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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The United States’ relations with Poland are surging across the board. Poland has long been a staunch U.S. Ally and strategic partner on NATO’s eastern flank. When at their best, U.S.-Poland relations are driven by a profound strategic commonality that links national interests with universal values, including democracy and rule of law. The bilateral affection is deepened further by our history, close cultural affinities and strong economic ties, laying the groundwork for an ambitious blueprint to strengthen further our partnership through joint, practical action. We are at a moment of tremendous opportunity, and we should seize it.

If the United States and Poland (and the people of both nations) stay focused on what is possible, we could bring bilateral trade volumes to the highest levels in our history. We can imagine our top scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs collaborating on a way to mitigate climate change, battle infectious diseases, and shift Poland’s dependency on coal to greener energy sources and a smaller carbon footprint. We can deepen security linkages enabling a stronger Poland that contributes to collective security. In the period 2022-2024, the United States will support Poland’s ambition of becoming a top-tier NATO Ally and the principal regional leader in collective defense.

The United States’ priorities in Poland are to: 1) intensify our security cooperation; 2) increase our trade and investment opportunities with Poland, with particular focus on increased energy diversification and security; 3) reaffirm the need to uphold common democratic values and strong democratic institutions; and 4) secure the future of our relationship by strengthening people-to-people ties between our countries.

Security Cooperation: The U.S.-Poland shared commitment to freedom dates to the American Revolution when Polish heroes such as Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Casimir Pulaski aided our cause. The United States was the first country to recognize independent Poland in 1919. Today, Poland remains a stalwart Ally and one of the United States’ strongest partners in fostering security regionally and globally. The United States and Poland partner closely on NATO capabilities, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, missile defense, border security, transnational

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crime, and combatting cyber threats. Poland is in the midst of a multi-year (2020-2035), $133 billion military modernization program, and is one of only a handful of Allies meeting NATO guidelines to spend two percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of defense spending on modernizing equipment and infrastructure. We estimate Poland will spend $11.6 billion on defense spending in the next 24 months alone. Poland jointly hosts the NATO Multinational Corps and Division Northeast Headquarters and will host the forward command post of the U.S. Army’s newly established V Corps headquarters. Poland hosts approximately 4,500 rotational U.S. military personnel. The 2020 U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will enable a larger rotational U.S. presence in Poland and lays out burden-sharing support Poland will provide to U.S. forces. In late 2022/early 2023, the Aegis Ashore missile defense site in northern Poland is scheduled to reach operational status. A U.S. aviation detachment is located in Poland and the country will host a ballistic missile defense site under the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Poland’s cyber capacity is growing and will help improve the Polish government’s nascent preparedness for potential domestic and transient attacks. Together, the United States and Poland are addressing traditional and emerging threats to provide regional, European, and global security.

Trade and investment ties: Poland has an incredible economic story and an enormous amount of untapped trade and investment potential. Poland ranks second in the world in terms of total GDP change in a 30-year period (1990-2020), just behind China, and ahead of India. Poland’s economy has grown steadily for 28 consecutive years - a record surpassed only by Australia. While COVID disrupted even Poland’s economy, early indicators suggest that Poland economically managed the pandemic better than its EU neighbors. Trade has increased significantly in the last decade reaching $14.3 billion in 2019, the highest in history. The Department of Commerce manages interagency advocacy support for 30 government procurement projects in Poland, valued at $29.2 billion with $19.7 billion expected in U.S. export content. In 2020, U.S. agricultural exports reached $506 million, the second consecutive year U.S. food & agricultural trade surpassed the half-billion-dollar threshold. The United States is Poland’s top non-EU investor. American companies are and will continue to be attracted to Poland due to its strong economic growth, large domestic market, tariff-free access

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to the EU, political stability, and relatively low-cost and well-educated workforce. The cumulative value of 30 years of American investment in Poland: $63 billion, which supports 267,000 jobs and indirectly supports thousands more. There are 1,500+ companies with American capital and we’re just getting started. Mission Poland is leveraging private sector outreach and government partnership to target the sectors that hold the most potential for U.S. exporters: the defense industry, the energy sector, infrastructure and intelligent transportation systems, and digital technologies. Mission Poland will leverage Poland’s leadership in the Three Seas Initiative to increase U.S. exports and investments.

Energy and Climate Change: Like the United States, Poland is pursuing an “all-of-the-above” energy agenda which recognizes that energy security is made possible through energy diversity. Mission Poland is implementing three strategic objectives for our energy engagement with Poland: First, we are working with the Poles to fight climate change using clean energy; second, we are creating U.S. jobs in the green economy by supporting exports of U.S. clean energy technology and products; third, we are strengthening the security of the United States and our allies by improving Poland’s energy security through the diversification of sources and suppliers. Among our operational goals to deepen our energy and climate change cooperation with Poland, the most high-profile goal is to complete the export of a $45 billion U.S. nuclear reactor technology, setting the stage for a century’s worth of cooperation on energy. Concurrently, we are assisting in the protection of critical energy infrastructure, accelerating the reduction of Poland’s greenhouse gas emissions, deepening cooperation to support renewable energy sources, and supporting the export of U.S. clean energy technology and services. Taken together, these efforts will help Poland migrate away from coal prior to the planned phase-out in 2049.

Democratic values: Poland was once widely seen as the most successful example of a democratic transformation in central and eastern Europe and a leader of European integration. While still a relatively young democracy, Poland’s institutions are designed well to ensure the rule of law, protection of human rights, tolerance of diversity, and a market-based economy. The United States and Poland believe in a rules-and-values-based international system. Since 2015, the language and actions of Poland’s ruling coalition has demonstrated skepticism about
such a system and has stressed national sovereignty as a principal value. Judicial reform, legislation on property claims, respect for media freedom, the rights of women and LGBTQI+ persons have caused tension with the EU and other international partners and raised concerns about the Polish government’s commitment to democratic norms. Despite this, Poland continues to be an important model and partner in promoting democracy and reform in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and other countries throughout the region. We can demonstrate that EU unity and commitment to shared values are in our mutual interest. The United States will continue to strive to preserve the core common values on which our partnership with Poland is founded.

*People-to-People Ties:* With almost 10 million Americans claiming Polish ancestry, people-to-people ties are one of the most enduring features of the relationship and a source of unwavering support. Poles like Americans more than just about any other third country nationals. This affection stems from centuries-long cultural ties and shared worldviews. But we cannot be complacent; Poles now coming of age have no personal recollection of the U.S. role in the end of Poland’s communist era and its democratic transition. As Polish society becomes more politically divided, regard for the United States ebbs and rises among Poles of different political beliefs depending on which U.S. party is in the White House. Such swings have the potential to erode pro-American attitudes over time. To preserve our positive influence, we will further develop our people-to-people ties - especially engaging youth and women - and those who may be more focused on the EU or more skeptical of the status quo (including the U.S.-Polish relationship). Beginning in 2020, the Mission has focused on the start of the second century of diplomatic relations with Poland by building relationships with younger Polish generations and expanding people-to-people exchanges throughout Poland and at all levels of society. We will continue doing this by focusing on that generation’s priorities, including promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation, increasing civic engagement among young people and supporting human rights (particularly those of the LGBTQI+ community in Poland). We will also increase our teacher training programs, equipping educators to explore these topics in the classroom with the thousands of students they engage over their careers. We will also step up communication efforts in social and traditional media to reach broader

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audiences and to combat disinformation that seeks to divide us by countering false and malicious narratives before they become part of the mainstream.

