Functional Bureau Strategy

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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1. Executive Statement and Mission Statement

PM builds enduring security partnerships worldwide to advance U.S. national security objectives. The Bureau protects the American people and advances national interests around the world by helping to lead our nation’s policy formulation on national security issues, including regional stability, military operations, security assistance, arms transfers, and defense trade. PM makes America stronger and more secure through our advocacy and stewardship of arms transfers, defense trade, defense relations, security assistance, military operations and exercises, diplomatic clearance approvals for foreign State Aircraft and naval vessels entering the United States and its territories, peacekeeping capacity building, security sector governance (SSG), protection of civilians from harm in conflict, conventional weapons destruction (including humanitarian demining assistance), small arms and light weapons threat reduction (including Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)), and analyzing broad trends in international security affairs to determine their effect on U.S. policies. PM leads the U.S. government’s negotiation of bilateral security agreements, such as Defense Cooperation Agreements and Status of Forces Agreements, and coordinates with DoD on personnel exchanges to strengthen the defense-diplomacy relationship. PM is the primary link between State and DoD, representing U.S. foreign policy considerations in DoD’s planning processes.

PM works closely with political-military experts around the globe to ensure full coordination in the planning and execution of security cooperation and assistance to advance foreign policy objectives. On an annual basis, PM oversees the sale and transfer of roughly $150 billion in sensitive technology; directs nearly $7 billion in security assistance programs, which accounts for approximately 20 percent of the total annual Foreign Operations appropriation and three quarters of the total international security assistance for the Department; and leads coordination with DoD on an additional $9 billion in Title 10 security assistance. In addition, PM manages $60 million (varying by Fiscal Year) in State operating funds, of which roughly 80 percent supports American salaries and 20 percent in bureau-managed funding.

The Bureau helps America renew its competitive advantages and continue to be the preferred security partner for its allies and partners. The Bureau helps revitalize and modernize ties with allies and partners by working to strengthen their defense capabilities and institutional capacity to deter and address shared threats. PM helps secure U.S. leadership in technology by protecting U.S. technology from exploitation, diversion, or misuse, while maximizing the competitive advantages of the U.S. national security innovation base. The Bureau helps defend democracy around the world and uphold universal values by fostering sustainable and accountable security sectors and working to professionalize partners’ defense institutions. PM promotes international economic development by removing explosive remnants of war and enabling the safe return of populations to post-conflict areas. Further, the Bureau supports America’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic by maintaining and enhancing the competitive advantages of the defense industrial base that supports up to one million American
Lastly, the Bureau makes every effort to ensure it has the right resources and talent to achieve our foreign policy objectives and meet evolving mission needs.

2. Bureau Strategic Framework

**Bureau Goal 1:** Enhance partners’ defense capabilities and interoperability to deter and defend against competitors and manage persistent threats.

- **Bureau Objective 1.1:** Security partners enhance deterrence and defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty against strategic competitors and other state threats. (EF 4.2)
- **Bureau Objective 1.2:** Security partners act with increasing effectiveness to counter armed non-state actors whose activities threaten the United States or its partners. (EF 4.1)
- **Bureau Objective 1.3:** Partners contribute to and participate in security missions, international peace operations, joint exercises, and regional organizations that promote peace and security regionally and globally. (EF 4.3)
- **Bureau Objective 1.4:** Shared investments in defense and security increase through cooperative development, joint acquisition, and bilateral sales.

**Bureau Goal 2:** Strengthen coordination with allies and partners and with DoD to enable America’s military to operate globally and better integrate diplomacy and defense.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1:** Bureau personnel institutionalize partnerships with DoD counterparts to effectively collaborate on defense strategies, plans, and posture; security sector assistance; defense trade; and diplomatic engagements.
- **Bureau Objective 2.2:** Security partners permit U.S. basing, overflight, and other access identified by the DoD as necessary to support operations. (EF 1.3)
- **Bureau Objective 2.3:** The United States maintains sufficient influence with security partners to shape foreign national strategies, decisions, priorities, and capabilities. (EF 2)
- **Bureau Objective 2.4:** Partners support U.S. leadership in securing free and open access to the global commons, including through maritime security, freedom of navigation operations, and state aviation security. (EF 2.3)

**Bureau Goal 3:** Foster sustainable and resilient security sectors that respect human rights, the rule of law, and democratic values.

