

**Statement by the United States**

**Main Committee II  
Subsidiary Body on Regional Issues**

**The Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**Statement by Senior Advisor Thomas Countryman**

**New York  
August 9, 2022**

Madam Chair,

As we take stock of the significant benefits that all Parties derive from the Treaty, we must not lose sight of the serious nuclear proliferation challenges that continue to threaten regional and international security.

Foremost among these is Iran's continued expansion of its nuclear activities beyond JCPOA limits, including its production of highly enriched uranium and enriched uranium metal, both of which are of direct relevance to nuclear weapons development. Iran's production of HEU up to 60% has no credible civilian purpose. The United States has been steadfast in pursuing a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA. We are currently reviewing the final text proposed by the EU in its capacity as Coordinator of the JCPOA's Joint Commission, and we will provide our answer to the EU as requested. We urge Iran to do the same, approaching the EU's proposal with utmost seriousness.

With respect to Iran's safeguards obligations under the Treaty, we echo the IAEA Board of Governors in expressing profound concern that safeguards issues remain unresolved due to insufficient substantive cooperation by Iran. Iran can resolve these issues by providing the information necessary to clarify IAEA's questions regarding potential undeclared nuclear material. Iran's decisions to stop implementing modified Code 3.1, which would be contrary to its legal obligations, and to end implementation of its Additional Protocol are also troubling. Iran's unsatisfactory cooperation has prevented the IAEA from providing essential assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and raises serious concerns regarding Iran's compliance with its NPT obligation to accept safeguards.

Madam Chair,

The DPRK's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs continue to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and to the global nonproliferation regime. Our goal remains the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are committed to a calibrated, practical approach that seeks serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK, and will continue to push the DPRK to honor its commitment to return as soon as possible to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.

The DPRK continues to fund its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs through sanctions evasion in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, which remain in place. We call upon all Parties to fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions addressing the DPRK, which play an important role in promoting further dialogue.

For more than a decade, the Syrian regime has refused to cooperate with the IAEA to remedy its safeguards noncompliance for constructing an undeclared plutonium production reactor. The Syrian regime's ongoing noncompliance and refusal to heed calls for cooperation by the IAEA Director General and Board of Governors are not historical concerns; they are ongoing and will remain so until Syria has cooperated fully with the IAEA to resolve concerns about potential undeclared nuclear material or activities in Syria. Syria's persistent stonewalling of the IAEA's safeguards investigation is a clear case of noncompliance, not just with Syria's safeguards agreement but with the Treaty itself. We invite all Parties to join the United States in co-sponsoring a joint statement at this Review Conference calling on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

Madam Chair,

The United States supports nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, which reinforce the NPT and regional security, and intends to ratify the protocols that it has signed, including those providing security assurances to parties to the relevant zone treaties. The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, consistent with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and based on arrangements freely arrived at by all the regional states. We remain convinced that the only path to meaningful progress toward such a zone is through direct, inclusive dialogue aimed at building confidence and addressing the legitimate security concerns of all regional states.

The United States took note of developments during the first two sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, but we continue to question whether the UN Conference in its current form can serve as an effective forum for dialogue among all the regional states. We remain closely engaged with all regional parties and stand ready to actively support any initiatives to advance implementation of the 1995 Resolution that have consensus regional support.

We remain concerned by the growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles and capabilities of NPT Parties and non-Parties in Asia, and continue to encourage all states with nuclear weapons to join the United States in exercising restraint regarding their nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, including by establishing and maintaining moratoria on production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, and to support efforts to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States continues to support the long-term goal of NPT universality, and we remain fully committed to efforts to strengthen and uphold the Treaty.

Thank you, Madam Chair.