Joint Regional Strategy

Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and USAID Bureau of Europe and Eurasia

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1. Executive Statement and Mission Statement

Executive Statement:

For more than seven decades, the United States and its Allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia have championed democracy and human rights as we have sustained worldwide economic growth, which is now threatened by inflation and the global effects on prices and supply chains partly because of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Biden-Harris Administration has committed itself to reinvigorating the transatlantic alliance to address global challenges, advance justice, promote freedom, and build a prosperous future together. To achieve this vision, the Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau of Europe and Eurasia (E&E) have developed a Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) for Europe and Eurasia for 2022-2026. The JRS is driven by the Biden-Harris Administration’s four overarching foreign policy priorities: revitalizing partnerships; strengthening democracies; leveraging alliances to address global challenges; and promoting economic growth. The EUR-E&E JRS is framed to support the goals and objectives as laid out in the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP).

Our engagement and assistance to European and Eurasian Allies and partners is predicated on countering mutual threats and strengthening our democratic institutions that are under attack. In pledging to revitalize our partnerships in Europe and Eurasia, we acknowledge the importance of facing threats to democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. Our shared values and history of sacrifice bind our transatlantic alliance in confronting authoritarian states that threaten the principle of sovereignty and exploit the vulnerabilities of free societies. Such aggression is rooted in revisionist policies intended to reestablish spheres of influence and reclaim lost empires. Whether it is Russia instigating disorder through overt and covert measures, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) wielding its economic power against more vulnerable European and Eurasian partners, a united response is crucial for preserving freedom, stability, and prosperity in the region.

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Not only is unity a prerequisite for our success, we must also demonstrate unequivocally that democracy delivers. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed in the aftermath of World War II, heralded a new era of global respect for democratic values and human rights. These values can only flourish if we ensure that our democratic institutions are able to preserve and protect fundamental freedoms. Working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (COE), the community of European nations, and other multilateral fora, such as the United Nations (UN), we will work with our European partners to strengthen human rights, prevent democratic backsliding, advance justice, solve regional conflicts, protect biodiversity and the environment, mitigate and adapt to climate change, and combat transnational corruption. We must collaborate with our transatlantic Allies and partners to root out corruption by making democratic institutions accountable and resilient; encouraging a free media and an active civil society; and protecting the independence of the judiciary and the integrity of electoral systems.

The world community is challenged by the dangers of an escalating climate crisis, a protracted pandemic, humanitarian disasters, resurgent authoritarianism, war-displaced populations, violent extremism, and terrorism. Borders and walls will not shield us from these threats; we must take collective action with our transatlantic Allies and partners. We must commit to environmental changes to avert a climate catastrophe. We must fund the equitable distribution of vaccines and expand our humanitarian disaster response capability. We must confront autocratic leaders and warmongers as we look to strengthen our democratic institutions. Our renewed engagement with the European Union (EU) reflects our understanding of its indispensable role as a fundamental partner and ally in maintaining peace, prosperity, and the international rules-based order in Europe and beyond. Through the Paris Agreement, the United States and our European and Eurasian Allies and partners will lead the way to address climate change so that future generations can thrive. Finally, we have reaffirmed our Article 5 commitment to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and pledged our leadership and assistance in collectively addressing current and emerging threats, including the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine.
To succeed in the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), we must reorient our economic priorities and address growing economic disparity in Europe and Eurasia. Our economic diplomacy must be inclusive in its approach and promote sustainable prosperity for the populations of the United States and Europe. The transatlantic economy accounts for approximately 50 percent of the world’s GDP and one-fifth of global exports. We must manage historical irritants so they do not impede collaboration that produces economic benefits from investment, trade, energy, health security, and implementing the global minimum tax standard. Emerging industries for clean energy and biotech will propel innovation further and offer new opportunities to align our security and economic principles to address the climate change crisis and potentially reduce future migration pressures due to environmental conditions. Working in collaboration with European and Eurasian partners, including through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (U.S.-EU TTC), we can protect our supply chains and intellectual property rights, facilitate technological advancements, and shape the economic rules of the road for the 21st century economy, which translates into jobs for both European and American workers, supporting the growth of the middle class.

Finally, our foreign policy and the conduct of our diplomacy will reflect those principles to which we aspire: fairness, justice, and equal opportunity for all. This requires the integration of diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility into our lives, our laws, and our institutions. Our success in this, and in holding Russia accountable for its war crimes, will determine not just our security and prosperity, but the long-term success of our democracies.

Mission Statement:

Reinvigorate alliances with our NATO Allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia to strengthen democracy, expand transatlantic prosperity, protect national sovereignty, and take collective action to meet global challenges.
2. Bureau Strategic Framework

**Bureau Goal 1**: Revitalize European Alliances and Partnerships in the Evolving Security Environment.

- **Bureau Objective 1.1**: Strengthen U.S. and Allied commitment to NATO, including Article 5, to ensure that NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is fully resourced, with the burden equitably shared, in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and equip the Alliance to handle other contemporary and emerging threats, including to non-NATO countries’ sovereignty and independence.

- **Bureau Objective 1.2**: Raise the level of U.S.-EU ambition to collaborate globally, use enlargement as a strategic tool, and impose costs on and hold Russia accountable for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in coordination with allies and partners to maintain transatlantic unity.

- **Bureau Objective 1.3**: Increase support and awareness among Allies and partners of the importance of using the OSCE to hold Russia and others to account for violations of core principles of international law and the Helsinki Final Act, and to make progress on conflict resolution.

- **Bureau Objective 1.4**: Harmonize our strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific with NATO, the European Union, and European partners to promote shared interests.

**Bureau Goal 2**: Strengthen Democracy and the Rule of Law Throughout Europe and Eurasia.

- **Bureau Objective 2.1**: Advocate for and reinforce democratic values, norms, and principles, including national sovereignty and countries’ self-determination.

- **Bureau Objective 2.2**: Strengthen democratic systems, institutions, and processes, including within the EU, and counter democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism, in the context of the European Democratic Resilience Initiative.

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• **Bureau Objective 2.3:** Strengthen the ability of Allies and partners to resist and counter influence operations, cyberattacks and disinformation from Russia, the PRC, and other actors.

• **Bureau Objective 2.4:** Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption through increased transparency and accountability of governing institutions, civic oversight, societal inclusion, and through greater adherence to the rule of law.

**Bureau Goal 3:** Promote deeper trade, investment, and energy cooperation, accelerate transatlantic connections and collaborate with the EU, NATO Allies, and European and Eurasian partners to counter non-market and coercive economic practices.

• **Bureau Objective 3.1:** Enhance economic cooperation with Europe and Eurasia to promote trade and investment in pre-accession countries with both the EU and the United States; to develop stronger, more secure and resilient supply chains; and to build back better from the global pandemic and the damage caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

• **Bureau Objective 3.2:** Strengthen tools to increase U.S. and European and Eurasian economic security, reduce access by malign actors, and develop coalitions to counter non-market and coercive economic practices, particularly by the PRC and Russia, including through strengthened investment screening and transparency and actions to reduce economic vulnerabilities and dependencies of partner countries and to enhance the resilience of NATO Allies and like-minded OSCE partners.

• **Bureau Objective 3.3:** Collaborate with Europe and Eurasia and the EU, to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable transatlantic digital economy that supports democratic principles and promotes workforce development and prosperity.

• **Bureau Objective 3.4:** Expand partnership with Europe and Eurasia to increase energy security, accelerate the clean energy transition, and prevent Russia and other malign actors from using energy as a weapon.

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Bureau Goal 4: Leverage Alliances and Partnerships to Ensure Russia’s Strategic Failure in its War in Ukraine and to Address Other Global and Regional Threats and Challenges.

- **Bureau Objective 4.1:** Support Ukrainian efforts to win the war and rebuild the country; ensure respect for national territorial integrity by securing Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine; deter future aggressive acts; and seek peaceful resolution of Russia-backed territorial conflicts, including its influence on the Western Balkans and South Caucasus.

- **Bureau Objective 4.2:** Counter Russia’s claims and false narratives and steadfastly support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through the OSCE.

- **Bureau Objective 4.3:** Support emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, vulnerable populations, and refugees inside and outside of Ukraine, particularly those bordering Ukraine with the goal of creating the conditions to allow refugees and displaced persons to return.

