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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The U.S. Mission in Sudan, for the foreseeable future, will be operating in a challenging environment. The U.S. Mission will work closely with the Sudanese people to overcome the legacy of decades of an autocratic regime and a transition to democracy recently disrupted by a military-takeover on October 25, 2021.

For almost thirty years, Sudan had been a significant outlier from the United States’ robust engagement with Africa. As a state sponsor of terrorism (SST) and headed by a President indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Sudan was subject to strict economic sanctions. In 2016, the United States launched a new strategy towards Sudan, offering the Government of Sudan (GoS) a path towards normalizing the bilateral relationship. By October 2017, the GoS had made enough progress in areas such as counterterrorism and ending internal conflicts, that the United States lifted most U.S. economic and trade sanctions against Sudan.

A wave of popular protests in 2019 led to the ousting of President Bashir and the creation of a technocratic civilian-led transitional government (CLTG). A new constitutional framework established a 39-month transitional period that would culminate in democratic elections in 2022. U.S.-Sudan relations improved significantly during the transition period. In December 2020, Congress acknowledged Sudan’s reform efforts by removing it from the SST list.

On October 25, 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Fattah Burhan initiated a military takeover of the GoS, arresting Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and suspending several articles of the Constitutional Declaration. This action precipitated months of civilian protests, often violently suppressed by the security forces and resulting in dozens of deaths. The military takeover set back the transition, weakened already fragile government institutions, lost international financial aid, and damaged stability.

On January 8, 2022, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) began a facilitated process to support a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue on how to end the crisis. The Sovereign Council, under General Burhan, continues to oversee the country.

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U.S. Mission Sudan has the capacity to pursue a more ambitious bilateral agenda, including necessary space, security, and self-sufficiency. The greatest threat to our Mission strategy is the October 25 military takeover and its disruption of the democratic transition. Sudan’s economy and political and social structures remain weak and prone to crisis. Khartoum will continue to be a hardship post with difficult climatic conditions, limited recreation activities available on the local economy, and limited travel within the country.

Within this operating environment, the Mission seeks to positively impact Sudan in several areas. We endeavor to support:

- A Sudan that makes political and economic reforms to support the establishment of democratic institutions, enhance protection of human rights, and advance the full participation of women and youth in governance and the economy.
- A Sudan that makes steady progress to improve its internal peace and stability, while becoming a more effective partner on countering terrorism and transnational threats.
- A Sudan that makes ongoing commitments to a range of necessary economic reforms and improvements in transparency to allow debt relief within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Paris Club processes.
- A Sudan that takes steps to improve its human rights record, including actively protecting freedom of religious practice.

We assume that Mission operations will remain similar in size and level of funding as the FY2019 baseline, with perhaps some modest increases should the bilateral context improve. If credible civilian leadership can be restored, the Mission's foreign assistance budget would begin to transition from extensive humanitarian assistance programs and support to civil society and peacebuilding to activities supporting greater host-country self-reliance. This strategy reflects an inter-agency assessment of Mission Sudan's internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as external opportunities and threats to which we must respond.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Advance the Transition to a Civilian-led Government and Institutions

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Sudan transitions to a popularly accepted civilian-led government through creation of democratic institutions, acceptable transitional justice and rule-of-law reforms, and space for a vibrant and resilient civil society and media to operate.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Sudan makes necessary preparations and develops capacity for free and fair elections that promote popular and inclusive participation from across Sudan.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Improve enabling environment to prevent and address human rights violations and protect advocacy.


- **Mission Objective 2.1:** The Sudanese government, Sudanese Armed Forces, and Juba Peace Agreement signatories uphold their obligations under the Agreement.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** The Sudanese Armed Forces and security forces are trained on acceptable police practices, respect human rights, and support a constitutional democracy under civilian authorities.

Mission Goal 3: Promote Economic and Banking Reforms

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Sudan restarts economic reforms including revision of economic, commercial, and banking laws, regulations, and policies to create a conducive investment climate, increase trade, improve agricultural production, and promote economic growth.

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• **Mission Objective 3.2:** Sudan fosters sustainable and inclusive growth policies that reduce extreme poverty and improve the economic safety net for the most vulnerable segments of Sudanese society.

**Mission Goal 4:** Address the Needs of Marginalized, Vulnerable, and Underrepresented Populations

• **Mission Objective 4.1:** Sudan implements legal reforms, develops policies, and commits substantial state resources to promote, protect, and support marginalized, vulnerable, and underserved populations.

• **Mission Objective 4.2:** Sudan has greater capacity to provide access to quality health care, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services and is better able to deliver support to vulnerable populations through protection initiatives against the impacts of man-made crises and natural disasters.

