Integrated Country Strategy

TUNISIA

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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Eleven years after its 2011 revolution, Tunisia faces questions surrounding its democratic path amid political upheaval and increasing economic uncertainty. Ensuring the preservation of democratic institutions in the immediate term and the ability of these institutions to deliver tangible results for the Tunisian people are in the direct interest of the United States.

During the years covered by this Integrated Country Strategy, Tunisia should return to a system of checks and balances, wherein the Presidency, an elected parliament, and an independent judiciary together ensure a functioning government that protects human rights and fundamental freedoms. The country must enact necessary economic reforms that foster inclusive growth. Tunisia will continue to face persistent security threats caused by regional instability, the return of Tunisians from foreign conflict zones, and domestic terrorism. Accordingly, our three Mission Goals center on progress in those fields.

Goal one addresses the efficacy and development of Tunisia’s democratic institutions. A large majority of Tunisians supported President Saied’s upending of the political system and consolidation of power on and since July 25, 2021, because ineffective institutions led them to question whether democracy truly improved their quality of life. Efforts to increase citizen understanding of, and advocacy for, the ability to exercise their rights will balance the need to improve government institutions’ efficacy and responsiveness. Assistance to the three branches of government and independent constitutional bodies will focus on improving practices so that agencies can better serve the Tunisian people and better inform the public about their work. Support to the media, civil society, and the public will empower groups to advocate for policies that address public needs and call out abuses of power. Legislative and presidential elections will take place in late 2022 and 2023, respectively, and will be one important marker of Tunisia’s ability to remain on the democratic path.

Goal two relates to sustainable, inclusive economic growth. There is significant crossover between the economic health of the country and people’s faith in the government and the value of democracy. Our plan attempts to address the drivers of economic inequality, with an
emphasis on supporting structural adjustments needed to improve the overall health of the economy. Specifically, we seek to improve the conditions for private sector-led growth, improve the efficiency of state-managed economic activity, and discourage investments that threaten Tunisia’s long-term information, economic, and data network security. We will continue to prioritize work on the investment climate and ensuring fair opportunities for U.S. companies. In addition, we will aim to target critical economic reforms focused on reforming the energy sector, advancing climate change priorities, and promoting equitable access to clean energy innovations. Strengthening the public health system and local resilience to exogenous events, such as the global COVID-19 pandemic, will also remain an important focus.

Goal three deals with the security sector. Tunisia has made significant progress to contain terrorist threats and improve military capacity over the past five years. Tunisian law enforcement and criminal justice institutions still suffer from a public trust deficit and our engagement and assistance in this area will continue to focus on promoting greater accountability, transparency, reduction of corruption, and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. We will advocate for the prioritization of Tunisian security forces’ partnerships with the United States and avoidance of partnerships that undermine Tunisia’s sovereignty and regional stability. Counterterrorism and military assistance will continue to support the dismantling of domestic violent extremist organizations, securing Tunisia’s land and sea borders, and facilitating Tunisia’s participation in regional and UN security missions.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Tunisia strengthens democratic institutions and increases citizen confidence in government responsiveness. (USAID CDCS)

- Mission Objective 1.1: Tunisian government institutions uphold human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and expose and prosecute corruption.
- Mission Objective 1.2: Tunisian citizens and civil society understand and exercise their rights and responsibilities in a democratic system.
- Mission Objective 1.3: Tunisian citizens, particularly youth, women, and other geographically marginalized populations have equal access to government services and fully benefit from economic development.
- Mission Objective 1.4: Tunisia identifies, plans for, and mitigates potential shocks and crises caused by climate change, COVID-19, and other emergencies. (USAID CDCS)

Mission Goal 2: Tunisia stabilizes government finances and generates inclusive, private sector-led growth.

- Mission Objective 2.1: Government policy reforms and anticorruption efforts increase fiscal stability, stimulate private sector-led growth and employment, and increase U.S. investment opportunities. (USAID CDCS)
- Mission Objective 2.2: Tunisia’s public and private infrastructure development avoids long-term partnerships that threaten Tunisia’s economic, data, and information network security.
- Mission Objective 2.3: Tunisia pursues sustainable, green development to enhance its economy.