- **Bureau Objective 4.4:** Secure ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation outcomes in support of international climate agreements, including the Paris Agreement, and transatlantic priorities.

- **Bureau Objective 4.5:** Lead global health security improvements to end the COVID-19 pandemic and prevent or mitigate against future pandemics.

- **Bureau Objective 4.6:** Alleviate the global impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on food security, energy supplies and energy diversification efforts, and world economies.

- **Bureau Objective 4.7:** Counter Russian, PRC, Iranian, and other state, and non-state actors’ strategic, conventional, and hybrid threats and emerging disruptive technologies that threaten U.S., European, and Eurasian security in the region and beyond.

- **Bureau Objective 4.8:** Work with Arctic allies and partners to ensure the region remains open to our shared commercial, scientific, and security interests.
• **Bureau Objective 4.9:** Work with like-minded allies and partners to defend a rules-based international order at the UN and other international organizations, including by preventing the insertion of language in multilateral documents that would advance authoritarian ideology, and coordinating on the election of qualified officials committed to democratic principles.

**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 5:** Recruit, develop, and retain EUR talent that represents the diversity of the United States and has the set of skills necessary to advance the Bureau’s goals.

- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 5.1:** Develop and implement a Bureau strategy for advancing diversity and inclusion that includes a comprehensive recruitment and assignment process.
- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 5.2:** Empower employees by involving them in policy-making processes and decision making, training and mentorship on policy-making, and management skills.
- **Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 5.3:** Leverage the diversity of our bureau as a tool for domestic outreach and to promote greater engagement with European and Eurasian interlocutors (members of the public and/or government).
3. Bureau Goals and Objectives

**Bureau Goal 1:** Revitalize European Alliances and Partnerships in the Evolving Security Environment.

- **Bureau Goal 1 Description:** The bedrock of our strategy in Europe and Eurasia is torevitalize our relationships with NATO Allies, the EU, and our regional partners. In a world of strategic competition, the security, prosperity, and freedoms of the United States are interconnected with those of our transatlantic allies and partners. We reaffirm our steadfast commitment to NATO’s Article 5 to respond and to anticipate the evolving threats of today and tomorrow. We aim to collaborate with European and Eurasian nations through individual initiatives in our bilateral engagements and match those efforts in multilateral fora. The Biden-Harris Administration’s renewed and vigorous engagement with the EU makes evident that we consider the organization a vital partner in our global endeavors. At the OSCE we seek to advance democratic precepts through its broad reach and to ensure that Russia and others do not undermine the organization’s effectiveness. We understand that authoritarian states find validation for their models of governance when democracies falter. Therefore, EUR and E&E will not only build resilience, but go further to leverage NATO, U.S.-EU collaboration, European and Eurasian partnerships, and the broader UN system to contest and end the disruptive influence of Russia as well as the intimidation tactics employed by the PRC in Europe and Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, and beyond.

**Bureau Objective 1.1:** Strengthen U.S. and allied commitment to NATO, including Article 5, to ensure that NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is fully resourced, with the burden equitably shared, in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and equip the Alliance to handle other contemporary and emerging threats, including to non-NATO countries’ sovereignty and independence.

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Justification and Linkages: The importance of NATO is enshrined at the highest level of U.S. national security guidance, the National Security Strategy (NSS): “… we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond – strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values.” The most successful alliance in history, NATO provides deterrence and defense for Allied national territory and populations comprising over 1 billion people. NATO is a cornerstone of the international rules-based order. The Washington Treaty is NATO’s founding document, and Article 5 commits allies to collective defense – an attack against one ally is an attack against all. To credibly maintain the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture, we must have the capabilities, readiness, and interoperability across the Euro-Atlantic area. U.S. nuclear extended deterrence is the ultimate assurance for allied security. Allies must also be able to assess and counter contemporary and evolving threats and challenges, including malicious cyber and hybrid actors. The U.S. and its NATO allies have drawn on their stocks of suitable conventional weapons to supply Ukraine with defensive weaponry able to be used to repel the Russian invasion such as anti-tank missiles. These stocks of NATO ally weapons will need to be replenished for NATO’s own defense, and allies must be prepared and committed to fund replenishment of these capabilities. Given an uncertain and deteriorating security environment, it is a core national security priority for the United States as articulated in the JSP and the National Security Strategy (NSS) to maintain a strong, united, and effective NATO. Objective 1.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.3, and 4.3.
Risk Considerations: Potential adversaries, namely Russia, seek to undermine NATO and fracture its unity. Failing to consult adequately and in a timely fashion with allies on matters affecting their security could also place achievement of this objective at risk. Calls by certain allies for “European Strategic Autonomy” risk decoupling the United States from Europe and could diminish NATO’s role as the organizing actor and guarantor for Euro-Atlantic security. Not all Allies are meeting, or are projected to meet, their Wales Defense Investment Pledge commitments by 2024. Adequate defense investment in capabilities and contributions are necessary to sustain the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture against the full array of conventional and non-conventional threats and challenges, as well as the effectiveness of Alliance missions and operations. We will promote U.S. positions to advance national security goals and continue consulting closely with allies on deterrence and defense issues, providing leadership in shaping our collective defense to meet threats and challenges over the coming decade.

Bureau Objective 1.2: Raise the level of U.S.-EU ambition to collaborate globally, use enlargement as a strategic tool in coordination with allies and partners to maintain transatlantic unity, and impose costs on and hold Russia accountable for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Justification and Linkages: The United States and Europe have been partners of first resort for decades. Reestablishing the primacy of this relationship and elevating our shared ambitions will support increased collaboration with the EU to tackle some of the world’s most pressing challenges and jointly confront actors that threaten our collective prosperity, security, and way of life. To do this most effectively, we should leverage areas of shared interest with the EU to promote unity and stronger ties. Using the EU’s six Commission priorities for 2019-24 as a reference and understanding the variety of stakeholders, we can position the United States as a reliable and attractive partner, increasing the EU’s willingness to collaborate with us on shared global challenges. Objective 1.2 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, 4.3, and 5.1.

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• **Risk Considerations:** Without deliberate and consistent action to rebuild and strengthen the U.S.-EU relationship, the EU may turn inward and seek to develop greater autonomy. A weakened transatlantic relationship could negatively affect U.S. security, economic prosperity, global leadership, and ability to compete effectively with strategic rivals in ways that are consistent with our values. The PRC may seek to drive wedges in EU unity through acts of economic coercion to make some EU member states more compliant with Beijing’s national interests or through inducements to make some European countries look to the PRC to address infrastructure needs. In the aftermath of Brexit and with the continued migration crisis in Europe, EU unity and commitment to enlargement remains uncertain.

**Bureau Objective 1.3:** Increase support and awareness among allies and partners of the importance of using the OSCE to hold Russia and others to account for violations of core principles of international law and the Helsinki Final Act, and to make progress on conflict resolution.

• **Justification and Linkages:** At the heart of the transatlantic alliance and partnerships are our shared values, and none are more important than our shared democratic values. Safeguarding and fostering democracy is among the highest priority U.S. foreign policy objectives. Around the world, democratic values are being threatened. The challenges are not confined to newer democracies. Europe and the United States together must confront deepening polarization across our societies, the spread of misinformation and disinformation, and low levels of public trust in democratic institutions. Strengthening democracy in Europe, EU candidate countries, and beyond will ensure our continued security, prosperity, and way of life. Strengthening democratic values in Europe will also revitalize transatlantic alliances and partnerships, guaranteeing the United States remains the partner of first resort. Finally, strong democracies make stronger allies. An EU and NATO with strong democratic members will more easily reach consensus and be more steadfast allies and stronger partners in advancing our key policy goals, including
throughout Eurasia at the OSCE, and our global interests. Objective 1.3 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.3, and 5.1.

- **Risk Considerations:** Nations with weakened democratic institutions and values are less reliable partners, which could weaken EU and NATO abilities to respond to crises and advance our shared interests.

**Bureau Objective 1.4:** Harmonize our strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific with NATO Allies, the EU, and European partners to promote shared interests.

