Integrated Country Strategy

U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (USOSCE) advances U.S. policy priorities, as laid out in the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy (NSS) Guidance, at the largest regional security organization in the world, covering most of Eurasia and encompassing over one billion people. The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security represents an indispensable pillar in our common security architecture and bolsters peace, security, and stability in the region.

Russia’s willful disregard of OSCE principles, values, and commitments, as most immediately exemplified through its war in Ukraine, threatens the rules-based international order and will be the Mission’s primary focus for the foreseeable future. The Mission directly confronts Russia’s hypocrisy, aggression, and disinformation in the OSCE’s weekly Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Cooperation, and other official and informal meetings; through the provision of sufficient resources for programs strengthening security and stability in the OSCE region, with a focus on Ukraine; and through alliances and partnerships within the OSCE that isolate Russia and counter its malign influence via a robust public diplomacy strategy with vocal support for the OSCE, its independent institutions, and its Field Missions.

USOSCE will leverage the OSCE’s broad and comprehensive view of security to safeguard space for civil society to act and will advance commitments on human rights, economic and environmental issues, and in the security sector. We will focus particular attention on those countries – as noted in the Interim NSS Guidance – prone to backsliding towards authoritarianism, as well as address external threats to the security of OSCE participating States and Partners for Cooperation. We will seek to rebuild European security in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine and bolster the security of vulnerable states across Eurasia. USOSCE will leverage the OSCE’s wide geographic scope – covering 57 countries across three continents – to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The OSCE is an ideal forum to demonstrate U.S. leadership and mobilize coalitions to address security challenges and advance basic international norms and values across the three Dimensions that form the core of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security: political-Approved: August 5, 2022

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military security, economy and environment, and human rights. USOSCE will press the OSCE to focus on Russia’s war on Ukraine as its foremost priority and, post-conflict, seek to rebuild European security across all three Dimensions. The First Dimension allows us to raise traditional political-military concerns, reciprocal military transparency and de-escalation, as well as non-military security threats, such as cybersecurity vulnerabilities and transnational organized crime. The Second Dimension provides a means to address security-related economic and environmental concerns, an important part of our strategy as detailed in the Interim NSS Guidance. Finally, the Third Dimension allows us to advance U.S. national priorities in the realm of human rights and democracy, recognized as vital in March 2021 Interim NSS Guidance.

The OSCE plays a key role in facilitating regional conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. It is also the only regional organization to take a holistic view of security, focusing on governance, economic, environmental, and human rights issues as additional causes of insecurity and conflict. The range of critical interests addressed through the OSCE requires the United States to sustain a leadership role within the Organization.

USOSCE will continue to advance U.S. strategic security objectives through four primary Mission goals:

1. Maintain support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. Advance the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Serbia and Kosovo; the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in Moldova and Georgia; and regional integration (including the Western Balkans and Central Asian regions) through effective use of OSCE tools to include extrabudgetary projects and field missions.

3. Hold participating States accountable for the principles and commitments they have made to advance security, economic, and environmental priorities shared by the United States, as well as uphold the U.S. commitment to promoting human rights, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms.

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4. Promote U.S. security interests in Europe to reduce the risk of conflict, sustain an open international system underwritten by strong democratic alliances and partnerships to counter international threats.
2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Maintain support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Increase support within the OSCE to hold Russia to account for its invasion of Ukraine, the resulting humanitarian crisis, and the associated human rights abuses.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Ensure the presence of a highly effective OSCE presence in Ukraine that engages in work in all three dimensions and solidifies the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and path to Euro-Atlantic integration by maintaining political and financial support among OSCE participating States.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Bolster the Ukrainian government’s efforts to strengthen the nation’s independence and democratic resilience in the face of unprecedented Russian aggression.

Mission Goal 2: Advance the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Serbia and Kosovo; the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in Moldova and Georgia; and regional integration (including the Western Balkans and Central Asian regions) through effective use of OSCE tools.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Strengthen democratic resilience and overcome barriers to rule of law in States susceptible to threats of Russian aggression by leveraging friends and Allies to offer alternatives to corrupt, authoritarian models.

Mission Goal 3: Hold participating States accountable for the principles and commitments they have made to advance security, economic, and environmental priorities shared by the United States, as well as uphold the U.S. commitment to human rights, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms.