The next three years will be critical in determining the future of Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. partnership with Poland can serve as a force to shape these developments to maximize the benefits to America’s security and prosperity.
2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Poland becomes a more responsive and effective partner on regional security and actively addresses global security challenges.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** An enhanced U.S. military presence in Poland and a modernized Polish military successfully deter aggression and result in a Polish force able to contribute to NATO and out-of-area operations.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Increased engagement with the United States and other partners improves Poland’s ability to address cyber threats, counter terrorism, and tackle transnational challenges such as proliferation, narcotics, and organized crime.

Mission Goal 2: Poland’s economic growth is sustainable, carbon neutral, resilient, and benefits American workers and families by contributing to U.S. economic growth and prosperity.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Promotion of U.S. commercial interests, opportunities, and removal of barriers to doing business in Poland increase bilateral trade and investment, strengthen supply chains, and support the build back better agenda.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Facilitate business, tourism, and immigrant travel to the United States to increase investment in the United States and reunite immigrating families from the region.
- **Mission Objective 2.3:** Poland adopts clean and secure sources and supplies of energy to enhance regional energy security and accelerate Poland’s path towards climate neutrality by 2050.
- **Mission Objective 2.4:** Poland adopts sound policies to support innovation, scientific research, and public health.

Mission Goal 3: Poland continues to respect the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, media, and other democratic institutions at home; uses its transition

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experience to promote democracy abroad; and shows greater respect for and acceptance of minorities and socially marginalized groups within its borders.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Effectively engage with the Polish government to maintain respect for rule of law and the independence of courts and judges; protect space for private media, academics, and non-governmental organizations to operate free of government interference or pressure; Polish society shows greater respect for, and acceptance of, minority groups.

- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Enhance Poland’s capability to support civil society and democracy in Russia, Belarus, and Eastern Partnership member countries.

**Mission Goal 4:** Poles understand and support the core values at the foundation of the U.S.-Poland alliance with an increasing long-term commitment to specific Mission goals and the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship.

- **Mission Objective 4.1:** More Poles participate in programs that facilitate the bilateral exchange of people, ideas and culture, improving their understanding of and the value they place on the U.S.-Poland relationship.

- **Mission Objective 4.2:** Mission programs identify and disrupt disinformation campaigns that seek to undermine shared values and policies, train journalists to combat disinformation, and increase the media literacy and critical thinking skills of Polish youth.

**Management Objective 1:** The management platform is sufficient in size, structure, and expertise to fully support the Mission and enable goal accomplishment.

**Management Objective 2:** The Mission’s facilities and housing are safe, secure, and adequate.

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3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | Poland becomes a more responsive and effective partner on regional security and actively addresses global security challenges.

Description | This goal reflects the U.S. strategic priority of deterring and preventing adversaries from threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to global common areas, or dominating key regions. The mission will work with Poland to foster cooperation between our militaries through bilateral and NATO deployments, to provide military expertise, and to increase Polish contributions to international security and Peacekeeping Operations. This goal also reflects the U.S. strategic priority of increasing engagement with partners on addressing cyber threats and counter terrorism, as well as transnational challenges such as proliferation, narcotics, and organized crime. The mission will work with Poland to improve its cyber capabilities and ability to counter hybrid threats including malign disinformation, to address terrorist threats, to manage regional security threats, and to support U.S. priorities in international organizations.

Objective 1.1 | An enhanced U.S. military presence in Poland and a modernized Polish military successfully deter aggression and result in a Polish force that contributes to NATO and out-of-area operations

- Justification | Security remains a pillar of our bilateral relationship. In response to Russian aggression, at the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit, the United States declared it would serve as the framework nation for the NATO multinational Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup in Poland, a commitment it is now fulfilling with the contribution of a U.S Army battalion. Additionally, in 2016, the United States committed to a bilateral deployment to Poland consisting of heel-to-toe persistent rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The U.S. Army also moved its Division Mission Command Element from Germany to Poznan to support U.S. Army deployments to Poland and movement throughout the region.
Starting in 2017, the 143rd Combat Sustainment Support Brigade and Combat Aviation Brigade also rotational troops and equipment at Powidz airbase in support of Atlantic Resolve in Poland and throughout the NATO eastern flank. Since 2012, U.S. Detachment 1/52nd Operations Group has been stationed in Poland on an enduring basis to support quarterly rotations of F-16s and C-130 aircraft to train with Polish Air Forces. From 2018 to 2021, the U.S. Air Force deployed a detachment to Mirosławiec Air Base to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) flights. The U.S. Navy is overseeing the construction of a U.S. missile interceptor base at Redzikowo as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that will accommodate upwards of 200 additional U.S. personnel.

In June and September 2019, Presidents Trump and Duda signed joint declarations on defense cooperation to increase the U.S. military presence in Poland by approximately 1,000 troops. The two leaders agreed to establish a Combat Training Center for joint use in Drawsko Pomorskie, a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 ISR squadron, an aerial port of debarkation in Wrocław-Strachowice, and additional U.S. Special Operations Forces in Lubliniec. The agreements also upgraded the Mission Control Element in Poznan to a Division Headquarters (Forward) and established an area support group in Poznań to support current and future U.S. forces in Poland. Our increased military presence in Poland will provide opportunities for new and innovative bilateral training engagements that can increase Polish military effectiveness and NATO interoperability.

On November 13, 2020, the U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into force. The agreement establishes a detailed framework for the future U.S. military presence in Poland and lays out burden-sharing support Poland will provide to U.S. forces. The agreement will enable both greater flexibility in U.S. troop deployments and the ongoing move of the V Corps Headquarters-Forward to Poznań. Construction of these facilities will be a multi-year process. V Corps established the Forward Command Post in Poznań on November 20, 2020. V Corps will staff its forward headquarters with approximately 200 personnel on a rotational basis. The V Corps
Headquarters will conduct operational planning, mission command, and oversight of U.S. rotational forces in Europe.

Meanwhile, Poland’s military continues to make its transition from a Warsaw Pact-era force based on conscription, to a modern, agile, and professional all-volunteer force capable of expeditionary missions as well as conventional operations. Poland’s military gained valuable experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Poland’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven to be world-class and highly interoperable with U.S. counterparts. Continuing and expanding partnerships and training with Polish SOF will pay long-term dividends as it will enable Poland to successfully participate in out-of-area operations and support bilateral objectives.

