance institutions, and be capable of partnering with the United States and the international community. Likewise, working with UNSMIL and appropriate Libyan entities on DDR programs will enable former members of non-state armed actors to transition into formal security positions or civilian life.

- **Linkages** | The objectives links with Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objective 1.4, “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges [and competitors]; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.” It also links to the MENA Joint Regional Strategy Goal 1, “Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships, and multilateral cooperation to prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; counter terrorism; and address regional security and stabilization challenges.” It also aligns with the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.

- **Risks** | Further integration of armed groups into state security apparatuses could destabilize those institutions and lead to the increased entrenchment of armed groups inside the government. Demobilization of armed groups could allow non-state security actors and/or terrorist organizations to take advantage of the resulting power vacuum. To mitigate such risks, it will be critical to work with UNSMIL and the Libyan government to identify such security risks early in the DDR process. In the absence of locally led and generated solutions, there is significant risk of non-sustainable and ineffectual approaches being brought to bear on these complex challenges, due to an absence of local-level buy-in, support, expertise, and contextual awareness. Thus, it is critical to develop local capacity in addressing underlying factors with commitment from the broader society.

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Objective 2.3 | Support the reunification of the Libyan military.

- **Justification** | A unified military would be able to contribute to regional security and defense initiatives, including counterterrorism efforts and the departure of foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries (FFF&M). Military unification across Libya and government control over non-state armed actors and militias will decrease risks of violent conflict and instability and enable political stabilization. Without foreign and domestic armed actor competition and influence, an empowered Libyan security sector will contribute to long-term stability and the development of effective governance institutions, capable of partnering with the United States and the international community and address global competition from the PRC and Russia. A unified Libyan military would be symbolic of the progress Libya has made as it emerges from a decade-long period of civil conflict and serve as a means by which to further reconciliation more broadly.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objective 1.4, “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges [and competitors]; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.” It also links to the MENA Joint Regional Strategy Goal 1, “Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships, and multilateral cooperation to prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; counter terrorism; and address regional security and stabilization challenges.” This objective aligns with the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.

- **Risks** | It is conceivable that a reunified military may seek to exert political influence that is not in the interests of the Libyan people, so it will be critical to engage with a diverse group of military decision-makers, balancing inter-regional, intra-regional, and the inter-service dynamics while empowering legitimate civilian authority to manage key national security decisions.
Mission Goal 3 | Libya’s economic and governance environment supports equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth and opportunity.

Description | Libya’s economic and financial institutions play a significant role in contributing to economic growth that provides stability to the country. These institutions must capably manage the country’s revenue, derived primarily from the sale of oil and gas, through inclusive budget creation and transparent budget execution. This revenue is needed to underwrite government operations and investments, especially costly service delivery projects aimed at reversing years of underinvestment and deferred maintenance. If Libya’s economy is going to deliver for all citizens, it must modernize and diversify beyond the oil and gas sector. Libya must also increase the share of clean energy in the energy mix to accelerate the decarbonization of the economy, protect the environment, and address the urgent climate crisis.

Objective 3.1 | Libya improves the capabilities of key institutions to enhance the transparent and accountable management of Libya’s resources (economic, financial, energy, and climate/environment) and mitigate opportunities for corruption. (USAID DO1)

- Justification | Increased transparency and accountability in Libya’s economic and financial institutions will decrease the probability of renewed conflict over resources and deter spoilers from stealing state resources. A focus on the climate and environment will help Libya keep pace with worldwide trends to decarbonize and diversify the Libyan economy, providing more opportunity for clean, sustainable growth over the mid-to-long term. The technical assistance and training contemplated under this objective will help Libyan government institutions more capably respond to the needs of citizens by implementing sound budget planning and transparent budget execution. The mission will deliver targeted technical assistance to key Libyan institutions and carry out bilateral training events, in addition to increasing our diplomatic engagements to achieve this objective.

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• **Linkages** | This Objective is linked to USAID/Libya’s Country Strategic Framework, 2021-24 Development Objective 1: “Effectiveness of key Libyan governance institutions improved,” specifically areas 1.2. “Enhancing fiscal transparency and promoting targeted reforms.” It also links with Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objectives 1.2, “Secure ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation outcomes”; 2.4, “Strengthen U.S. and global resilience to economic, technological, environmental, and other systemic shocks; and 3.3, “Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption,” in addition to the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption. It also links to the Middle East and North Africa Joint Regional Strategy goal 3 “Strengthen inclusive economic growth that achieves stable and prosperous societies while creating new markets for U.S. exports,” specifically objectives 3.1 and 3.2, and goal 5 “Accelerate equitable and ambitious cross-sectoral actions to address the climate crisis in line with 2050 net-zero emissions targets,” specifically objective 5.1.

