Country Reports on Terrorism 2021
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BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Country Reports on Terrorism 2021 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.
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Since September 11, 2001, the United States has established a strong and sophisticated counterterrorism enterprise to reduce the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks on the homeland. Twenty-one years later, the terrorist threats we face are more ideologically diverse and geographically diffuse than ever before. At the same time, the United States is confronting a dynamic range of national security challenges, including strategic competition, cybersecurity threats, and climate change. Therefore, to confront evolving and emerging terrorist threats within the context of broader national security priorities, the United States is entering a new era of counterterrorism, one increasingly rooted in diplomacy, partner capacity building, and prevention, and recognizing successful counterterrorism efforts require use of the full range of counterterrorism tools and a whole-of-government and whole-of-society counterterrorism approach.

In 2021, the United States and its partners continued to make major strides against terrorist organizations under this new framework, bolstering diplomatic and multilateral engagements and partner capacity building efforts. Through U.S. leadership, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Defeat-ISIS) raised more than $600 million in pledges to support stabilization projects in liberated areas of Iraq and Syria and established the Africa Focus Group (AFFG) to provide a mechanism for direct engagement with African Coalition members on addressing the threat of ISIS affiliates on the African continent. The United States designated three ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) leaders, including Emir Sanaullah Ghafari, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, in response to the August attack on Kabul International Airport, which killed at least 185 people—including 13 U.S. servicemembers supporting evacuation operations—and injured more than 150 others. The United States also completed nine designations against al-Qa’ida (AQ)-linked individuals and entities and offered a reward of up to $7 million for information leading to the location or identification of Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, the leader of the terrorist organization AQ in the Islamic Maghreb. Additionally, the United States increased diplomatic engagement across the globe to counter Iran-backed Hizballah’s destabilizing activities, with more countries using their national authorities to designate, ban, or otherwise restrict the terrorist organization. The United States released its first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which includes a focus on transnational Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE). To that end, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), launched the first-ever criminal justice practitioner’s guide on countering REMVE. The United States, partnering with Norway, also launched a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) effort to develop a GCTF REMVE Toolkit for policymakers and practitioners that will build on the IIJ’s REMVE guide.

Despite key counterterrorism successes, terrorist groups remained resilient and active. ISIS continued to promote a large-scale terrorism campaign, responding to increased counterterrorism pressure by adapting its tactics and techniques. Groups affiliated with ISIS ramped up activities in the Lake Chad Region of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Despite losing its territorial “caliphate” in 2019, ISIS in Iraq and Syria maintained a significant operational structure and conducted terrorist operations in that region.
In 2021, AQ and its affiliates constituted an enduring threat to the United States and its allies. AQ continued to leverage its branches in the Middle East and Africa — notably AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin — that remain quite capable of inflicting damage on our allies and targeting our interests. AQ-related threats expanded from West Africa and the Sahel into the Gulf of Guinea littoral states in 2021, with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo reporting terrorist group activity and attacks in their northern border regions.

In Afghanistan, ISIS, elements of AQ, and regionally focused terrorist groups maintained an active presence and conducted terrorist activities. Despite taking significant losses from U.S. and NATO forces in recent years, ISIS-K continued to conduct terrorist attacks against civilians and the Taliban. ISIS-K remained a resilient enemy with roughly 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in the country, although precise estimates are hard to determine. AQ and its regional affiliate AQ in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continued to have a presence in Afghanistan. Haqqani Network members and key leaders also have assumed formal and informal roles within the Taliban. Although the Taliban committed to preventing terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to stage attacks against the United States or others, the extent of its ability and willingness to prevent AQ and ISIS-K from mounting external operations remained unclear.

Iran continued to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities around the world. Regionally, Iran supported acts of terrorism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through proxies and partner groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Additionally, senior AQ leaders continued to reside in Iran and engaged with other AQ elements from the country. Globally, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran’s primary actor involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plots across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America. Iran also maintained a near-global procurement network, obtaining cutting-edge technology from companies and locales around the world to bolster its terrorist and military capabilities.

REMVE remained a threat to the United States and our allies. Violent white supremacists and like-minded individuals continued to promote violent extremist narratives, recruit new adherents, raise funds, and conduct terrorist activities — both online and offline — across Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. REMVE actors also continued to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to radicalize individuals and incite violence, particularly against health professionals, government officials, and minority populations. Additionally, the December arrest of four neo-Nazi actors in Brazil for allegedly plotting an attack against Jewish and Black residents on New Year’s Eve demonstrates the growing reach and influence of REMVE adherents globally.

As terrorist threats morphed and metastasized, the United States adapted its counterterrorism approach and marshalled international efforts to counter global terrorism. In 2021, the United States supported the listing of two individuals to the UN Security Council’s 1267 ISIL/Da’esh and al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee and three individuals to the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee; these were the first three additions to the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee since 2018. The UN also listed ISIS-Tunisia (aka JAK-T) at the 1267 Sanctions Committee, bringing the total number of ISIS affiliates listed at the UN since 2019 to seven.
In December the United States co-chaired a political director-level meeting of Defeat-ISIS Coalition members that also included an inaugural meeting of the AFFG, an endeavor the United States co-leads with Italy, Morocco, and Niger to counter ISIS networks in the sub-Saharan region. At this meeting, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition welcomed Burkina Faso as its 84th member. Further, the United States continued to make notable gains in a high-level diplomatic campaign to counter Hizballah’s terrorist and other illicit activities. In May, Austria banned the use or display of any Hizballah-related symbols, building on the previous ban that was limited to symbols of Hizballah’s so-called military wing. In November, Australia announced its intention to expand its domestic designation of Hizballah by declaring the group in its entirety a terrorist organization. Through U.S. diplomatic efforts, 15 countries have now designated, banned, or otherwise restricted Hizballah, applying their national authorities over the past several years.

**The United States prioritized multilateral engagements to advance its counterterrorism priorities, bolster partner capacity to implement international obligations and commitments, and promote greater burden sharing.** To maintain international momentum on the use of battlefield evidence to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases, the United States and the IIJ co-hosted a UN General Assembly side event in September that brought together more than 100 criminal justice practitioners and senior policy officials from around the world to highlight recent advances in collection, exploitation, and international sharing. In September, the 30-member GCTF adopted a *Strategic Vision for the Next Decade* and new framework documents that provide the international community with tools to prevent terrorist travel and enhance border security measures; address terrorist financing related challenges; and develop capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorist actors. Similarly, the United States led the successful negotiation of UNSCR 2617 (2021), which was unanimously adopted in December and renewed the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate mandate for another four years, preserving all precedent text related to the protection of human rights, inclusion of civil society, and importance of rule of law-based approaches. The United States also leveraged other multilateral organizations such as NATO, INTERPOL, OSCE, OAS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Council of Europe, the IIJ, and Hedayah.

Additionally, the United States continued to bolster partner capabilities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks. The United States supported partner governments on the front lines against terrorist threats in critical areas, including information sharing, aviation and border security, law enforcement investigations and prosecutions, and countering the finance of terrorism, leading to real-world results that advanced shared security national security interests and protected the U.S. homeland. To restrict terrorist travel, the United States also signed two new and expanded arrangements under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 to share information on known and suspected terrorists, bringing the total number of partner countries to over 75. Under the Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program, the United States provided capacity building for countries to develop terrorist watchlists and exchange terrorist identity information. The Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) border security platform grew to include 227 ports of entry in 23 countries, with international partners using it to screen hundreds of thousands of travelers each day and disrupt terrorist travel.
Through capacity building efforts, the United States also emphasized to its partners the critical responsibility of governments engaged in counterterrorism operations to ensure that their security forces’ respect international human rights and humanitarian law. The United States also stressed the importance of partner governments’ holding their security forces accountable for violations and abuses committed against civilians during these counterterrorism operations.

Another major line of effort in 2021 was facilitating the repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and prosecution of ISIS FTFs and family members, where appropriate. About 2,000 non-Syrian and non-Iraqi FTFs remain in detention facilities controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and some 56,000 associated family members from more than 60 countries remain in displaced persons’ camps across northeastern Syria. The only durable solution for this complex security and humanitarian crisis is the repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and, where appropriate, prosecution of these populations. To ensure that ISIS fighters and family members captured by the SDF never return to the battlefield, the United States continued to lead by example in bringing back its citizens and prosecuting them when applicable. As of December the United States had repatriated 30 U.S. citizens from Syria and Iraq — 13 adults and 17 children — and the Department of Justice charged 10 of the adults with a variety of terrorism-related crimes. The United States also urged other countries to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and prosecute their citizens and assisted several countries in doing so with their citizens or nationals.

Furthermore, the United States continued to promote a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach to prevent and counter violent extremism by engaging with governments, local religious leaders, and tech companies. The Department of State supported international initiatives, including the Strong Cities Network and the Global Community Engagement & Resilience Fund, and concentrated on building local resiliency to terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mis/disinformation, including in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Somalia, Tunisia, the Sahel, and the Western Balkans. The United States also advanced international efforts by engaging the Global Internet Forum to Counterterrorism and endorsing the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online to support voluntary collaboration with technology companies to address terrorist and violent extremism, including REMVE, content online. In September, the United States engaged with Twitter, Facebook, and Google/YouTube senior representatives to discuss the digital security of Afghan nationals with U.S. connections who may be targeted by the Taliban and other designated terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

This constitutes a brief overview of the United States’ ongoing work to protect our people from the ongoing threat of terrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2021 provides a detailed review of last year’s successes and the ongoing challenges facing our country and our partners, challenges that will require a continued commitment to and investment in global counterterrorism efforts going forward.

Timothy A. Betts
Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism
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<td>AAB</td>
<td>Abdallah Azzam Brigades</td>
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<td>AAB</td>
<td>al-Ashtar Brigades</td>
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<td>AAD</td>
<td>Ansar al-Dine</td>
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<td>AAH</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq</td>
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<td>AAI</td>
<td>Ansar al-Islam</td>
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<td>AAMB</td>
<td>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</td>
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<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi</td>
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<td>AAS-D</td>
<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah</td>
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<td>AAS-T</td>
<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Armed Peasant Association (Agrupación Campesina Armada)</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<td>ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings</td>
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<td>Africa Focus Group</td>
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<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>Afripol</td>
<td>African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation</td>
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<td>AILCT</td>
<td>International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism</td>
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<td>AIPJ2</td>
<td>Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Justice Phase 2</td>
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<td>AMIA</td>
<td>Argentine Jewish Mutual Association</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AML/CFT</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism</td>
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<td>AMLO</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering Office</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>National Customs Authority (Panama)</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
<td>al-Nusrah Front</td>
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<td>ANIF</td>
<td>National Agency for Financial Investigation (Chad)</td>
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<td>Ansaru</td>
<td>Jama’atu Ansaru Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan</td>
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<td>AOI</td>
<td>Army of Islam</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APG</td>
<td>Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering</td>
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<td>API</td>
<td>Advance Passenger Information</td>
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<td>APJG</td>
<td>Asia/Pacific Joint Group</td>
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<td>APML</td>
<td>Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (Serbia)</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
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<td>AQAP</td>
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<td>al-Qa’ida in Iraq</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>AQIS</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<td>AQY</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>al-Shabaab</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>Aryan Strikeforce</td>
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ASG  Abu Sayyaf Group
ATA  Antiterrorism Act
ATM  automated teller machine
ATT  Anti-Terrorism Tribunal (Bangladesh)
ATU  Anti-Terrorism Unit (Bangladesh)
AU  African Union
AUM  Aum Shinrikyo
AWD  Atomwaffen Division
BARMM  Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BCIJ  Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (Morocco)
BGSF  Border Guard Security Force
BH  Boko Haram
BIA  Security Intelligence Agency (Serbia)
BIFF  Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BITMAP  Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program
BLM  Black Lives Matter
BLA  Balochistan Liberation Army
BNM  Bank Negara Malaysia
BNPT  National Counterterrorism Agency (Indonesia)
BRAC  Border Risk Assessment Centre (Pakistan)
BPRM  Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement
BSIAT  *Brigade Spéciale des Investigations Antiterroristes*
BSIAT  Special Anti-Terrorism Investigation Brigade
C5+1  the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States
CAERT  African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism
CANIF  Mauritania Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit
CARD  Committee Against Racism and Discrimination
CBL  Central Bank of Libya
CBR  Central Bank of Russia
CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBUAE  Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates
CBY  Central Bank of Yemen
CCE  Commission for Countering Extremism (UK)
CDCT  Council of Europe counterterrorism committee
CDE  Ciudad del Este (Paraguay)
CDP  Cabo Delgado Province (Mozambique)
CENAREF  Democratic Republic of the Congo Financial Intelligence Unit
CENTCOM  U.S. Central Command
CFA  West African franc
CFATF  Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CFK  Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
CFT  Countering the Financing of Terrorism
CICO  Interministerial Framework for Intervention and Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations (Senegal)
CICTE  Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
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<td>CIFG</td>
<td>Counter-ISIS Finance Group</td>
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<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>CITCO</td>
<td>Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime (Spain)</td>
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<td>CIU</td>
<td>Corrections Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>CJTF-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>National Intelligence Council (Paraguay)</td>
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<td>National Counterterrorism Commission (Tunisia)</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>COVID-19</td>
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<td>Country of Particular Concern</td>
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<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
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<td>CPP/NPA</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army</td>
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<td>CROAT</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Operational Intelligence Centre (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019</td>
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<td>counterterrorism academic curriculum</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism Action Plan</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee (of the United Nations Security Council)</td>
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<td>CTED</td>
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<td>counterterrorism financing</td>
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<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism Service (Serbia)</td>
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<td>Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism Working Group</td>
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<td>Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>chemical weapons</td>
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<td>CYCLOPS</td>
<td>Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security</td>
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<td>DANS</td>
<td>State Agency for National Security (Bulgaria)</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disengagement, Disassociation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DDIS</td>
<td>Danish Defense Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>Defeat-ISIS</td>
<td>Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS</td>
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<td>DGAPR</td>
<td>General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DGS</td>
<td>Directorate of General Security</td>
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<td>DGST</td>
<td>General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance</td>
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<td>DHKP/C</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DIWM</td>
<td>Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq</td>
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<td>DNP</td>
<td>Djiboutian National Police</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>DSA</td>
<td>Digital Security Act (Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of State Security and Dubai State Security</td>
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<td>DSN</td>
<td>Directorate for Security and Intelligence (Austria)</td>
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<td>DST</td>
<td>Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire</td>
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<td>DVE</td>
<td>domestic violent extremism</td>
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<td>DXX</td>
<td>State Security Service (Uzbekistan)</td>
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<td>EAG</td>
<td>Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
<td>Ejército Guerrillero Popular</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional and National Liberation Army (Colombia)</td>
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<td>EML</td>
<td>Mariscal López’s Army (Ejército del Mariscal López)</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordinance disposal</td>
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<td>EPL</td>
<td>Ejército Popular de Liberación</td>
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<td>Paraguayan People’s Army</td>
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<td>EPPK</td>
<td>Euskal Preso Politikoen Kolektiboa, the union of incarcerated Basque separatist terrorists</td>
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<td>ERDIN</td>
<td>Resilience Plan for Northern Mozambique</td>
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<td>ESAAMLG</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna)</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>EXBS</td>
<td>Export Control and Related Border Security</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU-9</td>
<td>composition of the European Union beginning on January 1, 1973: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
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<td>EXBS</td>
<td>Export Control and Related Border Security</td>
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<td>FACI</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Special Action Forces (FAES)</td>
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<td>Armed Forces for National Liberation</td>
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<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
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<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FDS</td>
<td>Mozambican Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>FETO</td>
<td>Fethullah Terrorist Organization</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Directorate (Bahrain)</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>International Federation of Association Football</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>FinCEN</td>
<td>Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury</td>
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<td>FINTRAC</td>
<td>Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada</td>
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<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>Financial Reporting Center</td>
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<td>Paraguayan Internal Operational Defense Command</td>
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<td>foreign terrorist fighter</td>
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<td>GAO-R</td>
<td><em>Grupo Armado Organizado Residual</em></td>
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<td>Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism</td>
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<td>GID</td>
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<td>Financial Intelligence Office (Macau)</td>
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<td>GIFCT</td>
<td>Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>GNNT</td>
<td>Gendarmes, Army, Customs, and the National and Nomadic Guard</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>goAML</td>
<td>an anti-money laundering reporting platform developed by the UN for</td>
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<td>Financial Intelligence Units to collect suspicious transaction reports</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td><em>Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat</em></td>
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<td>Salafist Group for Call and Combat</td>
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<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>HAS/TM</td>
<td>Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount</td>
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<td>Hizbul Mujahideen</td>
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<td>HQN</td>
<td>Haqqani Network</td>
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<td>Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham</td>
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<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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ICEPCVE Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
ICSVE International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
IDEK Islami Dawat-e-Kafela
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
IDP internally displaced person
IG Gama’a al-Islamiyya
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIJ International Institute of Justice and Rule of Law
IIT Investigation and Identification Team
IIU Islamic Jihad Union
IKR Iraqi Kurdistan Region
IM Indian Mujahedeen
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INCSR International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INP Indonesian National Police
INTERPOL International Police Criminal Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPOB Indigenous People of Biafra
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
IS-21 Invincible Sentry 21
ISA Internal Security Act (Singapore)
ISF Internal Security Force (Qatar)
ISF Internal Security Forces (Lebanon)
ISF-IM Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIL-Libya Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS-DRC ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo
ISIS-GS ISIS-in the Greater Sahara
ISIS-K ISIS Khorasan
ISIS-K Islamic State’s Khorasan Province
ISIS-M ISIS-Mozambique
ISIS-Mozambique ISIS affiliate in Mozambique
ISIS-P ISIS-Philippines
ISIS-Somalia Islamic State branch in Somalia
ISIS-SP ISIS-Sinai Province
ISIS-WA ISIS-West Africa
IS-Khorasan Islamic State’s Khorasan Province
ISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
ISP ISIS-Philippines
JAF Jordan Armed Forces
JAK-T ISIS-Tunisia
JAT Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid
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<td>national action plan, National Action Plan</td>
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<td>National Socialist Order</td>
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<td>OAS-CICTE</td>
<td>Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OLA</td>
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<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>Danish Security and Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>Brazilian Federal Police</td>
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<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>PISCES</td>
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<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Popular Mobilization Forces</td>
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<td>PMRI</td>
<td>People’s Resistance Movement of Iran</td>
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<td>PNP</td>
<td>Paraguayan National Police, and Peruvian National Police</td>
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<td>PPRF</td>
<td>Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces</td>
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<td>Public Security Directorate’s (Jordan)</td>
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<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
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<td>preventing violent extremism</td>
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<td>QF</td>
<td>Qods Force</td>
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<td>RAB</td>
<td>Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>RATS SCO</td>
<td>Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>Rwanda Defense Force</td>
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<td>READ Act</td>
<td>Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act</td>
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<td>REMVE</td>
<td>racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism</td>
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<td>RePET</td>
<td>Public Register of People and Entities Linked to Acts of Terrorism and Their Financing</td>
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<td>RESILAC</td>
<td>Inclusive Economic and Social Recovery Program for Lake Chad</td>
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<td>RFJ</td>
<td>Rewards for Justice</td>
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<td>RIM</td>
<td>Russian Imperial Movement</td>
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<td>RIRA</td>
<td>Real IRA</td>
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<td>RLG</td>
<td>Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Counter-Crime</td>
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<td>RMP</td>
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<td>Royal Oman Police</td>
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<td>ROYG</td>
<td>Republic of Yemen government</td>
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<td>RRRG</td>
<td>Religious Rehabilitation Group (Singapore)</td>
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<td>Revolutionary Struggle</td>
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<td>Regional Security Mechanism</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAJ</td>
<td>Special Anti-Terrorist Unit</td>
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</table>
SARPs  Standards and Recommended Practices
SCLCT-CTO  Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational
           Organized Crime
SCN  Strong Cities Network
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCRA  State Commission for Religious Affairs (Kyrgyz Republic)
SDF  Syrian Democratic Forces
SDGT  Specially Designated Global Terrorist
SEARCCT  Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism
SEBIN  Bolivarian National Intelligence Service
SENAFRONT  National Border Service (Panama)
SGSecure  Singapore's community response to the threat of terrorism
SIC  Special Investigation Commission (Lebanon)
SINAI  National Intelligence System (Paraguay)
SIPA  State Investigation Protection Agency (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SL  Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)
SLTD  stolen and lost travel document
SNA  Somali National Army
SNI  National Intelligence Secretariat (Paraguay)
SNP  Spanish National Police
SOE  State of Emergency
SPF  Somali Police Force
SPO  State Prosecutor’s Office
SRF  Le Service de Renseignements Financiers (Djibouti’s financial
     information service)
SSB  Qatar State Security Bureau
SSSG  State Security Service of Georgia
STC  Yemeni secessionist Southern Transitional Council
SZPLIV  Serbian Border Police’s System to Check Persons and Vehicles
TAJK  Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir
TASS  Russian News Agency TASS
TC  Turkish Cypriot
TES  Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism (Serbia)
TF  terrorist financing
TFN  Taskforce Nightingale (Trinidad and Tobago)
TFTC  Terrorist Financing Targeting Center
TNP  Turkish National Police
TPB  Terrorism Prevention Branch (of UNODC)
TPLF  Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
TS  Technical Secretariat
TSCTP  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
TTP  Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
TVEC  Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content
UAE  United Arab Emirates
UN  United Nations
UNCCT  UN Counterterrorism Center
Significant human rights issues influenced the state of terrorist activity in many countries in this report, which may have impeded effective counterterrorism policies and programs or supported causes and conditions for further violence. Such human rights issues included, among others, unlawful and arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention (all of the preceding by both government and nonstate actors); harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; violence against and unjustified arrests of journalists; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; widespread and pervasive corruption; repression of religious freedom and violence against religious minorities; and forced and bonded labor.


**The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report**
For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes regarding many of the countries in this report, see the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*:
https://www.state.gov/2021-international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/
### Members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

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<th>Country or Organization</th>
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Chapter 1. Country Reports on Terrorism

AFRICA

Overview: Terrorist groups primarily aligned with AQ and ISIS conducted attacks against civilians, humanitarian workers, government personnel and facilities, and security forces, which resulted in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the capture and destruction of property across Sub-Saharan Africa during 2021. Terrorists routinely manipulated intercommunal disputes by supporting longstanding claims against other groups to gain support for terrorist operations. These actors continued to carry out attacks on military outposts; kidnap or attack western private citizens and humanitarian workers; attack churches, mosques, and schools teaching western curricula; and assassinate civil servants and politicians. African countries, as well as regional and multinational organizations, sustained counterterrorism efforts against terrorist groups throughout 2021.

In East Africa, AQ-affiliate al-Shabaab (AS) retained access to recruits, the ability to raise and manage substantial resources, and de facto control over large parts of Somalia through which it moved freely and launched high-profile, sophisticated attacks on civilians, government personnel and facilities, and security forces, including Somali and African Union peacekeeping operations. ISIS-linked fighters in East Africa continued to conduct small-scale local attacks. In Central Africa, ISIS-linked fighters conducted attacks primarily against civilians and security forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. In the Lake Chad region, ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram (BH) continued to conduct attacks primarily in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.

In the Sahel region, terrorist groups continued their operations in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS-affiliate ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS). In Southern Africa, ISIS-linked fighters continued operations in northern Mozambique and ISIS-linked facilitation networks continued alleged activity in South Africa.

The United States continued to support partners across affected regions of Sub-Saharan Africa in their efforts to build counterterrorism capacity in areas including aviation and border security, improving regional security forces, countering terrorist finance, advancing criminal justice sector reforms, and training and mentoring of law enforcement to manage crisis response and conduct investigations. African partners undertook efforts to develop and expand regional cooperation mechanisms to detect and interdict terrorist travel and other terrorism-related activities.

BURKINA FASO

Overview: Terrorist attacks increased in 2021, compared with 2020. The Global Terrorism Index ranked Burkina Faso as the country fourth-most affected by terrorism in 2021, after Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. JNIM continues to be the most prominent terrorist group in Burkina Faso, followed by ISIS-GS and the homegrown Ansaroul Islam.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, the country registered 597 security incidents with 1,073 fatalities and an estimated 1.6 million internally displaced persons in 2021. Those attacks included armed attacks, abductions, carjackings, IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, rocket attacks, and ambushes. The most-affected regions in Burkina Faso are the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Est.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Defense and security forces, civilians, humanitarian workers, religious, political, traditional, and community figures have all been victims of terrorist attacks:

- On May 3, armed militants attacked the village of Kodyel in the eastern Komandjari province. Homes were burned. At least 30 people were killed, and another 20 were wounded.
- On June 5, 160 people were killed, including 20 children, when gunmen stormed the Solhan Commune in the Yagha province along the northern border with Niger.
- On August 18, groups affiliated with ISIS-GS attacked a convoy made up of civilians who left Dori heading to Arbinda, under the escort of Defense and Security Forces and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDPs) in the Sahel region. Thirty civilians, 14 gendarmes, and three VDPs were killed in the attack.
- On November 14, JNIM militants attacked the gendarmerie detachment at Inata resulting in the deaths of 57 people, including 54 gendarmes. The incident provoked protests throughout the country about the authorities’ failure to curb the years-long conflict.
- On December 23, Islamist insurgents attacked a convoy escorted by VDPs in the Centre-Nord region. About 41 people were killed, including a beloved national icon of the fight against terrorism.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The state of emergency declared in six regions and 14 provinces since 2019 has been again extended by the Parliament until late 2022. Burkina Faso’s Defense and Security Forces are augmented by VDPs units. The country’s specialized counterterrorism units are the Army Special Forces, the Special Legion of National Gendarmerie, and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of National Police.

The Brigade Spéciale des Investigations Antiterroristes (BSIAT, Special Anti-Terrorism Investigation Brigade) refers cases to the specialized counterterrorism court for prosecution. The court held the only trials from August 9 to 13, convicting five persons of terrorism and acquitting one. On October 6, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Counterterrorism Strategy and the National Security Policy to combat terrorism by defining new strategic imperatives. Burkina Faso has 21 border police stations. The country uses border security systems sponsored by the IOM to help collect, store, and analyze travelers’ information. In 2021, INTERPOL Burkina increased the use of terrorist and criminal screening watchlists.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Trafficking of illicit goods (in coordination with organized criminal groups), robberies, kidnappings, and illegal gold mining remain terrorist groups’ primary sources of funding. In December, a Ouagadougou tribunal, with the assistance of the Financial Intelligence Unit, sentenced 39 individuals for fuel smuggling and endangering the lives of persons. The defendants also were accused of supplying fuel to terrorists; those allegations were transferred to the counterterrorism court for further investigations.
**Countering Violent Extremism:** In January, a ministry in charge of national reconciliation and social cohesion was created as part of the Government of Burkina Faso’s efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization. On May 10, a workshop was held in Ouagadougou to validate the national strategy for the prevention of radicalization to violence and the fight against violent extremism and its action plan. This strategy, developed with the support of USAID, aims to provide the Government of Burkina Faso with effective policies to fight against radicalization to violence and violent extremism, considering all the actors contributing to the expansion of the phenomenon and proposing adequate and sustainable solutions to population resilience.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Burkina Faso continues its participation in the G-5 Sahel, along with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The country is also part of the Accra Initiative with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. Mali and Niger are observer members. The Accra Initiative is a cooperative and collaborative security mechanism aimed at preventing the spillover of terrorism from the Sahel and addressing transnational organized crime and violent extremism in member countries’ border areas. Burkina Faso became the 84th member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in November.

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**CAMEROON**

**Overview:** In 2021, terrorist activity decreased in the Far North Region. The NGO Stand Up for Cameroon reported that Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) killed 339 people in 2021, compared to an estimated 400 people in 2020, a 15 percent decline in fatalities. Attribution for the attacks is contested in the public sphere. Terrorists appeared to have intensified attacks on military targets, compared with attacks on civilians; however, terrorists continued to attack civilians, which caused many to abandon their villages. As of December 31, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees had identified 358,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 117,000 refugees in the Far North Region in need of humanitarian assistance because of terrorist activity.

Thousands of terrorists and associated family members surrendered and joined disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) centers after the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May. The government facilitated the voluntary repatriation of about 2,000 ex-combatants and their families back to Nigeria from a DDR center in September. The Cameroon government began constructing a DDR center to host 1,500 ex-combatants in November and facilitated the voluntary return of 7,900 displaced persons to Nigeria in 2021.

Cameroon continued its counterterrorism cooperation with support from the international community. Over the course of the year, Cameroon participated in operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and remained a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Countering terrorist threats remained a top security priority for the Government of Cameroon.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: Attacks included raids in search of supplies, indiscriminate killings, targeted murders, beheadings, suicide bombings, abductions, arsons, and lootings. A representative sample of the deadliest attacks in the Far North Region included the following:

- On January 8, Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 13 civilians in Mozogo.
- On March 18, Boko Haram terrorists killed two civilians and burned at least 52 homes in Kangaleri.
- During July 24-27, ISIS-WA terrorists in military vehicles killed 13 soldiers and wounded several others in Sagme and Zigue.
- On August 30, ISIS-WA terrorists kidnapped 15 fishermen in Blangoua.
- On October 6, Boko Haram terrorists shot and killed seven civilians in Assighassia.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Cameroon continued to use the 2014 antiterrorism law to prosecute suspected terrorists, but also to suppress dissent and arrest activists. In June, human rights lawyer Nicodemus Amungwa was imprisoned on charges of inciting terrorism.

Countering Financing of Terrorism: There were no changes since 2020.

Countering Violent Extremism: During September 21-24, the IOM and the government trained 30 participants on planning, implementation, and coordination of DDR programs and ways to increase women and youth engagement in the project framework. Training was provided within the context of the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilization Strategy to improve recovery and resiliency in terrorist-affected areas.

In September, the Rapid Intervention Battalion gave books and supplies to 300 students and teachers in Bodo, Far North Region, as part of a “Get Back to School” program to promote education in areas affected by terrorist attacks.

In 2021, the United Nations Population Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the IOM supported victims of Boko Haram and ISIS-WA through a project to promote social cohesion, facilitate economic recovery, and support the local government in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari, the three most-affected divisions in the Far North Region.

In 2021, the government invested $10 million to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by Boko Haram. In October, the government launched the reconstruction of markets, security posts, and schools that terrorists in Amchide, Far North Region, had destroyed. The UNDP performed the reconstruction under the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilization Strategy.

The government facilitated the surrender of thousands of terrorists and their family members and provided food and accommodations for ex-combatants at DDR centers. It hosted at least 1,500 ex-combatants and their families at the DDR center in Meri and transformed many public buildings along the border with Nigeria into temporary DDR housing. In September, the government eased the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 1,993 ex-combatants and their families to Nigeria. From January through March, the government facilitated the voluntary repatriation of 7,900 refugees at the camp in Minawao, Far North Region. In November, the
government began constructing a $2.6 million DDR center in Meme, Far North Region, that is expected to host at least 1,500 ex-combatants.

In May, National DDR Coordinator Francis Fai Yengo organized a seminar to explain the DDR process to stakeholders, including ex-combatants, security officers, administrative authorities, and host communities. Local languages Mandara and Kanuri were available during the seminar. The organizers urged ex-combatants and ex-associates at the DDR center to encourage other terrorists to drop their weapons.

The Inclusive Economic and Social Recovery Program for Lake Chad (RESILAC), funded by the European Union and the French Development Agency, promoted social cohesion between IDPs and local communities in the Far North Region. RESILAC created jobs and supported agricultural entrepreneurship.

In 2021, the State Department funded 13 civil society organizations to support locally led efforts in the Far North Region to prevent violent extremism as well as a project to strengthen social cohesion through trust-building activities between local communities and security forces.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** There were no changes since 2020.

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**CHAD**

**Overview:** In 2021, Chadian President Déby was killed during a battlefield engagement with rebels; the Transitional Military Council that assumed control after the longtime president’s death has maintained Chad’s prior commitments to regional counterterrorism efforts. Chad has experienced persistent terrorist threats in the border areas near population centers surrounding Lake Chad but suffered only two attacks against military and civilian targets in 2021, both in the Lake Chad region.

Security forces and basic government services remained under resourced, which limited the Chadian government’s ability to address all security concerns, but Chadian armed forces led missions within the Sahel to contribute to regional security. Chad maintained a strong commitment to fight terrorists: deploying soldiers to Mali to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), supporting the Lake Chad region’s MNJTF, and committing forces to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

Chad continued to host the French Task Force Barkhane, France’s CT mission to the Sahel. The United States has historically been the largest direct supporter of capacity building for Chadian security forces and has benefited from Chad’s contributions to regional security and the counterterrorism efforts that this support has enabled.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: BH and ISIS-WA continued attacks around the eastern and northern shores of Lake Chad:

- On August 5, BH assailants killed 26 Chadian soldiers and wounded 14 others while on patrol near Tchoukoutalia before the Chadian army repulsed the attackers.
- A September attack by BH on Kadjigoroum in the Lake Chad region 20 kilometers from Baga Sola killed nine civilians before assailants set the village on fire.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Chad’s Special Anti-Terrorism Group Division is the primary military force deployed to fight terrorism in Lake Chad Basin and across the Sahel. The Director General of National Police remained supportive of U.S. CT efforts.

The National Police selected a group of law enforcement officers from multiple agencies to form a new CT investigation unit specifically designed to operate in the Lake Chad region. The program has been restarted after impacts from COVID-19, and the National Police increased the size of the unit.

Securing borders remains challenging. Porous borders, particularly across Lake Chad, provide easy passage for terrorists and criminal entities. Border security remained a shared task of the Gendarmes, Army, Customs, and the National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT), none of which is resourced sufficiently.

In November, the government announced amnesty for 296 Chadian rebels and opposition members charged with a range of infractions, including “crimes of opinion, terrorism, and threats to the integrity of the state,” as a confidence-building measure preceding government negotiations with rebel groups (known as political-military groups in Chadian political vocabulary).

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Chad’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the National Agency for Financial Investigation (ANIF), is a member of the Egmont Group. ANIF requested Antiterrorism Assistance (yet unallocated) for training new analysts to combat financial crime and antiterrorism financing. Chad is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa.

Countering Violent Extremism: Chad actively opposed violent extremism. The High Council of Islamic Affairs promoted peaceful coexistence and tolerance, and diverse faith groups utilized the Interfaith Dialogue Commission to engage in mitigating conflict. The national coordination office for the G-5 Sahel maintained its radicalization prevention unit, stood up in 2020, which initiates coordination meetings of CVE practitioners.

International and Regional Cooperation: Chad engaged actively in the following CT organizations:
- UN
- MNJTF
- G-5 Sahel
- Lake Chad Basin Commission
Surrounded by conflict, Chad is a leader in exporting security forces to contribute to regional stability in the Sahel. Chad contributed 1,425 soldiers to Mali as part of MINUSMA; 2,000 soldiers in support of the MNJTF; and 650 soldiers in northern Chad as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force East Zone Headquarters. Chad also deployed 1,200 soldiers to the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

Chad also supports the Chad-Sudan Mixed Force by contributing 600 soldiers as part of the joint border security effort with Sudan. In December, the Government of Chad announced its desire to increase the Chadian MINUSMA contingent by an additional 1,000 Chadian Peacekeepers, and this request is still pending review and approval from the United Nations Security Council. While this proposal still awaits implementation, it underscores the importance that Chad places on contributing to regional security.

N’Djamena hosts the headquarters of the five-nation (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) MNJTF, which was formed to counter the threat posed by ISIS-WA, al-Qa’ida, and BH in the Lake Chad region. N’Djamena also hosts France’s largest operational military deployment in the world, Task Force Barkhane, which provides French military planners with a strategic command position while it reevaluates the array of French forces throughout the Sahel.

Chad has received security resource support from China, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Türkçe, and the European Union in the past, and continued resource shortfalls are forcing Chad to reassess its need for military capabilities to address encroaching security challenges.

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CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Overview: Côte d’Ivoire was added to the 2021 Country Report on Terrorism because a significant increase in attacks from violent extremists in the North spilled over the porous border from Burkina Faso. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire assesses the Macina Liberation Front (aka Katiba Macina), part of the al-Qa’ida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), to be responsible for the attacks. JNIM exploits tensions between ethnic communities and is trying to expand into coastal West Africa.

Thus far, JNIM has successfully targeted Ivorian security forces in the far North, with more than 20 casualties resulting from numerous of attacks. Separately, according to open-source reporting, some members of the large Lebanese community in Côte d’Ivoire provide financial support to Hizballah. The Ivorian government demonstrates a strong commitment to preventing the spread of violent extremism by strengthening ties to the population through training and equipping, delivering public services, investing in infrastructure, and improving communication. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire is prioritizing investments in special units dedicated to investigating and countering terrorist activity.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: The following terrorist incidents occurred in 2021:

- On March 21, unidentified gunmen surrounded and attacked a military base, killing two in Kafolo, Savanes region (north), and used similar tactics in Tehini, Zanzan region (northern Côte d’Ivoire), to kill one.
- On April 12, in a rural area of Savanes region (north), a gendarmerie detonated an IED planted by unidentified terrorists. There were no reports of casualties.
- On June 10, also in a rural area of Savanes regions (north), the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FACI) repulsed an attack on a rural military base that killed 12 soldiers and wounded seven others. FACI killed one assailant.
- On October 19, gunmen attacked a police station in Tehini, wounding one officer before FACI repulsed the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Côte d’Ivoire and the United Nations Office for Counterterrorism signed an MOU on June 3, under the CT-Travel Program, to prevent and detect terrorist travel through advance information about airline passengers. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire passed the Ivoirian Anti-Terrorism Act No. 2015-493 in 2015. This legislation remains in effect. Under this law, individuals convicted of terrorist activity may be sentenced to 10 to 20 years in prison and fined up to CFA 50 million.

There are seven law enforcement units responsible for counterterrorism efforts: the Brigade Anti-terroriste, the Centre de Coordination des Décisions Opérationelles, the Force de Recherche et d’Assistance, the Unité de Lutte contre le Crime Organisé et Transnational, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières, the Police Criminelle, and the Police Economique.

The Government of Côte d’Ivoire created the Counterterrorism Operational Intelligence Center (or CROAT) under the dual supervision of the National Security Council and the Ministry of Defense. The security forces conducted several operations in response to the terrorist threat throughout the year.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Côte d’Ivoire is developing the expertise and body of laws required to successfully detect, prevent, and prosecute cases of terrorism financing. According to open-source research, Côte d’Ivoire allegedly is Hizbollah’s primary center for fundraising within Africa, helped greatly by the country’s sizeable community of established Lebanese families.

The Government of Côte d’Ivoire is part of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa. Côte d’Ivoire is developing a national strategy to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Eight months after the terrorist attack on the tourist town of Grand Bassam (near Abidjan) in early 2016, the National Assembly passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act. That same year, Côte d’Ivoire joined the African Development Bank’s Partnership on Illicit Finance. The Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières (Financial Information Treatment Cell) under the Ministry of Finance analyzes financial transactions and informs the banking sector of nonconforming ones.
**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, the Ivoirian government expanded the use of community policing practices to counter violent extremist groups, particularly in the north of the country. Law enforcement personnel receive training on and are directed to implement the doctrine in partnership with civil society, religious, traditional, and other community-based groups to co-create safe communities. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire directed security forces to collaborate with local populations to enhance border security by reviving a traditional practice of having visitors register their presence in a village with the local chief.

Côte d’Ivoire is actively developing approaches to enhance cooperation with historically marginalized communities, most notable of which is the Peulh (Fulani) ethnic group. Local authorities are aware of the need to address longstanding mistrust and are actively working to implement training and community outreach. Nevertheless, there are allegations of security forces targeting Peuhls based on their ethnicity.

**International and Regional CT Cooperation:** Côte d’Ivoire engaged actively in the following organizations:

- United Nations, member state
- UN Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT)
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- African Union, member state
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), member state
- ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff Committee, member state
- Accra Initiative, member state

In June the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, in partnership with France, inaugurated the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) to improve domestic and regional efforts to holistically combat terrorism. The AILCT has three mutually reinforcing lines of effort: research, academic instruction, and tactical training.

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**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

**Overview:** More than a dozen significant armed groups and about 100 criminal gangs and local militias operate in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). ISIS maintains links with local affiliate ISIS-DRC, locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen. The United States designated ISIS-DRC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2021.

Before pledging allegiance to ISIS in 2019, the ADF had operated in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for years. They are known for large-scale, systemic violence against civilians and asymmetric attacks against the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). In 2021, Democratic Republic of the Congo security forces arrested Burundian, Jordanian, Kenyan, Rwandan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan ISIS-DRC suspects, in addition to Congolese.
**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** According to the UN, in 2021 ISIS-DRC allegedly injured at least 257 people, abducted 1,129, and killed at least 1,120 people, a 52 percent increase in such violence over 2020. ISIS-DRC primarily targets civilians in large-scale attacks, but it also targets the FARDC and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (known as MONUSCO) Peacekeepers.

In 2021, there were notable changes in ISIS-DRC’s tactics and weapons. The group’s push north into Ituri Province and west in North Kivu Province throughout 2021 enlarged its operating area, making it less predictable and stretching Congolese security resources. Major attacks on main roads were intended to disrupt transit of goods, people, and security forces. While ISIS-DRC continued to use rudimentary IEDs in a defensive manner, in June the organization deployed multiple IEDs in Beni city, including its first suicide bombing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These devices employed a more sophisticated design than previously seen, suggesting outside expertise.

Since the onset of joint FARDC-Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) military operations against ISIS-DRC on November 30, the group is believed to be operating in several decentralized and mobile groups.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Democratic Republic of the Congo has no comprehensive CT legislation. Its National Assembly passed a draft CT bill in 2018 that stalled in the Senate. The Democratic Republic of the Congo shares some 6,835 miles of land, lake, and river borders with nine countries but lacks the capacity to effectively patrol them. The border authority, the Directorate General of Migration, uses the IOM Migration Information and Data Analysis System (or MIDAS) at only a fraction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s more than 400 official border crossings.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The government made efforts to strengthen its AML/CFT framework, although it still lacks resources and capacity. Notably, under new leadership, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Financial Intelligence Unit (known as CENAREF) revitalized engagement with international partners. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a member of GABAC, the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo government introduced a bill in 2021 to make the Democratic Republic of the Congo an Associate Member of the policy of CEMAC, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, on AML/CFT.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no significant changes in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a member of the Global Defeat-ISIS Coalition and participated in the June Defeat-ISIS Ministerial in Rome, and the December Africa Focus Group meeting in Brussels. In late November, President Tshisekedi authorized the UPDF to intervene in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat ISIS-DRC and to conduct joint UPDF-FARDC operations.

In 2021, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a member of the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. President Tshisekedi held the annual rotating chairmanship of the African Union in 2021.
The Republic of Djibouti remained a critical partner for the United States and the region in the fight against terrorism, and no terrorist incidents were reported in Djibouti in 2021. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted Camp Lemonnier, the headquarters of AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the only enduring U.S. military installation in Africa. Djiboutian law enforcement agencies continued to prioritize CT efforts throughout the country. As in previous years, Djiboutian government officials, particularly those in law enforcement and the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs, worked closely to identify and address terrorist activity.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organization for the Greater Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti. IGAD’s Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) provides training and resources to counter violent extremism throughout the region. Djibouti’s armed forces deploy soldiers to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) campaign and will field their Rapid Intervention Battalion in FY 2024 with the task of rapid response and CT.

2021 Terrorist Attacks: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Djibouti in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Djibouti has a legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes and can try those charged of terrorism-related offenses in criminal courts, using its penal code. In 2020, the Ministry of Justice issued life sentences to two accomplices in a 2014 suicide-bomber attack at a popular restaurant, La Chaumière.

Djiboutian law enforcement agencies consist of the Djiboutian National Police (DNP), the Djiboutian National Gendarmerie (the Gendarmerie), the General Directorate for Services of Documentation and Security, and the Djiboutian National Coast Guard — all of which proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism in the country. The DNP, the Gendarmerie, and the Coast Guard developed a biometric program that uses handheld biometric capture devices, which can generate a DNA profile. Once populated, the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard DNA database can be searched for identity and limited familial (including paternal) relationships.

Djibouti continued to enhance border security and deter terrorist travel, with security protocols and increased use of criminal databases such as INTERPOL’s. The country also continued to conduct traveler screening and process travelers through entry and exit points at the international airport and seaports.

Most travelers who enter Djibouti do so by land at one of four border points, one of them at the Somali-Djibouti border. Maritime travelers also enter at Obock, located on the north side of the Gulf of Tadjoura. Djiboutian law enforcement agencies coordinate their CT functions and information sharing. The DNP controls border checkpoints, with support from the Gendarmerie patrolling between border posts, and the country’s armed forces are responsible for patrolling
land borders in remote locations. To screen for potential security threats, law enforcement agencies also maintain checkpoints and conduct vehicle cordon-and-search operations on the way into and within the capital city.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Djibouti’s FIU is *Le Service de Renseignements Financiers* (SRF). SRF oversees and enforces AML/CFT regulations. It conducted online trainings on detecting terrorism financing, including for financial institutions, to identify potential terrorism financing threats among their NGO account holders. The FIU also signed MOUs with the Djibouti Tax Office and Djibouti Customs, intending to enhance cooperation between the two government agencies and SRF on countering terrorism financing. Djibouti is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a FATF-style regional body.

The country’s proximity to Somalia and Yemen remains a risk factor for terrorism financing concerns, as many Djibouti-based financial institutions continue to operate in neighboring countries that have weak or no AML/CFT legislation or other financial controls. There were no published law enforcement cases involving suspected terrorism financing in 2021.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Justice continued to convene the National Antiterrorism Taskforce, consisting of a national commission of experts, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ICEPCVE. The task force held several terrorism-related exercises on responses to and the prevention of terrorist attacks, enhancing protection of soft targets such as restaurants, hotels, and grocery stores. Although law enforcement measures constitute the bulk of Djibouti’s national CT strategy, community engagement — including with youth, sports, culture, and civil society organizations — is an increasingly important feature of its CVE efforts. Law enforcement agencies continued to work with the High Islamic Council within the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs to identify and monitor activity that promoted violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Djibouti hosts IGAD’s executive secretariat. Additionally, the IGAD ICEPCVE is based in Djibouti and provided training and resources on CVE throughout the region, including representatives from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Djiboutian military continued its participation in AMISOM, which counts Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda as the other four Troop Contributing Countries.

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**ETHIOPIA**

**Overview:** The Government of Ethiopia continued to partner with the United States government on counterterrorism issues in 2021, though in a diminished capacity owing to emerging domestic security threats. Al-Shabaab and ISIS terrorist threats emanating from Somalia remain a high priority for the National Intelligence and Security Service.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Ethiopia in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: 2021 saw an increase in the number of allegations and charging decisions against domestic defendants cited under the Government of Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2019, only to be quickly withdrawn, especially during a nationwide State of Emergency (SOE) that began in November 2021 and continued into 2022. In some cases, the courts ruled against the Government of Ethiopia, dismissing criminal complaints altogether or granting outright bail to defendants.

In May the Government of Ethiopia officially designated the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) as terrorist organizations, a designation not shared by the U.S. government or the UN. On November 2, Ethiopia proclaimed a nationwide SOE that gave the armed forces and law enforcement organizations expanded search, seizure, and arrest powers in cases involving known or suspected terrorist supporters. The SOE reportedly led to the arrest and detention of tens of thousands of Ethiopian citizens, in many cases simply because of their Tigrayan ethnicity or affiliation with Tigrayan persons.

The Government of Ethiopia’s CT capacity decreased in 2021, as resources were reassigned to counter growing threats from the OLA and the TPLF. However, the government continued to deploy CT units along Ethiopia’s borders with Kenya and Somalia. Ethiopian aviation security made improvements to passenger and cargo security in 2021; however, lack of an effective access control system remains a vulnerability. The insertion of biometric controlled access has enhanced terminal security, even though the airport system is not yet fully installed.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Ethiopia is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, and Ethiopia’s FIU, the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre, is a member of the Egmont Group.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Government of Ethiopia’s CVE strategy focuses on eliminating factors that help al-Shabaab recruitment, including on reducing poverty and ethnic strife and on local mediation and conflict mitigation strategies to defuse ethnic and religious tensions.

International and Regional Cooperation: Owing to allegations of a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed by Ethiopian government forces in the context of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, the United States has imposed wide-ranging restrictions on security assistance to the country.

Ethiopia has been one of the largest troop- and police-contributing countries in UN and AU peacekeeping, though its contributions are declining. In Somalia, a significant portion of the 4,000 Ethiopian troops present under a bilateral agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia were recalled to Ethiopia to reinforce units engaged in the conflict in northern Ethiopia.

As a result of the ongoing dispute with Sudan over the contested al-Fashaga border area, the UN agreed to replace roughly 3,200 Ethiopian Peacekeepers assigned to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei.
About 1,500 Ethiopian Peacekeepers are deployed in support of the UN Mission in South Sudan, and some 3,800 Ethiopian Peacekeepers are deployed to Somalia in support of the AU peacekeeping mission. Ethiopia also participates in the IGAD and its CT programs and trainings, including the IGAD Security Sector Program, which builds regional capacity to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity.

KENYA

Overview: In 2021, Kenya continued to suffer terrorist attacks primarily along the Kenyan-Somali border. IEDs and ambushes targeting Kenyan security forces and important infrastructure were the primary means of attack. Indiscriminate IED attacks on roads used by Kenyan security forces have resulted in numerous additional civilian casualties. While Kenyan security forces were the principal targets, teachers and key infrastructure also were targeted. Though large-scale attacks decreased with the onset of COVID-19, possibly because of pandemic countermeasures such as travel restrictions and lockdowns, al-Shabaab has maintained a consistent operational tempo in the border region.

A member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Kenya plays a leading role in regional CT cooperation. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) continued to participate in AMISOM and supported border security and counter-IED efforts within Kenya. Security services responded to numerous terrorist incidents, while also disrupting al-Shabaab and ISIS attack planning, recruitment, and travel. Reports of human rights violations and abuses by security forces during CT operations continued, including allegations of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture. However, Kenyan security forces demonstrated improved procedures regarding protection of human rights in response to terrorist threats and attacks.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist incidents in 2021 included the following:

- On January 16, suspected al-Shabaab (AS) operatives attacked the village of Waco Dadacha in Mandera, 150 kilometers from the Kenya-Somalia border. During the five-hour siege, one civilian was killed, one injured, and significant property damaged.
- On March 24, four persons were killed and 10 wounded (four critically), when a bus operating between the cities of Lafey and Mandera hit an IED planted on a busy highway in Mandera County.
- On July 2, AS operatives killed three nonlocal construction workers and wounded one in Dhoibley, Garissa County, near the Somalia border.
- On October 12, six KDF personnel were wounded, one seriously, when their vehicle detonated an al-Shabaab IED in Lamu County.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kenya’s government continued to rely on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (amended in 2014) to investigate and prosecute terrorism. Crowded court dockets and the lack of continuous trials slowed progress on many terrorism proceedings. However, 2021 saw the opening of the U.S.-funded Kahawa Law Court in Nairobi. This secure courthouse is a dedicated resource for bringing suspected terrorists to trial and has heard numerous cases.
Despite successes, challenges persist. Access to defense counsel for terrorism suspects is limited because the government has not fully funded the National Legal Aid Service. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has been working to develop a uniform and consistent nationwide policy on plea negotiations. The use of plea agreements could provide a mechanism for cooperation of lower-level accomplices against higher-level terrorism suspects. Both CT-focused prosecutors and judges have begun using plea agreements in proceedings.

CT functions are divided among the three branches of the National Police Service: 1) the Kenya Police Service (including the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU); the Traffic Police; and the regional, county, and local police); 2) the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative Antiterrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit); and 3) the Administration Police (including the Border Police Unit).

The National Intelligence Service, elements of the KDF, and the interagency also shared responsibility for CT functions. Uneven coordination, resource constraints, insufficient training, corruption, and unclear command and control continue to hinder CT effectiveness. Kenya’s National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) continued to work with private security companies on preventing soft target attacks. Kenya’s interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force began operations and made its first arrest on November 13.

Kenyan officials continued to work to secure the nation’s porous land borders to prevent terrorist exploitation, but hurdles remain. While aviation safety and security at Nairobi’s international airport and at several points of entry have improved with the establishment of Joint Operations Centers, watchlist screening and basic equipment at smaller ports of entry were generally lacking.

The Kenyan government worked to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), including Kenyans attempting to join AS or ISIS, and those returning from abroad. Kenyan security services also detected and deterred terrorist plots and responded to dozens of terrorism-related incidents. The Kenyan government cooperated on threat information and security at Embassy Nairobi, including through a dedicated GSU CT response team funded by the United States.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Kenya helped host a regional counterterrorism financing (CTF) meeting in Nairobi in November, during which Kenyan officials explored expanding CTF collaboration with their Djiboutian and Somali counterparts.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The NCTC’s County Action Plans for CVE in all 47 counties continue to be the primary framework for U.S. and other international CVE programming at the local level, but implementation of action plans in many counties remained hampered by a lack of funding. Police in Nairobi, coastal, and northeastern counties participated in community engagement training and early warning and response programs. Prison and justice sector stakeholders improved handling of terrorist suspects and convicts, and judicial officials worked to improve management of remand prisoners through plea bargaining and other methods. Kenya’s second largest city, Mombasa, is an active member of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Nairobi hosts the UN headquarters in Africa. The KDF continued its participation in AMISOM and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Although not a member, Kenya participated in regional meetings of the GCTF.

Mali

Overview: The transition government, installed following the 2020 coup d’état, undertook another extraconstitutional change in government on May 24, when military forces arrested transition President Bah N’Daw and transition Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. Assimi Goita, who led the 2020 coup and had served as vice president following it, subsequently assumed the transition government presidency.

Mali’s longstanding counterterrorism partnerships with foreign forces in country — particularly France’s Operation Barkhane — experienced increased disruptions throughout 2021. In fall and winter of 2021, French troops withdrew to Gao from bases in Kidial, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. Barkhane handed the bases over to the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa). In a nod to its populist leanings, the transition government ratcheted up anti-France rhetoric in late 2021. In December, the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group deployed to Mali. The security vacuum created by the withdrawal of French and other international forces cannot be filled by Malian forces and Wagner Group forces.

Terrorist activities increased in lethality throughout the country and continued to target civilians, FAMa, international peacekeepers, and international military forces, with 1,826 fatalities recorded by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project for 2021. Terrorist groups active in Mali include ISIS-GS and JNIM — an AQ-affiliated umbrella group that formed when the Sahara branch of AQIM, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front merged.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: JNIM and ISIS-GS continued to conduct terrorist attacks, primarily targeting Malian and international military forces. While attacks principally occurred in the central area of Mali, terrorist groups continued to press farther south along the Burkinabe border into the Sikasso Region. Additionally, attacks occurred along Mali’s borders with Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, further enveloping Bamako and other population centers:

- On June 25, 13 MINUSMA peacekeepers were seriously injured during the largest suicide-vehicle-borne IED attack in recent memory against a temporary UN base near the village of Ichagara in the Gao region.
- On August 8, Gunmen on motorcycles attacked several villages in a coordinated assault against several villages in the Gao region along the border with Niger, killing more than 50 civilians. A day later, across the country in Dioura, in southern-central Mali, terrorists killed 30 civilians, including 20 Dozo hunters, for refusing to pay religious “taxes.”
- JNIM claimed responsibility for a September 28 complex ambush against an Australian-owned gold mining convoy about 100 miles from Bamako. Five Gendarmerie Special Forces soldiers guarding the convoy were killed, and several vehicles were destroyed.
• In December, in the increasingly volatile central Mali area, at least 31 civilians were killed and 17 were wounded after gunmen attacked a bus en route to a market in Bandiagara.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes to Mali’s counterterrorism legal framework in 2021. Plans for a massive legal overhaul in 2020 were suspended. Despite the delay of the criminal and procedure codes, 30 terrorism cases went to trial. The COVID-19 outbreak caused significant delays, which were exacerbated by the 2020 coup d’état and the May military consolidation of power.

Mali’s vast and porous borders extend some 4,500 miles and touch seven neighboring countries. The Gendarmerie and the National Border Police both provide security and law enforcement support to prevent and deter criminal activity at borders; however, both agencies are understaffed, are poorly trained, and lack essential equipment and resources. Customs officials under the Ministry of Economy and Finance monitor the flow of goods and enforce customs laws at borders and ports of entry.

Mali receives INTERPOL notices, but the INTERPOL database is unavailable outside of Bamako. Exit and entry stamps used by border officials have inconsistent size and shape, undermining efforts to authenticate travel documents. The government receives Public Key Infrastructure certificates for passport security information from the International Civil Aviation Organization; however, the information sharing is done manually and inconsistently. Security features for Malian passports remain unchanged. Imposters obtain fraudulent documents, such as birth and marriage certificates, with relative ease, undermining the veracity of Malian identification documents.

The transition government has made little progress toward implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2396 regarding border security. Mali previously implemented biometric fingerprint and facial recognition screening at established ports of entry. However, Mali has little or no control over its many and vast territorial borders, allowing terrorists to move across borders with ease.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mali is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a financial action task force-style regional body. Mali’s National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. Efforts to counter terrorism financing remain ineffective owing to lack of resources, training, basic auditing tools, and automation.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Despite the inclusion of armed group representatives in the transition government, progress on the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the Algiers Accord) remains stymied. The transition government has not yet announced its strategy to combat violent extremism. As the ongoing French withdrawal proceeds, FAMa reports of widespread success against terrorist organizations remain difficult to verify and are likely untrue.
International and Regional Cooperation: Since the May 24 consolidation of military power, Mali has grown increasingly insular, shirking its traditional partners in favor of rebuilding its relationship with Russia. Following the 2020 military coup, U.S. foreign assistance for the Government of Mali has been restricted pursuant to section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. Mali is currently suspended from Economic Community of West African States and the AU.

MAURITANIA

Overview: Mauritania remained an excellent security and regional CT partner for the United States. Despite continued terrorist violence in neighboring Mali, the country has not suffered a terrorist attack on its soil since 2011. Countering terrorist activity remains the top priority for the Mauritanian government, and Mauritanian military leadership underscores this message when appealing to donor nations for additional equipment and training assistance.

During the year, the government continued to focus its efforts to prevent what it termed extremism, and it took steps to increase its capacity to deter and respond to terrorist attacks, including by working with the Mine Advisory Group and the United States to better manage ammunition stockpiles to prevent them from falling into terrorists’ hands.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Mauritania in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Mauritanian government did not pass or amend any laws regarding terrorism during 2021. The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, in cooperation with the Regional Security Office and host nation partner forces, provided numerous training opportunities for more than 200 national gendarmerie personnel. Training topics included tactical medicine, facilities protection, active shooter response, managing terrorism investigations, and emergency preparedness.

On February 8, the U.S. ambassador and the Mauritanian Minister of Interior and Decentralization signed an MOU to facilitate continued cooperation on border management assistance at all of Mauritania’s land, air, and sea points of entry to identify, disrupt, and deter terrorist travel.

Mauritania’s battalion to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force is deployed near the border with Mali to help with CT and counter smuggling operations. The Mauritanian Ministry of Justice also worked with the UNODC, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the German Embassy to host an October 25 workshop to train judges and other judicial officials on how to dismantle the links between organized crime and terrorism.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mauritania is a member of MENAFATF. In addition to the Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit (CANIF), Mauritania has two national committees, the National Committee to Combat Terrorist Financing and the National Committee to Combat Money Laundering, which are tasked with improving internal government coordination on these issues. CANIF also continued to roll out additional security requirements on money transfers to increase transparency on transactions.
Countering Violent Extremism: Mauritania continued its efforts to counter violent extremism, including through several partnerships with the United States. On October 27, the U.S. ambassador launched an $800,000 two-year program with World Vision and the Mauritanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education (MIATE) to work with youth, women, religious community leaders, and civil society actors to promote tolerance and fight against what the government terms “extremism.” During June 16-18, UNICEF and the MIATE implemented a U.S.-funded program to train 40 Mahadra teachers in Nouakchott. The training aimed to facilitate the integration of *talibes* (children, principally boys, studying the Quran) into the country’s formal education system.