Poland is several years into a military modernization process to create a larger, more capable, and flexible 21st century military force. In February 2019, the government updated its modernization plan to spend more than 130 billion from 2020-2035. In addition, national law now mandates that Poland allocate two percent of its GDP to defense spending, and that they reach two and a half percent by 2030. Using our bilateral policy mechanisms, such as the High-Level Defense Group and USEUCOM-led Joint Commission, we can leverage opportunities to advise and provide expertise to guide and prioritize Poland’s military modernization process. A more capable Polish military partner will help the United States realize our foreign and security policy priorities within the broader NATO Alliance and will continue to contribute to success in combating global and regional security threats.

- **Linkages** | This goal reflects the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance priority of promoting a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions. It also advances EUR draft Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) Goal 1, objectives 1 and 4. Additionally, this goal supports USEUCOM Theater Strategy priorities, Support NATO’s Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships, and Enable U.S. Global Operations.
• **Risks |** Failure to continue setting conditions for enhanced U.S. military presence and supporting Poland’s military modernization program would reduce our bilateral military cooperation and slow Poland’s military modernization efforts. This would weaken our ability to deter and, if necessary, resist aggression on NATO’s eastern flank, limit the ability of Poland, a willing and able ally, to contribute to U.S. operations globally, and increase doubt regarding the U.S. commitment to maintain strong transatlantic bonds and defend NATO Allies.

**Objective 1.2 |** Increased engagement with the United States and other partners improves Poland’s ability to address cyber threats, counter terrorism, and tackle transnational challenges such as proliferation, narcotics, and organized crime.

• **Justification |** Poland has matured into a capable and important partner on regional security and law enforcement issues. Past U.S. capacity-building efforts have helped Poland develop professional services capable of combating security threats and allowed these agencies to increase their operational cooperation with the United States on a range of security challenges.

The Polish government has made increasing Poland’s cyber capabilities – both civilian and military – a top priority. This reflects both confidence in Poles’ technical acumen and concern about the cyber threat Poland faces from malign actors. Poland has consistently sought U.S. assistance in this area. Terrorists and other actors increasingly utilize cyber systems for recruitment, communication, and facilitation of organized criminal activity. Continuing U.S. efforts to build Polish cyber capacity will increase cooperation and support investigative activity and information sharing on multiple domestic and transnational threats.

As Poland grapples with how to create a 5G network free of threats and challenges, they will benefit from U.S. knowledge and expertise. Poland’s 2019 signing of a 5G joint declaration with the United States shows its strong willingness to partner with the United States and highlights the potential for greater government cooperation.
Under the auspices of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the Ministry of the Interior and Administration and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Poland Concerning Cooperation to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material signed January 8, 2009, the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program strengthens Poland’s capabilities to deter, detect, and investigate the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials by providing the expertise and tools needed to respond to smuggling events. Poland also works proactively with the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to physically security nuclear and high activity radiological material. Poland also works with NNSA to permanently disposition disused high activity radiological sources.

As Polish need for, and U.S. funding to support, additional U.S. training for Polish law enforcement and security services declines, we recognize the opportunity to encourage the Polish services to take a leadership role throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Polish agencies have expressed an interest in participating in training exchanges, which serve the dual purposes of increasing Poland’s capacity and enhancing regional security.

Polish mainstream political actors agree that the U.S.-Poland relationship is the bedrock of Poland’s foreign policy, a sentiment mirrored widely throughout Polish society. Poland has regularly supported U.S. positions at the UN. Poland continues to lead on support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in light of Russian aggression and has approached the Chinese presence in Europe with a healthy dose of skepticism, while actively pushing back on Xi Jinping thought. We will work closely with the Polish government to ensure their continued support for U.S.-supported candidates to international organizations, U.S.-backed Middle East initiatives, stabilization of Syria, support of democratization in Belarus and Venezuela, North Korea and Russia sanctions, human rights policy, and humanitarian assistance.)

- **Linkages** | This goal reflects the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance on the importance of taking collective action against security threats, including new and emerging challenges such as cyber. It advances the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan

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(JSP) Goals 1 and 2, as well as Strategic Objectives 1.4, 1.5, and 2.4. It advances EUR draft Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) Goal 1 (especially Objective 1 and 4) and Goal 4 (especially Objectives 3 and 4). It also advances the Department of Justice Strategic Plan first strategic goal.

- **Risks** | Failure to continue cooperation with Poland in these security issues would mean greater exposure of Poland, Europe, and the United States to cyber threats from malign actors and risk from terrorist groups. A failure to secure Polish buy-in to support U.S. foreign policy priorities in international fora would mean a loss of U.S. international influence and the risk of negative policy outcomes, including a weakened international non-proliferation regime.

**Mission Goal 2** | Poland’s economic growth is sustainable, carbon neutral, resilient, and benefits American workers and families by contributing to U.S. economic growth and prosperity.

**Description** | This goal reflects the second Pillar of the 2017 National Security Strategy, to promote American prosperity. It also supports Executive Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, the State-USAID 2018-2022 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 2, Objectives 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, and the EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan 2015-2018 Goal 4. Consistent with the National Security Strategy, State and EUR Regional Strategies, the Mission will promote American prosperity by promoting increased exports to Poland and supporting U.S. business to ensure a level playing field and fair access for all U.S. exports and investors as well as promoting Polish investment in the United States.

**Objective 2.1** | Promotion of U.S. commercial interests and opportunities and removal of barriers to doing business in Poland in order to increase bilateral trade and investment, strengthen supply chains, and support the build back better agenda.

- **Justification** | Poland is one of the 25 largest economies in the world, but it is the 38th largest export market for the United States as of the end of 2020, and its foreign direct investment in the United States, though growing, has greater potential. Poland's real

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GDP growth over the last decade has averaged 3.0 percent annually, including by 5.4 percent in 2018. According to the World Bank, Poland’s well-diversified economy is among Europe’s least affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, GDP declined by 2.7 percent in 2020, the first output contraction in more than 20 years. The size of the Polish market and Poland's strong desire to reduce its reliance on the common market by expanding commercial relations outside of the EU represent a substantial opportunity for the United States to increase its trade and investment relationship with Poland. The bilateral trade relationship continues to break records annually, with more than $13.6 billion in two-way trade in goods in 2020.

Despite an overall welcoming investment climate in Poland, U.S. companies point to low regulatory predictability and the inability to provide meaningful input into the rulemaking process as challenges to doing business. Some successful U.S. companies have been unfairly targeted under new tax regimes or proposed ownership restrictions or have seen their investments suffer due to drawn-out lawsuits. While the local public procurement process has recently improved, U.S. companies still encounter a lack of transparency and continued over-reliance on lowest cost as the dominant government selection criteria. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed weaknesses in supply chains including dependance on suppliers located in authoritarian countries that do not respect market-economy principles.