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**Mission Goal 3:** Tunisian security forces prioritize public safety and security, public trust, and human rights and continue to counter terrorism.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Tunisian law enforcement and criminal justice institutions respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.
- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Tunisian security forces prioritize partnerships with the United States and avoid partnerships that undermine Tunisia’s sovereignty and regional stability.
- **Mission Objective 3.3:** Tunisia continues to prioritize the dismantling of domestic violent extremist organizations, securing Tunisia’s air, land and maritime borders, its development as a regional training hub, and participation in regional / UN security operations.

**Management Objective 1:** Provide increasingly robust, progressively appropriate, and consistently safe and secure mission facilities to support staff growth to meet all mission objectives.

**Management Objective 2:** Deliver superior, forward-leaning shared administrative support services that reflect best practices and emphasize client satisfaction, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, innovation, stability, and support for U.S. strategic interests and long-term goals in Tunisia.

**Management Objective 3:** Strengthen our mission workforce, enhance workplace satisfaction, and restore resilience within the mission community by grounding professional development, mission-wide recruitment efforts, and community-integration events in principles of diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility.
3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | Tunisia strengthens democratic institutions and increases citizen confidence in government responsiveness. (USAID CDCS)

Description | President Saied’s freezing of Parliament and consolidation of power since July 25, 2021, followed a period wherein Tunaisians increasingly questioned whether democracy truly improved their quality of life. Entrenched bureaucracy, conflicting and unimplemented laws across sectors, and a largely ineffective parliament have stunted the development of democratic institutions and increased distrust among the Tunisian public. The long-term success of Tunisia’s democracy depends on institutions that can demonstrably respond to citizens’ needs, an effective system of checks and balances, and a transparent and fair judicial system. This includes the establishment and/or strengthening of critical institutions and a dedicated effort to advance human rights, counter corruption, improve government transparency and accountability, and ensure judicial independence. Political parties, a vibrant civil society and a free press must freely and effectively contribute to the formulation and implementation of responsive policies. Free and fair national and local elections are an important component, but only the starting point for a well-developed democracy. This goal corresponds to Bureau Goal 4: Advance accountable and responsive governance through strengthening democratic principles and fundamental freedoms.

Objective 1.1 | Tunisian government institutions uphold human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and expose and prosecute corruption.

- Justification | The Tunisian people broadly believe corruption is rampant across the public and private sectors. Government practices that remove opportunities for personal enrichment and provide transparent prosecutions will increase citizens’ trust. At the same time, government institutions must demonstrate a commitment to protecting the fundamental rights of all Tunisians, particularly its most vulnerable citizens. Changes to existing laws should only come after vigorous debate and public input and should be subject to independent judicial review.

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• **Linkages** | NEA-USAID/ME JRS Objective 1.2; 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance (INSSG), the 2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and JSP Objective 1.4

• **Risks** | The resumption of parliament and the return to a system of checks and balances represent conditions necessary for Tunisia to return to a credible democratic system. Should these steps not take place, the long-term success of Tunisia’s democratic system will be in doubt.

**Objective 1.2** | Tunisian citizens and civil society understand and exercise their rights and responsibilities in a democratic system.

• **Justification** | A vibrant civil society and free, independent, and responsible media are critical to the success of a participatory democratic system. The Tunisian people should understand, advocate for, and exercise their rights to ensure that all rights are properly protected. Newly established rights recognized or established in the post-revolution constitution still require some legislation and attention to be fully implemented. If civil society, media, and the general public do not understand these rights and the mechanisms necessary to protect them, citizens will be unable to hold elected officials accountable. Lack of full citizen awareness of such issues could also lead to democratic backsliding by government officials or others whose power or wealth may be lessened by the full exercise of a rights- and rule of law-based democracy.

• **Linkages** | Bureau Objective 4.2: Enable independent civil society to adapt, freely operate, represent diverse communities, and hold governments accountable. Bureau Objective 4.3: Strengthen independent, safe, diverse, and free media. Bureau Objective 4.4: Advance respect for human rights and promote access to justice, including for marginalized populations, women, and youth.