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• **Mission Objective 3.1:** Reinforce OSCE decisions and support their implementation through statements in the Permanent Council, promotion of model legislation, media engagements, robust staffing of OSCE missions, and extrabudgetary contributions to programs.

• **Mission Objective 3.2:** With our friends and Allies, strengthen and deepen the resilience of democratic institutions throughout the OSCE space, helping demonstrate that democratic systems best deliver freedom, security, and prosperity.

• **Mission Objective 3.3:** Support Partners for Cooperation in their efforts to adhere to OSCE principles and commitments and contribute to OSCE efforts to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.

• **Mission Objective 3.4:** Integrate and elevate the fight against corruption in line with the December 2021 National Strategy on Countering Corruption to promote accountability for corrupt actors and disrupt and deter those who would seek to act with impunity, undermining democracy, the rule of law and economic prosperity.

**Mission Goal 4:** Promote U.S. security interests in Europe to reduce the risk of conflict, sustain an open international system underwritten by strong democratic alliances and partnerships and counter transnational threats.

• **Mission Objective 4.1:** Re-assess arms control and confidence building measures post-conflict (in Ukraine), including the Vienna Document, to ensure reciprocal transparency, address threats, and reduce risks more effectively.

• **Mission Objective 4.2:** Ensure OSCE security cooperation on transnational threats (including counterterrorism, transnational organized crime, and cybersecurity) prioritizes strong human rights safeguards and fundamental freedoms.

**Management Objective 1:** Secure appropriate USOSCE staffing to support Mission Goals and Objectives.

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Management Objective 2: Bolster human capital opportunities to support expanding Mission goals through the development of a more diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible workplace.

Management Objective 3: Counter the ever-evolving cyber threat to an increasingly mobile workforce by providing a secure network for Tri-Mission Vienna’s operations to ensure the integrity of the Tri-Mission’s IT platform.
3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | Maintain support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Description | Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made it imperative that USOSCE focus primarily on supporting Ukraine and holding Russia accountable for its actions, helping ensure Russia suffers a strategic defeat. The OSCE serves a necessary and critical role as the only security forum where Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and our partners and Allies sit together at the table and discuss Russia’s war of aggression as equals. With this in mind, we envision the following main pillars for OSCE support based on the Organization’s concept of comprehensive security: stabilizing and strengthening Ukrainian democratic institutions and civil society; addressing evolving risks to the safety and security of Ukrainians; supporting inclusive rehabilitation of Ukraine in the post-conflict period; and facilitating regional cooperation within the OSCE context.

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Objective 1.1 | Increase support within the OSCE to hold Russia to account for its invasion of Ukraine, the resulting humanitarian crisis, and the associated human rights abuses.

- **Objective 1.1 Justification** | The vast majority of OSCE participating States (pS) stand strongly with Ukraine against Russia’s aggression. However, there remain pS, predominantly in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Balkans, under Russian pressure to resist joining broad OSCE support to hold Russia to account. Russia’s numerous violations include war crimes and atrocities committed in Ukraine and violations of commitments made on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders through the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, as well as military transparency commitments. Ensuring the support of these pS for OSCE efforts to hold Russia accountable, or – short of that – ensuring that they do not actively oppose such efforts, would demonstrate that it is not only Western partners, but the whole of the OSCE holding Russia accountable for flagrant violations of international law. Sustaining strong support to hold Russia to account would likewise bolster cohesion on sanctions against Russia and make it harder for Russia to continue to portray itself as the victim of Western anti-Russia bias.

- **Objective 1.1 Linkages** | This Mission Objective is tied to the Interim NSS Guidance, p19: “...we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over. We will work alongside fellow democracies across the globe to deter and defend against aggression from hostile adversaries.”

- **Objective 1.1 Risks** | The risk of not achieving this objective is that Russia successfully sells its narrative that the European security architecture was biased against it and that it had a legitimate need to use force to redress past grievances. To mitigate this risk, we will increase our engagement with all OSCE members and institutions to make it clear Russia stands alone in its rejection of the OSCE foundational documents and principles.
Objective 1.2 | Ensure the presence of a highly effective OSCE presence in Ukraine that supports post-conflict reconstruction and governance reforms and the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and path to Euro-Atlantic integration by maintaining political and financial support among OSCE participating States.