Throughout the year, the MIATE continued to implement and expand its “Simple Mahadras” program. The program aims to increase the MIATE’s oversight of Mahadras in the country, to fight against extremism and ensure children are less vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking in persons. The Mauritanian government also continued to make efforts to reintegrate former terrorists and returning FTFs.

Both the Mauritanian government and civil society used strategic messaging during the year to promote alternative narratives and weaken the appeal of terrorism. For example, the government nominated Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a former Guantanamo detainee, as a brand ambassador for Mauritania during its expo in Dubai. The nomination amplified Slahi’s message about the importance of turning away from extremist ideology.

International and Regional Cooperation: Mauritania is a member of the following international organizations that have CT equities: the United Nations, the African Union, the G-5 Sahel, the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program.

Mauritania continued to work with international partners to combat instability in the Sahel, particularly through its engagement with the G-5 Sahel. In July, the Nouakchott-based G-5 Sahel Defense College graduated 44 international students. Most of the students came from G-5 Sahel member states, and six came from Saudi Arabia.

MOZAMBIQUE

Overview: The Republic of Mozambique regained significant amounts of territory from ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) in 2021, but ISIS-M continued to carry out attacks in the northern part of the country. The Armed Conflict and Event Data Project reported 314 terrorist attacks in 2021, a significant decrease from 2020, but the ongoing violence in Cabo Delgado Province has displaced more than 800,000 people since it began in 2017.

On March 24, ISIS-M attacked the northeast town of Palma, creating thousands of IDPs as ISIS-M expanded its control over the province. In response, TotalEnergies halted its natural gas development operations in nearby Afungi peninsula and declared force majeure. However, starting in July 2021, the deployment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Mission in Mozambique and Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) assisted the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) to regain territory, including Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, a strategic port town that ISIS-M had taken in 2020. As of November 30, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique reported that troops had captured 245 suspected terrorists and killed 200 terrorists in battle. As ISIS-M fighters dispersed, they attacked several villages, including in two districts in Niassa Province.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** The following list details a small number of significant attacks:

- On March 24, ISIS-M launched a multipronged complex attack on the town of Palma, resulting in a days-long effort to reassert government control over the district and prompting at least 50,000 IDPs to flee the area.
- On September 12, ISIS-M ambushed an RDF convoy in Mocímboa da Praia district, killing four RDF soldiers and injuring six others.
- On October 2, ISIS-M kidnapped seven women from Nacate village in Macomia district, which is located south of Mocímboa da Praia.
- In November and December, ISIS-M moved across the provincial line into Niassa Province for the first time and attacked several villages in Mecula and Marrupa districts.
- On December 15, ISIS-M reportedly decapitated a Christian pastor in Macomia district and ordered his wife to give his head to the FDS.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In 2021, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique began crafting new legislation to amend current terrorism laws, though it did not complete the process during the calendar year. The proposed amendments create criminal penalties for domestic terrorism-related offenses, whereas current law addresses only international terrorism. The amendments would also establish sentences for terrorism-related crimes between eight and 24 years in prison, the maximum penalty in Mozambique. There were no significant changes in 2021 to Mozambique’s law enforcement CT capacity. Border security also remained a challenge for Mozambique, with no significant changes in 2021.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In June 2021, ESAAMLG released its *Mutual Evaluation Report (MER)* for Mozambique. Among the MER’s key findings, ESAAMLG noted “important technical compliance gaps” that need to be addressed and the lack of a National Risk Assessment (NRA), factors that put Mozambique at risk of placement on FATF’s “gray list” of countries publicly named as deficient on illicit finance measures. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique started to address these gaps by drafting new laws on domestic terrorism, money laundering, and terrorism finance, as well as an NRA, though all were pending completion at year’s end.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In July, the Ministry of Justice co-hosted a launch event for a National Working Group on the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR), an initiative that brought together stakeholders from government, civil society, the private sector, and the international community to discuss ways to address the drivers of conflict and instability in Mozambique’s northern provinces. The Ministry of Defense also supported VPSHR, signaling an increase in government support for the initiative throughout 2021.
On October 28, the Integrated Development Agency for the North unveiled the Resilience Plan for Northern Mozambique (ERDIN), a long-term plan to address the root causes of the violence through security, socioeconomic development, governance, and human rights engagement in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula. At the end of 2021, ERDIN was still waiting for approval by the Council of Ministers.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2021, Mozambique accepted significant military assistance from its neighbors and other partners, including the SADC, Portugal, Rwanda, and the EU. Portugal began training commandos and marines in May, which became part of the EU Training Mission, which launched in November, to train and equip 11 companies in the next two years. While not a GCTF member, Mozambique participated in the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the GCTF’s capacity building in the East Africa Region Working Group.

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**NIGER**

**Overview:** Niger faces terrorist threats on most of its borders. Terrorist organizations take advantage of Niger’s extensive borders and sparsely populated desert regions to attack and recruit among populations where access to government services is weak and economic opportunity is negligible. The Government of Niger is a member of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the G-5 Sahel. Niger’s efforts to fight terrorism are stressed by its small defense force, ineffective coordination among security services, budget shortfalls, and instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin.

Terrorist groups active in Niger included ISIS-GS, BH, ISIS-WA, and JNIM — the last of these an amalgamation of the Saharan branch of AQIM, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist organizations carried out at least 74 attacks in Niger during 2021. Two main fronts saw attacks from BH and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) in the Southeast, and from JNIM and the ISIS-GS in the West and Northwest. The following five incidents are examples of the most significant attacks:

- On January 2, terrorists attacked two villages in the Tondikiwindi district of Tillabéri region, killing 101 civilians.
- On March 16, terrorists attacked the villages of Banibangou, Chinagodrar, and Darey Dey in the Tillabéri region, killing an estimated 64 civilians and burning grain stores.
- On March 21, terrorists attacked the villages of Akifakif, Bakorat, and Intazayene in the Tillia district of the Tahoua region, killing an estimated 177 civilians.
- On November 2, ISIS-GS attacked the village of Banibangou, Tillabéri region, killing at least 69 civilians.
- On May 4, 200 terrorists attacked a military outpost near Banibangou in the Tillabéri region, killing at least 15 soldiers and wounding four others. In a second attack on the same day, terrorists killed 20 civilians in Chinagodrar, Tillabéri region.
Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Following rapidly evolving threats in the tri-border region, key officials in the Ministries of the Interior and Justice amended the national framework regarding defectors to encompass the management of defectors from extremist organizations in any of Niger’s impacted zones.

The updated national framework, ratified in May, provides uniform defection screening by the National Police’s Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (SCLCT-CTO) and the national prosecutor to determine eligibility for rehabilitation. It also provides for development of regional rehabilitation centers, and establishes a National Disengagement, Disassociation, Rehabilitation, & Reintegration (DDRR) Steering Committee.

Since 2019, the IOM has expanded support to implement the DDRR program for the Tillabéri region, similar to the Government of Niger’s Rehabilitation Center in Goudoumaria, Diffa region. Completion of the country’s second defections center in Hamdallaye is anticipated in 2022.

Nigerien law enforcement and security services were actively engaged in detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism. CT investigations are the responsibility of the SCLCT-CTO, an interagency body formed by members of Niger’s National Police, National Guard, and Gendarmerie. Niger reinforced its capacities to investigate, adjudicate, and imprison terrorists, consistent with the rule of law and international human rights. UNODC trained members of Niger’s military responding to terrorism incidents to use standard operating procedures to improve the collection of evidence for use in the judicial process. Niger is recognized by regional partners as a leader in prosecuting terrorist suspects through its specialized antiterrorism court, which is supported by the embassy’s U.S. Department of Justice Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training program resident legal advisor, whose work with the tribunal has supported more-efficient analyses of counterterrorism cases, resulting in a reduced number of pending terrorism cases and increased capabilities of prosecutors and judges.

Niger continued to enhance its capacity to detect and deter terrorist incursions at its borders and ports of entry through the expansion of new technologies, public outreach, critical infrastructure development, and additional specialized security forces assigned along the border; however, it remains dependent on international partners to fund and implement border security initiatives.

Niger uses border security systems through the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), a bureau within the national police responsible for travel documents, identification credentials, and border security. Border security systems collect biometric information at air and land ports of entry and are linked to INTERPOL’s I-24/7 network-sharing relevant traveler information with partner nations.

DST headquarters construction was completed in 2020, and the DST is now fully operational in the new facility. IOM supported DST in the development of revised legal texts to improve governance of the DST, though the reforms have not yet been formally adopted by the Ministry of Interior or included in the five-year development plan to guide ongoing management and operations of the organization.
The Rural Border Patrol Operations Program that launched in 2019 and provides equipment, training, and mentorship continued to see success in conducting rural patrols along Niger’s western border with Burkina Faso. The groups are identifying terrorist safe havens, arresting suspects, and recovering evidence on these groups.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Niger is a member of the GIABA. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2021 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, USAID strengthened women’s representation, capacity, and leadership, including support for the G-5 Sahel Women’s Platform and established local peace committees to strengthen local conflict monitoring, prevention, and management. USAID also supported youth-led conflict mitigation and stabilization efforts in five communes in northern Tillabéri. The agency supported community radio stations in delivering positive messages to counter violent extremist organizations’ ideology and activities to prevent and resolve conflict at the community level.

USAID supported three operational and pilot research activities on gendered drivers of violent extremism, the role of traditional leaders in resilience to violent extremism, and the effectiveness of community-level programming in building social cohesion and resilience. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives focused on critical regions where emerging threats were beginning to grow in the southern areas of the Tillabéri and Dosso regions. Under the Niger Stability Support Initiative, USAID partnered with local leaders in these target areas to strengthen government action in response to threats to stability.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Niger is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-chairs the AFFG. Niger is a member of the G-5 Sahel and the Sahel Alliance and manages the G-5 Sahel Joint Forces’ Central Sector Command in Niamey and hosts a battalion in the Eastern Sector in Madama. Niger contributes troops to the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force and MINUSMA. Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States.

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**NIGERIA**

**Overview:** ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks against government and security forces and civilians in the North East region of the country, which resulted in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the destruction of property.

BH attacks did not appear to discriminate between civilians and government officials, whereas ISIS-WA generally focused attacks on government and security forces and expanded efforts to implement shadow governance structures. Following BH leader Abubakar Shekau’s death in May, BH’s attacks in Nigeria decreased and thousands of BH fighters reportedly surrendered in the largest wave of defections since 2002. The Nigerian Air Force deployed A-29 Super Tucanos purchased from the United States against BH and ISIS-WA, beginning in September.
The Nigerian Army largely succeeded in preventing terrorists from overrunning forward operating bases for extended periods of time. However, BH and ISIS-WA exploited the military’s absence outside the “super camps” and abducted aid workers, attacked humanitarian operations hubs, and controlled security along many of the major roads. The deteriorating security environment exacerbated conditions for civilians and severely constrained relief operations in northeastern Nigeria.

Nigeria worked under the MNJTF with neighboring countries to counter terrorist activity in the region. ISIS-WA continued to enjoy a large degree of freedom of movement throughout Borno State and eastern Yobe State. BH and ISIS-WA terrorist actions contributed to the internal displacement of an estimated two million people in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States, and the external displacement of more than 328,000 Nigerian refugees to neighboring countries, principally Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Attacks and kidnappings in the North West and North Central regions of the country by criminal gangs colloquially known as “bandits” reportedly caused more civilian deaths in 2021 than BH and ISIS-WA in the Northeast. Nigeria designated these groups as terrorists under domestic law on November 25 to maximize a federal security response, including the increased use of the military. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), separatists designated by the Nigerian government as a proscribed terrorist group in 2017, reportedly conducted violent attacks in the Southeast.

Nigeria is a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program. U.S. Mission Nigeria coordinated with the Nigerian military at the Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency’s (NDIA’s) Joint Intelligence Fusion Center (JIFC), Geospatial Intelligence Directorate Analysis Center, and Nigeria Defense Intelligence College. NDIA leadership requested assistance from the embassy to help build the JIFC’s capabilities.

**Terrorist Incidents in 2021:** BH and ISIS-WA carried out hundreds of attacks in Nigeria using small arms, captured military equipment, improvised explosive devices (person borne, vehicle borne, and animal borne), ambushes, and kidnappings. The following list details a fraction of the incidents that occurred:

- On February 23, a BH rocket attack in Maiduguri, Borno State, reportedly killed at least 16 civilians, including nine children.
- During March 1-2, ISIS-WA attacked a humanitarian hub in Dikwa, Borno State, forcing dozens of NGO staff to flee and take refuge while the attackers burned several NGO compounds.
- On April 5, gunmen believed to represent IPOB and its Eastern Security Network attacked a jail in Imo State, reportedly freeing nearly 2,000 inmates and killing one police officer.
- On April 9, fighters believed to be BH insurgents attacked in Adamawa State, killing at least five civilians and abducting around 30 women. The fighters set fire to approximately 50 homes, as well as churches, government buildings, schools, and other property, before withdrawing. At least 5,000 people were displaced to neighboring communities.
On December 23, rockets reportedly fired by ISIS-WA exploded near the airport in Maiduguri, Borno State, minutes before President Buhari was scheduled to arrive by plane. Four civilians on the ground were reportedly killed.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Nigeria uses the Terrorism Act of 2011, as amended in 2013, to criminalize and prevent terrorist acts and financing. Although there were no changes to Nigeria’s counterterrorism legal framework in 2021, on October 21 UNODC and the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies launched a user guide to the Terrorism Act for law enforcement and judicial officials.

The Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), the Ministry of Justice, and the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), which has a Counterterrorism Unit and Terrorist Investigation Branch. Border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, the DSS, the NSCDC, Customs, Immigration, and the Nigerian military. Coordination among agencies was limited.

The Nigerian government has cooperated with the United States and other international partners to prevent further acts of terrorism in Nigeria.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Nigeria is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), an ECOWAS regional body and affiliate of FATF. GIABA published a report in August assessing Nigeria’s counterterrorist financing measures. GIABA concluded that Nigeria has not adequately prevented BH and ISIS-WA from moving revenues through its financial system, noting that Nigeria largely prefers intelligence, military, and law enforcement responses to terrorism, as opposed to methods that counter terrorist financing. Nigeria is seeking FATF membership and is working toward meeting its requirements, including by addressing GIABA’s findings. Nigeria’s Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) was readmitted to the Egmont Group in 2018 after the NFIU became an independent agency, a change intended to make the NFIU more effective at combating money-laundering and corruption.

Countering Violent Extremism: Nigeria’s disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration efforts are not currently well developed or coordinated.

International and Regional Cooperation: Nigeria continued high-level participation in regional security and counterterrorism conferences. The country participated in several CT trainings sponsored by the United Nations. In May, participants at the 30th session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice organized an event focused on the effective criminal justice response to terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. Nigeria is a member of the GCTF and co-chairs its Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group with Switzerland. Nigeria also is an International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law Board Member.

SENEGAL
Overview: Although there were no reported terrorist attacks in Senegal in 2021, the Government of Senegal increasingly considers itself a potential target given ongoing terrorist activities in West Africa and instability in neighboring countries. In light of these concerns, Senegal continued to work closely with foreign partners, including U.S. military and law enforcement officials, to strengthen its CT capabilities.

The risk of terrorist activity in Senegal arises primarily from the growing terrorist threats and the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups across the region, combined with political instability in neighboring Mali and Guinea. These factors increase the risk that extremism and accompanying instability could spill across the border into Senegal. Senegal has taken steps to combat this threat by contributing troops to MINUSMA and establishing new military and gendarmerie camps along its eastern border. Internally, there are secondary risks with the promotion of “extremist ideologies” by a small number of religious leaders; however, these ideologies remain outside Senegal’s prevailing Islamic norms.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Senegal in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no significant changes to Senegal’s CT legal framework in 2021. Senegal continued to enhance the capabilities of its Interministerial Framework for Intervention and Coordination of CT Operations (CICO). CICO, formed in 2016, is designed to coordinate the government’s response to terrorism.

Senegal’s second-ever special terrorism court session, held March 17 to April 8, resolved six cases involving nine defendants, including a returning fighter, a young French radical, two Malian financiers, and three Mauritanians with alleged connections to the masterminds of the 2016 Grand-Bassam attack in Cote d’Ivoire. The trial evidence revealed no alarming uptick in radicalization or insurgent activity within Senegal’s borders. At the same time, the case results showed that much work remains. Five of the nine defendants were acquitted, two by agreement of the prosecutor, which suggests inadequate investigations and insufficient evidence. Moreover, all nine of the defendants — including those ultimately acquitted — waited as many as five years in pretrial detention before their cases were heard. Those convicted received five-year prison terms and stiff financial penalties.

Senegal’s gendarmerie and national police have specialized units to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism. Challenges remain to effective interagency cooperation and information sharing among the various governmental bodies that have CT functions in the country. Senegal continued to improve its law enforcement capacity by participating in multilateral efforts, such as the GCTF’s Capacity-Building in the West Africa Region Working Group, AU programs, and ECOWAS. Additionally, Senegal continued to work with the IOM to promote cooperation and coordination among border agencies.

Senegalese officials remained concerned that gaps in border protection resources and regional cooperation created security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were exacerbated by the absence of systems to verify travel document security, to screen travelers using terrorist screening watchlists, and to capture biographic and biometric information for travelers entering
the country outside major ports of entry. The Government of Senegal is near implementation of U.S. Custom and Border Protection’s Automated Targeting System-GLOBAL with the National Police, paving the way for Senegal to capture and analyze traveler data (API/PNR) in a move toward compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2396.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Senegal is a member of GIABA. Senegal’s FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. In February, Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation review (MER) in 2018, Senegal has made progress on some of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by adopting a National Strategy for AML/CFT and amending its legal and institutional framework. However, the provisions of the law have yet to be fully implemented.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Senegalese Center for Security and Defense, a governmental think tank, along with the Regional Bureau for West Africa and the Sahel and Lake Chad Security Studies Institute, published a joint study on preventing violent extremism in the artisanal gold mining regions of southeastern Senegal on December 16. Recognizing the human insecurity risks related to extractive mining processes, this Government of Senegal-led report identified state-level, preventive solutions to address these vulnerabilities. Senegal’s National Police are in the process of adopting an International Narcotics and Law Enforcement-funded program on community policing strategies to counter violent extremism through improved community relations, security assessments, and early reporting structures.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Senegal is a member of the AU, ECOWAS, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Although not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Senegal participated in regional workshops and activities held by the GCTF West Africa Region Capacity Building Working Group. France and the EU provided financial support and training to reinforce Senegal’s CT and border security capabilities.

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**SOMALIA**

**Overview:** Al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant terrorist threat in Somalia and the wider region in 2021, despite shared efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia, the United States, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other partners to combat the group. Al-Shabaab continued to leverage its influence in southern and central Somalia to extort millions of dollars in revenue from residents and businesses, according to the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia.

The group conducted deadly operations, including IED attacks, suicide bombings, complex attacks against government and civilian facilities, targeted assassinations, ambushes along supply routes, and indirect fire. There was one complex hotel attack in 2021 in which al-Shabaab's target appeared to have been a high-profile Somali National Army (SNA) general.
Throughout the reporting period, al-Shabaab also deployed several car bombs against tea shops and restaurants in Mogadishu likely targeting security forces known to congregate therein. Al-Shabaab tactics, techniques, and procedures focused on targeted attacks, and the group maintained an ability to strike U.S. interests in the region. It conducted a major propaganda campaign late in the year to increase recruitment of FTFs.

The Islamic State branch in Somalia (IS-Somalia) focused its efforts on revenue generation, extortion activities, and low-level targeted attacks with grenades and an occasional IED in Puntland and Mogadishu. It faced battlefield setbacks in Puntland, where the group is concentrated, owing to pressure from al-Shabaab.

The Federal Government of Somalia made modest, localized security gains with significant international assistance. The SNA, including the U.S.-trained Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade, conducted clearing operations against al-Shabaab in the Benadir, Galgaduud, Lower Jubba, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and Mudug regions and transitioned control of some of these areas to local authorities. Holding recovered areas remained a significant challenge, inhibiting stabilization efforts in those areas. Political instability and logistical constraints prevented the government from achieving more durable progress on institutional reforms, force generation, and military operations targeting terrorists. Al-Shabaab fighters contested SNA control of defensive positions and supply lines.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Somalia experienced continual, low-intensity fighting between government-aligned forces and terrorists in 2021. Some higher-profile terrorist incidents included the following:

- On January 31 a car bomb detonated at the Hotel Afrik in Mogadishu, and gunmen stormed inside, killing five persons, including an American, before security forces responded and killed the attackers. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
- On March 5 an attack on the Bosasso, Puntland, jail killed seven security officers and freed almost 400 prisoners, many of them members of al-Shabaab, which claimed responsibility.
- On April 2 a car bomb detonated at the SNA base at Bariire in Lower Shabelle while a simultaneous attack occurred nearby at the Awdheegle SNA base with a car bomb and fighters. At least 48 soldiers were reportedly killed. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
- On May 10, a suicide bomber killed six police officers and wounded six more at a police station in Mogadishu. An American citizen was also killed. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
- On June 28, multiple car bombs were used to assault a military base in Galmudug, triggering a fight with government troops and armed locals, and killing an estimated 30 people, including soldiers and civilians. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
- On August 18 the mayor of a town in central Puntland was killed at a tea shop by a large group of militants with firearms. IS-Somalia claimed responsibility.
- On November 25 a suicide car bomb attacked a UN convoy in Mogadishu, killing at least eight persons and wounding 17. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Federal Government of Somalia and local authorities demonstrated a commitment to improve the quality of Somalia’s law enforcement and judicial entities and made progress on U.S.-supported counterterrorism initiatives. In 2021, the Somali Police Force (SPF) leveraged U.S. mentorship and increased its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases. Somalia hosted an adviser through the U.S. Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program to help develop a national-level watchlisting system. The Federal Government of Somalia and state leadership continued to recruit and train criminal investigators throughout the country and improve Somalis’ access to formal justice systems.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Somalia is a member of MENAFATF. Al-Shabaab uses Somalia-based banks and mobile money services to manage its funds. The Federal Government of Somalia expanded its use of the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), a government-led financial intelligence entity, to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FRC is now capable of referring cases for investigation to the SPF and international law enforcement and continues to monitor reports submitted by financial institutions. U.S. funding supported the FRC’s messaging campaign through outreach activities and the establishment of a public reporting hotline.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating Federal Government of Somalia efforts and international support for the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE). In 2021, the Federal Government of Somalia and the SNA increased strategic communications that aimed to deny al-Shabaab control of public media narratives. Somalia, with Bureau of Counterterrorism support, continued a messaging campaign that increased enrollments in defector rehabilitation centers and created a resurrected defector hotline.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Federal Government of Somalia worked with African Union (AU) and international partners to start preparing for a new AU-led mission to succeed the African Union mission in Somalia.

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**SOUTH AFRICA**

**Overview:** There were no terrorism-related incidents in South Africa during 2021, possibly owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. This continued a downward trend following an unusually high number of incidents in 2018. ISIS facilitation networks and cells remained a threat, after the South African government first publicly acknowledged them in 2016. Regional dynamics persisted as an increasing concern as terrorist groups made gains in the Southern African Development Community region, including Mozambique. The government charged Johannesburg-based brothers Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie for international terrorism and continues to prosecute alleged terrorists charged in previous years.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in 2021.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA) criminalizes acts of terrorism and terrorism financing, and it specifies international cooperation obligations. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 applies to nationals who attempt to or who join terrorist organizations like ISIS.

The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation’s Crimes Against the State Unit and South Africa’s State Security Agency are tasked with detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa. The South African Police Service (SAPS) Special Task Force is specifically trained and proficient in CT, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) prosecutes terrorism and international crime cases.

Prosecutors charged a South African farmer with a terrorism-related offense after he allegedly led other rioters in storming and damaging courthouse property during an October 10 protest related to a hearing for suspects charged with murdering another farmer.

In 2020, South African police arrested individuals in South Africa possessing ISIS propaganda, weapons, and flags. One of the individuals was sentenced to 15 years in prison for kidnapping in 2021, but no terrorism charges were filed. All charges against other individuals arrested with him were dropped.

South African border security is challenging, because of its numerous land, sea, and airports of entry for international travelers. Multiple South African law enforcement agencies police the country’s borders, but many of them are stovepiped. Inadequate communication and equipment limit their border control ability.

Counterterrorism measures at the international airports include screening with advanced technology X-ray machines, but land borders do not have advanced technology or infrastructure. Trafficking networks use these land borders for illicit smuggling, and South Africa does not require neighboring countries’ citizens to obtain visas for brief visits. The SAPS internal affairs office investigated corruption allegations related to illicit sale of passports and other identity documents in the Department of Home Affairs, but use of illegitimately obtained identity documents persisted.

In 2021, South Africa’s NPA continued to prosecute terrorism crimes. To decentralize terrorism case prosecution and provide provincially based prosecutors with relevant experience, the NPA’s Gauteng-based Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) returned prosecutors who had been seconded to the central unit to their previous provincial assignments and reassigned terrorism cases to attorneys in judicial districts where the crimes occurred. While the PCLU retained an oversight role, it gave provincial prosecutors substantial autonomy to direct terrorism cases. Progress in several high-profile cases slowed as newly assigned NPA provincial prosecutors familiarized themselves with the cases and developed prosecution strategies.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa is a member of FATF and of ESAAMLG. South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre is a member of the Egmont Group.

Countering Violent Extremism: There are no updates in 2021.
**International and Regional Cooperation:** South Africa is a member of the AU, the GCTF, and the Southern African Development Community.

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**SUDAN**

**Overview:** The October 25 military takeover that ousted former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the civilian-led transitional government (CLTG) halted Sudan’s democratic transition and stalled efforts to adjust domestic CT authorities.

However, even in the period since the takeover, under the authority of Sovereign Council Chair and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan has continued to seek to strengthen CT cooperation with the United States, including through consistent information sharing and efforts to build capacity to identify terrorists and deny them safe haven within Sudan.

Despite the absence of any terrorist attacks in 2021, ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) continued to use Sudan as a facilitation and logistics hub. Terrorist groups in recent years have likely opted not to conduct attacks inside Sudan to preserve the country’s relatively permissive environment, though this calculus could change as security forces place more pressure on terrorists. Lone actors and low-level extremists, who lack direction from senior leadership, remain a potential threat who could launch attacks in Sudan. The government continues to view FTFs as the predominant threat.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents in Sudan in 2021. However, on September 28, two General Intelligence Service (GIS) officers and three noncommissioned personnel were killed during a raid on an ISIS cell in the Jabra district of Khartoum, where GIS arrested 11 foreign terrorists of various nationalities. On October 4, one security forces officer was killed during a follow-on raid in the Jabra district on the ISIS cell.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Previous efforts by the CLTG to amend the overarching CT legal framework in Sudan have been stalled because of the military takeover. The military-led government granted security services — namely, GIS — additional authorities to target terrorists in late 2021. Otherwise, there were no significant developments regarding CT authorities in 2021.

Regarding law enforcement actions against terrorism, Sudanese security forces continue to actively target and interdict terrorist cells in Sudan. Sudanese security services, primarily led by the GIS, targeted ISIS cells in Khartoum and Omdurman for arrest operations during a series of raids from late September to early October. Separately, on October 3, security forces arrested eight foreign terrorists in Omdurman.

Sudan continues to focus on improving its border security measures to track and interdict terrorist suspects traveling on forged passports, which is particularly important given Sudan’s extensive and porous borders.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  There were no significant changes in 2021.

Countering Violent Extremism:  Before the October military takeover, the CLTG was focused on broadening its relationships and engagement on CVE by seeking input from international bodies, civil society, and local experts.  The CLTG and security services held numerous joint conferences, led by the Sudan National Commission for Counterterrorism (SNCCT), with local and international stakeholders to discuss various CVE initiatives.  These efforts have largely stalled since the military takeover in October.

International and Regional Cooperation:  Sudan continues to support CT efforts in regional and multilateral organizations.  Sudan remains a member of the following groups which have CT equities:  International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP); INTERPOL; and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization.  The UN Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) organized a large introductory workshop in October to focus on interagency coordination in counterterrorism in cooperation with the SNCCT.  UNOCT maintains a small team in Khartoum to liaise with Sudanese authorities, UN entities (including UNDP, UNESCO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission Sudan), and regional organizations (AU and IGAD) to share best practices for counterterrorism strategy, border security, Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and community policing.

TANZANIA

Overview:  In 2021, the Government of Tanzania and the United States engaged in limited counterterrorism and countering violent extremism cooperation.  Counterterrorism has risen in importance for the Government of Tanzania, as Tanzania faces terrorist threats within the country and along three of its borders — Kenya (from al-Shabaab), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (from ISIS-DRC), and Mozambique (from ISIS-M).  ISIS-M presents a significant danger to individuals in Tanzania, especially those who live along its shared border with Mozambique.  Tanzania-Mozambique cross-border security cooperation began to materialize in 2021 through multilateral engagement — primarily with coordination provided by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); however, bilateral cooperation will be important for securing Tanzanian citizens and territory.

2021 Terrorist Incidents:  Tanzania experienced five notable terrorist attacks in 2021:

- On September 20, approximately 15 ISIS-M members crossed into Mahurunga village, Mtwara Region from Mozambique.  They looted and burned shops and houses and kidnapped and raped women. At least one Tanzanian was killed.
- On October 1, 12 members of ISIS-M attacked civilians and looted food supplies in Kiwengulo, Mtwara.  One Tanzanian woman was killed.
- On October 21, ISIS-M members attacked civilians in Kilimahewa, Mtwara region.  A warehouse and several houses were burned.  An unknown number of people were
kidnapped and later rescued by the Tanzania People’s Defense Force (TPDF). Fatalities are unknown.

- On November 13, approximately 10 members of ISIS-M raided the villages of Sindano and Michawe, Mtwara. An unknown number of civilians were killed, and at least four others were hospitalized.
- On December 10, members of ISIS-M crossed into Kiwengulo village, Mtwara, burning at least three houses and a dispensary. Four civilians were killed; three from a single family were beheaded. The attackers clashed with TPDF security forces, leaving five attackers and one TPDF member dead. Local law enforcement officials confirmed the attacks and killings with the embassy.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Government of Tanzania did not pass or amend any laws regarding terrorism in 2021. In June, Tanzania’s Director of Public Prosecutions ordered all charges dropped against 34 Zanzibari Muslim leaders held in pretrial remand on terrorism charges from 2012 through 2014. The leaders were part of a now-defunct Islamist organization that advocated for Zanzibar independence, the Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation (UAMSHO). The 34 UAMSHO members were released from jail.

In 2021, Government of Tanzania officials publicly acknowledged terrorist activities along Tanzania’s border with Mozambique, a departure from the government’s previous posture of publicly downplaying the threat and labeling violent extremists as “bandits.” In response to continued ISIS-M activity in Mozambique, the Government of Tanzania maintained a robust security personnel presence in the southern border regions of Mtwara and Ruvuma, as well as in neighboring Lindi Region.

The Government of Tanzania continued to limit access of diplomatic missions and humanitarian organizations in some areas along the southern border. In rare bilateral engagement related to counterterrorism in 2021, Tanzania’s Inspector General of Police met his Rwandan counterpart in Kigali to discuss strengthening security cooperation on cross-border crimes, particularly terrorism. Additionally, police commanders from Tanzania, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda met in Tanzania’s Kigoma Region to discuss ways to maximize collaboration, intensify security along the borders, and exchange security information.

A years-long effort to finalize a U.S.-funded border security program — the first in the northern Tanga Region and later shifting to the southern Mtwara Region — stalled and then expired in 2021 after Government of Tanzania ministries failed to sign an MOU.

Charges of terrorism, terrorism financing, and money laundering, all of which result in a prohibition on the use of bail, were used to incarcerate citizens, journalists, and political party representatives for political reasons, though this practice has slowed since the transition to Samia Suluhu Hassan’s presidency following the March death of former president John Magufuli.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Throughout 2021, the United States funded anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing training to Ministry of Finance officials. In 2021, the Government of Tanzania continued efforts to regulate the movement of foreign currency. While the primary purpose of the regulations appears to be reducing tax
evasion, the measures also make it easier to trace transactions, including those associated with money laundering.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, the SADC and the Government of Tanzania worked to organize and plan for a Regional Counter Terrorism Center to advance counterterrorism. Tanzania’s National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) remained Tanzania’s primary liaison with international partners on CVE in 2021. Starting in 2017, NCTC partnered with the UNDP on a CVE project that included the development of a national CVE strategy and action plan. Since 2018, NCTC and the UNDP have assured donor countries that the national strategy and action plan would be completed imminent.

In 2021, the United States supported a UNDP initiative on community policing, aimed at building stronger ties between security providers and community members. Separately, the United States continued its support for CVE initiatives through civil society actors in vulnerable areas to raise public awareness and increase resiliency to violent extremist threats and to understand cross-border dynamics that support terrorist actors.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Throughout 2021, the Government of Tanzania engaged primarily in multilateral efforts through SADC to address regional security and counterterrorism issues. Tanzania sent a contingent of troops to the SADC’s Standby Force Mission in Mozambique, which also included forces from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa. The SADC Mission joined Mozambiquan and Rwandan military efforts to combat the uprising of ISIS-M violent extremism in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique. Additionally, the Government of Tanzania continued to pursue training from bilateral and multilateral donors to enhance CT-related security units.

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**UGANDA**

**Overview:** Uganda is considered to have one of the most effective security forces in the region with respect to CT capabilities. Nonetheless, in 2021 Uganda experienced the first terrorist incidents on home soil since the 2010 bombings claimed by al-Shabaab. Four bombings in October and November were attributed to and claimed by ISIS-DRC (also known in Uganda as the Allied Democratic Forces, or ADF); authorities also attributed the June attempted assassination of the Minister of Works and Transport and former Ugandan Chief of Defense Forces Gen. Katumba Wamala to the same group. The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) began a joint operation with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in November to combat ISIS-DRC in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda also continued in its role as the top troop-contributing country to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the international effort to combat al-Shabaab in Somalia.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** The following terrorist incidents took place in Uganda during 2021:

- On June 1, unknown assailants attempted to assassinate Gen. Wamala, also the highest-ranking member of the Baganda ethnic group — the largest tribe in Uganda — serving in government. Assailants instead killed Wamala’s daughter and driver in the attack on his
Security services arrested approximately 12 alleged conspirators (though the exact number remains unclear) and killed four, all with purported links to ISIS-DRC.

- In July and August, near Masaka (located about 93 miles southwest of Kampala bordering Lake Victoria), machete-wielding men killed at least 29 people and injured 14 others in their homes. Officials blamed the act on ethnic tensions, ISIS-DRC, and opposition lawmakers, and arrested at least 78 people — including two opposition lawmakers — but had not conclusively solved the case by the end of 2021; the motive for the killings is unclear.

- On August 27, security forces stopped an attempted suicide bombing at the funeral procession of former Deputy Inspector General of Police Paul Lokech. Ugandan media and authorities attributed the attempt to ISIS-DRC.

- On October 23, three individuals hid a bomb at a restaurant in the suburbs of Kampala, a venue known to attract members of the security services as patrons. When the bomb detonated, it killed one person and injured several others. Police later attributed the attack to ISIS-DRC.

- On November 16, IEDs were detonated in two locations in downtown Kampala near the central police station and the Ugandan parliament building, killing those who were transporting them. Two Uganda Police Force (UPF) personnel and two passers-by also died as a result of the explosions; 27 police and nine other individuals sustained injuries requiring hospitalization. The UPF attributed the bombings to the ADF and an ISIS-linked social media channel seemed to confirm this assessment by claiming responsibility for the attacks.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Despite its strong military capabilities relative to other countries in the region, Uganda remains vulnerable to terrorism. The vulnerability is at least in part due to porous borders, corruption, a lack of trust and information sharing among disparate security services, diversion of security force capabilities to focus on opposition politicians, an overly militarized approach to combating violent extremism within Uganda, and the security forces’ poor relations with local communities and civil society.

Ugandan law enforcement has been accused of torturing Muslims it accuses of affiliation with the ADF. Lawyers defending accused terrorists (even those likely to be innocent) say they fear government harassment as well as reputational risk and possible loss of business for representing such clients.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Uganda is a member of the ESAAMLG, and Uganda’s financial intelligence unit is known as the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA); it is a member of the Egmont Group. Uganda’s few large banks largely comply with international standards for anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), but most smaller banks do not have the capacity or technology to fully comply with international and national standards. In June, the Bank of Uganda began regulating mobile money transactions in line with successful passage of the 2020 National Payment Systems Act, which added mobile money financial transactions to the financial system’s regulatory framework.
The FIA historically was a capable and willing partner, but it lacks the high-level political will to effectively regulate the financial sector. Additionally, the FIA’s reputation remains severely damaged after it froze the accounts of respected NGOs working in the democracy and governance space that receive funding from the United States and other donors for political reasons preceding the January presidential elections. FATF placed Uganda on its gray list in 2020 based on shortcomings in Uganda’s efforts to tackle AML/CFT. Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and planned to implement FATF’s recommendations by midyear 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** As of December, Uganda had still not approved its draft national strategy to counter violent extremism. Additionally, any progress previously made in improving community policing has likely been lost because of multiple violent crackdowns by security services in the lead up to and aftermath of the January elections and confirmed and alleged terror attacks throughout the year. Violence and reported prolonged and unexplained detention at the hands of law enforcement are some of the major “push factors” of violent extremism in Uganda, reinforcing a key narrative employed by violent extremist recruiters to radicalize youths to violence.

**International and Regional CT Cooperation:** In December, the UPDF deployed 2,500 troops in a joint military operation with FARDC designated “Shujaa” to combat ISIS-DRC in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda continued to be the largest troop-contributing country to AMISOM in 2021, with close to 6,000 personnel, and was responsible for the region in Somalia that suffers the largest number of al-Shabaab attacks, especially from IEDs.
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Overview

During 2021, governments in East Asia and the Pacific faced diminished threats from U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, REMVE, and terrorists inspired by ISIS. CT pressure from regional security forces made significant impacts on the leadership structure of several terrorist organizations in the Philippines and Indonesia. Most incidents involved attacks against soft targets and public spaces, such as a March suicide bombing at a church in Indonesia and a bus attack in the Philippines that killed four persons in June. CT pressure and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic may have reduced opportunities for radicalization to violence through more traditional, person-to-person networks and increased the phenomenon of radicalization online as many people spent more time at home and online. The pandemic and corresponding increases in time spent online also has exacerbated the problem of misinformation and disinformation, particularly online, and allowed terrorists greater opportunities to gain new adherents on the internet and inspire violence. REMVE continues to be a concern for Australia and New Zealand. Governments in East Asia and the Pacific voiced concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan attracting a new wave of foreign terrorist fighters.

Authorities in East Asia and the Pacific continued to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases, increase regional cooperation and information sharing, and address critical border and aviation security gaps. Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, and New Zealand are members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Japan also is a member of the G-7 Counterterrorism and Counter-Crime Rome-Lyon Group. Regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum, also shared best practices on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism.

Burma and the People’s Republic of China used counterterrorism as a pretext to crack down on opposition movements and to repress members of religious and ethnic minorities, respectively.

AUSTRALIA

Overview: The Counterterrorism Coordination Centre within the Department of Home Affairs is responsible for domestic policy development; whole-of-government coordination, including the use of counterterrorism laws relating to citizenship cessation; listing of terrorist organizations; and treatment of high-risk terrorism offenders. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade leads Australia’s international CT engagement. In December, the Australian government listed Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization for the purposes of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Previously, Australia’s listing was restricted to Hizballah’s External Security Organization. At the end of 2021, Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Advisory System remained at “Probable,” the third-highest level on a five-level scale.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Australia in 2021.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In August, Parliament passed the Counterterrorism Legislation Amendment (Sunsetting Review and Other Measures) Bill 2021, which extended the Federal Court’s powers to impose control and preventive detention orders to manage terrorist threats by continuing the detention of persons of concern. In November, Parliament passed the Counterterrorism Legislation Amendment (High-Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2020, which lengthens the extended supervision order (ESO) arrangement for high-risk terrorist offenders where a state or territory Supreme Court determines they continue to pose a risk to the community at the end of their custodial sentence. The ESO will enable a person to be released into the community, subject to prohibitions and other conditions on their activities, associations, and movements. Also in November, the government introduced into Parliament the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Bill 2021 to address operational challenges facing Australia’s intelligence agencies. Key elements of the bill include authorization for agencies to produce intelligence on Australians who are, or are likely to be, involved with listed terrorist organizations and strengthened arrangements for Australian intelligence agencies to cooperate with one another and with other organizations.

Significant law enforcement actions and judicial determinations in 2021 included the following:

- In March, Ahmed Luqman Talib, who was publicly listed by the U.S. government as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2020, was arrested on charges of arranging travel to Syria for a terrorist in 2013.
- In September, three men were arrested and charged by the Victorian Joint Counterterrorism Team for planning a 2018 terrorist attack in Melbourne were sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with a nonpatrol period of seven years and six months.
- In October, the Supreme Court of New South Wales sentenced three individuals for separate terrorism offenses:
  - Seven years and four months’ imprisonment for acts in preparation of a terrorist act in Australia and preparing for foreign incursions.
  - Three years and 10 months’ imprisonment for being a member of a terrorist organization and advocating terrorism — the first time a person in Australia has been sentenced for the offence of advocating terrorism.
  - Five years and four months’ imprisonment for acts in preparation of a terrorist act and exporting prohibited material.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: There have been no changes since 2020.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Department of Home Affairs coordinates a comprehensive national approach to preventing and countering violent extremism — whether politically, religiously, or racially motivated — as a shared effort among federal, state, and territory government agencies. The program’s stated objective is to combat the threat posed by homegrown terrorism and to discourage Australians from traveling overseas to participate in conflicts. The government’s approach comprises four complementary streams of activity, including building strength in diversity and social participation; targeted work with vulnerable communities and institutions; addressing terrorist propaganda online; and diversion and deradicalization. In March, Australia designated the right-wing organization Sonnenkrieg
Division as a terrorist group. In November, the Minister of Home Affairs declared right-wing extremist organization The Base a terrorist group. These designations make it a criminal offense to be a member of either group. In October, the Minister of Home Affairs chaired a national Ministerial Meeting on Counterterrorism, which brought together state and territorial ministers responsible for these matters to discuss the current and future threat environment and identify opportunities for enhanced cooperation to respond to them.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Australia continued to play an active role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and was a leading contributor to the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s military support, humanitarian aid, strategic communications, and efforts to disrupt foreign terrorist fighters. Australia is a financial supporter and board member of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Established in 2012, the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) functions as a high-level body consisting of representatives from the two countries’ federal, state, and territorial governments.

Since 2017, Australia has co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF’s) Countering Violent Extremism Working Group with its partner, Indonesia. The CVE Working Group has concentrated on a range of GCTF initiatives to develop and implement best-practice guidance on fighting extremism in line with the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy. Most recently, the Working Group developed a *Gender and P/CVE Policy Toolkit* for presentation to other GCTF Member States at the Forum’s 20th Coordinating Committee and 12th Ministerial meeting. In 2021, Australia’s ambassador for counterterrorism led whole-of-government consultations with regional partners in Southeast Asia, which strengthened operational relationships and provided technical assistance. Australia also participated (with the United States, India, and Japan) in the second Quad counterterrorism tabletop exercise in November, hosted by India. Australia continues to engage with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partners and in ASEAN-related fora on counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, including technical and regulatory assistance to develop and implement counterterrorism legislation. For example, Australia and the United States in February co-hosted with the Philippines the second virtual workshop in a three-workshop series for ASEAN Regional Forum members on watchlisting, aviation security, and information sharing. The Australian Federal Police works with policing agencies in Southeast Asia.

**PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU)**

**CHINA**

**Overview:** The counterterrorism efforts of the People’s Republic of China continued to target almost exclusively ethnic Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim alleged extremists, whom Beijing labels as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group Beijing considers the primary source of terrorism in Xinjiang. However, the United States has not seen clear and convincing evidence of ETIM’s existence. In July and August, as the United States was withdrawing forces from Afghanistan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on the Taliban to “re-impose the ban on Xinjiang’s Uyghur militant group, ETIM,” and to “resolutely and effectively combat” the
organization. Further, People’s Republic of China officials stated that Beijing would strengthen ties with the Taliban to ensure “ETIM do[es] not function from Afghanistan’s soil targeting Xinjiang.”

The Government of the People’s Republic of China’s measures, which it describes as counterterrorism, have included holding more than one million people in detainment camps. NGO data have identified more than 12,000 of these detainees who were sentenced to prison terms, in most cases for five to 20 or more years. When questioned, the People’s Republic of China claimed that the camps are vocational education and training centers. The People’s Republic of China denies that its Xinjiang policies involve human rights abuses, claiming its system of “reeducation” camps exist to “combat separatism and Islamist militancy in the region” and are a crucial part of the “war on terror.” China continued to expand law enforcement tools and enhance its military and counterterrorism capacities to justify and improve its ability to carry out this repressive campaign, respond to threats because of China’s increasing global economic footprint, and garner international support for its counterterrorism-related policies.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: People’s Republic of Chinese officials claimed that no violent terrorist incidents occurred in the country; however, Chinese authorities continued to use counterterrorism as a pretext to prosecute ethnic Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minorities, on terrorism charges. In April, Shirzat Bawudun, former head of Xinjiang’s Department of Justice, and Sattar Sawut, former head of Xinjiang’s Department of Education, were sentenced to death on terrorism and extremism charges; five others were given lesser sentences.

International terrorist-related incidents associated with Chinese citizens continued in 2021, including a targeted gun assault by a Sindhi separatist group in Karachi, Pakistan, that wounded a People’s Republic of China national; a Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack on China’s ambassador to Pakistan, during which four others died; a Balochistan Liberation Front (BLA) attack on two People’s Republic of China nationals in Karachi; a BLA suicide bombing attempt against Chinese interests in Gwadar, Pakistan; and the deaths of nine Chinese workers by suicide bomb in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which China attributed to ETIM with TTP’s assistance.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The People’s Republic of China continued to advance and defend its counterterrorism policies, including reeducation camps in Xinjiang. On June 1, the People’s Bank of China issued a revised draft anti-money laundering law for public comment, with the stated goal of preventing and curbing money laundering and terrorist financing as well as safeguarding national security. As of this report’s publication, the legislation has not been passed. Under the pretext of securing the border against ETIM members, the People’s Republic of China placed politically motivated INTERPOL red notices against Uyghurs.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: China is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. China’s Financial Intelligence Unit is not a member
of the Egmont Group and lacks capacity or political will to effectively share financial intelligence.

Based on current law enforcement investigations, the People’s Republic of China does not adequately control terrorist financing. Chinese law enforcement claimed to have limited ability to freeze funds and investigate banking transactions, and no corporate transparency regulations exist. China piloted a central bank-backed digital currency known as the eCNY, or eCNY Digital Currency Electronic Payment, to deter use of other virtual currencies, among other objectives. The People’s Republic of China also increased regulatory scrutiny of the financial sector by making improvements to the anti-money laundering framework. However, serious shortcomings persisted in effective implementation and ensuring transparency, particularly in the context of international cooperation.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The People’s Republic of China continued to implement broad repressive campaigns in Xinjiang under the guise of countering what the Chinese government calls “extremism.” China’s repressive measures include mass “reeducation” and “vocational training” of predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. Despite the United States’ 2021 determination that People’s Republic of China authorities in Xinjiang have committed genocide and crimes against humanity and strong condemnations from many other countries, China continued to defend its policies in Xinjiang and obstructed access to the region by international observers. In October, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Spokesperson Xu Guixiang stated: “The so-called Xinjiang-related issues are not ethnic, religious, or human rights issues at all, but antiviolence, antiterrorism, anti-infiltration, antiseparation, and anti-interference issues.” Under the pretext of counterterrorism efforts, the People’s Republic of China used existing domestic laws to actively screen, monitor, and censor its citizens on the internet.

The People’s Armed Police is increasingly focused on internal security and joint operations with the People’s Liberation Army and is developing capabilities for rapid response, mobility, and counterterrorism operations, which included “counterterrorism in Xinjiang and Tibet.” In December, the People’s Liberation Army conducted emergency drills and joint law enforcement drills in a nationwide campaign. A 2021 Department of Defense report noted that the People’s Republic of China continued to develop military and law enforcement capabilities and further coordination between Chinese military and counterterrorism apparatuses, stating: “Xi Jinping and the [Chinese Communist Party] leadership tasked the [People’s Armed Police] with integrating themselves into the [People’s Liberation Army’s] joint operation system.”

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The People’s Republic of China engaged in multilateral, regional, and bilateral fora, seeking to present itself as a global leader on counterterrorism. China continued to promote the UN as the primary international forum for counterterrorism, where it actively advances a repressive approach to counterterrorism.

On July 28, Wang Yi met with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, then the political chief of Afghanistan’s Taliban, urging the Taliban to “make a clean break with all terrorist organizations, including ETIM.” In response, the Taliban leader said it “will never allow any force to use Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.”
In August the People’s Republic of China conducted antiterrorism drills with Tajikistan, citing concerns about terrorist elements from Afghanistan spilling over the border. In September, troops from China and Pakistan conducted a joint exercise as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO’s) Regional Antiterrorism Structure. In September, President Xi presented a five-point proposal underscoring SCO’s important efforts over the past 20 years. On December 22, the China Institute of International Studies, which is affiliated with the MFA, organized the second International Seminar on Counterterrorism, focused on new threats and joint response measures to counter terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, in which 17 countries participated.

The People’s Republic of China is a member of the following organizations:

- The ASEAN Regional Forum
- The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
- The East Asia Summit
- The Global Counter Terrorism Forum
- The SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure

**Hong Kong**

**Overview:** Historically, Hong Kong has been neither a hub nor a target for international terrorist groups or extremists and has long maintained highly efficient security forces. Strict travel restrictions put in place by the Government of Hong Kong, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, have further reduced the likelihood of foreign terrorist threats to the city. Consequently, Hong Kong law enforcement has not been a close partner on counterterrorism matters, including intelligence sharing.

However, Hong Kong remains an important financial center and is geographically close to countries with known domestic and foreign terrorism issues — including Indonesia and the Philippines — providing a potential nexus for terrorist financing flows and a possible location for terrorist activities when international travel returns to normal.

Hong Kong continued security and law enforcement cooperation with the United States through the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s joint implementation of the Container Security Initiative. Hong Kong cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations. Despite these efforts, the Government of Hong Kong and its law enforcement apparatus could be a stronger partner on counterterrorism and other security challenges, such as providing more information related to terrorism financing and associated activities.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** The Hong Kong Police reported an incident on July 1, which it described as a lone-wolf-style domestic terrorist attack, involving a man using a knife to wound a male police officer and then killing himself.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Counterterrorism remained an operational priority for the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF). The Police Counterterrorism Response Unit provides a strong deterrent presence, assisting police districts with counterterrorism strategy implementation and complementing the tactical and professional support of existing police specialist units, such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, the Special Duties Unit, the Airport Security Unit, and the VIP Protection Unit.

In 2018 the Government of Hong Kong set up the Interdepartmental Counter-Terrorism Unit (ICTU) to strengthen overall counterterrorism efforts by monitoring global trends, reviewing and improving counterterrorism strategies in Hong Kong, developing specialized counterterrorism training, and optimizing emergency response plans. The ICTU held its most recent counterterrorism exercise in November.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Hong Kong is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Hong Kong’s Joint Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group.

In May the Government of Hong Kong concluded a three-month consultation on legislative proposals to enhance Hong Kong’s Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CTF) regime through the introduction of a licensing requirement for virtual asset services providers and a registration system for dealers in precious metals and stones. As of December, the government had not yet introduced a bill into the Legislative Council.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) supervises financial institutions’ risk management systems and takes disciplinary actions for those failing to comply with AML/CFT measures. In 2021, disciplinary actions were taken against three Chinese banks and a Hong Kong-based online payment provider. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CFT measures, HKMA in November launched AML Regtech Lab, or AMLab, to allow experimentation with technologies and data analytics for preventing and detecting financial crimes.

In September the Securities and Futures Commission published its revised AML/CFT guidelines, which include additional guidance to facilitate the adoption of a risk-based approach to AML/CFT measures by securities industry participants. The revised guidelines require financial institutions to apply additional due diligence and risk mitigation measures for cross-border correspondent relationships in the securities sector, such as determining through publicly available information whether the respondent institution has been subject to targeted financial sanctions or regulatory actions and obtaining senior management’s approval before establishing cross-border correspondent relationships. The guidelines also prohibit financial institutions from establishing or continuing a cross-border correspondent relationship with a shell financial institution.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no changes to Hong Kong’s CVE programming in 2021.
**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2020, the President’s executive order on Hong Kong normalization directed agencies to take action to end the provision of training to members of the Hong Kong Police Force or other Hong Kong security services at the Department of State’s International Law Enforcement Academies.

A Greater Bay Area (GBA) Anti-Money Laundering Summit was organized in October to enhance exchange and cooperation on AML among mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. The GBA refers to mainland China’s development plan to promote economic and social integration between and among Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities in Guangdong province. Hong Kong is also an APEC economy.

During July 27-31, the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau conducted the first Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau tripartite counter-cyber-and-physical-terrorism exercise with the Cyber Criminal Investigation Department of the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department and the Macau Judiciary Police. The exercise simulated a terrorist group planning to launch a terrorist attack in Hong Kong.

**Macau**

**Overview:** Historically, Macau has not been a proactive partner on counterterrorism matters, including intelligence sharing. Macau is neither a hub nor a target for international terrorist groups or extremists and maintains highly efficient security services. The stringent travel restrictions put in place by the Macau government because of the COVID-19 pandemic further reduced the likelihood of foreign terrorist threats to the city. Macau is one of the most successful and popular destinations for gambling globally and is geographically close to countries with known domestic and foreign terrorism issues, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. When international travel returns to normal levels, the city will potentially be a nexus for facilitating terrorism financing or location for terrorist activities. The Police Intervention Tactical Unit (UTIP) branch of the Macau Public Security Police Force is responsible for CT issues. UTIP’s responsibilities include protecting important installations and dignitaries and IED deactivation. Macau cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations. Despite these efforts, Macau and its law enforcement apparatus could be a stronger partner on counterterrorism and other security challenges, including providing more information related to terrorism financing and associated activities.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** No terrorist incidents were reported in Macau in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There are no updates for 2021.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Macau is a member of the APG. Macau’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Financial Intelligence Office (GIF), is a member of the Egmont Group. The GIF’s functions include freezing assets, introducing the AML/CFT assessment standards of international organizations, and sharing international organizations’ recommendations for law enforcement authorities to step up AML/CFT efforts.
The GIF’s director was appointed by FATF in 2020 as co-chair of the Asia/Pacific Joint Group (APJG), a financial action task force subgroup responsible for establishing sanction and monitoring lists. The GIF director chaired or participated in more than 20 virtual APJG meetings in 2021. The GIF provided AML/CFT training sessions to more than 900 practitioners from the financial and gaming sectors in 2021.

Macau’s interdepartmental AML/CFT working group, which was established in 2002 and currently consists of 15 government agencies, held one AML/CFT plenary meeting in May to prioritize project items listed in the Five-Year Strategic Plan for Anti-Money Laundering (2021-2025). The working group is responsible for tracking the development of AML/CFT international standards and best practices, and formulating overall policies against money laundering, terrorism financing, and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no changes in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In April the GIF signed an MOU with the New Zealand Financial Intelligence Unit on the exchange of AML/CFT intelligence.

In July, Macau’s Judiciary Police conducted the first Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau tripartite counter-cyber-and-physical-terrorism drill with the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department and the HKPF to prepare for a large-scale bomb attack and a hostage-taking crisis.

The 2020-21 tripartite online meeting among Macau authorities and those on the mainland and in Hong Kong to foster cooperation on AML/CFT took place in October, in a virtual format, with a focus on facilitating a cross-border intelligence-sharing mechanism.

**INDONESIA**

**Overview:** Indonesia continued to detect, disrupt, degrade, and deny safe haven for terrorist groups operating within its borders. ISIS-affiliated Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and ISIS-inspired lone actors targeted police and other symbols of state authority. While not a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Indonesian government and Muslim civil society leaders continually denounced ISIS and actively promoted the importance of CVE efforts to complement law enforcement counterterrorism efforts. Indonesia pursued members of al-Qa’ida-inspired Jemaah Islamiyah connected to charity fundraising, legitimate businesses, or active in mainstream religious organizations.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** ISIS-inspired groups and lone actors continued to target civilians and law enforcement:

- On March 28, two JAD members executed a suicide bombing in front of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral Church in Makassar, South Sulawesi, injuring 20 people.
- On March 31, Indonesian National Police (INP) killed an ISIS-inspired suspect after she fired an airsoft gun at police at the INP headquarters in Jakarta.
• In May, MIT members killed four villagers in Poso district, Central Sulawesi.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On April 24, the coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs announced the designation of Papuan armed groups as terrorist organizations, but Indonesia has not to date added those groups to its domestic List of Terrorism Suspects and Terrorist Organizations. Human rights organizations raised concerns of suspected extrajudicial killings by Indonesian security forces in the provinces of Papua and West Papua as part of CT operations. Human rights groups also continued to advocate for reform of the 2018 Antiterrorism Law, citing concerns that provisions of the law that allow detention without trial were not in line with international norms. The Government of Indonesia in January adjudicated victims’ requests for compensation for damages incurred attributable to past terrorist attacks in Indonesia, in accordance with Regulation No. 35/2020 on Providing Compensation, Restitution, and Assistance to Witnesses and Victims, as an implementing regulation under the 2018 Law on Terrorism.

INP counterterrorism force Densus 88 reported the arrests of 370 terror suspects during 2021, 13 of whom died while resisting arrest or in custody. Densus 88 on September 18 killed MIT leader Ali Kalora while executing the joint police-military task force Operation Madago Raya in Parigi Moutong district, Central Sulawesi. The government extended Operation Madago Raya (formerly Operation Tinombala) through December 31. Indonesia in April sentenced six suspects to death for masterminding the 2018 riot inside the INP mobile brigade command HQ detention facility in Jakarta that killed five personnel. The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) said 13 Indonesian foreign terrorist fighters were repatriated from the Philippines and Malaysia in 2021.

Border security improved, but challenges remain. Indonesia’s Customs and Excise Directorate General has the capability to screen most international passenger traffic against INTERPOL databases. Indonesia also actively contributed stolen and lost travel document (SLTD) records to the INTERPOL global database through automation. Police and other agencies maintain watchlists of suspected terrorists, but lines of communication and coordination among stakeholder agencies were not always clear. The U.S. government is working in coordination with BNPT and other Indonesian border security and law enforcement agencies to develop and consolidate these efforts through the Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program (WASP).

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Indonesia is a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Indonesia’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, is a member of the Egmont Group. Indonesia acquired observer status in FATF in 2018 and is on track toward full membership sometime in 2022. The nation is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group. In 2021, Indonesia arrested, prosecuted, and convicted individuals for financing terrorism and added 17 entities to its List of Terrorism Suspects and Terrorist Organizations.

Countering Violent Extremism: Indonesia issued a presidential executive order on January 6, formalizing its National Action Plan for CVE. BNPT also managed “deradicalization” programs for terrorist convicts. Indonesians deported from third countries for attempted travel to Iraq and Syria were enrolled in a one-month deradicalization program at a rehabilitation shelter operated
by the Ministry of Social Affairs in Bambu Apus, East Jakarta. BNPT used former terrorists for CVE outreach campaigns and helped establish boarding schools to educate children of former terrorists.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Indonesia continued to use the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation as a regional training center. Indonesia co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum CVE Working Group with Australia, which has been extended until late 2024. The Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Justice Phase 2 (AIPJ2) on law and justice reform from 2017 to 2022 addressed the prevention of violent extremism. BNPT in November recognized the Hedayah Center for modeling the Indonesian experience in the treatment of children and families affected by violent extremism as a best practice in the *Blueprint of a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center: Guiding Principles for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Family Members.* With support from the Government of Japan, Hedayah and BNPT in September delivered a capacity building program on Supporting Families in Countering Violent Extremism in Jakarta.

Indonesia continued to support CT efforts in several regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meetings on Counterterrorism, the ARF Workplan on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime, the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings (ADMM), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, and the APEC Counterterrorism Working Group. The United States and Indonesia cohosted a virtual workshop with the Republic of Korea for ASEAN members on terrorism watchlisting in November.

