ERITREA
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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Eritrea’s destabilizing military involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia that began in November 2020 destroyed any hope that the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement would usher in a new era of stability and development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean forces committed widespread and serious human rights abuses in Tigray. In August 2021, the United States imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on the head of the Eritrean Defense Forces and in November, under Executive Order 14046, sanctioned several Eritrean entities and individuals. Since September 2021, the Embassy has maintained an NSC-endorsed policy of “disciplined confrontation” with the Eritrean government under which it rigorously challenges government mis/disinformation, seeks to isolate Eritrea’s toxic regional influence, and limits its engagement with political-level regime officials. The policy supports the Administration’s goal to defend and advance American values abroad, including by combatting threats to free societies by limiting Eritrea’s anti-democratic and destabilizing influence in the Horn of Africa. Our primary strategic policy goal is to cultivate Eritrea’s next generation and prepare for a post-Isaias era.

Embassy Asmara’s team consists of 12 USDHs, six EFM/EPAP hires, and 237 LE staff, led since 2010 by a Chargé d’Affaires because the Eritrean government will not accept the credentials of an American ambassador. In addition to the Chargé, the current USDH staffing pattern includes a Deputy Chief of Mission, Management Officer, Pol/Econ/Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, Security Technical Specialist (currently staffed with a one-year TDYer, will be vacant again starting in late 2022), Consular Officer, Information Management Officer, entry-level Information Management Specialist, Office Management Specialist, an EFM RSO Office Management Assistant (currently vacant), a part-time EFM Community Liaison Officer, an EFM General Services Assistant, and an EPAP Assistant PAO. In 2022, we expect to add PAO and GSO positions. This ICS aligns the Embassy’s ends with its modest means, i.e., our mission goals and objectives are realistic for a small post with a limited budget operating in one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States.

Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our ACS “customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during

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arrests, deaths, child abductions, destitution, and criminal victimization. The Consular Section also supports several retired dual nationals living in Asmara. The Embassy is revitalizing its American Liaison network, refreshing its list of American citizens, and bringing online a new emergency contact system. Through careful screening of visa applicants, information sharing with the Eritrean government, and (at the moment, limited) law enforcement cooperation, the Embassy seeks to prevent potential malefactors from travelling to the United States.

Monitor and Report on Developments in Eritrea. Embassy Asmara’s diplomatic reporting is the only reliable U.S. source of information and context on Eritrea for U.S. policymakers. Eritrea has no independent media and Voice of America is the only international media in country, which is represented by a (presumably regime-approved) Eritrean national. The regime also tightly controls information that most other countries would make publicly available.

Promote fundamental human rights, democracy, and American values: Eritrea has one of Africa’s worst human rights records. The regime of President Isaias Afwerki is repressive and totalitarian. Dissent and civil society are not permitted. A liberal constitution was drafted but never adopted. There is no freedom of speech or assembly, and religious freedom is limited. Citizens are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention. Eritrea is ranked as Tier 3 for Trafficking in Persons due to its mandatory, indefinite National Service program, which is in essence forced labor, and is designated as a Country of Particular Concern for international religious freedom. In 2021, the European Union imposed human rights-related sanctions on Eritrea. Our carefully calibrated approach to advancing human rights uses diplomatic engagement; exchange programs; our Embassy Facebook page and other public diplomacy programming; American Center activities; visits by U.S. officials; and collaboration with local like-minded diplomatic missions.

Support regional peace and security: Eritrea’s foreign policies are inimical to and actively seek to thwart U.S. interests. In a coordinated effort to reduce Eritrea’s ability to engage in destabilizing regional activities and end its involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, the Embassy works closely with Washington to encourage regional partners, EU members, and

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others to limit high-level engagement with and support of President Isaias’ regime and to curtail the ruling PFDJ party’s diaspora fundraising.

*Counter malign Chinese influence:* China maintains a large embassy in Asmara and has a very active public outreach program. In late November 2021, Eritrea signed, in response to U.S. sanctions, a Memorandum of Understanding with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative and hosted Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yi in January 2022. China gets favorable treatment by and placement in Eritrea’s state-run media (there is no independent local media). However, China’s shoddy business practices and suspicions of its intentions provide an opening for us to counter Chinese narratives and highlight the dangers of Chinese investment to Eritrea’s economy.

*Prepare for the post-Isaias era:* Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for better relations in the post-Isaias era by building ties with the Eritrean people. The president is in his late seventies. He will not rule forever. Our public diplomacy programs, including the American Center, which attracts 100-250 visitors per day, are designed to cultivate close relations with students, educators, artists, intellectuals, businessmen, religious leaders, technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civil society contacts. We also coordinate closely with local diplomatic counterparts who share our values and vision for a more democratic Eritrea.