- **Bureau Objective 3.1:** Partner security institutions increasingly act in a manner consistent with democratic values and universal human rights. (EF 3.3)
• **Bureau Objective 3.2**: Partner political institutions increase their capacity and willingness to responsibly address SSG. (EF 3.2)

• **Bureau Objective 3.3**: Demining and explosive threat reduction helps partners improve stability and reduce barriers to public safety, essential services, and economic development. (EF 3.1)

• **Bureau Objective 3.4**: Partners increase the meaningful participation of women in their defense and security sectors. (EF 3.7)

**Bureau Goal 4**: Secure U.S. technological advantages and sustain the competitive advantages of the U.S. national security innovation base and U.S. military.

• **Bureau Objective 4.1**: The U.S. government expands its ability to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense equipment and investigate potential end-use violations, while partners expand their ability to protect sensitive military technology/hardware, meet end-use requirements, and implement export control requirements. (EF 5.1)

• **Bureau Objective 4.2**: Partners increase transparency and counter corruption in their defense acquisition systems, and screen for predatory foreign investments in the security sector. (EF 5.4)

• **Bureau Objective 4.3**: Foreign acquisition environments (e.g., acquisition rules, offset policies) do not unfairly block U.S. defense solutions. (EF 5.3)

• **Bureau Objective 4.4**: U.S. export controls and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system are continually modernized to enable fair competition internationally for American defense companies, protect U.S. intellectual property, and ensure U.S. warfighters’ qualitative military edge.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1**: Invest in and develop a diverse, equitable, and inclusive PM workforce equipped with the skills, data, IT, and infrastructure needed to drive global security policy and meet the challenges of the next decade.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1**: By 2026, PM takes concrete actions to build a more diverse and inclusive workforce equipped with the tools, infrastructure, and skillsets to lead the security cooperation enterprise.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2**: Improve PM’s ability to: (a) articulate how its programs and activities contribute to policy outcomes, and (b) use data and learning to inform decision-making, planning, and execution.

• **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3**: Enhance mission-driven data management and establish and enforce data governance policies for the Bureau.
3. Bureau Goals and Objectives

**Bureau Goal 1:** Enhance partners’ defense capabilities and interoperability to deter and defend against competitors and manage persistent threats.

- **Bureau Goal 1 Description:** The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) states the United States will strengthen and stand behind its allies, work with likeminded partners, and pool our collective strength to advance shared interests and deter common threats. JSP objective 1.4 is to lead allies and partners to address shared challenges and competitors; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security. PM plays a key role in supporting these goals by building enduring security partnerships and by helping partners meet their legitimate defense requirements through arms transfers, security assistance, and diplomatic engagement. PM will empower and equip our allies and partners to promote regional stability and interoperability; share the responsibilities of collective security; build defense capacity with strong SSG; and counter aggression from competitor nations, rogue regimes, and terrorist organizations.

**Bureau Objective 1.1:** Security partners enhance deterrence and defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty against strategic competitors and other threats. (EF 4.2)

- **Bureau Objective 1.1 Justification and Linkages:** As the INSSG states, ensuring national security requires the United States to promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world. The PRC is modernizing its military to expand its global footprint and dominate the Indo-Pacific region, while Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. Regional actors like Iran and the DPRK continue to pursue new capabilities and technologies, while threatening U.S. allies and partners and challenging regional stability. Through arms transfers and security assistance, PM will help allies and partners defend themselves and the global commons against these regional threats and deter destabilizing activities.

- **Bureau Objective 1.1 Risk Considerations:** PM will be challenged by the need to balance a human rights-focused foreign policy and other national security concerns in the context of building partner capacity and interoperability. The Bureau will need to weigh partners’ short-term security requirements against long-term institutional development and sustainability. PM may also face difficult decisions about enduring support to partners who have shown little or no progress towards a well-governed security sector.

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Bureau Objective 1.2: Security partners act with increasing effectiveness to counter armed non-state actors whose activities threaten the United States or its partners. (EF 4.1)

- **Bureau Objective 1.2 Justification and Linkages:** Per the INSSG, the United States continues to face challenges within countries whose governance is fragile, and from influential non-state actors that have the ability to disrupt American interests. Terrorism and violent extremism, both domestic and international, remain significant threats. JSP objective 1.4 likewise identifies the illicit activities of terrorists, insurgents, and other non-state actors as shared threats for the United States and its partners to address. PM will help partners better counter these threats and address the underlying drivers of instability through arms transfers and security assistance, including institutional capacity building.