Combining the tools of State Department economic statecraft with those of the Foreign Commercial Service, the Department of Energy, and the Foreign Agricultural Service (including matchmaking services, trade missions, corporate promotional events, international buyer programs, and tailored market research), the Mission will pursue the objectives of the President's National Security Strategy and continue to significantly grow U.S. exports to Poland. Achieving this goal will require increases in traditional U.S. exports as well as a focus on Poland’s key growth export sectors, including defense, information technology, infrastructure, energy, smart cities solutions, food products, and energy efficient building products and technologies. We will advocate for agricultural trade, regulatory, and climate-related policies which are transparent,
science-based, and consistent with international obligations, and encourage Poland to take a more proactive role in their development at the European Commission.

We will deepen cooperation with Poland’s private sector, particularly to promote women innovators and entrepreneurs, to ensure Poland is developing new markets for U.S. investment and exports. We will employ the SelectUSA program to showcase the United States as an attractive investment destination for the Polish private sector. We will develop our relationship with Polish ministries, agencies, local governments, and business organizations not only as partners in promoting increased trade and investment, but also to ensure that the Polish government will address issues of market access and impediments to doing business. We will also take advantage of Poland’s informal leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which comprises 12 central and eastern European member states, to strengthen north-south investment and economic connectivity. The 3SI also provides an alternative to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road and 16+1 initiatives.

- **Linkages |** This goal reflects the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, to “expand economic prosperity and opportunity” and “serve all Americans, not just the privileged few.” It recognizes that “our strength abroad requires the United States to build back better at home” which will “allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation.” It also supports the draft State-USAID 2022-2026 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 2, Objectives 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, and the 2021 draft EUR Joint Regional Strategy Plan Goal 3. This goal also incorporates efforts put forth in the 2021 Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains. Consistent with these plans, the Mission will promote American prosperity by promoting increased exports to Poland and supporting U.S. business to ensure a level playing field and fair access for all U.S. exports and investors as well as promoting Polish investment in the United States.

- **Risks |** If this goal is not reached, U.S. exports to Poland and Polish investment in the United States will not increase, or may even decrease, weakening economic growth in both countries and possibly undermining the overall bilateral relationship. Growth in Poland’s economy may not be environmentally sustainable and could adversely impact
quality of life in Poland over the medium and longer term. U.S. companies in the Polish market, if not treated fairly, may start to divest and potential new U.S. investors will be discouraged from investing, resulting in a worsening business climate, loss of jobs and revenue in both countries, and missed opportunities. Poland may turn to less reliable partners, such as China, to fill the void. The United States may need to pause certain aspects of the business and strategic relationship until the environment improves.

**Objective 2.2 |** Facilitate business, tourism, and immigrant travel to the United States to increase investment in the United States and reunite immigrating families from the region.

- **Justification |** In November 2019, Poland became a member of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). It is now possible for Polish tourist and business travelers to enter the United States without visas for periods of up to 90 days. Demand from Poles for nonimmigrant visas, as a result, has fallen greatly in the past two years. However, Mission Poland is redeploying its consular resources in order to assist posts in the region that are unable to process many or any visa applications due to their countries’ internal politics and security situations – specifically, Embassies Moscow, Minsk, and Kyiv. The Bureau of Consular Affairs named Embassy Warsaw as the official immigrant visa processing post for Russian and Belarusian applicants in 2021, and post is working to obtain sufficient resources to process these family-reuniting visas, including the creation of consular officer and Locally Engaged Staff positions with Russian-speaking prerequisites. Increasing numbers of Russians seek nonimmigrant visas in Poland, while the Belarusian and Ukrainian communities in Poland are growing, leading to larger numbers of visa applicants from these two groups as well. In addition, many American citizens based in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine seek assistance with citizenship services at Embassy Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow. Mission Poland needs to become a regional center of expertise for adjudicating third-country visa applications and providing services for U.S. citizens. Furthermore, demand for visa and citizenship services will only grow as the world recovers from, or adapts to the presence of, COVID.
Concurrently, Poland’s recent entry into the Visa Waiver Program presents growing opportunities to increase travel, tourism, and investment in the United States. The Mission will continue efforts to promote travel under the Visa Waiver Program and increase people-to-people ties through targeted campaigns. To those Poles who still require visas to travel to the United States (such as students, exchange visitors, academic researchers, and performers) the Mission will maintain a high level of service and low wait times, as it will for other nationalities presenting themselves for visa services and for Americans in need of consular assistance.

- **Linkages |** Strategic Goal 5 of the FY 2022-2026 Joint Strategic Plan: Serve U.S. citizens around the world and facilitate international exchange and connectivity; Bureau of Consular Affairs’ Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS), Bureau Goal 1: Provide consular services to U.S. citizens overseas effectively and efficiently; Bureau Goal 2: Maintain secure, efficient passport services and improve the customer experience; Bureau Goal 3: Facilitate legitimate travel while ensuring secure U.S. borders.

- **Risks |** If Mission Poland is not able to meet the increased demand for consular services for Americans, Poles, and third-country national applicants and an increase in global travel post-COVID, there will be serious repercussions. American citizens may experience unexpected delays for passport and citizenship services. American citizen petitioners in immigrant visa cases will have to wait longer for their family members to join them in the United States. Bona fide nonimmigrant visa travelers from Poland and other countries in the region will be delayed or even prevented from doing business, spending tourist dollars, providing critical services, etc., in the United States.

**Objective 2.3 |** Poland adopts clean and secure sources and supplies of energy to enhance regional energy security and accelerate Poland’s path towards climate neutrality by 2050.

- **Justification |** Poland needs to clean and diversify its energy mix in order to improve energy security and to combat climate change. Poland’s investments in diverse energy technologies such as nuclear power, energy efficiency, renewable energy (especially
solar and offshore wind), and the use of natural gas as a transition fuel will help Poland maintain energy security during its transition to climate neutrality.

Poland is one of the EU’s five largest greenhouse gas emitters. The Polish government recognizes a need to transform the energy sector by 2050 to reduce emissions and seeks to phase out state-supported hard coal production by 2049. Polish leaders consistently argue in favor of an emissions target approach which has a fair and just distribution of commitments. If Poland can reduce its emissions, the country could serve as a model to others around the globe who moved from their economies from being high carbon and high emission economies to low carbon and low emission.