**Management Priorities**

*Upgrade our facilities:* Embassy Asmara’s physical plant is an eight-building, 3.2-acre compound built nearly 100 years ago on which no significant renovations or updates were done during the 2003-2016 period. In 2019 OBO approved a $12 million critical upgrades and renovation project. The first phase was completed in December 2021. The second – and largest – phase began in January 2022. It will last at least two years and involve dozens of contractors.

*Create and fill a new ARSO position:* Based on our current staffing trajectory, by summer 2022, we will have 14 USDH and as many as 8-10 EFMs, bringing the total U.S. footprint to 22-24 people, doubling the number under COM authority. In addition, as Post becomes more

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attractive to families, we expect this number to continue to increase. Our sole RSO is
unsustainably stretched as he seeks to balance his responsibilities as Post’s security advisor,
crisis responder, and safe guarder of Mission personnel, information, and property, and the
manager of nearly 200 local staff. The November 2020 rocket attacks in Asmara marked a
change in the regional security environment forcing the COM to reconsider how Post maintains
its security posture. On multiple occasions, the sole RSO faced challenges in efforts to request
trained DS TDY support to allow for necessary rest and recuperation (R&R). TDY requests for
relief were often hampered by the unavailability of DS trained security agents for the needed
time and/or manpower constraints of nearby Posts in the region. Post considers the risk of
leaving an identified Post Security Officer (PSO) that lacks specialized DS training that all agents
undergo as unsustainable coupled with the increase in operational footprint. An ARSO position
would decrease the number of demands placed on the RSO and allow him/her to enhance
overall leadership to the section, provide strategic guidance to the Chief of Mission and other
regional inter-agency partners, and focus on the Mission priority of strengthening relations with
national actors to improve information coordination, in support of the Administration’s top goal
of protecting the United States.

Create and fill an HRO position: Together with the approved GSO position, the addition of an
HRO would bring Embassy Asmara’s Management team in line with M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing
recommendation. Three factors drive this request: (1) The Embassy has a disproportionately
high number of local staff to USDH because the 160-plus person local guards are employed by
the Embassy. Given normal turn-over and a robust Special Immigrant Visa program, this
perpetually creates a relatively large pool of vacant positions. As a result, the HR team must
devote a large percentage of its time to recruitment. (2) High local demand for U.S. Embassy
jobs results in the HR team receiving dozens to hundreds of applications for most, especially
unskilled, positions. (3) The Embassy is not able to use automated systems to screen and
manage applications because no one has Internet (Internet penetration is less than 2%). As a
result, manual screening is required for all applicants. An HRO would provide better oversight
of the team and relieve the Management Officer of this responsibility.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: U.S. citizens in Eritrea and the United States are safe.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Expand the access of U.S. citizens in Eritrea to Embassy services by upgrading Embassy’s suite of communications/outreach tools and increasing frequency of outreach.

- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Enhanced cooperation between the Embassy and the Government of Eritrea at the “technical” level prevents potential malefactors from traveling to the United States and improves access to detained American Citizens.


- **Mission Objective 2.1:** There are tangible improvements in religious freedom such as official recognition of additional religious denominations beyond the four the government currently recognizes.

- **Mission Objective 2.2:** National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).

- **Mission Objective 2.3:** A limited number of independent proto-civil society groups are established.

- **Mission Objective 2.4:** Effect the release of or at least determine status of LE staff and Ciham Abdu Ali.

Mission Goal 3: Support regional peace and security.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Limit Eritrea’s ability to undermine stability in the Horn of Africa.

- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Eritrea does not object to or seek to block U.S. global initiatives such as a negotiated end to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, countering Russian aggression in Europe, and resisting Chinese efforts to dominate the UN.

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Mission Goal 4: Restored U.S. credibility and reasserted global leadership position the United States as a strong partner for the Eritrean people.

- **Mission Objective 4.1**: Embassy identifies and cultivates future leaders and opinion makers.
- **Mission Objective 4.2**: Rooted in our commitment to democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the United States prevails in our strategic competition with China for the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Eritreans.

Management Objective 1: Embassy’s physical plant is able to support mission activities and personnel.

Management Objective 2: Embassy is properly staffed to achieve its goals.
3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | U.S. citizens in Eritrea and the United States are safe.

Description | Consistent with the Interim National Security Strategy Guidelines’ (INSSG) “solemn obligation to protect the security of the American people,” Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. This is complicated by several factors, including limited communications options in country, lack of internet for ordinary travelers and residents, and the fact that the Eritrean government does not recognize dual-nationals’ U.S. citizenship.