- **Bureau Objective 1.2 Risk Considerations:** PM’s tools to build capacity in partner security sectors may prove ineffective in the absence of effective diplomatic and development strategies to help partners address the root causes of instability and illicit activities by non-state actors. Further, partner governments may lack the political will to address the root causes of instability in their countries.

Bureau Objective 1.3: Partners contribute to and participate in security missions, international peace operations, joint exercises, and regional organizations that promote peace and security regionally and globally. (EF 4.3)

- **Bureau Objective 1.3 Justification and Linkages:** As the INSSG notes, a stable and open international system is underwritten by strong partnerships and multilateral institutions, and the United States must resume leadership in those institutions and in its network of partnerships accordingly. JSP objective 1.4 calls for active U.S. engagement in multilateral fora and highlights U.S. re-engagement with NATO, the EU, the Quad, ASEAN, and the AU in particular. As part of efforts to renew U.S. leadership in multilateral institutions, PM will help partners contribute more effectively to multilateral security missions and peace operations by providing training, equipment, advisory and technical assistance, and deployment support to partner nation security forces.

- **Bureau Objective 1.3 Risk Considerations:** Partners may lack confidence in the United States’ willingness to sustain security commitments and leadership in multilateral fora over the long-term. Strategic competitors – especially the PRC – are working to shape the rules and norms of multilateral institutions to advance interests contrary to the United States’.

Bureau Objective 1.4: Shared investments in defense and security increase through cooperative development, joint acquisition, and bilateral sales.
• **Bureau Objective 1.4 Justification and Linkages:** The INSSG notes the United States and its partners multiply their strength when they combine efforts and share costs to address common challenges. It is not always possible for the United States to help partners fulfill their legitimate defense requirements through security assistance or the transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles. In such cases, PM can explore opportunities for cooperative development, joint acquisition, and other solutions through defense trade dialogues.

• **Bureau Objective 1.4 Risk Considerations:** Cooperative development limits the USG’s freedom of action when it comes to sales of systems that have been jointly developed. Many European partners have stringent conditions on end-users who are engaged in an ongoing conflict, or specific end-use restrictions on sales to Taiwan. In an environment of increasing strategic competitiveness, these constraints may hinder U.S. efforts to support certain allies and partners.

**Bureau Goal 2:** Strengthen coordination with allies and partners and with DoD to enable America’s military to operate globally and better integrate diplomacy and defense.

• **Bureau Goal 2 Description:** The INSSG identifies America’s broad and deep network of partnerships and alliances and its military as key sources of national power and enduring advantages in the context of strategic competition. It also elevates diplomacy as the tool of first resort to advance U.S. foreign policy. JSP objective 1.4 seeks accordingly to lead with diplomacy, renew U.S. leadership, and mobilize coalitions to address the global challenges that have the greatest impact on Americans’ security and well-being. PM will support these goals by building and deepening security partnerships; providing foreign policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade; and concluding international agreements to meet U.S. security requirements.

**Bureau Objective 2.1:** Bureau personnel institutionalize partnerships with DoD counterparts to effectively collaborate on defense strategies, plans, and posture; SSA; defense trade; and diplomatic engagements.

• **Bureau Objective 2.1 Justification and Linkages:** The INSSG notes diplomacy, development, and economic statecraft should be the leading instruments of American foreign policy – not the military instrument. PM serves as the Department’s principal link to DoD and provides foreign policy direction to defense planning, posture, and security cooperation activities. PM works closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands to strengthen the linkages between defense strategies, plans, and posture and U.S. foreign policy goals. PM coordinates SSA program planning with DoD and facilitates coordination and clearance of DoD SSA.
programs on behalf of the Department. Further, PM provides the person-to-person link to DoD through recruiting, assigning, managing, and supporting Foreign Service Officers for their postings with DoD as Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs), as well as the DoD officers assigned to the Department as Military Advisors (MILADS). POLADs and MILADs work to align DoD’s operations with the Department’s foreign policy goals, offering advice and counsel that is critical to optimizing whole-of-government efforts.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1 Risk Considerations:** PM’s limited staff and resources relative to DoD restrict its ability to provide foreign policy direction to DoD strategies, plans, and posture and to Title 10 security cooperation activities. Coordination of DoD strategies, plans, and posture may depend on personal relationships or informal mechanisms instead of formal, well-institutionalized processes.