• **Mission Objective 4.3:** Empower youth through scholarships, exchanges, and training in fields critical to Sudan’s sustained economic, political, and social development.

**Management Objective 1:** Implement Policies and Request Support for Improving Mission Personnel's Quality of Life to Sustain Current Staffing Levels and Attract Prospective Bidders

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3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1: Advance the Transition to a Civilian-led Government and Institutions Description: Sudan’s two-year progress toward democracy was interrupted by the military’s October 25, 2021, government takeover. However, Sudanese leaders continue to seek increased constructive engagement with the United States. The Sudanese people continue, through ongoing civil disobedience, to press for the military’s removal and the reinstitution of civilian rule. The mission will bring diplomatic support to an international effort to pressure stakeholders to reach an agreement to return to the democratic transition, culminating in the establishment of a popularly elected government.

Objective 1.1: Sudan transitions to a popularly accepted civilian-led government through creation of democratic institutions, acceptable transitional justice and rule-of-law reforms, and space for a vibrant and resilient society and media to operate.

- Justification: The Sudanese people, first in 2019 and now in 2022, have risked their lives in pursuit of democracy. Ongoing protests demonstrate the public’s unwillingness to tolerate a military-led government. In a region increasingly dominated by military dictatorships, Sudan offers an opportunity to establish a rule of law-based democracy, supported by strong governing institutions, and become a reliable regional ally for the United States.

- Linkages:
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.1: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.3: Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 3.1: Promote accountable, transparent, and democratic governance by empowering key reformers and actors to promote access to justice, strengthen checks on executive power, and incorporate citizen-responsive governance to reduce corruption and improve the delivery of public services.

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- **Risks:** An ongoing political stalemate could exhaust and demoralize the Sudanese public, ceding to the military de facto control of Sudan’s government. A military government, unhappy with U.S.-led efforts to pressure it to accept civilian control, could look to strengthen economic and military ties with Russia and China, as well as make it more difficult for implementing partners to function effectively throughout the country.

**Objective 1.2:** Sudan makes necessary preparations and develops capacity for free and fair elections that promote popular participation from across Sudan.

- **Justification:** Sudan held elections during the Bashir-era, but these were viewed as sham elections with hand-selected candidates and pre-determined outcomes. The Bashir-era bureaucracy included many corrupt cronies who diverted state resources to enrich political elites. The 2019 revolution sought to purge the government of corrupt actors and usher in an era of open, honest government that would utilize the national wealth for the betterment of the Sudanese people. The public’s trust in the legitimacy of its government will be initially tested by the administration of its national election. A robust, transparent, and verifiable election process would be the first step to cementing public trust in the government and the democratic process.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.4: Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges [and competitors]; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.1: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 3.3: Protect and promote democratic values and leadership, competitive political processes, as well as freedom of speech and assembly. Increase participation of women, youth, LGBTQI+ persons, and other marginalized groups in democratic processes.

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Promote open dialogue among civil society actors, governments, and the communities they serve.

- **Risks:** Sudan has not conducted a census in over a decade and has a large population of refugees and internally displaced persons. Prior to elections, it will be necessary to count and validate the body of eligible voters. This process will be lengthy, costly, and must be administered by a non-partisan, trusted organization for the results to be publicly accepted. A similar effort will be needed to organize the election process, including the identification and selection of non-biased administrators and staff whose work will be respected and accepted by the Sudanese public.

**Objective 1.3:** Improve the enabling environment to prevent and address human rights violations and protect advocacy.

- **Justification:** Historically, Sudan’s human rights track record has been poor. Armed conflicts occur intermittently throughout the country, motivated by racial, ethnic, and tribal animosities, and are often sparked by clashes over scarce resources. The civilian government sought to expand the central government’s ability to protect vulnerable populations and assume the UNIMID security responsibilities. This progress was interrupted in the wake of the October 2021 military takeover. Since the military leadership seized power, the country experienced an increase in tribal clashes, arbitrary arrests, detainments, and the repeated use of lethal force against civilian protesters. Prior to October 2021, the Mission’s assessment was that the CLTG was making progress to improve the country’s human rights record.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.1: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.
  - Joint Strategic Objective 3.2: Advance Equity, accessibility, and rights for all.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations by
improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media.

- **Risks:** Sudan military leadership could escalate its repressive measures to consolidate its authority. The military leaders could look upon efforts to support human rights as a method to encourage political dissent and undermine their authority. Human rights organizations and activists receiving U.S. government support also risk being target for retaliation by governing authorities.