Objective 1.1 | Expand the access of U.S. citizens in Eritrea to Embassy services by upgrading Embassy’s suite of communications/outreach tools and increasing frequency of outreach.

- Justification | Normal methods of consular communication, e.g., MASCOT, email, and the Embassy Facebook page, do not work well in Eritrea due to lack of internet access. The Embassy needs to identify other ways to communicate with local U.S. citizens.
- Linkages | JRS Goal 1.2: Improve the capacity and will of security forces, including defense and civilian sector actors, to identify and respond to ongoing transnational threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, maritime security, and border insecurity. INSSG: To protect the security of the American people.
- Risks | Our ability to understand the number and locations of U.S. citizens and to assist U.S. citizens in crises will be diminished if we don’t find an effective means of routine and emergency communication.

Objective 1.2 | Enhanced cooperation between the Embassy and the Government of Eritrea at the “technical” level prevents potential malefactors from traveling to the United States and improves access to detained American Citizens.

- Justification | Preventing potential malefactors from traveling to the United States supports the INSSG goal of protecting the American people but is not something we can do on our own. Consistent with the U.S. pledge to again “embrace international cooperation,” our efforts require the assistance of international partners such as

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Interpol and the UN as well as the Eritrean government, especially with regard to ensuring the integrity of documents, exchange of crime information, and border controls.

- **Linkages | JRS Goal 1.2**: Improve the capacity and will of security forces, including defense and civilian sector actors, to identify and respond to ongoing transnational threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, maritime security, and border insecurity. INSSG: To protect the security of the American people.

- **Risks |** Deterioration of bilateral relationship and tougher human rights-related sanctions, which could result if the Eritrean Defense Forces are further implicated in the atrocities committed in Tigray, Ethiopia, that prohibit all but humanitarian U.S. assistance to Eritrea could further degrade – or even eliminate – cooperation. Failing to achieve this objective leaves the United States more vulnerable to terrorists and others who seek to harm it and its people.

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Mission Goal 2 | The Eritrean government improves its performance on human rights.

Description | Eritrea’s abysmal human rights record runs counter to the INSSG pledge to “defend and protect human rights and address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization in all its forms” and continues to be the greatest impediment to improving bilateral relations. Eritrea is a Country of Particular Concern for religious freedom and Tier 3 for Trafficking in Persons, both of which carry sanctions and restrict programmatic options to support the government of Eritrea. Moreover, these human rights abuses, while intended to promote stability, cause state fragility in the long term. Supporting Eritrea to improve its human rights record is consistent with the United States’ goal to “continue to build partnerships in Africa.”

Objective 2.1 | There are tangible improvements in religious freedom such as official recognition of additional religious denominations beyond the four the government currently recognizes.

- Justification | Until Eritrea is no longer a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), the United States is limited due to CPC-related sanctions in how it can engage with and support Eritrea. This is consistent with the United States recommitment to core civil rights and liberties and the Africa Bureau Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) goal of upholding universal values and promoting human dignity.

- Linkages | JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life and recommitting to core civil rights and liberties.

- Risks | Not achieving progress on this goal will impede Eritrea’s development, compel more Eritreans to flee Eritrea, further depleting its diversity and human capital, and prevent improvements to the bilateral relationship.

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Objective 2.2 | National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).

- Justification | Eritrea’s current National Service system involves indefinite conscription for both military and civilian jobs, including some that are purely economic in character. As National Service workers have no ability to leave or refuse a job, it is a form of forced labor according to international standards. As this is a governmental policy, Eritrea is a TIP Tier 3 country every year, and thus subject to TIP-related sanctions. This prevents us from using our development agencies and financing tools to provide assistance to promote stability, as envisioned in the INSSG, and from increasing mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment as outlined in the JRS. In addition, the policy also causes many young Eritreans to flee the country, undermining Eritrea’s development potential and leading to further instability in the region.

- Linkages | JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.

- Risks | Without National Service reform, Eritreans will continue fleeing the country, impeding Eritrea’s development, exacerbating the refugee situations in nearby countries and Europe, exposing Eritreans to human trafficking networks, and severely restricting the provision of U.S. assistance.

Objective 2.3 | A limited number of independent proto-civil society groups are established.

- Justification | This objective supports the United States’ intention to “revitalize democracy the world over,” working with likeminded allies and partners. Independent “civil society” groups are not allowed in Eritrea. All such organizations are controlled directly by the government or the ruling party, leaving ordinary Eritreans with few independent outlets for organizing and helping each other.
Linkages | JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human
dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep
commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. INSSG:
Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.