- **Objective 1.2 Justification** | The SMM’s mandate ended on March 31, 2022, after Russia blocked consensus on its renewal. Russia also blocked the mandate renewal for the Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU), forcing the mission’s closure on June 30, 2022. We must therefore ensure that the OSCE maintains a presence in Ukraine to continue support for Ukraine’s democratic aspirations and that the OSCE is prepared to contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. In the face of the PCU’s closure, we will pursue support for instruments to operationalize OSCE support through non-consensual mechanisms.

- **Objective 1.2 Linkages** | This Mission Objective is tied to the Interim NSS Guidance, p19: “...we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over. We will work alongside fellow democracies across the globe to deter and defend against aggression from hostile adversaries.”

- **Objective 1.2 Risks** | Failure to achieve this objective will have a negative impact on the Ukrainian people and cause the OSCE to lose further legitimacy in Ukraine. Failure to achieve this objective would also allow Russia to limit the OSCE’s ability to support the Ukrainian government and people of Ukraine. To mitigate this risk, we will work closely with the Chair, the Secretary General, other OSCE institutions, and like-minded pS to ensure the OSCE maintains a presence in Ukraine.
Objective 1.3 | Bolster the Ukrainian government’s efforts to strengthen the nation’s independence and democratic resilience in the face of unprecedented Russian aggression.

- **Objective 1.3 Justification** | Ukraine has made great strides in developing democratic systems and structures, and in combatting corruption since achieving independence in 1991. However, there remains work to be done in these areas and the OSCE plays a vital role in working with the Ukrainian government to implement necessary reforms. OSCE programs, as managed through the Chair, Secretary General, and extrabudgetary programs, directly support Ukraine’s increased democratization and improved anti-corruption principles.

- **Objective 1.3 Linkages** | This Mission Objective is tied to the Interim NSS Guidance, p19: “…we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over... We will take special aim at confronting corruption, which rots democracy from the inside and is increasingly weaponized by authoritarian states to undermine democratic institutions.”

- **Objective 1.3 Risks** | Lack of success in achieving this objective will leave Ukraine less able to repel Russian military aggression and more susceptible to malign foreign and domestic influences, with its democratic trajectory stalled or weakened. To mitigate this, we will continue to promote OSCE programs that specifically support Ukraine’s democratization and anti-corruption efforts.

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Mission Goal 2 | Advance the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Serbia and Kosovo; the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in Moldova and Georgia; and regional integration (including the Western Balkans and Central Asian regions) through effective use of OSCE tools to include Extra budgetary projects and Field Missions.

Description | OSCE founding principles, commitments made by participating States, and the overall forum provided by the Organization provide a powerful set of tools to combat threats to democracy and security. Strained relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and persistent ethnically-based tensions between the seven successor states to the former Yugoslavia – most prominently Serbia and Kosovo and within Bosnia and Herzegovina – in addition to Russia’s occupations of Moldova and Georgia (through proxies), create destabilizing gaps in Europe’s broader security architecture. This challenge allows the spread of disinformation, the exploitation of diverging interests, and the generation of illicit flows of money and goods. A lack of regional integration, fragile institutions, and weak democratic political leadership in the Western Balkans and Central Asia present additional opportunities for exploitation by actors seeking to undermine democratic institutions. By promoting regional confidence-building measures and leveraging OSCE friends and Allies to strengthen democratic resilience in these frontline States, the United States can spur progress towards peace, including through regional outreach, public diplomacy efforts, and active support for and participation in OSCE-related early warning, conflict mediation, and conflict resolution fora.

Objective 2.1 | Strengthen democratic resilience and overcome barriers to the rule of law in States susceptible to threats of Russian aggression by leveraging friends and Allies to offer alternatives to corrupt, authoritarian models.
• **Objective 2.1 Justification** | The OSCE is well-placed to support the negotiation and settlement of conflicts, when the parties involved show the political will to do so, as in Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and Georgia, through an approach grounded in the principles of comprehensive and cooperative security. Progress in negotiations through OSCE formats is unlikely within the timeframe of this ICS due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its overall obstructionist posture. Thus, it will be even more crucial for USOSCE to draw attention to these conflicts and demonstrate support for their existing negotiating formats so that they can resume their work when the situation allows. USOSCE can focus the OSCE’s attention on confidence-building measures and support for democratization and anti-corruption measures in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.