This goal also links to the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) and to the USAID Climate Strategy Plan for FY 2022-2030. Specifically, the objective links to Strategic Objective 1: “Facilitate Targeted Direct Action: Accelerate and scale targeted climate actions,” Intermediate Result 1.1: “Catalyze urgent emissions reductions.” The objective also links to Strategic Objective 2: “Drive Systems Change: Catalyze transformative shifts to net-zero and climate-resilient pathways,” Intermediate Result 2.3: “Strengthen responsive, transparent governance and citizen engagement for effective climate action.” It also aligns with the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability and the principles of the Stabilization Assistance Review.

This objective is also advanced through the work to implement Law 59 and improve municipal financial management and budget execution described under Objective 1.2 of this strategy.

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• **Risks** | Absent a defined electoral process, progress on this objective may take time because reforming the management of a country’s resources fundamentally requires a supportive, stable, empowered government as a partner. To mitigate this risk, the mission plans to work closely with UNSMIL and other international partners to support an expeditious Libyan-led process that leads to fair and free elections. Operating in a post-conflict environment also poses certain risks. Foreign malign influences fail to cease their engagement in Libya and see it to their advantage to hinder elections or democratic political transition, complicating U.S. engagement. USAID programs will continue to use adaptive management and regular reviews to take stock of contextual changes in the operating environment (including knowledge and learning gained from monitoring and evaluation) and determine how best to apply lessons learned to achieve results.

**Objective 3.2** | Libya’s economic and business environment fosters more private sector development, including through enhanced economic opportunities for diverse groups, and increased U.S. investment and trade. (USAID DO2)

• **Justification** | Economic growth underpins Libya’s reconstruction goals and its stability. A determined and concerted effort to advance reforms in the legislative framework, key institutions, and primary economic sectors is critical to ensure an improved business enabling environment. If economic participation improves, if economic reforms advance, and if key institutions, including local governments, have more revenue, self-reliance of Libyan institutions and citizens will improve. To achieve these objectives, the mission will continue its messaging and outreach efforts at all levels of Libyan society. In consultation with the active AmCham in Tripoli, the mission will also organize trade- and sector-based fora as well as vocational training and entrepreneurship opportunities for Libyans.
• **Linkages |** This objective is linked to USAID/Libya’s Country Strategic Framework, 2021-24 Development Objective 1: “Effectiveness of key Libyan governance institutions improved,” specifically area 1.2. “Enhancing fiscal transparency and promoting targeted reforms,” and Development Objective 2: “Libyan empowered to mitigate drivers of instability and conflict,” specific area 2.2, “Strengthening entrepreneurship.” It also links with Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objectives 2.2, “Support inclusive and sustainable economic growth and opportunity for communities around the globe”; 2.3, “Support U.S. technological leadership, strengthen competitiveness, and enhance and protect the U.S. innovation base while leveraging technology to improve lives around the world,” and 3.3, “Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption.” It also links to the Middle East and North Africa Joint Regional Strategy goal 3 “Strengthen inclusive economic growth that achieves stable and prosperous societies while creating new markets for U.S. exports,” specifically objectives 3.1 and 3.2. This objective supports PREPARE and the USAID Climate Strategy Plan for FY 2022-2030. It also aligns with the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the U.S. Strategy to Combat Corruption, and the principles of the Stabilization Assistance Review.

• **Risks |** Pervasive corruption, lack of institutional capacity, and political instability represent the main risk factors to achieve these goals. Post will continue its outreach, messaging, and programming to support strong, capable institutions lead the fight against corruption.
Mission Goal 4 | The LEO increases its support to U.S. citizens and facilitates legitimate travel by Libyans to the United States.

Description | The Consular Section provides consular services that protect the interests of U.S. citizens in Libya, and facilitate legitimate travel to the United States, for both personal and official travelers. Both are rendered more difficult by the lack of permanent U.S. State Department presence in Libya, and it is therefore vital to develop and maintain strong contacts in Libya’s government before, during, and after the elections.