Poland’s potential partnership with the U.S. to develop large-scale nuclear power plants with U.S. technology could result in over $18 billion dollars in U.S. exports and strategically tie our two countries even more tightly together over the coming century. Increasingly, Polish companies are considering the procurement of U.S. Small Modular Reactors, which will complement the government’s large reactor program and help Poland become a regional supplier in the nuclear energy industry. The U.S. is already expected to be a major supplier of offshore wind technology, and U.S. solar companies are starting to compete with Chinese suppliers. The successful delivery of U.S. LNG to the Polish LNG port at Swinoujscie is forecasted to reach full capacity in 2023 and represents a new energy relationship. In order to meet its security and environmental objectives, Poland is trying to improve energy efficiency, increase the transparency of energy markets, integrate more fully into the European energy network (including Harmony Link with the Baltic countries), and diversify its suppliers and the routes that energy sources take to market.

American energy companies and academic and research institutions, as well as other USG entities, including the Department of Energy and its network of laboratory facilities, can leverage our support in the research, development, and deployment of diversified and efficient energy to increase Poland’s (and NATO’s) energy security, as well as accelerate Poland’s path to net-zero.

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The Mission will employ the following tools to achieve the objective and meet the overarching goal:

- The Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation is coordinated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- The 2020 Bilateral Intergovernmental Agreement on Civil Nuclear Energy
- Technical support for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
- Department of Commerce led Small Modular Reactor Public Private Program in Europe.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DOE backed Cybersecurity Conference for Energy Security (CC4ES)
- DOE and FBI provided one-off trainings focusing on addressing energy specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

- **Linkages** | This goal reflects: the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (March 2021); the EUR draft Joint Regional Strategy Goal 3, Objective 4; Goals 1.2 and 2 of the Joint State-AID Strategic Plan; Executive Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad; and the National Security Council Interim International Energy Engagement Guidance (November 2021).

- **Risks** | If Poland fails to improve its energy security, it will remain vulnerable to pressure and extortion from outside influences. Should malign actors seek to restrict Poland’s access to energy supplies it could cause political as well as social instability and have large economic consequences. A failure to import reliable energy infrastructure from trusted allies could create additional opportunities for external entities to jeopardize Poland’s energy supply. Regional countries could experience similar threats if they do not receive Polish support to diversify supplies and sources of energy. Instability amongst Poland’s neighbors could have a direct or indirect impact on Poland’s overall security.

Deployment of clean zero technologies can improve energy security while eliminating overall emissions. If Poland fails to pursue a path to climate neutrality by 2050 it jeopardizes a global effort to prevent the worst impacts of climate change. Failure to
support this critical global effort will strain relationships with committed allies in NATO and even jeopardize Poland’s membership in the European Union.

**Objective 2.4 |** Poland adopts sound policies to support innovation, scientific research, and public health.

- **Justification |** The United States and Poland have a long history of scientific cooperation and our joint efforts have resulted in scientific advancement and a stronger bilateral relationship. Engaging on innovation, scientific research, and public health will benefit both countries by deepening ties and finding solutions to critical problems facing our nations. Science, technology, and innovation are cornerstones of the American and Polish economies. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, good policies surrounding public health are key to our economic success. By supporting Poland in its adoption of sound policies related to innovation, scientific research, and public health, we will support the growth of our economic not just now but for decades into the future.

- **Linkages |** This goal reflects 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to “decisively respond to the public health and economic crises unleashed by COVID-19” and to “address the crises of today while promoting resilience, innovation, competitiveness, and truly shared prosperity for the future.” It also reflects the draft EUR Joint Regional Strategy Goal 3, Objective 3 to “jointly set the rules of the road for a 21st century economy that promotes democratic tech leadership, including in AI and 5G...” and Goal 4, Objective 2 to “Lead Global Health and Security Improvements to end the COVID-19 pandemic and quickly mitigate future pandemics.”

- **Risks |** If Poland failed to adopt sound policies to support innovation, scientific research, and public health, their economy would face long term negative consequences. Critics of the government in Poland worry that current and proposed legislation overly politicizes science and education. Without politically neutral and well-thought-out policies, scientific research and education in Poland could face a credibility crisis. If Poland’s health care system is unable to respond to the challenge of COVID-19 due to
the lack of appropriate policies, it would have economic consequences which could threaten some bilateral activities.

**Mission Goal 3 |** Poland continues to respect the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, media, and other democratic institutions at home; uses its transition experience to promote democracy abroad; and shows greater respect for and acceptance of minorities and socially marginalized groups within its borders.

**Description |** This goal reflects the U.S. strategic priority to defend and protect human rights and to address discrimination, inequality, and marginalization in all forms. The mission will advance that priority through engagement with the Polish government. By maintaining respect for the rule of law and independence of the courts, Poland will ensure that private media, academics, and non-governmental organizations can operate without government interference. This goal also reflects the U.S. strategic priority to join with allies and partners to revitalize democracy around the world, while working with likeminded allies to deter and defend against aggression from hostile adversaries. The mission will work with Poland to focus on supporting civil society and democracy in Russia, Belarus, and Eastern Partnership member countries. The mission will cooperate with Poland on developing democracy regionally, improving Russian-language news sources, fostering education and dialogue about Poland’s Jewish population and role in World War II, resolving property restitution and compensation claims, and increasing women’s participation in government, politics, and the business sector.

**Objective 3.1 |** Effectively engage with the Polish government to maintain respect for rule of law and the independence of courts and judges; protect space for private media, academics, and non-governmental organizations to operate free of government interference or pressure; Polish society shows greater respect for, and acceptance of, minority groups.

- **Justification |** The government’s actions on the judiciary, as well in areas of media freedom and freedom of expression, have raised concerns about its commitment to judicial independence, democratic institutions, and checks and balances. The European
Commission (EC), many IO and NGO experts, and the Polish opposition believe that many of the Law and Justice (PiS) government’s judicial changes since coming to power in 2015 have violated EU laws and democratic principles on judicial independence. This complicated issue has generated vigorous debate between the EU and Poland, and in Poland’s political arena and civil society. Successive governments have attempted some type of reform, as the judiciary is one of the least trusted institutions in Poland, according to polling. Ministry of Justice (MOJ) statistics released in April 2021 show a worsening efficiency situation, driven by significant increases in time needed to resolve economic cases.

PiS has repeatedly stated its intention to change Poland’s media laws to decrease foreign media ownership by limiting market concentration and cross-ownership of multiple media platforms. The government, which already heavily influences state-owned media, is seeking to increase its leverage over Poland’s private media outlets. PiS’s media agenda would negatively impact TVN, a subsidiary of American multinational mass media company Discovery, Inc. In January 2021, Polish state-controlled company PKN Orlen acquired the German-owned media company Polska Press, which owns 20 of 24 regional daily newspapers, about 120 weeklies, and about 500 web portals. In December 2021, the parliament approved legislation that threatened Discovery’s ownership of TVN. President Andrzej Duda vetoed the bill the same month, though the government could pursue the bill’s objectives through other measures. In September 2021, the Polish National Broadcasting Council renewed the license of TVN’s 24-hour news channel after a 19-month delay.

