



Integrated Country Strategy

TURKEY

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

Table of Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------|----|
| 1. Chief of Mission Priorities | 1 |
| 2. Mission Strategic Framework | 4 |
| 3. Mission Goals and Objectives | 7 |
| 4. Management Objectives | 17 |

1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The United States' relationship with Turkey is vital to many of our core goals in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Our cooperation on a broad range of security and diplomatic challenges in recent years underscores the importance of rebuilding and maintaining robust and dynamic ties with Ankara.

As a NATO Ally, a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, a candidate for European Union membership, a G20 country, and a long-standing partner in meeting regional and global challenges, Turkey — despite its complex relationship with United States and other Western nations — remains an indispensable component of our strategy for confronting many of today's most intractable problems. We will continue to work with the Government of Turkey to leverage its broad diplomatic, economic/commercial, and military reach to the benefit of our shared foreign policy and national security goals. From supporting a political transition in Syria based on the Geneva Communique, to promoting human rights, humanitarian relief, and the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan, to upholding Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to curtailing malign Iranian and Russian influence, Turkey is an essential U.S. partner. Turkey's generous response to the Syrian refugee crisis has made it an exemplar of refugee integration. Turkey's significant contributions to NATO's collective security have, for decades, been a key element of our relationship. Encouraging further steps to meet commitments on defense expenditures, interoperability, and technological adaptation will ensure Turkey remains on the forefront of efforts to counter emerging and existing threats. In support of these goals, we will seek to expand our multifaceted cooperation to resolve regional and global conflicts, combat terrorism, including the U.S.-designated terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), transnational crime, and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to engage with Turkey to ensure its defense investments adhere to its commitment to support NATO compatibility and do not endanger sensitive Alliance technology.

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

The U.S.-Turkey economic relationship is mutually beneficial and helps anchor Turkey to the West. Turkey's government, however, has long prioritized stimulus over sustainable economic growth. With an increasingly fragile economy, the government needs to pursue macroeconomic stability to confront soaring inflation, a moribund investment climate, and high unemployment. We will encourage Turkey to establish conditions for increased U.S. exports to Turkey and an improved trade and investment climate. We share Turkey's goal of improving energy security and will press Ankara to increase domestic energy sources and reduce dependency on Russian and Iranian hydrocarbons. Capitalizing on Turkey's recent ratification of the Paris Agreement, we look forward to working with Turkey on ambitious climate goals and the transition away from fossil fuels and towards clean energy.

Turkey's economic growth in recent decades, its work to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions, and the government's stated goal of eventually meeting the criteria for accession to the European Union have been powerful drivers of social change. The Government of Turkey's commitment to these values has been tested since the 2016 failed coup attempt, and the ongoing detention of Mission Turkey LE staff as well as tens of thousands of ordinary Turkish citizens based on scant or secret evidence under the state of emergency (and its subsequent codification) highlights Turkey's declining adherence to due process and judicial independence. The United States will continue to strongly encourage Turkey to respect the democratic standards of its own constitution and its international obligations. As vital and irreplaceable elements of any stable democracy, we will encourage Turkey to strengthen the role of civil society and a free media, both of which remain key to ensuring transparency and open debate as Turkey pursues its domestic and foreign policy priorities.

The American and Turkish people enjoy broad and deep ties, stemming from tens of thousands of academic exchanges; commercial, cultural, and scientific collaboration; and civil society cooperation. We will seek to maintain and expand these people-to-people ties, facilitate legitimate travel in both directions, and work to counter disinformation, building a relationship that continues to visibly benefit Americans and Turks alike.

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

The construction or renovation of diplomatic facilities over the next several years in Adana, Ankara, Gaziantep, and Izmir will be a powerful, visible reminder of the United States' strong and enduring relationship with Turkey. Mission Turkey will continue working to implement best practices to meet security, management, and personnel objectives to capitalize on our robust presence here and continue building an efficient and sustainable platform to support U.S. foreign policy goals.