**Bureau Objective 2.2:** Security partners permit U.S. basing, overflight, and other access identified by the DoD as necessary to support operations and strengthen integrated deterrence. (EF 1.3)

- **Bureau Objective 2.2 Justification and Linkages:** The INSSG says the United States will position itself, diplomatically and militarily, to deter its adversaries, defend its allies and interests, and work alongside partners. The United States will adjust its global defense posture consistent with the safety of U.S. personnel and in close consultation with allies and partners. PM plays a key role in these efforts by coordinating, negotiating, and concluding international bilateral agreements to meet U.S. security requirements. Specifically, PM leads the U.S. Government's negotiation of defense cooperation agreements (DCA); status of forces agreements; burden-sharing agreements, such as special measures agreements or host nation support agreements; and facilities access agreements, transit and overflight arrangements, and state flight agreements. Collectively, these agreements facilitate the deployment and movement of U.S. forces and materiel abroad and provide protections for U.S. service members operating overseas and enable Allies and partners to contribute to the shared defense of mutual security interests.

- **Bureau Objective 2.2 Risk Considerations:** Strategic competitors seek to persuade other countries that U.S. security partnerships come with too many “strings attached,” and that U.S. security commitments are no longer trustworthy. Allies and partners may be reluctant to relinquish legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel stationed in their countries.

**Bureau Objective 2.3:** The United States maintains sufficient influence with security partners to shape foreign national strategies, decisions, priorities, and capabilities. (EF 2)

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Justification and Linkages:** The INSSG says the United States will double down on building partnerships throughout the world, because our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts to address common challenges, share
costs, and widen the circle of cooperation. At the same time, the United States must be mindful of both its values and its interests as it engages partner nations. As such, it is critical the United States influence security partners to share burdens appropriately and not pursue policies at odds with American interests and values. PM plays a primary role in coordinating bilateral or multilateral defense and security dialogues, including strategy reviews, which the Department of State leads or co-leads annually. These forums typically consist of high-level U.S. interagency teams that review and coordinate on regional security issues, arms transfers, military-to-military cooperation, security assistance, weapons disposal, and other security topics with counterparts from other countries.

- **Bureau Objective 2.3 Risk Considerations:** Partners may perceive their security interests and common security challenges differently than the United States. The incentives created by U.S. security cooperation and assistance may not be sufficient to overcome domestic political or institutional considerations.

**Bureau Objective 2.4:** Partners support U.S. leadership in securing free and open access to the global commons, including through maritime security, freedom of navigation operations, and state aviation security. (EF 2.3)

- **Bureau Objective 2.4 Justification and Linkages:** According to the INSSG, the United States will continue to defend access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation and overflight rights, under international law. PM supports this objective by developing U.S. state aircraft policy, providing diplomatic clearance for foreign State Aircraft (including military aircraft) and government ships (including naval vessels) seeking to enter U.S. territory, leading on counter piracy efforts, and serving as the Secretariat for the Department of State’s MSCOI. PM also provides security assistance to strengthen partners’ maritime security and coordinates with DoD on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs).

- **Bureau Objective 2.4 Risk Considerations:** The PRC acts aggressively and coercively to consolidate its unlawful claims in the SCS. Russia often does not observe international norms for state aircraft clearances. FONOPs may not accomplish U.S. strategic goals over the long term, and State and DoD may disagree over the timing and efficacy of FONOPs.

**Bureau Goal 3:** Foster sustainable and resilient security sectors that respect human rights, the rule of law, and democratic values.

- **Bureau Goal 3 Description:** Fostering healthy, well-governed security sectors is vital to advancing the Administration’s priorities of reinvigorating alliances and partnerships, revitalizing democracy globally, and building sustainable interoperability and partner military capabilities. JSP objective 1.4 underscores the central mission to
“strengthen defense, deepen security...cooperation with allies and partners, enable civilian security, and reinforce commitment through the rule of law and respect for human rights.” Promoting good SSG strengthens U.S. security partnerships and improves the overall political trajectory of emerging democracies. Resilient security sectors are more capable of addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and instability, more effective in promoting shared interests, and more secure against external coercion and malign influence. PM’s overall objective is to provide services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of citizens. This will also support JSP objective 3.1, which seeks to promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.