• **Risks** | Shrinking space for civil society activism or free debate would severely hamper citizen engagement and efforts to hold government officials and others accountable.

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Objective 1.3 | Tunisian citizens, particularly youth, women, and geographically marginalized populations have equal access to government services and fully benefit from economic development.

- **Justification** | More than a decade after the revolution, democratic transition in Tunisia remains fragile. Broadly held public perceptions of lack of representation and opportunity, regional development disparities, political and social exclusion, inequitable public investment, and public sector corruption have fueled frustration and generated disillusionment with the benefits of democratic governance, especially among young people. Improving the relationship between Tunisians and their civic and government institutions is essential to fully consolidate democratic transition and reach a point of irreversibility. If the citizen-government relationship fails to produce outcomes that are considered effective or legitimate, there is a higher risk of instability and impeded development. Additional risks affecting this objective relate to Tunisia’s ongoing political instability, the political will to enact necessary reforms, and the security threats related to ongoing regional crises. This objective is built on the premise that effective governance systems foster constructive engagement through collaboration between state institutions and citizens, and that a cohesive society is a necessary foundation for democratization. This Mission Objective, therefore, will support the development of transparent and accountable governance systems, as well as encourage social cohesion and community resilience in disaffected and/or marginalized communities.

- **Linkages** | Bureau Objective 4.2: Enable independent civil society to adapt, freely operate, represent diverse communities, and hold governments accountable. Bureau Objective 4.3: Strengthen independent, safe, diverse, and free media. Bureau Objective 4.4: Advance respect for human rights and promote access to justice, including for marginalized populations, women, and youth.

- **Risks** | Economic instability and the political crisis have increased the risks of the government’s failure to provide basic services and opportunities to Tunisians. Local governance institutions are also not equipped with sufficient authority, resources, and capabilities to meet the diverse needs of their populations.
Objective 1.4 | Tunisia identifies, plans for, and mitigates potential shocks and crises caused by climate change, COVID-19, and other emergencies.

- **Justification** | As the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated, a large-scale crisis event—whether a global pandemic, natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other event—can have devastating consequences. Helping Tunisia enhance its preparedness, response capability, and resilience will mitigate the impact of these events.

- **Linkages** | Interim NSS, JRS/FBS (Cross-Cutting Strategic Priorities: COVID-19; Threats: Security and Stabilization), JSP Objectives 1.1 (Leadership in Strengthening Global Health Security), 1.3 (Humanitarian Leadership), 2.4 (Strengthen Resilience)

- **Risks** | The COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating impact on the Tunisian economy, and experts estimate it will take at least three years for recovery. Without a robust preparedness and response strategy, Tunisia runs the risk that another disaster event impacting the crippled economy will lead to potential growing social unrest in addition to exacerbating already high rates of unemployment. Already Tunisia is experiencing heightened concerns over the supply of wheat due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Mission Goal 2 | Tunisia stabilizes government finances and generates inclusive, private sector-led growth. (USAID CDCS)

Description | Enhanced economic stability and growth meets shared U.S.-Tunisian objectives of greater economic opportunities. In addition, a more economically stable Tunisia will help facilitate much needed economic and political reforms.

Objective 2.1 | Government policy reforms and anticorruption efforts increase fiscal stability, stimulate private sector-led growth and employment, and increase U.S. investment opportunities.

- Justification | Enabling more effective taxation, more responsible spending, and targeted assistance to the needy will support this goal and enable economic growth. Meanwhile, helping trim Tunisia’s energy deficit would decrease the government’s subsidy burden, mitigate the current-account deficit, slow the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, lessen downward pressure on the dinar, and reduce inflation. In addition, Tunisia faces the challenge of providing adequate private sector jobs for its population. By facilitating SME growth and improving the entrepreneurial environment, Tunisia will not only enhance employment opportunities, but reduce brain drain. Attracting new U.S. investors to Tunisia will further support these aims while also generating new U.S. export opportunities and increasing the use of trusted U.S. technology.