Turkey is a rapidly changing country in a turbulent region. Many of the constraints on U.S.-Turkey cooperation do not lend themselves to quick or easy resolution and will continue to require proactive, high-level engagement with a clear focus on our shared interests—and a candid, mutual understanding of the challenges we face. Ahead of the 2023 national elections, we must help Turkey strengthen its democratic institutions, separation of powers, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Mission leadership is committed to confronting the challenges ahead, opening new avenues of cooperation between Washington and Ankara, and will seek in the coming years to leverage Turkey's significant assets to the benefit of our shared goals. We will continually review this strategy through the lens of U.S. interests across the full spectrum of security, economic, and diplomatic goals that define our relationship.

2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: A robust U.S. – Turkey partnership advances shared regional and global security and stability priorities.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Turkey remains a critical partner in achieving stability and security in the Middle East and Africa through strategic engagements and cooperation initiatives.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Turkey increases its military capabilities, contributions, cooperation, and interoperability as a NATO and bilateral partner.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Turkey uses diplomatic and economic influence as well as military, law enforcement, financial, to create regional stability.
- **Mission Objective 1.4:** Turkey helps to de-escalate tensions with its Allies and neighbors over its maritime and airspace boundary disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

Mission Goal 2: A robust U.S.-Turkey economic relationship characterized by increasing U.S. exports, bilateral trade and investment, more open markets, and collaboration in climate, energy, and science and technology.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Turkey implements economic reforms and policies that support Turkey's own sustainable economic development and increases U.S. exports to Turkey.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Turkey meets its Paris Agreement goal of net zero carbon emissions while sustainably increasing energy security for itself and the region and reducing dependency on Russia and Iran.

Mission Goal 3: Sustained U.S. engagement strengthens Turkish democracy and respect for international human rights, religious freedom, gender equality and

LGBTQI+ rights, rule of law, protection for refugees and asylum seekers, and the freedom of expression.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Turkey takes concrete steps to promote greater respect for human rights and transparent governance.
- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Turkish civil society and media demonstrate increased ability to report independently and safely resist external malign influence and disinformation.
- **Mission Objective 3.3:** Turkey ceases the unjust prosecution of U.S. Mission Locally Employed Staff, who are released from prison and other forms of judicial control.

Mission Goal 4: U.S. engagement builds ties between the Turkish and American peoples and leads to more balanced and honest treatment of the United States, American citizens, and all Mission personnel by the Turkish government.

- **Mission Objective 4.1:** Turkish and U.S. citizens build personal, educational, and commercial ties in an effort to increase Turkish people's positive perception of the United States.

Management Objective 1: Improve the security posture and achieve efficiencies and greater effectiveness through new construction projects in Ankara, Adana, Gaziantep, and Istanbul.

Management Objective 2: Achieve better resource management, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and customer service by promoting a data-driven resource management culture using decision support information, budget analysis, and dashboards from various systems including ILMS. Strengthen Diversity & Inclusion (D&I) practices across all Mission Turkey management disciplines.

Management Objective 3: Strengthen collaboration, enhance platform harmonization, internal controls, and interoperability among the management operations at the three main posts by fostering stronger and more robust support and personnel exchanges between the Embassy and consulates.

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | A robust U.S.–Turkey partnership advances shared regional and global security and stability priorities.

Description | In alignment with the National Defense Security Strategy, the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, and the European Command Turkey Country Cooperation Plan Road Map, the United States and Turkey can work together to defeat terrorism, counter proliferation, increase NATO interoperability, counter Russian and Iranian malign influence, and improve regional stability. Turkey is a critical partner in achieving stability in the Middle East, bolstering NATO’s influence, and countering Russian and Iranian malign influence.

Objective 1.1 | Turkey remains a critical partner in achieving stability and security in the Middle East and Africa through strategic engagements and cooperation initiatives.

- **Objective 1.1 Justification** | U.S.-Turkey engagement is focused and should continue to focus both on urgent and strategic national security interests in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, the Black Sea, and counterterrorism. Following historic changes throughout the Middle East, with Syria in conflict, Iraq recovering after a lengthy fight to end the physical ISIS caliphate, and Iran’s ascendant influence, Turkey is increasingly concerned about developments along its southern border and more broadly in the region, which have undermined its security. On Syria, Turkey plays a vital role in hosting displaced Syrians and other refugees – now numbering nearly four million, the largest number of refugees hosted by any country in the world – as well as working with international partners towards transition to a democratic and stable state. Turkey is a critical partner in promoting stability and a political resolution in Libya.
- **Objective 1.1 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 4.3, and JSP Objective 1.4.
- **Objective 1.1 Risks** | Failure to successfully engage and cooperate with Turkey puts at risk U.S. and coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a key national

security priority. Further, coordination with Turkey is necessary to counter Russian influence in Syria, Libya, the Black Sea region, and the South Caucasus. Should Turkey no longer host the world's largest refugee population, we could see a return of attempts by refugees to transit to Europe, threatening European political unity.