Bureau Objective 3.1: Partner security institutions increasingly act in a manner consistent with democratic values and universal human rights. (EF 3.3)

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Justification and Linkages:** PM recognizes the central role partner security institutions play in promoting stability. JSP objective 1.4 notes our ongoing work to “promote international peace and security, champion universal values, and address enduring threats.” PM policies and programs encourage host nation institutions to build good governance capacity and improve civilian security while limiting opportunities for corrupt actors to engage in illicit diversion or illegal activities.

- **Bureau Objective 3.1 Risk Considerations:** Security partners may demonstrate uneven or inconsistent adherence to universal values, despite U.S. engagement. Promoting values and norms requires constant engagement not only on a bilateral level but also at the multinational and international levels. PM must be prepared to work in less-than-ideal conditions and to promote a positive, affirmational framework that actively highlights the benefits of U.S. values and international norms. Messaging must be synchronized across policies and programs to ensure clarity and longevity.

Bureau Objective 3.2: Partner political institutions increase their capacity and willingness to responsibly address SSG. (EF 3.2)

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Justification and Linkages:** The INSSG, JSP, and other policy documents reinforce the importance of promoting resilient and responsive institutions that prioritize the needs of civilian populations. JSP objective 3.1 specifically recognizes the need to “promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.” Partners with well-governed and accountable security sectors are better able to protect U.S.-origin defense articles from misuse or illicit transfer, ensure U.S.-provided training is correctly absorbed and targeted, and conduct military operations in a manner that addresses, rather than exacerbates, the underlying drivers of conflict. PM leads efforts to build SSG in
coordination with other USG departments and agencies. PM’s efforts to promote good SSG influence bureau policies and programs.

- **Bureau Objective 3.2 Risk Considerations:** While partners with strong SSG are generally more stable, open, and secure, the United States must be prepared to work with partners at varying stages in their development. Capacity building requires coordinating multiple lines of effort over long time horizons to develop more capable, reliable, and accountable security partners for the United States. Strategic competitors may actively exploit poor SSG to expand relationships while promoting alternative models to democracy. PM must be prepared to address these challenges in a dynamic environment with imperfect policy and program tools and resources.

**Bureau Objective 3.3:** Demining and explosive threat reduction helps partners improve stability and reduce barriers to public safety, essential services, and economic development. (EF 3.1)

- **Bureau Objective 3.3 Justification and Linkages:** JSP objective 1.4 says the United States will seek to address the causes of regional and intra-state conflicts, extremism, and instability such as deteriorating or inequitable economies, weak or illegitimate political institutions, and competition over natural resources. Explosive remnants of war (ERW) represent one of the chief obstacles to civilian safety and economic recovery in post-conflict environments. The United States is the world’s single largest financial supporter of efforts to address humanitarian hazards from landmines and unexploded ordnance in post-conflict countries and to reduce the availability of excess, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk weapons and munitions. PM designs conventional weapons destruction programming that actively engage host nations in developing capacity, demonstrating responsiveness, and establishing legitimacy with civilian-responsive institutions.

- **Bureau Objective 3.3 Risk Considerations:** Enduring threats in post-conflict environments may hinder ERW clearance operations. Partner governments may lack the capacity to facilitate clearance efforts and may lack the will to develop the capacity to sustain independent clearance operations.

**Bureau Objective 3.4:** Partners increase the meaningful participation of women in their defense and security sectors. (EF 3.7)

- **Bureau Objective 3.4 Justification and Linkages:** Consistent with the *U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security* (WPS), JSP objective 1.4 calls for the meaningful participation and leadership of women, youth, ethnic and religious minorities, and other marginalized groups in building peace and security. PM leads global efforts to increase the meaningful participation of women across the defense and security sectors as an essential way of improving the quality and reach of policies and programs. By increasing
gender equity in its initiatives and engagements, PM ensures representation from all stakeholders who contribute to stable, secure communities.