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**MALAYSIA**

**Overview:** Malaysia sustained counterterrorism efforts to monitor, arrest, deport, and prosecute suspected supporters of terrorist groups. Malaysian law enforcement cooperated with the United States and regional partners to increase border security at ports of entry to detect and disrupt terrorist transit and deny safe haven for terrorist networks. Malaysia is a member of the GCTF and promotes a whole-of-government approach to counter recruitment and disinformation from violent extremist groups.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist attacks in Malaysia in 2021, but the country remained a transit point and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for members of terrorist groups, including ISIS, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and al-Qa’ida. On May 8, Malaysian authorities reported the arrest and deportation of eight suspected Abu Sayyaf members from the Philippines who were reportedly planning kidnap-for-ransom activities in Sabah, a northern province in East Malaysia. Law enforcement also reported the subsequent deportation of seven suspected ASG members and the killing of two suspected ASG subleaders on May 18, who allegedly aimed to carry out kidnapping activities to fund ASG operations in the southern Philippines. The Eastern Sabah Security Command maintained its “heightened alert” status for the East Sabah area and increased maritime patrols to safeguard against kidnappings and cross-border threats.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Malaysian government did not make any changes to its security related laws, including the Security Offense Special Measures Act, the Prevention Against Terrorism Act, or the Sedition Act. Human rights organizations again advocated for a repeal of the laws, citing concerns that provisions of the law that allow detention without trial were not in line with international norms.

The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit has the lead counterterrorism law enforcement role. There were no media reports of prosecution or detention of terrorism-related suspects. Authorities stated that border closures and restricted in-country movements during the COVID-19 pandemic limited transit of terrorist networks, leading to a declining trend of arrests. Officials stated that terrorist transit through sea routes and porous borders remained a concern in Malaysia.

Malaysian authorities reported one Malaysian national repatriated from Syria in 2021. The government has reportedly repatriated 17 terrorist fighters to Malaysia from Syria and Iraq to date. The returnees include 13 adults and four children, with eight of the adults serving criminal sentences, according to media reports. Those released were admitted to a rehabilitation program administered by the government. The Malaysian government has allowed its citizens to return, provided they comply with checks, enforcement, and a government-run rehabilitation program. Malaysia has reportedly worked with other countries to facilitate its repatriations and estimates that 56 fighters and their families remain in the Middle East.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Malaysia is a member of Financial Action Task Force and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Malaysia’s Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Division is a member of the Egmont Group. In December, Malaysia’s central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, or BNM) announced preliminary findings from the National Risk Assessment 2020 (NRA 2020), prepared by the National Coordination Committee to Counter Money Laundering. The NRA 2020 identified fraud, illicit drugs trafficking, corruption, bribery, organized crime, and smuggling as crimes posing the highest risk of money laundering activity in Malaysia. The NRA 2020 also identified environmental crimes (e.g., wildlife trafficking, illegal mining) and cyber-enabled extortion as posing an “elevated risk” for money-laundering activities. BNM reported in December that the Malaysian Financial Intelligence Network, established in 2019 to facilitate information sharing between financial institutions and law enforcement agencies, has processed 44 cases related to terrorism financing, proliferation financing, corruption, and securities offenses to date.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) actively promoted a whole-of-society approach in preventing and countering violent extremism. These efforts included capacity building workshops with media professionals and civil society organizations to enhance their potential to analyze and report on terrorism trends and contribute to CVE efforts. SEARCCT also initiated its own podcast on counterterrorism narratives to encourage youth engagement. Episodes have been broadcast in both Malay and English. On regional cooperation, SEARCCT hosted training programs on border protection against terrorism in partnership with the Australian government and held advanced courses on open-source intelligence in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Centre and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. As part of the annual Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program, SEARCCT organized an online seminar on youth and terrorism for participants of 13 countries. The center also hosted other fora and webinars on contemporary issues such as terrorism financing.

International and Regional Cooperation: Malaysia continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations. Malaysian officials participated in numerous counterterrorism events hosted by the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit.

PHILIPPINES

Overview: The Philippine government placed significant resources toward countering threats from terrorist groups that operate primarily in the country’s South. Philippine military forces remained engaged in counterterrorism operations. The Philippine military, law enforcement, and judicial authorities participated in numerous U.S. capacity-building programs and used the training and equipment they received to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents. ISIS-East Asia remained the deadliest terrorist threat in the Philippines, continuing to recruit, fundraise, and stage attacks on security forces and civilians alike. ISIS-East Asia factions active in 2021 included Daulah Islamiya-Lanao (aka Maute Group), Daulah Islamiya-Maguindanao, Daulah Islamiya-Socsargen in South Cotabato, Sarangani, and General Santos City, ISIS-aligned elements of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan and Sulu, ISIS-aligned elements of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and rogue elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Philippines remained a destination for FTFs from Indonesia and Malaysia. The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) continued attacks on both security forces and civilians.

The government intensified actions against CPP/NPA and ISIS-East Asia through military operations and legal actions to cut off financing. Human rights organizations continued to raise concerns over security forces’ “red tagging” of civil society advocates and human rights defenders as communists or terrorists or both, which has led to threats, harassment, and killings of so-called red-tagged individuals. The government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including strict travel regulations, limited the ability of terrorist groups to travel and conduct The government intensified actions against CPP/NPA and ISIS East Asia through military operations and legal actions to cut off financing. Human rights organizations continued to raise concerns over security forces’ “red tagging” of civil society advocates and human rights defenders as communists or terrorists or both, which has led to threats, harassment, and killings of so-called red-tagged individuals. The government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including strict travel regulations, limited the ability of terrorist groups to travel and conduct operations.

The Philippine government continued a peace process with the MILF and transitioning to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), a semi-autonomous region established in 2019 after decades of conflict with Islamic extremist groups. The government postponed the first BARMM regional elections, originally scheduled for 2022, until 2025.
Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, the region’s transitional government, welcomed the decision, saying that the authority needed more time to establish legislative and parliamentary processes. The decision drew approval from peace advocates and human rights organizations. However, some rogue MILF elements and breakaway groups — including BIFF and ISIS-East Asia— continued to oppose the peace process and continue attacks in the region.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist attacks using, IEDs and small arms continued to target civilians and security forces:

- In June, two North Cotabato buses were bombed and torched, killing four persons. Authorities arrested Ali Akbar, a bomb maker for ISIS Affiliate Daulah Islamiya, in connection with the event. IEDs, blasting caps, and an ISIS flag were found in his possession.
- In September, eight persons were wounded by an explosion at a volleyball court in Datu Piang, Maguindanao. One victim was a 13-year-old boy; many others were members of the LGBTQI+ community. Authorities were unable to identify the perpetrators but believed BIFF to be behind the attack, as the group had sent death threats to local LGBTQI+ members days before.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Antiterrorism Act (ATA), signed into law in 2020 and developed with assistance from the United States, faced 37 petitions challenging its constitutionality in the Supreme Court, making it the most contested piece of legislation in Philippine history. Opponents of the ATA worried the law could be used against political rivals and human rights defenders. The government maintained that while the ATA expands the government’s authority to investigate and prosecute terrorists, it will not use such powers against human rights defenders. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled the ATA constitutional except for two provisions. One stricken provision allowed the government to arrest protesters if they endanger the public; the court ruled the provision to be overly broad and too easily abused. The second allowed the government to consider one a terrorist based solely on determinations by the UN Security Council, without the need for the government to make its own determination.

Government forces made several significant enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups, including disruptions and arrests.

In February, security forces arrested nine Abu Sayyaf members alleged to have been plotting attacks on military targets in Jolo. Security forces seized IEDs and other explosives after a raid on the suspects’ homes. The members were widows of Abu Sayyaf fighters killed in combat six months earlier. Abu Sayyaf insurgents detonated two bombs in Jolo province, killing 14 people and wounding 75 others.

In October, security forces killed Salahuddin Hassan, leader of ISIS-Near East and one of the government’s most wanted militants, during a raid in Maguindanao. Hassan was alleged to have planned dozens of bombings across Mindanao, most prominently orchestrating the 2016 bombing of a Davao night market that resulted in the deaths of 15 people. He allegedly led other
bombings, extortion, and kidnappings across the region as well as constructed bombs for other regional militant groups — including Abu Sayyaf.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In June, FATF placed the Philippines on its “gray list,” a registry of countries subjected to increased monitoring, to prove its progress against terrorist financing. In response to the FATF finding, the Philippines made high-level commitments to resolve strategic deficiencies outlined by FATF. Despite remaining on the gray list, FATF praised the Philippines in October for its efforts to respond to the FATF finding; FATF gave the Philippines until 2023 to resolve all strategic deficiencies. The Philippines is a member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its Financial Intelligence Unit, the Anti-Money Laundering Council, is a member of the Egmont Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government has a National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and has developed and implemented CVE training for security forces and civil servants. Local governments, NGOs, and the private sector partnered on CVE programs. The Armed Forces of the Philippines worked with local stakeholders to encourage defections from the ASG, BIFF, and ISIS-Near East and to rehabilitate former terrorist fighters. The government also supported strategic communications efforts to counter terrorist messaging. The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund provides funds for local implementers across the Philippines for programs to prevent and counter violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Philippines continued to support CT efforts in several regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN, ASEAN, ARF, ADMM, and APEC. The Philippine Navy continued joint patrols with its Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts under a 2017 trilateral arrangement to combat piracy, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade. Further, the Philippines and the United States in February co-hosted with Australia the second virtual workshop in a three-workshop series for ARF members on watchlisting, aviation security, and information sharing. The Philippines is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and participates in the organization’s Counter-ISIS Financing and Communications working groups.

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**SINGAPORE**

**Overview:** Singapore continued to identify counterterrorism as the nation’s top security policy priority and has a comprehensive CT strategy based on global and regional trends. The strategy included vigilant security measures, regional and international law enforcement cooperation, efforts to counter radicalization to violence, and a campaign to prepare the populace for possible attacks. Singapore was a committed, active, and effective CT partner in 2021. CT remained a pillar of the security relationship between Singaporean and U.S. law enforcement and security services. Cooperation on CT and information sharing continued during 2021. Singapore’s domestic CT apparatus and its ability to detect, deter, and disrupt threats remained effective. The government’s 2021 terrorism threat assessment report continued to identify global terrorist networks and domestically “self-radicalized” individuals influenced by online material as the prime terrorism threats.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Singapore in 2021.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists. The ISA authorizes the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), with the consent of the president, to order arrests and detentions without a warrant, trial, or full judicial due process, if it is determined that individuals pose a threat to national security. There were no changes to terrorism-related legislation in 2021, but amendments to the Police Force Act passed in August enhanced the police’s operational capabilities, powers, and readiness during a crisis such as terrorist incidents.

Singapore detained several individuals under ISA for terrorism-related activities in 2021, including a 20-year-old Singaporean in March for reportedly plotting to attack and kill Jews at a synagogue, the first plan that was allegedly motivated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Singapore also detained a Singaporean woman for allegedly supporting ISIS. Singapore released six Singaporeans who were previously detained under ISA, after assessing their rehabilitation progress and determining the individuals no longer posed a security threat that required preventive detention. Singapore allowed restriction orders against seven individuals to lapse.

Security forces continued to be on heightened alert and the Singapore Police Force and Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) enhanced border security measures and patrols. Singapore’s law enforcement and security services were capable of proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism, including through interagency cooperation, regular exercises, and information sharing.

Singapore maintains a “not if, but when” stance regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the country. The government’s SGSecure public awareness campaign, which aims to enhance emergency preparedness and community resilience, has used online programs and training sessions during the COVID-19 global pandemic. Under SGSecure, different government agencies also reached out to various segments of the community, such as schools, workplaces, and religious organizations.

To detect possible terrorist movements by air into or transiting through the country, Singapore’s primary border security agency, ICA, implemented Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data collection in 2019. ICA enhanced its border capabilities by operationalizing a multimodal biometrics clearance concept to detect fraudulent travel documents.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Singapore is a member of FATF and APG, and its Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office is a member of the Egmont Group. Singapore published its Terrorism Financing National Risk Assessment in 2020, identifying key CFT threats and vulnerabilities. There were no legislative changes in 2021, but Parliament passed an act that allowed the central bank to regulate cryptocurrencies, arguing they had a higher inherent terrorism financing risk.

Singapore convicted and sentenced a Singaporean man under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act in September to 46 months in prison for supporting ISIS with a total of $750. In December a Bangladeshi national was charged for terrorism financing for allegedly transferring
$650 to support ISIS. The Monetary Authority of Singapore conducted a series of counterterrorism financing supervisory examinations of payment service providers, including remittance agents in 2021 to assess the adequacy of existing controls.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Through entities such as the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), Singapore serves as a regional CVE hub. The government encourages interreligious and interethnic dialogue through Interracial and Religious Confidence Circles, the interagency Aftercare Group, and local community fora that bring leaders from Singapore’s religious and ethnic communities together to discuss issues of concern and build trust. The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Islamic authority in charge of Muslim affairs, maintains a social media presence and holds outreach and educational events to counter terrorist propaganda and recruitment efforts. MUIS manages the Asatizah Recognition Scheme that vets Islamic Religious Council teachers and scholars in Singapore.

RRG, a volunteer organization made up of religious scholars and teachers, has had success in counseling detainees held under the ISA through a comprehensive program involving religious and psychological counseling. RRG also operates a resource and counseling center for the Muslim community and held virtual community events and engagement sessions during the COVID-19 pandemic, including to raise awareness about the threats of online radicalization to violence. RRG and the Interagency Aftercare Group also conduct counter-ideology outreach activities for students and youths. In February, the government announced it was adjusting its rehabilitation program to include nonideological factors that led to radicalization to violence, as ISA detainees get younger. In January, the government launched the Online Industry Safety and Security Watch Group, which enabled the police and tech companies to share information to counter terrorism, among other crimes, and the spread of violent extremist propaganda through digital platforms.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Singapore is an active participant in CT cooperation efforts in ASEAN, ARF, ADMM, and APEC. The nation is a strong advocate for the ASEAN “Our Eyes” regional initiative, which strives for ministerial-level CT information sharing. Singapore participated in the Aqaba Process Virtual Meeting in September, INTERPOL’s Project Pacific working group to discuss CT issues in November, and the Third Subregional Meeting on Counterterrorism in December. Singapore operationalized and officially opened the Counterterrorism Information Facility in 2021, a Singapore-led initiative to increase information sharing among military and law enforcement agencies.

**THAILAND**

**Overview:** Thailand did not experience any attacks attributed to transnational terrorist groups in 2021, and violence was limited to attacks attributed to ethnonationalist insurgents in the country’s Deep South (the southernmost provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and parts of Songkhla). Violence levels in the Deep South in 2021 were higher than the previous year but remained at historically low levels since the conflict reignited in 2004. There is no evidence to date of any operational linkages between domestic insurgents and international networks. The
reopening of Thailand’s borders and loosening of COVID-related travel restrictions has increased the risk of Thailand’s becoming a transit and facilitation hub given the high volume of travelers through Bangkok and the available market of illegal goods. Thailand remained a productive counterterrorism partner in 2021, though the Thai government continued to focus on domestic political challenges as its primary security priority.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Insurgent attacks and related fatalities in 2021 increased from the previous year but were confined to Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Insurgents predominantly used small arms, IEDs, and VBIEDs. Incidents included the following:

- On January 31, an IED wounded eight police officers in Narathiwat province as they responded to a suspected arson attack on a cellular communications tower. Police found three more IEDs near the scene.
- On February 25, a combined IED and small arms attack killed two paramilitary rangers and wounded one in Narathiwat province.
- On March 19, an IED injured six territorial defense volunteers in Yala province.
- On August 3, an armed group attacked a military river outpost in Narathiwat with grenades and small arms, killing one and wounding four others. Media reported the attack was launched from across the river in Malaysia.
- On September 28, an IED killed two police officers and wounded four in Narathiwat province. During a raid in Narathiwat on the same day, two paramilitary rangers and six suspected insurgents were killed in a series of clashes. Two days later, armed men attacked a security checkpoint with IEDs and small arms, wounding a police officer, a defense volunteer, and three villagers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Thailand is in the process of drafting a new Counterterrorism Act, which aims to combine existing terrorism-related laws into one document, although no progress was reported in 2021. Thailand is drafting its next four-year National Counterterrorism Strategy for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks following the conclusion of the period of performance of its 2017-21 strategy document. Details have not been made public. Under the previous strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained plans for collaboration with foreign governments.

Thailand’s law enforcement authorities continue to demonstrate capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Multiple entities including the Royal Thai Police, the Department of Special Investigation, and components of the Thai military have law enforcement responsibilities on counterterrorism cases. Interagency cooperation and coordination were sporadic, information sharing was limited, and the delineation of duties between law enforcement and military units with counterterrorism responsibilities was unclear.

Thailand’s borders are relatively porous, and information sharing within Thailand and with neighboring countries is limited. The market in fraudulent documents remained active despite government efforts to crack down on criminal counterfeit networks. Since 2016, Thailand has collected and analyzed API/PNR data on commercial flights at all international airports. As of late 2018, Thailand’s immigration system was real-time connected with INTERPOL’s stolen and lost travel document database.
Thailand hosted and participated in courses offered at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, which included relevant training on narcotics investigations, media relations, leadership, financial investigations, cyber investigations, human trafficking investigations, arms trafficking investigations, wildlife trafficking investigations, tactical safety, personnel and physical security, radiological and nuclear material detection, post-blast investigations, and border interdictions.

On November 4, the Cabinet approved Thailand’s Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO)-proposed amendments to the anti-money-laundering law to bring it in line with international standards on countering money laundering and combating financing of terrorism. The draft bill aims to help Thailand become a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by 2023.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Thailand belongs to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body, which commits to the effective implementation and enforcement of FATF’s internationally accepted standards against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. AMLO is Thailand’s financial intelligence unit and a member of the Egmont Group. Thailand does not have a significant unregulated informal banking and money transfer system that could aid terrorism financing activities. In cases where the central bank (the Bank of Thailand) has discovered unauthorized remittances, it has coordinated with the police to arrest the offenders.

Thailand, through AMLO, has promptly issued designation orders each time the UN has made a change to the list of designated persons or entities pursuant to UNSCRs 1373, 1267, and 1988, passed the updates to all relevant agencies through the electronic gateway by secure email, and published an updated consolidation of all designations on the AMLO website. If any transaction was found by the designated person or entity under the UNSCRs, AMLO would freeze those assets. Thailand displays a generally high level of political commitment to combating terrorist financing and demonstrates generally good compliance.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The national counterterrorism strategy published in 2017 included a CVE component. Thailand lacks a national CVE action plan, but the National Security Policy and Plan published in 2019 (2019-22) includes regionally specific security plans that focus on violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Thailand is a member of regional and international multilateral fora, through which it participates in counterterrorism efforts, including ASEAN, ADMM, ARF, APEC, and the East Asia Summit.
EUROPE

Overview

During 2021, Europe continued to face ongoing terrorist threats and concerns, including from U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVEs), and terrorists inspired by ISIS. ISIS proved its ideological influence, even in the absence of controlling physical territory, and continued to project its power by recruiting from European countries and inspiring attacks against symbolic European targets and public spaces. Most terrorist incidents involved simple plots with easily executable tactics, using knives, guns, or vehicles to injure or kill targets of opportunity in France, Germany, Türkiye, and the UK.

In Eastern Europe, the United States maintained many strong counterterrorism partners. While the threat of terrorism in Eastern Europe remains low, foreign terrorist groups take advantage of active illicit smuggling and trafficking networks to attempt to facilitate entry of terrorists into Europe from the Middle East and South Asia.

Additionally, Eastern European countries, especially former communist countries, have become the target of state-sponsored disinformation and propaganda, seeking to exploit societal and cultural wedge issues and strengthen extremist groups. In 2021, Türkiye remained a transit point for FTFs departing Syria and Iraq. Also, Türkiye expanded its counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria and provided counterterrorism support to Somalia.

Separately, many European governments are concerned about the additional threat posed by REMVE actors. REMVE groups actively worked to engage, recruit, and radicalize to violence online. The persons motivated and inspired by these violent extremist groups and ideologies behaved as lone actors, frequently using improvised weapons to make attacks against individuals repeatedly criticized by the REMVE groups or identified on target lists. The lack of formal ties between the REMVE groups and lone actors significantly limited the ability of law enforcement to pursue charges, legal designations, or sanctions against the groups inspiring the attacks. Common themes motivated the attacks, including antivaccine sentiments, xenophobia, and socioeconomic inequality.

The United States supported partners across Europe in their efforts to build counterterrorism capacity and technical assistance in aviation and border security, advisory assistance for regional security forces, countering terrorist finance, advancing criminal justice sector reforms, and training and mentoring of law enforcement to manage crisis response and conduct investigations. European partners undertook efforts to develop and expand regional cooperation mechanisms to detect and interdict terrorist travel and other terrorism-related activities.

ALBANIA

Overview: Albania continued its strong support of international counterterrorism efforts in 2021, repatriating 19 of its citizens (five women and 14 children) from displaced persons camps in Syria and engaging in the process of reintegrating and rehabilitating them throughout the year.
The country has adopted national strategies on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism through 2025 and is in the process of drafting a new CVE strategy. The terrorism threat in Albania consists of FTO attempts to radicalize Albanian youth to violence, as well as Iran’s state-sponsored activity directed against the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen-e-Khaleq, members of whom resettled in Albania.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Albania in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Albania’s counterterrorism laws criminalize terrorist acts. It is illegal to join a terrorist organization, receive terrorism-related training, provide material support (including financing) to a terrorist organization, travel or intend to travel to fight on behalf of a terrorist organization, or participate in a foreign army. On June 1, pursuant to an amendment to the Albanian constitution, the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure received sole jurisdiction over terrorism offenses.

The Albanian State Police Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) worked closely with U.S. agencies to align Albanian government training and equipment requirements with U.S. expertise and resources, ensuring the Albanian government develops focused counterterrorism capabilities. The CTU received extensive amounts of training and equipment throughout the year from the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. The Albanian government has developed, in conjunction with international partners, contingency plans and capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets.

On August 1, Albania repatriated 19 citizens — five women and 14 children — from displaced persons camps in Syria. The Albanian government’s CVE Center directed the rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals and coordinated the efforts of various ministries, international donors, civil society members, and non-governmental organizations to support these efforts.

Corruption and barriers to information sharing among government agencies, insufficient intra-agency coordination, and weak judicial systems continued to hinder Albania’s law enforcement efforts at all levels. Implementation of deep reforms in the judicial sector continues, which began with the vetting of Albania’s 800 judges and prosecutors for corruption, competence, and ties to organized crime.

Albania has committed to enhancing its border security and screening efforts to interdict terrorist travel, in line with international standards, and with support from U.S. experts and programs. Albanian law enforcement services cooperate extensively with INTERPOL and other international law enforcement bodies. Albania continues work to implement UNSCR 2396 regarding Advanced Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR) data, which enhances screening of air passengers entering the country. The country has adopted a national law on API/PNR, and the United States and Albania solidified commitment to deepen cooperation in support of implementing this law. Albania sustains a port security oversight system to comply with requirements under the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Albania has implemented a stricter prison regime for dangerous convicts, called Article 41-bis of the Prison Administration Act. The
country also is an active bilateral partner on watchlisting development through the CT Bureau-funded WASP.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Albania is a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Albania’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group.

Albania’s FIU works to prevent and combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. Because of deficiencies in its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, Albania has been on MONEYVAL’s “enhanced follow up status” since 2018. In 2020, FATF added Albania to its gray list of countries with strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.

The country continued to work with FATF and MONEYVAL to address these deficiencies, but MONEYVAL reported in May that Albania has not significantly improved measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in line with FATF recommendations. MONEYVAL decided that Albania should remain in the enhanced follow-up procedure and report back on further progress to strengthen its implementation of AML/CFT measures annually.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Government of Albania has a national CVE strategy through 2025 and is in the process of drafting a new strategy. The National CVE Center coordinates and manages CVE programming among international donors and seeks to ensure all ministries cooperate effectively and avoid duplication of efforts. The capital Tirana, as well as the cities of Bulqizë, Cërrik, Elbasan, and Librazhd are members of the Strong Cities Network. The Albanian State Police has incorporated CVE into the portfolios of 26 community police units around the country. The chiefs of these units received training from the U.S. government and implement projects with local government counterparts aimed at detecting and countering terrorist radicalization efforts.

Embassy Tirana supports CVE efforts with a wide range of assistance programs and diplomatic engagement, including to local community groups that identify and mitigate factors underlying violent extremism. Albania is on the board of GCERF, which has three local partners in the country that work on CVE issues: the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, the Counseling Line for Women, and Terre des Hommes.

Embassy Tirana oversees the implementation of the fourth iteration of a CVE grant to the Muslim Community of Albania, which includes engagement by Islamic clergy with at-risk youths and their parents to steer youths away from paths to radicalization to violence and informing them about democratic principles, human rights, civic duties, and tolerance.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Albania is a member of the Adriatic Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, the United Nations, and the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (*Hedayah*). In 2021 it served as a nonpermanent
AUSTRIA

Overview: U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation remained strong. U.S. law enforcement agencies continued to assist in investigations of the 2020 terrorist attack in Vienna, during which a 20-year-old Austrian of North Macedonia origin killed four persons and injured 23 others. Parliament passed additional counterterrorism legislation, including on Hizballah, providing additional funding of $137 million for 2021-24, and $5.8 million to fight cybercrime. Parliament also passed legislation to reform the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism, Austria’s key counterterrorism agency within the Interior Ministry, and replaced it December 1 with the Directorate for Security and Intelligence (DSN).

Reforms included increased staffing of the agency’s “extremism” section and hiring more highly qualified personnel. DSN’s new chief said in late 2021 that “radical elements” exploiting protests against COVID-19 restrictions constituted one of Austria’s top security concerns. Other counterterrorism raids and investigations focused on “Islamist extremism,” alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the “right-wing extremist scene,” which promoted anti-Muslim and antimigrant violence. Austrian courts continued to impose stiff prison sentences for convicted “Islamist terrorists.”

The DSN monitors an estimated 90 people who returned to Austria from conflict zones, and the Interior Ministry estimated at the end of 2021 that 100 Austrian FTFs were still in Syria and Iraq. Overall, Austrian officials note that “Islamist terrorist” mobilization substantially declined after 2015.

Austria is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Stabilization working groups, with emphases on stabilization, the problem of FTFs, and countering violent extremism. Law enforcement agencies focused on intelligence gathering and investigations, as well as on sharing information with international partners. Austria has contributed significant humanitarian aid and separate funding for stabilization related to Defeat-ISIS efforts. Austria maintains an embassy in Damascus (the ambassador is accredited to Lebanon and Syria and based in Beirut, traveling periodically to Damascus).

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Austria in 2021. Investigations continued into the aforementioned 2020 terrorist attack in Vienna by the 20-year-old Austrian of North Macedonian origin. Police killed the attacker. Since the attack, investigators determined the terrorist acted alone but received encouragement from four ISIS sympathizers, and he received material support, including assistance obtaining ammunition, from three others. Authorities are holding these seven accomplices in pretrial detention.

provided more staff, funding, and legal tools for justice and law enforcement authorities to
detain, prosecute, and deradicalize potential terrorists. The legislation also increased resources
for monitoring and deradicalization of convicted terrorists, allowed electronic tracking of
released offenders, and prohibited them from visiting certain potentially radicalizing sites (e.g.,
some specific mosques). It also allowed authorities to strip dual-national convicts of Austrian
citizenship, expanded oversight of mosques and financing of Muslim institutions, and banned
symbols of Hizballah and the “right-wing extremist” Identitarians. The law also tightened
legislative loopholes against terrorism financing and brought Austrian legislation in line with EU
directive 2018/1673 on combating money laundering in criminal law.

In November, an appellate court declared the 2020 raids by Austrian authorities against
suspected members of the Muslim Brotherhood illegitimate in 10 cases and concluded that
related property seizures and confiscations in those cases also were illegal. Investigations
continue against other suspects charged in those raids.

Austrian law enforcement and DSN officials routinely cooperated with U.S. law enforcement in
a range of areas, including joint investigative projects and enforcement operations. Austria has
taken a whole-of-government approach to implement UN Security Council resolutions on
counterterrorism as well as the Global Counterterrorism Forum Good Practices on Addressing
the Challenge of Returning Families of FTFs. Austrian law punishes “travel for terrorism
purposes” with prison sentences of six months to five years, extends domestic jurisdiction to
individuals in Austria who committed a crime abroad, and ensures legal counsel for terror
victims. This law implements the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism and the UN’s
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

In 2021, Austria extended temporary border checks with its Schengen Zone neighbor countries,
introduced in 2016, and announced it was adding 1,000 soldiers at its eastern borders to thwart
increased illegal border crossings. Regulations allow border authorities to prevent minors from
leaving Austria on suspicion they would participate in foreign fighting activities. Border security
forces continued to make effective use of security measures, including biographic and biometric
screening at ports of entry, and information sharing internally and with other EU countries.
Austria’s rigorous processes to register and screen individuals applying for asylum, lawful
residence, and citizenship remained unchanged in 2021. EU and Austrian privacy statutes
occasionally limit Austria’s ability to fully utilize tools available through international
cooperation.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Austria is a member FATF. The Austrian Financial
Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. Related legislation aims to close loopholes
in Austria’s laws against financing of terrorism and bring them into conformity with pertinent
EU legislation.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Austrian, Belgian, Danish, and French government
representatives announced joint cooperation projects in fighting radicalization and Islamist
extremism at a Vienna conference in October, and Austria announced it would also seek similar
cooperative arrangements with other countries. Efforts in combating what the Austrian
government has called “political Islam” have been controversial, including the establishment of a
Documentation Office on Political Islam in 2020 and the government’s publication of an “Islam Map” identifying the locations of Muslim institutions in Austria.

Austria’s national action plan on Extremism Prevention and Deradicalization calls for improved networking among law enforcement agencies and civil society institutions; extension of exit programs for individuals radicalized to violence; better “transition management” through decoupling of terrorism convicts from their terrorist communities; increased civics and democracy education in schools; research on extremist and antidemocratic movements; providing counternarratives to radicalization myths through information campaigns; and inclusion of the findings of the Documentation Office on Political Islam.

The Ministry of European and International Affairs continued its cooperation with the Islamic faith community to conduct information campaigns in mosques, Islamic organizations, community centers, and prisons.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Austria hosted Western Balkan leaders in June to discuss measures against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal migration. Austria participates in Eurojust’s EU-wide register, which lists ongoing terrorism investigations by EU member states.

Austria has membership in the following organizations:

- The UN
- The EU
- The Council of Europe
- The OSCE
- The Salzburg Forum
- The Central European Initiative
- The Western Balkans Counter Terrorism Initiative

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**BELGIUM**

**Overview:** Belgium had an active counterterrorism policy that included robust domestic security efforts, international information sharing, and support for multilateral efforts. The country’s greatest terrorism threat remained homegrown terrorism carried out by lone actors, whether inspired by Islamist violent extremism or, to a lesser extent, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, which Belgium calls “violent right-wing extremism.” The general threat level during 2021 remained at 2 on a four-point scale, with 4 the most severe. During the COVID-19 pandemic, authorities noted an increase in “right-wing extremist propaganda,” especially online.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist attacks in Belgium during 2021.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Belgium’s primary CT-related agencies included the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice, together with both federal and local police, the civilian and military security and intelligence services, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor, the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, and the National Security Council. The Ministry of Interior maintained a Crisis Center. An interagency body called the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), comprising representatives of the relevant ministries, was responsible for setting nationwide threat-level ratings and maintaining Belgium’s database of individuals with a nexus to terror. Belgium’s law enforcement capacity, although underfunded, was capable and experienced in responding to and deterring terrorist activity.

During 2021, CUTA was reportedly tracking about 675 people for links to terrorism, of whom about 50 were in the category of violent right-wing extremism and about 15 in the category of “violent left-wing extremism.” The majority of the remaining were linked to Islamic extremism.

Belgian law enforcement took actions to disrupt potential terrorist actions. Some examples include the following:

- In March, Belgian police arrested four minors who had been radicalized to violence by online jihadist propaganda and who were at various stages of plotting terrorist attacks. The four were not working together.

- On May 17, a former Belgian special forces soldier, Jurgen Conings, left behind a note that threatened violence against health experts and politicians and disappeared with a significant arsenal of military weapons. His body was found five weeks later after a three-country manhunt, dead of an apparent suicide. The case exposed poor controls and communication between the military intelligence and operational sectors. On July 9, Defense Minister Ludivine Dedonder fired the head of military intelligence and promised improved vigilance and controls to prevent persons with known far-right views from becoming violent threats.

For 2021, Interior Minister Annelies Verlinden announced a budget increase of $5.8 million supporting the recruitment of 1,600 new staff, including police officers. For 2021, Justice Minister Vincent Van Quickenborne announced a $322 million increase to hire 1,400 new staff and ensure “a faster justice process,” representing a 15 percent augmentation over the Federal Public Service Justice’s 2020 budget. In mid-2021, the justice minister and the director of state security announced an additional increase of more than $10 million specifically for hiring staff and modernizing the state security computer infrastructure.

During 2021, Belgium’s Parliament did not pass any legislation that would alter Belgium’s ability to investigate, prosecute, or deter terrorism. Challenges to effective counterterrorism efforts continued to include Belgium’s complex government; the difficulty of information sharing between various agencies; data collection and retention regulations; short prison sentences; and bureaucratic hurdles to the full use of civil informants. Belgium implemented UNSCR 2396 through, among other actions, the implementation of the EU PNR directive for air
travelers, through its aggressive prosecution of known FTFs, often in absentia, and through its maintenance of databases to track known and suspected terrorists. Belgium’s Passenger Information Unit made a significant contribution to travel-related information analysis.

On July 17, pursuant to a policy change announced in March, Belgium repatriated six female FTFs with their 10 children from northeastern Syria. This was the first government-initiated repatriation of adult FTFs, motivated mostly by concern for the children. There remained about 20 adults and 20 children with a claim to Belgian citizenship in camps/detention in northeastern Syria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Belgium has been a member of FATF since 1990. Its FIU, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Belgium is also a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG). In 2006, in response to UNSC 1373, the country created a domestic designation regime that allows it to freeze the assets of listed terrorists. Belgium has implemented the EU’s Fourth and Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directives.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, Belgium replaced its plan to counter radicalization to violence, “Plan R,” with a new counterterrorism strategy. Known as “StrategyTer,” the new plan expands the strategy to include far-right and far-left extremism. It better incorporates the various federal, regional, and community actors in concentrating on preventing violent extremism. The plan reinforces the local task forces established under Plan R to coordinate the CVE response among local security, municipal, NGO, and social services personnel. During 2021, the Belgian cities of Antwerp, Liège, and Vilvoorde remained part of the Strong Cities Network and participated in a CT-sponsored CVE workshop following up on their City Pair exchanges, as did the city of Verviers.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Belgium participated in CT efforts with the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, and it was a member of the advisory board of the UN Counterterrorism Center. The country was also an active contributor to the subcommittees of the UNSC responsible for counterterrorism. Belgium was a troop-contributing member of Operation Inherent Resolve in Jordan, the European Union Training Mission in Mali, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Belgium participated in all EU efforts to interdict FTF travel across land and maritime borders, encouraged efforts to strengthen Schengen Zone external borders, and maintained a leading role in the European Strategic Communication Network. The nation was not a member of the GCTF but often participated as an observer. CUTA represents Belgium on the newly created EU Network of Prevent Policy-Makers, which is primarily dedicated to the fight against violent extremism. In addition to the CIFG, Belgium is a member of the Stabilization, Communications, and Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Groups in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

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**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

**Overview:** Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner, although its capacity remains limited and little progress was made on legal and regulatory reforms
because of the ongoing political crisis caused by secessionist rhetoric and obstruction of state-level institutions by Republika Srpska entity leaders and federation entity dysfunction attributable to Croat and Bosniak tensions and concentration on narrow political interests. There were no known registered Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens who attempted to travel to foreign battlefields in 2021, although some FTFs and family members remain in Iraq and Syria. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a willing partner in repatriation of FTFs, and in July established an interagency coordinating body to oversee future repatriation efforts. On CT investigations, interpersonal and interagency infighting and stovepiping undermine fully effective cooperation.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The adoption of a new national Strategy for the Prevention and the Fight Against Terrorism 2020-24 remains delayed despite the previous strategy’s expiration in 2020. In May the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers appointed an interagency working group to draft the new strategy, which is still under way. In March the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security formed an interagency coordination body to develop a plan for the repatriation, prosecution, or reintegration of alleged FTFs and their family members in Iraq and Syria. The Coordination Body was finalizing the whole-of-government plan at the end of 2021. The Ministry of Security CT Section increased staffing with the appointment of an assistant minister and a new head of CT. The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) continued to be the lead law enforcement unit performing CT functions; however, its effectiveness was limited owing to poor cooperation with the State Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) and, at times, poor investigatory practices. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have clear regulations and guidelines that govern cooperation among prosecutors, law enforcement, and the intelligence community in national security investigations. The SPO and SIPA continued to receive training provided by the Department of State’s ATA program; by the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training program (OPDAT) and DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program; and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Special Operations Command Europe.

In 2021, limited in-person trainings restarted. An SPO-led task force met three times in 2021, but law enforcement cooperation at a more strategic level continued to suffer because of an ongoing political crisis and from the impediments of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complex governmental structure. Political leadership often failed to support implementing U.S.-funded initiatives despite a desire from law enforcement professionals. Ongoing disagreements over state-versus-entity competencies prevented progress on updating laws and regulations governing the collection and use of airline passenger information in line with international standards. There was some progress, however, on updating border security and screening systems and technology. The Foreigners’ Affairs Service continues to enhance efforts to screen irregular migrants for links to terrorism.

In 2021, five FTFs who had repatriated to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2019, were convicted and sentenced to between one and six years. The SPO also indicted another FTF who was
repatriated from Türkiye in 2020. However, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina acquitted this defendant of all charges. A trial of a defendant indicted for the public incitement of terrorist activities in late 2020 commenced in 2021 and is ongoing. DOJ’s OPDAT provided case-based mentoring and guidance to Bosnia and Herzegovina partners in these investigations and prosecutions.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bosnia and Herzegovina is a member of MONEYVAL. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Department, is a member of the Egmont Group. Because of the current political crisis, little progress was made in updating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism legislation. Bosnia and Herzegovina also did not complete its National Risk Assessment, as required by MONEYVAL. Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated its first Financing of Terrorism case in 2021 involving a dual Bosnia and Herzegovina and Swiss citizen who allegedly provided funds to her husband, a member of ISIS fighting in Syria at the time. While the indictment is a sign of some progress for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SPO still needs to develop its capacity to investigate terrorist financing cases.

Additionally, the Bosnia and Herzegovina judiciary still tends to treat alleged terrorists lightly. This is especially true with female defendants whom Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities almost universally disregard as possible criminals. There were no designations for asset freezing based on UNSCRs in 2021, although in December Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities received training from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and OSCE on how to nominate entities for UN terrorism-related sanctions, and Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities were working with DOJ to submit multiple nominations.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Violent extremist ideology and violent regional nationalist groups remain potential sources of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2021, the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought about unprecedented divisive rhetoric by the country’s ethnonationalist political leaders. At the same time, the main religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, and Orthodox) continued to work together through the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote tolerance and confront acts of bigotry or violence directed at any of these communities. Religious communities noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities failed to tap into the expertise of religious communities in countering violent extremism or deradicalizing returnees from Syria and Iraq. In 2021, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives completed its programming to prevent and counter violent extremism programming. International and local actors working on countering radicalization made significant efforts in broadening their analysis beyond radical Islam to include extreme ethnonationalism and foreign influence, as well as domestic drivers of “extreme ideologies.” Bihać, Bijeljina, Sarajevo’s Centar municipality, Doboj, Jablanica, Prijedor, Srebrenik, and Tuzla are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The SPO continues to work with the United States, regional neighbors, and EU countries on CT investigations. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a member of or participating state in the UN, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, the Council of Europe.
BULGARIA

Overview: Bulgaria remained a strong counterterrorism partner of the United States. While the threat of terrorism in Bulgaria remains low, foreign terrorist groups take advantage of Bulgaria’s active illicit smuggling and trafficking networks to attempt to facilitate entry of terrorists into Europe from the Middle East and South Asia. In 2021, the government continued counterterrorism capacity building and maintained close cooperation with U.S. government agencies, though capability gaps continued to hinder overall effectiveness. Given Bulgaria’s strategic location as a crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, most of Bulgaria’s CT efforts focus on disrupting FTF transit through enhanced border security activities, traveler screening, and information sharing.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist attacks reported in Bulgaria in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The State Agency for National Security (DANS) is the lead for counterterrorism in Bulgaria. A separate National Counterterrorism Center, operating within DANS since 2014, aims to identify suspects, exchange information, and disrupt terrorist activities. The State Intelligence Agency also contains a small, primarily analytic CT capability and an equally small operational capability focused on threats to Bulgarian interests abroad. The Ministry of Interior contains a separate Special Weapons and Tactics team focused internally on domestic threats.

Throughout 2021, Bulgaria continued to conduct effective counterterrorism activities at its borders, executing strong migration control programs, U.S.-enabled biographic and biometric screening programs, and information sharing with the United States and other partners to identify and apprehend terrorist suspects crossing the borders or illegally residing in the country. Throughout the reporting period, U.S. government agencies worked closely with Bulgarian counterparts through a variety of border-focused CT capacity building programs. For example, the Departments of Homeland Security and State partnered with Bulgaria to implement screening programs in border and aviation security.

In 2021, two caretaker governments were responsible for eight months of the reporting period. As such, no major legislative changes occurred related to counterterrorism. Rather, political instability went hand in hand with uncertainty over the status of Specialized Criminal Courts with jurisdiction over terrorism cases. Judges and prosecutors in the specialized courts were ill-equipped to prosecute terrorists as they worked under legislative gaps and deficiencies.

Notable terrorism cases included the following:

- In February, prosecutors indicted Bulgarian national of Syrian descent Mohammed Abdulkader for actively supporting terrorism in Syria as a foreign terrorist fighter. Authorities reported Abdulkader’s father recruited him, and he traveled to Syria five times from 2017 through 2019 to fight with terrorist groups in Aleppo.
- In December, the Specialized Criminal Court issued a six-month suspended sentence against a minor who was arrested in 2019 at age 16 in Plovdiv on charges of plotting a
terrorist attack using homemade IEDs, which he built using ISIS online tutorials. He reportedly was unaffiliated with any terrorist group.

**Countering Terrorist Financing:** In September, the Bulgarian government adopted an action plan targeting terrorist financing and money laundering. The government based this plan on an interagency working group national risk assessment — a first of its kind — finalized in 2020. There were no incidents of cases involving terror financing in Bulgaria.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government is implementing its 2020 revision of the 2015-25 Strategy for Countering Radicalization and Terrorism. The aim is to prevent “forced radicalization”; combat “radical propaganda” and terrorist recruitment; prevent terrorist activity within Bulgaria; prosecute terrorist activities, leaders, and enablers involved in “radicalization” or terrorist activities in Bulgaria or abroad; minimize the effects of terrorist activities; and build societal trust and support for CT and CVE programs and activities.

In February the Plovdiv Appellate Court confirmed the Pazardjik District Court’s 2019 verdict against preacher Ahmed Mussa and 11 other Romani Muslims on charges of supporting ISIS, assisting foreign terrorist fighters, and “propagating Salafi Islam,” which the court characterized as an “antidemocratic ideology and incitement to war.”

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Bulgaria is a member of and active contributor to CT initiatives at the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

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**CYPRUS**

**Overview:** The Republic of Cyprus collaborated closely with the United States, the EU, and other countries — bilaterally and multilaterally — in international counterterrorism efforts in 2021. Since 1974, the island of Cyprus has been de facto divided into the Republic of Cyprus government-controlled area in the southern two thirds of the island, and the northern third administered by the Turkish Cypriots (TCs). A UN peacekeeping force patrols a buffer zone, also called the “Green Line,” that separates the two sides. The buffer zone is largely open to civilian traffic and remains a significant route for the illicit transit of persons, narcotics, and other contraband. The division of the island has impeded counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities and between the Republic of Cyprus and Türkiye, which do not maintain diplomatic relations. This report covers only the Republic of Cyprus. It does not address terrorism or counterterrorism efforts in the areas under the administration of TCs.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in the Republic of Cyprus in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes since 2020 to the Republic of Cyprus legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism. Republic of Cyprus authorities arrested six individuals suspected of planning an attack on a prominent
businessman residing in Cyprus. The individuals were charged with terrorism and are awaiting trial.

In January, the Department of State’s Export Control and Border Security program began construction of a U.S.-funded training facility, known as the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS). This $7.5 million facility will strengthen regional border security, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation efforts, including customs and export controls, port and maritime security, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), counter-improvised explosive device training, and cybersecurity. CYCLOPS was expected to open in 2022.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Republic of Cyprus is a member of FATF and MONEYVAL. In December, MONEYVAL released its first enhanced follow-up report to its 2019 Mutual Evaluation Report. The follow-up report found the Republic of Cyprus to be compliant with 16 FATF recommendations, largely compliant with 20, and partially compliant with four. The Republic of Cyprus has no “noncompliant” ratings. The Republic of Cyprus’s Financial Intelligence Unit, known as the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (and as MOKAS), is a member of the Egmont Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no significant changes in Cyprus’s CVE efforts in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Republic of Cyprus participates in regional and multinational counterterrorism exercises with partners including Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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**DENMARK**

**Overview:** The Kingdom of Denmark, which includes Greenland and the Faroe Islands, remained an important U.S. partner in the global fight against terrorism. As an active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Denmark cooperated closely with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives. Denmark devoted significant assets to counterterrorism programs and countering violent extremism initiatives, domestically and abroad.

According to the Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), administered by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the terror threat to Denmark remained “significant,” the fourth of a five-level ranking system (*minimal, limited, general, significant, and very significant*). The CTA characterized the terror threat to Greenland and the Faroe Islands as “minimal.” CTA assessed that the primary threat to Denmark was attacks perpetrated by individuals in Denmark and abroad who sympathize with and are inspired by what PET labels as “foreign militant Islamist terrorist groups,” including ISIS and al-Qa’ida.

According to PET, at least 160 individuals from Denmark have traveled to Iraq or Syria to join “militant Islamist groups” since 2012. Nearly half of these individuals have either
returned to Denmark or relocated to another country. PET also characterized the domestic terrorist threat from what the government terms “right-wing extremists” as “general.” While CTA assessed the COVID-19 pandemic was not a driver of terrorism in Denmark in 2021, it notes it is likely the pandemic has contributed to strengthening existing anti-government narratives among right-wing extremists.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents in the Kingdom of Denmark reported in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Danish National Police are responsible for law enforcement services in all regions governed by the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Denmark continues to use its 2006 terrorism legislation that allows information sharing between its agencies responsible for counterterrorism and foreign terrorist fighters — PET and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS). Efforts to counter terrorism also are shared among the Danish Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Danish security and law enforcement agencies share information through the CTA, which — as the Danish government’s intelligence fusion center — constitutes the focal point for reporting from the Danish National Police, PET, DDIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The Danish police and the Danish defense forces share responsibility for preventing terrorist attacks in Copenhagen and along the borders.

PET arrested 13 individuals in Denmark on February 6 and 8 who were charged with planning one or more terrorist attacks or being accessory to attempted terrorism.

In September, Danish courts sentenced Danish citizen Abdullah Akbulut to 10 years in prison for planning a terrorist attack after his 2020 arrest and charged him with attempted terrorism. Akbulut, who also holds Turkish citizenship, was stripped of his Danish citizenship and will be deported with a permanent ban on reentry once he completes his prison sentence.

In August, a Danish woman was sentenced to five years in prison for having traveled to Syria in 2016 to join ISIS. She also was charged with helping recruit a family member to join ISIS. She has been in custody since her arrest at Copenhagen Airport in 2020.

In October, the government repatriated three Danish citizen mothers, along with their 14 Danish citizen children, from northeastern Syria with the assistance of the United States. The three mothers were arrested on arrival and charged with promoting terrorism. PET maintains it is unlikely that repatriating the children would pose a terrorist threat, noting that this would depend on whether the government offers them deradicalization and reintegration support.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Denmark is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international money laundering and terrorist financing monitoring organization. Its Financial Intelligence Unit, the Money Laundering Secretariat, is a member of the Egmont Group. FATF’s February report recommended that Greenland and the Faroe
Islands strengthen their anti-money laundering and terrorist financing measures to address the vulnerabilities of the territories. Denmark is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Counter-ISIS Finance Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Established in 2017, the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism is responsible for preventing extremism nationally, locally, and virtually. Aarhus, Copenhagen, Gentofte, Guldbergssund, and Viborg are members of the Strong Cities Network. Denmark was also a contributor to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Much of Denmark’s multilateral engagement to prevent and combat terrorism is guided by the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which was most recently revised in June. Denmark continued to strongly support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, INTERPOL, Club de Berne, and the European Counterterrorism Center. Denmark also is among the founding members of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and is in the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Counter-ISIS Finance, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups. Denmark continued to lead the NATO Mission Iraq in 2021. Throughout 2021, Denmark continued to contribute personnel to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and the French-led counterterrorism mission in the Sahel. Denmark also contributed troops to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan before withdrawing in June.

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**FRANCE**

**Overview:** France is a key partner of the United States in the global fight against terrorism. Bilateral U.S.-France counterterrorism cooperation is strong. France is a longstanding and important member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

The terrorist threat in France remained high. Security services were concerned by lone-actor attacks carried out by individuals already in France, including those inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. French officials also were concerned by right-wing extremists able to form cells and organize attacks. The government adopted new laws to enhance the government’s ability to tackle what it described as Islamist separatism, and to make permanent some of the security measures temporarily imposed under the State of Emergency following the 2015 terrorist attacks. French law enforcement and intelligence agencies thwarted at least five attacks in 2021 and arrested at least 50 individuals, including 19 linked to REMVE actors.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** At least two suspected terrorist attacks took place in 2021, with limited casualties:

- On April 23, a Tunisian national stabbed and killed a police employee while shouting “Allāhu ’akbar” outside a police station in a suburb of Paris. Police shot and killed him. The National CT Prosecutor’s Office is investigating the case.
• On November 8, an Algerian national attacked two police officers with a knife, injuring one, in Cannes. The suspect reportedly carried out the attack “in the name of the Prophet [Muhammad].” Police shot and injured the assailant. The investigation is ongoing.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On August 24, France adopted the law “Upholding Respect for Principles of the Republic,” also known as the “Anti-Separatism” law, to address concerns that radical Islamists had created parallel societies that indoctrinated members with ideas contrary to the values of the French Republic. France adopted the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Law on July 30, which expands the terrorism prevention tools available to security agencies and makes permanent some of the temporary measures imposed by the 2015 State of Emergency, including search and seizures, the use of algorithms to analyze internet browsing data, home visits for suspected terrorist or radicalized individuals, and closures of “suspicious” religious places found to promote radical Islam or terrorist ideology. The CT and Intelligence Law also allows the government to impose additional “administrative” measures for up to five years on certain convicted terrorists following their prison release. An estimated 59 terrorist inmates completed their prison sentence and were released in 2021.

France has robust law enforcement and intelligence services that detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism on its territory. The Internal Security General Directorate is the lead agency for the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, coordinating with all other relevant intelligence and law enforcement services.

The French armed forces continued Operation Sentinel, a domestic deployment of up to 7,000 soldiers who enhance security at sensitive sites and large events throughout the country. France has a fully operational interministerial API/PNR capability to screen arriving and departing passenger data against other police and administrative databases.

France maintained its longstanding policy against the repatriation of French FTFs, repatriating minor children of FTFs on a case-by-case basis. As of December, France had repatriated a total of 35 minors — with the last operation conducted in January 2021. An estimated 300 French FTFs and their family members have returned to France in accord with a 2014 French-Turkish agreement whereby Türkiye coordinates with France to deport French nationals believed to have entered Türkiye from Syria. All adult FTFs returning to France have been systematically prosecuted since 2016. Minors, depending on their age, may face legal action if they are suspected of having participated in terrorist activities. Minors not believed to have participated in terrorist activities are enrolled in an extensive rehabilitation and reintegration program.

High-profile terrorist cases in the judicial system included the following:

• On September 8, the Special Criminal Court opened the trial for the 2015 coordinated terrorist attacks at the Bataclan concert hall and other sites. Twenty men, including five presumed dead, are accused of involvement in the coordinated attacks that killed
130 people, including one American. France cooperated with U.S. government agencies as part of the investigations. One U.S. victim is a witness in the trial.

- On September 21, the Special Criminal Court of Appeals increased Tyler Vilus’s sentence to life in prison for overseeing the executions of prisoners in Syria from 2013 through 2015.
- On February 3, the Riom Court of Appeals ordered the release from prison of Algerian national Kamel Daoudi. Daoudi was sentenced in 2020 to one year in prison for violating the terms of his house arrest. Daoudi was convicted in 2005 for planning a 2001 terrorist attack against Embassy Paris and had been under house arrest since 2008 until his incarceration.
- On April 14, the Paris Court of Appeals ruled to pave the way for a trial to look into the 1982 anti-Semitic terrorist attack in Paris that left six dead, including two U.S. citizens. Norwegian national Walid Abdulrahman Abou Zayed, a suspected shooter, was extradited to France in 2020.

France observed a rise in what it calls “far-right extremism” or “politically motivated terrorism.” There were at least five far-right terrorist plots that French services thwarted since 2017. The National Antiterrorism Prosecutor’s office investigated at least six far-right terrorist cases that involved 55 individuals. The neo-Nazi group Honor and Nation reportedly targeted government officials, a freemason lodge, and COVID-19 vaccination centers and called for a coup d’état under the leadership of Rémy Daillet. On August 26, a far-right man was arrested in Colmar for fabricating four pipe bombs with pieces of uranium purchased online.

On November 23, 13 members of far-right group Recolonization France were arrested throughout France following the police discovery of a weapons cache and numerous neo-Nazi objects. In a February 3 ruling, a court in Besançon convicted neo-Nazi Philippe Tribout to two years in prison for carrying out a racially motivated attack on February 1 against a man of Arab origin. The Paris Correctional Court convicted six far-right extremists of terrorism, sentencing them to five to nine years in prison on October 12. The government banned at least two far-right associations, including Génération Identitaire and Alvarium.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** France is a member of FATF, and France’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Tracfin is a member of the Egmont Group. France also is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Counter-ISIS Finance Group. France continued to investigate and prosecute financing of terrorism cases in 2021. In June, six family members of a 2015 Bataclan terrorist were arrested for financing terrorism. France is also a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance Working Group for the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** As part of its efforts to counter Islamist separatism, the government announced it would end foreign government funding of imams from Algeria, Morocco, and Türkiye within four years, replacing this program with imams trained within France. France increased scrutiny of religious schools to identify and close “illegal schools” run by “religious extremists.” Since 2020, the government had shuttered 21 mosques for ties to radical Islam. Out of 2,500 mosques in France, 92 have suspected ties to radical Islam.
Bordeaux, Montreuil, Paris, Sarcelles, and Strasbourg are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** France is a founding member of the GCTF and is active on the UN Security Council ISIL and al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee. France undertook joint CT operations with several EU partners and played an active role in CT capacity building in West Africa’s Sahel region with the Coalition for the Sahel and Task Force Takuba. The nation is a major contributor to the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and is a member of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Counter-ISIS Finance, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups.

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**GEORGIA**

**Overview:** Georgia continued its robust engagement on counterterrorism issues in 2021 and remained a strong U.S. security partner. The terrorism situation in Georgia in 2021 remained quiet and stable. Georgia took further action to secure its border and arrested five Georgian citizens on ISIS-related terrorism charges in 2021. Updated counterterrorism financing legislation came into force in Georgia, and the country worked to update its National Counterterrorism Strategy and Action Plan. Far-right groups carried out violence against journalists and activists during a Tbilisi Pride event July 5. The groups also destroyed an opposition protest site at Parliament, attempted to storm Parliament, and attacked NGO offices. LGBTQI+ activists described feeling hunted, as the locations where they sought refuge were discovered by far-right groups. These events occurred after the prime minister called the planned Tbilisi Pride event “inappropriate.” Throughout the day, the Ministry of Internal Affairs failed to deploy riot control measures. Despite the arrest and later conviction of 28 perpetrators, no group leaders or organizers of the violence have been held legally responsible.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Georgian Criminal Code criminalizes terrorism and acts that support terrorism, including terror financing, cyberterrorism, training, incitement, and recruitment into terrorist organizations, as well as foreign terrorist fighters.

In 2021, Georgia developed its National Counterterrorism Strategy and Action Plan for 2022-26, as its previous counterterrorism strategy concluded. The new strategy and action plan included interagency input and was approved in December by Georgia’s Interagency Standing Committee on Counterterrorism. Though the government included some NGOs in discussion of the strategy, a prominent civil society organization criticized the document for not adequately addressing key threats and challenges, including major causes of radicalization in Georgia, and for not assessing the role of the state in the radicalization process. The government also approved a national strategy (2021-30) and action plan (2021-23) for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threat reduction.
Georgia is generally capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorism incidents. The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) has the mandate for terrorism-related incidents and investigations and works closely through its Counterterrorism Center with the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Defense and the Prosecution Service of Georgia, among others. SSSG is generally well equipped and well trained, and the SSSG’s Counterterrorism Unit continues to receive regular training and equipment, including from international partners. Civil society, journalists, and the international community raised concerns in 2021 regarding the State Security Service’s secret surveillance system and its lack of political neutrality and weak oversight.

Because Russia occupies the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia does not control a portion of its internationally recognized land border with Russia and therefore must enforce security along administrative boundary lines with its occupied territories. Georgia’s Border Police and Coast Guard, both competent and organized, provide the initial response capability along Georgia’s land and maritime borders, respectively, except along the occupied territories.

In 2021, Georgia worked to enhance its land border and maritime security. The Border Police completed projects along Georgia’s land border to increase patrolling, surveillance, and deterrence capabilities. Georgia finalized construction of one Land Border Segment along the border with Türkiye, and one along the border with Azerbaijan. The Border Police enhanced detection capabilities with two additional mobile surveillance systems and increased the number of operational personnel along Georgia’s borders. Georgia created the Border Management and Coordination Division within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to improve intra-agency and interagency cooperation and risk management.

To improve its national command and control, Georgia began laying fiber optic cable to connect its border security sector headquarters with regional and national control centers. Georgia also added a maintenance facility to service its video surveillance camera infrastructure. Further, Georgia equipped CBRN units in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and SSSG with CBRN detection and decontamination equipment to respond to the risks and threats of WMD materials proliferation and their use. The United States provided Georgia’s Coast Guard with new radar, communication, and surveillance systems to enhance Georgia’s maritime domain awareness control capabilities. Resource constraints, including lack of funding for border scanning equipment, resulted in Georgia’s reliance on donations of luggage and body scanners from China, as well as from the United States and Europe.

In July, Georgia adopted a government decree approving the Rule on Transferring, Processing, Deleting, Obtaining, and Destroying API/PNR Record Data by Air Carriers. SSSG cooperated with air carriers, relevant agencies, and international partners to begin operation of API and PNR systems. Georgia participates in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization jointly run Container Control Program, and it has three task forces deployed to identify illegal cargo. Georgian border patrol agents check individuals, vehicles, and travel documents against databases, including INTERPOL. No Georgian citizens were identified as traveling to Syria or Iraq in 2021 for
terrorist activities. Georgia did not repatriate any FTFs or family members from Syria or Iraq.

In August, Georgia arrested five Georgian citizens in the Pankisi Gorge region on charges related to membership in ISIS and plans to travel to a terrorist camp in Syria. SSSG reported that one of the individuals had publicly stated he was ISIS’s “Emir of Georgia.”