Objective 1.2 | Turkey increases its military capabilities, contributions, cooperation, and interoperability as a NATO and bilateral partner.

- **Objective 1.2 Justification** | With the second-largest military in NATO and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the alliance, Turkey plays a critical role in regional security. Turkey can play a positive role in partnerships with NATO and non-NATO members in critical areas such as deterring Russian malign influence, interoperable defenses, maintaining the balance of power in the Black Sea, and in other multilateral peacekeeping and international humanitarian operations in areas of vital interest to the United States.
- **Objective 1.2 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 1.1, JRS Objective 1.4, JRS Objective 3.1, JRS Objective 4.5, and JSP Objective 1.4.
- **Objective 1.2 Risks** | Failure of Turkey to maintain a modern interoperable military risks its ability to partner with the U.S and NATO in military operations at a critical time for the region. Turkey faces modernization and sustainment challenges that if not addressed could significantly reduce Turkey's ability to fulfill its NATO commitments. Turkey is developing its indigenous defense industry but is still reliant on outside procurement and sustainment, particularly with regards to military aviation and maritime systems. If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey's pursuit of defense modernization, Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfill those defense capability gaps in areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.

Objective 1.3 | Turkey uses diplomatic and economic influence as well as military, law enforcement, financial, and intelligence assets to create regional stability.

- **Objective 1.3 Justification** | Turkey is a key partner to combat both terrorism and transnational crime, and benefits from international cooperation including timely exchanges of intelligence, evidence, and other information with the U.S. and other partners, and can demonstrate more leadership in international fora and initiatives relating to transnational threats. Cultural, political, and legal barriers currently impede efficient intelligence, evidence, and other information exchange, both among domestic agencies and with Turkey's partners.
- **Objective 1.3 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 4.4, JSP Objective 1.4, and JSP Objective 2.4.
- **Objective 1.3 Risks** | Turkey is a country of origin and transit for transnational criminals and terrorism. Failure to collaboratively engage with Turkish authorities on cases of mutual interest has in the past led to increases in human smuggling, money laundering, and cases of terrorism finance. This has led to direct threat to the United States and our citizens.

Objective 1.4 | Turkey helps to de-escalate tensions with its Allies and neighbors over its maritime and airspace boundary disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

- **Objective 1.4 Justification** | Internal Alliance strife over boundary disputes detracts from NATO's ability to project solidarity and from member states' effective usage of political, economic, and military resources to counter Russian malign influence in the region. It is in the interest of NATO, the United States, and Mission Turkey to advocate for de-escalation and peaceful resolution of disagreements by all parties involved.
- **Objective 1.4 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 1.4 and JSP Objective 1.4.
- **Objective 1.4 Risks** | Continued tensions over maritime and airspace boundaries in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean runs the risk of negatively impacting U.S and NATO freedom of maneuver and action in a critical region. Additionally, it would negatively impact U.S ability to train with Turkey both bilaterally and as part of the NATO construct.

Mission Goal 2 | A robust U.S.-Turkey economic relationship characterized by increasing U.S. exports, bilateral trade and investment, more open markets, and collaboration in climate, energy, and science and technology.

Description | The United States and Turkey enjoy a healthy, balanced trade relationship, which is projected to exceed \$25 billion in 2021. Nevertheless, there is considerable room for growth between these two G-20 economies and a reduction of trade barriers on both sides could boost trade. Investment by Turkish companies into the United States continues to increase. Turkey can better harness its full economic potential by reducing barriers to trade and pursuing macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth.