- **Justification and Linkages:** The key to ensuring mutually reinforcing outcomes to promote shared interests in the Indo-Pacific and Europe and Eurasia will come by achieving strategic alignment among our allies and partners. Through NATO, the EU, Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States trilateral security partnership (AUKUS), and other sub-regional fora and partnerships, we can make positive headway in the Indo-Pacific to advance democracy, human rights, security, and economic prosperity by investing in critical infrastructure, widening economic cooperation, strengthening security partnerships, and reaffirming the rules-based international order, including the preservation of the principle of freedom of navigation. Objective 1.4 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.3, and 5.1.

- **Risk Considerations:** We must consider the divergent relationships and interests among our Allies and partners. The announcement of the AUKUS agreement, while beneficial to some Allies, caused initial rifts among other Allies and partners. Without consideration of context and repercussions on other equities, such narrowly focused actions can incur costs within the transatlantic alliance, a foundation of U.S. national security. Making a careful calculus of shared interests allows us the opportunity to make sustainable progress in keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open. Moreover, our collaboration must be calibrated so it is not perceived as an attempt to make Allies and partners choose between the United States and the PRC.

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Bureau Goal 2: Strengthen Democracy and the Rule of Law Throughout Europe and Eurasia.

- **Bureau Goal 2 Description:** The United States’ greatest strategic advantage is its global network of alliances and partnerships, and in Europe and Eurasia these relationships are cemented by a shared commitment to democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the belief that these values provide the basis for strong, stable, and prosperous societies. Increasingly, however, these foundational principles are under attack from forces within and without. Across the continent, the rise of anti-establishment and extremist political movements has fueled polarization, contributing to political paralysis. An alarming increase in democratic backsliding – notably by former recipients of U.S. assistance - has undermined the rule of law and democratic institutions in EU members and aspirants alike, in some cases raising serious concerns about Europe’s universal commitment to civil liberties and human rights. Endemic corruption presents a persistent challenge that further erodes democratic credibility. Authoritarian actors, including Russia and the PRC, exploit these dynamics to promote illiberalism, discredit democracy, influence political outcomes abroad, and undermine transatlantic unity and U.S. global leadership.

In response, the United States will leverage the full range of tools at its disposal to bolster European democracy in the face of these threats. Through our bilateral, multilateral, and public diplomacy, we will underscore the unmatched benefits democracy offers to all people and reaffirm our enduring commitment to these core values. We will also orient our foreign development assistance to help our partners strengthen their institutions, systems, and processes against backsliding and rising authoritarianism. Similarly, we will also help our partners to build resilience against foreign influence operations and subversion, which threaten their democratic trajectories. Finally, consistent with the priorities outlined by the Biden-Harris Administration, we will expand our focus on anti-corruption efforts to bolster the rule of law and provide transparent, accountable governance.

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Bureau 2.1 Objective: Advocate for and reinforce democratic values, norms, and principles, including national sovereignty and countries’ self-determination.

- **Justification and Linkages:** While Europe remains committed to democracy, the rule of law, individual liberties, and human rights, the region faces intensified attempts from foreign and domestic forces to undermine and discredit democracy in favor of authoritarianism, expedited by polarization, corruption, and discontent with established political parties. To address these negative trends, the NSS affirms that, "... Europe stands at the front lines of the fight to defend the principles of freedom, sovereignty, and non-aggression, and we will continue to work in lockstep to ensure that freedom prevails." In support of this aim, EUR will orient its public diplomacy work to continue to support the democratic transitions of countries in Europe and Eurasia by promoting the benefits of personal freedoms and democratic governance for long-term stability, EU accession, and integration into transatlantic institutions. EUR’s efforts will attempt to bolster European democracy, while also ensuring our partners in the region are resilient against malign influence and able to take on regional and global development challenges. We will also work with countries to advance full participation in democracy, representation, and leadership, consistent with the White House’s gender equity strategy. Objective 2.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 4.3.

- **Risk Considerations:** The success of this objective is partly contingent upon the effectiveness of our public diplomacy (PD) programming and messaging. EUR must communicate its advocacy and reinforcement of democratic values, norms, and principles in ways that are attuned to and resonate with our intended audiences, while bearing in mind fundamental changes to the way information is now shared through digital and non-digital networks and the need to adapt implementation during future changes. EUR must select appropriate messengers and media to communicate the benefits and resiliency of democracy and the rule of law while understanding the widespread lack of trust in institutions, including partner governments and the United States. Additional risks include failing to understand the strengths and limitations of

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social media while simultaneously overvaluing and over-reliance on it, lack of continued investment in existing and new networks, and a failure to measure and evaluate messaging efforts. EUR will mitigate these risks by examining the use of networks built over decades in public diplomacy programming and outreach to shape, influence, and obtain feedback from its audiences.

**Bureau Objective 2.2:** Strengthen democratic systems, institutions, and processes and counter democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism, in the context of the European Democratic Resilience Initiative.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Against the backdrop of a global pandemic, a deepening climate emergency, rising nationalism, receding democracy, and growing competition with the PRC, Russia, and other authoritarian states, strong democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and participatory, accountable governance are critical for advancing U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. EUR and E&E will advance the ability of countries, including citizens and their leaders, to strengthen and stabilize their governing institutions to build more resilient, accountable, inclusive, free, and prosperous societies. We will support efforts to foster democracy and good governance so that countries will be less vulnerable to malign influence and able to partner with the United States in addressing regional development challenges. This includes strengthening the resilience of independent media and civil society, increasing the diversity of democratic leaders, improving judicial systems and processes, and strengthening efficiency and accountability of local governing institutions. EUR and E&E assistance will build on strong civil society organizational and technical capacity; emerging pockets of local activism; the media sector’s increasing openness to experiment with innovative business models and participate in reporting networks; increased mobilization of minority groups and vulnerable populations in political processes, including at the local level; and exposure by local watchdog organizations of the deterioration of rule of law. Objective 2.2 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 4.3.

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• **Risk Considerations**: Variability in political commitment to substantive reform by governments, coupled with a general lack of trust by citizens in political processes, governing structures, civil society, and media, have led to disillusionment and skepticism about the ability of democratic systems to deliver results. Moreover, issues of safety and security, operational and financial sustainability, legislative restrictions, or selective application of legal codes, and captured institutions present additional threats that can constrain our ability to accomplish this objective. Several factors have contributed to reduction in media freedom, including soft censorship, structural weaknesses in the media market, the continued rise of disinformation, declining internet freedom, and decreasing safety and security for media practitioners. As a result, governments in the region are becoming increasingly adept at controlling, co-opting, and manipulating information and communications. Meanwhile, some leaders continue to harass, stigmatize, and restrict the operations of civil society actors, who struggle with financial diversification and domestic resource mobilization, weak constituency engagement and poor legitimacy. Regarding rule of law, the fairness, independence, and effectiveness of legal systems has dramatically deteriorated in recent years, which the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated, as governments use emergency powers to increase their authorities and target minority rights and political opposition.
Bureau Objective 2.3: Strengthen the ability of Allies and partners to resist and counter influence operations and disinformation, particularly from Russia and the PRC.

- **Justification and Linkages:** U.S. competitors, most notably Russia and the PRC, employ a range of tactics that exploit institutional weaknesses in democratic societies to expand their influence abroad, sow division within and between the United States and Europe, and shape political outcomes. Foremost among these challenges is the widespread use of information operations to falsify premises for war in Ukraine, spin harmful or intolerant narratives, exacerbate pre-existing societal divisions, and discredit democracy and the rules-based international order. Authoritarian regimes make full use of advances in digital tools and allowances of free and open societies to ensure disinformation and misinformation reaches more people, penetrates more deeply into social networks, and spreads faster than ever. Russia and its proxies use disinformation and other influence tactics to support the further invasion of Ukraine, interfere in electoral processes, feed false information and conspiracies to voters, foment violence, and call into question electoral processes and results. Authoritarian external actors have also capitalized on democratic backsliding across the region to forge partnerships with aspiring European strongmen, who challenge democratic norms and values and advocate for PRC and Russian interests from within transatlantic institutions. In EU and NATO aspirant countries, these forces similarly work to thwart efforts to advance Euro-Atlantic integration, undermining their national sovereignty, foreign policy goals, and territorial integrity. Objective 2.3 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.4, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.3.