- **Bureau Objective 3.4 Risk Considerations:** Successful engagements on women, peace, and security may require significant investments of time and resources in areas where girls, women, boys, and men receive unequal benefits of public safety and security. Although there has been considerable attention to improving the participation of women in defense and security sectors, PM needs to prepare sustained commitments in challenging environments—especially as partner countries deliver security and defense services in transitional spaces or armed conflicts. PM also may need to cultivate relationships between partner nations, civil society organizations, the international community, and traditionally excluded stakeholders. Promoting meaningful participation also requires clear messaging about the benefits of increasing women’s roles in promoting stability and preventing instability.

**Bureau Goal 4:** Secure U.S. technological advantages and sustain the competitive advantages of the U.S. national security innovation base and U.S. military.

- **Bureau Goal 4 Description:** The INSSG and JSP objective 2.3 describe sustaining America’s innovation edge and protecting U.S. defense technologies as critical to national security. PM’s efforts to maximize the competitive advantages of the U.S. national security innovation base help ensure the U.S. military’s technological superiority, deepen security cooperation with allies and partners, improve interoperability, and influence the international standards for nonproliferation and technology transfer. PM champions U.S. defense industry abroad, building long-term defense relationships with allies and partners to address shared security concerns. Furthermore, a strong domestic defense industry contributes to domestic economic renewal by expanding U.S. manufacturing and creating high-wage, high-skill jobs. PM works to safeguard America’s military advantage by protecting U.S. defense technologies from exploitation, diversion, or misuse through the judicious review of arms transfers, end-use monitoring, investment screening, and engagement with the U.S. defense innovation base, to include universities. PM advances export control regulatory reforms to make U.S. export controls more comprehensible and user-friendly to both foreign partners and U.S. industry, and ensures technologies controlled on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage. PM actively engages with Allies and partners on export controls, including end-user and end-use obligations for defense technology and equipment. Bilateral and multilateral engagement is increasingly important since supply chains are globally interconnected—creating both benefits that unite allies and partners but also risks when supply chains grow dependent on single-points of failure or become vulnerable to exploitation.
Bureau Objective 4.1: The USG expands its ability to monitor the use of U.S.-origin equipment and investigate potential end use violations, while partners expand their ability to protect sensitive military technology/hardware, meet end-use requirements, and implement export control requirements. (EF 5.1)

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Justification and Linkages:** To ensure full accountability in regard to arms transfers, PM conducts, along with interagency partners, robust end-use monitoring (EUM) programs to minimize the risk of diversion and unauthorized use of U.S. defense articles, combat gray arms trafficking, uncover violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and build confidence and cooperation among defense trade partners by working with U.S. missions abroad to conduct a combination of pre- and post-license/shipment checks on foreign parties. It is also critical to ensure partners are expanding their own efforts to adequately control U.S.-origin defense articles by implementing domestic end-use monitoring efforts and improving compliance with U.S. export control requirements.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1 Risk Considerations:** The strength of partner export controls varies widely; efforts to help partners improve and modernize such controls can involve considerable work and lengthy amounts of time. Furthermore, U.S. EUM efforts are split across several Departments and Agencies, creating bureaucratic obstacles to both implementation and reform. EUM programs do not involve visits to war zones or areas of active conflict to monitor how partners employ U.S. defense articles.

Bureau Objective 4.2: Partners increase transparency and counter corruption in their defense acquisition systems, and screen for predatory foreign investments in the security sector. (EF 3.4)

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Justification and Linkages:** Opaque and corrupt defense acquisition systems are an impediment to improving bilateral defense relationships with the United States and often correlate with the improper application of force and the misuse of U.S.-origin defense goods. Furthermore, strategic competitors often target foreign defense companies for exploitation, putting the global defense industry supply chain and sensitive U.S. technologies at risk. PM’s Foreign Acquisition of Foreign Defense Entities (FAFDE) initiative is aimed at minimizing the potential for U.S. technology diversion through foreign acquisitions of foreign defense firms. FAFDE identifies subject firms or acquisition cases, investigates linkages, and can apply U.S.-based authorities, such as restricting new export authorizations or suspending existing export authorizations, to prevent technology diversion to strategic competitors or other foreign entities of concern.