• **Objective 2.1 Linkages** | This Mission objective supports Strategic Objective 1.4 under Goal 1 of the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) 2022-2026: “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges and competitors; prevent, deter and resolve conflicts and promote international security.” This Mission objective is also in line with the 2021 Interim NSS Guidance, which calls for the United States to "lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions and rules" and to combat new threats aimed at our democracy and those of our partners, including from disinformation to counter the destabilizing actions of Russia.

• **Objective 2.1 Risks** | The primary risk is that USOSCE’s attention and that of our partners and Allies will be diverted from these conflicts to others, particularly Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. Separately, domestic political situations could influence our partners’ capacities to take strong stances on holding Russia accountable and countering Russian disinformation. A decision by USOSCE leadership to continue drawing attention to those conflicts and to advocate for specific sub-objectives can help USOSCE to reach its goals.

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**Mission Goal 3 |** Hold participating States accountable for the principles and commitments they have made to advance security, economic, and environmental priorities shared by the United States, as well as uphold the U.S. commitment to human rights, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms.

**Description |** Over the past 40 years, OSCE participating States have made commitments to work together with the objectives of “promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace, free from any threat to or attempt against their security.” These commitments encompass the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, which rests on the underlying premise that human rights, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms are interconnected and interdependent components of security. Upholding these commitments, actively engaging with civil society, and ensuring the OSCE’s ability to monitor participating States’ implementation of these commitments are integral elements to maintaining a rules-based international order through strong and sustained U.S. leadership.
**Objective 3.1 | Reinforce OSCE decisions and encourage their implementation through statements in the Permanent Council, promotion of model legislation, media engagements, robust staffing of OSCE missions, and extrabudgetary contributions to programs.**

- **Objective 3.1 Justification |** This objective aims to undergird the U.S. strategic priority of promoting human rights, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms by ensuring they are addressed comprehensively by USOSCE and throughout the OSCE’s various lines of effort. The OSCE is an organization with multiple components that compliment and reinforce each other to be fully effective, and thus a multipronged approach will be required. For example, decisions reached during the weekly Permanent Councils and annual Ministerial Council will require vigilant follow-up to ensure pS are abiding by their commitments. This requires not only regular statements in the PC calling on pS to fulfill their pledges, but also liaising with U.S. Embassies in pS and with OSCE Field Missions to encourage their support in helping pS to work with their national legislatures to pass legislation in line with U.S. and OSCE shared values. We must also work with the multiple OSCE field missions and in-country program offices to position them to assist host governments achieve reforms in U.S. and OSCE priority areas. This requires ensuring that OSCE satellites are properly staffed, including with U.S. personnel, and that programs and projects are adequately funded through extrabudgetary contributions. Additionally, USOSCE will continue to cooperate with OSCE Independent Institutions, such as the Office of the Secretariat, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities to ensure their independent oversight is protected and their ability to objectively report on violations of OSCE commitments is not interfered with. Finally, all activities must be amplified through robust media engagement to keep the topics visible and sustain pressure on pS to be accountable for the principles and commitments they have made.

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• **Objective 3.1 Linkages** | Interim NSS Guidance, p9: “...we must remain committed to realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. That means more than simply sustaining the status quo – it means reinvigorating our democracy, living up to our ideals and values for all Americans, and standing up for our values abroad, including by uniting the world’s democracies to combat threats to free societies.” Interim NSS Guidance, p19-20: “Our work defending democracy does not end at our shores. Authoritarianism is on the global march, and we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over... We will defend and protect human rights and address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization in all its forms.” Interim NSS Guidance, p11: “**We will move swiftly to earn back our position of leadership in international institutions, joining with the international community to tackle the climate crisis and other shared challenges.**”