- **Risk Considerations:** Democratic backsliding in certain European countries could leave partner governments more susceptible to Russian and PRC influence and reduce the political will for key reforms necessary to build resilience against foreign malign influence. This could in turn damage our ability to work jointly through the EU, NATO, the broader UN system, and elsewhere to promote accurate information and counter disinformation. U.S. competitors are adept at leveraging current events and pre-existing domestic frictions as entry points for influence operations, which challenges our ability
to directly respond. Technology and social media companies caving to regime demands on censorship measures could further skew and restrict the information space in authoritarian environments. Authoritarian states’ focus on and consistently invest in information operations, which they use to shape developments beyond their borders. To mitigate these challenges, EUR and E&E will expand ongoing efforts to bolster democratic institutions to increase partner resilience against foreign influence, including promoting a rights-respecting approach to freedom of expression that balances national security with press freedom principles. We will also capitalize on growing cognizance of the foreign influence challenge to advocate for more robust collective resilience and response measures in bilateral and multilateral engagements.

Bureau Objective 2.4: Prevent, expose, and reduce corruption through increased transparency and accountability of governing institutions, civic oversight, and societal inclusion, and through greater adherence to the rule of law.

- Justification and Linkages: Government corruption and weak rule of law pose the greatest challenges to democratic progress in Europe and Eurasia and leave countries vulnerable to internal and external forces seeking to foment discord, encourage illiberal tendencies, and violate civil and human rights. A lack of government transparency and accountability, misuse of law enforcement, and erosion of judicial independence have allowed governments to engage in corrupt acts with impunity. Government crackdowns against civic organizations and independent media further erode state accountability and fuel public disillusionment with democratic institutions and processes. Foreign malign interests also exploit these weaknesses to channel influence abroad. In response, EUR and E&E will strengthen government institutions and enable civil society and independent media to provide effective oversight of core government functions contributing to resilient democratic processes and creating preconditions necessary for transparency and accountability in government institutions. EUR and E&E will work on strengthening justice sector institutions to ensure their independence and provide skills necessary to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate cases involving corrupt government
Objective 2.4 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.3, and 5.2.

- **Risk Considerations:** Lack of political will in some partner countries to engage in fighting corruption will continue to present risks for U.S. government efforts and programs. Public disenchantment over inadequate reforms and the inability of governments to root out corruption and provide equal access to justice could contribute to a rise in support for anti-establishment movements, which have driven political paralysis and led to further stagnation and political instability. In some cases, entrenched interests could seek to capitalize on prior backsliding to further erode checks and balances on government authority and secure their hold on power, at the expense of democratic principles. The erosion of the rule of law will seriously challenge the ability of civil society and independent media to effectively fulfill their oversight responsibilities. Foreign actors will also continue exploiting weak rule of law and endemic corruption to assert influence across Europe and Eurasia and encourage further democratic backsliding, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
Bureau Goal 3: Promote deeper trade, investment, and energy cooperation, accelerate transatlantic connections and collaborate with the EU and European and Eurasian Allies and partners to counter non-market and coercive economic practices.

- **Bureau Goal 3 Description:** America’s economic vitality is the cornerstone of American national security and underpins our ability to work with international allies and partners to address global challenges. In Europe, the efforts of the Department of State and USAID must support American economic prosperity and that of our European and Eurasian allies and partners by working in concert to deepen our trade and investment ties. The Biden-Harris Administration’s goals to build back better from the global pandemic can support transatlantic economic growth. Working with our European and Eurasian Allies and partners, we can set the rules of the road for the 21st century economy; strengthen energy security and the transition to the green economy; and take a united stand against non-market and coercive economic practices employed by our strategic competitors. The Department’s economic diplomacy and our foreign assistance must drive the revitalization of our transatlantic partnership and raise the level of ambition for our economic ties with Europe and Eurasia. Our engagement must help the United States deliver on a compelling vision for global trade, investment, and technology that serves the interests of people on both sides of the Atlantic while protecting American interests and promoting our innovations. By working with our European and Eurasian allies and partners, we can deliver on this vision while building on a foundation of shared values, including fair competition based on market principles.
**Bureau Objective 3.1:** Enhance economic cooperation with Europe and Eurasia to promote trade and investment in pre-accession countries with both the EU and the United States; to develop stronger, more resilient supply chains; and to build back better from the global pandemic and the damage caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

- **Justification and Linkages:** The Department and USAID promote free, fair, and reciprocal trade relationships with countries around the world to foster economic growth, employment, and opportunities. Democracies are strengthened when we maintain and deepen economic relationships that promote trust and partnerships, which over time increase investment, strengthen supply chains, and forge a joint approach to shared challenges. The EUR and E&E bureaus will advance this objective by working with governments, including the EU and its institutions, and private sector stakeholders such as businesses, labor and consumer associations, and civil society advocacy groups. Furthermore, we will collaborate with like-minded governments within multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), OECD, and World Bank, among others, as international institutions must do more to promote free, fair, and reciprocal trade and to set transparent standards that enable trade, investment, and innovation. We will encourage governments to adopt open procurement practices that can both counter corruption and create opportunities for U.S. companies. We will implement this strategy by promoting entrepreneurship, which creates jobs, grows free market democracies, and strengthens global political stability. Increasing the number of European small business owners can amplify local pressure on governments to fight corruption, including money laundering, procurement manipulation, and the opaque ownership of assets. Successful businesses that have benefited from a free-market economy can help end coercive economic practices and restrictive models promoted by the PRC and Russia that limit U.S. economic opportunities and undermine partners’ sovereignty. Small companies can be a source of advocacy for a regulatory environment that promotes open commercial data flows, which is also favorable for transatlantic trade and investment. Objective 3.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.4, and 5.2.

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• **Risk Considerations:** Implementation of the EU Green Deal may create new barriers to U.S. trade and investment and climate change itself, as well as EU policy mitigation measures (i.e., EU proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) that could impact production and supply chains, disrupting trade. Russian and PRC competition with respect to non-EU countries may reduce opportunities for transatlantic business and create divergences in U.S. and European interests and skew market pricing. WTO reform may not progress, limiting opportunities for resolution of trade disputes. EU policies on strategic autonomy, data sovereignty, or commercial competition may limit opportunities for cooperation and/or U.S. access to certain European markets. We will mitigate these risks through continued engagement and cooperative activities with governments and stakeholders on trade and investment issues of mutual concern.

**Bureau Objective 3.2:** Strengthen tools to increase U.S. and European and Eurasian economic security and develop coalitions to counter non-market and coercive economic practices, particularly by the PRC and Russia, including through strengthened investment screening and transparency and actions to reduce economic vulnerabilities and dependencies of partner countries.

• **Justification and Linkages:** The United States and Europe share an increasingly convergent assessment of the PRC and Russia’s non-market policies and practices that distort competition, and other coercive and predatory practices in trade, infrastructure finance, and technology. These concerns are reinforced by the PRC’s practices of economic coercion and continued efforts to transfer intellectual property through licit and illicit means, such as investments in high-tech sectors. Similarly, Russia continues to manipulate its trade relationships with dependent neighbors to assert political influence. The EU has taken steps to strengthen investment screening, beneficial ownership disclosure requirements, 5G security, and export controls, while introducing new proposals to address state subsidies, supply chain due diligence, and economic coercion. Through existing mechanisms like the U.S.-EU dialogue on China and the TTC, we will coordinate and cooperate with European and Eurasian Allies and partners to

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defend our shared economic interests from harmful practices by strategic competitors. We will use the full range of existing economic tools and develop new tools as needed, in line with our shared democratic values. Support for the Three Seas Initiative will help advance high standards for infrastructure development, while also serving to boost resilience to PRC coercion and Russian aggression. When appropriate, we will seek plurilateral cooperation with other like-minded partners (i.e., Japan). Objective 3.2 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, and 5.2.