- Linkages | Interim NSS, JRS/FBS (Opportunities: Economic Growth; Cross-Cutting Strategic Priorities: Gender and DEIA; Threats: Economic Growth), JSP Objectives 2.1 (Economic Governance), 2.2 (Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth), 2.3 (Technological Leadership and U.S. Competitiveness), 3.3 (Combatting Corruption)

- Risks | Failure to address required reforms could result in unsustainable public debt and increased social instability, including demonstrations and strikes. These could stall the reform process and reduce investment and economic activity, exacerbating unemployment. Similarly, failure to increase private sector employment opportunities

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could lead to even higher unemployment, continued growth of the bloated public sector to accommodate jobseekers, and/or increased risk of political instability due to economic discontent.

**Objective 2.2** | Tunisia’s public and private infrastructure development avoids long-term partnerships that threaten Tunisia’s economic, data, and information network security.

- **Justification** | Tunisia’s infrastructure faces serious deficiencies after years of neglect caused by corruption, public sector debt, and lack of sustained attention. Developing Tunisia’s infrastructure will be critical to not only restore its soundness, but also help the country become more economically competitive and attract foreign investors. Done right, infrastructure development stands to be the backbone of the nation’s future economic health as safe and secure physical infrastructure and networks will establish the technological foundation the country needs to communicate and trade with the rest of the world. A focus on quality, high standards – including labor and environmental standards – and data security will be critical to ensure Tunisia reaps the full benefits of such efforts and does not expose itself to negative social costs. Public partnerships will be key to unlocking Tunisia’s access to the financial and technological tools it needs to strengthen and develop its infrastructure. At the same time, it is critical that as Tunisia seeks to rapidly advance, it does so with partners that will facilitate the creation of trustworthy, secure networks that reassure investors and international partners that Tunisian networks and systems are safe and secure.

- **Linkages** | Interim NSS, JRS/FBS (Cross Cutting Strategic Priorities: International Competition with the PRC, Russia, and Iran; Threats: Economic Growth), JSP 2.3 (Technological Leadership and U.S. Competitiveness)

- **Risks** | Failure to choose trusted partners may not only impact infrastructure quality, but the confidence of external actors, including the private sector, in the security of Tunisian networks. As a result, selecting the wrong partners could limit much needed foreign investment in Tunisia.

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Objective 2.3 | Tunisia pursues sustainable, green development to enhance its economy.

• **Justification** | The shift to more sustainable and green technologies is a prerequisite of all nations to battle climate change. At the same time, for Tunisia, a shift away from hydrocarbon dependency that has caused an extreme strain on public finances and a move toward renewable energy sources offers significant economic benefits that will promote the growing use of renewable energies.

• **Linkages** | Interim NSS, JRS/FBS (Cross-Cutting Strategic Priorities: Climate Change), JSP Objective 2.2.

• **Risks** | Failure to pursue more sustainable solutions will continue. Tunisia’s dependence on hydrocarbons, a subsidized, imported commodity that is currently a drain on public resources, could lead to increasing the deficit.

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Mission Goal 3 | Tunisian security forces prioritize safety and security, public trust, and human rights while countering terrorism

Description | Tunisia’s security forces including the military, national police, and national guard have made significant strides since 2011, yet further progress is necessary to increase overall accountability, professionalism, and interoperability. The military has successfully enshrined a doctrine of political neutrality and is a professional and competent entity within the Tunisian government. In recent years, a strong bilateral security partnership has enhanced military capabilities and positioned Tunisia to support shared security objectives, contribute to regional peacekeeping missions, and serve as a regional hub for sharing and exporting expertise. The national police and national guard have undertaken capacity building and reforms aimed at building a better and more responsive force with the aid of international partners. Improvements in law enforcement efforts, including respect for democratic principles and rights, are ongoing. Further engagement and assistance will hold security institutions to their stated commitments to reform and enshrine good policing practices as a way to reinforce broader democratic values in Tunisia.

Objective 3.1: Tunisian law enforcement and criminal justice institutions respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law for the benefit of the Tunisian people and to protect the safety and security of American Citizens living in and visiting Tunisia.

- **Justification:** By strengthening institutional capacity, transparency, accountability, and oversight, Tunisians will be better protected under the law and have more confidence in their government. This protection will also benefit American citizens visiting or living in Tunisia.