**Mission Goal 2:** Support Peace Efforts and Reforms in Security and Military Institutions

**Description:** The 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) was a major step forward in ending years of internal conflict within Sudan. Under the agreement the signatories committed to ending hostilities and cooperating in the establishment of a unified national government that represented the views of all Sudanese. The JPA was a significant accomplishment of the civilian-led transitional government (CLTG) and received broad support by the international community. The agreement’s goal is the demobilization of the numerous armed groups within Sudan, the establishment of a civilian-controlled, unified military organization whose mission is to protect the country from outside aggressors and not to be utilized against the Sudanese population.

**Objective 2.1:** The Sudanese government, Sudanese Armed Forces, and Juba Peace Agreement signatories uphold their obligations under the Agreement.

- **Justification:** The JPA signatories are to initiate a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process for its members. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will train and retain those fighters who want to remain in the national armed forces. Fighters who separate from the service will be offered training in civilian occupations. Programs will be needed to work with communities for their return. The SAF will revert to civilian oversight.
• **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.1: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.
  - Joint Strategic Objective 3.3: Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 1.1: Strengthen the capability of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. Promote and protect fundamental rights and liberties.

• **Risks:** The DDR process will require the active participation and trust among all the JPA signatories. The signatories are required to submit to the government verifiable lists of fighters, designating those seeking to join SAF and those seeking demobilization. The government and SAF must commit resources to create a unified national military organization, while reintegrating the remaining soldiers into society. Distrust among the various armed groups and a lack of government resources could stall the DDR process. A stalled DDR process could undermine commitment to the JPA and see signatories revert to internecine violence.

**Objective 2.2:** The Sudanese Armed Forces and security forces are trained in acceptable police practices, respect human rights, and support a constitutional democracy under civilian authorities.

• **Justification:** Officially, internal security is undertaken by several armed elements, including the SAF, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Intelligence Services (GIS), and the unified police forces. The Sudanese public’s general sentiment is that these groups act without civilian control and cannot be held to account. To build public trust, security force leadership must be professionalized, and all personnel must be trained in proper procedures, to include respect for and adherence to laws and legal procedures. The security forces must be reorganized to subject them to strict civilian oversight.

• **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.4: Lead allies and partners to address
shared challenges [and competitors]; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.

- Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.5: Enhance foreign publics’ understanding of and support for the values and policies of the United States.

- Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.1: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens.

- AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 1.3: Support institution building in the security sector by addressing the immediate causes of conflict through engagement, training, or programming.

- AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 1.4: Enhance shared U.S. and African values grounded in dignity and human rights to prevent, respond to, and investigate alleged human rights violations and other incidents by security sector actors.

- AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental rights and liberties.

- **Risks:** The various power centers within Sudan (i.e.: SAF, RSF, GIS, and the JPA signatories) rely on their armed adherents to protect their interests. Any move to surrender power to civilian authorities must be undertaken simultaneously by the leaders of each of these power centers. Often these leaders are wary of their rivals’ motivations. Those who have traditionally held power in Sudan have, thus far, been reluctant to relinquish it.

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Mission Goal 3: Promote Economic and Banking Reforms

Description: Decades of economic mismanagement, endemic corruption, and commercial isolation devastated the Sudanese economy. The 2019 revolution was built upon the promise of improving the daily lives and future prospects of the broader Sudanese public. The CLTG committed to an IMF reform package whose goal was to stabilize the economy and lay the foundations for sustained, inclusive economic growth. The economic reform policies included the lifting of costly subsidies on many basic commodities (e.g.: bread, fuel, electricity), improved fiscal management of the national budget, and debt relief. The international community provided technical and financial resources to assist the CLTG with capacity building, regulatory reform, and budget support during the transition. That progress was interrupted with the suspension of international assistance following the October 2022 military takeover. A successful U.S.-led effort to pressure the military leadership into political compromise could once again open Sudan to further economic reform efforts.

Objective 3.1: Sudan restarts economic reforms including revision of economic, commercial, and banking laws, regulations, and policies to create a conducive investment climate, increase trade, improve agricultural production, and promote economic growth.

- Justification: Sudan’s significant agricultural and natural resources create a foundation for future economic development. Sudan has a sizeable and well-trained work force; however, its consumer markets are underserved. Foreign investors seeking new opportunities are reluctant to enter the Sudanese market because of its reputation for government corruption, a challenging commercial regulatory environment, and a dated financial infrastructure that makes profit repatriation exceedingly difficult. In improving Sudan’s financial sector and modernizing its commercial regulatory environment to international standards, the challenges of doing business in Sudan will be lessened – a key to making the country more attractive to international investors and fostering economic growth.

