

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Noncompliance by the Syrian Arab Republic

Joint statement endorsed by Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America

1. We, as Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), express deep concern with the Syrian Arab Republic's continued noncompliance with its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in connection with Syria's construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour.
2. We note that more than eleven years have passed since the IAEA Board of Governors found that Syria's failure to declare the nuclear reactor under construction at Dair Alzour to the IAEA constituted noncompliance with Syria's obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement. This finding was based on the IAEA's technical assessment that the Dair Alzour facility was a nuclear reactor comparable to the gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactor at Yongbyon in the DPRK and should have been declared to the IAEA.
3. We deeply regret that Syria has failed to respond to the IAEA Director General's repeated calls for it to cooperate with the IAEA in connection with unresolved safeguards issues arising from its noncompliance. We note with serious concern that Syria has not engaged substantively with the IAEA regarding the nature of the site or other related locations since June 2008 or provided a credible explanation regarding the IAEA's detection of anthropogenic natural uranium at the site.
4. We stress that Syria's IAEA safeguards noncompliance constitutes noncompliance with Article III of the NPT and that the possible presence in Syria of undeclared nuclear material and activities remains a serious outstanding concern. We welcome the IAEA

Director General's continued efforts to engage with Syria constructively and cooperatively, and we urge Syria to respond in good faith and take concrete steps toward resolving the IAEA's questions and concerns.

5. We emphasize that full compliance with obligations under the NPT is at the heart of the shared security benefits enjoyed by all NPT Parties and that addressing instances of noncompliance is essential to upholding the Treaty's integrity and maintaining the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system. Compliance with nonproliferation obligations is also a critical component of efforts to advance regional security and arms control.

6. We call on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA fully and without further delay in connection with all unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and all related locations, and to provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites, material, and persons necessary for the IAEA to resolve all outstanding questions so that the IAEA can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear program.