For most of its history, Poland has been home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities. The Second World War (WWII) and the Holocaust resulted in the near extermination of over one thousand years of Jewish life and the near annihilation of Roma in Poland. The ensuing post-war changes in Polish borders culminated in the expulsion of Germans and the movement, and in some cases removal, of entire ethnic populations. The result was a nation and a society almost completely ethnically and religiously homogenous. As Poland emerged from communism, Polish society was
forced to confront painful chapters of WWII history in order to completely transition to a democratic system of governance that respected the rights of all its citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual orientation/identity. In recent years, members of new minority ethnic groups from eastern Europe, East and South Asia, and Africa have made Poland their home. While legal frameworks exist to protect minority groups, xenophobic hate speech and hate crimes continue to occur. In 2018, Poland amended its Institute of National Remembrance law to criminalize any attribution of Nazi crimes to the Polish state or nation. Poland later repealed the criminal penalties in the law, though civil penalties remain. The controversy sparked an increase in anti-Semitic rhetoric in societal and political dialogue, which has remained elevated. In September 2021, a revision to the law severely restricted the process for private property restitution or compensation for both Jews and non-Jews. Poland continues to be the only EU member state with significant Holocaust-era property issues that has not passed a national comprehensive private property restitution law.

Before and after the 2019-2020 national elections, the governing United Right coalition repeatedly utilized anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric, which critics say was intended to mobilize its socially conservative base. Members of the United Right government have characterized those advocating for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons as promoters of an ill-defined “LGBT ideology.” The current government opposes same-sex marriage and same-sex partnerships; adoption by same-sex couples; expanding hate speech and hate crime protections to include gender identity and sexual orientation; and teaching about LGBTQI+ issues in schools. More than 90 local governments have passed either resolutions that explicitly reject “LGBT ideology” or “Family Rights Charters” that talk about family values in a way that LGBTQI+ rights NGOs say excludes LGBTQI+ individuals. Several resolutions have since been repealed following financial pressure from the EU, court challenges, and international criticism. How Poland learns to tolerate, understand, accept, and respect all different minority groups, both new and old, is essential to not only overcoming past grievances, but fully transitioning to a society where all its members are treated without bias, prejudice, or hate. A country

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secure with its identity and comfortable with diversity is more resilient and a better partner.

- **Linkages** | This goal reflects 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to “defend and protect human rights and address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization in all its forms,” the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, the 2021 Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex (LGBTQI+) Persons Around the World, the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, and the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. It also supports the State-USAID 2022-2026 Joint Strategic Plan, Goal 1, Objective 1.5, and Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5, as well as EUR Joint Regional Strategy goals and objectives.

- **Risks** | A Poland that protects and strengthens democratic institutions can be an effective security partner, an attractive market destination for U.S. exports and investments, and an advocate for the continued strengthening of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Centralization of power that erodes Poland’s democratic institutions and judicial independence or legislation limiting free speech and efforts to legislate media ownership muzzle a robust and diverse free press lead to heavier state involvement in the economy and erosion of confidence in the judiciary. U.S. investors perceive that Poland’s investment climate is in decline, offering less transparency, fairness, or predictability than in previous years. Poland’s ongoing disputes with the EU over rule of law, equal rights for women and LGBTQI+ people, and other issues diminish its influence on EU decision-making and its ability to be a strong voice on EU issues of importance to the United States. Poland becomes less tolerant to ethnic, religious, and racial minorities, and hostility toward members of the LGBTQI+ community increases. Women’s leadership still faces many challenges and threats to women’s rights increase.

**Objective 3.2** | Enhance Poland’s capability to support civil society and democracy in Russia, Belarus, and Eastern Partnership member countries.

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• **Justification** | Poland has experience to offer to eastern European countries in the process of democratization. Eastern Europe remains a top foreign policy priority for the Polish government, which has played a central role in focusing the EU’s attention on the Eastern Neighborhood. It has pressed for continued EU engagement with Eastern European states, advocated for increased investment in the region (such as the Economic Plan for a Democratic Belarus), and elevated dialogue with Ukraine through the Lublin Triangle. We will support Poland’s efforts to integrate these Eastern neighbors into EU structures and assist them in their democratic transitions. We will encourage Poland to develop its youth and education exchange programs with Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine to promote understanding and foster the development of civil society. We will seek to leverage U.S. and Polish development assistance funding and encourage further bilateral cooperation on democracy and rule of law promotion within Eastern Partnership countries and Belarus by actively encouraging the Polish MFA to sponsor projects under the Development Cooperation Partnership. We will work with the Polish government on programs to counter Russian disinformation campaigns that undermine the political and personal European aspirations of Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and other peoples in the former Soviet Union, and support efforts to strengthen a more pluralist, unbiased, and independent Russian language media environment in the region.

The Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the European Endowment for Democracy will be important external partners. Poland’s 2022 term as OSCE Chairperson-in-Office will give Warsaw new opportunities to encourage development and democracy in Eastern Europe.

• **Linkages** | This goal reflects 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to “join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over,” and “work alongside fellow democracies across the globe to deter and defend against aggression from hostile adversaries.” It also supports the 2022-2026 State-USAID Joint Strategic...
Plan, Goal 1, Objective 1.4, and Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, as well as EUR Joint Regional Strategy 2022 goals and objectives.

- **Risks** | Russia and Belarus continue to use disinformation, wedge issues, and aggressive actions to create instability and inflame divisions in the West. Continued Belarusian and Russian disinformation could exacerbate divisions among Poles, and between Poland and its partners, and amplify narratives and themes hostile to U.S. interests. A failure by Mission Poland to combat disinformation could lead to Polish opposition to continued cooperation in various areas, including security and military, as well as disagreement between Poland and its partners, thereby weakening NATO’s Eastern Flank and strengthening malign influence in the region.

**Mission Goal 4** | Poles understand and support the core values at the foundation of the U.S.-Poland alliance with an increasing long-term commitment to specific Mission goals and the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship.

**Description** | This goal reflects the mission’s aim to use its Public Diplomacy resources to build support for U.S. policy and U.S.-Poland engagement, focusing more on the medium-to-long term benefits of public diplomacy programs, cultivating future leaders through exchange programs and general goodwill through cultural, educational, and communications programs. They aim to create greater understanding of U.S. society and international interests, thereby promoting greater trust and receptivity for U.S. goals in successive generations.

Understanding the genesis of U.S. policy goals will help to create cohorts of likeminded influencers within Polish society and increase support for shared values, such as rule of law, civic engagement and human rights, climate change, and diversity. Efforts to combat malign disinformation will also serve to create greater media literacy and less receptivity in Polish society to manipulation through these means. While a significant part of Mission Poland public diplomacy efforts will be directed at goals one through three, long term benefits will accrue from additional efforts under Goal 4. Therefore, the Mission will continue to engage in a
dynamic and strategic public diplomacy approach, communicating to the average Pole the benefits of supporting the broad scope of the U.S.-Poland relationship.