- **Risk Considerations:** While Europe increasingly shares our concerns with PRC and Russian non-market practices, some countries worry that a more assertive approach could harm economic relations with both countries and provoke economic or other forms of retaliation. Some large economies reliant on the PRC for trade and investment and on Russia for energy supplies are eager to expand economic relations with the PRC and resuscitate economic ties with Russia. Meanwhile, others are home to PRC- or Russian-owned or financed infrastructure projects, sometimes with substantial levels of debt. The call among some EU member states for “strategic autonomy” could hamper closer U.S.-EU alignment on non-market practices. For example, if the United States tightens its economic defenses, but Europe does not, the PRC could shift its efforts at technology transfer to Europe; hence, coordination with Europe will be critical. While the EU has implemented an investment screening framework, taken steps to expand beneficial ownership disclosure mechanisms, and released a toolbox of 5G security best practices as part of a coordinated European approach, sustained U.S. engagement will be important to ensuring national-level implementation by member states.
Bureau Objective 3.3: Collaborate with Europe and Eurasia, including the EU, to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable transatlantic digital economy that supports democratic principles and promotes workforce development and prosperity.

- **Justification and Linkages:** America’s success in delivering high-paying jobs at home and projecting influence in the world will be determined increasingly by how well the United States and our European and Eurasian Allies and partners succeed in maintaining and capitalizing on transatlantic technological leadership in the digital economy. Promoting and investing in e-commerce, information and communication technology (ICT) products and services, digital and cybersecurity workforce development, and the effective incorporation of secure ICT into critical infrastructure will be key to continued economic growth both in the United States and in our Allies and partners. The transatlantic partnership also plays a crucial role in developing global, democratically informed policies, e.g., on intellectual property rights, 5G, etc., that counter strategic competitors’ drive to misappropriate technology for authoritarian control, censorship, and anti-competitive economic activities. Through fora such as the U.S.-EU TTC, the United States and our allies and partners will also work together to safeguard the benefits of the digital economy, promoting best practices and standards for critical infrastructure’s cybersecurity and facilitating the safety, security, and reliability of information sharing. E&E and EUR will engage with and support our allies and partners in their pursuit of digital innovation and prosperity. Objective 3.3 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1.

- **Risk Considerations:** Digitalization is a critical component of an increasingly interconnected global economy and a backbone of sustainable economic growth. Workforce readiness is lagging as well as legal and regulatory frameworks to effectively harness digitalization as a vehicle for economic growth. With greater digitalization, critical infrastructure is exposed to increasing and evolving cybersecurity threats, which invites new opportunities for malign state-backed or independent actors to inflict substantial damage through hybrid means. The NotPetya malware attack of 2017 is a clear demonstration of these vulnerabilities, causing over $10 billion in damage globally.

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Russia and other malign actors use similar hybrid tools to demonstrate power and exert political influence and control of the EUR region. Authoritarian actors also manipulate the delicate balance between security and freedom of information by establishing rules and norms for anti-democratic ends, which limits citizens’ ability to reap the gains of the digital economy, while suppressing political dissent. In the telecommunications sector, there is broad support for transatlantic efforts to promote vendor diversity to increase supply chain resilience, market competition, and secure alternatives to untrusted vendors. These efforts, however, could face resistance from European incumbents who do not want to cede their dominant market positions. Differences in the United States’ and the EU’s regulatory and legal approaches to the digital economy and privacy in the digital space could disrupt transatlantic data flows and limit U.S. market access to Europe’s digital economy.

**Bureau Objective 3.4:** Expand partnership with Europe and Eurasia to increase energy security, accelerate the clean energy transition, and prevent Russia and other malign actors from using energy as a weapon.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Energy security is vital for the United States and our Allies and partners. In Europe and Eurasia, energy supply diversity (e.g., source, type, and route) and transparent, competitive energy markets are a priority for EUR and E&E. Russia leverages its dominance of oil and gas supplies to increase its political influence especially in light of its war on Ukraine, as well as undermine efforts by aspiring EU members to move closer to the West. More broadly, malign actors leverage limited financing options to exert control over countries via debt trap projects and investments. Protracted conflicts in former Soviet states threaten energy supply to Europe and Eurasia while also hindering these nations’ access to affordable, reliable energy. Improving energy security requires increased diversification of supply, including expanded development and integration of clean energy, as well as increased application of U.S. technologies. Improved energy market integration and governance would serve as a positive incentive for the private sector to provide and scale up the necessary

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investment. EUR and E&E will pursue energy diversification and increased access to affordable and reliable energy in Europe, including promoting infrastructure investment through technical assistance and public-private partnerships. EUR and E&E will provide technical assistance to states aspiring to EU membership, facilitating regional market integration and transparency in line with European market standards, promoting an increase in gas storage capabilities, and building the capabilities of nations to integrate renewable energy. Objective 3.4 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

- **Risk Considerations:** Russia is the single largest oil and gas supplier to Europe and Eurasia, and Russia has shown a persistent willingness to use its dominant market position to achieve political goals and undermine European and Eurasian energy security by using energy supply dependency to create political divisions and setting energy prices to reward political allies and punish political opponents. Embedded resistance to energy sector reform and continued market protectionism, often to protect special interests and exacerbated by corruption and misinformation campaigns, continue to limit free trade within Europe and the integration of border states into internal European Union markets. Periodic price spikes, such as the significant post-COVID increase, led countries to prioritize local public infrastructure investments over pursuing market liberalization and integration, exacerbating a pattern where credible private sector investors continue to demand risk premiums for projects in aspiring EU member states. Likewise, European decarbonization goals present difficulties for many countries in the region, particularly those that are overly dependent on aging coal-based generation and lacking in the financial and technical capacities to develop or integrate large quantities of renewable energy. Western financial institutions are moving away from financing coal and natural gas technologies and fuel supply, leaving space for malign actors to exert influence. Opaque transactions and overly subsidized energy supplies continue to hamper the market development necessary to fully integrate the region and secure its energy supply. Aspiring EU member states are slow to liberalize.
energy markets and allow third party access, often arranging for sovereign finance of infrastructure via potentially malign actors.

Bureau Goal 4: Leverage Alliances and Partnerships to Ensure Russia’s Strategic Failure in its War in Ukraine and to Address Other Global and Regional Threats and Challenges.

- **Bureau Goal 4 Description:** The United States and our European and Eurasian Allies and partners face shared global and regional threats to our peace, prosperity, and security. The Biden-Harris Administration understands that revitalizing America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships offers an enduring advantage. Collective action multiplies our respective strengths and empowers our nations to meet 21st century challenges. Aggression, conventional and hybrid, are swiftly evolving threats from Russia, the PRC, Iran, and other state and non-state actors. The dangers they pose demand transatlantic cooperation on innovation to improve resilience, enable early detection, build deterrence, and provide rapid response. The United States will join our European and Eurasian allies and partners to use all available means at our disposal to deter Russian military aggression and expansion, resolve occupation incursions, and strengthen sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will work to combine our forces to address the weaknesses in global health security planning, systems, and capabilities, to ensure that we improve early prevention, detection, containment, and response to the spread of infectious diseases. We will support a joint accelerated approach to address the climate crisis, including through mitigation and adaptation efforts. In the Arctic we find a distinct, emerging arena for closer collaboration based on our combined interests in security, sustainability, responsible economic development, as well as careful husbandry of strategic location, resources, and biodiversity.

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Bureau Objective 4.1: Support Ukrainian efforts to win the war and rebuild the country; ensure respect for national territorial integrity by securing Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine; deter future aggressive acts; and seek peaceful resolution of Russia-backed territorial conflicts, including its influence on the Western Balkans and South Caucasus.

- Justification and Linkages: Russia continues its efforts to undermine regional solidarity and transatlantic integration, including through active aggression and/or threats to the territorial integrity of neighboring states. This includes the war of aggression in Ukraine; positioning Russian troops in Belarus to invade Ukraine; active warfare in the Donbas, Luhansk, Ukraine’s southern coastal cities on the Black Sea, and assault on Kyiv; military occupation of parts of Georgia; keeping troops and munitions in Moldova’s Transnistria region without Moldova’s consent; and other destabilizing behavior. As the NSS points out, Russia’s efforts are meant to “check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.” Strategic frameworks on Russia, the Black Sea, and other areas also contemplate resolutions to these conflicts, hold Russia accountable for its actions and war crimes, and build partners’ resiliency to prevent further escalation and protect their sovereign interests. Working with State, the USG interagency, allies, and partners, EUR will use diplomacy, deterrence measures, foreign assistance, economic tools, public and private messaging, and other methods to help European and Eurasian countries protect or reclaim their sovereignty from Russia.