Far-right, pro-Russia group Alt-Info and far-right networks associated with violent extremism including the Children’s Rights Defenders Society and Georgian March organized and carried out violence against dozens of journalists and activists during the July 5 Tbilisi Pride event and a July 6 protest against the July 5 violence. No group leaders or organizers of the violence were held legally responsible. Alt-Info leaders subsequently registered a political party, the Conservative Movement, and opened offices across Georgia. Alt-Info/Conservative Movement leadership has called for and voiced support for violence to achieve their goals.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Georgia is a member of MONEYVAL and the CIFG. Georgia’s FIU, the Financial Monitoring Service, is a member of the Egmont Group. On March 30, Georgia passed updates to its Law on Facilitation of Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, according to which amendments to the list of persons sanctioned by UN Security Council resolutions take direct effect in Georgia. Previously, legal action against such individuals required proceedings in Georgian court.  

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, Georgia continued efforts focused on minority integration, education, media access, youth, and cultural diversity.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Georgia is actively engaged on CT issues at international, regional, and bilateral levels. Georgia cooperates closely with NATO, the UN, the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union, the OSCE, INTERPOL, and the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. In 2021, Georgia participated in UN, EU, U.S., and NATO trainings and conferences, including the Second UN High-Level Conference of Heads of Counterterrorism Agencies of Member States in June. SSSG representatives participated in the CoE Steering Committee on Counterterrorism and various CoE CT working groups.

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**GERMANY**

**Overview:** Germany continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and the international community as a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (and co-leader of the coalition’s Stabilization Working Group) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum and in multilateral CT operations in Africa and the Middle East. In 2021, Germany allocated more resources toward combating all forms of terrorism. German officials consider REMVE actors to be the greatest threat to domestic security. The COVID-19 pandemic was a driver for extremists with anti-government ideologies. Germany’s domestic intelligence
agency (the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) added, in April, a new category of extremism called “delegitimization of the state.”

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Germany in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Act to Combat Right Wing Extremism and Hate Crimes entered into force on April 3. The Act amends several laws and obligates major social media companies to report suspected illegal content to authorities. Separate legislation that provides protections for politicians under threat and individuals disparaged for their national, racial, religious/ethnic origin, ideology, disability, or sexual orientation entered into force September 22. In July, the German Parliament passed legislation to strengthen the surveillance capabilities of the domestic intelligence service. The increasing use of encrypted communication poses challenges when conducting targeted surveillance. In March, Parliament passed a Foreign Intelligence Law that regulates and increases oversight of the German Foreign Intelligence Service.

Federal and state law enforcement agencies both conduct CT investigations. They coordinate through the Joint Counterterrorism Center, consisting of 40 internal law enforcement, security and migration agencies to coordinate on work against Islamist-based terrorism. For right, left, and nationalist-based extremism and terrorism, the Joint Extremism and Terrorism Prevention Center in Cologne is the site of interagency coordination. In 2021, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office opened about 420 new terrorism investigations.

German authorities collect API and use PNR analysis to combat serious crime and terrorism according to the relevant EU laws. German border management data systems, equipment, and infrastructure are highly developed.

Germany repatriated eight ISIS-affiliated women and 23 children in October, arresting six of the women. Germany uses a comprehensive approach to deradicalization and reintegration under the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, which includes cooperation and services at state and local levels. Germany is not repatriating FTFs. In November, the Frankfurt Higher Regional court found an Iraqi national and former ISIS member, who was extradited to Germany, guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity for the enslavement of a Yazidi woman and her child, who died. He was sentenced to life in prison. His German wife was sentenced to 10 years for aiding and abetting the child’s death.

Significant law enforcement actions in 2021 included the following:

- In September, police arrested a 16-year-old Syrian national for online contact with a known bomb specialist and on suspicion of plotting an attack on a synagogue during Yom Kippur. He is suspected to have been in contact with ISIS members in the Middle East. No bombs were found, and the investigation was ongoing at year’s end.
- In August, police arrested a 20-year-old German Moroccan for trying to buy a pistol and a hand grenade on the dark web. Chemicals for building an explosive device were found in his possession, but no target was identified.
• In April, the trial against 12 alleged members/supporters of the “right wing” terrorist group Gruppe S began. The defendants, arrested in 2020, are accused of amassing weapons and developing plans to commit political assassinations and attack migrants and Muslims.

Germany is limited by its postwar security architecture with a strict organizational separation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Privacy and data protection laws place significant limits on the collection and retention of data.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Germany’s Law on Associations gives the Interior Ministry authority to ban groups if their goals violate the criminal code. In May, the government banned Ansaar International e.V. and eight affiliates for using charitable donations to support terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Hamas, and al-Shabab. Police conducted 70 search and seizure raids across 10 states. In May, the government banned and took measures against three associations suspected of fundraising for Hizballah, which was banned and designated a terrorist organization in 2020. Germany is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Counter-ISIS Finance Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy (2016) guides the government’s activities. Most programs are federally funded, led jointly by the Federal Interior and Family Ministries, and implemented through the states and NGOs. The federal Live Democracy! program is a cornerstone of the government’s strategy. In 2021, the budget for the program was increased to $166.3 million, to expand its programs on right-wing extremism and polarization of society. The Interior Ministry plans to use the amended Network Enforcement Act (2017) to address unlawful internet content. Augsburg, Berlin, Dresden, Düsseldorf, and Halle are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Germany is a member of the GCTF and co-chaired the GCTF’s Capacity Building in the West Africa Region Working Group. Germany also cooperated with other OSCE participating states in the fight against terrorism. Germany was a co-leader for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Stabilization Working Group, helping lead the effort in setting stabilization priorities in Iraq and Syria. It was also a member of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Counter-ISIS Finance, and Communications Working Groups.

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**GREECE**

**Overview:** The Greek government remained a highly collaborative CT partner in 2021. Consistent with its responsibilities as a participant in the Visa Waiver Program, Greece operationalized its Passenger Information Unit by presidential decree and has implemented screening of air passengers in accordance with international standards. Greece also passed legislation in accordance with an EU directive on combating money laundering by means of criminal law, as well as a law denying furloughs and preventing early release of convicted terrorists.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Greece in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, Border Security: On July 9, the Greek Parliament passed legislation transposing, inter alia, EU Directive 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law. Greece also passed legislation denying furloughs to those serving in minimum security prisons and early release for convicted terrorists. The creation of the Passenger Information Unit (PIU) as the fifth department in the intelligence division of the Hellenic Police has been successful. The adoption of Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G), including access to U.S.-sourced terrorism screening data, constitutes a significant border security upgrade. The PIU began receiving airline data from almost two dozen airlines in 2021 and expects to add an additional 12 airlines soon. Since Greece’s national identification card remains vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution, Greek authorities moved forward in the process to provide citizens with biometric-enabled ID cards. Five consortia bid on the Ministry of Citizen Protection’s $566 million tender for an integrated online system for security documents, including the new ID cards. The tender is stuck in a drawn-out process and legal challenges by some companies; however, it is expected that new ID cards will be issued in the next two years.

Greek authorities carried out many arrests in 2021, including the following:

- A senior ISIS member was arrested in July in Greece, with Morocco’s help. The suspect, a Moroccan national known as Abu Muhammad al-Fateh, had joined ISIS in Syria, after 2014, before later escaping to Greece.
- On July 21, Greek authorities arrested Christos Pappas, the deputy leader of the now-defunct neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, in central Athens. He was arrested not for terrorism, but for criminal conspiracy.
- On October 4, Greek authorities arrested a suspected jihadist in Athens. The 34-year-old Iraqi was charged with being a member of ISIS.
- On December 23, authorities in Athens arrested a 40-year-old Iraqi man who was suspected of running a kind of “travel agency” for ISIS members looking to enter Greece and Europe.
- There also were several domestic terrorism arrests, such as anarchists, including from the Revolutionary Self-Defense Force.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Greece is a member of FATF. Its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Counterterrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority, is a member of the Egmont Group.

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2021, Greece continued to implement a law passed in 2020 to create a new division to prevent violent extremism, reporting directly to the Minister of Citizen Protection.

International and Regional Cooperation: Greece is a member of various international bodies. Greece also acts as a regional leader and is a willing partner in sharing its
counterterrorism experiences with its neighboring countries, particularly those in the Western Balkans.

**ITALY**

**Overview:** Italy collaborated closely with the United States and other partners in its international counterterrorism efforts in 2021. Domestically, Italy investigated and prosecuted terrorist suspects and regularly deported foreign nationals for terrorism-related security reasons. As a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition (and co-leader of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group), Italy was among the largest contributors of troops in Iraq and led the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s efforts to train Iraqi police and security forces.

The United States and Italy co-hosted a Defeat-ISIS Ministerial in Rome in June, which highlighted the growing threat of ISIS in Africa and the continued need for stabilization efforts and FTF repatriations to prevent the resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Italy remained one of the top troop contributors to NATO, the EU, the UN, and other bilateral and multilateral operations that promote global security, with a particular concentration on the wider Mediterranean region. Italy hosts NATO’s Strategic Direction-South HUB as a forum to connect NATO allies with partners and institutions in North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel to promote dialogue and stability. Italian authorities have identified several potential threats to the country, including terrorists from North Africa, returning foreign terrorist fighters, homegrown violent extremists, and fighters from the Western Balkans.

Italian and U.S. authorities regularly share counterterrorism best practices under the auspices of the U.S.-Italy Counterterrorism Working Group, a component of the U.S.-Italy Strategic Dialogue. Italy is working to improve its screening of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in consultation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Italy in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There have been no changes since 2020. Italian law enforcement has increased capacity to detect and deter terrorist activity, links, and associations within its borders. Authorities employ those capabilities to counter terrorist recruitment, radicalization to violence, and networking. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence services coordinate their efforts and meet on a regular basis to review terrorist threats and share information. The Italian government continued to make use of 2005 legislation facilitating the detention of terrorist suspects and expedited procedures for expelling noncitizens suspected of endangering national security. In 2021, Italy expelled 59 individuals suspected of posing a security threat. Police monitoring of jihadist media sites reveals that Italy remains a potential target of terror attacks, attributable in part to the presence of Vatican City, the city-state within Rome.

Prominent arrests and expulsions included the following:
• On March 8, Bari police arrested a 36-year-old Algerian man on charges of terrorism. Authorities offered evidence that the suspect provided forged identity documents to the perpetrators of the 2015 Paris “Bataclan” attack.
• On March 18, Italian authorities expelled a Tunisian migrant accused of telling friends he intended to carry out terror attacks in Italy in the name of jihad.
• On April 21, Italian police arrested a 28-year-old Albanian citizen accused of supplying weapons to the Tunisian terrorist who drove a truck into a crowd in Nice in 2016, killing 86 people.
• On July 5, Italian police arrested four Italian nationals in the southern city of Andria on suspicion of funding jihadists in other countries. Police said the four had sent more than $1 million through money transfers to “foreign collectors” in 49 countries, mostly going to ISIS affiliates.
• On November 17, in Milan, Italian investigators arrested a 19-year-old Italian-Kosovar woman and alleged ISIS militant. She was married to a Kosovar citizen closely linked to Kutim Fejzulaiv, who allegedly killed four persons in a terrorist attack in Vienna in 2020. Police reportedly found training manuals, audio recordings, and videos praising ISIS in her apartment.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Italy is a member of FATF. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Italy, is a member of the Egmont Group. Italy remained a strong advocate of the UN Security Council sanctions regime against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Italy is a co-lead for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group, which focuses on the disruption of ISIS financial networks.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** No new legislation was passed in 2021. The Penitentiary Administration’s Central Investigative Center continued to carry out investigations and respond to cases of possible radicalization to violence in Italian jails and prisons. Italian authorities also increased monitoring and prevention efforts to identify hostile “lone actors” online. Palermo is a member of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Italy continued its bilateral capacity building efforts in Libya, concentrating on coast guard cooperation and border security measures. Italy also hosted and led EU Operation *Irini*, charged with implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya. The Italian military continued its training activities with local security forces in Niger to strengthen border security, counter illicit trafficking, and combat threats to regional security. Italian forces also were in Mali as part of Task Force Takuba, which trains and assists the Malian Armed Forces in the fight against armed jihadist groups and as part of the EU Training Mission in Mali.

Italy made a substantial contribution to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, an inspired institution of the GCTF, and finalized a project to provide technical assistance on battlefield evidence to multiagency stakeholders in Burkina Faso. The project began in 2021 in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Italy continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the following: the UN, NATO, the EU, the G-7, the Group of Twenty (G-20), the
OSCE, the GCTF, the Council of Europe, and FATF. In addition to its leadership of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group and the newly formed Africa Focus Group, Italy is a member of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

KOSOVO

Overview: Kosovo continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and the international community as a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The government is drafting a new combined Strategy and Action Plan for Counterterrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) for 2023-27. Although the CT/CVE Coordinator’s Office was abolished in 2020, in April the government appointed Interior Minister Xhelal Svecla as the national CT/CVE coordinator.

In July, Kosovo repatriated 11 citizens — six male foreign terrorist fighters, one adult female, and four children — from prisons and displaced persons camps in Syria. The adults were charged with terrorism offenses. This was Kosovo’s second repatriation; it had repatriated more than 120 citizens at the end of the reporting period. Numerous Kosovars remain in camps, prisons, or are unaccounted for on the battlefield in Syria. Short sentencing in Kosovo for terrorism offenses remains a challenge, as do the reintegration and rehabilitation of FTFs and family members.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kosovo’s legislative framework is adequate to prosecute individuals suspected of committing or aiding terrorist activities or participating in foreign wars. Light sentencing, early or conditional release from prison, and a lack of organized post-incarceration supervision remain challenges. Kosovo maintained its commitment made at the White House in 2020 to enhance border security and screening to interdict terrorist travel. Kosovo has designated Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and is working toward passage of a Law on Targeted Financial Sanctions.

Through participation in the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, Kosovo Police (KP) received training in counterterrorism investigations and identification and seizure of digital evidence and have received associated equipment grants. U.S. mentorship strengthened judges’ and prosecutors’ capacities and helped increase cooperation between KP and the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS), specifically the Corrections Intelligence Unit (CIU). Kosovo’s policing and corrections systems have made strides in understanding the recidivist threat among violent extremists and the risks of extremist “contagion” since the repatriation of 110 nationals in 2019 and 11 in July.

There are no tailored interventions in Kosovo prisons for radicalized inmates — such as cognitive behavioral therapy, mentoring, or structured dialogue tools — and no means to continue monitoring terrorism convicts after their release from prison. Kosovo lacks capacity and resources devoted to the long-term reintegration of returnees from Syria and
deradicalization of homegrown extremists, and authorities are dependent on donor-driven programming.

Significant law enforcement actions included the following:

- In January, Sadat Topojani was granted conditional release. Topojani was an ISIS recruiter who had been at the center of a KCS/CIU investigation into the distribution of extremist propaganda within the Kosovo prison system.
- In April, the Kosovo Appeals Court acquitted all defendants involved in the “Hurricane” case of terrorism-related charges, the final verdict in that case. The defendants’ convictions on firearms offenses were affirmed, however, and they all remain incarcerated.
- In April, the Pristina Basic Court sentenced Nuredin Sulejmani to three years in prison for participating in ISIS during 2013-14. U.S.-based assistance in obtaining evidence played an important role in securing this conviction.
- In September, the Supreme Court of Kosovo upheld a five-and-a-half-year prison sentence for Visar Qukovci’s participating in ISIS, while ordering a retrial on charges of child abuse. Qukovci, an FTF repatriated in 2019, had filmed videos in which he placed a suicide vest on his infant son. The Pristina Basic Court in June had sentenced the defendant to eight months in prison for child abuse charges, which were added to the previous sentence.
- In October, police arrested five individuals suspected of planning an attack and seized an AK-47 weapon, ammunition, a handheld rocket-propelled grenade launcher and shells, explosive materials, electronics, and $71,207 in assorted currencies. This operation, the country’s largest ever, benefited from U.S. assistance.
- In December, the Pristina Basic Court sentenced Kreshnik Podvorica to two years and six months in prison for incitement to commit terrorism. Podvorica was found guilty of publishing content glorifying terrorist acts in Syria and inciting terrorist acts, including video publications of a terrorist act committed by his brother in Syria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kosovo’s legal framework against money laundering and terrorist financing follows international standards. Its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. One FTF repatriated in July was charged with terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Kosovo has shown limited progress in developing a new comprehensive CVE strategy. An interministerial working group is drafting a new Strategy and Action Plan to merge CT and CVE into a unified strategy. Challenges include inadequate capacity and resources, a CVE approach overly focused on security, and limited access granted to NGOs to work directly with returnees.

The KCS continued to implement a program, assisted by U.S. experts, to enhance management of terrorists in prison. This program involves collecting, analyzing, and sharing prison information among correctional service decisionmakers and other law enforcement officials and managing the rehabilitation and eventual reintegration of convicted terrorists. The Interior Ministry’s Prevention and Reintegration Division, despite being
chronically underresourced, continued programming to reintegrate individuals who had served time in prison on terrorism charges, FTF returnees, and their family members.

Kosovo continues cooperative activities through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, through which Kosovo is strengthening the network of actors working on reintegrating and rehabilitating women and children who returned from conflict zones. Thirteen Kosovo municipalities are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Kosovo coordinates closely with Albania and North Macedonia to support CT capacity building and regional cooperation.

THE NETHERLANDS

**Overview:** The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in border and transportation security, counterterrorist financing, CVE, and bilateral and multilateral CT cooperation. The national threat level remained “significant” (level 3 of 5) throughout the reporting period, with jihadist-inspired individual attacks regarded as the most conceivable threat. The government is also tracking an elevated REMVE threat through participation in international accelerationist networks and increased intermingling with anti-government demonstrations against coronavirus measures. The Netherlands has a comprehensive national CT strategy and implements policies at the local level to counter all forms of terrorism through multidisciplinary interagency cooperation.

The Netherlands participates in Defeat-ISIS working groups and is co-chair of its FTF Working Group with Türkiye and Kuwait. The country has embedded liaisons at various operational command centers, deployed force protection units, and contributed military personnel and trainers in Iraq. The Netherlands is a member of the GCTF.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported incidents in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes in law enforcement structures, capacity, international cooperation, or border security legislation in 2021. On November 9, the government submitted a bill to the Dutch Parliament that would strengthen the legal basis for the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) to process personal data for the purposes of protecting national security and combating terrorism.

Significant law enforcement and judicial actions related to CT included the following:

- On February 17, there was a stabbing of a prison guard by a Sunni extremist inmate Gokmen Tanis, while serving a life sentence for a 2019 attack.
- On April 6, a 43-year-old Syrian man was arrested at an asylum seekers’ center in Sint Annaparochie on suspicion of being involved in ISIS terrorist activities and other armed groups in Syria and Iraq.
• On April 17, an 18-year-old man from Reuver was arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. He allegedly participated in a Telegram chat group where instructions were shared on how to make explosives and a bomb vest.
• The Hague District Court in June sentenced a 33-year-old woman to six years imprisonment for her role as an administrator of an ISIS propaganda channel on Telegram.
• On September 23, nine individuals from Eindhoven were arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist offense, participating in a terrorist organization, and taking part in or facilitating jihadist training. The suspects allegedly discussed plans to attack Dutch politicians.

The government approved the June 5 repatriation of a suspected ISIS sympathizer and her two children, along with a 12-year-old whose mother had agreed to her repatriation on humanitarian grounds, in response to a local court ordering the defendant’s appearance at trial.

The NCTV assesses REMVE, or “right-wing extremism” as it is referred to in the Netherlands, as a threat to national security, particularly among young Dutch men who participate in international online accelerationist networks. REMVE actors in the Netherlands are loosely organized, lack central leadership, and are estimated at a few hundred individuals, mostly between the ages of 12 and 20. While there were no arrests of right-wing extremists for terrorist offenses inspired by right-wing extremist ideology, the government noted that arrests were made for other offenses, such as hate speech, incitement to commit criminal offenses, making threats, and possession of firearms.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Netherlands is a member of FATF and is one of the Cooperating and Supporting Nations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, a FATF-style regional body. The head of its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit-Netherlands, is the chair of the Egmont Group; the FIU contributes to Europol’s financial intelligence team. There were no changes to the Netherlands’ membership in FATF and FATF-style regional bodies in 2021. The Dutch framework for countering terrorist financing applies to all EU-designated terrorist organizations and the UN Security Council ISIL and al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee. As of December, the government’s national terrorist watchlists include 145 individuals and two organizations whose assets were frozen. The Netherlands is also a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance Working Group in the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Netherlands’ 2016-20 National Counterterrorism Strategy contains measures to strengthen communities, build resilience to terrorist radicalization, and prevent persons from becoming FTFs. Prevention is a key aspect of this strategy. The government uses a municipality-driven, multidisciplinary approach for prevention and develops tailored plans of action to intervene with individuals suspected of radicalization to violence. Similar programs also exist to rehabilitate former terrorists.

Community police officers are the cornerstone of the local approach to prevention. Other stakeholders include local governments with the support of the Office of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, the public prosecutor’s office, social workers,
The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education also play leading roles in countering foreign influence and funding for religious schools, NGOs, and other educational institutions. To counter terrorist messaging, local governments use outreach efforts with community and religious leaders to amplify alternative narratives. The Hague, Rotterdam, and Utrecht are members of the Strong Cities Network. The Netherlands is a contributor to GCERF and the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Netherlands participates in the GCTF and is host to its Administrative Unit. The country is also on the governing board of the three GCTF-inspired institutions: the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (*Hedayah*), the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, and GCERF. The Netherlands is an active participant in Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre and the Counterterrorism Group to improve cooperation and information exchange between and among European CT services. The nation continued to finance a wide variety of capacity building projects. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports regional security coordinators at six embassies that are dedicated to capacity building to identify terrorist radicalization. The Netherlands is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-leads the Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ Working Group, which shares best practices and identifies key issues regarding FTFs in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Africa. In addition to this leadership, the Netherlands is a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups.

**NORTH MACEDONIA**

**Overview:** North Macedonia cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. With no terrorist attacks in 2021 and no reported departures to join ISIS, the main counterterrorism issue North Macedonia faced consisted of returned FTFs from Syria and Iraq, given these individuals’ ability to establish violent extremist cells, plan attacks, and radicalize others to violence. The National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (NCCVECT) estimated that 143 citizens of North Macedonia (excluding children) in recent years have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria, Iraq, or both, to join terrorist groups. Of these 143 adults (133 male, 10 female), 38 were killed, 79 returned, five are believed to remain in Syria, and two are in prison or a refugee camp. Another 16 (11 men and 5 women) were repatriated, and three FTFs were deported from other countries. Authorities assessed the terrorist threat level to be “average high,” or medium, as ISIS members and sympathizers maintained a presence in country. In July, the government repatriated four FTFs and 19 family members.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in North Macedonia during 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** North Macedonia’s legislative framework is adequate to prosecute individuals suspected of committing or aiding terrorist
activities or participating in foreign wars. Low sentencing for terrorism-related offenses remains a challenge but improved, compared with previous years, and sentences are generally longer than in other Western Balkans countries. The U.S. Department of Justice provided mentoring and battlefield evidence training to case prosecutors and investigators.

In July, authorities repatriated four adult male FTFs, five women, and 14 children from Syria. Two pleaded guilty and received sentences of three and five years for participation in a foreign army. In November, an appellate court doubled the three-year sentence. Separately, the appellate court lengthened prison sentences for three individuals arrested in 2020 for plotting a domestic terrorist attack, as all three defendants previously had been convicted of participation in a foreign army. During September and October, a court sentenced seven additional individuals connected to the 2020 plot. In March, an FTF who returned voluntarily received a five-year sentence.

The Ministry of Interior’s “Terrorism and Violent Extremism Sector” led law enforcement-related CT efforts. North Macedonia developed a new 2021-25 National Strategy for Developing the Penitentiary System, which includes a component for deradicalizing and rehabilitating FTFs. The Department for Execution of Sanctions signed an MOU with the United Kingdom in July and began implementation of a corrections intelligence unit focusing on identification and prevention of terrorism threats and criminal activity in prison facilities.

North Macedonia continued its partnership with the United States on traveler screening tools and continues to take steps to enhance border security and screening efforts to include systematic use of Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in line with international standards. However, there was little progress with the Passenger Information Unit. The unit is still nonoperational because of legal amendments pending in Parliament. In December, authorities met with Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program experts from the U.S. Department of State to discuss gaps and weaknesses in watchlisting efforts. North Macedonian authorities cooperated with INTERPOL, Europol, the European CT Centre, and the FBI. U.S. support for CT training and mentorship has largely resumed after pandemic-related delays.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The country’s legal framework follows international standards. North Macedonia is a member of MONEYVAL, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its Financial Intelligence Unit, the Financial Intelligence Office (FIO), is a member of the Egmont Group. The government drafted a new law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing to implement the provisions of Directive V (2018/843) and harmonize it with EU legislation. The new draft law incorporates articles aimed at overcoming risks identified in the 2020 National Risk Assessment on terrorism financing of non-profit organizations and implements FATF recommendations. In August, the government adopted a new National Strategy for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (2021-24).

In 2021, the FIO received five reports for suspicion of terrorist financing from banks, and it submitted 11 total reports on suspicion of terrorist financing to competent authorities for
processing. DOJ/OPDAT resident legal advisers trained prosecutors and investigators on terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The NCCVECT continued awareness-raising activities around the national CVE strategy and action plan. In August, the government appointed a new National Coordinator and CT and CVE deputies and expanded the committee’s staff. The NCCVECT established two additional multistakeholder Community Action Teams now operational in six municipalities and focused on preventing violent extremism.

FTF repatriations were conducted in accordance with international law and the National Plan for the Reintegration, Resocialization, and Rehabilitation of Returnees From Foreign Armies. The government, with the support of the International Organization for Migration, in March drafted and adopted standard operating procedures for treatment protocols of FTFs and their family members. Social workers and mental health practitioners received training on psychosocial support for individuals who have returned from conflict zones.

The United States supported the NCCVECT in organizing an interfaith dialogue, which included the country’s two largest religious communities, the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Islamic Religious Community. The U.S.-funded Women Without Borders’ MotherSchools program continued teaching mothers in identified municipalities how to recognize and respond to early warning signs of radicalization and extremism in their children and their communities. Eight municipalities in North Macedonia are members of the Strong Cities Network. North Macedonia is also a partner country of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).

**International and Regional Cooperation:** North Macedonia continued its close cooperation with other Western Balkan countries on CT and CVE issues. North Macedonia participated in the implementation of projects in the Western Balkans funded by GCERF, Hedayah, the Strong Cities Network, Integrative Internal Security Governance, and others. Regionally, authorities held working meetings with the equivalent coordination bodies of Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government implemented capacity building projects supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and others. These efforts will help North Macedonia prepare for its 2023 OSCE chairpersonship.

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**Norway**

**Overview:** Norway’s Police Security Service’s annual threat assessment stated that the terror threat level remains moderate with an “even chance” — the third on its five-tier threat scale — that right-wing or Islamist extremists will carry out an attack in 2022. Lone-actor attacks continue to be the greatest threat, driven by continued online recruitment and radicalization to violence. Norway’s law enforcement capacity for proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in its territory is strong, despite underfunding in some areas. Norway is postured to prevent acts of terrorism, and its bilateral
counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. government is strong. Operational cooperation is high.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Norway.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no legislative changes related to counterterrorism in Norway in 2021. Norway issued new passports with enhanced security features in 2020. To prevent misuse, Norwegian passports are immediately canceled when they are reported lost or stolen. The adjudication process for new passports includes automatic biometric comparisons and more training for adjudicators at 79 passport and ID offices nationwide, including at Oslo Gardermoen Airport. Biometric emergency passports issued at Gardermoen are valid for one exit and one entry to Norway and must be surrendered on the traveler’s return. Older passports will be phased out as they reach the end of their 10-year validity for adults, and sooner for children under 16.

A 16-year-old Syrian boy was found guilty of planning an act of terrorism on June 29. A Norwegian-Pakistani woman is appealing her three-year prison sentence handed down in May for traveling to Syria to be with her husband, who was then a member of the al-Nusra Front and later a member of ISIS.

Authorities arrested five persons connected to right-wing anti-government extremism in an August investigation into a Norwegian citizen for firearms violations. The inquiry led to an investigation of a related individual for demonstrated interest in “accelerationism” and ISIS propaganda videos. Norwegian and U.S. law enforcement counterparts coordinated well on an investigation into the outlaw motorcycle gang Chieftains’ activities in the United States and Norway.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** There have been no changes since 2020. Norway is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Counter-ISIS Finance Group, and its FIU is a member of FATF and the Egmont Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government announced a new counterterrorism strategy focused on 1) improving technology in the intelligence services; 2) increasing communication with identified targets of terror; 3) expanding public-private and agency-to-agency cooperation to mitigate and respond to terror attacks; and 4) strengthening reintegration efforts for persons who have been radicalized or convicted for terrorism-related acts. The government continues to implement its Action Plan Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism.

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) provided $1.1 million in grants for local community programs countering radicalization and violent extremism. The grants went to a variety of municipal programs such as training mentors, a summer work program for youth, and strengthening cross-cultural identity youth programs.

Norway repatriated a Norwegian orphan from the Al-Hol camp in Syria, the third repatriation from ISIS refugee camps in Syria to Norway. At least four of the 11 Norwegian
women known to have traveled from Norway to Syria to join ISIS remain in refugee camps in Syria. Norwegian authorities presume five are dead. The Police Security Service (PST) charged the remaining women with participating in a terrorist organization in absentia. The foreign minister said that as a general rule, Norway does not assist citizens who participated in a terrorist organization overseas, in response to a petition from two of the women for help repatriating to Norway. The PST estimates that 20 out of at least 140 Norwegian-affiliated individuals who traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight on behalf of ISIS remain in those countries.

The Supreme Court is reviewing the appeal of a 25-year-old man who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for participating in ISIS online forums and encouraging terrorist acts in England and Denmark. He is the first individual in Norway to be convicted for acts committed exclusively online. Kristiansand and Oslo are members of the Strong Cities Network. Norway is a donor for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) and the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Norway chaired the UNSC Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea Sanctions Committee, the ISIS and al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, and was penholder for Afghanistan and Syria issues.

Norway supported the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and provided resource support to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. In addition to is support to GCERF, Norway supported INTERPOL’s capacity building programs on border security and rule of law in North Africa and the Sahel. And in addition to its membership in the Counter-ISIS Finance Group, Norway is a member of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

The country contributed $1.2 million to the UN Office of Counterterrorism for the 2018-21 period and supported Norwegian Special Forces in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Norway also provided an annual $7.1 million to Afghan security forces and provided up to 70 personnel in counseling and force protection duties through Operation Inherent Resolve and 10 in the NATO Mission Iraq. Norway co-led with the United States on the Global Counterterrorism Forum “Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism” REMVE Toolkit Initiative and actively participated in the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network; OSCE; the Christchurch Call to Action; and the Global Counterterrorism Forum Working Group on Capacity Building in East Africa.

State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Henrik Thune spoke at the launch of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law Criminal Justice Practitioner’s Guide for Addressing Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism. Kristiansand and Oslo are members of the Strong Cities Network (SCN). During an SCN visit to Kristiansand, the municipality of Mombasa, Kenya, signed an MOU that outlines plans for the two cities to conduct practitioner exchanges and trainings, youth exchanges, civil society mobilization,
and crime and violence prevention programming to prevent violent extremism. Ten Norwegian cities are part of the Nordic Safe Cities Network.

RUSSIA

Overview: The Russian Federation continued to prioritize counterterrorism efforts in 2021, primarily focusing on perceived domestic terrorist groups. Russia has used counterterrorism and “extremism” as pretexts to suppress political opposition and the exercise of human rights, or for other objectives in both domestic and foreign policy. Russia remained concerned about violent extremist Islamic groups, including those with ideological ties to ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, Russia has looked to build inroads with the Taliban, both to establish influential regional footholds and out of concern that terrorism would spill over into Central Asia and the broader former Soviet space.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported incidents in Russia in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Under the coordination of the National Antiterrorism Committee, the Federal Security Service (the FSB) — with aid from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the MVD) and Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia), when appropriate — perform counterterrorism functions. Russia has continued to use its counterterrorism and anti-extremism legislation as a tool to stifle political opposition, independent media, and certain religious organizations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, to criminalize the exercise of freedoms of religion or belief, expression, and association.

In 2021, Russia continued to use terrorism as a pretext to stifle internal dissent. The State Duma (Parliament) adopted three bills meant to silence individuals who provide any dissent toward the government and prevent them from participating in public life. These bills target Russians who support civil society and religious organizations that have been declared “extremist” or “terrorist” under the law that designates organizations as “undesirable.”

Those bills are

- Adopted on June 4, Bill No.1165649-7 bans leaders, staff, and supporters of organizations labeled as “extremist” from running for parliamentary elections. The bill gives Russian authorities the power to label any political group or entity as “extremist.”
- Adopted on June 9, Bill No.1165650-7 amends the law on “undesirable” organizations and prohibits Russian citizens from participating in activities of these organizations. It also imposes stricter measures on finances for organizations that operate with Russian bank accounts and those that receive money from persons who have been labeled as foreign agents.
- Adopted on July 1, Bill No.1165661-7 simplifies the process for charging and convicting those who have been designated as affiliates of “undesirable” organizations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reported that Russia’s security agencies saw a decline in terrorist threats and claimed that Russia had prevented 32 terrorist attacks over an 11-month span in 2021. Russia’s FSB Director General Alexander Bortnikov reported in December that terrorist attacks had been averted this year as a result of using “forceful and preventive measures,” according to Russian state news agency TASS.

Additionally, Russian media has claimed that Russia has stopped 62 clandestine cells of international terrorist groups and prevented 926 people involved in terrorist activities from entering Russia. According to Russian media, the government conducted at least 327 regional counterterrorism exercises and more than 323,000 preventive efforts designed to promote intolerance to terrorism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In 2021, Russia was a member of FATF, MONEYVAL, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG). Its FIU, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring), is a member of the Egmont Group. In addition, according to the federal law “On the Central Bank of Russia (CBR),” the CBR has the authority to monitor activities of Russian financial organizations to assess their compliance with provision of the federal law “On the Prevention of Criminal Proceeds Legalization and Terrorist Financing.” The CBR monitors the implementation of AML/CFT laws and imposes liability for violations committed by banking institutions. Criminal cases involving money laundering are investigated by the MVD, the Russian Investigative Committee, and/or the FSB.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** According to NGO reports, Russian government authorities, including the MVD’s Center for Countering Extremism and the FSB, continue to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism to curtail freedoms of expression, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association. Under new legal amendments, the Russian government has continued to add notable entities, such as Bard College in Annandale, New York, to the “undesirable” organizations list allegedly owing to the “program’s threat to order and security.”

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Russia is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Collective Security Treaty Organization in addition to being an active participant in several multilateral organizations, including the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN, the Eurasian Economic Community, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC.

Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, Russia and Tajikistan have strengthened their military alliance and held joint exercises at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. These exercises were intended to strengthen Tajik-Russian relations and to fortify border security.
Overview: With no terrorist attacks in 2021 and low levels of ISIS recruitment, the main terrorism concerns in Serbia remained the movement of money and weapons through the region, the need to repatriate FTFs and their family members from Syria, and terrorist self-radicalization through racially or ethnically motivated ideologies often related to nationalism. Serbia continued efforts to counter terrorism and cooperate with the United States and international partners.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Serbia’s Ministry of Interior has a Counterterrorism Service (the CT Service), which includes a Department for Preventing and Combating Extremism. Serbia’s Criminal Code criminalizes terrorism-related offenses, including international terrorism, incitement, recruitment, using a deadly device, destruction and damage to a nuclear facility, terrorist financing, and terrorist association. Amendments to the Criminal Code in 2019 introduced life imprisonment for acts of terrorism resulting in death and extended the application of terrorist financing to other crimes. The code also outlaws unauthorized participation in a foreign war or armed conflict, prescribing incarceration from six months to 10 years for such activities. Serbia has sentenced individuals for participating in terrorist-related activities in Syria and for participating in the Russia-Ukraine conflict in eastern Ukraine. The CT Service reported that of the 10 Serbian FTFs who have returned to Europe from Syria or Iraq, four returned to Serbia. Serbia prosecuted seven such FTFs (some in absentia), for a total of 69 years of sentencing, according to the CT Service. According to some NGOs and investigative outlets, prosecutors dealing with such cases reportedly apply different standards, with returnees from Syria facing up to 11-year sentences under terrorism-related offenses and returnees from Ukraine receiving suspended sentences for participation in a foreign armed conflict. The CT Service responded that the Criminal Code allows only those convicted of fighting with UN-designated terrorist groups, such as ISIS, may be prosecuted for terrorism-related offenses. Serbians fighting with pro-Russia groups in Ukraine — not designated as terrorist groups by the UN — were prosecuted for participation in a foreign armed conflict, according to the CT Service. Serbia lacks legislation that more broadly covers conduct related to receiving terrorist training, funding terrorist organizations, and terrorist recruitment activities.

Although UNSCR 2396 calls on member states to develop systems to screen PNR data, currently API and PNR screening programs are not in place in Serbia, although data Serbian airlines are required to transmit to the United States and other governments is collected and handled by third-party data vendors. Serbia in 2020 pledged, as part of the Washington Commitments, to implement information sharing agreements with the United States and to strengthen screening measures. Serbia is integrating with the European Common Aviation Area and cooperates with international partners to enhance capacities in accordance with UNSCR 2309.

According to NGOs there were at least 26 family members of Serbian FTFs in Syria, while the CT Service reported that 27 Serbian national adults are currently in Syria, among whom are family members of FTFs. There were no indications that Serbia repatriated any of these
individuals. Some NGOs and local communities claimed Serbia was unwilling to repatriate its nationals from Syria. International organizations reported that Serbia was establishing local reintegration teams and drafting bylaws to eventually receive repatriated citizens.

In the 2020 Washington Commitments, Serbia pledged to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and implement measures to restrict its operations and financial activities in Serbian jurisdictions. Serbia had not made this designation nor implemented these measures by the end of the reporting period, as the government reported that it follows UN designations of terrorism organizations when making such decisions.

There was no change to the way that the courts address terrorism in 2021. Current law stipulates that the Belgrade Higher Court’s Special Department for Organized Crime hears terrorism-related offenses, and the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office prosecutes them. The Belgrade Appellate Court’s Special Department for Organized Crime hears appeals.

Serbia’s law enforcement capabilities need improvement but are progressing. The Criminal Police Directorate’s Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism (TES) works on terrorism detection, deterrence, and prevention. Serbia’s Operational Working Group consists of TES, the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), and the Prosecutor’s Office. Soft targets are required to have terrorism contingency plans, with TES officers providing consultation and oversight. The Interior Ministry’s Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ) provides tactical response to terrorist incidents.

The Serbian Border Police’s System to Check Persons and Vehicles (SZPLIV) screens passengers and vehicles at all border crossings and other ports of entry. SZPLIV verifies the validity of travel documents through basic indicative security elements, collects biographic and biometric data, checks visa status, searches national and international databases, and stores the information. However, data transmission to the central system can take days.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Serbia is a member of MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body, and has observer status in the EAG. Its FIU, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML), is a member of the Egmont Group. Serbia is in negotiations with the EU under Chapter 4 of the EU Acquis (free movement of capital), which requires alignment with international standards and improved administrative AML and CFT capacity. In September, the APML, with U.S. support, finalized its National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism, and Proliferation, which rated the risk of terrorism financing as “medium to low,” an improvement over its last assessment. The 2020-24 National Strategy for Prevention of Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism, and Proliferation was finalized and adopted in 2020. Its second action plan, for 2022-24, will be finalized in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Serbia implemented its National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for the Period 2017-21 and accompanying Action Plan, which seeks to identify factors leading to radicalization, to enhance citizens’ security, and to intercept threats from social media activities. Serbia reported it will develop a new
strategy in 2022. The Serbian intergovernmental CT working group meets regularly. The municipalities of Bujanovac, Novi Pazar, Presevo, and Tutin are members of the Strong Cities Network. The CT Service reported that Serbia established four local teams made up of police, psychologists, and social workers in the cities of Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Smederevo, and Vranje that would support efforts for reintegration and social support for extremist individuals. These teams would fall under the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, but the CT Service reported they would operate independently, at the community level, in counter-extremism and reintegration efforts.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Serbia is engaged in some regional and international cooperation on CT issues. The Ministry of Interior and BIA cooperate with INTERPOL and Europol on CT activities, including watchlists. A participant in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Serbia routinely participates in international law enforcement training. In 2021, SAJ participated in two U.S. Special Operations Command training events for response to terrorist-related incidents.

Serbia cooperated with UNODC for arms control and border security programs that bolstered regional CT efforts. The OSCE supported seminars and other events to prevent violent extremism and terrorist recruitment.

Serbia has well-developed bilateral border security cooperation programs with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Serbia has a tri-border partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Croatia. Serbian law enforcement agencies routinely engage with counterparts in Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro.

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**SPAIN**

**Overview:** Spain continued to respond effectively to the global terrorism threat in border and transportation security, countering terrorism financing, and countering violent extremism through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Spain remained on “high” national alert for terrorism throughout 2021 for the seventh year in a row. Spanish authorities continued to arrest individuals suspected of planning terror attacks, facilitating terrorist financing, and engaging in ISIS- and al-Qa’ida-related recruitment and radicalization, both online and in their communities. During the year, Spanish counterterrorism cooperation with the United States was excellent.

In 2021, Spain served as co-facilitator of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy Review. Spain maintained its contribution to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, with about 150 personnel deployed to Iraq throughout the year in military and police training missions. Spain continued to exercise leadership in regional and global CT fora, including the GCTF and the 5+5 Defense Initiative.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** On September 14, a Moroccan national drove a vehicle into a crowd of people outside a restaurant, killing one bystander and injuring two others, before
stabbing himself to death. Notes left by the perpetrator suggesting premeditation caused the Guardia Civil to investigate the crash as a potential terrorist incident.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security Legislation:** No changes since 2020.

During 2021, the government continued to implement the 2020 law regarding the collection and analysis of API/PNR.

The Spanish government continued to implement its National Strategy Against Terrorism. The Ministry of Interior, through its Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO), with contributions from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, developed the document to align with the four pillars of Counterterrorism Strategies of the EU and the UN: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Prepare the response. The strategy includes measures to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets, such as hotels, stadiums, tourist resorts, and cultural sites, in line with UNSCR 2341 on protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

The Spanish criminal code punishes any act of “collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist organization,” including promoting terrorism on social media, self-radicalization on the internet, training remotely, operating without clear affiliation, and traveling in support of nonstate terrorist actors. Spanish authorities reported they had undertaken 22 counterterrorist operations and detained 45 suspects for terrorism-related charges during the year.

Significant law enforcement actions related to CT included the following:

- On January 10, Spanish National Police (SNP) arrested three individuals on terrorism charges for allegedly planning an imminent terrorist attack in Spain or another European country.
- On March 4, the government destroyed 1,377 weapons that had been under judicial control in relation to trials completed during 1975-2005 in prosecution of domestic terror groups.
- On April 29, the SNP arrested three suspected terrorists who used social networks to encourage terrorist and violent actions against French individuals and institutions.
- The SNP arrested, on terrorism charges, an Algerian national affiliated with a North African criminal smuggling operation on July 31 on Mallorca. Officials suspect the smuggling operation of facilitating entry for suspected Algerian terrorists into Spain and transporting suspected terrorists between Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
- On September 9, the SNP identified a prisoner at Penitential Center of Daroca, in Zaragoza, with ties to ISIS and launched an intervention. Authorities said the inmate “devoted significant time” to radicalizing fellow prisoners and made credible threats of violence against Spanish government entities.
- On October 10 and 11, SNP arrested five Algerian nationals and charged one with indoctrination, terrorism, and possession of a deadly weapon, and three others with membership in a terrorist group.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** There have been no legislative or significant policy changes since 2020. On March 23, the SNP arrested the president of the Islamic Commission of Spain Mohamad Aiman Adlbi, along with two other individuals, as part of an antiterrorism financing operation. The 74-year-old Adlbi was provisionally released because of health issues while the investigation continues. Spain is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Counter-ISIS Finance Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Spain continued implementation of its national CVE plan, developed in 2015, adjusted annually, and led by CITCO. The plan identifies the potential for terrorist radicalization and recruitment down to the census district level, using an algorithm based on socioeconomic factors, and seeks to build partnerships at the local level between civil society leaders from vulnerable communities and representatives of law enforcement and other public services. On November 29, the union of incarcerated Basque separatist terrorists (Euskal Preso Politikoen Kolektiboa, or EPPK) announced it would no longer support public events celebrating the release of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, or ETA) members who had been convicted of violent terrorist acts. The welcome-home ceremonies, known as ongi etorri, are seen by many as glorification of violence and an effort to undermine rule of law. Despite the November 29 statement, the ongi etorri continued to take place regularly when ETA members were released from prison.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2021, Spain served as co-facilitator of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy Review. Spain is a founding member of the GCTF and supports CT initiatives in the UN, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE. In addition to its membership in the Counter-ISIS Finance Group, Spain is a member of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Stabilization, and Communications Working Groups.

Spain is a donor nation to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and maintained forces throughout 2021 in EU training missions in Mali and Somalia. Spain continues to support the 5+5 Defense Initiative bringing together European (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) and North African (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia) countries to build capacity on CT, maritime and aviation security, and disaster management. The Spanish cities of Fuenlabrada and Málaga are both members of the Strong Cities Network.

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**SWEDEN**

**Overview:** The National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT) assessed that violent right-wing extremism and violent Islamist extremism posed the main terrorist threats to Sweden in 2021. Current terrorist threats from the left-wing radical environment are currently assessed to be close to nonexistent. A small number of individuals in these extremist environments could possibly develop the intent and capability to carry out a
terrorist attack in Sweden. NCT also noted that online radicalization to violence and attacks by lone actors had gradually become more prominent.

The Swedish Security Service reported that violent right-wing extremism had coordinating bodies at the national level, unlike violent Islamist extremism, which lacked the same level of cohesive leadership and organizational structure. However, violent Islamist extremists received the most funding from abroad and had the capability to generate income. Some violent extremist organizations increasingly use digital platforms rather than meeting in person. The Swedish Security Service regularly receives information on firearms and explosives with links to violent right-wing or left-wing extremism. At the end of 2021, the national alert level remained at Level 3 (elevated threat, no evidence of planning) on a scale of 5 (attack imminent, evidence of planning).

The government continued efforts to strengthen its counterterrorism framework. Laws on data retention and signals intelligence improved access to information to fight terrorism in 2021. The new legislation made it easier for the government agencies that make up the National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment to exchange data.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Sweden in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2021, the government proposed a new Terrorism Offenses Act replacing the three current laws relating to terrorism. All crimes should be tried as terrorist crimes if they have the capacity to hurt a country or an international organization and are carried out with the intent of terrorism. The Act proposes that prison sentences for most crimes relating to terrorism should be raised and Swedish courts should be able to carry out sentences, no matter who has committed the crime or where the crime has been committed. The changes will come into force at midyear of 2022.

Sweden repatriated at least nine female FTFs and their approximately 14 children who had previously been in Syrian Democratic Forces-run detention camps in Syria. The Security Service estimated that around 300 Swedish citizens traveled to join ISIS and around 150 returned during the last few years. One repatriated female foreign terrorist fighter was convicted in District Court in Lund and sentenced to three years in prison for child endangerment after bringing her infant child into the Syrian warzone, where she joined ISIS, and others were being investigated for war crimes. Swedish authorities collaborated closely with the FBI in their efforts to build criminal cases against the Swedish foreign terrorist fighters. The Swedish Center for CVE organized a network of nine agencies and organizations to support the rehabilitation and integration of the returnees.

Sweden is party to the EU’s identity verification and border management tools, such as the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System. Sweden collects and uses API, and some PNR, and exchanges information with other member states on irregular migration and border control. Sweden used the “serious threat to public policy or internal security” justification permitted under the Schengen Border Code to unilaterally prolong the temporary border controls first introduced in 2015 until midyear of 2022.
The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) and Nordic Strength are the two major neo-Nazi movements in the Nordic countries. The two groups have around 200 active members in Sweden combined. NRM conducted several acts of harassment and vandalism during 2021. The Swedish Jewish community was one of the most targeted groups. The movements also integrated into the anti-vaccine movement.

In January, two members of the “Eco-Fascist and Right-Wing Extremist” group “The Green Brigade” were convicted in District Court in Nacka on charges related to the arson of a mink farm in Southern Sweden in 2019. Because of their age at the time of the crime in Sweden (17 and 18 years old), the two men received no jail time. Court documents showed the men were also discussing attacks against abortion centers and judges among other plots. Swedish authorities and Luxembourg authorities collaborated closely with the FBI throughout the investigation of The Green Brigade.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sweden is a member of FATF. Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Service, is a member of the Egmont Group. There have been no significant changes to legislation or policy since 2020.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism promotes and coordinates preventive efforts at the national, regional, and local level. The Center supports municipalities, government agencies, and others in preventing violent extremism. The Security Service, together with other authorities, tried to close five schools that had been under the influence of leading figures in the violent Islamist environment and had been suspected of receiving funds from organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The decision was overruled after the schools’ owners appealed, and a final decision is pending. Malmö and Stockholm are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Sweden is a member of the EU and supports CT efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the European Commission’s Radicalization Awareness Network, the EU-9 (focusing on FTFs), the Counterterrorism Group, the Police Working Group on Terrorism, Europol, and the Global Coalition’s Stabilization Working Group.

Sweden engaged in the following efforts to combat terrorism internationally:

- Organizing the 2021 OSCE-wide Counterterrorism Conference
- Funding international CT capacity building projects through development assistance
- Funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch
- Funding to the OSCE
- Contributing 220 troops (a rifle company and a support unit) to MINUSMA
- Joining the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL
- Extending Sweden’s regional crisis strategy for Syria ($425 million for 2016-23) that includes resilience support for groups affected by ISIS’s progress
Türkiye

Overview: Türkiye experienced a significant decrease in terrorist incidents within its borders in 2021, compared with prior years. However, it has expanded its counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria and provided counterterrorism support to Somalia. Media reported that Turkish airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq resulted in civilian casualties, including children. Türkiye also has continued its active counterterrorism cooperation with the international community as a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe. Active as a co-chair of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s FTF Working Group, Türkiye also provided access to its airspace and facilities for coalition counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria.

Türkiye remains a transit point for FTFs departing Syria and Iraq. Domestically, Türkiye confronts terrorist organizations, including the PKK, ISIS, and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), all active both inside the country and along its borders. The nation also views the Syrian Democratic Forces, a U.S. partner in the counter-ISIS campaign, as a branch of the PKK terrorist group, and this remained a significant point of friction with the United States. Notably, Türkiye does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization; the U.S.-designated group maintains offices in Istanbul, and Hamas’ political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, has met with Turkish President Erdogan.

In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, the Government of Türkiye labeled the movement of self-exiled cleric and political figure Fethullah Gulen as the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (“FETO”). FETO (the Gulen movement) is not a designated terrorist organization in the United States. Türkiye continues to detain and arrest Turkish citizens — including locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission to Türkiye — and foreign citizens residing in Türkiye for alleged Gulen or terrorism-related links, often based on scant evidence and minimal due process. The Government of Türkiye also continued to dismiss military, security, and civil servants from public office in 2021. Since the failed coup, the Government of Türkiye has conducted 135,916 Gulen-related operations, arrested 312,121 citizens, dismissed or suspended more than 125,000 civil servants from public office, and closed more than 1,500 NGOs for alleged Gulen movement links. Politically motivated detentions and arrests of individuals — including journalists, human rights activists, lawyers, and politicians accused of supporting or aiding either the PKK or the Gulen movement — under antiterror and other laws continued in 2021.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist incidents included the following:

- In February, the PKK killed 13 Turkish soldiers and police officers (originally kidnapped in Türkiye) during a botched hostage rescue attempt by Turkish military forces in Gara, northern Iraq. In retaliation, Türkiye launched Operation Tiger Claw 2 in northern Iraq, killing 48 alleged PKK members.
• In April, a PKK attack killed one Turkish soldier involved in a counter-PKK operation in Türkiye’s eastern Siirt Province.
• In October, a PKK-planted roadside IED exploded, killing two electricity company workers in Türkiye’s eastern Bingöl Province.
• In December, a PKK attack killed three Turkish soldiers during operations close to Türkiye’s border in northern Iraq.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2021, Turkish security forces prevented a total of 101 terrorist attacks — 97 by the PKK, three by ISIS, and one by the violent extreme-leftist DHKP-C terror group, according to Türkiye’s Ministry of Interior. Data from the Ministry of Interior indicates that Turkish forces neutralized 320 ISIS members in 2021, which Türkiye defines to mean killed, captured, or otherwise removed from the battlefield. In June, Turkish security forces captured ISIS member Kasim Guler (aka Abu Usama al-Turki), the first capture of an ISIS terror suspect on Türkiye’s “red” top wanted list. Reportedly serving as an ISIS so-called financial officer covering Russia, Türkiye, and Europe, Guler allegedly confessed that ISIS had planned to assassinate Turkish political opposition leaders, as well as conduct attacks against LGBTQI individuals, tourists, and other groups in Türkiye.

Türkiye’s security forces conducted multiple operations domestically along with counter-PKK military operations in northern Iraq and northern Syria. According to Ministry of Interior reports, in 2021 a total of 197 PKK members surrendered to Turkish authorities, including several on Türkiye’s top wanted list, and security forces detained 7,607 individuals suspected of PKK affiliation.

The Turkish National Police (TNP) Migrant Smuggling and Border Gates division has proactively collaborated with DHS Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) to disrupt human smuggling organizations that actively move ISIS, PKK, and members of other nefarious groups across Türkiye’s borders. TNP and HSI worked jointly to disrupt a vast network operating in Türkiye and arrest its Uzbekistan national ringleader, Rustam Muminov, whose fraudulent document organization provided fake passports and other documents to known members of ISIS to facilitate their travel to European countries.

On border security, Türkiye has expanded its Risk Analysis Units — embedded within TNP’s Migrant Smuggling and Border Gates division and staffed by TNP intelligence and counterterrorism branch officers — to cover not only its major airports in Istanbul, Antalya, and Ankara, but also regional airports, bus terminals, and border crossings. These units have enhanced Türkiye’s security apparatus, preventing the flow of FTFs into the region. As a result, Türkiye this year detained more than 1,000 foreigners suspected of terrorist links, who now await deportation.

Türkiye completed a 145-kilometer (90-mile) wall along the Ağrı-Iğdır section of Türkiye’s eastern border with Iran to prevent terrorists from entering the country. Since 2015, 837 kilometers of Türkiye’s 1,295-kilometer southern border have been sealed with a border wall. Work continued in 2021 to bolster security with an additional 238-kilometer
stretch along the Iranian border in the East and 33 kilometers on the border shared with Iraq in the South.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** A member of the FATF, Türkiye failed to adequately address deficiencies identified in the 2019 Mutual Evaluation Report, resulting in an October FATF Plenary decision that put Türkiye on its gray list. At that time, Türkiye committed to a FATF-designed action plan to address these deficiencies. Since the October FATF result, Türkiye’s Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) has greatly improved its responsiveness to U.S. requests for asset freezes of suspected ISIS or Al-Qa’ida financial facilitators and has started sharing more information. MASAK also has decreased the time it takes to implement new UN designations from up to a month to less than 24 hours.

The Turkish Parliament approved a new law (effective as of 2021) titled “Prevention of Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” reportedly aimed at addressing some of the significant shortcomings identified by FATF with relation to anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism. MASAK created a system to categorize Türkiye’s non-profit organizations (NPOs) according to risk criteria and increased its audits of those in what it deemed to be the highest risk categories. MASAK has not publicly released its risk criteria. To date, audits have focused on NPOs working on human rights issues and vulnerable communities, particularly groups that focus on the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. Before the passage of this new legislation, those suspected of money laundering or raising funds for terrorist groups could be charged only with support for a terrorist group or “seeking to undermine Türkiye’s constitutional order,” which carries a six- to-15-year prison sentence upon conviction. Now, additional anti-money laundering or countering terrorism finance charges can add jail time. The indiscriminate scope of the new legal provisions on aid collection do not seem to meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality to protect freedom of association, and lack of judicial oversight to authorities could constitute serious infringement of the right of associations to conduct their own affairs. The Venice Commission and other international bodies have issued opinions and recommendations aimed at addressing these deficiencies.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The TNP undertakes social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers in all 81 provinces with a concentration on areas where the risk of what Türkiye deems radicalization is higher. Programs prepare medical, community, and religious officials for intervening to undermine terrorist messaging and to prevent recruitment. A new program, Hand in Hand to a Safe Future, specifically targets university students vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups. The Ministry of Justice implements some rehabilitation and reintegration programs for convicts and former criminals. Türkiye’s Religious Affairs Presidency (the Diyanet) attempts to prevent “radicalization” by creating a single Friday sermon it distributes nationally, leaving no room for dissenting messages. Antalya is a member of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: Türkiye is a member of the UN, NATO, the GCTF, the Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It co-chairs, with Kuwait and the Netherlands, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s FTF Working Group. Türkiye is also a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance and Stabilization Working Groups in the coalition. Türkiye regularly participates in GCTF meetings and initiatives. Türkiye also contributes to the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, a GCTF-inspired institution, and provides expert support to assist in training for judges and prosecutors handling terrorism cases.

UNITED KINGDOM (NORTHERN IRELAND)

Overview: The UK remained a key U.S. partner in the global fight against terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries was excellent. As a Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS partner, the UK continued to contribute to Iraq and northeast Syria stabilization efforts. The United Kingdom also serves as the coalition’s Communications Working Group co-leader, in partnership with the UAE and the United States on countering ISIS propaganda and messaging.

The UK’s terrorism threat level was at the third-highest rating (“substantial”) for most of 2021. On February 4, the UK lowered the threat level from “severe” to “substantial,” indicating a terrorist attack remains “likely” rather than “highly likely,” citing a “significant reduction in the momentum of attacks in Europe.” On November 15, following the October 15 stabbing of Sir David Amess, Member of Parliament (MP, Southend West), and the November 14 Liverpool bombing, the UK increased the threat level to “severe” owing to an overall change in the threat picture. UK officials categorize Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to national security, though they recognize the growing threat of racially and ethnically motivated terrorism, also referred to as “extreme right-wing” terrorism.

On November 18, the Home Office reported that, during the fiscal year ending in March, the UK’s Prevent counterterrorism program received more referrals related to extreme right-wing” radicalization (1,229) than “Islamist” radicalization (1,064) for the first time. From 2017 through December, police and security services disrupted 32 plots: 18 related to Islamist extremism, 12 to extreme right-wing extremism, and two to “left, anarchist, or single-issue terrorism.”

The terrorist threat level for Northern Ireland — set separately from England, Scotland, and Wales — remains severe because of threats from Dissident Republican groups, which remain opposed to British governance and use paramilitary-style attacks and intimidation to exert control over communities. In December, the Independent Reporting Commission published its fourth annual report assessing Loyalist and Republican paramilitarism, which remain a clear and present danger in Northern Ireland.
2021 Terrorist Attacks: The UK suffered two terrorist attacks in 2021:

- On October 15, a British national of Somali heritage fatally stabbed Conservative Sir David Amess, MP, while Amess met with constituents in Leigh-on-Sea, Essex.
- On November 14, an Iraqi-born asylum seeker killed himself when a homemade explosive charge he manufactured “with murderous intent” detonated inside a taxi outside Liverpool Women’s Hospital. The taxi driver was the only other individual injured in the blast.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In April, Parliament passed the Counterterrorism and Sentencing Bill, which increased maximum sentences from 10 to 14 years for three terrorism offenses: membership in a proscribed organization, supporting a proscribed organization, and attending a place used for terrorist training. The Bill created a new, extended post-release probationary regime for terrorism offenders and made it easier to impose stringent restrictions on freedom of association and movement on terrorist activity suspects not yet charged with a crime.

UK law enforcement made 188 arrests for suspected terrorism-related activity, of which 47 resulted in charges for terrorism-related offenses from 2020 through September, according to Home Office statistics. Of the 58 people convicted of terrorism-related offenses, 45 received sentences of less than 10 years and one received a life sentence. As of September, 218 people were in custody for terrorism-related offenses in the UK, with 154 of these individuals associated with “Islamist extremism” and 45 with “extreme right-wing” terrorism.