- **Linkages:** Interim NSS Pillar 3, JSP objectives 3.1 (Democracy and Governance) and 3.2 (Equity and Inclusion), INL Bureau Functional Strategy Goal 3 (Strengthen Criminal Justice Systems), the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace and Security and National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, INL-Tunisia Letter of Agreement, Joint Security Action Strategy. Consular Affairs Functional Bureau Strategy Goal 1.

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• **Risks:** Further deterioration of economic conditions and a potential move away from democracy could strain government resources and undermine political will to reform the criminal justice system. Failure to achieve this objective could lead to a worsening of the security situation, a return to more authoritarian policing practices, and the loss of public trust in democracy and the rule of law. This loss of public trust will directly affect the experience of American citizens in Tunisia. To mitigate these risks, the Mission is developing a systematic approach toward conducting assessments, program design, evaluations, and monitoring of program performance. The Mission also ensures that assistance is not used for non-democratic purposes.

**Objective 3.2 |** Tunisian security forces prioritize partnerships with the United States and avoid partnerships that undermine Tunisia’s sovereignty and regional stability.

• **Justification |** Our strategic competitors seek to degrade US access and influence in Tunisia and the broader Mediterranean region. They seek to use Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and security agreements to degrade Tunisian interoperability with US and NATO partners and encourage defense agreements to exploit perceived seams in the US-Tunisia relationship. Tunisia is vulnerable to these overtures as they often come at greatly reduced pricing, a reality especially important given Tunisia’s limited defense budget.

• **Linkages |** This mission objective links with the Interim National Security Strategy (NSS) in two instances. Page seven of the NSS discusses combatting “violent extremism and terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.” Page 15 of the NSS states that “In the Middle East, we will right-size our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests. This mission objective links with NEA-ME’s Draft Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) Bureau Goal 1: Modernize and revitalize U.S. alliances, partnerships, and multilateral cooperation to prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts, counter terrorism, and address regional security and stabilization challenges. It links with JRS Objective 1.1: Strengthen the capacity of regional partners,”

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including women leaders and marginalized communities, to address modern-day security and stabilization challenges. It also links with JRS Objective 1.3: Strengthen and modernize partnerships to address global competition from the PRC and Russia, and influence from Iran.

- **Risks** | Without continued U.S. engagement, regional competitors are likely to gain greater access and influence with the Government of Tunisia. Over the long term, they may succeed in successfully degrading Tunisian interoperability with U.S. and NATO partners and undercutting U.S. regional security interests.

**Objective 3.3** | Tunisia continues to prioritize the dismantling of domestic violent extremist organizations, the security of its air, land and maritime borders, its development as a regional training hub, and its participation in regional / UN security missions.

- **Justification** | Terrorism remains a clear, present threat in the region with longer range concerns related to the return of Tunisians from foreign conflict zones and regional stability. Countering threats from domestic and regional terrorism elements remains a key priority for the United States. Strong and secure borders help limit the flow of illicit materiel and violent extremist elements in the region and helps contain Libyan instability. More broadly, Tunisia already serves as a key partner nation and hub exporting U.S.-developed security sector expertise. Continued utilization and development of this capability maximizes U.S. ROI of grant programs and extends the operational reach of the United States to denied access countries. In the context of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO), Tunisia is a valued democratic partner and provides an alternative to the oversized Chinese support to UN PKO, which is particularly important given the uncertainty of future levels of U.S. and Western assistance to Africa.

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- **Risks** | Without continued support and cooperation on the terrorism front, there is a risk that violent extremist groups could regroup in Tunisia, especially along the Libyan border and western mountainous region along the Algerian border. Additionally, there are risks of diffusion of illicit weapons and other materials. Failure to support and/or grow Tunisian capabilities and support to UN PKO and limiting U.S.-Tunisian cooperation would open opportunities to regional U.S. competitors who will exploit perceived seams in the relationship. Additionally, limiting support would increase the strain on economic development at the cost of defense capability enhancement.
4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Provide increasingly robust and consistently safe and secure mission facilities to support staff growth to meet all mission objectives.