Promoting increased trade and investment as well as energy diversification, climate change goals, and market-oriented economic reforms tie directly into the goals and objectives of the EUR Joint Regional Strategy Framework and the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan. Pillar II of the National Security Strategy addressing the promotion of American prosperity seeks to create fair and reciprocal trade relationships, including through increasing U.S. exports and foreign direct investment in the United States, protection of intellectual property, and promotion of market-oriented reforms in other countries. In addition, the National Security Strategy notes that the United States will work with allies to support diversification of energy sources, supplies, and routes, and increase the export of U.S. energy and technology.

Objective 2.1 | Turkey implements economic reforms and policies that support Turkey's own sustainable economic development and increases U.S. exports to Turkey.

- **Objective 2.1 Justification** | Turkey had one of the fastest growing economies in the world in 2021 with 10 percent GDP growth. However, poor economic policy choices and a lack of reforms have led to a situation in which inflation is accelerating well over 30 percent. Turkey currently lacks macroeconomic stability and a healthy investment climate, and Turkish citizens consistently complain the economy is heading in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, with a young population, strong manufacturing base, and a desire to increase bilateral trade and investment, Turkey remains an important

economic partner for the United States. Historically the trade relationship has been largely balanced with a small U.S. trade surplus once services are counted, but in the first 11 months of 2021 Turkey's exports of goods to the United States surged over \$3 billion while U.S. exports showed only a modest recovery of around \$500 million. Turkey is rich with opportunities for U.S. firms; however, between the tit-for-tat trade actions following the 2018 imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs and the macroeconomic uncertainty that impinges on Turkey's investment climate, many of these opportunities are currently not being realized.

- **Objective 2.1 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 3.1, JSP Objective 2.1, and JSP Objective 2.2.
- **Objective 2.1 Risks** | Turkey's failure to move towards sustainable economic development with increased trade and investment would have several negative consequences for Turkey, the United States, and the region. Turkey would suffer from more frequent economic crises, risking regional contagion; the problem of youth unemployment would grow, increasing instability; and inflation would accelerate, leading to more poverty. Trade with the United States and Europe would diminish, as would Turkey's connections to the West. Turkey's barriers to trade impede the access of American companies to Turkey's market of 85 million people.

Objective 2.2 | Turkey meets its Paris Agreement goal of net zero carbon emissions while sustainably increasing energy security for itself and the region and reducing dependency on Russia and Iran.

- **Objective 2.2 Justification** | Turkey ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and is now in the process of developing revised nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in line with its commitments, including a net zero emissions by 2053 target. While Turkey is considered a green energy leader with 54 percent of installed electricity capacity from renewables, its current NDCs are unambitious. Despite its significant renewable energy capacity, Turkey's energy sector remains dependent on foreign imports of gas and coal, largely from Russia and Iran, as well as imported coal. Turkey has requested a bilateral

energy dialogue which would provide an opportunity for the U.S. to support its energy transition to net zero emissions, encourage energy security, and identify trade and investment opportunities for U.S. firms.

- **Objective 2.2 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 3.2, JRS Objective 3.4, JRS Objective 4.1, JRS Objective 4.3 and JSP Objective 2.4.
- **Objective 2.2 Risks** | If Turkey, a G20 and OECD country, does not adequately address climate change, it will contribute to global warming. It also risks diminishing its access to the European Union, Turkey's top trading partner, because of its Green Deal. This would weaken Turkey's anchor to the West. Turkey's continued reliance on Russian gas increases the country's vulnerability to pressure by the government of Russia.

Mission Goal 3 | Sustained U.S. engagement helps prevent further democratic backsliding and strengthens the Turkish public's pursuit of a strong democracy and respect for international human rights, religious freedom, gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights, rule of law, protection for refugees and asylum seekers, and the freedom of expression.

Description | The U.S.-Turkey alliance is based on shared interests, as well as shared values, including respect for democratic governance. Sustaining shared values provides the foundation for a strong bilateral relationship that advances objectives set forth in the National Security Strategy (Pillar IV), National Defense Security Strategy, and the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan.