- Linkages:

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Joint Strategic Plan Objective 2.2: Support inclusive and sustainable economic growth and opportunity for communities around the globe.

Joint Strategic Objective 2.4: Strengthen U.S. and global resilience to economic, technological, environmental, and other systemic shocks.

AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 2.1: Encourage improvements to business enabling environments and enhanced trade and investment between the United States and Africa through whole-of-government engagement.

AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 4.3: Reduce hunger, malnutrition, and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa by transforming Africa’s food systems for inclusive and sustainable economic growth, strengthening equitable and accessible resilience capacities, and climate adaptation and natural resource management, and the enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable agriculture-led economic growth.

Risks: A lack of financial resources has made it difficult for the Sudanese government to attract and retain talented administrators. The lack of bureaucratic capacity opens the door to corrupt actors willing to buy or sell government access. Until Sudan can improve its commercial climate it will remain a “high risk-high return” environment that will scare off many prospective investors, placing an effective damper on future economic growth prospects.

Objective 3.2: Sudan fosters sustainable and inclusive growth policies that reduce extreme poverty and improve the economic safety net for the most vulnerable and underserved populations.

Justification: Sudan is the poorest country in North Africa, with 55.6% of the population below the national poverty line. Sudan has natural resources, including vast mineral deposits and the largest amount of remaining unused arable land in the world. Sudan can play the role of “breadbasket” to the Gulf region and serve as the primary conduit for trade from central Africa. Sudan has economic growth potential,
but that potential is usurped by a narrow ruling class that controls the country’s resources for its own gain. Properly managed, the Sudanese economy possesses the resources to bolster economic growth, improve household incomes, and lift a large swath of the Sudanese population from poverty.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 2.2: Support inclusive and sustainable economic growth and opportunity for communities around the globe.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 4.3: Reduce hunger, malnutrition, and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa by transforming Africa’s food systems for inclusive and sustainable economic growth, strengthening equitable and accessible resilience capacities, and climate adaptation and natural resource management, and the enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable agriculture-led economic growth.

- **Risks:** Sudan’s military and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate important sectors of the Sudanese economy. Placing these companies under civilian control could launch a process of privatization that could improve economic competitiveness and attract investors. However, these SOEs provide the resources that fund the military and other security services, creating an independence they have been unwilling to surrender. Convincing the military to exit the commercial sector has thus far proven unsuccessful.
Mission Goal 4: Address the Needs of Marginalized, Vulnerable, and Underrepresented Populations

Description: Following the end of the Bashir regime in 2019, the CLTG moved to repeal many of the Islamist-backed policies that had severely limited personal freedoms, marginalized women, stoked intolerance, and oppressed minorities. The CLTG made a concerted effort to expand opportunities for women in government positions, including the appointment of female ministers to leadership positions (e.g.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The national Family Support Program, launched in 2021, provided a social safety net for poor communities to bolster them through the economic reform period. However, since October we have seen the return to many Bashir-era policies and tactics, including arbitrary arrests of political opponents, lethal force used against civilian protestors, internet blackouts, detention of journalists, etc. A return to a civilian-controlled government could re-start the CLTG’s reform efforts.

Objective 4.1: Sudan implements legal reforms, develops policies, and commits substantial state resources to promote, protect, and support marginalized, vulnerable, and underserved populations.

• Justification: In 2020 the CLTG pushed hard to end the UNAMID mission in Darfur, citing its responsibility for providing internal security. As the national government has inherited this responsibility to protect vulnerable populations throughout Sudan, it will need to provide the resources to fulfill its security commitments. In addition to financial resources, the government will need to undertake the security reforms required, including providing the necessary oversight and enforcement mechanisms to significantly deter malicious actors, and to carry out its pledges to protect all vulnerable communities. The USG should look for opportunities to support government actions that seek to advance inclusion, tolerance, social acceptance, and extend protections to marginalized, vulnerable, and underserved populations.

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• **Linkages:**
  
  − Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.2: Advance equity, accessibility, and rights for all.
  
  − Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.5: Improve inclusive and equitable health, education, and livelihood services, especially for women, youth, and marginalized groups.
  
  − Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.4: Promote a safe, humane, and orderly immigration and asylum system, address the root causes of irregular migration collaboratively with our partners, and enhance protections for refugees and displaced persons.
  
  − AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media.
  
  − Executive Order 13985 On Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities.

• **Risks:** Insufficient command and control capabilities, coupled with a well-armed population make it difficult for the government to provide concrete assurances to at-risk communities. In a security vacuum the at-risk populations will arm themselves for protection. Any clashes between individuals or small groups have the potential to escalate into widening conflicts with significant loss of lives and a possible return to pre-JPA armed factionalism.