- **Bureau Objective 4.2 Risk Considerations:** Entrenched interests can be opposed to defense industry reforms. Removing problematic parties from the defense supply chain could have implications for U.S. programs.
Bureau Objective 4.3: Foreign acquisition environments (e.g., acquisition rules, offset policies) do not unfairly block U.S. defense solutions. (EF 5.3)

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Justification and Linkages:** U.S. defense industry often faces adverse partner acquisition environments that are overly bureaucratic, complex, and inefficient, which hinder the ability of U.S. defense firms to fairly compete. Partner governments may enact measures to bolster their domestic defense industry that adversely affect U.S. industry’s ability to offer superior defense capabilities. Foreign governments may implement technology transfer requirements, which may run contrary to existing U.S. policies and may prevent further defense cooperation. PM will work to ensure foreign acquisition environments are fair, better enabling U.S. defense companies to compete and offer superior solutions.

- **Bureau Objective 4.3 Risk Considerations:** Encouraging foreign acquisition environment reform is often met with entrenched, bureaucratic interests focused on internal politics and/or protectionism. Diplomatic engagement takes time and there is an attendant risk of partners turning to competitors who will readily transfer technology and provide co-production or co-research agreements.

Bureau Objective 4.4: U.S. export controls and the FMS system are continually modernized to enable fair competition internationally for American defense companies, protect U.S. intellectual property, and ensure U.S. warfighters’ qualitative military edge.

- **Bureau Objective 4.4 Justification and Linkages:** PM will continually implement export control reforms to streamline the regulatory burden placed on U.S. companies while also being responsive to evolving threats to our national security innovation base. PM will advance export control regulatory reforms to make them more comprehensible and user-friendly to both foreign partners and U.S. industry and ensures that the USML controls technologies that provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage.

- **Bureau Objective 4.4 Risk Considerations:** Strategic competitors, especially the PRC, are actively engaged in efforts to illicitly obtain U.S. sensitive military technologies. We are monitoring investments by countries of concern, including the PRC, in the defense sector of U.S. partners, but authorities to counter illicit means of technology acquisition often rest with civilian law enforcement agencies.
4. Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1: Invest in and develop a diverse equitable, and inclusive PM workforce equipped with the skills, data, IT, and infrastructure needed to drive global security policy and meet the challenges of the next decade.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 1 Description:** PM’s greatest assets are its people. PM recognizes accordingly the importance of fostering a diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible workplace; bolstering employee resilience; providing professional career-enhancing opportunities; and promoting enhanced work-life balance to recruit and retain the best talent. The Bureau will continue working on advancing DEIA initiatives for its workforce in alignment with its DEIA Operational Plan and make updates to the Plan as needed. It will build a more effective, accountable, resilient, and data-literate team, equipped with the necessary tools, data, IT, and infrastructure to perform mission-critical work and meet the challenges of the next decade. PM will adapt to the changing nature of the post-pandemic environment by continuing to leverage workplace flexibilities, hybrid/remote work, and IT modernization. Through the Strategic Impact Assessment Framework (SIAF) team, the Bureau will prioritize efforts to improve knowledge management; data quality, centralization, storage, and access; and facilitate self-service retrieval of high-quality, cleared data for analysis and evaluation. PM will also establish and enforce Bureau-level data governance policies and build upon the pilot Security Cooperation Evaluation Framework (SCEF), a Bureau-wide diagnostic tool to assess the strength of partners’ security sectors and PM’s contributions to policy outcomes.