In June, the UK launched a consultation on strengthening UK border security by 2025, using new digital systems. The UK uses advanced biometric screening at some points of entry but lost real-time access to automated DNA and fingerprint comparisons after the Brexit transition period ended at year’s end of 2020. Under the terms of the withdrawal agreement, the UK was required to modify its systems to effect “deletion after departure,” absent specific justification (such as criminality or terrorism). Selective deletion takes time to automate, and the UK has been providing periodic reports to the EU as required.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The UK is a member of the FATF and has observer or cooperating status in the following FATF-style bodies: the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the Middle East and North Africa FATF, and the Caribbean FATF. The UK FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. The UK is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group.

The 2018 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act provided the legal framework to implement sanctions after the UK left the EU. The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 took effect in the beginning of 2020. The UK’s domestic counterterrorism sanctions regime — the Counterterrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit)
Regulations 2019 (known as CT3) — replaced the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 when the Brexit transition period terminated at the end of 2020.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE), a nonstatutory expert committee of the Home Office, published a February report recommending that the government commit to developing a “new legal and operational framework to capture the specific activity of hateful extremism.” The CCE also published a July report, which explored the range and nature of attitudes, beliefs, or false narratives among the general population, in relation to COVID-19 and “hateful extremism.” The CCE’s Academic-Practitioner Counter Extremism Network convened countering-violent-extremism experts from the CCE, government, and academia to align policy, practice, and research. The UK is a contributor to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. Birmingham, Derry/Londonderry, Leicester, London, Luton, and Manchester are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The UK continued to strongly support counterterrorism efforts in the Global Counterterrorism Forum and other regional and multilateral organizations, to include the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, where it co-leads the Communications Working Group and belongs to the Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Stabilization Working Groups. The UK is a key member of the Five-Country Ministerial, which promotes multilateral ministerial dialogue on border security and counterterrorism. The UK leads Five Eyes efforts to prevent new European data laws from interfering with lawful government access to suspected terrorist content and voluntary industry efforts to report suspected criminal content on their platforms. The UK cooperates with other OSCE participating States in countering terrorism.
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Overview

Terrorist groups continued to operate and maintain safe havens in the Middle East and North Africa throughout 2021. ISIS and its affiliates, al-Qa’ida (AQ) and affiliated groups, and Iran-backed groups continue to pose the greatest terrorist threats to the region.

ISIS maintained significant operational capabilities and conducted terrorist operations throughout Syria and Iraq, while continuing to promote a large-scale terrorism campaign across the region. While ISIS remains unable to control territory and its leadership ranks have been significantly degraded, the group remains a serious threat to U.S. interests and security in the region and beyond. ISIS fighters continued to wage a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria, seeking to destabilize the region, recruit new members, and regain territory. More than 10,000 ISIS fighters, including some 2,000 non-Iraqi and non-Syrian FTFs, remained in Syrian Democratic Forces-controlled detention facilities in northeast Syria. More than 70,000 associated foreign family members, most of them children, remain in humanitarian camps for displaced persons. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to present logistical challenges to repatriations, but the United States continued to encourage allies and partners to repatriate their citizens and to prosecurate or rehabilitate and reintegrate them, as appropriate. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS branches, networks, and supporters across the Middle East and North Africa remained active, including in the Arabian Peninsula, Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Tunisia, and Yemen. The 85-member U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS continued its comprehensive efforts to prevent a resurgence of ISIS’s so-called physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the activities of its branches and networks.

Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates constituted an enduring threat to the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East and North Africa. These groups remain capable of inflicting damage on our allies and partners and targeting our interests. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to linger in the seams between the various parties to Yemen’s civil war, despite pressure from the Houthi military campaign in al-Bayda governorate. Though al-Qa’ida’s leadership ranks in the Middle East and North Africa continued to be degraded in 2021 and the group suffered setbacks, al-Qa’ida remained a resilient adversary. It actively sought to reconstitute its capabilities and maintain safe havens in the region amid fragile political and security climates, including in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Iran-supported groups continue to engage in dangerous and destabilizing activity across the Middle East, with Iran using the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its proxies and partners to advance its interests abroad. Iran continued to acknowledge the active involvement of the IRGC-QF in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the latter in support of the Assad regime. Through the IRGC-QF, Iran continued its support to several U.S.-designated terrorist groups, providing funding, training, weapons, and equipment to various groups within the region. Among the groups receiving support from Iran are Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq, and Hizballah al-Hijaz in Saudi Arabia. Iran also provided weapons and support to other militant groups in Iraq and Syria, to the Houthis in Yemen, and to the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran-backed militias continued sporadic attacks on Embassy Baghdad and bases hosting U.S. and other Defeat-ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria.

Iranian support and guidance for the Houthis enabled attacks against Saudi Arabia in 2021. These attacks employed armed drones and ballistic missiles, which damaged airports and critical infrastructure. Iran also continued providing Hizballah with the bulk of the group’s annual operating budget, an allocation estimated in recent years to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This support has made Hizballah a dangerous terrorist partner with Iran and the most-capable terrorist organization in Lebanon. It also has enabled Hizballah to project its power throughout the region, including in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf. Hizballah’s presence in Lebanon and Syria continued to pose a threat to Israel. Israel continued to warn the international community about Hizballah’s efforts to produce precision-guided missiles within Lebanon with Iranian assistance. Hizballah has said that it has enough precision-guided missiles for a confrontation with Israel, but it has denied missiles are being developed in Lebanon. Although Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank and Gaza continued to threaten Israel, Israeli and Palestinian Authority security forces continued their coordination in the West Bank to constrain the ability of these organizations to conduct attacks.

ALGERIA

Overview: The United States and Algeria built their CT partnership through regular dialogue and exchanges of technical expertise. Algeria continued its significant efforts to prevent terrorist activity within its borders using continual CT operations to arrest and eliminate terrorist suspects, dismantle and disrupt terrorist cells, and destroy hideouts, arms, and other equipment.

These operations, particularly those that eliminated leaders and high-profile members of terrorist groups, substantially diminished their already-limited capacities to operate within Algeria. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and allied groups, ISIS’s Algeria branch, and the local group Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), remained in the country though in ever-smaller numbers, as they have been unable to attract new recruits or significant new resources (or in some cases, may have relocated to Mali, an easier operating environment). These groups did not conduct any attacks in 2021. In January, the Algerian Ministry of Defense declared that 2021 would be decisive in eliminating the last terrorist “remnants” from the country, and in private and public comments throughout the year some Algerian officials have asserted that Algeria has “defeated” terrorism. Embassy Algiers assesses that the country’s security forces could credibly reduce the likelihood of domestic terrorist threats to a negligible level within the next 18 months.

Terrorist activity in Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia — as well as human, weapons, and narcotics trafficking — contributed to the overall threat, particularly in border regions. Algeria’s security apparatus increasingly focused its CT capacity on preventing these elements from projecting into Algeria. Additionally, in 2021 Algerian authorities targeted more frequently the Berber separatist Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie and the Islamist movement Rachad, which the government designated as terrorist organizations in May. The United States considers these designations more political than security focused, as both groups are highly critical of the
government and do not appear to have committed what the United States defines as terrorist acts. In CT-related engagement with the United States, Algerian authorities have notably refrained from discussing these groups or the alleged threats they pose. The government occasionally charged individuals with terrorism-related crimes for activities that appeared to constitute expression and peaceful activism.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Algeria-based terrorist groups did not conduct any domestic attacks in 2021. According to the Algerian Army’s yearly report, it neutralized 23 terrorists, arrested 222 terrorists and their supporters, and discovered and destroyed more than 50 terrorist caches and almost 100 homemade bombs and other weapons during CT operations in 2021. Algerian security forces sometimes clashed with violent extremists during these operations, occasionally suffering casualties. While the United States does not assess either to be a terrorist incident, Embassy Algiers has noted two incidents below that are noteworthy for their number of fatalities:

- Three Algerian soldiers and six terrorists, as defined by Algeria, were killed in clashes during search operations in Tipaza Province on January 2 and 3. Sporadic clashes have erupted in the Tipaza region, where the mountainous terrain serves as one of Algeria’s last refuges for violent extremists.
- Five persons died and three were wounded when a truck carrying a group of hunters struck a homemade IED on a remote dirt road in the eastern Tébessa province on January 14. While initial reports by Algerian authorities and media labeled the incident a “terrorist attack,” the government subsequently released no evidence to suggest the explosion was purposeful or targeted. We assess it was likely old ordnance intended as a defensive measure for the small number of AQIM militants who remain in the area.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In 2021, Algeria amended its penal code to broaden the definition of terrorist acts and to create a national list of terrorist individuals and entities. The government used the new amendments to detain political activists and outspoken critics of the government. The Algerian judicial system tried and convicted numerous terrorists and their affiliates, and the government maintained its strict “no concessions” policy with regard to individuals or groups holding its citizens hostage.

Algerian military forces and multiple law enforcement, intelligence, and security services addressed CT, counterintelligence, investigations, border security, and crisis response. The Ministry of National Defense’s public announcements provided timely reporting on incidents during which its forces captured or eliminated terrorists, dismantled terrorist cells, and seized equipment and arms.

Border security remained a top priority. Algeria and Tunisia continued close CT cooperation to target ISIS strongholds in the border area and signed bilateral agreements concerning extradition and mutual legal assistance in December. The Algerian government closely monitored passenger manifests of inbound and outbound flights. In September, Algeria officially created a National Unit of Passenger Information registry to process and store international passenger information to prevent and counter terrorism and transnational organized crime. This registry supplements Algeria’s national API/PNR strategy and commission and its Passenger Information
Unit, which operates under the General Directorate of Customs. Government officials made active use of INTERPOL databases at ports of entry.

Algerian law enforcement agencies participated in training and exchanges offered by the U.S. government and by third countries. Algerian participants attended numerous workshops conducted under the auspices of the GCTF, the UN, the EU, the African Union (AU), and other multilateral organizations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENATATF). In 2021, the government passed an executive decree to strengthen and refine the country’s FIU, known as the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, which is a member of the Egmont Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no significant changes in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Algeria continued to support CT and security efforts through participation in international, multilateral, and regional organizations. It engages actively with UN affiliates such as UNODC and the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism. The country is an active member of the GCTF and co-chairs the GCTF’s Capacity Building in the West Africa Region Working Group, hosting and participating in numerous workshops and working group meetings. Algeria plays a leading role in CT-related matters in the AU. The nation hosts, in Algiers, the headquarters of Afrapol and the AU’s Center for Study and Research on Terrorism. In September, the AU’s Peace and Security Council adopted Algeria’s proposed “action plan” to address growing violent extremist threats in the Sahel. Algeria remains chair of the implementation committee for the peace accord in Mali and continues to support the UN political process in Libya. Algeria also hosted and participated in various Sahelian-Saharan fora to discuss development and security policies and the evolution of regional terrorism. Regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria remained an impediment to bilateral and regional CT cooperation.

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**BAHRAIN**

**Overview:** There were no successful terrorist attacks in Bahrain in 2021, but domestic security forces conducted numerous operations to preempt and disrupt attack planning. On February 6, Ministry of Interior security forces thwarted a plot to detonate explosives at two National Bank of Bahrain automated teller machines (ATMs) in the al-Naim and Jidhafs areas in Manama. In September, four individuals were arrested for setting fire to a Bahrain National Bank ATM; the Ministry of Interior also accused them of being funded by the Iran-based al-Wafa group.

The Government of Bahrain is a member of the Riyadh-based Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) and supports U.S. government counterterrorism efforts. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and participates in U.S.-led military coalitions, including the International Maritime Security Construct and the Counter Maritime Task Force. Bahrain continued to offer support for countering Iran’s malign activities...
in the region. The Government of Bahrain initiated numerous programs intended to improve relations between the community and security forces.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist attacks reported in Bahrain in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** On September 29, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated a regional Hizballah terrorism-financing network in a coordinated action against the group with Bahraini authorities. On October 5, Bahrain’s Attorney General Dr. Ali bin Fadl al-Buainain announced that prosecutors had charged three individuals in Bahrain and one individual in Qatar with terror finance and money laundering in connection to the network.

In September, the High Criminal Court found 13 men guilty of being part of a major terrorism cell and of planning several attacks in Bahrain. The court said the men, whose ages ranged from 21 to 37, were part of Saraya al-Ashtar (Al-Ashtar Brigades) and that seven of them had trained in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps camps in Iran.

In November, the Ministry of Interior arrested 14 individuals for plotting terrorist operations “against security and civil peace,” confiscating weapons and explosives it alleged came from Iran.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bahrain is a member of MENAFATF. Its Financial Intelligence Unit is known as the Financial Intelligence Directorate (FID). In 2021, the head of Bahrain’s FID was elected the regional representative of the Egmont Group. Bahrain is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group and the TFTC. In 2021, Bahrain ranked first in the Arab region and second in the Middle East on the Basel Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Index, with a score of 4.5 points; it was Bahrain’s second consecutive year leading the region on the AML Index.

As part of broader efforts to implement the recommendations set forth in its 2018 Financial Action Task Force *Mutual Evaluation Report*, over the last two years the Government of Bahrain established a Ministerial Committee to Combat Extremism, Money Laundering, and the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), chaired by the Minister of Interior. In addition to Edict 12 outlining the sanctions and designations authorities of the AML/CFT committee, the Government of Bahrain promulgated more than 30 laws to strengthen AML/CFT regulation, including requiring the disclosure of ultimate beneficial corporate ownership and eliminating cash real estate transactions. Further, the Public Prosecution created a specialized unit dedicated to money laundering crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Government of Bahrain continued public outreach initiatives such as a community police program that works to bridge the divide between the Bahraini Shia community and police force in neighborhoods and public schools. The Ministry of Interior continued to implement the *Bahrainuna* (“Our Bahrain”) initiative to promote a shared, national Bahraini identity.
Specially Designated Global Terrorists Saraya al-Mukhtar and Al-Ashtar Brigades seek to destabilize Bahraini society and pave the way for Iran to exert greater influence in Bahrain. According to a UN Counterterrorism Center’s 2020 Quarterly Report recommendation, the Government of Bahrain should work to increase awareness, build trust, and enhance civil society capacity to adhere to national regulations in a manner commensurate to the risk posed to the non-profit sector by terrorist groups.

The Ministry of Interior’s drug abuse and CVE prevention program, Ma’an, in partnership with DARE USA is available in 80 percent of Bahraini government schools. Ma’an worked in partnership with the University of North Carolina and DARE USA to develop a tolerance and CVE student curriculum as part of the National Action Plan to Combat Extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** As of December, the Bahrain Defense Force maintained small, deployed elements in Saudi Arabia and Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition against the Iran-backed Houthis and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. Bahrain is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

Mission Manama facilitated seven Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) courses with the Ministry of Interior: Investigating Terrorist Incidents; Police Leaders Role in Combating Terrorism; Combating Domestic and Transnational Terrorism; Fraudulent Document Recognition and Behavioral Analysis; Maritime Port and Harbor Security Management; Combating Domestic and Transnational Terrorism; and Explosive Incident Countermeasures. In October, the Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training and Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s ATA program successfully completed the first of five phases in the Counter-Lebanese Hizballah Training Program, which builds terrorism investigations and prosecutions capabilities through information integration and capacity building.

In August, the DOJ OPDAT program trained Bahrain’s Public Prosecution Office and FID on enhanced AML/CFT best practices, including methods to combat terrorism finance.

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**EGYPT**

**Overview:** Egypt experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity in 2021, compared with previous years. Egypt is committed to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. Egypt continued its military campaign and social development programs in North Sinai, where a degraded ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) targeted security forces, pro-government Bedouin groups, and civilians. In March, Egyptian security forces killed a senior ISIS-SP commander. In September, a high-profile ISIS-SP religious figure, reported to be behind the deadly 2017 Rouda Mosque attack, defected. Human rights organizations have raised concerns over reports of civilians allegedly killed during military operations in North Sinai. Accurate numbers for civilian, military, and terrorist casualties remain elusive because of security constraints in North Sinai and limited press, social media, and government reporting. As of early 2021, Egypt’s Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights reported that the Egyptian
government spent $224 million (out of a total $260 million budgeted) through 2020 on compensation (for property damaged in counterterrorism operations) and economic development to support North Sinai residents. While the Egyptian government announced it would not renew the national state of emergency in October, other laws give the government special powers in North Sinai where counterterrorism operations are focused. The government continued to periodically use terrorism-related charges to prosecute individuals for what appeared to constitute peaceful expression and activism.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Based on government press releases, as well as social media and other local reporting, at least 90 terrorist incidents took place in the Sinai Peninsula and claimed about 200 casualties. ISIS-SP claimed most of the attacks. Like prior years, the methodology for the attacks included small arms attacks, IEDs, VBIEDs, kidnappings, murders (or killings), complex assaults, ambushes, and targeted assassinations. There was a significant decrease in the number, frequency, and severity of IEDs, VBIEDs, and complex operations with large-scale casualties against Egyptian security forces. Opportunistic IED and sniper attacks appeared to constitute most security force casualties.

- On August 12, the Egyptian military announced the death of nine soldiers and 13 militants during undated clashes. Social media and ISIS-SP reporting claimed an IED attack on an M60 MBT and an armored vehicle during that timeframe.
- On July 31, ISIS-SP killed at least five Egyptian soldiers and injured another six near Sheikh Zuweid during an ambush on a checkpoint, according to the press and a statement from Egyptian officials.
- In mid-May, ISIS-SP media accounts claimed seven attacks with nine casualties, including Egyptian security forces and pro-government Bedouin tribe members.
- On March 24, dozens of alleged ISIS-SP members stormed a town near Bir al-Abd and kidnapped at least 14 civilians, according to social media and local press.

While ISIS-SP was the only group to publicly claim responsibility for attacks during the year, Harakat Sawa’d Misr and AQ-allied groups such as Ansar al-Islam remain groups of concern. Local security services were aware of attempts by unknown individuals to target churches and infrastructure across the year. Separately, security forces conducted and publicized occasional raids on weapons caches throughout Egypt, including in Cairo. Some of the raids resulted in the deaths of several individuals who were the intended targets of the raids. The government attributed those weapons caches to criminal elements rather than to terrorist organizations.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Egyptian government announced it would not renew the nationwide state of emergency on October 25, which had been in effect since 2017 (and previously during 1981-2012). Human rights groups and international NGOs reported the government continued to use counterterrorism authorities to pursue activists, political candidates, and critics. President Sisi also ratified amendments to the 2015 Antiterrorism Law:

- Authorizing the Egyptian president to delegate presidential authority to issue orders imposing evacuations, curfews, or isolation in an identified region for six months in case of terrorism or environmental disasters.
• Increasing the penalty for filming, recording, broadcasting, or displaying any facts from court sessions in “terrorist crimes” without the permission of the head of the court.
• Broadening the definition of funds to include a variety of assets tied to what the Egyptian government determined to be extremist ideology.
• Establishing a compulsory requirement for local authorities to provide information relating to money laundering.
• Outlining requirements for the authorities to publish statistics on its activities countering terror financing.

Amendments to the Penal Code criminalized the collection or publication of statistics, information, or data on the Egyptian Armed Forces without written permission from the Ministry of Defense. The Egyptian government also tightened financing laws, which they described as part of the effort to combat terrorism. The Prime Minister’s Decision No. 104 of 2021 prohibited non-profit organizations from conducting any activities related to terrorism or money laundering. These changes created administrative burdens, such as unclear reporting requirements, and increased the Egyptian government’s oversight of employment and financial data based on its expansive view of what constitutes supporting or financing terrorism.

The Egyptian government continued to expand its partnerships on land and maritime border security initiatives, particularly along its borders with Libya, Gaza, and Sudan. At border crossings and airports, Egyptian authorities continued to authenticate travel documents, conduct checks on individuals, and share derogatory information among border authorities for further action. Egypt maintains a terrorist watchlist for Egyptian immigration officials at the ports of entry, with detailed information maintained by the security services; this list occasionally included peaceful human rights activists and journalists. The United States assisted Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts by providing training, equipment, and other assistance to its law enforcement and armed forces.

In North Sinai in 2021, Egyptian security operations significantly degraded ISIS-SP. The Egyptian government continued to conduct military operations and limited airstrikes in the Sinai Peninsula to target terrorists. A significant number of civilians returned to villages in North Sinai Governorate in late 2021 following an Egyptian Armed Forces campaign to push ISIS-SP from those areas.

The Egyptian government remains highly aware of the dangers in North Sinai. Transit into and out of the Sinai Peninsula remains tightly controlled, and towns in North Sinai — particularly Bir al-Abd, Rafah, and Sheikh Zuweid — are closely monitored as the Egyptian government seeks to eradicate terrorist activity in the area. Human rights organizations claimed a video released in August by the armed forces to depict Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts shows two extrajudicial killings in North Sinai. Egypt denies the allegation. The Egyptian government provided compensation to North Sinai residents for property damaged in counterterrorism operations, compensation for the families of those killed or injured, as well as humanitarian/medical aid and social assistance, although North Sinai residents continued to lodge grievances about compensation calculations and disbursements. Local media and government announcements spotlighted economic development efforts to showcase government
investments in education, public infrastructure, and land dispute resolution tied to development projects as longer-term solutions to deter extremism.

The United States continued to support Egypt’s efforts to combat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt by sustaining and providing AH-64 Apache helicopters, mine-resistant and ambush-protected vehicles, counter-IED training, mobile sensor towers, and border security training programs. The United States routinely engages in bilateral discussions regarding strategies to defeat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt, to further efforts to mitigate the risk of civilian harm and encourage credible investigation into any allegations of human rights violations and abuses.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Egypt is a member of MENAFATF. Its Financial Intelligence Unit, the Egyptian Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Combating Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group and the National Council of Payments. Egypt also is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** CVE efforts remain an ongoing focus of the Egyptian government. The Ministry of Awqaf and the Ministry of Education highlighted ongoing efforts to demonstrate the threat of “extremist ideology” and promote youth programs and curricula on respect and moderation. Al-Azhar, a global leader in Islamic learning, maintains an observatory for combating online violent extremism (with a team of analysts working in 13 different languages) that challenges and debunks propaganda from ISIS and other violent extremist groups, and announced a forthcoming translation of the Quran into Hebrew.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Egypt participated in the UN’s 2021 Counterterrorism Week and contributed to the UN’s 2021 Counterterrorism Strategy, and regional-level counterterrorism organizations focused on border security. Egypt is a member of the GCTF and co-chairs the GCTF’s Capacity Building in the East Africa Region Working Group. Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its second-ever annual counterterrorism report outlining progress and updates.

**IRAQ**

**Overview:** Iraq’s primary terrorist threats included ISIS remnants and various Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs), including U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, as well as smaller militias claiming to be a part of Iraq’s “Islamic Resistance.” The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group primarily located in the mountains of northern Iraq and in southeastern Türkiye, conducted multiple attacks in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) resulting in the deaths of several Kurdish security forces (Peshmerga) personnel.

ISIS, though severely diminished in capacity, continued to conduct operations, particularly in northern and western rural areas with limited Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) presence. ISIS sought to reestablish footholds in Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din provinces, especially in the gaps between those areas frequently patrolled by the Peshmerga and
ISF. Although ISIS conducted deadly terrorist attacks in Iraq, those attacks resulted in fewer casualties nationwide in 2021 than in previous years. Methods included bombings, indirect fire, IEDs, sniper fire, and ambushes. Iraq remained a pivotal member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and a participant in all Coalition Working Groups (Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Counter-ISIS Finance Group, Stabilization, and Communications). Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) conducted about 170 counterterrorist operations against ISIS during 2021, often with Defeat-ISIS Coalition support.

Iraqi counterterrorism functions were principally executed by the CTS, a cabinet-level entity reporting directly to the prime minister, as well as by various security forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the Peshmerga. In limited instances, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) augmented Iraqi Army and CTS-led operations. All PMF were required by law to operate under the command and control of the prime minister. However, Iran-aligned militia groups, including many within the PMF, defied central government command and control and engaged in violent and destabilizing activities in Iraq and in neighboring Syria, including killing and abducting people protesting militia corruption. The number of attacks by IAMGs against U.S. interests resulting in the killing and wounding of Iraqi service members and locals remained about the same in 2021 as in 2020. Media reported Turkish airstrikes against the PKK in northern Iraq resulted in civilian casualties, including children.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorists conducted more than 100 IED attacks on Defeat-ISIS-contracted convoys and launched at least 40 indirect fire attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq. Major terrorist incidents included the following:

- On January 21, two suicide bombers attacked an open-air market in central Baghdad, killing 32 and injuring 110. ISIS claimed responsibility, saying it had targeted Shiites.
- Iran-aligned militias launched several drone and rocket attacks against Erbil Airbase; one such rocket attack on February 15 led to the death of a U.S. contractor.
- On April 18, Balad Air Base was struck by four 107mm rockets. On July 5, Ayn al-Asad Air Base was targeted with seven 122mm rockets. On July 7, Ayn al-Asad was targeted with 14 122mm rockets, impacting on-compound from a suspected multiple rocket launcher. On July 19 an ISIS suicide bomber killed at least 35 and wounded dozens more in a crowded market in the Sadr City district of Baghdad.
- On October 26, ISIS attacked Al-Hawasha village in the Muqdadiya district of Diyala province, killing 13 civilians and wounding seven others.
- On November 7, an IAMG drone attack targeted the Iraqi prime minister’s residence.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Iraqi government improved the security of the International Zone before the October national election. Iraq did not significantly change its counterterrorism legal and law enforcement framework. Human rights groups reported that authorities arrested suspects in security sweeps without warrants, particularly under the antiterrorism law, and frequently held such detainees for prolonged periods without charge. The groups also allege courts routinely accepted forced confessions as evidence, and in some ISIS-related cases this was the only evidence.
Border security and corruption remained a critical vulnerability, as the Border Guard Security Force (BGSF) had limited capability to fully secure Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran. Border security was administered by the BGSF, with ISF or Peshmerga deployed behind them. The border with Syria near Türkiye remained especially porous, and border areas with Iran were generally controlled by IAMGs. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Export Control and Related Border Security began a two-year train-the-trainer program for several hundred Iraqi border guards.

While the Ministry of Interior shared biometric information upon request on suspected terrorists with the United States, INTERPOL, and other partners, a biometric information-sharing program was not finalized by the government.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Iraq was a member of MENAFATF, as well as the Counter-ISIS Finance Group. The Government of Iraq — including the Central Bank, law enforcement, security forces, and judiciary in Baghdad and the IKR — continued to target ISIS financial networks and safeguard Iraq’s financial institutions.

Iraq worked to strengthen its AML/CFT regime. Iraq’s FIU was not a member of the Egmont Group, which limited Iraq’s ability to exchange information with other FIUs on illicit finance issues; but Iraq worked toward membership. To compensate, the FIU signed six MOUs with peer FIUs, including one signed with Türkiye in November.

In November, Iraq advised the public about the risks of virtual assets, although the government had not implemented any regulations governing cryptocurrency use.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Iraq continued strategic messaging to discredit ISIS, in part by providing significant content to the Coalition Communications Cell. Many Iraqi ISIS fighters remained in Iraqi custody, while many Iraqi civilians, including some family members of ISIS members, remained in displaced persons camps. Iraq acknowledged that the return and social reintegration of family members of suspected ISIS supporters, as well as the provision of fair and equal justice, is important to prevent future terrorism and violent radicalization. However, almost 1.2 million Iraqis remained displaced within Iraq and an estimated 30,000 Iraqis — almost entirely women and children — resided in Al-Hol refugee camp in Syria. The Government of Iraq repatriated 300 suspected ISIS fighters from northeastern Syria detention facilities as well as 1,779 Iraqi nationals, mostly women and children from Al-Hol. IAMGs routinely used threatening messaging to promote violent extremism and protect their power throughout Iraq.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Iraq continued to work with multilateral and regional organizations — including the UN, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, INTERPOL, and the League of Arab States — to support counterterrorism efforts.
ISRAEL, AND THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA STRIP

Israel

Overview: Israel remained a committed counterterrorism partner, closely coordinating with the United States on a range of counterterrorism initiatives. Owing to COVID-19, Israel and the United States held virtual interagency counterterrorism dialogues to collaborate on regional threats. Counterterrorism issues were also at the center of the agenda during numerous high-level U.S. visits to Israel.

Israel faced threats along its northern and northeastern frontier from Hizballah and other Iran-backed groups, including as many as 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel, according to some Israeli estimates. Israeli officials expressed concern that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, including precision-guided missiles. This concern included Iran’s work to assist Hizballah and other proxies in indigenously producing rockets, missiles, and drones.

To the South, Israel faced threats from terrorist organizations including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and ISIS-Sinai Province. During the May escalation between Israel and Hamas, Hamas fired thousands of rockets into Israel from Gaza over 11 days, causing casualties. Other sporadic rocket attacks resulted in several injuries and property damage. The May escalation also saw a spike in intercommunal violence. There were attempts to infiltrate Israel from Gaza by armed militants (mostly during the May escalation), none of which resulted in Israeli casualties. Other sources of terrorist threats included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and lone-actor attacks.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that the number of deaths from terrorist incidents had been the lowest in a decade. Nonetheless, Israel still experienced terrorist attacks involving weapons ranging from rockets and mortars to vehicular attacks, small arms, and knives. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, combined property damage as a result of incendiary balloons and rockets from Gaza during the year totaled $61.7 million.

The following is a representative list of IDF-identified incidents:

- In May, Hamas and other terrorist groups, including PIJ, launched more than 4,400 rockets and numerous incendiary balloons from Gaza toward Israel, many of which targeted civilian areas. Rockets from Hamas killed 13 civilians in Israel; Iron Dome, Israel’s air defense system, intercepted the vast majority of the rockets destined for populated areas. Israeli retaliatory airstrikes and errant Hamas rockets killed 256 Palestinians, of whom 128 were civilians, per UN figures. Estimates of Palestinians killed by Hamas rockets that fell short in Gaza are disputed, with some NGOs stating that as few as 20 were killed in this manner, and others putting the number at 91.

- The May escalation with Hamas sparked social and intercommunal violence that resulted in property damage and casualties. Three Arab Israeli residents of Jaffa allegedly threw firebombs in Jaffa’s Ajami neighborhood, and 12-year-old Mohammed...
Jintzai sustained serious injuries in one of those attacks. Three suspects were arrested and charged with planning and perpetrating terror attacks, and for the illegal possession of weapons. The State Attorney’s Office also indicted seven Arab Israelis and Palestinians (five Israeli citizens and two residents of the West Bank) for terror offenses, including the murder of Yigal Yehoshua in Lod on May 11, for throwing stones, harming a vehicle, and obstructing justice. Four Jewish Israelis were arrested for assaulting, stabbing, and seriously wounding a Palestinian man in Jerusalem, and a similar assault carried out by a different group of young Jewish men also took place in Jerusalem later in the year. Police arrested 2,142 suspects, seized 970 illegal weapons and ammunition, and filed 184 indictments (some against more than one suspect) because of the May violence.

- On September 30, a 30-year-old Palestinian woman attempted to stab police officers at the Chain Gate entrance to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (HAS/TM), according to press reports. Police shot and killed her, then briefly closed one HAS/TM gate and the Damascus Gate in the aftermath of the attack.

- On November 21, a Hamas militant opened fire in Jerusalem’s Old City, killing one person and wounding four others (one seriously) before Israeli police fatally shot him. Israeli officials said Eliyahu Kay, a 26-year-old immigrant from South Africa, was killed in the shooting. Police identified the attacker as a 42-year-old Palestinian, Fadi Abu Shkhaidem, a teacher at a nearby high school in East Jerusalem.

- On December 3, a 25-year-old Palestinian resident of the West Bank repeatedly stabbed a Jewish civilian outside Damascus Gate in East Jerusalem, then attacked two Border Police officers who shot and ultimately killed the attacker.

- On December 8, a Palestinian minor stabbed 26-year-old Moriah Cohen in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, as Cohen was taking her children to daycare. Although stabbed in the back, Cohen was only lightly injured. The suspect was arrested later in the day at her school.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and promote international legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists. Israeli security forces took law enforcement actions against suspected terrorists and terrorist groups. On November 24, the Shin Bet said it had uncovered a major Hamas cell of more than 50 operatives in the West Bank seeking to commit terror attacks, including within Israel. The Shin Bet added that it found a variety of weapons, including materials for assembling four explosive belts. This was the first case in more than five years in which Israel had disrupted a major Hamas plot to resume suicide bombings. On October 22, the Israeli Defense Ministry issued a military order designating six Palestinian NGOs under Israel’s 2016 Counterterrorism Law as affiliates of the PFLP, which is a U.S.-designated FTO.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The 2019 Israeli Deduction Law requires the Ministry of Finance to withhold from its monthly tax revenue transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) the amounts Israel estimates the PA pays to Palestinians connected to terrorism,
including to the families of terrorists who died in attacks. The PA calls these prisoner and “martyr” payments, and argues they are social payments for families who have lost their primary breadwinner. The United States and Israel argue the payments incentivize and reward terrorism, particularly given the higher monthly payments the longer an individual remains imprisoned, which corresponds to more severe crimes. The Jerusalem Post estimates that “martyr” payments total $152.3 million annually.

According to the PA, during 2021 Israeli deductions from clearance revenues for prisoner and “martyr” payments amounted to $259.74 million, although this amount was expected to be reduced to $192 million in 2022. In January, senior Palestinian officials told the Times of Israel that the PA was willing to base the stipends on prisoners’ financial needs rather than the length of their sentence. However, at year’s end this suggested policy change had not occurred. In September, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories estimated that resolving the prisoner and “martyr” payments issue “would unlock over a billion shekels [$314 million].”

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no updates in 2021.

International and Regional Cooperation: Collaborative counterterrorism efforts continued among Israeli intelligence services, their partners in Europe and Australia, and the United States. According to Israeli officials, these efforts have successfully thwarted terrorist attacks by ISIS, Hizballah, and other violent extremist groups over the past several years.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip

Overview: The IDF, under the Israeli Ministry of Defense, is responsible for the West Bank, but PA security forces were granted security control of 17.5 percent (called Area A) under the 1993 Oslo Accords. The PA has administrative control over Area B (about 22 percent of the West Bank), but security control is shared with Israeli authorities. Israel maintains all administrative and security control of Area C, which comprises 61 percent of the West Bank. PA security forces and the IDF continued counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts in parts of the West Bank, where U.S.-designated FTOs such as Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP operated. PA security forces constrained the ability of those organizations to conduct attacks, including arresting Hamas members. PA security forces continue to proactively arrest individuals planning attacks against Israeli targets or those suspected of supporting terrorist organizations, and continue to arrest Palestinians wanted for weapons smuggling or illegal weapons possession.

The United States, through the multinational office of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, worked with the PA Ministry of Interior and PA security forces on reform efforts and training, including counterterrorism.

According to the Israeli Ministry of Public Security, “the West Bank saw 39 terror attacks in 2021, down from the IDF’s reported figure of 60 in 2020.” Numbers accounting for terrorist attacks in the West Bank vary slightly depending on the source — the IDF, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), or human rights groups such as
B’Tselem. While this decrease was partially attributable to greater movement restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, it also reflected a general downward trend in certain violence indicators since 2016, such as deaths of Israelis, deaths of Palestinians, and terrorist attacks in the West Bank. However, these figures do not account for settler violence against Palestinians and their property, which increased over the last year.

Hamas, a U.S.-designated FTO and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, maintained de facto control over Gaza in 2021. Hamas and several militant groups, including Sunni violent extremist groups such as PIJ, launched an estimated 4,400 rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza. Hamas and its affiliates launched incendiary balloons and devices toward Israel, damaging farms and nature preserves. Hamas and PIJ tunneling activities continued. Live ammunition from Hamas’s anti-aircraft weapons struck buildings in Israel.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist incidents during the year included the following:

- On May 2, assailants in a passing vehicle shot and injured three Israelis near Tapuach Junction/Za’tara Checkpoint south of Nablus, then fled the scene. One of the victims, Yehuda Guetta, died as a result of his injuries. Israeli authorities set up checkpoints, resulting in clashes with youths during which five were shot. Medics said the three persons injured in the attack were men in their late teens or early 20s. They were taken to Petah Tikva’s Beilinson Hospital for treatment. The perpetrator of the drive-by shooting attack was a U.S. citizen, Muntassir Shalabi, according to media reports. The Shin Bet did not believe he had any affiliation with Palestinian terror groups. He was arrested four days after the attack, and later sentenced to two life sentences.

- On August 21, a Palestinian militant from Gaza approached a border post and shot an IDF soldier at point-blank range during Hamas-organized border clashes in which several Palestinians were also killed. The soldier later succumbed to his wounds.

- On September 30, a 30-year-old Palestinian woman attempted to stab police officers at the Chain Gate entrance to HAS/TM, according to press reports. Police shot and killed her, then briefly closed one HAS/TM gate and the Damascus Gate in the aftermath of the attack.

- On November 21, a Hamas militant opened fire in Jerusalem’s Old City, killing one and wounding four others (one seriously) before Israeli police fatally shot him. Israeli officials said Eliyahu Kay, a 26-year-old immigrant from South Africa, was killed in the shooting. Police identified the attacker as a 42-year-old Palestinian, Fadi Abu Shkhaidem, a teacher at a nearby high school in East Jerusalem.

- On December 3, a 25-year-old Palestinian resident of the West Bank repeatedly stabbed a Jewish civilian outside Damascus Gate in East Jerusalem, then attacked two Border Police officers who shot and ultimately killed the attacker.

- On December 8, a Palestinian minor stabbed 26-year-old Moriah Cohen in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, as Cohen was taking her children to daycare.
Although stabbed in the back, Cohen was only lightly injured. The suspect was arrested later in the day at her school.

- On December 16, near the Homesh settlement, three Palestinians in a car shot and killed Yehuda Dimentman. They were later arrested.

Israeli settlers living in the West Bank committed a variety of physical attacks, property damage, and “nationalistic” crimes against Palestinians, some of which caused serious injury, according to Israeli human rights organizations and media reports. Multiple sources reported a substantial rise in such attacks during 2021. UN monitors documented 496 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians, including 370 attacks that resulted in property damage, and 126 attacks that resulted in casualties, three of which were fatal. This is an increase from the 358 settler attacks UN OCHA documented in 2020, 84 of which resulted in casualties. According to the UN, Israeli settlers cut down more than 12,300 trees and vandalized over 330 Palestinian-owned vehicles. The Shin Bet registered 397 settler attacks, an increase from the 272 violent incidents in 2020, according to Israeli press reports.

Human rights groups and West Bank residents reported settler attacks over the last year were also expanded in severity and scale. Whereas in prior years groups of four to five settlers typically carried out sporadic attacks, the UN documented attacks by groups of 20 or more settlers during the year, indicating that attacks were likely preplanned. Attacks were also more destructive and expanded into parts of the West Bank, such as Area A, that were previously not sullied by settler violence. In one high-profile attack in September, dozens of settlers attacked the village of Um Faggarah in the middle of the day, targeting women and children, and resulted in a four-year-old Palestinian boy’s skull being fractured by a large rock, which settlers reportedly threw onto him while he was sleeping.

Such incidents generated significant concern among parts of the Israeli security establishment and a series of public condemnations from government officials, including the Israeli Defense Minister Gantz and the Minister for Public Safety Bar Lev, who labeled settler violence as terrorism. In response, Israeli National Police and the Ministry of Defense announced a series of measures, including reform of the police unit responsible for handing far-right violent extremism in the West Bank to enable a faster response to violence by targeting hotspots. Despite these efforts, Israeli security personnel often did not prevent settler attacks and rarely detained or charged perpetrators of settler violence. Only one settler was convicted (and sentenced to 20 months in prison) in 2021, for throwing a stun grenade at a Palestinian home, injuring two and causing significant damage. Some Israeli NGOs allege IDF presence during some attacks and accuse the IDF of enabling a permissive environment by its lack of enforcement.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes in 2021.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Palestinian Authority is a member of MENAFATF. Its financial intelligence unit, the Palestinian Financial Follow-Up Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. The PA’s MENAFATF mutual evaluation was postponed from 2020 to 2022-23 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
**Countering Violent Extremism:** Despite a PA policy of prohibiting content that incites violence, the PA has been inconsistent in enforcement. Official PA traditional and social media accounts, affiliated with the ruling political faction Fatah, featured content praising or condoning acts of terrorism. For example, the Fatah Youth movement at An-Najah National University praised the December killing of Yehuda Dimentman as a “heroic operation.” In another instance during the year, Fatah’s Facebook page referred to a Palestinian man who had stabbed and injured an Orthodox Jewish man in Jerusalem as a “martyr” after the attacker was shot by police. Problems continued with misleading textbooks, some with maps not depicting Israel, and public ceremonies celebrating Palestinian “martyrs.”

Palestinian authorities pledged to reform Palestinian textbooks, but an EU report issued in February showed that instances of antisemitism and incitement to violence continued to appear in textbooks. Palestinian President Abbas continued to state a commitment to nonviolence, a two-state solution, and previous Palestine Liberation Organization commitments, but others in the Palestinian leadership have avoided making such commitments. The Palestinian leadership continued to offer prisoner and “martyr” payments to families of Palestinians who were wounded or died while committing terrorist acts or in connection with terrorism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Palestinian Authority justice, security leaders, and PA security force personnel continued to participate in regional conferences and meetings to combat terrorism, though in 2021 COVID-19 pandemic restrictions limited these opportunities.

**JORDAN**

**Overview:** Jordan remained a committed partner on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism in 2021. As a regional leader in the Defeat-ISIS Global Coalition, Jordan played an important role in coalition successes in degrading the terrorist group’s territorial control and operational reach. Although Jordan did not experience a successful terrorist attack in 2021, the country faced a continued threat from terrorist groups. While the Jordanian security forces thwarted plots and apprehended suspected terrorists, the threat of domestic radicalization to violence, especially online, persisted.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorism incidents in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes in counterterrorism legislation, law enforcement capacity, or the State Security Court.

The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the primary government agency responsible for counterterrorism, although the Public Security Directorate’s (PSD’s) Police Special Operations (PSO) group is the primary responder to an active terrorist incident. These two organizations operate with support from various elements within the Jordan Armed Forces and PSD’s Gendarmerie. In 2021, the Jordanian government continued to implement measures and conduct joint exercises to improve interagency coordination among security agencies, although
COVID-19 prevented some training. Enhanced overt security measures continued to be in place across Jordan, most visibly at some hotels and shopping malls.

Jordan continued to reinforce its border defenses and surveillance capabilities in response to terrorist and criminal threats emanating from its 230-mile border with Syria and 112-mile border with Iraq. Jordan also participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program focusing on strengthening the security service’s counterterrorism capabilities.

During 2021, Jordanian authorities took legal action against numerous individuals accused of terrorism under Jordanian law, including rulings on previous years’ cases of terrorism. In an interview published October 5, GID Director Ahmed Husni Hatuqay stated that since he took up his post in May 2019, GID had thwarted 120 operations, including 52 terrorist plots, and arrested 103 persons involved in planning attacks in Jordan. The GID also contributed to stopping an additional 68 terrorist plots globally. While Husni Hatuqay did not specify how many operations occurred in 2021, Jordanian media noted the disruption of several terrorist plots, including the following:

- In March, the GID disrupted a terrorist plot by ISIS supporters to attack a GID facility in the northern city of Irbid with firearms. The three defendants were previously imprisoned for terrorism-related crimes, and the plot originated while the accused were still inside prison.
- In July, GID disclosed it had stopped a February plot in which four ISIS supporters planned to kill Israeli border guards.

The United States has emphasized to the Jordanian government the importance of holding Ahlam al-Tamimi accountable in a U.S. court for her admitted role in a 2001 bombing in Jerusalem that included two Americans among the 15 victims. She had been serving a prison sentence in Israel for a terrorism conviction related to the bombing before she was released by Israel as part of a prisoner exchange.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Jordan is a member of MENAFATF, a FATF-style regional body, and a member of the coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group. Jordan’s financial intelligence unit, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Unit, has been a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units since 2012.

In October, Jordan was added to the FATF gray list, and subsequently committed to strengthening the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Government of Jordan has taken steps to address concerns identified by FATF, including through the September passage of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism law. The revised law expanded the powers of the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, granted the public prosecutor the power to seize assets used in money laundering and terrorism financing crimes, and established an office to manage seized funds and confiscated assets.

Countering Violent Extremism: Jordan continued to implement a national strategy on preventing violent extremism (PVE), coordinated by an office in the Prime Ministry. Priority
engagement areas include countering violent extremist ideology, building social cohesion among civil society, and assisting law enforcement. Officials regularly engaged experts on topics such as the role of women and girls in terrorism prevention as well as the monitoring and evaluation of PVE programs. Civil society organizations have undertaken work across the country to address root causes of violent extremism and offer positive alternatives to youth through activities that build critical thinking skills, encourage civic participation, increase awareness of online safety, and address the needs of returning terrorist fighters to their families. In September, the Jordanian government hosted a regional conference organized by the Council of Muslim Elders to spread the values of peace and tolerance and confront extremism and hatred.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Jordan is a major non-NATO ally and a member of the GCTF. Within the GCTF, it co-chairs the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group with the United States. It is a member of the UN, the League of Arab States, Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Jordan participated in September’s First Global Parliamentary Summit on Counterterrorism, held in Vienna, which stressed the importance of addressing challenges in the Sahel area that affect stability and security, real solutions for a population that has suffered greatly, and support for the victims of terrorism in the region.

In August, Jordanian troops participated in the international military exercise Bright Star in Egypt along with forces from several other states, including the United States, Britain, France, and the UAE. The exercise aimed to increase cooperation and coordination and strengthen security efforts related to issues of violent extremism and combating terrorism. In December, Jordan hosted an Aqaba Process meeting in Amman focused on identifying future terrorism threats. The Aqaba Process is a Jordanian initiative started by King Abdullah in 2015 to counter violent extremism.

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**KUWAIT**

**Overview:** Kuwait is an active participant in international fora and regularly participates in counterterrorism training. The nation is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-leads the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group with Türkiye and the Netherlands. Kuwait has begun its Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluation process. However, the planned March onsite assessment was postponed to late 2023 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Kuwait in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security:** There were no changes to Kuwait’s counterterrorism legal framework. Political gridlock in the National Assembly prevented the passage of substantive counterterrorism legislation.

In June, more than 100 officials from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO), the Ministry of Interior, and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) attended a series of workshops hosted by
DOJ OPDAT to strengthen Kuwait’s ability to detect and combat terrorism financing. In November, more than 70 officials from the PPO and the MOI participated in OPDAT-sponsored training on countering the use of cyberspace and cryptocurrency in terrorism. Private sector groups, including the Kuwaiti bar association and trade groups for the banking and remittance industries, also participated in OPDAT-sponsored training.

In September, Kuwait’s criminal court sentenced an individual to five years’ imprisonment for joining Hizballah and planning to use weapons to commit a hostile act against Lebanon. The prosecutors working on the investigation had received capacity building assistance from the United States.

In November, as part of a broader political dialogue, Amir Nawaf Al Sabah commuted the sentences of 20 members, including the leader of the “Abdali cell,” convicted in 2016 of charges including storing weapons and explosives and spying for Lebanese Hizballah. The pardons also included four additional persons convicted of harboring Abdali cell members while they fled prosecution.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kuwait is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and its Counter-ISIS Finance Group, and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center. The Kuwait FIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

Kuwait has not updated its AML/CFT law since its passage in 2013. In May, Kuwait advised the public about the risks of virtual assets such as Bitcoin, but the government has not yet enacted any regulations to govern the use of cryptocurrency.

In November, Kuwait detained 24 persons for allegedly using charitable organizations to raise money for Hizballah, including one individual who had been designated as a terrorist by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in September. The proceedings are ongoing.

For much of 2021, Kuwait’s FIU was under acting leadership. The FIU continues to have a backlog of reporting on its investigations and prosecutions data. Kuwaiti prosecutors also dismissed several money laundering investigations for lack of evidence. The FIU is increasing its ability to share information with partner agencies by concluding interagency MOU, including with Kuwait’s Central Bank in October.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Interior runs TV and radio programming aimed at audiences believed to be at higher risk of “radicalization.” The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs launched a five-year strategic plan to promote moderation and confront violent extremism. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs operates the Kuwait Moderation Center, which sponsors programs designed to promote religious tolerance. In October, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs formed a committee to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism on the internet and social media.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Kuwait served as chair of the Arab League from September to early 2022, is a member of the Governing Board of Administrators of the
International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law and remains an active member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Small Group. Kuwait continued its historical role as mediator in several regional disputes, most notably mediating the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Lebanon rift. Additionally, Kuwait hosts the headquarters for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

Kuwait is a member of the following international organizations engaged in counterterrorism cooperation: the United Nations, the Arab League, the GCC, the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, and CJTF-OIR.

LEBANON

Overview: In 2021, the United States provided security assistance and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and worked with law enforcement organizations, such as the Internal Security Forces (ISF), to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities and investigate and prosecute local terrorism cases.

Terrorist groups operating in Lebanon included U.S. government-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Hizballah and ISIS.

Hizballah continued armed militia activities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in collaboration with the Iranian regime. Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps remained largely outside the control of Lebanese security forces and posed a security threat because of the potential for militant recruitment and terrorist infiltration. Several individuals on the FBI’s most wanted list and the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice list reportedly remained in Lebanon.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: The following is a representative list of terrorist incidents in Lebanon:

- On February 3, civil society activist Lokman Slim was assassinated in southern Lebanon. Many local observers attributed his murder to Hizballah.

- On May 13, 17, and 19, and on July 20 and August 4, rockets were launched from southern Lebanon toward Israel. The LAF attributed the launches to unspecified Palestinian terrorist groups.

- On August 6, Hizballah claimed responsibility for launching 19 rockets from southern Lebanon toward Israel.

- On August 22, members of a suspected ISIS cell orchestrated the drive-by motorcycle shooting of a retired LAF officer in Tripoli. In September, the LAF arrested members of a suspected ISIS cell in Tripoli accused of having killed the retired LAF officer the previous month.
On October 14, members of Hizballah and political party Amal engaged in armed clashes with members of the political group Lebanese Forces, in the Tayyouneh area of Beirut. The LAF deployed to restore order. Seven persons were killed and 32 injured in this incident.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Lebanon does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism law, but several articles of Lebanon’s criminal code are effectively used to prosecute acts of terrorism. No new laws related to terrorism were passed in 2021. The LAF, the ISF, the Directorate of General Security (DGS), and the General Directorate of State Security were the primary government agencies responsible for counterterrorism. Although cooperation among the services was inconsistent, they took steps to improve information sharing. Structural limitations in the justice system remained a barrier to conducting trials on terrorism cases in a timely manner. Because of delays, some individuals suspected of terrorism were held in pretrial detention for extended periods. The Department of State funded programs to train judges and prosecutors on the skills needed to adjudicate criminal cases, including terrorism-related cases. The Department also provided virtual courtroom equipment in 23 courtrooms across Lebanon to more effectively and efficiently adjudicate criminal cases.

In January, the LAF and ISF arrested demonstrators protesting deteriorating economic conditions in Tripoli, who reportedly damaged public properties and attempted to injure security forces. In February, a military court charged 35 of the protesters with terrorism-related crimes, which some civil society groups described as an attempt to suppress political dissent.

The LAF held primary responsibility for securing Lebanon’s land and maritime borders, while DGS and Customs were responsible for official points of entry. The LAF improved its ability to monitor Lebanon’s land border with Syria through the Land Border Security Project funded by the United States, Canada, and the UK. This project resulted in enhanced border enforcement and an improved ability to interdict terrorist and criminal travel.

Lebanon made efforts to implement UN Security Council resolutions 2396 and 2309 by collecting biographic data for travelers at Beirut International Airport, Passenger Name Record data for commercial flights, and Advanced Passenger Information. DGS regularly updated INTERPOL watchlist information at border security terminals at Beirut International Airport. DGS routinely shared information about falsified travel documents with foreign embassies in Lebanon. The ISF neared completion of a Department of State-funded project to increase the ISF’s biometric collection and storage capabilities, which will also enable the ISF to share biometric data with other Lebanese security services. In 2021, Lebanese security services coordinated with the United States on numerous instances to investigate individuals involved in terrorism.

LAF and ISF units, including units receiving U.S. capacity building assistance, undertook enforcement actions against suspected terrorists in 2021. In January, the LAF arrested 18 Lebanese and Syrian nationals suspected of being ISIS operatives in the northeastern Arsal region.
The presence of Hizballah in the Lebanese government continued to impede effective host government action against terrorist incidents associated with Hizballah. For instance, the ISF and judiciary were accused by Human Rights Watch of failing to fully investigate politically sensitive murder investigations during 2020 and 2021, including the suspected Hizballah assassination of civil society activist Lokman Slim.

In addition, despite repeated attempts by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to gain access to areas within its area of responsibility from which Hizballah is suspected to have stored or used weapons, Lebanese authorities in many instances declined to facilitate UNIFIL access to these areas. Some Lebanese security forces personnel may interact with Hizballah as part of official duties but are not beholden to the terrorist group. In domestic and international fora, Lebanese officials argued that acts taken against “foreign occupation” are not terrorism. This characterization was used to justify Hizballah’s acts against Israel as resistance to occupation rather than as terrorism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Lebanon is a member of MENAFATF. Its FIU, the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), is a member of the Egmont Group. Lebanon is a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG) and the working group of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.

In 2021, the SIC received 22 terrorism and terrorism-financing cases. The SIC reported that there were 203 individuals and 19 entities on Lebanon’s national terrorism-financing list as of year-end 2021. Lebanon did not propose any new designations to the UNSCR 1267/2253 Sanctions Committee in 2021.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Lebanon published its national strategy for PVE in 2018. The National PVE Coordination Unit organized workshops in 2019 to solicit inputs for a PVE National Action Plan (NAP) for implementation of the strategy. Because of COVID-19 and delays in government formation during 2020-21, the Cabinet has not yet endorsed the NAP. In March, Lebanon’s National PVE Coordination Unit launched a “National Exchange Platform,” an online portal that facilitates CVE information sharing among civil society groups and government officials in Lebanon. Lebanese municipalities continued to engage in activities organized by the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Lebanon supported counterterrorism efforts in regional organizations and participated in counterterrorism finance programs.

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**LIBYA**

**Overview:** Libyan government officials continued to work with U.S. counterparts to combat terrorism, although fractured security institutions limited direct cooperation. Following the failure of the self-styled Libyan National Army’s (LNA’s) military assault on western Libya in 2019-20, UN-facilitated talks selected a new nominally unified interim executive authority, the Government of National Unity (GNU), in March, with a mandate to lead the country to national elections, which were ultimately postponed.
Despite the political uncertainty, terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been unable to significantly regroup. While terrorist groups control no territory in Libya and are significantly degraded in terms of numbers and capacity, they remain a threat. Elements of the GNU are reliable and willing U.S. counterterrorism partners, although the GNU’s capacity to eliminate terrorist safe havens, counter terrorist financing, deter the flow of FTFs, and ensure effective counterproliferation efforts across Libya’s territory was limited. The LNA countered terrorism in the East and South of the country, but its counterterrorism gains were limited to areas under its direct control.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Significant terrorist incidents in Libya in 2021 included the following:

- In June, ISIS claimed responsibility for a VBIED suicide attack on a security checkpoint in Sebha. When local police manning the checkpoint stopped and approached the vehicle, the driver reportedly detonated the VBIED, killing himself and two officers.
- In August, a Sudanese national affiliated with ISIS attempted to conduct a VBIED attack against a security checkpoint manned by the LNA’s 128th Brigade in the town of Zellah in Al Jufra. The LNA claimed it shot the attacker before the VBIED detonated, and there were no other reported causalities.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The GNU retained the Government of National Accord’s CT strategy and its national CT coordinator. In practice, however, under the tenure of the GNU, coordination between relevant authorities still largely occurs on an ad hoc basis, and an implementation plan for the new strategy has yet to be promulgated. Throughout 2021 the GNU conducted CT operations in the country, and the LNA countered terrorism in areas under its control.

Libya did not pass or implement any counterterrorism legislation in 2021. Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, although the Libyan penal code (under Title 2, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 170, and Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 207) criminalizes offenses that may threaten national security, including terrorism, the promotion of terrorist acts, and the handling of money in support of such acts.

Libya has ratified the African Union’s (AU’s) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which requires states to criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws. The GNU continued to seek international support to combat ISIS-Libya and AQIM.

Despite Libya’s disjointed security institutions and ongoing political strife, the GNU undertook operations to disrupt terrorist groups. In September, the GNU announced the arrest of senior ISIS leader Mubarak al-Kharmi along with two other militants in the western city of Bani Walid. That same month, LNA forces captured suspected ISIS member Ali al-Ajili al-Hasnawi in Brak al-Shati.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Libya is a member of MENAFATF. Libya is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS CIFG. In November, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) participated...
in a detailed gap analysis of the Libyan Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law No. 1013 of 2017 and identified numerous strategic weaknesses. The CBL also contributed to the development of a regulatory framework to help ensure better compliance with international standards and applicable regulations governing anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism.

In December, the CBL initiated the development of a set of instructions for banks and financial institutions that offer accounts to nonprofit organizations. The instructions aim to expand the awareness and capacity of these banks and institutions regarding tracking and reporting on possible money laundering and terrorist financing activities.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no changes in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The European Union and the UK continued working to support the development of the Libyan National CT Strategy under the CT Coordinator. Libya is a member of the United Nations, the AU, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

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**MOROCCO**

**Overview:** The United States and Morocco have a long history of strong CT cooperation. The Government of Morocco continued its comprehensive strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter radicalization policies. In 2021, Morocco continued to mitigate the risk of terrorism. The country continued to face sporadic threats from small, independent terrorist cells, the majority of which claimed to be inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. Morocco is a member of the GCTF, which it co-chairs with Canada. Morocco is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Countering Violent Extremism Working Group and co-chairs the Africa Focus Group within the Coalition.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Morocco in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Morocco investigates, prosecutes, and sentences defendants under CT legislation enacted in 2003 and expanded in 2015, and which is in line with UN Security Council resolution 2178.

In 2021, Moroccan law enforcement, coordinated by the Ministry of Interior, targeted and arrested at least 55 individuals in 11 CT operations, effectively dismantling cells in the early stages of planning attacks against a range of targets, including public buildings, prominent figures, government security service buildings, and, as reported in local press, foreigners. The number of arrests in 2021 was lower than the number of arrests made in the years before the COVID-19 pandemic. Moroccan law enforcement leveraged intelligence collection, police work, and collaboration with international partners to conduct counterterrorism operations. The Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ) remains the primary law enforcement agency responsible for counterterrorism prosecutions. The BCIJ reports to the General Directorate for
Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals.

The following offers a snapshot of arrests in 2021:

- In March, the DGST arrested a 38-year-old male in Meknes. The suspect, a suspended police officer since 2015, also faced charges of extremist indoctrination of his children. The Moroccan authorities seized an ISIS flag, a knife, and a mobile phone.
- In June, the DGST dismantled a six-member cell that was planning terrorist attacks in Salé. Cell members ranged from 23 to 39 years old and were orchestrating motorcycle accidents to collect insurance claims to finance terrorist operations. The DGST seized a motorcycle and medical documentation with the names of the suspects, records of the staged traffic accidents, digital data, and “extremist” literature, in addition to drugs.
- In December, the DGST arrested 25 ISIS suspects affiliated with ISIS. The suspects planned terrorist attacks across Morocco against public targets and security services headquarters. The Moroccan authorities reportedly seized firearms, ammunition, knives, IED instructional documents, and ISIS literature.

Moroccan law enforcement agencies participated in a wide range of U.S.-sponsored programs to improve the country’s technical and investigative capabilities, including financial investigation, intelligence analysis, forensics, and cybersecurity.