Risks | A lack of a civil society impedes Eritrea’s development and leaves its people
vulnerable to any shocks that render the government unable or unwilling to assist its
people.

Objective 2.4 | Effect the release of or at least determine status of imprisoned LE staff and
Ciham Abdu Ali.

Justification | The continued unjust detentions of our LE staff and U.S. citizen
Ciham Abdu Ali are an anathema to the promotion and protection of fundamental human
rights, undermine our national security priority to protect the security of the American
people, and are major impediments to full rapprochement between our governments.
The LE staff were detained due to their political and religious beliefs. Ms. Abdu Ali was
detained at the age of 15 for her father’s political beliefs.

Linkages | JRS 1.1: Strengthening the capacity of multilateral and regional organizations,
government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the
emergence of armed conflict. JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights
for all people, including marginalized populations by improving equality and inclusion to
advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and
professional media. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart
of the American way of life.

Risks | Failure to secure the release of these individuals, especially Ciham Abdu Ali, will
continue to cause friction in the relationship and increase risk of attracting negative
attention from U.S. Congress.

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Mission Goal 3 | Support regional peace and security.

Description | Eritrea’s foreign policies are inimical to and actively seek to thwart U.S. interests, including the INSSG-stated goal to bring an end to the African continent’s deadliest conflicts and prevent the onset of new ones. The Embassy is advancing a broader policy of regime isolation and financial sanctions to limit its ability to perpetuate the conflict in northern Ethiopia. We are working closely with Washington to encourage regional partners, EU members, and others to limit or cease engagement with and support of President Isais’ regime and to closely monitor the impact of – and regime response to – E.O. 14046 sanctions.

Objective 3.1 | Limit Eritrea’s ability to undermine stability in the Horn of Africa.

- Justification | Following the signing of the 2018 peace agreement with Ethiopia, the United States and international community were optimistic that Eritrea was breaking with its past, destabilizing behavior and sought to play constructive role in achieving regional integration and the settlement of regional conflicts. This optimism has not borne out. Eritrea’s military involvement in Ethiopia threatens to destabilize the region and has triggered financial sanctions designed to limit Eritrea’s ability to prosecute the conflict and a diplomatic effort to isolate President Isais and the regime.

- Linkages | JRS 1.1: Strengthening the capacity of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. JRS 1.3: Address the immediate causes of conflict through long-term investments and institution-building in the security sector. INSSG: Protecting the security of the American people.

- Risks | If Eritrea does not remove its forces from Tigray and begin acting constructively in the region, local conflicts could increase dramatically and destabilize the region. Already, the presence and behavior of Eritrean troops are the biggest recruiting tool for the rebel forces in Tigray.

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Objective 3.2 | Eritrea does not object to or seek to block U.S. global initiatives such as a negotiated end to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, countering Russian aggression in Europe, and resisting Chinese efforts to dominate the UN.

- **Justification** | Currently, Eritrea votes against the United States on most contested United Nations votes.

- **Linkages** | JRS 1.1: Strengthen the capability of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations, by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media.

- **Risks** | Eritrea actively campaigns against U.S. candidates and encourages fringe nations to do the same.

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Mission Goal 4 | Restored U.S. credibility and reasserted global leadership position the United States as a strong partner for the Eritrean people.

Description | Due to the large Eritrean diaspora and several successful members of the diaspora, the United States is already the partner of choice for many Eritreans. Through demonstrated leadership in the areas of democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity, we will build on this and make the United States the preferred choice for the majority. This is intended to lay the bedrock for better relations in the future when Eritrea’s current aging leadership, for whom the most formative experience was the independence struggle, exit their positions.

Objective 4.1 | Embassy identifies and cultivates future leaders and opinion makers.

- **Justification** | Current senior Eritrean leaders publicly support the regime narrative that the United States is an enemy that did not support the independence struggle, but the upcoming generations are far more reasonable. In order to have influence in the future direction of the country, we need to actively cultivate this younger generation. China is currently doing the same.

- **Linkages** | JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations, by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media. JRS 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, an environmental change. INSSG: Reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world.

- **Risks** | China is actively involved in cultivating the same future leaders, and offers more (in terms of scholarships, fellowships, etc.) than we are able to offer. Therefore, if we do not successfully compete in this arena, we are likely to lose the new generations to Chinese influence.

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Objective 4.2 | Rooted in our commitment to democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the United States prevails in our strategic competition with China for the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Eritreans.