EUR and E&E are well positioned to lead and/or coordinate U.S. efforts to help Ukraine win the war and rebuild the damage caused by Putin’s war of choice. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine presents the Euro-Atlantic region, and the international order more broadly, with its greatest threat to stability and security in multiple generations. Despite operational and strategic setbacks by Russia’s military and profound pressure on the Russian economy by multiple sanctions regimes, Russian leadership continues its brutal assault on sovereign Ukraine and seeks both to redraw the European map and upend the post-Cold War European security architecture. NATO has upheld the principle of the Open Door for all candidates meeting membership criteria, and the United States continues to support countries in the Western Balkans, as well as Ukraine.

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Moldova, and Georgia, as they seek to deepen ties and integration with the EU. Objective 4.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.2, 2.1, and 2.3.

- **Risk Considerations:** Existing Russia-backed conflicts are in open warfare, deeply protracted, or on a path to escalation, limiting the amount of progress we can expect to make within a four-year timeline. Likewise, Russia’s current trend of irresponsible and unpredictable behavior could further escalate or expand these conflicts beyond those specified in this strategy. Russia increasingly leverages hybrid activities below the level of armed conflict to achieve its aims while avoiding detection. Relatedly, continued use of misinformation, disinformation, and weaponized corruption could exploit perceived weaknesses and undermine democratic reforms to stall European integration of Russia’s neighboring states. Russia will continue its efforts to exploit differences in European and Eurasian assessments of the security environment to its advantage, affecting the scope and effectiveness of multilateral approaches. Russia’s coercive use of energy and economic ties to affect the policies of its neighboring states will continue to complicate or endanger these efforts.

Russia remains a significant military power with a sustained ability to wage a scalable war in Ukraine in a brutal manner, potentially for years. This conflict has already devastated Ukraine’s economy and state infrastructure, sent over 13 million Ukrainians fleeing from their homes, and killed several thousand civilians. These impacts will take decades of partner support to Ukraine to reverse; leaving such impacts partly or completely unaddressed will incur extremely negative effects on European stability moving forward. The Kremlin uses its energy resources as a point of leverage over much of Europe, which has lagged in diversifying its energy sources and now finds itself searching for sustainable ways to break dependencies on Russian gas and develop alternative routes and sources in the event of a full cut-off. Meanwhile, a simultaneous restriction on gas supplies during winters would bring serious consequences to European industry and households that could call into question the political commitment of European states and threaten unity on sanctions and other joint efforts.

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**Bureau Objective 4.2:** Counter Russia’s claims and false narratives and steadfastly support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through the OSCE.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Russia regularly makes false allegations about the United States, NATO, and Ukraine in an attempt to deflect blame and deny responsibility for its ongoing aggression against Ukraine. These statements encompass broad allegations that the United States and NATO seek to undermine Russia’s security, and specific accusations about the role of the United States and NATO in the war in Ukraine. The U.S. Mission to the OSCE (USOSCE) directly confronts Russia’s disinformation in the OSCE’s weekly Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Cooperation, and other official and informal meetings where Russia is present at the table. In each of these sessions, the United States and like-minded delegations are able to counter Russia’s narratives in real time and spotlight Russia’s contempt for the truth and its violations at home and abroad of international law and OSCE commitments. In addition to enabling direct exchange by NATO Allies and partners with Russia, this engagement reaches all 57 OSCE participating States, including states in the Balkans and Central Asia. USOSCE also conducts robust media outreach, echoed by like-minded delegations, to condemn Russia’s brutal actions in Ukraine, expose Russia’s false narratives, and voice unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty. The United States also supports OSCE’s objective fact-finding capabilities to examine Russia’s human rights violations in Ukraine and the human rights situation in Russia and publicizes these findings.

- **Risk Considerations:** The risk of not achieving this objective is that Russia successfully sells its narrative that the European security architecture is biased against Moscow and that the Putin regime had a legitimate need to use force to redress past and on-going grievances. Further, the false narratives risk fracturing European unity and U.S. abilities to work with the Global South on food security and energy, particularly in multilateral fora. To mitigate this risk, we will increase our engagement with all OSCE members and institutions to make it clear that Russia stands alone in its rejection of the OSCE foundational documents and principles. Russia may also continue to pursue hybrid methods to destabilize allies and partners, refuse to engage in confidence-building
measures and conflict resolution mechanisms, and hamper the ability of the OSCE to effectively carry out its work.

**Bureau Objective 4.3:** Support emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, vulnerable populations, and refugees inside and outside of Ukraine, particularly those bordering Ukraine with the goal of creating the conditions to allow refugees and displaced persons to return.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified war in Ukraine has triggered the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. USAID and State are working closely with the Government of Ukraine, European allies and partners, as well as international organizations and local NGOs both to mitigate the humanitarian impacts of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine and to support those seeking safety in the neighboring Moldova, Central and Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus. Putin’s war has displaced nearly 13 million people, including 5.3 million refugees displaced elsewhere in Europe and 6.3 million people displaced inside the country. The invasion has significantly increased Ukraine’s existing humanitarian needs that stem from years of protracted conflict and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and also further strains the COVID-19-impacted economies of Eastern European countries accepting refugees. Beyond widespread insecurity, restricted mobility, broken supply chains, and mass displacement, the hostilities have damaged or destroyed more than 400 hospitals and caused widespread conflict-related disruptions to infrastructure including power and water supplies. Through the UN, humanitarian NGOs, local organizations, USAID, and State distribute life-saving supplies including water, shelter, emergency health care, psychosocial support, and much-needed household supplies to conflict-affected populations across Ukraine, as well as refugees in neighboring countries. Through UN agencies, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and local nongovernmental organizations, USAID and State also provide multipurpose cash assistance to help conflict-affected individuals across Ukraine and in neighboring countries meet their needs. Finally, the Government of Ukraine estimates that 160,000

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square kilometers of its land may be contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war. Through INGOs and contractors, State will continue provide support to clear this contamination, which in turn will allow IDPs to safely return home Objective 4.3 is linked to JSP Strategic Objective 1.3.

- **Risk Considerations:** As humanitarian needs have rapidly risen within Ukraine, Russia’s artillery, missile, and air attacks continue to damage the infrastructure needed to transport aid – destroying roads, bridges, and railroads, and hindering aid workers’ efforts to reach conflict-affected populations. The threat of unexploded ordnance and mines, as well as the lack of sufficient capacity to assess and demine quickly in areas held or formerly held by the Russian Federation, also continue to be risks to providing assistance safely. Convoys face significant challenges to reach people in besieged cities or nongovernment-controlled areas (NGCAs). Without improvements to access, humanitarian conditions will continue to deteriorate. Insecurity in NGCAs, particularly in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, is also increasingly endangering relief personnel. In the absence of a ceasefire, humanitarian safe passage must be assured to allow aid workers to safely and reliably reach people in need, while also creating a path to safety for civilians who wish to evacuate. While the response to the refugee exodus from Ukraine has shown a solidarity of action and clarity of purpose with European allies and partners and within the humanitarian community, population movements and the conflict environment that fuels these movements can be unpredictable; and the durability and sustainability of these efforts will be challenged as the humanitarian needs and prospects of further forced displacement likely grow in the months or even years ahead.
Bureau Objective 4.4: Secure ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation outcomes in support of international climate agreements, including the Paris Agreement, and transatlantic priorities.

- **Justification and Linkages:** The region is already seeing the impacts of the climate crisis on communities, land use, agriculture, forests, water regimes, ecosystems, energy, infrastructure, settlement patterns, and human health. These challenges have created public awareness of and calls for action on climate change, strongly influenced by civil society and independent media in the region. Countries in the region have largely committed to significantly reduce emissions, including to net zero by 2050, and to strengthen adaptation and resilience. Regional counterparts trust the Biden-Harris Administration and American universities, research institutions, civil society, media, and the private sector to provide expertise and experience in data analytics, resource management and planning, cutting-edge technology, and diplomatic engagement to advance action planning and implementation on climate adaptation and mitigation priorities in the region during the critical 2022-2026 period. President Biden has placed the climate crisis at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy and national security planning because it directly impacts Americans’ safety and well-being. Objective 4.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 3.4.