Border security remained a top priority for Moroccan authorities. The General Directorate for National Security has primary responsibility for conducting border inspections at ports of entry such as Casablanca’s Mohammed V Airport. Law enforcement officials and private airline carriers worked regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempting to transit illegally and to address watchlisted travelers. Moroccan airport authorities have excellent capabilities in detecting fraudulent documents. In addition, police, customs officers, and the Royal Gendarmerie operated mobile and fixed checkpoints along the roads in border areas and at the entrances to major municipalities. Moroccan naval and coast guard units monitored and patrolled Morocco’s extensive coastal waters, including the Strait of Gibraltar, to interdict illicit traffickers.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Morocco is a member of MENAFATF. The National Financial Intelligence Authority (FIU) is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2021, Morocco enacted stricter anti-money laundering legislation, in line with FATF standards, in response to a 2019 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation Report that placed Morocco on increased monitoring status for money laundering.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Morocco has a comprehensive CVE strategy that prioritizes economic and human development in addition to countering radicalization to violence and “oversight of the religious sphere.” To counter what it views as religious extremism, Morocco promotes an interpretation of the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an educational curriculum for Morocco’s nearly 50,000 imams as well as for female Islamic guides (mourchidates).
Morocco’s imam training center in Rabat trains imams mostly from West Africa. The Royal Mohammedan League of Ulema (Rabita Mohammedia) counters “radicalization” by producing scholarly research, reviewing educational curricula, and conducting youth outreach on religious and social topics. The Department of State has supported the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration’s (DGAPR’s) efforts to modernize prison management, develop prisoner classification tools, control disturbances, modify inmate behavior, and construct more secure facilities. The DGAPR, in cooperation with other ministries, conducted several trainings of its deradicalization program, Moussalaha (Reconciliation), for both women and men.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Morocco is a co-chair of the GCTF with Canada and is a member of the D-ISIS Coalition and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. A major non-NATO ally, in 2021 Morocco hosted African Lion, AFRICOM’s (U.S. Africa Command’s) largest and most complex military exercise, which includes specialized training for CT-related units. Additionally, the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) established a UNOCT Program Office in Morocco for Specialized Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Training in Africa; it opened in June and hosted several training courses in late 2021. Morocco also enjoys strong cooperation with European partners — particularly Belgium, France, and the Netherlands — to thwart potential terrorist threats in Europe.

**OMAN**

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism partner. The nation remains concerned about the conflict in Yemen and the potential for AQAP and ISIS-Yemen to threaten Oman’s land and maritime borders. Omani and U.S. officials regularly engaged on efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Oman sought training and equipment from the U.S. government, other countries, and commercial entities to support its efforts to control its land, air, and maritime borders. The country welcomed U.S. security assistance to improve its crisis management capacity, as well as its counterterrorism tactics and procedures; however, some counterterrorism training and exercises were postponed or canceled because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Oman issued statements condemning terrorist attacks around the world in 2021.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Oman in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes to Oman’s counterterrorism legislation in 2021.

Local capacity and a challenging operating environment owing to Oman’s extensive coastline and long, remote borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen remain obstacles for counterterrorism investigations, crisis response, and border security capabilities. Nevertheless, Oman had sufficient communication and coordination among its many counterterrorism-related agencies and National Security Council. The Sultan’s Special Forces and the Royal Oman Police (ROP)
Special Task Force are Oman’s primary tactical counterterrorism response forces. The Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service, the Internal Security Service, and ROP’s Special Branch play key roles in securing Oman from terrorist threats. Omani authorities have developed specific plans to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets.

Oman recognizes the need to improve its counterterrorism capabilities and the value of U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement training and assistance. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program targeted skills related to crisis management and advanced counterterrorism operations and response. Omani officials from the ROP and other agencies participated in ATA training.

The ROP Coast Guard, ROP Customs, the Maritime Security Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Royal Office participated in several training activities through the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. EXBS programming supported the government’s efforts to build its capacity to interdict weapons and conduct investigations at airports and seaports. EXBS programming also increased Omani officials’ understanding of UN sanctions implementation through virtual webinars and tabletop exercises.

The major impediments to effective law enforcement and border security in Oman remained limited resources, challenges with Omani interagency coordination, and the need for continued training to develop advanced law enforcement skills. The rugged mountainous terrain along Oman’s border with Yemen presents an additional challenge. Oman continued to seek opportunities for additional U.S. border security training.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Oman is preparing for an upcoming Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation. Oman is a member of MENAFATF, and its Financial Information Processing Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. The nation also is a member of the Riyadh-based Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC). Oman continued to participate in TFTC capacity building workshops and expressed support for continued joint sanctions.

Oman has taken steps to enhance the efficiency of the National Center for Financial Information (NCFI, its financial intelligence unit) to analyze and respond to suspicious activity reports related to AML/CFT, such as an MOU between the Central Bank of Oman and NCFI to enhance information-sharing mechanisms.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The full nature and scope of Oman’s CVE initiatives remained opaque in 2021, but engagement with the Omani government suggests that Oman continued to counter terrorist recruitment through unpublicized initiatives.

There were no reports of foreign government or foreign non-governmental support for religious schools, mosques, or other organizations that may be conducive to the spread of violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Oman is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, and TFTC. Oman
regularly votes in favor of counterterrorism measures in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

QATAR

**Overview:** The United States and Qatar continued to increase counterterrorism cooperation, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of State and Qatari foreign minister signed a counterterrorism MOU in 2017. During the November U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue’s Counterterrorism Session, the two governments reviewed the significant progress made on counterterrorism cooperation and committed to maintaining ongoing momentum for 2022. Qatar is an active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and all the Defeat-ISIS working groups. Qatar facilitated U.S. military operations in the region and hosts roughly 8,000 U.S. service members at military installations critical to Defeat-ISIS efforts.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Qatar in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes in counterterrorism legislation. Qatar maintains an interagency National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC) with representatives from more than 10 government agencies. The NCTC formulates Qatar’s counterterrorism policy, ensuring interagency coordination, fulfilling Qatar’s counterterrorism-related obligations under international conventions, and participating in multilateral conferences on terrorism. U.S. officials regularly met with the NCTC chairman to discuss overall counterterrorism cooperation. The Qatar State Security Bureau (SSB) maintained an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal terrorism-related activities. The Ministry of Interior and the Internal Security Force (ISF) continue to participate in structured counterterrorism training and exercises, including with U.S. agencies.

Qatar and DHS signed an agreement and a memorandum of cooperation in 2021 bolstering the ability to share certain biometric and visa data. The United States and Qatar continued to partner on terrorist screening and aviation security. Ministry of Interior authorities cooperate with officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and Homeland Security Investigations to screen the near 40 million travelers who transit Hamad International Airport annually.

U.S. technical assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies increased during 2021. The U.S. Departments of Justice (DOJ), State, and the Treasury, as well as the FBI, led or participated in several capacity building initiatives involving the Ministry of Interior, the ISF, the SSB, the Public Prosecution, the Central Bank, and other Qatari agencies. A DOJ resident legal adviser has been stationed in Qatar since 2018, providing technical assistance to Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and building prosecutorial capacity.

U.S. Central Command and Embassy Doha coordinated multiple virtual planning conferences with their Qatar counterparts from the Ministry of Interior, the ISF, and Qatar Joint Special
Forces, for Invincible Sentry 21 (IS-21), a bilateral counterterrorism exercise that took place March 21-26 in Doha. The exercise tested Qatar’s tactical capabilities, command, control, coordination, and decision making within and between governments, agencies, and ministries in preparation for the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup. The U.S. interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team also participated in this bilateral Department of Defense Combatant Command exercise. Additionally, Qatari explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) personnel trained with Diplomatic Security’s electronic countermeasure instructors and U.S. Air Force EOD personnel from Al Udeid Air Base to enhance commercial electronic countermeasure capabilities, explosive identification, and post-blast investigations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Qatar is a member of MENAFATF. Qatar’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Qatar is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition Counter-ISIS Financing Working Group and the Riyadh-based Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Qatar in July sanctioned six individuals and entities affiliated with ISIS terror-support networks in the region.

In September, Qatar took coordinated action — with the United States — against a major Hizballah financial network based in the Persian Gulf region, designating, under its updated AML/CFT regime, seven individuals and one entity for their role in the financing of terrorism. This represents one of the most significant joint actions the United States has taken with a Gulf Cooperation Council partner to date.

Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring all such activity to be conducted through one of four approved charities — to protect charitable giving from terrorist financing abuse.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Qatar’s primary CVE strategy remained investment in education, sports diplomacy, and increasing economic opportunities for youth around the globe, largely through the Qatar Foundation and related organizations, such as Silatech and Education Above All. Since 2020, Qatar has hosted UNOCT’s first International Hub on Behavioral Insights to Counterterrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, to better understand the underlying roots of violent extremism and determine the best use of sports as a CVE tool. Qatar has made strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples can still be found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.

Qatar was a major funder of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) and sits on its Governing Board of Directors. The Qatar Fund for Development supported GCERF’s efforts to build awareness among community leaders about the impact of terrorist radicalization and recruitment, to share information on how to respond to terrorism, to promote peace through community engagement activities, and to provide educational initiatives.

Qatar’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) supported English-language programming in MEHE schools to counter terrorist influence and messaging. The MEHE
undersecretary, who also serves as chairman of the semigovernmental Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue, requested recommendations from the Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom on educational consultants or Fulbright scholars to assist with further revisions of Qatar’s Islamic studies public school textbooks to increase understanding of religious pluralism and tolerance.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Qatar is an active participant in the UN, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League. Qatar also is a member of the GCTF and the TFTC. Qatar was reincorporated into GCC activities in January, following a three-and-a-half-year pause owing to the 2017 to 2021 Persian Gulf rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. Since June, Qatar has hosted the UNOCT Program Office on Parliamentary Engagement, which seeks to strengthen the contributions, coordination, and capacity of parliaments at national, regional, and global levels to enhance international efforts against terrorism.

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**SAUDI ARABIA**

**Overview:** In 2021, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued to work closely with U.S. and international counterparts to deploy a comprehensive and well-resourced counterterrorism strategy that included security measures, threat detection and deterrence, measures to counter terrorist financing, and counter-radicalization efforts. The leading terrorist threat was Houthi cross-border attacks, some of which the United States has described as terrorism, which more than doubled in 2021. As in previous years, Saudi Arabia was a full partner and active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and provided significant operational and logistical support to Coalition activities.

**Terrorist Incidents:** Houthi cross-border attacks, some of which the United States has described as terrorism, surpassed 400 in 2021, more than double the number of attacks in 2020. Incidents included the use of ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, unmanned surface vessels, and floating mines. Significant cross-border incidents in 2021 included the following:

- On February 10, shrapnel from a Houthi attack on Abha International Airport caused a fire on a civilian aircraft and injured 12 people.
- On March 2, a Houthi drone attack against Jizan injured five civilians and caused damage to several buildings.
- On August 30 a Houthi drone attack on Abha airport wounded eight civilians and damaged the airport and a commercial airliner.
- On September 4 a Houthi complex drone and missile attack in the Eastern Province resulted in injuries to two children and damage to 14 private residences.
- On October 8 a Houthi drone injured 10 civilians after it struck a commercial airport in Jizan.

On March 30, a man was arrested at Masjid al-Haram, the Great Mosque of Mecca, after brandishing a weapon and shouting terrorist slogans. No injuries were reported. Separately,
French prosecutors announced that they were investigating a December 30 vehicle explosion in Jeddah as a possible terrorist attack. The incident damaged an automobile associated with the Dakar Rally auto race and injured one civilian, a French national, according to press reports.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Comprehensive counterterrorism legislation has been in place since 2017, and no changes were made in 2021. Saudi Arabia was committed to securing its borders and denying safe haven to terrorists. The Ministry of Interior monitored passenger manifests for inbound and outbound flights and issued travel documents with security technology, advance passenger name record information, and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry.

The Saudi government continued to partner with the United States through Saudi-funded and U.S.-implemented programs that, among other objectives, sought to improve the country’s counterterrorism capacities. Projects included training to protect critical infrastructure sites such as maritime ports, aviation assets, energy infrastructure, and desalination plants from terrorist threats. Saudi Arabia also participated in multilateral engagements with Persian Gulf state counterparts, including joint counterterrorism operations in Yemen.

The counterterrorism law’s definition of terrorism drew criticism from local human rights activists, international human rights organizations, and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism for its overly broad and vague definitions of terrorism, which has been used by the government to prosecute political dissidents, women’s rights activists, and members of minority faiths. In October, the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeals upheld the six-year prison sentence of women’s rights activist Mohammed al-Rabea. In April, the court sentenced al-Rabea under the country’s counterterrorism law to six years’ imprisonment, with credit for time served, and a travel ban. Detained in 2018, al-Rabea’s arrest was also tied to his activism for women’s right to drive and against the guardianship system. Human rights groups reported authorities used the cybercrimes law and the counterterrorism law both to monitor terrorist and extremist discourse on social media as well as to restrict freedom of expression, including by prosecuting numerous individuals under these laws on charges related to statements made on social media.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Saudi Arabia remained a regional leader in countering terrorist financing, hosting the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center that brings together the United States and Gulf partners to confront new and evolving networks and lead efforts on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures.

Saudi Arabia is an active member of FATF and completed a Virtual Asset/Virtual Asset Service Provider risk assessment, in line with FATF recommendations, which will serve as the basis for a national action plan focused on the mitigation of money laundering and terrorist finance risks.

Saudi Arabia streamlined its process to restrict financing to individuals and entities listed by the UN Security Council and completed an assessment to evaluate its compliance with UN resolutions. It imposed sanctions against individuals and entities associated with an international network funding the Houthis.
**Countering Violent Extremism:** Saudi Arabia had numerous government and government-affiliated entities devoted to CVE, including the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal), the Intellectual Warfare Center, and various entities within universities and the military and security services. Major CVE organizations focused on refuting extremist ideology through scholarly interpretation of the Quran. Etidal touted the signing of an MOU with the UN Counterterrorism Center (UNCCT) in April, and Saudi Arabia continued to be the UNCCT’s largest donor.

Saudi Arabia continued its flagship program at the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Counseling and Care, which seeks to deradicalize former terrorists and facilitate their reentry into society.

The Muslim World League promoted a message of tolerance and focused efforts on acceptance of other faiths. On August 30, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Call, and Guidance issued circulars to every Saudi mosque that included a directive to remove extremist literature and a prohibition on proselytizing. In contrast, antisemitic language was used in several Friday sermons at the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina.

The Saudi government made further progress in revising textbooks used in the public K-12 curriculum to reduce “intolerant and extremist” content.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Saudi Arabia is a member of the following organizations engaged in CT cooperation:

- G-20
- GCTF
- Gulf Cooperation Council
- Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition
- Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- UN Counterterrorism Center

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**TUNISIA**

**Overview:** Counterterrorism and border security continued to be a top priority of the Government of Tunisia in 2021. The risk of terrorist activity remained high, exacerbated by sustained instability in neighboring Libya, although the frequency and scale of terrorist attacks conducted in 2021 decreased.

Tunisia’s continued work to professionalize its security apparatus in partnership with the United States and its commitment to conduct joint Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense CT operations have steadily degraded violent extremist organization capacity within the country. Despite COVID-19 challenges affecting national resources, Tunisia demonstrated consistent security force readiness and carried out proactive CT operations throughout the year. Tunisia continued work on implementation of a national preventing/countering violent...
extremism strategy and the freezing of terrorist assets, and demonstrated improvements in CT crisis response, coordination, and investigation.

**Terrorist Incidents:** On March 11, the Ministry of Defense reported that an IED explosion near Mount Salloum in the governorate of Kasserine killed two children, ages 7 and 9, and injured their mother. On November 26, police shot and wounded a violent extremist who attacked the Ministry of Interior headquarters in Tunis using a knife and a cleaver.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Overall, the government’s CT efforts continue to demonstrate advances in successful, proactive CT operations and improved coordination between Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense security elements. There is substantive cooperation with Embassy Tunis on investigations, prosecutions, and prevention of terrorist activity aimed at U.S. interests in Tunisia.

The Tunisian National Counterterrorism Commission (CNLCT) worked on revising the National Counterterrorism Strategy through a consultative process with ministries and civil society organization stakeholders. The next five-year plan, which will be completed in summer 2022, strives to be a holistic, whole-of-government and society approach for CVE. Tunisia has specific capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets, such as hotels, stadia, tourist resorts, and cultural sites, in line with UNSCR 2341 on protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. Safeguarding tourist zones remained a government focus, with work continuing in the context of the G7+7 Tourist and Cultural Sites Protection project group. The number of tourists travelling to Tunisia was reduced by more than 70 percent because of COVID-19.

Border security remained a top government priority in 2021 because of continued instability in Libya. The Tunisian Armed Forces, along with the Ministry of Interior’s National Guard, successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, vehicles, and weapons in joint operations throughout 2021. Phase 2 of the southern electronic border surveillance system was completed in 2021. The maritime coastal surveillance system continued to provide full coverage along the entire Tunisian coast. As part of interdiction and border security support efforts, the United States has provided training in advanced travel document examination.

The government has limited prosecutorial, prison, and social services capacity for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. Significant CT-related law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups included the following:

- In April, authorities reported they dismantled an ISIS affiliated terror group in Sfax, disrupting an imminent terror attack in the process. Authorities reportedly seized significant amounts of raw materials for making explosives and electronic devices.
- In April, authorities conducted an operation against Ajnad al-Khilafah (the Army of the Caliphate, affiliated with ISIS), eliminating known terrorists and seizing weapons.
- In January, authorities arrested the leader and members of a terrorist cell affiliated with the Okba Ibn Nafaa group.
Tunisian police, the National Guard, and the military continued to benefit from U.S.-provided capacity building assistance including training focused on interagency cooperation and investigative and tactical skills; embedded mentors within the National Guard and National Police antiterrorism units; and train-the-trainer courses. Additional assistance included funding for a National Guard Operations room and renovation of CT judicial facilities. The government continues to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement authorities to prevent further acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests in Tunisia. However, owing to internal government bureaucracy, broader cooperation at times remained challenging and inefficient.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The CNLCT in December froze the funds and assets of six Tunisians suspected of links to terrorist crimes. As of December 31, Tunisia had designated 142 individuals, organizations, and/or entities as having links to terror groups, freezing their assets as part of that designation.

U.S. efforts to support counterterrorism finance investigations included trainings to identify potential misuse of cryptocurrencies. The United States also sponsored Tunisian government participation in the November regional MENA Money Laundering Conference in Bahrain that focused on regulatory expectations and compliance.

Tunisia launched the online platform Hannibal in January, which increased information sharing on hard currency transfers in real time to improve cooperation between law enforcement and the private sector.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Tunisia remained committed to preventing radicalization through youth and educational programs coordinated among its ministries and civil society organizations. In October, the U.S. Agency for International Development launched the MA3AN program, a 5-year, $48 million resilience and community empowerment program focused on preventing violent extremism at the community and national level. Tunisia’s ability to reintegrate Tunisians from foreign conflict zones remains limited. The Ministry of Family and Women’s Affairs in collaboration with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees held two workshops in June and December focused on CVE and repatriation of FTFs and associated women and children.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Tunisia held a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2020-21. Tunisia is a board member for the International Institute of Justice and Rule of Law, participated in Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS events, and is a recipient country for CVE assistance from the Global Community Engagement and Resiliency Fund.

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**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

**Overview:** The United Arab Emirates (UAE) advanced counterterrorism efforts in 2021, particularly in countering terrorist financing and in the international cooperation domain. The UAE’s Central Bank (CBUAE) imposed financial sanctions on several exchange houses operating in the UAE, and the cabinet added 38 individuals and 15 entities to the UAE’s terrorist list. U.S. and UAE security agencies signed an information-sharing memorandum of
cooperation to facilitate lawful international travel. The UAE remains a leader in countering violent extremist narratives on a global level, supporting CVE education and participating in and hosting international fora to promote tolerance and coexistence. The UAE continued valuable support for counterterrorism efforts as a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and in Yemen against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, including support to local forces in counterterrorism operations.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in the UAE in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In April, the UAE passed a law regulating donations and fundraising activities for charities with the stated aim to protect organizations from the risk of exploitation by terrorist organizations.

The State Security Directorate (SSD) in Abu Dhabi and Dubai State Security (DSS) remained primarily responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement efforts. Local, emirate-level police forces, especially Abu Dhabi Police and Dubai Police, were the first responders in such cases and provided technical assistance to SSD and DSS. The UAE security apparatus demonstrated capability in investigations, crisis response, and border security, and forces were trained and equipped to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents.

As in previous years, the UAE worked closely with the United States, through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to improve its border security posture. Information sharing between Abu Dhabi Police’s Criminal Investigations Division and DHS Homeland Security Investigations helped counter transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups. In January, the United States and the UAE signed a memorandum of cooperation that demonstrated a shared commitment to facilitating lawful international travel. The UAE’s border security efforts have increased to further deter terrorist travel by enhancing travel document security; increasing the use of terrorist screening watchlists, including INTERPOL databases; expanding information sharing within the UAE government and with other countries; and institutionalizing the collection of passenger information on commercial flights.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The UAE is a member of MENAFATF, and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. The UAE is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Finance Group and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center.

The United States and others recognized progress the UAE has made to strengthen its domestic AML/CFT regime over the past two years. There was a noticeable increase in public announcements of enforcement actions taken against banks, exchange houses, and law firms. The UAE became the first GCC country to launch goAML, an AML reporting platform developed by the United Nations for FIUs to collect suspicious transaction reports. The UAE launched a new AML Public-Private-Partnership Committee in late 2021, including representatives from the Ministry of Economy, CBUAE, the Ministry of Justice, the Dubai International Financial Center, and the Abu Dhabi Global Market. The government created a permanent executive office for AML/CFT in February to support the UAE’s AML/CFT National Strategy.
Following the CBUAE introduction in 2020 of a mandatory registration framework for informal money transfer operators known as hawala brokers, CBUAE registered more than 50 licensed hawala brokers and referred more than 20 unregistered hawala brokers to law enforcement agencies for investigation. In December, CBUAE imposed fines on six of the brokers under the Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regulations for failure to register on goAML. The CBUAE published several guidance documents throughout 2021 covering topics including targeted financial sanctions, reporting requirements for licensed financial institutions (LFIs), AML/CFT guidance for exchange houses, and guidance for LFIs that provide services to cash-intensive businesses and to the precious metals and stones sector. The UAE’s FIU signed more than 60 MOUs to enhance international cooperation and information sharing on AML/CFT issues.

The UAE updated its domestic terrorist sanctions list in September to add 38 individuals and 15 entities. These included Türkiye-based ISIS financial facilitator Alaa Khanfurah, whom the United States designated in May, as well as the Yemen-based al-Omgy Money Exchange, which the United States designated in 2016. In addition, the list included Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Hizballah facilitators and added six Nigerian nationals for financing Boko Haram.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The UAE government continued to play a leadership role in global efforts to counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The UAE hosts the Sawab Center, a bilateral partnership with the United States that counters ISIS messaging online, and continued to support Hedayah, an international center of excellence for countering violent extremism based in Abu Dhabi. With coordination and support from U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi, Sawab collaborated with international and multilateral partners to counter online propaganda by ISIS and ISIS-affiliated organizations. Hedayah carried out CVE programs and research projects around the world, including a U.S. Department of State-supported countermessaging effort for religious and community leaders in Tunisia.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The UAE led or was actively engaged in a range of counterterrorism cooperation efforts within international, multilateral, and regional organizations and groupings that align with U.S. and like-minded policy priorities. Relevant UAE engagements are highlighted below:

- Senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials met with European External Action Service counterparts in March to discuss security and counterterrorism cooperation, including continued AML/CFT coordination.
- The UAE’s AML/CFT Executive Office hosted a team from the General Secretariat of the GCC in September to develop joint action programs among the GCC countries to combat terrorist financing.
- The UAE is a member of the GCTF and participated in the 11th GCTF Ministerial Plenary Meeting and the 19th GCTF Coordinating Committee Meeting in October.
- The UAE participated in the MENAFATF Plenary and Working Group sessions, held in Cairo in November.
Overview: Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS-Yemen, and Iranian and Iran-backed terrorist groups such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah exploited the political and security vacuum created by conflict between the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen government and the Houthis, as well as conflict between the government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Additionally, IRGC-QF exploited the conflict to expand Iran’s influence and enable Houthi cross-border terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia. UN reporting has highlighted connections between IRGC-QF and the Houthis, including the provision of lethal aid used to undertake attacks against infrastructure in Saudi Arabia impacting civilians.

The Republic of Yemen government controlled roughly two thirds of the country’s territory, although Houthi-controlled areas contained 70 percent to 80 percent of the population, including the capital, Sana’a. Implementation of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which called for a power-sharing agreement between the government and the STC, was incomplete and failed to eliminate tensions in the South, where AQAP turned for safe haven following Houthi gains in al-Bayda governorate.

The Republic of Yemen government cooperated with the U.S. government on counterterrorism efforts but could not fully enforce CT measures or reliably undertake operations across the country because of instability, violence, and degraded capabilities. A security vacuum persisted, which provided AQAP room to operate. In territory controlled by the government and government-aligned forces, there were instances in which counterterrorism charges were used as a pretense to detain independent journalists (especially female journalists) who published articles critical of local authorities. Security Belt Forces affiliated with the STC and UAE continued to play an important role in CT efforts, as they exercised control over significant parts of Aden and Abyan; however, they have also been accused of human rights abuses, including in detention facilities they operate. ISIS-Yemen has been severely degraded, and many affiliates likely have reintegrated into local militias. AQAP remained active in central Yemen, most notably in al-Bayda. When the Houthis pushed into al-Bayda, AQAP scattered to neighboring Abyan and Shabwah governorates. In November, AQAP leader Khaled Batarfi posted a video justifying reduced activity in Yemen as an opportunity to recruit and leave AQAP’s foes to weaken one other.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Attacks attributed to AQAP decreased in 2021, compared with 2020. Methods included sniper fire, VBIEDs, ambushes, armed clashes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. Notable terrorist incidents included the following:

- In March, AQAP-affiliated gunmen killed eight soldiers and four civilians in an attack on a checkpoint controlled by Security Belt Forces in the Ahwar district of Abyan.
- The UN Panel of Experts reported that AQAP kidnapped five government officials in Shabwah on June 14, whom they later released on July 5.
- In November, AQAP claimed several attacks in al-Bayda.
• Houthi cross-border attacks, some of which the United States has described as terrorism, are addressed in the Saudi Arabia section.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Yemen made no significant changes to its CT legal framework in 2021. Yemen does not have comprehensive counterterrorism legislation.

Draft counterterrorism legislation has been pending in Parliament since 2008. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the draft was under parliamentary review. The law would facilitate the detention of suspects and include mandatory sentencing for several terrorism-related crimes. There have been no clear moves to implement legal structures compliant with UNSCRs 2178 and 2396 related to countering foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist travel, although the Republic of Yemen government continues to institute some measures to combat terrorist travel. There are limited commercial flights operating out of airports in Yemen, and the government does not have the capacity or resources to implement UNSCR 2309 mandates on aviation security.

Before 2015, Yemen’s National Security Agency and the President’s Office drafted a National Counterterrorism Strategy. A ministerial committee reviewed the draft but was unable to finalize it because of political instability. Thus, Yemen’s National Counterterrorism Strategy had not been officially adopted or implemented by the end of 2021.

Yemen employed the U.S.-provided Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) integrated border security management system, which was being expanded and upgraded at year’s end.

Yemen, with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UK participated in the Yemen Security Working Group, which included military and diplomatic representatives and developed cooperative capacity-building initiatives for Yemeni military and security forces. The Department of State-funded training on operational border security management, air cargo control and strategic trade enforcement, vehicle interdiction, and cross-border infectious disease management.

The Yemeni Coast Guard assisted in interdicting weapons and illegal materials destined for terrorist groups. They took custody of detained crews in at-sea transfers from stateless smuggling vessels interdicted by the U.S. Navy. Yemen’s maritime borders remained porous and vulnerable to maritime smuggling of fighters, weapons, and other material used to support AQAP and ISIS-Yemen.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Yemen is a member of MENAFATF. The Republic of Yemen Government-controlled Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden continued incremental efforts to implement IMF Diagnostic Report recommendations to enhance AML/CFT capacity. The government was unable to fully implement FATF and IMF recommendations and UNSCRs related to terrorist financing because of the lack of judicial capacity and ability to exercise power throughout Yemen’s territory. Since 2010, FATF has identified Yemen as a risk to the international financial system because of its AML/CFT
deficiencies. The number of commercial banks that comply with providing AML/CFT transaction information increased despite Houthi pressure. In December, the president appointed a new CBY board and Governor who has emphasized improving Yemen’s AML/CFT capabilities.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no significant changes in 2021. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that Houthi summer camps for children provided basic military training and encouraged hate speech and violence. The Saudi Arabia King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center Child Soldiers Rehabilitation Program in Yemen launched in 2017 was suspended in 2020 because of COVID-19 and evaluated in 2021 for relaunch in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Republic of Yemen government continued to cooperate with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, the GCC, the United States, and other countries in pursuit of a political solution to the conflict. Yemen is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League.
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Overview

South and Central Asia in 2021 saw, in addition to continued terrorist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a volatile mix of insurgent attacks punctuated by incidents of terrorism in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and threats by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) against Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Al-Qa’ida and its regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent, AQIS, kept a low profile in accordance with Taliban directives.

Following the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, ISIS-K, elements of AQ, and regionally focused terrorist groups maintained a presence in Afghanistan and conducted terrorist activities in the region. ISIS-K had between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters in the country, although precise estimates are hard to determine. Haqqani Network members and key leaders have increased their public profile and meeting with international envoys since assuming both formal and informal roles within the Taliban following the insurgent group’s takeover of Kabul.

ISIS-K increased high-profile terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, often targeting members of vulnerable ethnic and religious minority populations such as Hazara Shias. Multiple terrorist incidents targeted members of the Shia community. On August 26, an ISIS-K suicide bomber attacked the Kabul airport, killing 13 U.S. servicemembers and more than 170 Afghan civilians.

The United States has not made a decision to recognize the Taliban or another entity as the Government of Afghanistan but has pressed the Taliban to uphold their counterterrorism commitments under the 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement (the “Doha Agreement”). The Taliban have repeatedly committed publicly to meet their Doha Agreement commitment to prevent any group or individual from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. However, the extent of the Taliban’s ability to prevent AQ and ISIS-K from mounting external operations remained unclear. Instability and potential terrorist activities emanating from Afghanistan became a serious concern for the country’s neighbors, as they worried about spillover effects from the conflict and instability.

ISIS-K, elements of al-Qa’ida (including affiliate AQIS), and terrorist groups targeting Pakistan—such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—continued to use the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as a safe haven. The numbers of attacks and casualties were higher than in 2020.

Instability in Afghanistan also affected Central Asian states, which remained on guard against violent extremist elements from Afghanistan crossing their borders, as well as the potential threat posed by the return of their citizens who traveled to Iraq or Syria to fight with terrorist groups. Tajikistan, which shares an 843-mile border with Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan strengthened their border security through a large increase in U.S. assistance, as well as additional security cooperation with Russia, China, and others.

Tajikistan approved the national strategy on countering extremism and terrorism for 2021-2025 and adopted a law on combating terrorism. Uzbekistan approved its first “National Strategy on
Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2021-2026,” and the country also finalized its first national CT/CVE and AML/CFT strategies.

Elsewhere in the South and Central Asia region, the United States continued to build on its strategic partnership with the Government of India, including through the annual Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and the Quad counterterrorism tabletop exercise alongside Australia and Japan.

AFGHANISTAN

Overview: During the reporting period, ISIS-K increased high-profile attacks against civilians, often targeting members of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority populations such as Hazara Shias, to spread fear and sow divisions in Afghan society. ISIS-K received an influx of detained fighters back into its ranks, as ISIS-K members were among the thousands who escaped from Parwan detention facility and Pul-e-Charki prison during the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August. ISIS-K, elements of al-Qa’ida (including affiliate AQIS), and terror groups targeting Pakistan, such as TTP, continued to use the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as a safe haven. Following their takeover of Kabul, the Taliban publicly stated that they were acting to counter ISIS-K and, according to international media reports, resorted to brutal tactics — including summary executions — in doing so. The United States has not made a decision to recognize the Taliban or another entity as the Government of Afghanistan and pressed the Taliban to uphold their counterterrorism commitments under the 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement (the “Doha Agreement”). The Taliban repeatedly committed publicly to meet their Doha Agreement commitments to prevent any group or individual from using Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: ISIS-K attacks in Afghanistan increased, compared with the previous year. ISIS-K increasingly targeted what it perceived as soft targets in urban areas. This tactic aligned with its shift to a configuration of clandestine urban cells in various parts of the country, following its territorial losses in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces in 2019. Significant terrorist incidents included the following:

- On May 8, a bombing at Sayed Ul-Shuhada high school, located in a predominantly Hazara Shia neighborhood in Kabul, killed at least 90 people — mostly women and girls. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but international observers widely ascribed the attack to ISIS-K, which had previously conducted similar attacks.
- On August 26, during U.S.-led evacuation operations, an ISIS-K suicide bomber attacked the Kabul airport, killing 13 U.S. servicemembers and more than 170 Afghan civilians.
- On October 8, an ISIS-K suicide bomber attacked a Shia mosque in Kunduz province during Friday prayers, killing more than 40 people and injuring more than 140 others.
- On October 15, a group of ISIS-K suicide bombers attacked a Shia mosque in Kandahar province during Friday prayers, killing 47 people and injuring nearly 70 others.
- On November 2, ISIS-K fighters and at least one suicide bomber attacked a military hospital in Kabul, resulting in 25 deaths and more than a dozen injuries.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The United States has not made a decision to recognize the Taliban or another entity as the Government of Afghanistan. The United States discontinued funding of counterterrorism support following the Taliban takeover. The United States did, however, closely track Taliban efforts to counter terrorist groups in Afghanistan and condemned reports of brutal tactics. In November, international media reported that the Taliban sent 1,300 fighters to Nangarhar province to conduct operations against ISIS-K.

The Taliban reportedly killed and publicly displayed the bodies of individuals they suspected of collaborating with ISIS-K. Taliban provincial leadership reportedly approved these summary executions. The Taliban associated followers of the Salafist interpretation of Islam with ISIS-K. Some Salafists claimed that the Taliban killed and detained members of their community and closed Salafist mosques. In December the Taliban claimed they arrested more than 600 ISIS-K members in the previous three months and destroyed 25 ISIS-K hideouts in Kabul and Jalalabad. The Taliban also claimed publicly that ISIS-K is no longer a substantial threat in the country, despite the increased attacks.

Pakistan alleged that TTP used Afghanistan as a sanctuary. Border tensions remained high between the Taliban and neighboring countries, with clashes taking place between the Taliban and Pakistan and Iran. Central Asian states, meanwhile, remained on guard against violent extremist elements from Afghanistan crossing their borders. Tajikistan heightened its military posture along its border with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan increased its patrolling, and Russia expressed concern about Central Asian states’ potential vulnerability to incursions by violent extremist elements operating from Afghanistan.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: In August the Egmont Group disconnected Afghanistan’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA), from the Egmont Secure Web. In September, Reuters reported that FinTRACA had ceased operations.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no notable strategies or initiatives for countering violent extremism in Afghanistan during the reporting period.

International and Regional Cooperation: No country expressly took a decision to recognize the Taliban as the Government of Afghanistan, and there was no notable counterterrorism cooperation between the Taliban and international, multilateral, or regional organizations during the reporting period.

BANGLADESH

Overview: In 2021, incidents causing injury and death derived from hate-based communal protests and political differences occurred, with some violent extremist group involvement. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reemphasized Bangladesh’s zero-tolerance policy on terrorism. Terrorist groups increased recruitment and funding activities online. U.S.-trained
Bangladesh police units’ arrests of terrorist suspects prevented some attacks, although elements of the security forces have been accused of conducting extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist incidents in 2021 included the following:

- On May 17, police detected a remote-controlled homemade explosive device placed in front of a police box in the city of Narayanganj; U.S.-trained bomb disposal officers neutralized the IED with a U.S.-funded remote-controlled robot. The Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTCU) suspected ISIS-aligned Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB).
- On July 11, CTTC police in Narayanganj raided a Neo-JMB militants’ den, recovering IEDs, bomb making materials, weapons, ammunition, and Neo-JMB plans for future attacks.
- On September 16, Delwar Hossain hurled a petrol bomb in a lone-wolf attack in the Gulshan Diplomatic Zone of Dhaka at what he believed was a vehicle associated with the U.S. Embassy and was immediately arrested. Police believed Hossain was radicalized to violence online. No injuries were reported.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Antiterrorism Act of 2009, as amended, remains the basis for the arrest and detention of terrorist suspects. Under the 2018 Digital Security Act (DSA), the police can counter alleged extremists propagating, funding, radicalizing, recruiting, or distributing hate speech online; domestic and international critics assert the DSA is used to target, harass, and arrest perceived government critics, particularly journalists and political opponents.

The CTTCU, the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) continued raids and arrests against suspected militants. The CTTCU investigated 40 cases and made 85 arrests, most in Dhaka. The Chattogram Metropolitan CT police responded to 40 incidents and arrested 10. The ATU, though not yet leading Bangladesh’s CT efforts, increased its capacity and reportedly investigated some 75 cases. In December, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky sanctions program, the U.S. government sanctioned RAB, several high-level RAB officers, and Bangladesh’s top law enforcement official, for serious human rights abuses. Additionally, several senior RAB officials were designated for involvement in gross violations of human rights under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 2021. RAB and CTTCU’s Investigation Wing are ineligible for assistance under the Leahy law.

Other CT-related units included border guards, Special Branch, Aviation Security, the Airport Immigration Police, and the Airport Armed Police Battalion. Each worked independently. In addition to Metropolitan Police cyber, SWAT, and bomb disposal training, the U.S. government provided Anti-Terrorism Tribunal (ATT) judges and prosecutors courses on handling evidence, conducting investigations, and prosecuting terrorists and terrorism financing cases, as well as physical courtroom security upgrades. Police and judicial officials cited resource constraints and requested more training and support.
Bangladesh has the capacity to patrol land and maritime borders and has improved cargo and passenger airport screening with updated equipment, procedures, and increased staff. Airline security is not as strong. Bangladesh has initiated e-passports for all and shares information with INTERPOL but has no dedicated terrorist watchlist. A U.S. “Alert List” project is under government consideration. Bangladesh does not systematically use API/PNR passenger information to screen travelers before flights arrive. In 2019, the ATT sentenced to death seven terrorists for supporting roles in the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack. The Bangladesh Supreme Court still has not ruled on their appeal.

The seven ATTs carried a caseload of about 700 cases. Eight Cyber Tribunals, which handle cases arising under the DSA, have a backlog of more than 4,600 cases; most suspects will not receive bail before long-delayed trials. Two ATT judges reportedly received numerous death threats in 2021. Based on CTTCU investigations, ATT in February sentenced five defendants to death for the 2015 murder of Bangladeshi-American Avijit Roy, who wrote books on atheism. The ATT also sentenced eight Ansar-Al-Islam members to death for murdering Roy’s publisher, also in 2015. The High Court upheld death sentences for 10 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) members for attempting to assassinate Sheikh Hasina in 2000, sentencing 14 additional HUJI-B members to death in March. On August 31, in a high-profile case, ATT sentenced six members of the banned Ansarullah Bangla Team to death, acquitting two, for brutally killing in 2016 Xulhaz Mannan, a USAID employee, and his partner Mahbub Rabby Tonoy, for promoting LGBTQI+ rights. On October 3 the ATT convicted two JMB leaders, sentencing one to life in prison and one to death, for a 2005 suicide bombing at a Chattogram court.

**Counter Terrorist Financing:** There have been no changes since 2020.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Following a 2019 joint UN/USAID conference to jumpstart the process, police, academics, civil society organizations, and others continued drafting a National Counterterrorism Coordination Strategy. The CTTCU, think tanks, the UN, and universities conducted CVE-related research on such topics as social profiling, motivating factors, and female radicalization. CTTC led districtwide community engagement awareness workshops to counter extremism. Four U.S-funded NGOs conducted nationwide CVE programming for youth.

The CTTCU reported it had they worked to deradicalize 10 local violent extremists and reintegrated them and their families into their communities. Bangladeshi violent extremist groups tend to draw ideological inspiration from ISIS, though increased online chatter indicated that the Taliban and al-Qa’ida expanded their influence. The government influenced madrassas’ curricula, and police worked with community leaders to promote alternative messaging. The government had little capacity to address radicalization efforts in the prison system. Dhaka North, Dhaka South, and Narayanganj are members of the Strong Cities Network. Bangladesh is a partner country of GCERF.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** As international funding dwindled or ended, Bangladeshi organizations curtailed cooperative activities under GCERF and the UN, but the United States and the UN revitalized some programs to reach vulnerable populations, especially
young adults 18 to 35 years old. Bangladesh was active in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

INDIA

Overview: In 2021, terrorism affected the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the northeastern states, and parts of central India. Terrorist groups active in India include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, ISIS, al-Qa’ida, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Terrorist tactics showed a shift toward attacks on civilians and greater reliance on IEDs, including an explosives attack using drones on an air force base. The Indian government made significant efforts to detect, disrupt, and degrade operations of terrorist organizations. In October, the United States and India held the 18th meeting of the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, and in November India hosted the second Quad counterterrorism tabletop exercise along with Australia and Japan.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: During the year, there were 153 terrorist attacks in J&K, causing 274 deaths that included 45 security personnel, 36 civilians, and 193 terrorists. Other notable attacks included an attack on November 1 in Manipur, in which the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur and Naga People’s Front killed seven persons in an ambush, including an Indian Army officer and with his wife and minor son.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes in terrorism-related legislation in 2021. India expanded the number of state-level Multi-Agency Centers to strengthen sharing of intelligence among state and federal agencies.

India implements UNSCR 2396 by using watchlists, implementing biographic and biometric screening at ports of entry, and prioritizing information sharing. Pursuant to a bilateral arrangement, the U.S. and Indian governments have committed to collaborating on improving border security and information-sharing capabilities. The U.S. government is still pending a decision from the Government of India on an offer to collaborate on watchlisting assistance.

India collaborates with the United States on implementing UNSCR 2309 and is implementing dual screen X-raying for cargo screening at airport locations.

Significant law enforcement actions included the following:

- A National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Special Court sentenced three Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami terrorists to prison sentences of 10 years for weapons smuggling.
- Eight Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh terrorists were convicted for attacks with explosives in Bodh Gaya in 2012.
- Through September, the NIA had investigated 37 cases related to ISIS and arrested 168 people.
India responds promptly to U.S. requests for information related to terrorism investigations and makes efforts to mitigate threats in response to U.S. information. Collaborative efforts to disrupt terrorist travel continue, and alerts are issued to U.S. authorities for possible threats in the United States and against U.S. interests.

Indian law enforcement, including border security forces, face budgetary, staffing, and equipment constraints. Capacity to patrol and secure extensive maritime and land borders is improving but not adequate, given India’s extensive coastline.

The Government of India does not use the category of Racial and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism and opposes labeling terrorism based on “the motivation behind such acts.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** India is a member of FATF, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group. India’s Financial Intelligence Unit-India is part of the Egmont Group. There were no changes in terrorism-related legislation in 2021. NIA investigated nine cases of possible terror funding.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** India did not adopt any new strategies or programs for countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The Ministry of Home Affairs is the lead agency for CVE. There is no national CVE policy or national CVE coordinator. State governments have the lead on CVE and deradicalization strategies.

Media reports and security experts claim donations from private groups in western countries and the Middle East earmarked for religious institutions, social organizations, and schools in India contribute to radicalization to violence.

In J&K, the Indian Army runs schools, training courses, recruitment drives, medical camps, and emergency services to prevent “radicalization.” Only five of the 28 Indian states have formulated a CVE strategy. CVE efforts are uneven and vary based on local interests and contexts. CVE programs target demographics and cohorts at the highest risk of vulnerability for terrorist recruitment.

India does not have a policy to repatriate FTFs or their families and has declined to repatriate four Indian citizen spouses of Indian ISIS fighters from Afghanistan. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs for Indians who have joined terrorist or violent extremist organizations on its territory take place at the state or local level.

The Ministry of Home Affairs is in the process of preparing an action plan on strategic messaging to counter radicalization, but it has not been released. At least one Delhi-based think-tank runs a program that promotes alternative narratives to counter online radicalization to violence.

Several federal agencies and state police forces monitor online platforms for extremist content and messaging. The NIA arrested two persons in August for disseminating content from the ISIS-affiliated online magazine *Voice of Hind*. Mumbai is a member of the Strong Cities Network.
International and Regional Cooperation: In 2021, India began its two-year term as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council, where it chairs the Counterterrorism Committee, the 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committee, and the Libya Sanctions Committee. India has leadership roles in the following regional and international fora, where it has promoted multilateral CT cooperation:

- The Global Counterterrorism Forum
- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
- Council of Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (known as RATS SCO)
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime
- The Group of Twenty

India shares counterterrorism information with Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. India’s defense relationships with Canada, France, and Russia, the United Kingdom extend to counterterrorism issues. India’s military exercises with most countries, especially with neighbors such as Nepal, incorporate CT elements. In November, as part of the Quad with the U.S., Australia, and Japan, India hosted a Counterterrorism Tabletop Exercise that addressed international CT responses.

Kazakhstan

Overview: Kazakhstan remained on guard against the potential for both externally directed and homegrown terrorist attacks. The government continued rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for more than 600 Kazakhstani FTFs and family members repatriated from Syria and Iraq since 2019, including 12 returned in February. The government continued to implement its five-year (2018-22) program against “religious extremism” and terrorism, but NGOs and independent observers expressed concerns that terrorism and “extremism” laws were applied broadly, in some cases against political opponents and adherents of non-violent religious movements.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Kazakhstan in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kazakhstan has a comprehensive CT legal framework. The lead CT agency is the Committee for National Security (KNB), which coordinates efforts at both the central and local levels. The government approved an ambitious five-year, $900 million program in 2018 to counter religious extremism and terrorism. Law-enforcement officers and prosecutors continued to have wide discretion to determine what qualifies as terrorism or extremism. President Tokayev signed amendments into law in December abolishing the death penalty, including for terrorism-related crimes.

Kazakhstani law bans its citizens from fighting in foreign wars. The government has taken a two-pronged approach to citizens returning from Iraq and Syria, prosecuting fighters and those suspected of active participation in terrorism while allowing others to reintegrate into their communities, where they have access to state-supported theological counseling and
psychological, social, and educational services. After returning more than 600 of its citizens from Iraq and Syria in 2019, Kazakhstan repatriated an additional 12 from northeast Syria in February, including four men, one woman, and seven children.

Law-enforcement units demonstrated a strong capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. There appeared to be an increase in extremism and terrorism-related prosecutions. For example, from January to July, the country registered 139 criminal offenses related to extremism and terrorism, a 19.8 percent increase from 2020. Local researchers have estimated that up to 90 percent of charges filed under laws against terrorism and “extremism” do not involve real or planned violent acts, and in some cases appeared to be connected to political opposition activity. For example, in February, a criminal court in Atyrau placed prominent local political activist Max Bokayev on the list of people suspected of financing terrorism and extremism, barred him from public activities, and imposed restrictions on his bank accounts. Courts also continued to deliver harsh sentences for the promotion of extremism online. For example, a Shymkent court handed down sentences of seven to eight years’ imprisonment to two individuals for “propaganda of terrorism” online and “incitement of religious hatred.”

Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service (part of the KNB) and other agencies proactively worked to prevent Kazakhstani and foreign citizens with suspected terrorist links from traveling to, from, or through Kazakhstan consistent with UNSCR 2396. This included the use of specialized equipment to interdict suspicious or unauthorized travelers at both official and unofficial air, land, and sea crossing points. For example, in September the migration police in Turkistan region detained two Kazakhstani citizens for organizing an “illegal migration channel” that helped three Afghan citizens illegally enter Kazakhstan, and in October law-enforcement officers in Kostanay reported preventing an illegal border crossing by two Afghan citizens, though individuals charged with “illegal border crossing” could be labor migrants or asylum seekers, rather than terrorists. Through a 10-year contract with a multinational security technology company, Kazakhstan has been working since 2018 to install and operate an API/PNR system to screen travelers.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kazakhstan belongs to the EAG, and the nation’s Committee on Financial Monitoring is a member of the Egmont Group. In preparation for an EAG mutual evaluation planned for completion in 2023, three Financial Asset Task Force recommendations on virtual-asset service providers, politically exposed persons, and transparency and beneficial owners were sent to the legislature for consideration. The Prosecutor General’s Office transferred seven terrorist financing cases to the court system during the first 10 months of 2021, up from three during the same period in 2020.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Even as Kazakhstan’s five-year strategy places a heavy emphasis on law enforcement, it also includes efforts to promote officially approved versions of Islam to youth and provide alternatives to “extremism” through social programs and economic opportunities. Working with religious experts, psychologists, and theologians, the Ministry of Information and Social Development (MISD) conducted direct outreach in communities across the country; maintained an educational website on religion, state policy, and prevention of terrorism; and operated a nationwide hotline offering consultations on religious questions.
At the same time, the government continued to block online content it considered extremist. In December, MISD reported that in 2021 the government had identified and removed more than 181,000 online materials promoting “religious extremism” and terrorism, a more than eightfold increase over the previous year. The government also continued to implement rehabilitation and reintegration programs for individuals convicted of extremism-related offenses and their relatives. Aktau and Karaganda are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Kazakhstan partnered with the United States and international organizations such as UNDP, UNODC, and the OSCE on a variety of CT and CVE projects. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development piloted several initiatives, including a mentorship program for former low-level extremism offenders, a project to improve family support services in Aktobe, and a life-skills program in technical colleges in at-risk communities.

The U.S. Department of State’s CT Bureau continued implementation of technical assistance projects focused on prison-based support for programs that advance community-based rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for returnees from Syria and Iraq. As a member of the C5+1 (the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States) diplomatic platform, Kazakhstan participates in the associated C5+1 Security Working Group, which concentrates on regional CT and CVE cooperation. Kazakhstan also participates in CT-related exercises and training through membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

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**KYRGYZ REPUBLIC**

**Overview:** The Kyrgyz Republic’s counterterrorism efforts continue to concentrate on rooting out “extremists,” CVE, preventing those returning from conflicts abroad from engaging in terrorist activities, and repatriation of FTF family members. The Kyrgyz government restricts public information on national security issues, making it difficult to assess the efficacy of its CT operations and the extent of the threat. The country remains vulnerable to transnational threats, especially in the remote south, where ill-defined and porous borders allow for the relatively free movement of people and illicit goods. According to government statistics, some 850 Kyrgyz citizens left the country to join terrorist groups over the last decade. The government faces limitations on its ability to investigate, prosecute, and rehabilitate returning FTFs owing to a lack of expertise and resources, as well as potential shortcomings in the legal framework.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes to terrorism-related legislation in 2021; however, changes to the criminal code increased the penalties for creating and financing terrorist organizations to 10 and 12 years, respectively.
There were no reports in 2021 that the government used CT laws to prosecute political opponents. The Kyrgyz Republic introduced biometric passports in May. The Kyrgyz government does not yet operate an API/PNR system for commercial flights. International organizations and Kyrgyz government officials have expressed concerns that the Prosecutor General’s Office and the State Committee for National Security lacked adequate tools and the legal framework to properly prosecute citizens suspected of committing terrorist acts abroad.

Authorities reported several extremism or terrorism-related arrests in 2021, including of individuals accused of recruiting Kyrgyz citizens to join international terrorist organizations. With assistance from UNICEF, the Kyrgyz government repatriated 79 children of FTFs from Iraq in March. The children underwent rehabilitation for several months in a government-managed center and received psychological and medical assistance before being released to family-member guardians.

The Kyrgyz government provided information to the U.S. government about known or suspected terrorists and reported lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and the country’s State Financial Intelligence Service is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes to the Kyrgyz government’s efforts and capacity related to countering the financing of terrorism in 2021. In 2021, the State Financial Intelligence Service fulfilled 125 requests received from law enforcement agencies related to countering terrorist or extremist financing, and 21 cases were registered with the Unified Crime Registry.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Kyrgyz government’s national program and action plan on countering terrorism was in its fourth year of implementation in 2021. Civil society organizations have expressed concerns that the government used the national program and action plan to muzzle free speech and to stigmatize members of ethnic minority groups. Human rights NGOs reported that security services used laws pertaining to so-called extremist materials on the internet to disproportionately target for prosecution ethnic Uzbeks, especially those who followed social media accounts focused on Islam.

The Ministry of Education, with the State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA), continues to implement a curriculum for high school-aged students on “moderate” Islam and to identify terrorist recruitment tactics. The Ministry of Interior and the SCRA, in cooperation with local religious leaders and civil society, organizes CVE trainings to prevent radicalization and religious extremism among youth.

The Probation Department of the Ministry of Justice held trainings with SCRA and UNDP on preventing extremism among probation clients. UNODC and the Probation Department launched a project on post-release monitoring and probation of FTF and violent extremist prisoners in October. As of the date of this report, there were 138 people convicted of less-serious crimes with religious overtones registered with probation authorities.
The SCRA works with the United Nations Population Fund on a project focused on countering radicalization to violent extremism. The project, which is being implemented in 16 madrassas, concentrated on civic education, the role of Islam in Kyrgyz society, and recognition of recruitment of religious youth by terrorist groups. The SCRA and Mutakalim, an organization focused on peace building through religious tolerance, started an internet-based program to counter recruitment to violence, especially of vulnerable youth.

SCRA Research Center, in partnership with Albany Associates, worked on a U.S. Department of State-funded project on strategic communications to counter violent extremism and operationalize the Kyrgyz government’s CVE National Action Plan by developing and operationalizing a strategic communications strategy with a focus on mitigating Internet usage by terrorists. The Ministry of Interior blocked 38 “extremist” websites and 315 photos and videos. The Kyrgyz government cooperated with the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations and foreign governments to facilitate CVE training and other CVE-related programs. Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Talas are members of the Strong Cities Network. Bishkek City Hall hosted a City Exchange workshop in December.

The SCRA worked with Embassy Bishkek-supported Public Fund “Ulybka” to establish an interfaith council in three southern regions to promote and support the development of interfaith dialogue.

UNODC worked with the prison administration to secure violent extremists and to develop a system to ensure they were not able to radicalize other inmates. The SCRA and various government ministries participated in a conference to learn from the experience of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on their rehabilitation and reintegration programs for women and children, to understand the challenges of repatriation and rehabilitation of returnees, and to develop recommendations for the prevention of violent extremism.

International and Regional Cooperation: The People’s Republic of China and Russia provided financial, organizational, and methodological assistance to law enforcement agencies in Central Asian countries including the Kyrgyz Republic, regularly conducting joint counterterrorism exercises, providing information on persons suspected of terrorism, and providing military technical assistance, primarily through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The OSCE Program Office in Bishkek focuses on a range of security issues: from countering terrorism, border security, and transnational threats such as human trafficking, to developing the country’s regions, strengthening efforts to combat corruption on all levels, as well as supporting the reform of the justice sector, implementation of election reform, gender equality, and building open and resilient societies.

MALDIVES

Overview: The Government of Maldives is cognizant of the threat of terrorism and in 2021 continued to focus its counterterrorism efforts on CVE and arrests of Maldivians suspected of
plotting IED attacks and “supporting or promoting a terrorist organization.” Maldives works with international partners, including the United States, to strengthen CT efforts and capacity.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** On May 6, individuals labeled by the government as Islamic extremists attempted to assassinate Speaker of Parliament Mohamed Nasheed by detonating an IED in the capital city of Malé, seriously wounding Nasheed and injuring five others.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Antiterrorism Act (ATA) is the primary legislation for preventing and prosecuting terrorism. In December, the Maldivian government passed a third amendment to the ATA. This amendment authorizes Maldives Police Service (MPS) to arrest and detain suspects for certain ATA crimes for up to 48 hours without a warrant; allows courts to consider police intelligence reports in determining detention basis; extends the charging deadline to a maximum of 105 days for detained suspects; authorizes monitoring and control orders against suspects under 18 years of age; outlines special procedures for returning FTFs; mandates all FTFs either be arrested, placed under a monitoring and control order, undergo a rehabilitation program, or be placed in administrative detention pending a risk assessment; and outlines procedures for registering the birth of children born in conflict zones.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) oversees the CT Intelligence Fusion Center to better coordinate CT efforts. In April, President Solih appointed a secretary to a newly established National Security Advisor office. In August the Minister of Home Affairs announced the establishment of a harmonized system to share information related to threats to national security between the Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF), MPS, and other relevant institutions, as required by the ATA. Responsibility for CT operations, including investigations, rests primarily with MPS. It shares investigative and evidentiary materials with the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) through an informal cooperative arrangement and provides the PGO with evidentiary packets for charging consideration. After charges are filed, MPS continues to support the investigation during the pretrial, trial, and sentencing phases. The MNDF, including the marines and coast guard, are responsible for CT response.

The MNDF conducted multiple cooperative engagements with U.S. forces focused on CT operations. The engagements also enhance maritime security capabilities to increase Maldives domain awareness and security. Maldives cooperates with the United States to strengthen its border security through use of the U.S.-provided PISCES integrated border security management system, which screens arriving and departing travelers, and through the Customs Department’s World Customs Organization’s Global Travel Assessment System. In January, MPS announced it had been granted real-time access to INTERPOL’s criminal database. In February, Maldives Immigration successfully implemented an integrated system to automatically upload stolen and lost travel document (SLTD) information to INTERPOL’s global database, with assistance from the United States’ INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Washington.

Nine men whom the government described as supporters of ISIS were charged under the ATA in relation to the May 6 IED attack on Speaker Nasheed. One of the nine, Adhuham Ahmed Rasheed, entered into a plea bargain agreement under which the Criminal Court sentenced him to 23 years’ imprisonment in December. In court, Rasheed said he participated in the attack because of religious beliefs. The remaining eight defendants were in pre-trial proceedings and
remained in detention as of year’s end. Following the May 6 attack, MNDF and MPS conducted a series of joint operations in Malé and Addu, arresting at least 10 individuals suspected of being ISIS supporters, some of whom were charged with possession of material promoting a terrorist organization. Prosecutions were still in the pretrial phase at the end of the year.

The trial of Mohamed Ameen, the first Maldivian to be listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Affairs Control (OFAC), began in November. Shortly afterward, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s dismissal of the case. According to OFAC, Ameen materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for goods or services in support of ISIS-K, including through his activities as an ISIS-K recruiter. Ameen had been arrested in 2019 and charged with joining a terrorist organization and planning terror acts under the ATA. The trial was ongoing as of year’s end.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Maldives is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) has the mandate to notify police and relevant authorities in terrorist finance-related cases. The United States has worked with the Government of Maldives to strengthen its AML/CFT efforts. At the end of the year, MMA was working closely with the Attorney General’s Office and PGO to amend legislation on AML/CFT, and regulations on asset recovery, with assistance from the United States.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Although President Solih announced Maldives’ intent to facilitate the return and prosecution of Maldivian FTFs and families in Syria in 2019, no repatriations occurred during 2021. The Maldives began the development of a National Reintegration Center to process and rehabilitate returning FTFs and their families. The NCTC held numerous regional workshops and capacity building exercises with both public and private sector groups, to include counternarrative creation and the role of civil society and local leaders in countering what it considers violent extremism and terrorism. In partnership with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Gender, Family & Social Services, the MPS continued CVE programs in islands with “extremist activities.” Malé is a member of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** COVID-19 reduced the ability of government officials to participate in or host international and regional workshops on CT efforts. However, the Government of Maldives continued to work with multilateral and bilateral partners to strengthen its CT efforts. In 2020, a visiting EU delegation announced the launch of a $2.8 million project to support Maldives’ efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

In May, Japan announced a roughly $4.7 million grant to bolster Maldives Immigration and Maldives Customs Service border security efforts. NCTC, in collaboration with UNODC, conducted national- and regional-level capacity building consultations and workshops focusing on addressing the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning FTFs and their families. The NCTC also worked with UNDP Maldives, UNODC, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to increase capacity of law enforcement agencies and the legal sector and the resilience of civil society organizations.
NEPAL

Overview: While 2021 saw many anti-Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) protests and threats of violence, including a YouTube video threatening violence against anyone who advocates for MCC, Nepal’s security services and MCC political supporters addressed the issues without incident. On March 5 the Government of Nepal, and the outlawed Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) splinter group (more commonly called Biplav), signed a historic peace agreement committing both sides to peacefully resolve their differences through future political talks. Following the agreement, the Government of Nepal lifted its ban on the group and ceased to investigate and arrest members.