Objective 4.1 | More Poles participate in programs that facilitate the bilateral exchange of people, ideas and culture, improving their understanding of and the value they place on the U.S.-Poland relationship.

- Justification | As Poland has integrated into the transatlantic community over the past two decades, its relationship to the United States has evolved. While our deep historical ties and cooperation on security matters remain strong, Poland’s membership in the EU has changed the equation. The EU helps build Polish infrastructure, supports Polish civil society organizations and invests heavily in the cultural and educational sectors, including through university exchange programs. As a result, Poles are far more likely to visit, study in, trade with, and identify with their EU partners than the United States. While the level of financial investment in Poland limits our ability to compete with Poland’s European partners, we still hold a comparative advantage in the arena of ideas and best practices. Mission Poland will capitalize on this by increasing opportunities for the exchange of best practices and ideas through traditional exchange programs and through virtual and in-person programming that connects Poles and Americans for discussions, workshops and speaker engagements on topics that are vital to the bilateral relationship and issues on which the United States can offer particular expertise.

- Linkages | This objective links to goal 1.5 of the Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan: Enhance foreign publics’ understanding of and support for the values and policies of the United States, as well as the EUR JRS Goals and Strategic Objectives, Goal 1: Revitalize European Alliances and Partnerships and Goal 2: Strengthen Democracy and Rule of Law. It also reflects the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’s goal of realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.

- Risks | Expanding opportunities for Poles to connect with Americans and facilitating the exchange of ideas and best practices mitigates the risk that Poles will devalue the U.S.-
Poland relationship and turn instead to other potential partners. This would impede Post’s ability to make progress on USG foreign policy goals in Poland and more broadly in the region. It could also increase the risk that Poland increases its cooperation with China.

Objective 4.2 | Mission programs identify and disrupt disinformation campaigns that seek to undermine shared values and policies, train journalists to combat disinformation, and increase the media literacy and critical thinking skills of Polish youth.

- Justification | As in many democratic countries, internal divisions in Poland offer malign actors opportunities to use disinformation to undermine cooperation with the United States and Allies. Combating this phenomenon requires identifying and disrupting disinformation campaigns, reinforcing positive messages on U.S. and transatlantic values and policies, and enhancing media literacy among Polish youth.

Malign actors target areas of weakness or division in our Alliance and use wedge issues in our bilateral relationship to negatively influence public perceptions of the United States and the nature of the bilateral relationship. The open media environment, combined with the influence of online portals and social media as primary sources of information for many Poles, is vulnerable to the rapid and wide spread of disinformation. Poland is a target of disinformation by both Russia, because of its position on NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern border, and China, as an important, growing economy in Central Europe. Both countries have developed sophisticated, multi-pronged approaches to spreading disinformation, particularly through portals and social media.

The Mission must track, understand, and respond to the influence of malign actors using disinformation to target areas of long-standing U.S.-Poland cooperation, especially attempts to erode trust in our shared security and economic commitments. Further, the Mission must counter attempts to use disinformation aimed at provoking or exacerbating internal divisions over respect for the rule of law and the strength and stability of democratic institutions, including a free and independent media.
environment. The Mission will also strengthen its efforts to increase resistance to disinformation through programs that enhance media literacy among Poles.

- **Linkages |** This objective links to the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (March 2021): “Anti-democratic forces use misinformation, disinformation, and weaponized corruption to exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations, erode existing international rules, and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance. Reversing these trends is essential to our national security;” the FY 2022 – 2026 Draft Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan: Strategic Objective 1.5: Build Support for American Values and Performance Goal Statement 1.5.1: By 2026, expand and improve information flows between Americans and foreign publics about U.S. values and foreign policy, including by countering disinformation; the draft EUR JRS Goals & Strategic Objective Goal 2: Strengthen Democracy & the Rule of Law throughout Europe and Eurasia, Objective 3: Bolster the resilience of institutions to external malign influence and disinformation, particularly from Russia, PRC, Iran, and Turkey to enhance the sovereignty, freedom, and self-determination of our democratic partners; and Goal 4: Leverage Alliances and Partnerships to Address Global and Regional Threats and Challenges, Objective 3: Counter Russian, PRC, and Iranian Disinformation, Conventional and Hybrid Threats, and Emerging Disruptive Technologies that Threaten U.S. and European Security in Europe, the Arctic, and Beyond.

- **Risks |** Disinformation propagated by malign actors undermines confidence in the United States as a valued and trusted partner, in the NATO Alliance, and in our shared values. Without aggressive pushback and amplification of counter-narratives, the positive perception of the United States and of our bilateral cooperation with Poland is eroded. Disinformation also damages the unity of the NATO Alliance, which relies on a common understanding of our collective security. Risks to U.S. foreign policy objectives from misunderstanding, conspiracy theories, and social division are all exasperated by the spread of disinformation.
4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | The management platform is sufficient in size, structure, and expertise to enable the Mission to accomplish its operational goals while showcasing America’s diversity in our staffing.

- **Justification** | Mission growth in the last four years and projected growth for the next 3-5 years will require staffing increases and regrading to ensure the management platform has the expertise and bandwidth to support critical Mission operational goals. In the last four years, Mission Poland has approved 22 requests to add operational positions including the establishment of two new offices (Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Energy). Poland’s location, stability, and infrastructure make it increasingly attractive as a regional hub for regional disposal of property through auction, State Consular services, the Foreign Commercial Service, the Foreign Agricultural Service, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Post expects this growth to continue once the new Consulate is constructed in Krakow. As of January 15, 2022, post has one confirmed request for a new position and inquiries on two more.

Despite this growth in the customer base, the Mission’s Management staff — LE Staff and U.S. Direct-Hires (USDH) — has remained constant. Warsaw lost one Assistant GSO position in 2014 and is now understaffed, with one SGSO and one AGSO. Post will restore this third GSO position to serve this growing mission. Oversight will be a critical function for this position. Currently approximately one-third of the 50+ LE Staff in the GSO section work in an off-site warehouse (along with most of the Facilities Maintenance staff), without an on-site American officer to exercise oversight. Warsaw currently serves as a regional disposal hub for all of Europe, helping posts recoup money from auctions of excess/old furniture.

Post also needs to add another Management USDH to the 73-employee Consulate General in Krakow. Currently there is just one USDH leading the 22-LE Staff Management section in Krakow and there is no USDH IRM employee to handle the
server infrastructure. Similarly sized consulates (Milan, Naples, Munich, Recife, etc.) all have at least one additional American officer; some have two. The Consulate is experiencing a growth in workload due to a new agency (DoD) and an increase in VIP visit support requirements.