• **Objective 3.1 Risks** | Not achieving the objective would have several severe consequences. First, it would signal to the other pS that the United States has abdicated its standing in the OSCE as one of the Organization’s top defenders – if not the top defender – of commitments in the area of human rights, democratic principles and fundamental freedoms. Second, were we to stop making statements that held irresponsible pS accountable, or to stop staffing missions or funding programs, our authority to promote our national agenda in the OSCE would be severely diminished. Third, were we to not fully engage with the media to highlight our priorities, values, and activities, we would be fighting an uphill battle to amplify our messages and counter disinformation and false narratives. Finally, failure to achieve this objective would weaken the transatlantic relationship because our Allies and partners value this organization’s multilateral approach to comprehensive security. To mitigate these risks, we will continue to harmonize our efforts internally among the multiple USOSCE sections, laterally with other embassies and missions, and in Washington with EUR, DRL, and other Bureaus to ensure the objective is achieved.
Objective 3.2 | With our friends and Allies, strengthen and deepen the resilience of democratic institutions throughout the OSCE space, helping demonstrate that democratic systems best deliver freedom, security, and prosperity.

- **Objective 3.2 Justification** | As China and Russia attempt to sway countries in the OSCE space to support authoritarianism, it is vital to strengthen and enhance the ability of democratic institutions to respond to the needs of their citizens. The OSCE is uniquely equipped to assist in this effort via OSCE election observation missions, and review of draft legislation submitted by participating States to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Additionally, field missions have significant capacity to work directly with host country governments and civil society to strengthen democratic institutions.

- **Objective 3.2 Linkages** | State-USAID FY 2022-2026 JSP Strategic Objective 1.4 under Goal 1: “Lead allies and partners to address shared challenges and competitors; prevent, deter, and resolve conflicts; and promote international security.”

- **Objective 3.2 Risks** | OSCE efforts rely on support from the host country. If participating States no longer see the value in OSCE assistance, then the ability of the OSCE to enhance democratic institutions will be limited. Thus, it is essential that the OSCE maintain positive relations with participating States.
Objective 3.3 | Support Partners for Cooperation in their efforts to adhere to OSCE principles and commitments and contribute to OSCE efforts to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.

- **Objective 3.3 Justification** | Through the two special OSCE Partnership programs (the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation and the Asian Partners for Cooperation), the OSCE can expand its perspective outside the immediate OSCE region. Recognizing that conflicts and crises often extend beyond borders and affect non-OSCE members, the Partners for Cooperation can play a key role in supporting OSCE values and principles (human rights, democratic accountability, rule of law, etc.), demonstrating these are not merely “Western” ideals. Partners can speak at OSCE fora in support of U.S. policy positions and can contribute to OSCE extrabudgetary projects.

- **Objective 3.3 Linkages** | This Mission Objective nests within State-USAID FY 2022-2026 JSP, Strategic Objective 3.1 under Goal 3: Promote good governance and defend strong, accountable, and resilient democracies that deliver for their citizens. It also reflects 2021 Interim NSS Guidance to “lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnership, multilateral institutions, and rules” and core objectives of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.

- **Objective 3.3 Risks** | It is possible some Partners for Cooperation may use their resources (political or financial) to advocate policies and programs in opposition to U.S. interests (à la those advocated by the Russian Federation). As some Partners find their voices and more actively support U.S. positions at the OSCE, others may feel similarly empowered to take the opposing route.

Objective 3.4 | Integrate and elevate the fight against corruption in line with the December 2021 National Strategy on Countering Corruption to promote accountability for corrupt actors and disrupt and deter those who would seek to act with impunity, undermining democracy, the rule of law and economic prosperity.

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- **Objective 3.4 Justification** | Countering corruption involves addressing interlocking challenges in the OSCE area that are central to the organization’s ability to uphold its core values and comprehensive concept of security. The cross-dimensional nature of corruption (which includes security, economic, and human rights aspects) has made it historically difficult for the Organization to formulate a correspondingly comprehensive response. The consensus basis of OSCE decision-making reinforces this dynamic, as some participating States are unwilling to accept the simultaneous consideration of the law enforcement, good governance, and human rights or democracy-related aspects of corruption. In this context, we will advance our anti-corruption priorities via four lines of effort that combine the focused use of OSCE platforms with USOSCE engagement and public outreach. These include shaping any new Ministerial Council decisions to include anti-corruption elements; using extrabudgetary projects to advance U.S. policy goals; elevating the profile of anticorruption in USOSCE statements and public engagement; and supporting the work of the OSCE Special Representative on Combating Corruption.