Biplav continues to honor the agreement under Prime Minister Deuba. The Nepali government does not provide political, diplomatic, or financial support for international terrorism, nor does it knowingly permit Nepal to be used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist groups. Because of the open border with India and insufficient security protocols at the country’s sole functioning international airport in Kathmandu; however, Nepal has and could be used as a transit or staging point for international terrorists.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Nepal in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no significant changes to counterterrorism laws in Nepal in 2021.

The law enforcement organization directly responsible for counterterrorism activities is the Special Bureau of the Nepal Police. This unit consists of some 120 officers who have specialized and unique training to monitor and counter threat groups and activities throughout Nepal. The Special Bureau is supplemented by Nepal Police and Armed Police Force officers when necessary. The Nepal Army Special Forces units are tasked with counterterrorism and receive training in hostage rescue, responding to hijackings, and similar terrorism incidents.

Airport security controls in Nepal are weak and inadequate. Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport does not prescreen passengers, and landing data are not entered into any database. Physical security checks of passengers are rudimentary. There is no travel document security, and the airport lacks ultraviolet lights to examine documents. The Special Bureau of the Nepal Police assigns approximately 10 personnel to the airport and approximately 15 officers to its INTERPOL office, which is located at Nepal Police headquarters. The INTERPOL office has no designated personnel at Tribhuvan International Airport, but communication between INTERPOL and airport personnel does occur. INTERPOL notices are acted on and maintained in a database, but passengers are not routinely screened through this database. Security and immigration officials are generally responsive to U.S. requests for information, but often have little information to provide.

Nepal shares an open border with India. There are some checkpoints along the 1,000-mile border, but these lack sufficient security controls and are sometimes staffed by only one immigration official. Most people crossing the border are neither stopped nor checked, and the
crossing points can easily be circumvented to avoid scrutiny. The primary constraints preventing more effective border-control capability are a lack of resources, information stovepiping among security sector and civilian agencies, and a lack of political will to deploy a more robust approach. The security services lack the personnel, technology, databases, basic equipment, and often electrical power, to provide effective border control. Additional constraints include lack of training and widespread corruption.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** There were no changes in 2021.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Nepal does not employ strategic communications to counter violent extremism. There are no government or civil society programs in Nepal to counter recruitment into violent extremism or rehabilitate former violent extremists. The government generally does not view violent extremism, specifically violent extremist ideology originating from conflict/instability in the Middle East, as a significant threat in Nepal. A more significant threat is non-Nepali international terrorist groups using Nepal as a transit/staging point or soft target.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Nepal is a signatory of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. INTERPOL hosts an annual regional counterterrorism seminar, to which the Nepal Police sends two to three officers.

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**PAKISTAN**

**Overview:** Pakistan took steps in 2021 to counter terror financing and to restrain some India-focused militant groups. Pakistan reviewed and revised its 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism, reducing the NAP from a 20-point plan to 14 key points, but made meager progress on the most difficult aspects — specifically its pledge to dismantle all terrorist organizations without delay or discrimination.

In September, Pakistan prosecuted Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) founder Masood Azhar and JeM leader Abdul Rauf Azhar on terrorism-related charges. In 2018, FATF identified Pakistan as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT system. Pakistan remained on the FATF gray list in 2021.

Pakistan experienced significant terrorist activity in 2021. The number of attacks and casualties was higher than in 2020. Major terrorist groups that focused on conducting attacks in Pakistan included TTP, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and ISIS-K. Separatist militant groups conducted terrorist attacks against varied targets in Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Terrorists used a range of tactics to attack varied targets, including IEDs, VBIEDs, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations.

In 2018, Pakistan was designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated a CPC in 2019, 2020, and 2021.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: Pakistan experienced numerous terrorist attacks in 2021. Members of religious minorities faced significant threats from terrorist groups. The following examples are some of the more-destructive and higher-profile attacks and demonstrate a variety of methods, targets, and perpetrators:

- On January 3, ISIS-K militants claimed responsibility for the murders of 11 Shia Hazara coalminers in the Kachi district of Balochistan.
- On April 21, five persons were killed in a VBIED suicide attack in the parking lot of the Serena hotel in Quetta, Balochistan. According to details of the investigation, the attack targeted local and foreign officials. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, also claiming the targets were police and law enforcement.
- On July 14, a VBIED suicide attack killed 10 People’s Republic of China workers, an additional civilian, and two Frontier Corps soldiers near the Dasu dam in Upper Kohistan district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The blast hit a bus that was transporting People’s Republic of China workers to the construction site. Pakistani officials reported the blast as a suicide attack perpetrated by the TTP, which the group denied.
- On October 10, a prominent journalist was killed in an explosion in Hub, Balochistan. According to law enforcement, the bomb was attached to his vehicle. The BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On December 30, attackers ambushed security officials in North Waziristan. Four security personnel were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Pakistani government continued to implement the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, the National Counterterrorism Authority Act, the 2014 Investigation for Fair Trial Act, and major 2014 and 2020 amendments to the Antiterrorism Act, all of which give law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts enhanced powers in terrorism cases.

Military, paramilitary, and civilian security forces conducted CT operations throughout Pakistan against anti-state militants. Pakistani law allows for preventive detention, permits the death penalty for terrorism offenses, and creates specialized courts to try terrorism cases.

Pakistan collects biometric information at land crossings through its International Border Management Security System. Authorities had limited ability to detect smuggling by air travel. The Customs Service attempted to enforce anti-money laundering laws and foreign exchange regulations at all major airports, in coordination with other agencies. Customs managed the entry of dual-use chemicals for legitimate purposes through end-use verification, while also attempting to prevent their diversion for use in IEDs.

Consistent with UNSCR 2178, returning FTFs may be prosecuted under Pakistani law.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Pakistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Pakistan continued to face significant money-laundering and terrorist financing risks. Several terrorist organizations, including UN-listed groups, operated in Pakistan, raising funds through a variety of means including direct support, public fundraising, abuse of non-profit organizations, and through criminal activities. Funds were moved through
formal and informal (hawala/hundi) channels. Pakistan’s geographic landscape and porous borders increase its vulnerability to terrorist financing and heighten Pakistan’s risks.

In 2018, FATF identified Pakistan as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime and placed the country on the FATF gray list. Though Pakistan has made significant progress in addressing noted FATF deficiencies from its 2018 action plan, FATF maintained Pakistan’s position on the gray list owing to one remaining item associated with the investigation and prosecution of terrorist financiers.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government operated deradicalization camps offering “corrective religious education,” vocational training, counseling, and therapy. A Pakistani NGO administered the juvenile-focused Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center in Swat Valley, which it founded in partnership with the Pakistani military. Additional deradicalization centers are operated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Some madrassas continued to teach extremist doctrine. While the government continued efforts to increase madrassa regulation, some analysts and madrassa reform proponents observed that many madrassas failed to register with the government, provide documentation of their sources of funding, or comply with laws governing acceptance of foreign students.

The Pakistani cities of Nowshera, Peshawar, and Quetta are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Pakistan took part in several multilateral fora where CT cooperation was discussed, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

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**SRI LANKA**

**Overview:** Sri Lanka has continued efforts to enhance its CT capabilities and to improve border security, including through engagement with the United States and other international partners. Efforts were hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and a government focus on opening the country for economic recovery. The investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide attacks undertaken by ISIS-inspired terrorists culminated in the indictment of 25 individuals in August. In November, the government also indicted the former secretary of the Ministry of Defense and the former Inspector General of Police, who were part of the greater inquiry into the suspected failures of officials to act on available intelligence that might have prevented the 2019 attacks.

While the rise of radicalization and extremism are security concerns in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan government still considers the reorganization of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) — a U.S. designated FTO that fought the government for 26 years until its military defeat in 2009 — to be a top threat. LTTE’s legacy leaves some government security officials concerned that it could inspire terrorism in Sri Lanka and throughout the diaspora internationally. The
government was cooperative in engaging on CT and attended several meetings of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS as observers.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Sri Lanka in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Government of Sri Lanka continued to use the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), enacted in 1979 as a wartime measure, enabling the police to exercise broad powers to search, arrest, and detain terrorist suspects for investigation. Officially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports the detention of 136 suspects under the PTA in 2021 while civil society organizations report that more than 300 detentions remain. A cabinet subcommittee and a committee comprising senior representatives from across the government were appointed in June to revisit the PTA and to bring its provisions in line with contemporary national security requirements as well as Sri Lanka’s human rights obligations and commitments. No legislation was implemented in 2021 to directly support investigations or prosecution of terrorism offences. Sri Lanka implemented the Cyber Security Bill and the Defense Cyber Command Bill to strengthen cyber security against cyber-facilitated acts of terrorism.

The Border Risk Assessment Center (BRAC) officially opened in December at the Department of Immigration and Emigration under the Ministry of Defense, with technical support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and with $5 million in funding from the government of Australia. The BRAC was established as part of the Integrated Border Management strategy for national agencies to share intelligence, systems, resources, and real-time data. At year’s end, 11 organizations were jointly contributing to the BRAC.

Sri Lanka conducted two rounds of Border Security Roundtables with the U.S. Department of State. The discussions focused on the potential implementation of PISCES, INTERPOL connectivity, and the Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program.

There were several reports of ex-LTTE cadres trafficking drugs and weapons, with some officials alleging those instances were efforts to resuscitate the LTTE despite the lack of evidence pointing toward organized, coordinated efforts to revive the organization. The recovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where the LTTE was active received enhanced media coverage. In December, authorities recovered 190,755 rounds of ammunition from a workshop in Paranthan, Kilinochchi District.

Authorities identified a group called the Tamil Eelam Cyber Force that has been hacking government and private websites in Sri Lanka. The Terrorism Investigation Division arrested two suspects in Jaffna for alleged online promotion of the LTTE. In another case, the National Investigations Agency (NIA) of India arrested a former LTTE intelligence operative, 42-year-old Satkunam (alias Sabesan), for alleged involvement in drugs and arms trafficking from Pakistan to Sri Lanka. The complaint included five other Sri Lankans, following the seizure of five AK-47 rifles, 300 kilos of heroin, and a thousand 9mm ammunition rounds. The NIA believes that Satkunam was involved in financing an LTTE revival in Sri Lanka.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Sri Lanka's FIU took steps for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of offenses related to money laundering and terrorist financing, though no significant results were evident. No new legislation has been passed to combat financing of terrorism since 2019. Three cases with charges of terrorism financing are pending in the High Court. The legal provisions of the Financial Transaction Reporting Act are in place for future law enforcement efforts.

Countering Violent Extremism: No FTFs or associated family members were repatriated in 2021. The Commissioner General of Rehabilitation is working on a reintegration mechanism to deradicalize youths back into their families. The government of Sri Lanka is looking to educational reforms to enhance skills development for employment. The Commissioner General is studying conflict prevention strategies for communities and continues to participate in meetings of the South Asian Network on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.

International and Regional Cooperation: The GCERF Sri Lanka project was launched in 2021. The United States and other donors contributed to the development and approval of the program strategy and are regularly updated on the progress of the program. UNODC has worked with the U.S. Embassy on prison system reforms in Sri Lanka, specifically targeting the need to construct prison courtrooms to facilitate hearings. These efforts will address delays in the judicial system that contribute to long detention periods, which can lead to radicalization to violence. The United States discussed strategies with Quad country and like-minded partners on how to support Sri Lanka in countering terrorism.

TAJIKISTAN

Overview: Tajikistan shares an 843-mile border with Afghanistan, and after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August, Tajikistan’s government redoubled its counterterrorism efforts. In 2021, the U.S. government moved forward with plans to renovate and build border outposts along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and provided equipment, such as offroad vehicles, and training to enhance Tajikistan’s counterterrorism capabilities. Tajikistan participates in exercises with the United States and regional partners, including the annual security exercise Regional Cooperation, which it is scheduled to host in 2022.

In 2021, Tajikistan conducted more than 50 bilateral engagements with the U.S. Department of Defense. Russia agreed to fund construction of an outpost along the Afghan border and reportedly worked with Tajikistan to re-equip the country’s army. Tajikistan participated in counterterrorism-focused exercises with Russia, other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states, and the People’s Republic of China. The government asserted that northern Afghanistan was a primary source of terrorist activity and host to thousands of militants. Six terrorist incidents, including two attacks, were reported in Tajikistan in 2021. Tajikistan cooperates with regional and international organizations, such as the EU, the OSCE, and the UN on combating terrorism.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were two terrorist attacks and four attempted terrorist attacks in 2021. Authorities implicated the banned
opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan and ISIS-affiliated groups in the planning of several attempted attacks but did not supply further details regarding these or other incidents.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On December 23, Tajikistan adopted a Law on Combating Terrorism, which superseded the 1999 counterterrorism law. The law defines basic counterterrorism principles and establishes Tajikistan’s legal and organizational framework for counterterrorism efforts.

New elements in the 2021 law include frameworks for: 1) informational efforts to combat terrorism, 2) protection of individuals and facilities, particularly critical infrastructure, and 3) countering terrorist financing. The law lays the foundation for counterterrorism operations and international counterterrorism cooperation. The law names the following state entities as directly involved in combating terrorism: the State Committee on National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), the Ministry of Defense, the Agency on State Financial Control and the Fight Against Corruption, the Drug Control Agency, the National Guard, and the Committee on Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that it identified 579 members of terrorist or “extremist” organizations in 2021 and arrested 339, including dozens of alleged proponents of Salafi Islam and members of banned opposition groups. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported cooperation with foreign partners in the detention and repatriation of 50 members of terrorist and extremist organizations. Also in 2021, 75 members of extremist organizations or participants in hostilities abroad were voluntarily repatriated to Tajikistan and pardoned, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On December 8, the Tajik Parliament’s lower house ratified a joint air defense agreement with Russia that defense officials said would help counter growing regional threats, such as terrorist use of unmanned aerial systems. The agreement’s initial term reportedly is five years.

The OSCE’s Border Management Staff College held a November roundtable in Dushanbe on security threats to Central Asia from Afghanistan. Participants from Tajik government agencies, civil society, diplomatic missions, international organizations, and foreign militaries exchanged views on strengthening border security cooperation.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and the National Bank of Tajikistan’s (NBT’s) Financial Monitoring Department is a member of the Egmont Group. The Government of Tajikistan continued its efforts to improve the banking sector’s capacity to combat terrorism financing in 2021. Tajikistan adheres to FATF requirements and has made various commitments to this body. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 15 cases of terrorist financing in 2021.

The Financial Monitoring Department website maintained a list of individuals and entities allegedly involved in terrorism, including those sanctioned under UNSC resolutions. Press have reported that the NBT’s list includes opposition activists and journalists in exile. The NBT continued to operate a national money transfer center that centralized the receipt of remittances
from abroad. The NBT asserted that this system allowed it to monitor and regulate alternative remittance services, wire transfers, and nonprofit organizations to prevent terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In June, Tajikistan’s president approved the national strategy on countering “extremism” and terrorism for 2021-25 and the action plan for its implementation.

*Hedayah*, an internationally-backed CVE center of excellence, in 2021 began a project to assist Tajikistan with implementing its CVE National Action Plan and developing an effective communications strategy to counter radicalization to violence and recruitment of FTFs.

Tajikistan amended its criminal laws in 2015, allowing authorities to pardon Tajik FTFs who voluntarily return home from abroad, express remorse for their actions, and renounce ties to foreign terrorist groups.

In January, the Ministry of Justice opened a legal case against the UK-based NGO Saferworld, which had been implementing U.S. Embassy CVE programs since 2018. In April, a court ruled that Saferworld must shut down its office in Tajikistan because of alleged violations of Tajik laws.

The Tajik government continued to place heavy restrictions on groups it classifies as extremist, including on those groups’ political and religious expression. On November 15, the U.S. Secretary of State redesignated Tajikistan as a “country of particular concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** On November 10, UNODC provided investigations-focused training on countering terrorist financing to officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the NBT, the anticorruption agency, and the PGO.

Tajikistan actively participates in regional security arrangements such as the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On May 19, Dushanbe, as part of its 2021 chairmanship, hosted the CSTO’s Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, where participants discussed cooperation to ensure regional security by strengthening the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and combating terrorism, extremism, and transnational organized crime.

Tajikistan’s government supports the C5+1, a diplomatic platform for coordination among the five Central Asian states plus the United States and serves as co-chair of the C5+1 Security Working Group.

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**TURKMENISTAN**

**Overview:** In 2021, the Government of Turkmenistan continued its efforts to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, ensure border security, and detect terrorist financing. Turkmenistan actively cooperates with international organizations and participates in the C5+1 diplomatic platform to counter international terrorism. Turkmen authorities maintain close surveillance on the country’s population and its borders.
2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Turkmenistan in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Government of Turkmenistan strengthened an existing law (AML/CFT/ Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) on countering money laundering, combating the financing of terrorism, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as part of its Second National Risk Assessment (or NRA-2) in May. The revisions were suggested by the OSCE.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: In 2021, the Government of Turkmenistan continued cooperation with the UN Counterterrorism Office, the EU, and the OSCE on countering terrorism financing. Turkmen law enforcement officers took part in antiterrorism training, including on biometric data exchange and money laundering. The Turkmen government continues to regulate alternative remittance services, collect data on wire transfers, and monitor non-profit organizations as part of a broader effort to prevent the sponsorship of terrorist activities. Turkmenistan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. The Financial Monitoring Service of Turkmenistan became a member of the Egmont Group in 2019.

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2021, the Turkmen government continued its cooperation with international organizations and participated in the C5+1 diplomatic platform on countering violent extremism. The Government of Turkmenistan also participated in UNDP-led trainings on preventing and countering violent extremism, as part of its global “Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism” in Asia project.

International and Regional Cooperation: Turkmenistan works with international and regional organizations such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, UNODC, the UN Counterterrorism Center, the EU, and the OSCE. As a member of the C5+1, Turkmenistan also participates in the associated Security Working Group. Among others, the Government of Turkmenistan has sent high-level delegations to the OSCE Regional Conference on Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime in March, the Ministerial C5+1 virtual dialogue on Afghanistan in April, the International Conference on Central and South Asia regional Connectivity, which included a discussion on security and extremism issues, in July, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathering on border security in September.

UZBEKISTAN

Overview: The Taliban takeover of Kabul heightened the Government of Uzbekistan’s concerns about the potential spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors, particularly by ISIS-Khorasan Province, as well as Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari, and Jamaat Ansarullah. Terrorism and violent extremism concerns regarding Uzbekistani migrant laborers abroad and ISIS fighters returning from Iraq and Syria persisted. The government continued to repatriate FTF family members. Uzbekistan increased efforts to counter terrorist use of the internet for radicalization
to violence, recruitment, and training. The government finalized and approved its first national CT/CVE strategy and national AML/CFT strategy. Uzbekistan continued active regional and international security cooperation. Uzbekistan remained an active participant in the C5+1 diplomatic platform and related CT/CVE cooperation; Uzbekistani ministries, agencies, civil societies, and non-governmental organizations coordinated with the U.S. Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development on various CT and CVE initiatives.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents in Uzbekistan in 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Uzbekistan’s first “National Strategy on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2021-26” targeted cyber, prosecutorial, and regulatory and legislative framework improvements. The Law on Combating Terrorism governs terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions and identifies the State Security Service (DXX) as the lead CT law enforcement agency. The national CT/CVE strategy charges Prime Minister Aripov and National Security Council Secretary Viktor Makhmudov with implementation and requires ministries, DXX, and the Security Council to submit biannual updates for presidential review. DXX, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National Guard have dedicated CT units.

Uzbekistani law enforcement tracks terrorist data and contributes to INTERPOL databases, including the SLTD database, through the I-24/7 network and its INTERPOL National Central Bureau. Most official land and air border crossings are equipped with biometric data scanners. Uzbekistan implemented an ID card system to replace biometric passports and reported the development of an API/PNR system in line with requirements under UNSCRs 2309 and 2396.

Uzbekistan repatriated 93 FTF family members — 62 children, including seven orphans, and 24 women — from Syria in the Mehr-5 operation. The Government of Uzbekistan continued to reintegrate FTF family members into their home communities and identified suitable families for many unaccompanied minors. In close cooperation with UNICEF, the government monitored returnees’ progress and provided a mix of national- and local-level rehabilitation and reintegration medical, psychological, administrative, social, educational, religious, and financial services.

Uzbekistani law enforcement announced several arrests related to terrorism and violent extremism. Changes in Afghanistan’s border security and migration patterns complicated efforts to deter and prevent terrorist travel; after August, the government cooperated with the Taliban on border security and terrorist apprehension.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Uzbekistan’s FIU is an Egmont Group member. Uzbekistan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), which submitted its draft regional risk assessment report at the 35th plenary in November. The Academy of the General Prosecutor’s Office hosted an international conference on legal science and education, where the EAG Secretariat presented a report on the importance of legislative establishment and financial investigation procedure regulation to AML/CFT.

Uzbekistan’s new national AML/CFT strategy targeted prosecution and accountability improvements and required Uzbekistan to bring the national AML/CFT/counter-WMD
proliferation financing system in line with international FATF standards. Uzbekistan amended legislation to outline and adjust AML/CFT reporting procedures and approved regulations for suspending and resuming operations and freezing the assets of individuals participating or suspected of participating in terrorism or WMD proliferation. The events in Afghanistan presented new challenges on money laundering, arms trafficking, and narcotrafficking.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** President Shavkat Mirziyoyev issued a decree to strengthen efforts to prevent and counter online violent extremism and terrorist ideology. According to the government, Uzbekistan amended legislation and updated the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” to counter radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment. For further information, see the Department of State’s *International Religious Freedom Report*.

The Government of Uzbekistan reported empowering Imam-khatibs to lead CVE conversations in mosques, educational institutions, and labor collectives; youth leaders to facilitate communication between vulnerable youth and community leadership; and assisting vulnerable youth through business and entrepreneurship financing. The government and non-governmental organizations continued to use advertisements, counter-messaging campaigns, and training to prevent radicalization of at-risk citizens and labor migrants. Official media continued posting about the dangers of “extremism.”

The Government of Uzbekistan continued its active role in the C5+1 regional CVE and FTF framework through virtual and hybrid CVE and repatriation workshops, online youth resilience building, and community leader and rehabilitation and reintegration care provider trainings.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Uzbekistan’s multilateral CT/CVE engagements included the following:

- Presented at a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee roundtable on national CT/CVE action plan implementation.
- Supported the fourth phase of the UN regional counterterrorism strategy implementation project.
- Hosted Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism;
- AML/CFT training and discussions with the EU’s Law Enforcement in Central Asia project.
- Collaborated with the OSCE Action Against Terrorism Unit and participating in a virtual regional OSCE expert dialogue on FTF repatriation.
- Presented at a Defeat-ISIS Coalition Counter-ISIS Financing Working Group.

Uzbekistan, the 2021-22 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Chair, participated in the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure Joint Antiterrorist Exercises. The country remained engaged in CT-related activities with the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), of which Uzbekistan has not been a member since 2012. Uzbekistan participated in a joint counterterrorism military exercise in India; joint CSTO counterterrorism military exercises with Tajikistan and Russia near the Afghan border;
and the SCO Peace Mission 2021 counterterrorism military exercise in Russia. Uzbekistani law enforcement cooperates on terrorism detection and investigation with foreign countries.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Overview

Terrorism remained a security concern for most countries throughout the Western Hemisphere in 2021. National or locally oriented groups, such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN), Segunda Marquetalia, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) in Colombia and Venezuela and Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso in Peru remained the region’s most significant terrorist threats. Transnational terrorist organizations have a limited presence, with small pockets of supporters in the region. Corruption, weak governmental institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or nonexistent legislation, and limited resources — all compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic — remained obstacles to improving security in 2021. Nevertheless, governments in the Western Hemisphere made significant progress in their counterterrorism efforts and strengthened regional cooperation against terrorism.

Lebanon-based and Iran-backed terrorist group Hizballah continued its long history of activity in the Western Hemisphere, including fundraising by its supporters and financiers in places like the tri-border area, where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. Hizballah supporters generate funding through licit and illicit activity and donate undetermined amounts to Hizballah in Lebanon, which uses the funds to advance its broader agenda. In recent years, Hizballah supporters and members have been identified in Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and the United States.

On November 30, the U.S. Secretary of State revoked the designation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), reflecting FARC’s formal disarmament and dissolution as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so in accordance with the 2016 Peace Accord. Simultaneously, the Secretary designated FARC dissident groups Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP (Ejército del Pueblo, in Spanish) as FTOs and their leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela all experienced continued terrorist activity. Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, and the ELN continued to commit acts of terror throughout Colombia, including bombings, kidnappings, violence against civilian populations and demobilized FARC members, attacks against utilities infrastructure, and violent attacks against military and police facilities.

Authorities in the Western Hemisphere actively participated in multilateral and regional efforts to counter terrorism. Peru remained determined to uphold its commitment to host the next CT ministerial conference despite having to delay until 2022. The Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS-CICTE) held its 20th regular session on September 25. Several countries in the region joined the U.S.-funded OAS-CICTE 24/7 Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism, which seeks to strengthen cooperation between member states to prevent and address terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere.
ARGENTINA

Overview: In 2021, Argentina continued to focus its counterterrorism strategy on the tri-border area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where suspected terrorism financing networks operate. Despite significant travel limitations attributable to COVID-19, robust U.S.-Argentine law enforcement and security cooperation continued in 2021. Argentina maintained Hizballah’s listing on its domestic registry of terrorist groups and entities for the second year.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Argentina during 2021.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Plans to change the criminal code’s legal framework for terrorism cases remained delayed in 2021. The executive branch drafted and submitted legislation to Congress for approval in 2019; however, it has not yet been approved.

Multiple security agencies maintained specialized law enforcement units that have substantial capabilities to respond to criminal activities, including terrorist incidents. Argentina continued to develop its nationwide network of law enforcement intelligence fusion centers and to incorporate biometric data at ports of entry to fight against international terrorism and transnational crime.

The nation continued cross-border coordination through its participation in the Tripartite Command, an interagency security mechanism created by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to exchange information and combat transnational threats, including terrorism, in the TBA.

According to local press, on May 7 federal security forces conducted multiple raids targeting five persons with potential links to ISIS in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe and seized their phones and computers, which allegedly contained instructions for manufacturing explosives.

The lack of justice for the 1994 Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) suicide terrorist bombing remained in the news, as did developments in several legal cases investigating the attack itself and judicial failures in its aftermath. In 2020, a federal court announced that it had decided to acquit Carlos Telleldín, who had been charged with providing the vehicle used in the bombing; the court’s main argument was related to insufficient evidence. The public prosecutor’s office appealed the decision on May 3, and the case is now with the criminal appeals court.

On October 7, a federal court announced that it had dropped charges against Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) in what was known as the “Iran MOU Case.” Prosecutors had accused CFK and codefendants of treason for allegedly engaging in a 2013 bilateral agreement with Iran with the intent of covering up Iran’s involvement in the AMIA attack in exchange for lucrative trade agreements. The federal tribunal ruled that while the MOU may have been a poor political decision, it did not constitute a crime. The plaintiffs appealed on October 24, and the case is now with the criminal appeals court.
No new names were added to the Public Register of People and Entities Linked to Acts of Terrorism and Their Financing (RePET) in 2021. RePET was created by presidential decree in 2019 and includes UNSC-designated terrorist groups and individuals linked to Hizballah and the AMIA bombing.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Argentina is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a FATF-style regional body. Its financial information unit (FIU) is a member of the Egmont Group. The TBA is one of the principal routes into Argentina for counterfeiting, drug trafficking, multi-billion-dollar trade-based money laundering, and other smuggling operations. In addition, many of the money laundering organizations in the TBA have suspected links to Hizballah.

The U.S. State Department funded the Argentina’s Department of Justice to implement capacity building activities and training focused on strengthening the nation’s ability to identify and disrupt transnational crimes linked to terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2021 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Government of Argentina has systematically issued statements of condemnation against major acts of terrorism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Argentina participated in the virtual Forum of Parliamentarians Against Terrorism in July and the Organization of American States Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism in October.

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**BRAZIL**

**Overview:** Brazil and the United States maintained strong counterterrorism cooperation in 2021, building on collaborative efforts under way since the 2016 Summer Olympics. The Brazilian Federal Police (PF), Brazil’s lead CT agency, worked closely with the United States and other nations’ law enforcement entities to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats. The Brazilian government continued to support CT activities, which included third-country technical assistance for controlling sensitive technologies and investigating fraudulent travel documents.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Brazil in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no major changes to CT legislation in 2021. The president proposed new CT legislation, which is still under consideration in Congress but likely does not have the votes for passage in the Senate. Under current laws, the PF opened 12 terrorism investigations in 2021. There have been 63 inquiries and 11 convictions in the five years the law has existed. On December 2, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated a Brazil-based network of al-Qa’ida-affiliated individuals and their companies for providing support to al-Qa’ida. Among those designated was Haytham Ahmad Shukri Ahmad Al-Maghrabi, who was one of the first identified individuals linked to this al-
Qa’ida network in Brazil. This action will freeze assets and accounts in the United States for all the named individuals.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Brazil is a member of FATF and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America. Brazil’s FIU, the Council for Financial Activities Control, is a member of the Egmont Group. The CT Bureau began funding the Countering Financing of Terrorism Project in 2021, implemented by the American Bar Association. This program will build the capacity of governments and financial sector stakeholders in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to degrade and disrupt the financing of Hizballah and other terrorist groups, thus limiting their ability to plan and carry out attacks in the TBA region and globally.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) worked closely with the PF and frequently shared information on violent extremist activity on the internet. As a direct result of HSI information, on December 21 the PF arrested members of a neo-Nazi cell that had allegedly been planning mass-casualty attacks in Brazil. The PF uncovered weapons, including pipe bombs, during the raid.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Brazil participated in regional CT fora, including the Organization of American States Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism; the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Joint Working Group on CT; and the Southern Common Market’s working group on terrorism and sub-working group on financial issues. Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay coordinated law enforcement efforts in the TBA by means of their Trilateral TBA Command. Brazil is a member of the Regional Security Mechanism.

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**CANADA**

**Overview:** Canada’s National Terrorism Threat Level remained at “Medium” through 2021, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur.

The February Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership committed to enhancing bilateral cooperation to counter exploitation of social media and the internet by terrorists, violent extremists, and hate groups; strengthening information sharing related to domestic violent extremism (DVE); and enhancing reciprocal sharing on known and suspected threats.

The Public Safety Canada (PS)-U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led DVE Working Group began developing a joint threat assessment on DVE connectivity between the neighboring countries, including a comparison of respective designation and listings processes. Additionally, PS’s Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence continued its close collaboration with its U.S. counterpart, DHS’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, on initiatives to prevent and counter radicalization to violence, including online.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** On June 6, Canadian citizen Nathaniel Veltman allegedly rammed a truck into Muslim Pakistani Canadian pedestrians in London, Ontario, killing four persons and
wounding one — all members of the same family. The attack was allegedly motivated at least in part by Islamophobia. London Police Service (LPS) charged Veltman with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. LPS, working in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ministry of the Attorney General, and Canada’s Public Prosecution Service, determined the murders constituted terrorist activity under Canadian law. The Federal and Provincial Attorneys General commenced terrorism proceedings, alleging the murders and the attempted murder also constituted terrorist activity.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Canada’s strict privacy laws continued to limit counterterrorism-related intelligence sharing among Canada’s law enforcement agencies, and between Canada and other countries, including the United States.

Although Canada’s Criminal Code includes sections on terrorist activities, prosecutors have limited their pursuit of charges under these statutes because the legal bar is high and cases have raised complex questions of potentially overlapping offenses. Prosecutors typically choose to pursue more-straightforward charges against those suspected of terrorist activities (e.g., murder), a trend that continued in 2021.

Canada continued to resist repatriation of FTFs and their family members from Syria, asserting it was unable to send staff to assist owing to the security situation within Syria. In 2021, former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith facilitated the return to Canada of a woman and her minor daughter from a camp for displaced persons affiliated with ISIS in Syria via Iraq. Galbraith said his effort was a private initiative; the Canadian government indicated it was not involved in the pair’s exit from Syria.

On February 3, Canada listed 13 new terrorist entities under Canada’s Criminal Code and, on June 25, listed four additional new terrorist entities.

In 2021, there were developments in ongoing legal proceedings with a terror nexus:

- On May 20, Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice ruled Iran’s shooting down of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 in 2020 was an intentional act of terrorism. Fifty-five Canadian citizens and 30 Canadian permanent residents were among the victims.
- On August 26, Canadian citizen Saad Akhtar pleaded guilty to charges of murder and terrorism following his 2020 killing of a woman in Toronto. A note that Akhtar placed beside his victim included an ISIS slogan and said the murder was committed in service to ISIS. The case marked Canada’s first conviction for the crime of “murder — terrorist activity.” Akhtar was sentenced to life in prison with no eligibility for parole for 25 years.
- Following his guilty plea on weapons charges in June, Patrik Mathews, a former Canadian Armed Forces reservist and member of violent white supremacist group The Base, was sentenced October 28, in U.S. federal court, to nine years in prison for his role in a neo-Nazi plot to instigate a race war in the United States. Federal prosecutors successfully argued for a “terrorism enhancement” of Mathews’s sentence, asserting he promoted a federal crime of terrorism even though he himself was not charged with terrorism.
• On December 10, Saudi-born Canadian citizen Mohammed Khalifa, a leading ISIS media figure and FTF, pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to conspiring to provide material support to an FTO (ISIS), resulting in death.
• Two applications for peace bonds were made in 2021 pursuant to Section 810.011 of Canada’s Criminal Code (“Fear of Terrorism Offence”); these were still before the court at year’s end, and the individuals involved had not been charged with an offense. The individuals’ names and identifying information were withheld; one was a minor, and the other’s identity was protected by a publication ban.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Canada is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Canada’s FIU, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (known as FINTRAC), is a member of the Egmont Group. On June 1, several amendments to regulations under Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act entered into force, significantly overhauling Canada’s related regulatory landscape and closing gaps in the existing framework, such as those stemming from technological advances (e.g., cryptocurrencies).

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence continued its work to develop related policy and on partner/stakeholder engagement and coordination, research, and programming. It also administered the Community Resilience Fund, a grants and contributions program that provides financial support to organizations working to improve Canada’s understanding of — and capacity to prevent and counter — violent extremism. In 2021, Canada continued its financial support to and was a board member of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, a multilateral organization that funds local programs to prevent and counter violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2021, Canada continued its term as co-chair of the GCTF and was active in the development and finalization of GCTF’s Strategic Vision for the Next Decade, endorsed by ministers in October. The country also is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Canada was an active participant in the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Stabilization, Counter-ISIS Financing, Foreign Terrorist Financing, and Communications working groups.

In May, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate conducted a hybrid visit to Canada on behalf of the Counterterrorism Committee.

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**COLOMBIA**

**Overview:** On November 30, Secretary Blinken designated Segunda Marquetalia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP, Ejército del Pueblo) as FTOs. At the same time, the Secretary revoked the designation of FARC as an FTO. Following the 2016 Peace Accord between FARC and the Colombian government, the National Liberation Army (ELN), Segunda Marquetalia, and FARC-EP terrorist organizations saw a resurgence and in some areas of Colombia have been filling the void left by former FARC combatants who permanently left the battlefield. As of December, roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants (including former rank-and-file guerrillas and militia) continue to participate in the reintegration...
process based on the 2016 Peace Accord. Challenges to Peace Accord implementation and continued security vacuums created ongoing risk of terrorist activity and attacks on civilians, security forces, and infrastructure in 2021. Open-source reporting suggests that support networks and armed members of Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP have a combined strength of an estimated 4,500 to 5,000 members. Similarly, estimates of ELN members and supporters hover around 5,000. Colombian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation remains strong. While Colombia is not a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Colombia has openly condemned ISIS and its objectives.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: In 2021, Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, and ELN continued to commit acts of terrorism throughout the country, including bombings, violence against civilian populations and infrastructure, kidnapping, and violent attacks against military and police facilities. Terrorist incidents in 2021 included the following:

- On March 26, FARC-EP detonated a car bomb outside of a mayoral office in Corinto, Cauca, 37 miles south of Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city. The bombing injured 43 people.
- Mostly peaceful nationwide protests beginning in April were co-opted in some areas of the country by Segunda Marquetalia and ELN terrorists who, in some instances, directed protestors in acts of violence against Colombian security forces and provided weapons and other supplies to protestors.
- On June 15, FARC-EP claimed responsibility for bombing a Colombian Army base in Cúcuta along the Colombia-Venezuela border. The bombing resulted in 36 injuries, including one member of the U.S. military, who sustained minor injuries.
- On June 25, President Duque’s helicopter was shot by FARC-EP members as it attempted to land in Cúcuta during an official visit.
- On December 14, FARC-EP detonated a bomb at Cúcuta’s Camilo Daza International Airport, killing three persons. Colombian authorities have concluded that the attacks were planned by FARC-EP members residing in Venezuela.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes to terrorism-related legislation and investigation procedures in 2021. In November, Colombian authorities working with INTERPOL arrested Russian citizen Vladimir Taranet, alias Ali Ali, at Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport during a layover on his way from Türkiye to Guatemala. Ali Ali had an outstanding INTERPOL red notice issued by Russia, which says Ali Ali was a member of ISIS and committed acts of terrorism in Iraq and Syria.

In August, media cited Colombian security officials in disclosing a plot allegedly orchestrated by an Iranian named Rahmat Asadi to pay two Colombians $100,000 to kidnap and kill two Israeli businessmen in Bogotá. The sources claimed that Asadi had close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and reportedly met the two hired Colombians while in a Dubai prison after being extradited from Thailand on murder charges. The Israeli businessmen were notified of the plot and fled. The two Colombians reportedly also fled after Asadi threatened them for not following through on the assassination plot.
Colombian border security remained an area of vulnerability as military and law enforcement agencies continued to face the challenge of working in areas with porous land borders, difficult topography, illegal armed groups, and drug trafficking.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Colombia is a member of FATF, and its FIU, Colombia’s Financial Information and Analysis Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. In August, Colombia’s Council on Economic and Social Policy approved financing to strengthen the capacity of the government to combat money-laundering and terrorism financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants and former militia members who demobilized under the 2016 Peace Accord continued to participate in social and economic reintegration activities. Colombia continued to employ a modern, multi-agency approach to CVE. The number of members of armed groups — including ELN, Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, Clan del Golfo, Los Pelusos, and Los Caparros — who demobilized individually in 2021 was 278. Of those 278, 160 were minors.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** There were no changes since 2020.

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**MEXICO**

**Overview:** Counterterrorism cooperation between Mexico and the United States remained strong in 2021. There was no credible evidence indicating international terrorist groups established bases in Mexico, worked directly with Mexican drug cartels, or sent operatives via Mexico into the United States in 2021. Still, the U.S. government remains vigilant against possible targeting of U.S. interests or persons in Mexico by individuals inspired by international terrorist groups. The U.S. southern border remains vulnerable to terrorist transit, but to date there have been no confirmed cases of a successful terrorist attack on U.S. soil by a terrorist who gained entry to the United States through Mexico.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Mexico in 2021.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes to Mexico’s counterterrorism legislation in 2021. The government lacked adequate laws prohibiting material support to terrorists and relied largely on counterterrorism regimes in other countries to thwart potential threats. U.S. law enforcement reported increased collaboration with Mexican authorities in 2021 to identify potential counterterrorism threats among the growing number of third-country nationals transiting Mexico. In October, the United States and Mexico launched the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities to boost bilateral cooperation on law enforcement and border security, among other security matters. The Center for National Intelligence, housed within the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection, was the lead agency for detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorist threats in 2021. The Mexican Attorney General’s Office was the lead agency for investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related offenses. Impunity remained a problem, with extremely low rates of prosecution for all crimes, including terrorism.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mexico is a member of FATF, as well as the GAFILAT, a FATF-style regional body. Mexico is also a cooperating and supporting nation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and is an observer of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (or MONEYVAL), two FATF-style regional bodies. The Financial Intelligence Unit-Mexico is a member of the Egmont Group and proactively shared financial intelligence on shared threats with its U.S. Department of the Treasury counterpart, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Mexico passed an expansive assets forfeiture law in 2019, but in 2021 the Supreme Court declared civil asset forfeiture elements of the law unconstitutional. To date, Mexican prosecutors have not used the law to seize assets of illicit origin in a terrorism case.

Countering Violent Extremism: There was no action in 2021 to establish official CVE policies, initiatives, or programs.

International and Regional Cooperation: As a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2021-22, Mexico led the adoption of a UNSC presidential statement in November on maintaining international peace and security through a holistic approach to countering terrorism. Mexico reiterated its commitment to counterterrorism efforts in 2021 at several UN discussions. It supports the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and has underscored the need to combat firearms trafficking to deprive terrorists of weapons. Mexico is a member of the OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS-CICTE). In October, Mexico became vice chair of the CICTE.

PANAMA

Overview: As Panama is a transit country for illicit goods, money, and migrants, its government’s willingness to engage on bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism initiatives is critically important for regional security. Under President Laurentino “Nito” Cortizo, the Government of Panama (GoP) continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism, especially through effective implementation of maritime-related provisions of UN and U.S. sanctions, including through revocation of the registry of vessels implicated in the evasion of sanctions. Since the beginning of 2021, the GoP has de-flagged dozens of ships for violating U.S. or UN sanctions. Through the Transnational Criminal Investigations Unit and different partnerships, Panama cooperated with U.S. authorities on several CT-related cases in 2021 and continues to lead the region in enrollments in the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP). However, Panama has been on the FATF gray list since 2019 for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime and has completed only nine of 15 items on its Action Plan. Panama remained the first and only Latin American member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and continues to be involved in the Coalition’s Counterterrorism Finance Working Group.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents in 2021.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Although Panama does not have comprehensive CT legislation or a robust CT legal framework, it has an executive decree to control dual-use goods and has adopted a national control list for dual-use goods consistent with UNSCR 1540. Panama also has an executive decree to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. While the country does not have a formal coordinating authority on migration below the cabinet level, officials from the GoP’s National Security Council, National Border Service (SENAFRONT), National Migration Service (SNM), and National Police (PNP) met frequently among themselves and with U.S. government officials to efficiently coordinate and act on migration alerts and detain and deport travelers who represented a security risk. Panama furthered its UNSCR 2396 obligations to collect biographic and biometric data, share information with regional partners, share advance passenger information, and participate in INTERPOL.

A U.S.-Panamanian Joint Task force that shares information on Known and Suspected Terrorists (KSTs) and detains and/or deports them as needed cooperated on several CT-related cases. The task force continued to process Panama’s BITMAP data and provide intelligence information, analytical products, and migration trends to Panamanian officers. The GoP’s biometric enrollments provide U.S. agencies with information on foreign partners’ law enforcement and border encounters with KSTs, gang members, and other persons of interest.

The Ministry of Security and the National Customs Authority (ANA) made progress to address the country’s lack of cargo scanners. At the time of this report, the scanners project was in the final stages of approval, with a late 2022 anticipated delivery, leaving the ANA to rely heavily on just three Customs and Border Protection/Crime Scene Investigation scanners operating at the ports of Colón and Balboa. The lack of scanners significantly limits the GoP’s ability to analyze cargo transiting the country, including at Tocumen International Airport — which has the highest number of passenger movements in the region — and entry to and exit from the Colón Free Trade Zone. Limited scanner capabilities, along with a lack of proper institutional and interagency protocols at ports, greatly increases the risk of illicit cargo transiting undetected to and through Panama. Current GoP efforts, supported by Embassy Panama City, will increase interagency information sharing and expand situational awareness in the land, air, and maritime border security environments.

Panama continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement on ongoing counterterrorism cases this year, including investigations of individuals linked to Hizballah. However, the GoP’s ability to investigate financial support to terrorist-related organizations remained limited.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Panama belongs to the Latin American Financial Action Task Force. One of the departments of Panama’s FIU covers CFT-related reviews of information and prevention efforts. Panama belongs to the Egmont Group.

The government is making slow progress to demonstrate effective supervision, information sharing, risk management, and prosecution of financial crimes as outlined in its FATF Action Plan.
In 2021, the Panama Maritime Authority, which oversees the world’s largest ship registry, deflagged dozens of ships for facilitating violations or evasion of U.S. or UN sanctions related to Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, and Cuba.

For additional information on money laundering, see the 2021 INCSR, Vol. 2: Money Laundering.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no changes for 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Panama continued working to strengthen its implementation of UN resolutions that promote the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism received funding from the Export Control and Related Border Security Program in 2021 to strengthen Panama’s implementation of UNSCR 1540 and contribute to increasing the effectiveness of customs administration in Panama.

The project focuses on providing legislative assistance to help Panama comply with international instruments and obligations; promote outreach to the private sector, industry, and academia to increase awareness of potential proliferation risks; and build capacity to strengthen national capabilities to mitigate and combat potential risks. Funding in 2021 expanded on the initial program that focused on government representatives to support engagement with the private sector and industry, including the Authorized Economic Operator program and the Colon Free Trade Zone.

Panama continued its active participation in regional security initiatives. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted virtual workshops on CFT in Panama, focusing on proliferation financing and sanctions evasion. The workshops included detailed overviews of best practices for risk assessment and mitigation strategies for government regulators and representatives from the judicial sector. In 2021, Embassy Panama City carried out training for Panamanian prosecutors, judges, police, forensic experts, bank supervisors, stock market personnel, and Financial Analysis Unit staff on money-laundering investigation techniques, trade-based money laundering, and cryptocurrency as a method of money-laundering.

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**PARAGUAY**

**Overview:** In 2021, the Government of Paraguay continued to be a receptive partner on counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, though challenges stem from ineffective immigration, customs, financial, and law enforcement controls along its porous borders, particularly the TBA with Argentina and Brazil, and its land border with Brazil from the TBA to Pedro Juan Caballero.

Since 2008, persons claiming to be part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) — a domestic criminal group initially dedicated to a socialist revolution in Paraguay — have conducted violent acts meant to extort and intimidate the population and local governments in the northern
departments of Concepción, San Pedro, and Amambay. Paraguayan authorities officially consider the EPP and its offshoots — Mariscal López’s Army (EML), and the Armed Peasant Association (ACA), which reemerged in 2020 — as organized criminal groups rather than terrorist organizations. However, public discourse of Paraguayan leaders occasionally refers to them informally as terrorist organizations.

The Government of Paraguay increased its Joint Task Force (FTC) presence in Concepcion Department following the EPP’s 2020 kidnapping of former Vice President Óscar Denis. The government has not located Denis, nor Felix Urbeita — the other hostage believed still to be in EPP custody — as of year’s end.

In 2021, attacks attributed to the EPP and its offshoots resulted in the deaths of three FTC soldiers, two police officers, and three civilians. The Government of Paraguay believes the EPP is a small, decentralized group of between 20 and 50 members. EPP, EML, and ACA’s activities have consisted largely of isolated attacks on remote police and army posts, or against ranchers and peasants accused of aiding Paraguayan security forces. Ranchers and ranch workers in northeastern Paraguay, including members of the Mennonite community, claimed the EPP frequently threatened both their livelihoods and personal security.

### 2021 Terrorist Incidents:

Terrorist incidents in Paraguay in 2021 included the following:

- On June 12, six EPP members attacked a farm in the Sargento Felix Lopez district in Concepción Department, where they shot and killed Brazilian farmer Jonas Fernando Alves and wounded Elix Regina de Lima.
- On June 26, members of the EPP-ACA abducted Jorge Rios at gunpoint from his home in Sargento José Félix López district and demanded a USD $200,000 ransom from Rios’s family. On July 3, Rios’s bullet-riddled body was found in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul.
- On July 29, three FTC soldiers were killed when their vehicle struck an IED planted by the EPP on a road on the border between Amambay and San Pedro departments.

### Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:

The Paraguayan government continued to make use of a 2013 counterterrorism law that allows for the domestic deployment of the Paraguayan military to counter internal or external threats. The FTC, the joint task force charged with countering the EPP, consists of around 800 military, supported by 450 Paraguayan National Police (PNP) officers, as well as National Anti-Drug Secretariat personnel. The PNP Secretariat for the Prevention and Investigation of Terrorism officially handles counterterrorism functions, although other PNP units and agencies such as the National Anti-Drug Secretariat work such cases as well, particularly when related to drug trafficking. In 2018, Paraguayan President Abdo Benítez, inaugurated the new headquarters of the National Intelligence System (SINAI) service, composed of the National Intelligence Council (CNI) and the National Intelligence Secretariat (SNI), which report directly to the president.

The purpose of the SINAI is “detecting, neutralizing, and counterbalancing the actions of domestic and international terrorist groups, and of transnational criminal organizations.” The first meeting of the CNI took place in 2020. In 2021, SNI continued to serve as Paraguay’s lead
authority for coordination of counterterrorism operations. Military forces and police officials continued to operate jointly in the San Pedro, Concepción, and Amambay Departments against the EPP, with uneven success. On August 2, the FTC conducted an operation that killed two EPP-affiliated members believed to be responsible for the kidnapping of a cattle rancher.

In 2019, Congress enacted Law 6379, which created a special court jurisdiction in economic and organized crime, including terrorism and terrorist financing. Article 1 created a new branch of the judiciary to adjudicate these cases to include drug trafficking, and specifically created judicial space for magistrate judges, trial courts, sentencing courts, and courts of appeal. Paraguay’s Supreme Court issued Resolution 8153 and Resolution 8263 in 2020, to appoint specialized criminal justice magistrates to these courts. The Special Court for Economic Crimes began hearing cases in 2021 and obtained several notable convictions, including the late former Senator Óscar González Daher for illicit enrichment.

The TBA has been attractive to individuals engaged in terrorist financing, as the ineffective — and often corrupt — police, military, customs, and migration agency presence along these borders allows for a largely unregulated flow of people, goods, and money. Paraguay’s efforts to provide more effective law enforcement and border security suffered from a lack of interagency cooperation and information sharing, as well as from pervasive corruption within security, border control, and judicial institutions.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Paraguay is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT), a FATF-style regional body. Paraguay’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. GAFILAT conducted its fourth-round mutual evaluation visit in September and coordinated additional information requests with relevant Paraguayan agencies throughout the remainder of the year. GAFILAT will issue its final mutual evaluation report in 2022. Paraguay has counterterrorist financing legislation and the ability to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets immediately, if requested to do so by another government. FATF experts noted that Paraguay possesses an adequate legal framework, while noting that Paraguay falls short on implementation. In particular, government agencies struggled to coordinate effectively to detect, deter, and prosecute money laundering and terrorism financing. Implementation of the packet of 12 draft laws to tighten counterterrorism finance enforcement, which passed in 2019, remained incomplete.

The Paraguayan government registers and has reporting requirements for non-governmental organizations, including non-profit organizations, and mandates that NGOs set up internal monitoring and training to guard against criminal or terrorism financing. Paraguay also requires the collection of data for wire transfers. Despite these mechanisms, government agencies’ efforts to enforce anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing laws continued to lag.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2021 INCSR, Vol. 2: Money Laundering.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Paraguay had no CVE program in 2021. Police in Ciudad del Este (CDE) on the border with Brazil do regularly engage with the city’s large Muslim population. CDE’s Muslim community has not shown a history toward radicalization to
violence; however, the police also lack the training necessary to effectively identify and address signs of violent extremism or understand the nuances of Islamic religion and culture.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Paraguay continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations. The country participated in the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. It continued to collaborate with Argentina and Brazil on border security initiatives, regional exchanges, and law enforcement projects, although the closure of borders during the COVID-19 pandemic hindered in-person exchanges.

Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay coordinated law enforcement efforts in the Tri-Border Area through their Trilateral Tri-Border Area Command. Paraguay remained a member of the Regional Security Mechanism (RSM) established in 2019. The RSM, which did not hold meetings in 2020 or 2021 owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, aims to facilitate security coordination, including counterterrorism, between member states. In December, Paraguay’s Interior Ministry signed an agreement with the Interior Ministries of Brazil and Uruguay to strengthen coordination against transnational organized criminal organizations through increased investigative cooperation and intelligence sharing.

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**PERU**

**Overview:** The Peruvian National Police (PNP) and armed forces continued operations in 2021 targeting alleged Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*, or SL) remnants. The government also continued investigating SL front organizations and its legal political branch, called the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (*Movadef*).

Virtual hearings in the terrorism trial against Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar, a Lebanese citizen suspected of links to Hizballah, continued in 2021. The prosecution presented the testimony of an FBI Hizballah subject-matter expert to demonstrate common elements between the Hamdar case and another case successfully prosecuted in the United States. Hamdar’s case is still pending witness testimony and closing arguments. If convicted, Hamdar would represent the first terrorism conviction of a Hizballah operative in South America.

SL continued to operate in the Valley of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM). Estimates vary, but most experts and the Peruvian security services assess SL remnants numbered between 250 and 300 members, including from 60 to as many as 150 armed fighters. SL collects “revolutionary taxes” from drug trafficking organizations operating in the area to support its terrorist activities.

Víctor Quispe Palomino (aka Camarada José), a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency Most Wanted Fugitive, leads SL’s remnants in the VRAEM, which he calls the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP). Quispe allegedly oversees all MPCP illicit activities, including extortion, murder, and drug trafficking.
SL founder Abimael Guzmán died on September 11, at age 86, while in a military prison near Lima. He and key accomplices were serving life sentences for terrorist acts conducted during the 1980s and 1990s. Peru’s political establishment, including President Pedro Castillo, overwhelmingly welcomed the news of Guzmán’s passing and condemned terrorism more broadly.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: The overall number of terrorist attacks and deaths of security forces attributable to terrorism in Peru decreased in 2021, compared with the previous year.

- During May 24-25, 16 local people were killed in the vicinity of San Miguel del Ene, in the Cusco Region’s La Convención Province. The victims included four children. Pamphlets were found urging Peruvians not to participate in the 2021 presidential elections. The Peruvian government attributed the attack to SL remnants, although SL did not publicly take responsibility.
- During July 3-4, SL remnants attacked military police in the vicinity of Pampa Aurora, in Ayacucho’s Huanta Province, resulting in several injuries.
- On October 28, narcotraffickers, with ties to terrorism, attacked military police in the vicinity of Nueva Maravilla, in Ayacucho’s Huanta Province. Government troops successfully repulsed the attack.
- On October 29, narcotraffickers, also with ties to terrorism, attacked a military patrol after being pulled over in their van in Santa Cruz de Llacchusas, in Ayacucho’s Huanta Province. The assailants escaped but abandoned the van and more than 60 kilograms of cocaine.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Peru adopted multiple counterterrorism laws over the past 30 years, and CT measures have broad public support. Enforcement of the COVID-19 pandemic national lockdown took a heavy toll on security forces’ availability, but joint military and police teams completed 17 planned operations in 2021, including the following:

- On March 21, a military patrol captured SL operative Marco Antonio Díaz in Nuevo Unidos Tahuantinsuyo, in the Ucayali Region’s Padre Abad Province.
- On September 13, a joint military and police patrol tracked down key SL logistician “Camarada Hernán,” in Chibuco, in the Junín Region’s Satipo Province. Hernán was killed during the raid, and the patrol recovered computer equipment and other intelligence.
- On November 7, a joint military and police patrol seized military equipment belonging to SL in Pachamarca District, in Huancavelica’s Churcampa Province. The equipment included rifles, handguns, grenades, ammunition, 148 sticks of dynamite, and terrorist propaganda.
- On December 13, a joint military police patrol seized military equipment belonging to SL in the vicinity of Libertad, in Junín’s Satipo Province. The equipment included hand grenades, dynamite, homemade explosives, detonators, firearm ammunition, and terrorist propaganda.
Immigration authorities continued to collect biometric information from visitors at ports of entry to protect Peruvian border security. Visas were not required for visitors from Europe, Southeast Asia, or Central America (except El Salvador and Nicaragua). The United States and Peru have had a bilateral information sharing arrangement in place since 2019, which facilitates the exchange of terrorist screening information and complements other programs such as the DHS Automated Targeting System-Global.

In 2021, Peru expanded its cooperation with the United States on the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program, which offers the capability to search, enroll, and identify known or suspected terrorists, violent international gang members, and other individuals of interest by leveraging three key U.S. databases. The program also serves as a capacity building mechanism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Peru is a member of GAFILAT, a FATF-style regional body. The FIU of Peru is a member of the Egmont Group. GAFILAT continues to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in its 2018 Mutual Evaluation Report, and the FIU is implementing the Asset Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention System in the foreign exchange trading sector.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government’s multisectoral VRAEM 2021 Development Strategy, part of Peru’s bicentennial vision, aims to foster alternative development and social inclusion and complements aggressive actions against SL terrorism, propaganda, and recruitment. The Ministry of Justice also continues to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Plan of Reparations for victims of violence between the armed forces and terrorist groups during the 1980s and 1990s, as part of Peru’s national policy of peace, reconciliation, and reparation.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Peruvian officials participated in CT activities in international organizations, including the UN, OAS-CICTE, the Union of South American Nations, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The PNP Counterterrorism Directorate also coordinated with police in other countries to track terrorist activities.

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**TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**

**Overview:** The threat from ISIS sympathizers in Trinidad and Tobago and the possible return of individuals who traveled, or attempted to travel, to Syria or Iraq to fight with ISIS is the primary terrorism concern in the country.

Trinidad and Tobago and the United States continue to cooperate on counterterrorism investigations involving Trinidad and Tobago nationals. The Trinidad and Tobago Cabinet approved a policy to address the return and reintegration of its FTFs. The policy has yet to be implemented and may require an amendment to the existing Trinidad and Tobago Antiterrorism Act.

**2021 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorism incidents reported in Trinidad and Tobago in 2021.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Trinidad and Tobago’s counterterrorism institutions continue to face challenges related to staffing, funding, and coordination. There were no arrests or prosecutions initiated against any terrorist groups or individuals suspected of terrorist activity in 2021.

The government is undertaking reforms, including the introduction of plea bargaining and judge-only trials, aimed at speeding up the lengthy judicial process. These developments may lead to increased prosecutions of serious crimes, including terrorism.

The Antiterrorism Amendment Bill 2021, which would govern the return and reentry of Trinidad and Tobago’s FTFs, remained pending at the end of 2021. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago remains reticent to accept returning FTFs and their families, frequently citing the need to balance the needs of individuals and national security. During the reporting period, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago passed legislation to meet additional FATF requirements and a new evidence act that allows for the use of electronic evidence in court, including closed-circuit television footage.

The government continues to convene an interagency taskforce, known as Taskforce Nightingale (TFN), which is charged with developing recommendations related to the possible return of FTFs and others who have traveled to the Middle East and joined ISIS. The taskforce consists of various law enforcement, judicial, foreign affairs, defense force, and immigration and border protection officers. Separate from TFN, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s Interministerial Committee on Counterterrorism, tasked with implementing Trinidad and Tobago’s counterterrorism strategy, oversaw the development of the National Operations Fusion Center and the National Intelligence Fusion Center. The Operations and Intelligence Centers became functional in 2021 and are tasked with coordinating the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s counterterrorism operations. The government’s willingness to allocate an annual budget that supports the implementation of its counterterrorism strategy will determine its success.

Trinidad and Tobago’s institutions have demonstrated the capability to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism with the assistance of international partners. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service is the law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for investigating terrorism and terrorism finance cases. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago conducts vulnerability assessments on important structures such as stadia, airports, and monuments periodically. Trinidad and Tobago continues to participate in the Advance Passenger Information system and maintains a national watchlist of persons of interest to national security, which can include persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. Nonetheless, Trinidad and Tobago’s southern border, which is approximately seven miles from the Venezuelan coast, remains porous and is vulnerable to drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, and illegal migration. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago continues to make positive strides on strengthening border security, including the commissioning of two new Cape-class patrol boats for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard during the reporting period.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, a FATF-style regional body. Trinidad and Tobago’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. The government continues to carry out its international obligations under UNSC and FATF regulations on combating terrorism and terrorist financing.

In March, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago undertook its second National Risk Assessment with technical assistance from the World Bank, which included a terrorist financing risk assessment. To date, under its Antiterrorism Act, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has designated 494 individuals and entities and frozen their assets. In 2021, Trinidad and Tobago also approved a national action plan to combat the illicit trade in consumer goods.