Lastly, our 03 Facility Manager is tasked with keeping two 60-year-old buildings running in Warsaw while managing a 40+ person staff, spread over two physical locations while also overseeing the 500-year-old Consulate building in Krakow. The responsibility of this position, as well as the demands placed upon it, are commensurate with an 02 officer. The Facility Manager position should be upgraded. As post moves into the next bidding cycle, we will continue to target underrepresented groups to fill our ranks, ensure a fair and equitable bidding process and, strive to expand the diversity of our mission team.

• **Linkages |** This goal links to EUR JRS Goals and Strategic Framework Management Objective 2 (Empower officers by involving them in policy-making processes and decision-making, training and mentorship on policymaking and management skills) by appropriately staffing the mission with appropriately graded officers with the needed skillsets to succeed and support overall mission goals. Put simply, operational goals are hard to achieve when you cannot access your files or your colleagues (IT), when your office is freezing/boiling (Facilities), or the logistics platform cannot support your needs (GSO). The goal also links to JRS Objective 3 (Develop a comprehensive recruitment and assignments process that ensures a diverse applicant pool and an equitable approach to EUR foreign and domestic assignments) of the same document, Goal #4 of the Joint State-AID Strategic Plan, which is also linked to the implementation guidelines for Executive Order 13985: Revitalize the diplomatic and development workforce and institutions.

• **Risks |** Failure to increase the Management platform size to support the expanding client base will result in degraded services and an inability to continue handling regional tasks that dispose of unserviceable items from all over Europe. Failure to expand the management footprint in Krakow will result in degraded support for the entire Consulate. Warsaw will continue to support Krakow with frequent visits and attempt to...
fill our vacant EFM positions that can provide on-site support. Failure to increase the grade of the Facility Manager puts Post and OBO at risk of delays brought about by having a less experienced supervisor managing the complex building and upgrade projects anticipated over the next 3-5 years. Not creating a more diverse Mission team weakens our ability to engage on a personal level with our Polish interlocutors and ‘speak from experience.’ As we develop a more diverse Mission population, we will continue outreach programs and use virtual meetings to share stories about the Department’s pursuit of a diverse work force.

Management Objective 2 | The Mission’s facilities and housing are safe, secure, and adequate.

• Justification | Built in 1963, Embassy Warsaw is in an ideal location within Poland’s capital but has many structural and space challenges. It is comprised of a Chancery and annex building (originally an apartment building) with both buildings having virtually no set-back, extremely poor and outdated infrastructure, and lacking in multiple ADA compliant requirements. Despite a planned Capital Security Upgrade (CSU) project, the Embassy is and will continue to be in poor condition. The CSU only provides a small bandage for a hemorrhaging infrastructure problem. The embassy also lacks sufficient space for its current and projected needs.

The Consulate General in Krakow is situated in the heart of the city’s Old Town in a two-part 500-year-old set of buildings divided by a tiny courtyard with no set-back from the sidewalk or roadway, dismal infrastructure, and grossly inadequate space in a historic building with literally no area for expansion - including up. The basement and attic are unusable. There isn’t a single elevator in the entire complex making it completely non-ADA compliant. Working conditions are crowded and replete with occupational safety and health concerns. The plumbing is ancient and sewage pipe deterioration within the rock walls results in the leaking of raw sewage into the building. Antiquated wiring creates fire hazards. The landlord does not want to engage in extensive renovations

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unless the United States commits to staying for many years to come. The building is also unable to be properly secured.

Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow are on OBO’s Top 80 list as numbers 20 and 27, respectively. While Warsaw is not scheduled for a New Embassy Compound (NEC) in the foreseeable future, the Embassy is eager to start looking at new building options with OBO. In the meantime, Management faces the challenge of making the compound a secure, efficient, and environmentally sustainable area to work. Post will continue to work with OBO to obtain funding for needed improvements to both the chancery buildings and the aging USG-owned Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) and Deputy Chief of Mission Residence (DCR). Consulate General Krakow is further along in the process. They are awaiting a final report from OBO relating to whether the current consulate location can be sufficiently renovated to acceptable standards, especially security standards, or whether a new build is the proper path forward. To date, all draft reports indicate Consulate General Krakow will be having a New Consulate Complex (NCC) in its future. Two parcels of real estate are high on OBO’s list. Recently, Mission Poland learned that OBO has placed a halt on all consulate construction plans. Mission Poland hopes this is not the case, as remaining in the current location is unsustainable and they may not be able to get the necessary waivers if a building plan isn’t in process.

Embassy Warsaw has 39 government-owned (GO) residential properties, including the Chief of Mission Residence (CMR), Deputy Chief of Mission Residence (DCMR) and the Marine Security Guard Residence (MSGR). Many of these GO residential properties are in dire need of major repairs and renovations and all need at least minor repair and renovation. As landlord for these properties, the USG needs to maintain housing that is in good condition. As noted above, the work sites in both Warsaw and Krakow have needed and continue to need extensive maintenance and upkeep and this has resulted in the GO residential properties not receiving the attention needed. Embassy Warsaw, with OBO’s assistance, needs to correct this

- **Linkages** | Having safe, secure, and usable space of the appropriate size is imperative in the accomplishment of all Mission, Bureau, Agency and Executive Branch objectives as is
the providing of living areas that meet U.S. standards and which are in safe, secure and habitable condition for USG employees working and residing overseas. Positive work and living environments are conducive to meeting objectives. Furthermore, the lack of ADA compliant workspace at both Embassy Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow hinders Mission Poland’s goal of offering a work environment that permits those who are mobility impaired to easily access all areas and functions thereby promoting a more diverse and inclusive workforce as well as a more welcoming environment to guests of our facilities. For example, buildings lack elevators, and stairwells in embassy buildings have ceilings so low near the landings that anyone over five feet five inches tall must be careful not to hit their head on the underside of upper stairs. This could be extremely dangerous during an emergency evacuation – when they are supposed to serve as a safety feature, not a danger to be avoided.

- **Risks |** The poor condition of Embassy Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow’s infrastructure poses numerous risks in a variety of areas. First, the lack of setback at both locations creates a dangerous security situation for employees and visitors. This cannot be alleviated at either location. Second, the outdated infrastructure results in increased risk of fire, water damage, and compromise of information. Third, the time and money spent trying to repair and maintain outdated equipment is not a good long-term investment. Fourth, due to Poland’s location on the eastern flank of Europe and Poland’s strong and cooperative relationship with the United States, Warsaw and Krakow offer highly desired locations for State and other agencies to place personnel. The mere mentioning that Krakow is planning to build a NCC and that Warsaw is looking for land for a NEC has generated keen interest already. Embassy Warsaw and CG Krakow have been limited by their physical plant size when it comes to staffing. Fifth, neither the Embassy nor the CG are ADA compliant, thereby hindering Mission Poland in implementing diversity and inclusion goals.

The risk of not properly renovating and maintaining GO residences results in properties being uninhabitable. This is a tremendous problem. It results in the USG owning
property that it will not benefit from because leases will be required for new properties if GO residences cannot be used.