- **Justification** | Mission compound space constraints are now the most urgent diplomatic platform issue to resolve at Embassy Tunis. Even with the estimated late 2024 completion of an office space retrofit of the compound’s Annex D office building, post has identified a long-term unmet need for office space totaling at least 46 desk positions, or closer to 80 desk positions if the Embassy continues to host the Libya External Office (LEO) on a longer-term (5-10 years) basis. In addition to office space, the mission also is in dire need of additional and larger meeting rooms for other support uses that are currently operating in spaces that are not up to security standards. In addition to space issues, the current chancery and four annexes are 20 years old, and many critical systems require replacement and numerous safety and security systems do not fully meet current standards.

- **Linkages** | This objective links to the 2022-2026 JSP Objective 4.3 to protect our personnel, information, and physical infrastructure. It also links to the COVID Mitigation Posture (CMP); OBO Functional Bureau Strategy (2018-2022); E.O. 14057 on Federal Sustainability (December 8, 2021); Greening Diplomacy Initiative; DOS Future of Work (FoW).

- **Risks** | Post could face catastrophic failure of a critical system. Post has already run out of available desk space for new employees despite continuing requests to fully staff several agencies’ projected staffing needs to effectively manage and monitor foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement. Not meeting this objective could lead to ineffective staffing levels or unsafe conditions that risk efficient and effective achievement of mission objectives.

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Management Objective 2 | Deliver superior, forward-leaning shared administrative support services that reflect best practices and emphasize client satisfaction, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, innovation, stability, and support for U.S. strategic interests and long-term goals in Tunisia.

- **Justification** | The Embassy compound was inaugurated 20 years ago. The U.S.-Tunisia relationship has expanded dramatically in recent years, underpinned in large part by shared security, law enforcement and economic interests. However, the diplomatic platform resources required to support this deep-rooted and long-standing relationship have not grown at a corresponding rate. The shared administrative support services platform needs continued enhancements to better ensure meeting the demands of existing and incoming agencies space demands in its already outgrown the Embassy Compound, constructed 20 years ago. Creating efficiencies to existing efforts by utilizing new technologies and limiting waste through cost-savings initiatives will further ensure that resources are properly deployed.

- **Linkages:** JSP Strategic Objective 4.3, 4.2.

- **Risks** | The failure to meet this management objective risks the integrity of, and effective operations of, the management support platform. Support services need continued enhancement and staffing and resource adjustments to meet current and projected demands. A failure to further optimize through new positions, assets, facilities, and innovation, would necessarily impede its ability to effectively support Mission, Department, and U.S. interests in the region.

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Management Objective 3 | Strengthen our mission workforce, enhance workplace satisfaction, and restore resilience within the mission community by grounding professional development, mission-wide recruitment efforts, and community-integration events in principles of diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility.

- **Justification** | The State Department, along with other U.S. government agencies, is making strides to help adopt a work culture that supports, empowers, and cares for our workforce so that federal government service is meaningful and rewarding, but sustainable and family friendly as well. This in part requires training and investments at Post to embrace teleworking tools and acquire the needed equipment and technology. Supervisors will need to adapt their leadership style to better manage remote work and maintain productivity. New challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, require creativity, innovation, and a more inclusive approach. Promotion of diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) extends beyond holding events and discussions and requires concerted action in the form of workplans and policy recommendations in order to embed DEIA principles in a meaningful way. Mentoring, both informal and formal, at all levels of the organization is essential to promote equity. Supervisors have a role to play in modeling our values, setting the tone, identifying needs, and addressing gaps.

- **Linkages:** This objective links to the JSP 2022-2026 Strategic Objective 4.1 to build a diverse, inclusive, resilient, and dynamic workforce and the DOS DEIA Strategic Plan (Nov. 30, 2021).

- **Risks** | Failure to achieve this objective risks the Mission’s ability to recruit and retain USDH and locally employed personnel and underutilize existing talent. To mitigate this risk the mission will identify and prioritize lines of efforts that contribute to the modernization of the workplace and is responsive to the needs of different groups within the workforce with a focus on holding supervisors and mid-level managers accountable in modeling Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) practices.

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