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1: By 2026, PM takes concrete actions build a more diverse and inclusive workforce equipped with the tools, infrastructure, and skillsets to lead the security cooperation enterprise.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1 Justification and Linkages:** The Biden-Harris Administration has made strengthening and empowering the federal workforce a key management priority, as reinforced in JSP goal 4 and the Department’s DEIA Strategic Plan. PM has launched a Bureau-level DEIA Council led by the PM Front Office, with working groups on recruitment and outreach, retention and professional development, open conversations, and data analytics. It established a DEIA Operational Plan (OP) to guide PM’s efforts through 2026 and beyond. Guided by the DEIA OP, PM will take concrete steps to attract and retain diverse talent, guide managers, harness data, dedicate resources, and undertake meaningful reforms to establish a more diverse, equitable, accessible, and inclusive workplace and culture. PM’s DEIA Council will continue its strong engagement within the Department (CDIO, S/OCR, GTM,
Department Affinity Groups, and other Bureau Diversity and Inclusion Councils), and work to improve outreach to academia, HBCUs and other MSIs, Think Tanks, and NGO communities. PM will also continue to bolster its training efforts with the Foreign Service Institute and academic institutions, while also enhancing mentorship, career growth, and leadership opportunities to better develop and retain our talent. PM will continue to prioritize investments in secure space, communications, technology, and infrastructure to modernize and support much-needed upgrades to adapt to a post-COVID work environment, mitigate risk, and to help keep pace with the interagency. Additionally, PM will continue to pursue legislative flexibilities and prioritize resources for additional full-time equivalent (FTE) staff to bring more programming in-house, which will result in cost savings and increase the long-term effectiveness of diplomatic and security cooperation efforts.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.1 Risk Considerations:** Failure to modernize and strengthen DEIA in our global PM workforce and workplaces, provide our people with the necessary tools to succeed, or adapt to a post-pandemic posture will put at risk the Bureau’s investments in recruiting, developing, and retaining the best talent in the long-term. The Bureau may lose people due to burnout, lack of work-life flexibilities, and frustrations over lack of DEIA representation, career mobility, and professional development opportunities. A lack of secure space will continue to hinder PM’s ability to engage on urgent national security matters within the interagency and increase the risk of accidental spillage. Without much-needed IT and data modernization and infrastructure upgrades, the Bureau also risks losing talent due to an inflexible work environment and/or health concerns in a post-pandemic posture. Without legislative relief and flexibilities, as well as increased staff for in-house program management, PM may continue to lose ground in the security cooperation enterprise to DoD. For some programs, this will result in slower implementation and increased overhead costs.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2:** Improve PM’s ability to: (a) articulate how its programs and activities contribute to policy outcomes and (b) use data and learning to inform decision-making, planning, and execution.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2 Justification and Linkages:** In line with JSP 4.2 (Data-Informed Diplomacy), the Evidence Act (and OMB Bulletin M-19-23 on implementation), the Administration’s “Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking,” and the Department’s Learning Agenda and Enterprise Data Strategy, PM continues to be a Department leader in the use of data, analytics, and learning to drive decision-making. Since 2018, PM’s data and analytics hub, SIAF, has advanced the Bureau’s modernization through the development of analytical tools and investments in data literacy and access to quality data. In 2021, the Bureau launched a pilot SCEF to
holistically assess partners’ security sectors and evaluate PM’s contributions to foreign policy outcomes. PM is making further investments in IT and data infrastructure to expand the ability of the global political-military workforce to better leverage analytics resources and products and strengthen data literacy, culture, and collaboration.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.2 Risk Considerations:** Scaling the SCEF from 25 countries in its pilot year in 2021 to a near-global scope will require a significant level of effort. It will take years of data collection to identify meaningful trends in the performance of U.S. security partners and to identify PM contributions to partner outcomes. The metrics for a handful of SCEF sub-outcomes remain undefined or in need of improvement. Transitioning to a data-literate culture will involve an initial learning curve for the entire Bureau as personnel work to acquire and practice new data skills. PM offices and personnel will need to commit time to develop those skillsets, potentially at the cost of other learning opportunities.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3:** Enhance mission-driven data management and establish and enforce data governance policies for the Bureau.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3 Justification and Linkages:** PM data management practices vary considerably from office to office. In line with JSP 4.2, OMB Bulletin M-13-13 (“Managing Information as an Asset”), E.O. 14028: “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” “E.O. on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,” and the Department’s Enterprise Data Strategy, PM will establish mission-driven data management, governance, and access policies and practices. Establishment of Bureau data governance policies will optimize data quality, collection, storage, monitoring, and evaluation; support a culture of data and technology fluency; and potentially enable AI and machine-learning-enabled data ingestion and task automation. Consistent data management across PM will allow teams and offices to more easily access, manage, share, and use data, while reducing the time and resources required to do so. In cases where multiple stakeholders have similar analytic needs to meet mission requirements, the Bureau will encourage joint development of products through PM’s SIAF-maintained data infrastructure to break down silos and maximize return on investment.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1.3 Risk Considerations:** PM lacks comprehensive policies and procedures to provide management and oversight of data and core business processes across the Bureau. Without standard PM-wide guidance informing daily operations or Bureau standards for the full data life cycle, PM’s efforts to improve and measure its impact on foreign policy outcomes will be impeded. While the proliferation of analytics products has benefitted individual programs, teams, offices, and posts, potential users in other parts of the Bureau and the Department lose valuable time searching them out or building redundant ones.