**Objective 4.2:** Strengthen Sudan’s capacity to provide access to quality health care, nutrition, and WASH services and support of vulnerable populations against the impacts of man-made crises and natural disasters.

• **Justification:** Changing climate patterns have increased the severity of droughts, flooding, and other disruptive weather-related phenomena. In 2020,
the country experienced record high water levels in the Nile during the rainy season, resulting in increased flooding, the disruption of daily lives, the displacement of thousands of people, and an uptick in water-borne diseases. Droughts have forced traditional farmers and ranchers to move to new areas in search of better land, grazing areas, and more reliable water supplies, leading to clashes with indigenous populations over scarce resources. Displaced and migrating groups are vulnerable to exposure to the elements, diseases linked to inadequate sanitation, and an absence of health care services.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.3: Reinvigorate U.S. humanitarian leadership and provide lifesaving protection and assistance in response to international disasters and humanitarian crises overseas.
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 3.5: Improve inclusive and equitable health, education, and livelihood services, especially for women, youth, and marginalized groups.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 4.2: Accelerate equitable, inclusive, and accessible actions to address the climate crisis, build the capacity to adapt, and foster resilience to climate-related environmental change.
  - Executive Order 13985 On Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities.

- **Risks:** Sudan’s hinterlands are remote, lack basic infrastructure (e.g.: electricity) and are often beyond the reach of the Khartoum government. Providing consistent, modern services in these distant regions is costly and difficult to sustain. Large swaths of Sudan’s frontier regions suffer from lawlessness, due mainly to an absence of regular police protection, making those populations vulnerable to armed groups. Large migrant populations, in search of more productive land, do not permanently settle in one area, meaning that services must be relocated to support the population. These factors present challenges to those seeking to establish and build upon basic service infrastructure.

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Objective 4.3: Empower youth through scholarships, exchanges, and training in fields critical to Sudan’s sustained economic, political, and social development.

- **Justification:** The 2019 ouster of President Bashir was driven in part by a youth movement determined to improve its future economic prospects and standards of living. The CLTG was staffed in large part by experts drawn from the Sudanese diaspora who put their careers on hold to return home to launch the new government on the path to stability, security, and prosperity. Sudan’s future leaders, in the private, public, and academic sectors, should be drawn from the pool of eager youth who worked and sacrificed to see the end of the Bashir era. Many of these same youth, who saw their 2019 gains threatened by the October 2021 military takeover, are now risking their lives daily to participate in protests and organize political resistance committees. These future leaders look to the United States for moral and material support. The U.S. government should capitalize on this opportunity to help develop Sudan’s future leaders to embrace our values.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.5: Enhance foreign publics’ understanding of and support for the values and policies of the United States.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Objective 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, and environmental change.

- **Risks:** In the absence of U.S. engagement and support, Sudan’s youth could seek support from American rivals in China, Russia, or Iran. This could present an opportunity for our rivals to shape Sudan’s next generation. The CLTG’s leadership included several U.S.-trained and Western-trained professionals who shared America’s values and sought to work closely with the embassy in re-orienting Sudan toward a liberal democratic view of the world. To sustain that progress, the U.S. government should consider investing in the next generation of Sudanese leaders.
4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1: Implement Policies and Request Support for Improving Mission Personnel's Quality of Life to Sustain Current Staffing Levels and Attract Prospective Bidders.

- **Justification:** Embassy Khartoum remains a historically difficult-to-staff post. While we have been successful in recent years recruiting candidates, many positions go unfilled or receive one or two interested bidders. Post offers significant financial incentive (e.g.: a combined 45% Post Hardship differential and Danger Pay allowance) and four R&Rs in two years, but Khartoum’s limited social options, lack of domestic travel opportunities, difficult climate, and adult EFM-only status remain disincentives for potential bidders.

- **Linkages:**
  - Joint Strategic Plan Objective 4.1: Build and equip a diverse, inclusive, resilient, and dynamic workforce.
  - AF Bureau Joint Regional Strategy Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 1: Revitalize the diplomatic and development workforce and infrastructure in a diverse, inclusive, equitable, and accessible manner.

- **Risks:** Sudan’s internal turmoil has led to the suspension of foreign financial assistance that could have been dedicated to much-needed infrastructure upgrades. It is unlikely that basic services (e.g.: educations, health care, internet infrastructure, roads, etc.) will improve in the next five years. Despite post’s many efforts, living conditions in Khartoum will remain challenging, making attracting interested bidders equally challenging.