Turkey's credibility as a democratic and reliable ally hinges on its respect for democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Since the July 2016 coup attempt and under a prolonged state of emergency (SoE) that expired in July 2018, Turkey has experienced an erosion of checks and balances among branches of government with significant implications for judicial impartiality and rule of law. Parliament codified many of the provisions of the SoE in legislation passed in July 2018. The government has also imposed restrictions or penalties that curtail human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free speech. The government has used broadly defined anti-terror and anti-defamation legislation

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

to target and detain opposition figures, civil society actors, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, and academics, stifling the public debate fundamental to any vibrant democracy. The new executive presidential system, implemented following the 2018 national elections, has led to further consolidation of power against a backdrop of continued democratic backsliding and rule of law concerns. The government has failed to fully protect the rights of a range of minorities, including Kurds, women, religious minorities, LGBTQI+ individuals, and others. Media freedom has come under consistent attack, with Turkey ranking as one the top jailers of journalists in the world. Widespread self-censorship and considerations of economic patronage negatively affect the availability of a more diverse discourse on important public issues. Turkey has set an example in hosting refugees, extending them assistance (and, in some cases, rights) prescribed by international norms and laws. Promoting more effective, accountable, and democratic governance and respect for human rights in Turkey will improve political and economic stability and can aid Turkey's return to its role as a prosperous, stable, and democratic partner anchored to its western alliances, including with the United States and NATO.

Objective 3.1 | Turkey takes steps to promote greater respect for human rights and transparent governance.

- **Objective 3.1 Justification |** The strength and integrity of Turkey's democratic institutions, as well the government's respect for the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, shape Turkey's stability and reliability as a key strategic partner for the United States, including in the broader great power competition with anti-democratic actors like Russia and China. Under the new presidential system, weakening the separation of powers and checks and balances could tax Turkey's political stability. The upcoming elections, currently scheduled for 2023, will serve as a test of the current GoT's ability to respect rule of law and ensure peaceful power transition.

Greater respect for minority rights, including Kurds, women, LGBTQI+, and religious minorities would enhance Turkey's domestic stability and could help reinvigorate the stalled EU harmonization process. Turkey's continued assistance to displaced Syrians

will help address a major shared humanitarian challenge, provide ballast to the bilateral relationship, and demonstrate its commitment to international obligations.

- **Objective 3.1 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 2.2, JRS Objective 2.4, JSP Objective 3.1, and JSP Objective 3.2.
- **Objective 3.1 Risks** | There is significant risk that the GoT will accelerate backsliding and subvert upcoming elections to ensure Erdogan remains in power, damaging U.S. human rights priorities. Furthermore, U.S. advocacy on human rights issues runs the risk of backfiring, resulting in GoT defiance and retribution against Mission contacts and LE Staff.

Objective 3.2 | Turkish civil society and media demonstrate increased ability to function and report independently and safely resist external malign influence and disinformation.

- **Objective 3.2 Justification** | The dominant control of a majority of mainstream print/television media outlets by a handful of pro-government actors and the government's targeting and, in some cases, closure of opposition outlets has further undermined a free and impartial media environment. Independent civil society actors, including those that play an important role as checks against government excess (e.g., monitoring human rights abuses, election security), face similar obstacles and are increasingly unable to carry out their functions without fear of reprisals. Easing pressure and restrictions on independent media and civil society institutions would help reinvigorate Turkey's democracy and enhance the accountability of leaders to their citizens.
- **Objective 3.2 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 2.2, JRS Objective 2.3, and JSP Objective 3.2.
- **Objective 3.2 Risks** | Further restrictions on media and jailing of journalists undermines free and fair elections. Loss of civil society capacity undermines progress toward addressing violence against women, protecting LGBTQI individuals, and harms other populations that benefit from a robust civil society.

Objective 3.3 | Turkey ceases the unjust prosecution of U.S. Mission LE staff, who are released from prison and other forms of judicial control.

- **Objective 3.3 Justification** | Following the July 2016 attempted coup, the Turkish government detained, prosecuted, and convicted three Mission Turkey LE staff on unsubstantiated charges related to work they carried out in the course of their official duties.
- **Objective 3.3 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 2.2, JRS Objective 2.4, JSP Objective 3.1, and JSP Objective 3.3.
- **Objective 3.3 Risks** | Continued targeting of Mission LE staff has long-term corrosive impact on talent recruitment and retention, as well as USG's ability to effectively execute our priorities in country and negatively implicates other initiatives between the USG and GOT.