- **Risk Considerations:** The effects of climate change—including more frequent and prolonged droughts, higher temperatures, flooding, and wildfires—will continue to cause major physical damage and financial losses to communities and infrastructure that were constructed without planning for climate resilience. Poorly regulated land use planning and a lack of adherence to building codes increases the potential for weather-related extreme events to turn into emergency situations, further burdening state budgets already taxed by COVID-19 and related economic impacts. The region’s economy is fueled by carbon-intensive resources and infrastructure that will require significant investment to transition to a clean energy economy. Relatedly, malign actors that are major hydrocarbon exporters may seek to undercut efforts to reduce reliance on oil and gas. The U.S. government has limited funding and financing mechanisms for regional...
climate adaptation and mitigation priorities. Additionally, private-sector investors have shown limited interest in many of the nations that are most in need of assistance within the region due to perceived and real corruption, small market sizes, and the lack of an enabling environment and capacity within partner countries and their institutions. Cross-border political disputes and malign influence continue to obstruct cooperation and progress on key issues related to climate change interventions, such as water resource and energy management. As climate change impacts food security and employment in Africa and the Middle East, migration will impact the region already struggling with its own challenges and cause underprepared governments to face increased instability, anti-immigrant xenophobia, and human rights concerns. Failure to address these challenges will stall economic growth and prevent the region from reaching its full economic and democratic potential.

Bureau Objective 4.5: Lead global health security improvements to end the COVID-19 pandemic and prevent or mitigate against future pandemics.

- **Justification and Linkages:** EUR and E&E are well positioned to lead efforts to combat the continuing and persistent threat of COVID-19 and strengthen health systems to ensure longer term resilience against future threats. The United States will leverage its position as a donor and strong partner to push for reforms and strengthen the World Health Organization. Likewise, we will support the international response to COVID-19 through the UN and have already contributed more than any other country to the pandemic response through COVAX. EUR and E&E will work with strong partner organizations, including the EU and nations in the G20 and G7. We will revitalize and expand global health and health security initiatives in our region to reduce the risk of future pandemics by building the longer-term resilience and sustainability of health systems. Along with other actively engaged partners, and consistent with the NSS, the USG will join with others to address the grave challenges caused or aggravated by the pandemic, including growing debt, rising poverty, deteriorating food security, backsliding in democracy and governance, and worsening gender-based
violence. Objective 4.5 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, and 3.4.

- **Risk Considerations:** The region struggles with pandemic preparedness including detection, prevention, and rapid response. To improve prevention, the region needs to strengthen biosafety, biosecurity, research capabilities, surveillance of zoonotic disease, and antimicrobial response. For detection, the region needs to strengthen the skills of the health workforce, supply chain systems, and technical protocols. To accelerate rapid response, the region needs to develop, exercise, and operate treatment and communication protocols, including emergency response plans. Misinformation and disinformation, particularly related to the COVID-19 vaccine, are a threat to achieving vaccination targets and will have implications for future vaccination efforts in Europe and Eurasia. Strategic competitors have amplified these false narratives to discredit the transatlantic response, while elevating their own. COVID-19 has had a disproportionate effect on women, with notable increases in gender-based violence, added caregiving responsibilities, and inability of assistance programs to reach women equitably. Political, governmental, or economic instability in the region could affect countries’ efforts to build stronger health systems and achieve high vaccination rates. Distrust of public authorities further exacerbates existing vaccine hesitancy and creates challenges for effective vaccination campaigns. Resource limitations have led to distrust and frustration between otherwise cooperative governments.
Bureau Objective 4.6: Alleviate the global impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on food security, energy supplies and energy diversification efforts, and world economies.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has deepened the global food emergency that started in 2020 under the COVID pandemic and was further exacerbated by droughts. The Russian blockade and seizure of Ukraine’s ports and coastline on the Black Sea have crippled the export of Ukrainian grain which typically feeds hundreds of millions of people per year, pushing 44 million people closer to starvation according to the World Food Program. The fighting pushes up the prices of food at a time of record world inflation rates. Encouraging diversification of energy suppliers, routes, and fuels and the accelerated deployment of clean energy technology increases the resiliency of U.S. allies and partners for sustained economic growth and prosperity. Preventing adversaries from using energy resources to harm the interests of the United States and our allies bolsters U.S. national security. State and USAID leverage the U.S.-EU Energy Council, the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission, and robust bilateral and regional engagement to accelerate critical energy infrastructure projects that will reduce monopolistic Russian control over energy supplies, prices, and consumers. We engage allies to promote and strengthen energy connectivity between Ukraine and the rest of Europe and coordinate energy sanctions on Russia, including on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The economic outlook for the region appears challenging as countries cope with the fallout from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and economic growth faces significant headwinds amid elevated levels of unemployment, inflation, and government debt. The output in Europe is forecast to decline twice as much as was experienced during the COVID-19-induced recession in 2020. The IMF’s 2022 forecasts for the region’s foreign assistance countries (excluding Ukraine) anticipate high average unemployment, annual inflation rates, and general government debt as a share of GDP. EUR countries neighboring Russia, where the economy is expected to contract by 8.5 percent, are expected to experience negative impacts on trade, remittances, investment, and tourism. Objective 4.6 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4.

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• **Risk Considerations:** Europe is currently struggling with the follow-on impacts of Russia's war in Ukraine, and the resulting implications for Ukrainian agricultural exports as well as the dramatic impact of the climate crisis on food systems throughout Europe. Efforts to find European land-route alternatives for those exports have placed a high burden on border, rail, and river transport infrastructure, particularly in the neighboring countries of Romania, Poland, and Moldova. The need to facilitate storage and export of Ukrainian agricultural products must be balanced with the demands of European countries' own domestic export needs. Additionally, like the United States, many European countries are facing impacts of Russian disinformation narratives, targeting the crisis’ most heavily impacted regions – the Middle East and Africa – and blaming American and European sanctions for contributing to the global food security crisis. The lack of access to energy supplies risks creating conditions for political instability, migration, and the proliferation of extremist organizations. Lack of development and deployment of affordable and reliable clean energy alternatives will impede efforts to strengthen energy security and mute climate action. This could lead to the continued or even deepened dependence on traditional energy sources and suppliers. Climate considerations influence energy supply and demand. The second-order economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine on our partners’ economies, if unaddressed, could lead to protests, the destabilization of economies, and lack of trust in the government, further exacerbating regional instability.
**Bureau Objective 4.7:** Counter Russian, PRC, Iranian, and other state, and non-state actors’ strategic, conventional, and hybrid threats and emerging disruptive technologies that threaten U.S. and European and Eurasian security in the region and beyond.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Adversaries including Russia, the PRC, and Iran, increasingly use strategic, conventional, hybrid, and disruptive technologies and tactics to threaten U.S. and allied security. They are also proliferators acquiring or seeking to acquire increasingly dangerous weapons and other technologies and employing assassination campaigns and malicious cyber activity to threaten American interests or the U.S. homeland. In the pursuit of advanced WMD, their means of delivery, and conventional weapons, such actors rely on the acquisition of equipment, components, and expertise from foreign suppliers, as well as developing indigenous capabilities. ISIS and other terrorist groups also seek to use nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological materials in terrorist attacks, including on our homeland and around the world. We have the opportunity to step up our transatlantic cooperation as many European and Eurasian governments share our view of the PRC as an “economic competitor” and “systemic rival” and concerns about Russia’s continued aggressive actions and militarization. We must jointly leverage our diplomacy to deter destabilizing hybrid activity and interference, stop the spread of WMD and other military systems of concern, and address and prevent the breadth of threats emanating from authoritarian regimes, other adversaries, and non-state actors. We will also collaborate with our European and Eurasian Allies and partners to address conventional threats such as uncontrolled migration and internal conflicts in Africa. Objective 4.7 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.1, 1.4, and 2.3.
• **Risk Considerations:** International and multilateral organizations factor among our most important platforms to coordinate actions with like-minded European and Eurasian Allies and partners and other states; however, these bodies work by consensus, which can delay or thwart our ability to take decisive action. U.S. competitors actively seek to create divisions among Allies, providing additional challenges to rallying coalitions on these issues. Further, many hybrid actions are not immediately detected or obvious, posing a significant challenge to deploying prompt and effective countermeasures. Strategic competitors continue to develop new disruptive technologies at astonishing rates, putting additional pressure on U.S. industry to maintain the leading edge. Some adversaries are deploying coercive economic practices, engaging in intellectual property theft, and heavily investing in the development of indigenous capabilities. There is worldwide access to dual-use life science research; and the internet increasingly provides information relevant to the production of chemical and biological weapons.