Objective 4.1 | Improved coordination with Libyan officials to better serve U.S. citizens in distress by allowing for quicker access to detained citizens, victims of crime, and more organized and efficient evacuations.

- Justification | Protecting U.S. citizens is one of the Department of State’s highest priorities for Embassies abroad. By improving coordination with Libyan government officials, we can better assist U.S. citizens who have medical emergencies, who have been detained, or who are victims. This is especially true when we do not have a permanent presence in Libya and must rely on government officials to conduct welfare and whereabouts checks when the U.S. government cannot.

- Linkages | This objective links with Joint Strategic Plan Goal 5, specifically Strategic Objective 5.1 “Support and serve American citizens traveling or residing abroad.”

- Risks | The unpredictable nature of crises and political upheavals in Libya presents a risk for our ability to effectively respond to U.S. citizens in distress. To mitigate these risks, we will continue to develop a wide network of contacts to assist us.

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Objective 4.2 | Reinforce processes and safeguards related to visa security and streamline communication with Libyan officials on appropriate visa procedures and travel policies in order to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States.

- **Justification** | Providing visa services in a secure, accurate, and efficient manner results in strengthened borders and enhanced national security, as well as increased economic, cultural, and social ties to the United States, benefiting both countries. By engaging directly with the local government, we can model a law-based approach to visa issuances and reduce misuse of visas.

- **Linkages** | This objective links with Joint Strategic Plan Goal 5, specifically Strategic Objective 5.2 “Advance U.S. interests by facilitating legitimate travel to and from the United States.”

- **Risks** | Delays in visa processing could have diplomatic, economic, and political repercussions. This can be mitigated by properly managing the expectations of applicants.

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4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Expand the LEO’s operational footprint in Libya to ensure that the mission has the assets and personnel capabilities on the ground to support full diplomatic engagement and advance the 2 FAM 410 process for reopening an embassy.

- **Justification** | As the Mission revamps its engagement activities and is moving forward to reestablish a diplomatic presence in Libya, its capacity, including facilities and human resources to conduct services in support of growing operations must also expand.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to 2 FAM 400 and the suggested decision-making process for establishing a post overseas; 3 FAM 3773 travel to countries where the United States is engaged in contingency operations or where operations are suspended; and 3 FAM 3776 waivers of travel prohibitions. It links with Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objectives 4.2 “Modernize IT and leverage data to inform decision-making and support mission delivery,” and 4.3, “Protect our personnel, information, and physical infrastructure from 21st century threats.”

- **Risks** | LEO’s diplomatic efforts in Libya will be hindered if the management platform and the management support on the ground are not commensurate with the projected operational growth in Libya. Not having a diplomatic presence on the ground significantly stifles our diplomatic efforts to advance U.S national objectives and puts us in a disadvantaged position compared to other international actors. The LEO relies on limited partner agency resources and Tripoli-based caretakers’ support to conduct official visits to Libya.

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Management Objective 2 | Increase the engagement of LEO Locally Engaged Staff (LES) in support of evolving mission requirements in Libya.

- **Justification** | The U.S. government has full diplomatic relations with Libya without a U.S. presence and relies on a caretaker staff of Tripoli-based LES to maintain the relationship in-country. As high-level U.S. diplomats and officials visit Libya with increasing frequency to engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. assistance programs, it is critical for the mission to fully utilize its existing resources on the ground and more actively involve its local staff in expanding mission operations.

- **Linkages**: This objective links to 3 FAM 7170 and the “Policy on Employment of Locally Employed (LE) Staff at U.S. Mission in Suspended Operations Status.” It links with Joint Strategic Plan Strategic Objective 4.1, “Build and equip a diverse, inclusive, resilient, and dynamic workforce.” It also links with MENA Joint Regional Strategy Management Objective 2, “Strengthen the Department of State and USAID's ability to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain diverse talent and remove barriers to equal opportunity for historically underserved communities.”

- **Risks** | LES logistical, administrative, and technical support enables the LEO to effectively carry out the mission essential tasks in the country, mitigate safety and security risks and act as an invaluable force multiplier to safeguard success of our diplomatic efforts. Retention of trained employees who hold institutional knowledge and conduct ongoing engagement with Libyan interlocutors is critical to the LEO’s current operational status and any eventual return to full in-country operations. The LEO continues to retain Tripoli-based LES and the bureau reauthorizes their caretaker status biannually.

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