- **Justification** | The government of Eritrea is ideologically drawn to China’s governing philosophy, while the people prefer that of the United States. During Eritrea’s years of isolation, China was the only major power willing to support it. Eritrea moving further into China’s sphere of influence (Eritrea signed a Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding with China in November 2021) would greatly reduce our ability to influence the region as a whole.

- **Linkages** | JRS 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, and environmental changes.

- **Risks** | An Eritrea strategically aligned with China will see no reason to reform its human rights issues and could deny the United States access to a large part of the most valuable shipping route in the world and increases China’s foothold in the Horn of Africa.

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4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Embassy’s physical plant is able to support mission activities and personnel.

- **Justification** | Embassy Asmara is housed in an eight-building, 3.2 acre compound with buildings that are nearly 100 years old. No significant renovations or updates were done during the 2003-2016 period of poor bilateral relations because the Eritrean government would not issue visas to any official Americans other than the Embassy’s core diplomatic personnel. For nearly two decades our Management Officers and LE staff have worked heroically to maintain the buildings and meet relevant U.S. health and safety standards with limited resources locally available. This is an immense challenge and certain projects simply can’t be done with local resources. In 2019 OBO approved a $12 million critical upgrades and renovation project. The first phase was completed in December 2021. The second – and largest – phase is expected to kick off in January 2022 and run for a period of two years. In summer 2021, significant upgrades were made to roofing infrastructure, but some require complete replacement.

- **Linkages** | AF-AFR JRS Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective: Revitalize the diplomatic and development workforce and infrastructure in a diverse, inclusive, equitable, and accessible manner.

- **Risks** | Without significant renovation and repair, Embassy will not be able to support mission personnel and activities, and safety standards will not be met.

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Management Objective 2 | Embassy is properly staffed to achieve its goals.

- Justification | The PAO and GSO positions requested in previous MRRs have been approved and Post will work with Washington to staff these positions in 2022. M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing Review for Embassy Asmara concluded that the Embassy’s customer-to-management ratio is nearly triple that of its comparators; M/PRI’s model projects three USDH positions. Currently, Embassy Asmara has only one Management Officer who oversees the GSO, FMO, HRO, and Facilities Maintenance functions. In addition, we are in the early stages of a two-year, $12 million OBO project to renovate our long-neglected and much-in-need-of-repairs Embassy compound. While the addition of the GSO position will relieve the Management Officer of GSO-related responsibilities, we assess that, without the addition of another USDH to the Management team, the MO will continue to be overwhelmed and Embassy operations negatively affected. Based on our current staffing trajectory, by year-end 2022, the total US footprint could as high as 30 people (USDH, EFMs, PSCs, long-term TDY), tripling the number under COM authority. As Post becomes more attractive to families, we expect this number to continue to increase. As such, Embassy Asmara requests the following positions:

  o ARSO (first requested in 2021 ICS/MRR): Our sole RSO is unsustainably stretched as he seeks to balance his responsibilities as Post’s security advisor, crisis responder, and safe guarder of Mission personnel, information, and property, and the manager of nearly 200 local staff. An Assistant RSO position would decrease the number of demands placed on the RSO and allow him/her to enhance overall leadership to the section, provide strategic guidance to the Chief of Mission and other regional inter-agency partners, and focus on the Mission priority of strengthening relations with national actors to improve information coordination, in support of the Administration’s top goal of protecting the United States.

  o HRO (first time request): Together with the approved GSO position, the addition of an HRO would bring Embassy Asmara’s Management team in line with M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing recommendation. Three factors drive this request: (1)
The Embassy has a disproportionately high number of local staff to USDH because the 160-plus person local guards are employed by the Embassy. Given normal turn-over and a robust Special Immigrant Visa program, this perpetually creates a relatively large pool of vacant positions. As a result, the HR team must devote a large percentage of its time to recruitment. (2) High local demand for U.S. Embassy jobs results in the HR team receiving dozens to hundreds of applications for most, especially unskilled, positions. (3) The Embassy is not able to use automated systems to screen and manage applications because no one has Internet (Internet penetration is less than 2%). As a result, manual screening is required for all applicants. An HRO would provide better oversight of the team and relieve the Management Officer of this responsibility.

- **Linkages** | AF-AFR JRS Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective: Revitalize the diplomatic and development workforce and infrastructure in a diverse, inclusive, equitable, and accessible manner.

- **Risks** | Without an ARSO, we will not be able to satisfactorily meet the security requirements for a growing Embassy staff. Without an HRO, Post will continue to a large number of long-standing local employee vacancies that will affect Embassy security (as most are guards) and Embassy operations (because other HR functions go unfilled or are delayed).

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