**Bureau Objective 4.8:** Work with Arctic Allies and partners to ensure the region remains open to our shared commercial, scientific, and security interests.

• **Justification and Linkages:** The Arctic is warming at three times the global average; Arctic communities are on the frontlines of the climate crisis. Melting ice and increased accessibility is fueling strategic competition. Securing the Arctic is vital to homeland defense; the security of U.S. allies and partners; preservation of freedom of the seas; and support for commercial activity and scientific research. Six of the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) fall within EUR. Five are NATO Allies and two are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners. All Arctic states are members of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and many non-Arctic European states are observers. Russian and PRC activities in the Arctic increasingly challenge U.S. efforts to keep the region stable, secure, and governed by the rule of law. EUR will enhance its diplomatic presence in the Arctic region as well as deepen its engagement with Arctic allies and partners to advance

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shared interests and promote U.S. narratives that showcase common values. EUR will support engagement on non-security related issues through the Arctic Council and other fora. EUR will work to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense in the High North. We will also use bilateral dialogues such as the reconstituted Joint Committee with Greenland and the Iceland Strategic Dialogue as well as regular engagement with the Nordic states to advocate for policy initiatives such as investment screening mechanisms, 5G legislation, and other efforts to increase resilience. Objective 4.8 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1.

- **Risk Considerations:** Policy disagreements among Arctic states and allies could inhibit decision-making at NATO and within the Arctic Council; both organizations are consensus-based. Some states’ desires to manage tensions with Russia could challenge transatlantic consensus on sensitive issues. Russia could use regional bodies and dialogues to exploit potential fissures among Arctic states. Non-Arctic actors, such as the EU, may push for greater influence and norm-setting authority that might complicate broader cooperation. Failure to increase presence, information-sharing, and engagement could leave like-minded Arctic states vulnerable to PRC influence. Greenland’s push for autonomy could create friction within the Kingdom of Denmark, which may negatively impact our relationship with both Copenhagen and Nuuk.

**Bureau Objective 4.9:** Work with like-minded allies and partners to defend a rules-based international order at the UN and other international organizations, including by preventing the insertion of language in multilateral documents that would advance authoritarian ideology, and coordinating on the election of qualified officials committed to democratic principles.

- **Justification and Linkages:** Consistent with the global strategy for the Bureau of International Organizations (IO), EUR and E&E bureaus and constituent posts support the use of multilateral diplomacy in promoting democracy and the rule of law. Accordingly, this objective mirrors that of IO’s Regional Bureau Strategy (RBS) Goal 1. The United States played a critical role in establishing the United Nations, and it remains...
in our interest to maintain and strengthen the multilateral system to achieve international peace and security, as well as to address challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. The United States’ interests include defending the system’s foundational democratic values and principles, which enable effective global cooperation, promote equity, and protect individual rights and freedoms. This objective supports JSP Strategic Objectives 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

- **Risk Considerations:** Failing to achieve this goal risks undermining the international rules-based order and enabling states that do not share our commitment to fundamental individual rights and freedoms to advance their interests through multilateral institutions. Competition for appointments and elected positions in UN agencies and bodies is increasing and U.S. candidates cannot be assured of success even with sustained USG advocacy at senior levels.

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4. Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal

Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal 5: Recruit, develop, and retain EUR talent that represents the diversity of the United States and has the set of skills necessary to advance the Bureau’s goals

- Management Goal Description: Executive Order 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government, signed by President Biden on his first day in office, established that affirmatively advancing equity, civil rights, racial justice, and equal opportunity is the responsibility of the U.S. Government. Advancing equity requires a systematic approach to embedding fairness in decision-making processes, and executive departments. Agencies must recognize and work to redress inequities in their policies and programs that serve as barriers to equal opportunity. Building on that premise, Executive Order 14035, Promoting Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility (DEIA) in the Federal Workforce, signed by President Biden on June 25, 2021, furthered, and expanded these efforts. With this context, EUR must continue to ensure that its diverse workforce has the skills necessary to advance U.S. foreign policy goals for Europe and Eurasia. There is a vested interest in maintaining a cadre of officers that have advanced policy, management, and linguistic competencies, and that the Bureau maintains a recruitment and retention process that allows officers to develop these skills during their service in the Bureau.

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**Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective 5.1:** Develop and implement a Bureau strategy for advancing diversity and inclusion that includes a comprehensive recruitment and assignment process.

- **Justification and Linkages:** A growing body of evidence demonstrates that diverse workplaces yield higher-performing organizations. E.O. 14035 establishes that it is the policy of the Biden-Harris Administration to cultivate a workforce that draws from the full diversity of the Nation so that the Federal workforce reflects the American people. E.O. 14035 calls for the Federal Government to be a model for DEIA, where all employees are treated with dignity and respect. Accordingly, the E.O. instructs the Federal Government to strengthen its ability to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain our Nation’s talent and remove barriers to equal opportunity, and to provide resources and opportunities to strengthen and advance DEIA across the government. Objective 5.1 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2.

- **Risk Considerations:** DEIA can be a divisive issue, particularly among those who express concerns that DEIA leads to quotas. The presumption is these efforts will lead to the hiring and advancement of less qualified individuals.

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Bureau Cross-Cutting Objective 5.2: Empower employees by involving them in policy-making processes and decision-making, training and mentorship on policymaking, and management skills.

- Justification and Linkages: A cadre of employees with strong policy, analytical, communication, and management skills is essential to advancing an ambitious diplomatic and development agenda and building leadership over the long-term. While the Department offers training and professional enrichment opportunities for employees after a certain rank, the EUR Bureau has a vested interest in tailoring training and mentorship resources and practical, hands-on experience that allow Civil and Foreign Service staff to develop the skills the bureau will need for a sustained effort to advance the goals outlined in the JRS. Just as importantly, the bureau’s diversity efforts depend heavily on a commitment to effective management and mentorship of our personnel. We will not be able to retain diverse talent if we do not ensure that EUR presents an environment in which employees can grow professionally and see a path to promotion and advancement. We need to complement our recruitment efforts with a serious, coordinated mentorship and management program. Objective 5.2 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 3.2 and 4.1.

- Risk Considerations: There is a risk to long-term operational effectiveness if we do not modernize the approach we take to staff development. While there are differences in the Civil and Foreign Service personnel systems, the approach to employee empowerment and skills development should address all EUR employees. Risks to this approach include overcoming Department and bureau cultural norms on “managing up” and working with peers.

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Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Goal Objective 5.3: Leverage the diversity of our bureau as a tool for domestic outreach and to promote greater engagement with European and Eurasian interlocutors (members of the public and/or government).

- **Justification and Linkages:** The NSS states that “Indeed, pluralism, inclusion, and diversity are a source of national strength in a rapidly changing world.” It further notes that, “… America’s democratic experiment has long been a source of inspiration for people around the world” and “Since the founding of our Nation, America has been strengthened and renewed by immigrants seeking opportunity and refuge on our shores—a unique strategic advantage.” As President Biden affirmed in a February 2021 National Security Memorandum, “It is the policy of my Administration to prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a national security imperative, in order to ensure critical perspectives and talents are represented in the national security workforce.” Our strategy to engage European publics and governments should incorporate the diversity of our workforce to strengthen our foreign policy efforts, enhance our image overseas, and reflect the Administration’s stated values. Objective 5.3 is linked to the following JSP Strategic Objectives: 3.2 and 4.1.

- **Risk Considerations:** The success of Objective 5.3 is contingent upon the success of management objectives related to recruitment, retention, and professional development. As EUR continues to improve in these areas, the bureau will have more opportunities to incorporate diverse talent in our outreach. For example, EUR’s Public Diplomacy Working Group has led social media campaigns highlighting bureau employees domestically and overseas who have volunteered to be featured in celebration of various heritage months.

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