Mission Goal 4 | U.S. engagement builds ties between the Turkish and American peoples and leads to more balanced and honest treatment of the United States, U.S. citizens, and all Mission personnel by the Turkish government.

Description | Although the United States and Turkey have been formal allies since 1952, historically a small percentage of Turkish citizens have a favorable opinion of Americans and the United States. This goal builds on the deep cooperation and connections between the United States and Turkey over the past seventy years, and the core belief that Turkey and the United States benefit immeasurably from continued cooperation. Turkey and the United States are our own best partners, and our cooperation makes both countries safer and more prosperous. Sustaining ties cements the foundation for a strong bilateral relationship that advances objectives set forth in the National Security Strategy State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (Goal III), National Defense Security Strategy, and the National Security Strategy (Pillar III).

Objective 4.1 | Turkish and U.S. citizens build personal, educational, and commercial ties in an effort to increase Turkish people's positive perception of the United States.

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

- **Objective 4.1 Justification** | Despite seventy years of NATO partnership and billions of dollars in USG assistance, many Turks remain deeply suspicious of the United States. Younger generations of Turks, moreover, have little memory or knowledge of the importance and mutual benefit of strong bilateral ties. Media freedom has come under attack in recent years and has been significantly curtailed since the 2016 attempted coup. Widespread self-censorship and considerations of economic patronage negatively affect the availability of a more diverse discourse on important public issues. Within this complicated media landscape, the Mission-wide PDS team makes a concerted effort to highlight the breadth, depth, and mutual benefits of the modern relationship between the United States and Turkey. Efforts focus on opportunities for the Chief of Mission, visiting senior U.S. officials, other target-of-opportunity visitors, and Mission personnel to engage the Turkish public and global audiences through media interviews and appearances, round table engagements, press statements, etc., in order to advocate American policy interests and to explain American society. Additionally, efforts such as academic scholarships to the United States; U.S. speakers; entrepreneurship education; professional, academic, and youth exchanges; English language programs; and grant support for Turkish civil society groups showcase a more diverse and accurate view of American society. These programs and our media efforts seek to emphasize the mutual benefits that accrue from a strong bilateral partnership between Turkey and the United States.
- **Objective 4.1 Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 2.2, JSP Objective 3.1, and JSP Objective 1.5.
- **Objective 4.1 Risks** | Diminished respect for the United States and appreciation for American values leads to decrease in bilateral cooperation to address shared concerns. May also lead to decline in interest in studying in the U.S. or participating in Summer Work Travel programs by Turkish youth.

4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Improve the security posture and achieve efficiencies and greater effectiveness through new construction projects in Ankara, Adana, Gaziantep, and Istanbul.

- **Justification** | These projects will not only accommodate those with physical disability and mobility needs, but also provides improved and more efficient office space, and significantly enhanced security posture.
- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Objective 5.1.
- **Risks** | Failure to provide sufficient office space in a safe and secure facility for Americans, local staff and visitors will prevent us from operating effectively or efficiently. Furthermore, it will create unacceptable vulnerabilities to our staff that would be detrimental to mission accomplishment.

Management Objective 2 | Achieve better resource management, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and customer service by promoting a data-driven resource management culture using decision support information, budget analysis, and dashboards from various systems including ILMS. Strengthen diversity & inclusion (D&I) practices across all Mission Turkey management disciplines.

- **Justification** | The Mission has limited funding and resources, and it is imperative to manage these resources most effectively to ensure we can adequately fund the ICS goals.
- **Linkages** | This objective supports JSP Goal 5.1.
- **Risks** | Failure to manage limited resources effectively will require the Mission to decrease funding and resources for select goals and objectives that will prevent their full realization.

Approved: MAY 13, 2022

Management Objective 3 | Strengthen collaboration, enhance platform harmonization, internal controls, and interoperability among the management operations at the three main posts by fostering stronger and more robust support and personnel exchanges between the Embassy and consulates.

- **Justification** | Optimizing management platform and operations and strengthening professional development within the MGT Section will position the section to better support Mission goals and objectives.
- **Linkages** | This objective supports JRS Objective 5.3.
- **Risks** | Failure to optimize the management platform and develop Management Section officers, EFMs, and LE staff will prevent the section from providing a sustained and optimal level of support for all ICS goals that could negatively impact goal accomplishment.