- **Objective 3.4 Linkages** | USOSCE’s approach to anti-corruption priorities is rooted in several key strategy documents that directly address the issue. Most directly, we are guided by the December 2021 *Strategy on Countering Corruption* – especially the Strategy’s Pillar Four (Preserving and Strengthening the Multilateral Anti-Corruption Architecture) and Pillar Five (Improving Diplomatic Engagement and Leveraging Foreign Assistance Resources to Advance Policy Objectives). In addition, the following strategies and policies shape our posture:

  o **March 2021 Interim NSS Guidance** p. 8: “Together with our allies and partners, we can modernize the architecture of international cooperation for the challenges of this century, from cyber threats to climate change, corruption, and digital authoritarianism.” And p. 19: “We will take special aim at confronting corruption, which rots democracy from the inside and is increasingly weaponized by authoritarian states to undermine democratic institutions.”

  o **State-USAID FY 2022-2026 JSP**: Under Goal 3, Strategic Objective 3.3 – prevent, expose, and reduce corruption.

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• **Objective 3.4 Risks** | By not reinforcing the OSCE’s work to counter corruption, USOSCE risks losing momentum behind recent progress and missing current opportunities in the Organization to advance U.S. policy goals per the Strategy on Countering Corruption and the December 2021 Summit for Democracy (Note: a follow-up Summit is planned for late 2022). The OSCE is well-placed to engage on the issue, with longstanding training capabilities that can benefit the most vulnerable of its 57 participating States, and a significant body of existing commitments. However, some participating States still resist more active OSCE activity on this issue or reject an effective cross-dimensional approach to it. We can mitigate these risks by leveraging our resources and influence within the organization to advance our goals across all five proposed lines of effort simultaneously.

**Mission Goal 4** | Promote U.S. security interests in Europe to reduce the risk of conflict, sustain an open international system underwritten by strong democratic alliances and partnerships, and counter transnational threats.

**Description** | Russia’s ongoing aggression and military action against Ukraine, deliberate provocations of its closest neighbors, and efforts to split alliances have significantly increased tensions within the European security environment. Protecting the remaining European security architecture and rebuilding military transparency is critical to improving European security over the long term. Dialogue on security issues should focus OSCE attention on current and future challenges to security – including active and protracted conflicts, modernization of current CSBMs, ways to de-escalate tensions, and restoring/how to restore confidence post-conflict.
Objective 4.1 | Re-assess arms control and confidence building measures post-conflict (in Ukraine), including the Vienna Document, to more effectively address threat perceptions, reduce risks and ensure reciprocal military transparency.

- **Objective 4.1 Justification** | The United States must continue to rally Allies and partners to collectively address the areas in which Russia’s behavior has eroded European security by contravening OSCE principles and political-military commitments. The Vienna Document (VDoc) is the OSCE’s main political-military confidence and security building measure for military transparency and risk reduction, providing for information exchanges, the notification and observation of military exercises, and evaluation and inspection visits. Russia and Belarus rebuffed VDoc risk reduction mechanisms ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which fundamentally upended VDoc commitments. Since 2011 Russia has blocked efforts to modernize VDoc, including a Joint Proposal introduced by NATO Allies and partners in 2019. Russia has also scuttled the other two “pillars” of the European security architecture, having illegally “suspended” implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) since 2007 and withdrawn from the Treaty on Open Skies in 2021.

- **Objective 4.1 Linkages** | This Mission Objective is tied to the 2021 Interim NSS Guidance requirements to promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions; and to lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.

- **Objective 4.1 Risks** | Russia has already demonstrated non-compliance with arms control treaties and non-adherence to CSBMs. Rebuilding confidence shattered by Russia’s war of Ukraine post-conflict and re-engaging with Russia on verifiable arms control CSBMs will be a long and hard process.

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Objective 4.2 | Ensure that OSCE security cooperation on transnational threats (including counterterrorism, transnational organized crime, cybercrime, and cybersecurity) prioritizes strong human rights safeguards and fundamental freedoms.

- **Objective 4.2 Justification** | As the transnational threats facing the United States and the OSCE area continue to evolve, it is crucial we ensure the OSCE’s key work on these areas continues to track closely with core OSCE values on human rights and fundamental freedoms. This is particularly relevant as Russia is increasingly seeking to introduce alternative models for addressing these threats (i.e., using a top-down, authoritarian, law enforcement perspective on combating terrorism or creating regulations within cyberspace to encourage state-censorship of sensitive material online). USOSCE must ensure that all current and future OSCE efforts to address these threats continue to be strongly grounded in the OSCE’s foundational values, principles, and commitments.

- **Objective 4.2 Linkages** | This Mission Objective nests broadly within the State-USAID FY 2022-2026 JSP Goal 3: “Strengthen democratic institutions, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity.”

It also reflects the 2021 Interim NSS Guidance “to make cybersecurity a top priority, strengthening our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace” and “adapt our approach to counterterrorism, including by aligning our resources to evolving threats.”

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Objective 4.2 Risks | Russia is extremely proficient at disguising true authoritarian intentions behind seemingly innocuous programs – i.e., its drug trafficking policies (which expose criticisms of U.S. and NATO activity in South Asia) or its interest in combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (which leads to authorizing states’ censorship of the Internet or unrestricted access to personal private data of citizens). It can be difficult to collaborate with Russia in combating transnational threats when we assume their objectives are never in good faith. Ensuring true collaboration requires very careful assessment of all potentially sensitive new proposals to counter transnational threats, including coordinating closely with Washington and with the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (where the issue may be tracked on the UN side).
4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Secure appropriate USOSCE staffing to support Mission Goals and Objectives.

- **Management Objective 1 Justification** | Maintaining proper staffing is key to meeting USOSCE’s mission and operational objectives. Over the past seven years, leading international efforts to curtail Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere across the OSCE region have consumed the majority of our resources. The Political Section has two officers receiving Special Needs Differential due to the need to work 55+ hours/week, but they are not the only ones working those intense hours. The mission is not able to maintain a healthy work-life balance due to the increased workload and stagnant staffing pattern. The increasing workload has left USOSCE with diminished means to advance other key priorities at the OSCE. Russia's increasing recourse to hybrid warfare across all three OSCE dimensions – security, economic, and human – and its non-compliance with key arms control regimes further complicates these challenges, which will persist in the coming years.

- **Management Objective 1 Linkages** | 2021 Interim NSS Guidance.

- **Management Objective 1 Risks** | Maintaining proper staffing in this multilateral environment is the difference between successfully advancing U.S. security goals and falling short of utilizing the OSCE as a tool for bolstering peace, security and stability in the region. Continuing staffing imbalances would have an effect not only on the mission’s ability to fulfill its objectives, but also impact morale and work-life balance.

Management Objective 2 | Bolster human capital opportunities to support expanding Mission goals through the development of a more diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible workplace.

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• **Management Objective 2 Justification** | Advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) in the workplace is a whole of enterprise effort resulting in a recruiting, developing and retaining a talented and dynamic workforce which advances Mission goals and supports the work of the Administration.

• **Management Objective 2 Linkages** | Presidential Executive Order on DEIA in the Federal Workforce. Preliminary DEIA Strategic Plan.

• **Management Objective 2 Risks** | Advancing DEIA is one of the Department’s top management priorities. Not aligning with these objectives and values will be detrimental to the Tri-Mission’s recruitment, development, and retention goals.

**Management Objective 3** | Counter the ever-evolving cyber-threat to an increasingly mobile workforce by providing a secure network for Tri-Mission Vienna’s operations to ensure the integrity of the Tri-Mission’s IT platform.

• **Management Objective 3 Justification** | Maintaining the integrity of our computer and communications infrastructure and platform, keeping it current and updated, and safeguarding it from cybersecurity threats is key to advancing our objectives. In line with the Department’s Modernization agenda, a secure and available network, and a nimble workforce properly trained on cybersecurity vulnerabilities provide a primary tool for fulfilling the mission’s goals.

• **Management Objective 3 Linkages** | Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity; 2021 Interim NSS Guidance; DOS IT Strategic Plan; State-USAID FY 2022-2026 JSP Performance Goals 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.

• **Management Objective 3 Risks** | A vulnerable network and workforce can be easily compromised resulting in obstacles in achieving the Mission’s goals and potentially result in grave threats to national security.

Approved: August 5, 2022