Countering Violent Extremism: While the Government of Trinidad and Tobago approved a policy to address the return and reintegration of its FTFs, implementation may require an amendment to the Trinidad and Tobago Antiterrorism Act. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago continues to partner with the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) to learn best practices in CVE. Trinidad and Tobago supported the ICSVE’s “Breaking the ISIS Brand in Trinidad” project, including a social media engagement program in July that reached more than 94,000 people living in areas where most Trinidadian and Tobagonian ISIS fighters originated.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago is also a member of a CVE working group in Port of Spain, the International Partners’ Group, comprised of several diplomatic missions, including the United States, Canada, the EU, the UK, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the UN, to coordinate and collaborate on CVE efforts within the country.

International and Regional Cooperation: Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the of the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. The government continues to work with its Caribbean Community partners on counterterrorism issues.

Trinidad and Tobago participated in the Second United Nations High-Level Conference of the Heads of Counterterrorism Agencies and Member States and the Seventh Review of the Global Counterterrorism strategy in June. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s Strategic Services Agency, its lead intelligence agency, hosted a virtual seminar on “Challenges and Opportunities on Countering Terrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism in the Caribbean Post COVID-19” in June for participants from local, regional, and international partners.

VENEZUELA

Overview: The United States recognizes the Interim Presidency of Juan Guaidó and the 2015 National Assembly. Nicolas Maduro continues to claim to be the leader of Venezuela and retains control and the loyalty of the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB). Members of the Maduro regime continue to engage in criminal activities and members of several Colombian FTOs — including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), Segunda Marquetalia, and the National Liberation Army (ELN) — continue to operate in Venezuelan territory with relative impunity.
Clashes among terrorist organizations and between these organizations and elements of the FANB increased in 2021, especially in Apure state, bordering Colombia. Nonetheless, ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia continued to expand their presence inside Venezuelan territory, according to local experts. On May 11, local NGO FundaRedes reported the presence of ELN in 17 of Venezuela’s 23 states, as well as in the capital city of Caracas. FundaRedes reported FARC-EP and/or Segunda Marquetalia presence in 14 of the 23 states, as well as in Caracas.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: The regime’s complicated relationship with terrorist groups continued to be characterized by both conflict and cooperation. The Venezuelan Armed Forces and the Venezuelan police Special Action Forces (FAES) began to clash more frequently with armed terrorist groups, especially with forces from the FARC-EP in Apure state led by Miguel Botache Santillana (alias Gentil Duarte) and Fabian Guevara Carrascal (alias Ferley).

- On February 15, the National Anti-Drug Office reported a clash between FAES and FARC-EP fighters that resulted in two FARC-EP killed, after the militants were reportedly caught unloading 192 cocaine pans in Muñoz municipality, Apure state. One officer was injured, while another man was arrested by Venezuelan forces.

- On March 21, the FANB and FAES launched Operation Bolivarian Shield 2021 in Apure state to root out the presence of FARC-EP; however, some observers have publicly speculated that elements of the regime were acting in alliance with ELN and Segunda Marquetalia to maintain control over lucrative smuggling routes. For more than two months, regime forces clashed with FARC-EP, resulting in at least 16 military casualties, 40 wounded, and 12 kidnapped by FARC-EP.

- The total number of casualties from the FARC-EP side remains uncertain, but Vladimir Padrino López, a regime member claiming to act as defense minister, said at least six were killed and another 30 detained. The FANB also reported dismantling nine camps, including one that produced cocaine. Local NGOs Provea and FundaRedes reported the extrajudicial killings of five Venezuelan citizens in Apure and 30 illegal detentions against regular citizens framed as members of irregular groups. These civil society groups alleged the FANB planted evidence to imply unaffiliated civilians were involved with armed groups and to demonstrate false successes.

- On April 23, an estimated 300 FARC-EP fighters launched an ambush against 28 FANB soldiers and two helicopters in La Capilla town. NGO FundaRedes reported the deaths of 12 soldiers, later confirmed by a statement released by the FANB. Through a video recorded on May 4, presumably filmed under coercion, eight kidnapped FANB soldiers requested that Venezuelan authorities negotiate their release in exchange for not confronting the presence of the FARC-EP in Apure state. FundaRedes said in public statements that at least three encounters between the irregular group and Venezuelan authorities took place to discuss this proposal, but none were confirmed by the regime. On May 31, the FANB abruptly retreated from Apure.
On June 1, the regime reported the release of the eight detained. On April 28, the interim government had passed a decree on the Apure events that accused the FANB of protecting Segunda Marquetalia, in violation of Venezuela’s constitution and national security.

Members of Segunda Marquetalia including one of its leaders, Jesús Santrich, were reportedly killed in Venezuelan territory in 2021. In December, Colombian Defense Minister Diego Andrés Molano Aponte confirmed the death of Hernán Dario Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” in Venezuela.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes to Venezuela’s counterterrorism legislation in 2021. The regime’s usurpation of the judicial system and military/security services for its own illicit ends, rampant public corruption, and cooperation with criminal elements continued to provide ideal conditions for illegal activity. The regime continued to target political dissidents and civil society groups using terrorism charges.

In July, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (called SEBIN) unjustly detained the founder and director of FundaRedes, Javier Tarazona, and two other FundaRedes members, Omar de Dios García and Rafael Tarazona. The three were held incommunicado from family or legal representation, without specification from regime authorities of the reason for their arrest, according to public reporting and Amnesty International. The trio subsequently were charged with treason, terrorism, and incitement of hatred in the “Third Control Court for Terrorism.” García and Rafael Tarazona were released on October 26, while Javier Tarazona remains in prison. The detention of Tarazona is linked directly to his work covering the Apure events.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Venezuela’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2021, the Maduro regime tried to implement new legal means to monitor and control human rights and humanitarian organizations under the guise of “antiterrorism” measures. In March, the Maduro regime published Administrative Ruling 001-2021, which requires NGOs to register with the Office Against Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing (or ONCDOFT). Upon registration, NGOs are required to provide documents such as their articles of incorporation, bylaws, a list of national and international donors, a list of their overseas headquarters, and a list of all beneficiaries of their services.

The regime pointed to CFATF recommendation 8, which requires that the laws and regulations that govern NGOs be reviewed so they cannot be used for the financing of terrorism, as the reason for the new requirement. NGOs objected to the new requirement, noting it held a base assumption that criminalized the work of NGOs by forcing them to register with an agency intended for antiterrorism efforts. In April, more than 700 civil society organizations denounced Administrative Ruling 001-2021 as unconstitutional and cited as dangerous the need to supply the regime with a list of their beneficiaries. In May, the requirement was amended and replaced by Administrative Ruling 002-2021, which excluded the need for a list of beneficiaries and lessened the penalties for noncompliance. The timeline to adhere to the new
requirement also was changed, although the deadline for registering remained unclear. NGOs reported that compliance was not enforced in 2021.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no known CVE efforts under way in 2021.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Analysts continued to warn of increasing ties between the regime and Iran. Flights between both nations continued using sanctioned airlines Conviasa and Qeshm Fars Air, with reports that the flights may have been used to shuttle oil production materials and unspecified military equipment. In June, two ships that departed from Bandar-e ʿAbbās port in Iran were thought to be headed to Venezuela carrying weapons, before they diverted to Russia late in their journey. On October 18, regime Foreign Minister Felix Plasencia visited Iran and met with President Ebrahim Raisi. The two sides reported discussing strategic relations as well as a roadmap for the two countries’ relations over the next 20 years. Plasencia announced Maduro’s intention to visit Iran in 2022.
Chapter 2. State Sponsors of Terrorism

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2021 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. It does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations.

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria requiring the President to certify either a) that a designated country has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the previous six months and has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future, or b) that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the designated country, that the country is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the country has provided assurances it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. A wide range of sanctions is imposed because of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the following:

- A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
- Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism.
- Restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance.
- Visa processing requirements.
- Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

CUBA

On January 12, 2021, the Department of State designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the Cuban government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists.

Cuba was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982 because of its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.

Cuba’s designation was rescinded in 2015 after a thorough review found that Cuba met the statutory criteria for rescission. In 2021, the Secretary of State determined that Cuba had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism since its State Sponsor of Terrorism designation had been rescinded in 2015. Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the 2019 bombing of a Bogotá police academy that killed 22 people and injured 87 others.

The Cuban government did not formally respond to the extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka “Pablo Tejada”) and Ramírez Pineda (aka “Pablo Beltrán”) filed by Colombia.
Cuba also harbors several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades. For example, the Cuban regime refused to return Joanne Chesimard, aka Assata Shakur, a fugitive on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List, who was convicted of murdering New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster.

Cuba also refused to return William “Guillermo” Morales, a fugitive bomb maker for the Armed Forces for National Liberation, who is wanted by the FBI and escaped detention after his conviction on charges related to domestic terrorism; Ishmael LaBeet, aka Ishmael Muslim Ali, who received eight life sentences after being convicted of killing eight persons in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1972 and hijacking a plane to flee to Cuba in 1984; Charles Lee Hill, who has been charged with killing New Mexico State Policeman Robert Rosenbloom in 1971; Ambrose Henry Montfort, who used a bomb threat to hijack a passenger aircraft and fly to Cuba in 1983; and Víctor Manuel Gerena, a Puerto Rican militant who stole $7 million in a bank heist.

DEMONCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
On November 20, 2017, the Secretary of State designated the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the DPRK government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as the DPRK was implicated in assassinations on foreign soil.

The DPRK was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1988 primarily because of its involvement in the 1987 bombing of a Korean Airlines passenger flight. The DPRK’s designation was rescinded in 2008 after a thorough review found that North Korea met the statutory criteria for rescission. In 2017, the Secretary of State determined the DPRK had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism since its State Sponsor of Terrorism designation was rescinded in 2008. The DPRK also has failed to take action to address historical support for acts of international terrorism. Four Japanese Red Army members wanted by the Japanese government for participating in a 1970 Japan Airlines hijacking continue to shelter in the DPRK. The Japanese government also continues to seek a full accounting of the fate of numerous Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s; only five such abductionees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002.

IRAN
Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist-related activity in 2021, including support for Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and various terrorist and militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere throughout the Middle East. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region. Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the Iraq and Syria conflicts, and the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad. In 2019, the Secretary of State designated the IRGC, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Iran also used regional militant and proxy groups to provide deniability, in an attempt to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.
In Iraq, Iran supported various Iran-aligned militia groups in 2021, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated weapons — including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) — support, funding, and training. These groups conducted roughly two dozen rocket and UAS attacks on U.S. and coalition facilities across Iraq in 2021. These included rocket attacks on U.S. Embassy Baghdad on January 22 and July 8; explosive UAS attacks on U.S. facilities in Erbil on February 15, April 14, and July 6; and multiple attacks in June on U.S. and coalition forces at Ain Al-Assad Airbase. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups conducted an explosive UAS attack on PM Kadhimi’s residence on November 6.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime. Iran views the Assad regime in Syria as a crucial ally and Iraq and Syria as vital routes through which to supply weapons to Hizballah, Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group. Iranian forces have directly backed militia operations in Syria with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles. Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown in Syria. These Iran-aligned forces conducted an attack on U.S. forces at Al-Tanf, Syria, on October 20.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to indigenously produce rockets and missiles to threaten Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In 2021, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These groups were behind numerous deadly attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, training, advanced equipment such as unmanned aerial systems, and other support to Houthi militants, who engaged in hundreds of attacks against regional targets in Saudi Arabia. In May and December, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted dhows carrying Iran-origin weapons intended for the Houthis, including hundreds of heavy machine guns and sniper rifles; dozens of advanced, Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles; several hundred rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical sights for weapons; and thousands of assault rifles.
In 2021, Iranian forces attacked several commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, including an April 13 attack on the Hyperion Ray and a July 29 UAS attack on the Mercer Street vessel.

Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2021, including a thwarted January plot to attack an Israeli embassy in East Africa, a January bomb attack outside the Israeli embassy in New Delhi for which the Indian government said the IRGC-QF was responsible, and a disrupted attempt to attack an Israeli businessman in Cyprus in October.

Senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members continued to reside in the country, and Iran has refused to publicly identify members it knows to be living in Iran. Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting Iranian dissidents. In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories. Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in Denmark. In 2021, the United States disrupted an Iranian intelligence network plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, an Iranian American journalist and human rights advocate living in Brooklyn, New York, from within the United States. The plot entailed luring Alinejad to a third country to capture her and forcibly render her to Iran. An Iranian plot to kidnap an Iranian helicopter pilot from Türkiye was also reportedly foiled by Turkish authorities.

**SYRIA**

Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Syria continued its political and military support to various terrorist groups. The regime continued to provide weapons and political support to Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm and finance the terrorist organization. The Assad regime’s relationship with Hizballah and Iran remained strong in 2021, as the regime continued to rely heavily on external actors to fight opponents and secure areas. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains present and active in the country with the permission of President Bashar al-Assad. Assad remained a staunch defender of Iran’s policies, while Iran exhibited equally energetic support for the Syrian regime. Syrian government speeches and press releases often included statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, and vice versa.

Over the past two decades, the Assad regime’s permissive attitude toward AQ and other terrorist groups’ foreign terrorist fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict fed the growth of AQ, ISIS, and affiliated terrorist networks inside Syria. The Syrian government’s awareness and encouragement for many years of terrorists’ transit through Syria to Iraq for the purpose of fighting U.S. forces before 2012 is well documented. The Assad regime released thousands of violent extremists from its prisons in 2011 and 2012, fueling a rise in terrorism within the country, in an attempt to justify its repression of the Syrian people and fracture international support for the Syrian opposition. Those very networks were among the terrorist elements that brutalized the Syrian and Iraqi populations in recent years. Throughout the Syrian conflict, terrorist groups in Syria have often cited the regime’s egregious human rights abuses and
violations to justify their activities and recruit members. The Assad regime has frequently used counterterrorism laws and special counterterrorism courts to detain and imprison protesters, human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, and others on the pretext of fighting terrorism. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups from Iraq, some of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, continued to travel to Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime. Affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party also operated on Syrian soil and represent Türkiye’s primary counterterrorism concern in Syria. ISIS cells remained active in parts of Syria and launched attacks on civilians and U.S. partner forces. In 2019, U.S. forces completed an operation that resulted in the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. ISIS members in Syria continued to plot or inspire external terrorist operations.

As part of a broader strategy used throughout the past decade, the regime continued to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all internal armed opposition members as “terrorists.”
Chapter 3. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Terrorism

The use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise remained a credible terrorist threat in 2021. As a countermeasure to this threat, the United States published a National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism in 2018 and continues to work proactively to disrupt and deny ISIS and other nonstate actors’ CBRN capabilities.

The international community has established numerous international partnerships to counter the CBRN threat from terrorists and other nonstate actors. The United States routinely provides technical and financial assistance as well as training to international organizations and partner nations to help strengthen their abilities to protect and secure CBRN-applicable expertise, technologies, and material. Efforts to address CBRN terrorist threats through UNSCR 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are detailed in Chapter 4.

The United States is an active member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), launched in 2002 to prevent terrorists — and states that support them — from acquiring or developing WMD. Today, the G-7-led GP has expanded its membership to 30 countries and the European Union, sustaining a vital forum for countries to exchange information on national priorities for CBRN programmatic efforts worldwide, assess the threat landscape, share best practices, and coordinate assistance for these efforts.

The United States continues to support the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Division of Nuclear Security, which helps member states develop the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to threats of nuclear terrorism through the development of internationally accepted guidance, as well as the provision of training, technical advice and assistance, peer reviews, and other advisory services.

Through the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the Department of State coordinates its programming internally with other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.

In 2021, WMDT undertook multiple bilateral and multilateral capacity building assistance projects and activities with priority foreign partners. These included several workshops with Nigerian law enforcement and laboratory stakeholders to examine chemical weapon sampling and analysis methods and techniques. WMDT also provided law enforcement officials from Algeria, Iraq, and Jordan training to enhance their capabilities to identify potential terrorist chemical and biological attack tripwires. In addition, WMDT supported the development and execution of virtual engagements that advanced multilateral programming and policy priorities. These promoted international adherence to and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, strengthened burden sharing with partner nations, and addressed global radiological, chemical, and biological terrorism threats.
ISN’s Global Threat Reduction Program (GTR), managed by CTR, continued its work to prevent states and terrorist groups from acquiring or proliferating WMD to attack the United States. In 2021, GTR’s chemical, biological, and nuclear security programs engaged with hundreds of foreign partners through virtual trainings to strengthen capacities to detect and counter WMD terrorism threats. In Iraq, GTR provided virtual training on advanced CBRN incident management to the Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government CBRN teams to ensure the whole of Iraq is prepared to respond to any potential chemical or biological attacks. In response to the threat of transnational terrorists using unrestricted, commercially available material to conduct chemical weapons (CW) attacks, GTR collaborated with security forces around the world to train law enforcement in partner countries to detect and prevent CW attacks against vulnerable transportation hubs, such as railways and subways, and trained partners in academia, industry, and the transport sector to secure chemicals in their custody against malicious access.

GTR’s biosecurity programming continues to support partner capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of high-consequence pathogens — whether intentional, accidental, or natural. GTR worked to strengthen coordination and information sharing between and among ministries as well as security and research sectors to enhance detection and response to outbreaks and bioweapon attacks. The program continued to work with government, industry, and academic personnel through virtual engagements in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Nigeria, the Philippines, and other countries to promote the adoption of security measures to prevent individuals or nonstate actors from acquiring weaponizable chemical, biological, and nuclear material and technology.

The Department of State’s EXBS program funds capacity building programs aimed at strengthening legal and regulatory systems, developing licensing tools, enhancing border security and trade enforcement, providing outreach to key industrial and business sectors, and encouraging information sharing within governments and across national borders. As part of a core national security strategy to counter terrorist organizations, a key objective of EXBS is to provide stakeholders with substantive knowledge, skills, and tools to prevent state and nonstate actors from acquiring WMD, explosives, and conventional arms (including Man-portable Air Defense Systems and Antitank Guided Missiles) or using those materials against U.S. citizens and interests. To achieve this objective, EXBS continued to train partner governments in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, and Western Hemisphere regions to detect, interdict, and counter the materials, technologies, and tactics that terrorists could use to carry out low-technology attacks on public transportation.

Additionally, in 2021, EXBS began implementing curricula for partner nation security forces to address threats posed by improvised threats, including the use of drones as delivery mechanisms and insider threats focused on the commercial aviation sector. The program also provided comprehensive training to Middle Eastern and North African border security officials on cargo and passenger interdiction, border security, and counter-IED training. EXBS partnered with the CT Bureau and the interagency to engage with key partners on aviation security programming. Finally, EXBS and the CT Bureau furnished equipment and training to strengthen aviation security and mitigate threats to civilian aviation, and provided land border security
training for Egyptian, Iraqi, and Libyan security forces to stem the flow of illicit materials and maintain gains made against ISIS and other nonstate actors.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), in collaboration with EXBS, is supporting the expansion of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO’s) Program Global Shield. With NDF’s support, the WCO will

1. Cultivate foreign partners’ analytical capabilities to monitor illicit trade in chemical explosives precursors through risk-based targeting profiles.
2. Conduct tactical operations to test participating countries’ capabilities to detect and interdict such trade.
3. Provide training and equipment to sustain national-level targeting, detection, interdiction, and investigation of illicit chemical transfers.

The U.S. government continues to work with the interagency and partners to take steps to address the global challenge of chemical terrorism at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Such steps include measures aimed at facilitating OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) access to additional response tools against chemical weapons use, including by nonstate actors. U.S. efforts also include ensuring appropriate funding for the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team, which is responsible for identifying individuals or entities involved in the use of chemical weapons in certain cases, regardless of whether the perpetrators are state or nonstate actors.

The U.S. government is also working on developing OPCW States Parties capacity to safely analyze and identify chemicals that would be used in an attack, including by nonstate actors, and determine the likely provenance of such chemical weapons agents. The Forensic Science Centre of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is, for example, working with the National Laboratory of Morocco as part of an OPCW labs twinning program. In 2021, U.S. government experts helped draft indicative guidelines for OPCW States Parties on how to secure their chemical value chain, including from nefarious nonstate actors. The Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund also provided funding and personal protective equipment to support the OPCW TS’s special missions and contingency operations related specifically to Syria through the OPCW’s Trust Fund for Syria Missions. Finally, the U.S. Government is studying the possibility of assisting African and Southeast Asian countries vulnerable to terrorism with developing chemical protection plans in line with requirements of Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Chapter 4. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, undergoverned, and ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” exclude the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a determination under section 4605(j)(1)(A) of Title 50 [deemed under Section 1768(c)(2) of the NDAA of FY 2019 to refer to section 1754(c) of the NDAA FY19 as of August 13, 2018]; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22. (For information regarding the DPRK, Iran, and Syria, see Chapter 2, State Sponsors of Terrorism.)

Terrorist Safe Havens

Africa
Somalia. Many parts of Somalia, particularly Somaliland and the Juba River Valley, remained terrorist safe havens in 2021 because federal and local authorities had a limited ability to project influence beyond populated areas and some forward operating bases. Al-Shabaab raised much of its funds by extorting people in ungoverned areas of Somalia.

According to independent sources and non-governmental organizations engaged in demining activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern regarding the presence of WMD in Somalia.

The Lake Chad Region. In 2021, Boko Haram (BH) and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) maintained safe havens in parts of northeastern Nigeria and on islands in Lake Chad, preventing the reestablishment of state administration, service delivery, and humanitarian relief in broader territory surrounding Lake Chad. While BH’s terrorist safe havens have been reduced owing in large part to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and clashes with ISIS-WA, ISIS-WA has continued to extend its reach, battling both government forces and those of BH. Forces from Nigeria and other members of the MNJTF (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) continued to combat both terrorist groups, but still lack the ability to clear safe havens or to secure borders and hold and effectively administer territory regained from the militiants. ISIS-WA continues to conduct — through suicide bombers, vehicle-borne IEDs, raids, ambushes, kidnappings, and other means — asymmetric attacks against civilians, military, and government personnel. It funds itself primarily by “taxing” local populations, kidnapping for ransom, and looting material.

In February, BH militants fired a series of rocket-propelled grenades in Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least 10 people. In April, a heavily armed ISIS-WA group killed 33 soldiers at a Nigerian base, destroyed a main battle tank, and stole several other military vehicles. When soldiers arrived in response to the attack, ISIS-WA ambushed the reinforcements. This attack was followed by a series of attacks throughout Yobe State in Nigeria’s Northwest. The next
month, ISIS-WA attacked and overran BH’s bases in the Sambisa Forest, resulting in the death of BH’s leader, Abubakar Shekau. Numerous BH militants reportedly joined ISIS-WA following Shekau’s death, but BH remnants remain active around Lake Chad. No government in the Lake Chad region was known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

The Trans-Sahara. In 2021, AQ affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and other groups, including ISIS-Greater Sahara, continued to stage asymmetric attacks in the Trans-Sahara region, expanding and consolidating areas under their control and preventing effective government provision of services. These terrorist groups have freedom of movement throughout Mali and Burkina Faso, except for major cities. JNIM continued to conduct large-scale attacks and massacres, expanding its operational footprint and capabilities, with JNIM alone responsible for more than 500 incidents in 2021. JNIM’s success attracts support from other regional terrorist groups, including Nigeria-based and AQ-aligned Ansaru. JNIM continued to insert itself into longstanding ethnic conflicts such as the Fulani-herder-versus-Dogon-farmer conflict over water and grazing land.

Vast swaths of Mali’s territory — particularly in the country’s northern region and along its eastern borders with Niger and Burkina Faso — remained effectively ungoverned in 2021. In these spaces, terrorist networks, including groups linked to JNIM and ISIS-Greater Sahara, have taken root and exploited the lack of state presence to plan and conduct operations and to recruit operatives. The area where terrorist groups can operate freely continues to grow and, over the last year, extends south along the Burkinabe border to Côte d’Ivoire.

No government in the region was known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory, although the region remained prone to arms and munitions smuggling.

Mozambique: The Islamic State in Mozambique (ISIS-M), was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States in March. ISIS-M continued attacks in Cabo Delgado and Niassa Provinces in northern Mozambique and expanded into Mtwara, Tanzania. Mozambique, Rwanda, and the South African Development Community (SADC) coordinated a response to the threat in July, which resulted in an increase in ISIS-M events against state forces. This was the first year in which most ISIS-M activity were clashes with state/external forces rather than attacks against civilians.

In March, ISIS-M attacked the town of Palma, the administrative capital of Palma District, and the northernmost district bordering Tanzania in Cabo Delgado Province (CDP). This was ISIS-M’s first attack on the district capital, and the city was under siege from the FTO until April. ISIS-M activity in Palma and Nangade during the first five months of 2021 surpassed the total number of events in 2020, indicating a geographic shift northward of ISIS-M’s attacks in CDP when compared with its activity in previous years.

In July, the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) completed its deployment of special forces and police to CDP. In addition, elements from Botswana, South Africa, and Angola arrived under the auspices of the SADC Standby Force mission to Mozambique to counter ISIS-M. By
September, Mozambican security forces (FDS) and RDF troops continued small-scale clearing operations, including maritime interdictions, against retreating ISIS-M fighters in CDP. The FDS and RDF, with support from the SADC Standby Force, also began to conduct counter-ISIS-M operations in Niassa Province, which borders CDP to the West.

While coordinated regional forces enjoyed some success in containing ISIS-M in CDP, ISIS-M attacked several villages in the Mecula and Marrupa districts in neighboring Niassa Province beginning in November. During a December attack, heavily armed insurgents killed a civilian and razed houses and cars in several villages south of Mecula town in Niassa Province. Throughout the year, there were 384 ISIS-M events with a total of 1,127 fatalities among civilians, state forces, and ISIS-M militants.

The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Sudan.** Sudan’s extensive and porous borders and physical location continue to make the country a potential gateway for linking violent extremist activities in the region. Though Sudan has in general endeavored to tighten its border control measures, continued illicit and unmonitored movement across the borders is likely. The results of the autumn counterterrorism raids surfaced primarily foreign terrorists, speaking to terrorists’ continued ability to use Sudan as a logistical and facilitation hub.

The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Southeast Asia**

The Southern Philippines. The Philippine government closely tracked terrorist groups that continued to operate in some areas, particularly in the southern Philippines. The government sustained aggressive military and law enforcement operations to deny safe haven to such groups and prevent the flow of FTFs through its territory. The government further deepened close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, enhancing military and law enforcement efforts to address the full spectrum of terrorist threats, including from WMD.

Although the Philippine government possesses the political will to apply security measures against terrorist threats and has consistently partnered with the United States and other nations to build the capacity to do so, it is still working to apply a coordinated whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism and prevent the Philippines from being used as a terrorist safe haven. The continued ability of terrorist organizations to operate in the southern Philippines reflects the centuries-long challenge of governing effectively in the country’s more remote areas and of establishing consistent security in a region characterized by a strong separatist identity, endemic poverty, and religious differences.

The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.
**The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral.** The Government of Indonesia conducts monitoring and surveillance of suspected terrorist cells in its territory but acknowledges that a lack of resources hinders its ability to monitor potential terrorist activity in maritime and remote parts of Indonesia, including the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas.

The Malaysian government sustained efforts to deny terrorists use of the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas as a safe haven by working with Indonesia and the Philippines to prevent the flow of incoming and outgoing foreign terrorists throughout its territory. Malaysian authorities reported that information sharing with the Philippines resulted in the arrests and deportation of suspected Abu Sayyaf Group members in May 2021.

The governments were not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through their territories.

**The Middle East and North Africa**

**Sinai Peninsula.** In 2021, ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) continued to conduct IED, sniper, and small-arms attacks against security forces and pro-government Bedouin groups, predominately in a small northern strip of the Sinai Peninsula. ISIS-SP also kidnapped and assassinated civilians who were collaborating with Egyptian security forces. Egyptian security operations that led to the March death of a senior ISIS-SP commander, the September high-profile defection of a prominent ISIS-SP religious figure (reportedly behind the deadly 2017 al-Rawda Mosque attack), and increasing rank-and-file ISIS-SP defections coincided with a significant decrease in the frequency and complexity of ISIS-SP attacks across the Sinai — less than half the rate of 2020.

The Government of Egypt continued its wider counterterrorism strategy of infrastructure, development, and humanitarian projects on the Sinai Peninsula, spending hundreds of millions of dollars in recent years to compensate North Sinai residents for houses or land lost or damaged in counterterrorism operations, payments to the families of those killed and injured, and for medical aid and social assistance. North Sinai residents have filed grievances about compensation calculations and disbursements.

Egypt continued to partner with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and support measures to prevent the proliferation and trafficking of WMD. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territories.

The United States has supported Egypt’s efforts to combat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt by providing mine-resistant and ambush-protected vehicles, counter-IED and counter-sniper training, rotary and fixed-wing surveillance and transport aircraft, mobile sensor towers, and F-16s and AH-64 Apache helicopters (both of which conduct airstrikes against ISIS-SP). The United States routinely engages in military-to-military discussions on how it can help Egypt defeat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt, including at the U.S.-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee in September and the U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue in November.

**Iraq.** Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizbullah, and Harakat al-Nujaba — all U.S.-designated terrorist organizations — and other Iran-backed Iraqi militias continued to maintain
an active presence in Iraq targeting U.S., Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and Iraqi forces and logistics convoys. These groups claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on U.S. interests, including Embassy Baghdad, throughout the year. Terrorists conducted more than 100 IED attacks on Defeat-ISIS-contracted convoys and launched at least 40 indirect fire attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq. Iran-aligned militias launched several drone and rocket attacks against Erbil Air Base during the year and killed a U.S. contractor with a rocket attack in February.

While ISIS has been defeated territorially and its leadership ranks have been significantly degraded, the group remains a serious threat to the stability of Iraq and to U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition interests in the region. Methods of attack included bombings, indirect fire, IEDs, sniper fire, and ambushes. ISIS fighters continue to wage a low-level insurgency in northern and central Iraq, seeking to regain territory while also endorsing violence abroad through ISIS’s branches and networks and inspiring lone-actor attacks. Supported by the 85-member Defeat-ISIS Coalition, the Government of Iraq maintained nominal control of the territory retaken from ISIS. ISIS continued to carry out assassinations, as well as suicide, hit-and-run, and other asymmetric attacks throughout the country. The United States continued to engage with Iraqi government officials, including officials in the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, to deny ISIS access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, including in areas with reduced government regulatory control over and/or law enforcement access to CBRN facilities and enterprises. The United States worked to strengthen the expertise and ability of Iraq’s government, academic institutions, and private sector to secure weaponizable chemical and biological materials and to detect, disrupt, and respond effectively to suspected CBRN activity. The United States and Iraq also maintain a bilateral partnership to counter nuclear smuggling under the framework of the 2014 Joint Action Plan on Combating Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Smuggling.

Lebanon. Lebanon remained a safe haven for terrorist groups, including in Hizballah-run areas. Hizballah used these areas for terrorist recruitment, training, fundraising, and financing. The Government of Lebanon did not take meaningful actions to disarm Hizballah, even though Hizballah continued its weapons buildup in defiance of UNSCR 1701.

Other terrorist groups, including Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, continued to operate inside Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, which remain outside of Lebanese government control. Lebanon’s lack of a strong control regime for the storage and movement of weaponizable materials posed risks for the spread of WMDs, including for potential terrorism. In 2021 the Lebanese Arms Forces, Internal Security Forces, and other Lebanese authorities partnered with U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent proliferation and trafficking of WMD.

Libya. Libya remained politically divided during the year between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and eastern-based parallel institutions and groups. Terrorist groups attempted to exploit a security vacuum in the southern region of the country but were limited in their ability to do so because of tactical gains by the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) against these groups. The nationwide ceasefire signed in 2020, after the LNA’s failed attempt to take control of Greater Tripoli, was largely respected.
The GNU, although the internationally recognized government, lacked the capacity and reach to exercise control in most of Libya and relied on armed groups for security in areas it did not have the ability to effectively control, including the capital Tripoli. The GNU had limited ability to eliminate terrorist safe havens, track or prevent the flow of FTFs in and out of the country or ensure effective counterproliferation efforts owing to difficulties of controlling the borders and underresourced enforcement of security procedures at airports, seaports, and land-border crossings. The GNU and aligned groups maintained their strongest influence in the Western Mountains and the northwest coastal areas stretching from the Tunisian border to territory just west of Sirte. LNA-aligned groups exerted control in the remainder of Libya, including Cyrenaica, and the central and southern districts of Jufra, Kufra, Murzuq, and Sabhā. Although significantly degraded, remnants of terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb continue to pose threats particularly in Libya’s vast, sparsely populated desert areas in the South. The LNA effectively countered terrorism in the East and the South of the country, but its counterterrorism gains were limited to areas under its control. During the year, significant numbers of foreign forces, fighters, and mercenaries remained deployed to the country, including the Russian-backed private military company Wagner Group.

**Yemen.** The Iran-backed Houthis continued to control large portions of northern Yemen, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continued to maintain a presence. The Saudi-led coalition, which includes Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provided support to the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG), which continued to fight to hold off further advances and reclaim areas held by the Houthis. The ROYG, with Saudi and Emirati support, continued counterterrorism operations to degrade al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen operations in the country. However, owing to the ongoing conflict, instability, and its own degraded capabilities, the ROYG was constrained severely in its ability to prevent terrorist training, funding, recruitment, and transit. Although AQAP and ISIS-Yemen have been weakened in recent years, the two groups continued to benefit from the ongoing conflict, successfully instilling themselves among elements of the anti-Houthi coalition and exploiting the security vacuum with room to operate in large parts of the country. Further, AQAP continued to harbor external operations ambitions. The ROYG was as cooperative with U.S., Saudi, and Emirati counterterrorism operations as its limited capacity allowed.

Yemen’s political instability continued to hinder efforts to enact or enforce comprehensive strategic trade controls to counter the flow of weapons and munitions in the region. This left Yemen vulnerable as a transit point for destabilizing weapons, including weapons originating from Iran. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territories.

**South Asia**

**Afghanistan.** Terrorist and insurgent groups, including ISIS-K, elements of AQ (including affiliate al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent [AQIS]), and terrorist groups targeting Pakistan (such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), continued to use Afghanistan, especially its remote regions, as a safe haven throughout 2021.

Before the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the Taliban takeover of Kabul, U.S. and Afghan security forces partnered in numerous counterterrorism efforts through Operation Freedom’s
Sentinel, and the Afghan government executed its own counterterrorism operations. After the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the danger of terrorist groups operating from safe havens in Afghanistan increased significantly. The Taliban itself remains a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), and several members of the Taliban are individually UN and/or U.S. designated terrorists. Haqqani Network, which is designated as an FTO and SDGT, has members and key leaders who have also assumed both formal and informal roles within the Taliban.

The Taliban has committed publicly to meet its Doha Agreement commitment to prevent any group or individual from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. However, the extent of the Taliban’s ability to prevent AQ and ISIS-K from mounting external operations remained unclear. Though al-Qa’ida has weakened, its regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) continued to operate from remote locations in Afghanistan that have served as safe havens.

ISIS-K increased high-profile attacks against civilians in Afghanistan both before and after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, often targeting vulnerable minority populations such as Hazara Shias. In November the UN said there were 334 attacks attributed to ISIS-K so far in the year, compared with 60 in 2020, and assessed that ISIS-K was present in nearly all the country’s provinces. In August an ISIS-K suicide attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport killed 183 people, including 13 members of the U.S. military. ISIS-K was estimated to have 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in Afghanistan in 2021.

The potential for WMD trafficking and proliferation in Afghanistan remained a concern. Before August the United States helped the Afghanistan government enhance its capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and other radioactive material smuggling incidents. Before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the Afghanistan and U.S. governments also continued to work to implement comprehensive strategic trade controls and to strengthen Afghanistan’s border security; however, since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, U.S.-Afghan cooperation in border security has ceased, potentially increasing the possibility of WMD trafficking.

**Pakistan.** Major terrorist groups focused on conducting attacks within Pakistan included Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army, and ISIS-K. The TTP and other designated terrorist groups continue to conduct attacks against Pakistani military and civilian targets. Although Pakistan’s national action plan calls to “ensure that no armed militias are allowed to function in the country,” several UN- and U.S.-designated terrorist groups that focus on attacks outside the country continued to operate from Pakistani soil in 2021, including the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Although Pakistan took some steps in 2021 to counter terror financing and to restrain some India-focused militant groups, authorities did not take sufficient action to dismantle them. In September, Pakistan successfully prosecuted JeM founder Masood Azhar in absentia and JeM leader Abdul Rauf Azhar; however, LeT and JeM continue to operate within Pakistan.

Pakistan is committed to combating the trafficking of items that could contribute to the development of WMDs and their delivery systems. Pakistan was a constructive and active participant in IAEA-hosted meetings and in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Western Hemisphere

Colombia. Rough terrain and dense forest cover, combined with low population densities and historically weak government presence, define Colombia’s borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Historically, these conditions have allowed terrorist groups — particularly Segunda Marquetalia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) — to operate. The 2016 peace accord between the Government of Colombia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) led to the demobilization of the majority of FARC combatants and the FARC’s conversion into a political party. However, ongoing challenges to peace accord implementation and continued security vacuums have created risk for terrorist activity and attacks on civilians, security forces, and infrastructure in some areas in 2021. A troubling number of FARC members refused to demobilize, estimated at around 2,600 individuals who chose not to participate in the peace process or who have subsequently joined the dissident ranks of the Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP. They continued engaging in terrorist and other criminal activities, particularly in border regions and areas previously controlled by the FARC.

The ELN perpetrated armed attacks across the country in 2021. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

Cuba. Cuba, citing peace negotiation protocols, refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the 2019 bombing of the national police academy in Bogotá, killing 22 people and injuring 87 others. During 2019, Colombia filed extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka Pablo Tejada) and Israel Ramírez Pineda (aka Pablo Beltrán) with the Cuban government, to which Cuba has not acceded.

Cuba also harbors several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges of political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades. For example, the Cuban government has refused to return Joanne Chesimard, aka Assata Shakur, a fugitive on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List, who was convicted of executing New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster. Cuba also has refused to return William “Guillermo” Morales, a fugitive bomb maker for the Armed Forces for National Liberation (or FALN), who is wanted by the FBI and escaped detention after being convicted of charges related to domestic terrorism; Ishmael LaBeet, aka Ishmael Muslim Ali, who received eight life sentences after being convicted of killing eight persons in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1972 and hijacking a plane to flee to Cuba in 1984; and Charles Lee Hill, who has been charged with the 1971 killing of New Mexico State Policeman Robert Rosenbloom. The Cuban government provides housing, food ration books, and medical care for fugitives residing there.

In 2021 the Department of State designated Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism, citing, in part, the continued presence of ELN negociators.

The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.
**Venezuela.** Much of Venezuela is ungoverned, undergoverned, or ill governed. The Maduro regime allows and tolerates the use of its territory by terrorist organizations. The regime continues to provide safe haven for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), Segunda Marquetalia, and the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army (ELN). Financial ties with regime-aligned Segunda Marquetalia, ELN, and Venezuelan paramilitary groups facilitate the public corruption and graft schemes of the regime to include members of the armed forces. However, Venezuelan security services also have clashed with FARC dissident groups. Colombian authorities contend that significant numbers of ELN, Segunda Marquetalia, and FARC-EP leaders and members are located in Venezuela.

The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**White-Identity Terrorism/Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism**

Pursuant to the FY 2021 NDAA, section 1299F(h), the Department of State was directed to incorporate in the annual Country Reports on Terrorism all credible information about “white-identity terrorism” (WIT), including relevant attacks, the identification of perpetrators and victims of such attacks, the size and identification of organizations and networks, and the identification of notable ideologues.

In 2021 the Counterterrorism Bureau instructed all Department diplomatic and consular posts to engage with their host governments regarding individuals or groups affiliated with REMVE, with particular attention to advocates for WIT who perceive that their idealized ethnically white identity is under attack from or is being replaced by those who represent and support multiculturism and globalization.

In response, European governments and the European Union reported that REMVE, including WIT, was a growing counterterrorism priority but noted that many governments have decades of experience addressing these types of threats. Several European governments and the EU observed that groups engaged in REMVE, including WIT, lack hierarchical structures and typically do not have a central command. They assessed that lone actors pose a greater threat than more formalized organizations, with these individuals communicating and influencing one another on social media, including closed chat groups and messaging platforms. Such groups also organize both virtually and in person in unofficial settings, such as employment groups, sports clubs, and concerts.

In 2021, there were no known successful WIT attacks and one successful conviction for planned WIT violence:

- **United Kingdom:** In June, neo-Nazi Dean Morrice was sentenced to 18 years in jail for multiple terror offenses that included stockpiling explosive materials for making bombs. UK Police also found he had terrorism manuals and instructions for a 3D-printed gun.
In addition, foreign partners in 2021 designated, proscribed, banned, or subjected to similar actions and/or authorities the groups below. Statutory criteria and domestic legal authorization to take such action differ greatly across governments. For example, other governments may rely solely on speech-related activity as the basis of the designation, proscription, or banning actions, which raises freedom-of-expression concerns and is not permissible in the United States under First Amendment protections.

International actions taken in 2021 included the following:

- **Alvarium** (banned by France) was created in 2018 in Angers, France. French authorities banned Alvarium for promoting violence and discrimination against individuals based on their country of origin or religion and accuse Alvarium of engaging in anti-immigrant and anti-Islam speech. French authorities note that Alvarium maintains links with other like-minded groups, and that Alvarium members were repeatedly involved in acts of violence and vandalism.

- **Aryan Strikeforce (ASF)** (designated by Canada) was founded in the United Kingdom between 2006 and 2010. Canadian authorities note that the neo-Nazi group aims to carry out violent activities to overthrow governments, start a race war, and eradicate ethnic minorities. According to Canadian authorities, ASF subscribes to the philosophy of decentralized leaderless resistance and has had chapters in the UK and the United States, and contacts in Eastern Europe, South America, South Africa, and Canada. Canadian authorities note that members of the group have been convicted of crimes in the UK and the United States involving the production of chemical weapons, preparing and possessing material useful to commit acts of terrorism, facilitating the transfer of bomb making instructions, and attempting to secure illegal firearms. Canadian authorities note that ASF had planned a suicide bombing attack on counter protesters during a 2016 white-supremacist rally in Pennsylvania.

- **Atomwaffen Division** (designated by Canada and the United Kingdom) was founded in the United States in 2013. Canadian authorities note that the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) calls for acts of violence against racial, religious, and ethnic groups and informants, police, and bureaucrats, to prompt the collapse of society. According to Canadian authorities, AWD has previously held training camps, also known as hate camps, where its members receive weapons and hand-to-hand combat training. AWD members have also carried out violent acts at public rallies, including the 2017 rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. According to UK authorities, AWD’s online propaganda has encouraged and promoted terrorist acts and this content likely remains influential among accelerationist groups. UK authorities note that in 2020 AWD claimed it had disbanded, following pressure from U.S. law enforcement agencies. In 2020, the National Socialist Order (NSO) announced itself online as AWD’s “successor.” UK authorities note that AWD is almost certainly now operating under the name NSO in the United States.

- **The Base** (designated by Australia, Canada, and the UK) is a neo-Nazi organization founded in 2018. Canadian authorities note that the group was primarily active in the United States and promotes a nihilistic and accelerationist rhetoric — an ideology
embraced by white supremacists who have determined that a societal collapse is both imminent and necessary. The group advocates for direct action, especially in the form of violence, to create chaos, incite a race war, and establish a white ethno-state. The network specifically seeks to recruit individuals with military experience so that they can leverage their training. According to Canadian authorities, the Base has distributed manuals for lone-wolf terror attacks, bomb making, countersurveillance, and guerilla warfare to its members. Canadian authorities note that group members plotted to carry out attacks at a 2020 rally in the U.S. state of Virginia, and the group also organized training camps in weaponry and military tactics around North America.

- **Génération Identitaire** (banned by France) is a Lyon-based group that “incites discrimination, hatred, and violence” against individuals based on their country of origin or religion. French authorities accuse the group of engaging in anti-immigrant and anti-Islam speech. According to French authorities, the group, which has branches in several European countries, could be regarded “as having the character of a private militia” and has ties to white-supremacist groups. Also according to French authorities, *Génération Identitaire* has tried to patrol land and sea borders to prevent migrants from reaching Europe.

- **James Mason** (designated by Canada) is a lifelong American neo-Nazi responsible for publishing a series of newsletters during the 1980s that promoted the idea of lone actors conducting terrorist attacks against the United States government to bring about the collapse of society and a race war. According to Canadian authorities, Mason’s collective works, published as a book called *Siege*, have served as the ideological grounding for neo-Nazi groups such as Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and serves as the backbone for AWD’s worldview and training program. Canadian authorities note that Mason also has provided tactical direction on how to operate a terrorist group and has met with members of AWD, where he coached them on propagandizing murder and genocide.

- **Proud Boys** (designated by Canada) is a neofascist organization that was formed in 2016 and engages in political violence. Canadian authorities note that members of the group espouse misogynistic, Islamophobic, antisemitic, anti-immigrant, and/or white-supremacist ideologies and associate with other white-supremacist groups. According to Canadian authorities, the group consists of semi-autonomous chapters located in the United States, Canada, and internationally. The group and its members have openly encouraged, planned, and conducted violent activities against those they perceive to be opposed to their ideology and political beliefs. According to Canadian authorities, the group regularly attends Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests as counter protesters, often engaging in violence targeting BLM supporters. Canadian authorities note that on January 6 the Proud Boys played a pivotal role in the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol; leaders of the group planned their participation by setting out objectives, issuing instructions, and directing members during the insurrection. The leader of the Proud Boys was arrested two days before the insurrection as part of a stated effort by U.S. law enforcement to apprehend individuals who were planning to travel to the Washington, D.C., area with intentions to cause violence.
• **Russian Imperial Movement** (designated by Canada), or RIM, provided paramilitary-style training to white supremacists and neo-Nazis in Europe and actively works to rally these types of groups into a common front against their perceived enemies. In 2016, two Swedish individuals attended RIM’s training course; thereafter, they committed a series of bombings in Gothenburg, Sweden, targeting a refugee shelter, a shelter for asylum seekers, and a café — crimes for which they were convicted in Sweden. In 2020, the U.S. government also designated RIM and members of its leadership as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

• **Sonnenkrieg Division** (designated by Australia) is a UK-based white-supremacist group established in 2018 as a splinter group of the System Resistance Network. Members of the group were convicted in the UK of “encouraging terrorism and possession of documents useful to a terrorist” in 2019. The group encouraged and glorified acts of terrorism through its posts and images.

• **Three Percenters** (designated by Canada) are a decentralized entity within the broader anti-government militia movement in the United States, with a presence in the United States and Canada. Canadian authorities note that the Three Percenters have been linked to bomb plots targeting U.S. federal government buildings and Muslim communities. Canadian authorities further note that in 2015 a Three Percenter was arrested and convicted of shooting and wounding five men at a BLM demonstration in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In 2020, two of the group’s leaders directed a plot to kidnap the governor of Michigan, which involved acquiring and detonating explosives to divert police attention from the kidnapping, as well as to carry out public executions of public officials by hanging them on live television.

**Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front**

In 2021 the Department of State designated five new groups as FTOs and amended one existing FTO designation by adding aliases. In addition, 30 entities and individuals were designated as SDGTs under the Department’s authorities in Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. The Department also reviewed and maintained the FTO designations of 15 entities.

The Department of the Treasury also designated entities and individuals under E.O. 13224, as amended. For a list of all U.S. designations, see the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

**2021 Foreign Terrorist Organization/Executive Order 13224 Group Designations**

On January 14 the Department of State designated Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) as an FTO. HASM was previously designated under E.O. 13224 on January 31, 2018. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on HASM.)

On March 10 the Department of State designated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) under E.O. 13224. The FTO designation of ISIS-DRC
became effective on March 11. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIS-DRC.)

Also on March 10, the Department of State designated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique) under E.O. 13224. The FTO designation of ISIS-Mozambique became effective on March 11. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for more information on ISIS-Mozambique.)

On December 1 the Department of State designated Segunda Marquetalia as an FTO and under E.O 13224. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on Segunda Marquetalia.)

Also on December 1, the Department of State designated the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) as an FTO and under E.O. 13224. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on FARC-EP.)

Again on December 1, the Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 and FTO designations of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) to include additional aliases. (See Chapter 5, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for more on ISIS-K.)

2021 Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 Designations

On January 12 the Department of State designated two Iran-based al-Qa’ida leaders: Muhammad Abbatay, also known as Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, and Sultan Yusuf Hasan al-’Arif.

Also on January 12 the Department of State designated three leaders of the al-Qa’ida Kurdish Battalions an al-Qa’ida-linked group that operates on the border between Iran and Iraq: Isma’il Fu’ad Rasul Ahmed, Fuad Ahmad Nuri Ali al-Shakhan, and Niamat Hama Rahim Hama Sharif.

On January 13 the Department of State designated Abd al-Aziz Malluh Mirjirash al-Muhammadawi, also known as Abu Fadak. Muhammadawi is the former secretary general of Kata’ib Hizballah and is separately working in conjunction with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force.

On January 14 the Department of State designated Yahya al-Sayyid Ibrahim Musa and Alaa Ali Ali Mohammed Al-Samahi. Musa is a Türkiye-based HASM leader. Al-Samahi is a Türkiye-based senior HASM official with an operational role in the group.

On March 10 the Department of State designated ISIS-DRC leader Seka Musa Baluku and ISIS-Mozambique leader Abu Yasir Hassan.

On May 20 the Department of State designated Yusuf al-Madani. Al-Madani is a prominent leader of Houthi forces and the commander of forces in Al Ḥudaydah, Ḥajjah, Al Maḥwīt, and Raymah, Yemen.
On June 28 the Department of State designated Ousmane Illiassou Djibo, also known as Petit Chapor. Djibo is an ISIS-Greater Sahara leader operating in the Ménaka Region of Mali.

On August 6 the Department of State designated five terrorist leaders in Africa: Bonomade Machude Omar, Sidan ag Hitta, Salem ould Breihmatt, Ali Mohamed Rage, and Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir. Omar leads the Military and External Affairs Departments for ISIS-Mozambique. Hitta is a JNIM senior leader and commander. Breihmatt is a JNIM senior leader and emir. Rage is al-Shabaab’s spokesman and a senior leader of the group. Abdikadir is an al-Shabaab senior leader.

On November 22 the Department of State designated three ISIS-K leaders: Sanaullah Ghafari, Sultan Aziz Azam, and Maulawi Rajab. Ghafari, also known as Shahab al-Muhajir, is ISIS-K’s current overall emir. Azam, also known as Sultan Aziz, has held the position of ISIS-K spokesperson since ISIS-K first came to Afghanistan. Rajab, also known as Maulawi Rajab Salahudin, is a senior leader of ISIS-K in Kabul province, Afghanistan.

On December 1 the Department of State designated three FARC-EP leaders: Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, Miguel Santanilla Botache, and Euclides Espana Caicedo. Fernandez, also known as Ivan Mordisco, is the commander and overall leader of FARC-EP. Botache, also known as Gentil Duarte, is a commander in FARC-EP and deputy to Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez. Caicedo, also known as Jhon Fredey Henao Munoz, is the most senior commander of multiple units of the FARC-EP organization in important territorial areas.

Also on December 1, the Department of State designated three Segunda Marquetalia leaders: Luciano Marin Arango, Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, and Henry Castellanos Garzon. Arango, also known as Ivan Marquez, is the founder and overall leader of Segunda Marquetalia. Saldarriaga, also known as El Paisa, is a senior commander in Segunda Marquetalia and serves as the group’s military commander. Garzon, also known as Romana, is a senior leader in Segunda Marquetalia with military operations responsibilities.

**Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism**

In 2021 the United States continued to work through multilateral organizations to promote U.S. approaches to countering terrorism, and to strengthen regional and international counterterrorism efforts, including by developing and promoting global norms and building the capacities of states to implement them. At the UN, the United States supported negotiations to conduct the biennial review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and the renewal of the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate mandate that updated the international counterterrorism framework to address evolving threats, including racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE).

Other examples of U.S. multilateral engagement are described below.

**The United Nations.** One priority for the United States is sustained and strategic engagement at the UN on counterterrorism issues. Throughout 2021 the UN remained actively engaged in addressing the evolving threat of terrorism to international peace and security, including through the biennial review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, the renewal of the UN
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate mandate that updated the international counterterrorism framework to address evolving threats (including REMVE), and the renewal of the UN 1267 ISIL and al-Qa’ida sanctions mandate.

U.S. engagement with UN actors on counterterrorism included the following:

- **The UN Security Council and its Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED).** The United States led the successful negotiation of UNSCR 2617 (2021) that was adopted unanimously on December 27 to renew the UN/CTED mandate for another four years. The resolution focuses on the protection of human rights, inclusion of civil society, and importance of rule-of-law-based counterterrorism approaches, and it addresses new and evolving threats for the first time in a UNSCR that condemns terrorism “on the basis of xenophobia, racism, and other forms of intolerance.” Further, it recognizes the need to improve the collection, handling, preservation, and sharing of battlefield evidence; recognizes the increasing global misuse of unmanned aerial systems by terrorists to conduct terrorist attacks; and calls for a global report within one year to assess member states’ implementation of the provisions in UNSCRs 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017) to counter terrorist travel and address the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters and their accompanying families. The United States also supported the negotiation of several resolutions and Presidential Statements, including one to commemorate the 20th anniversary of September 11.

  The United States supported CTC and CTED efforts to assess evolving terrorist trends and to analyze capacity gaps of member states to implement UNSCRs 1373, 1624, 2178, 2396, and other relevant counterterrorism resolutions, and to facilitate training and other technical assistance to UN member states. In 2021, CTED held six open briefings on issues including terrorist threats to civil aviation and the role of the criminal justice sector in bringing terrorists to justice through the effective use of battlefield- or military-collected evidence. CTED also completed 67 Overview of Implementation Assessments and Detailed Implementation Surveys and shared 18 assessment visit reports with the Global Counterterrorism Coordination Platform, which was launched in March.

- **UN Security Council Sanctions Regimes.** In 2021 the United States led or supported the listing of four individuals by the Security Council’s 1267 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and three individuals by the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee; these were the first three additions to the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee since 2018. In addition, ISIS-Tunisia (aka JAK-T) was listed by the 1267 Sanctions Committee, bringing the total number of ISIS affiliates listed at the UN since 2019 to seven. The United States worked closely with the UN 1267 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee by proposing listings, providing amendments, engaging the committee’s ombudsperson regarding petitions for de-listings, and providing input to the committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures. The United States also assisted the monitoring team with information for its research and reports. Three individuals were de-listed, and 163 entries were amended during the year, supporting the UN 1267 Committee’s priority to ensure due process and accurate listings. The total figures on the list are 264 individuals and 89 entities, as of December 31. The committee also worked to ensure the
integrity of the list by conducting regular reviews and endeavoring to remove those individuals and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing. The United States also led the negotiation of several other counterterrorism sanctions-related UN Security Council Resolutions, including UNSCR 2615, which provided a humanitarian exemption for the Taliban Sanctions Regime; UNSCR 2611, which renewed the mandate of the Taliban sanctions regime’s Monitoring Team; and UNSCR 2610, which renewed the mandate of the ISIS/AQ sanctions regime’s Monitoring Team.

• **The UN Global Assembly and UN Office of Counterterrorism.** The UN Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) continued to work closely with the 40 UN entities plus INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union through the Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact, to ensure balanced implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy: 1) strengthen the delivery of UN counterterrorism capacity building assistance to member states; 2) promote and improve visibility; 3) advocacy; and 4) resource mobilization for UN counterterrorism efforts. The United States supported the biennial review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in 2021 and negotiated a General Assembly resolution that updated the global counterterrorism framework to address threats and challenges associated with REMVE, repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their families, battlefield evidence, terrorist use of drones, terrorist sentencing commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, and soft targets protection and security. The United States also participated in the UN’s Counterterrorism High-Level Week organized by UNOCT by providing high-level speakers in several of the side events, focusing on FTF repatriation; countering terrorist misuse of unmanned aerial systems; terrorist watchlisting; REMVE; and terrorist use of new and emerging technologies.

• **The UN Office on Drugs and Crime.** The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC’s) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) continued to assist countries seeking to ratify and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism, and it provided assistance for countering the financing of terrorism in conjunction with UNODC’s Global Program Against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism. The United States supported UNODC/TPB as a counterterrorism assistance implementer, particularly for programming concentrated on strengthening the criminal justice system’s response to terrorism by member states. In 2021 the United States continued to support UNODC/TPB programs that concluded a series of training workshops in North Africa and South and Central Asia on countering terrorist travel and supporting border-related terrorism prosecutions. This workshop series, beginning in 2019 and funded in part by the Counterterrorism Bureau, highlighted best practices in watchlisting, information sharing, screening, and evidence collection to assist countries in meeting the obligations of UNSCR 2396. The United States also participated in the UNODC Expert Group on the Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and other forms of Intolerance, or in the name of Religion or Belief and coordinated U.S. government input that will be included in the UNODC training manual.

• **The UN Security Council 1540 Committee.** The 1540 Committee monitors and facilitates efforts to implement UNSCR 1540 (2004) requirements, which address the nexus of proliferation concerns surrounding chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their
means of delivery, on the one hand, and activities by nonstate actors, who wittingly or unwittingly provide WMD-related assistance to terrorist organizations, on the other. The 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts (GoE) participates in a wide range of multilateral and regional activities designed to facilitate technical assistance to member states when they request it. Using Office for Disarmament Affairs Trust Fund resources to cover expenses, the GoE also has interacted with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the World Customs Organization, INTERPOL, UNODC, the Financial Action Task Force, and other multilateral counterterrorism bodies, as well as with individual countries to this end. The United States is one of eight countries, plus the EU, that have contributed to the 1540 Trust Fund, which is used to support these activities and to financially support 1540 regional coordinator positions in the OAS, the OSCE, the AU, and ASEAN. U.S. funds also continued to be used to conduct projects that assist African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries in strengthening national 1540 implementation by providing training to national 1540 points of contact and developing voluntary national action plans (NAPs). Given the key role played by current 1540 coordinators in GoE-supported peer-to-peer reviews, the United States will continue to promote the idea of establishing additional 1540 regional coordinators, to increase the number and quality of NAPs in the lead-up to a UNSCR 1540 Comprehensive Review, which will take place throughout 2022.

**The Global Counterterrorism Forum.** Founded in 2011 by the United States and Türkiye, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) aims to diminish terrorist recruitment and radicalization while increasing countries’ capacity to deal with terrorist threats within their borders and regions by strengthening civilian institutions to counter terrorism. Canada and Morocco are GCTF co-chairs until late 2022.

The GCTF comprises three thematic and two regional working groups: Countering Violent Extremism, Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Capacity Building in the East Africa Region, and Capacity Building in the West Africa Region. In 2017 the United States and Jordan became co-chairs of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group for an initial two-year term. The United States and Jordan renewed their co-chairmanship of the FTF Working Group in 2019 for another two-year term, now extended until late 2022 because of the COVID-19 global pandemic.

The United Nations is a close partner of the GCTF and a participant in its activities. The GCTF continued to increase cooperation and partnership as outlined in the 2018 joint GCTF-UN statement marking enhanced cooperation between the two bodies. The GCTF serves as a mechanism to further the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and more broadly to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the UN. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and ASEAN.

In October, GCTF ministers formally endorsed two new framework documents and an addendum to an existing framework document (found at www.thegctf.org):
• *GCTF Good Practices for the Implementation of Countering the Financing of Terrorism Measures While Safeguarding Civic Space*

• *Memorandum on Criminal Justice Approaches to the Linkages Between Terrorism and Core International Crimes, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Crimes, Crimes, Human Trafficking, Migrant Smuggling, Slavery, and Crimes Against Children*

• *Addendum to the New York Memorandum on Good Practices for Interdicting Terrorist Travel*

Moreover in 2021, the GCTF continued the work of the Forum by migrating initiatives to webinar formats, including two co-led by the United States:

• *The Watchlisting Guidance Manual* initiative created a “toolkit” to assist countries with implementing a whole-of-government approach to managing the watchlisting and screening of known and suspected terrorists (KSTs). This toolkit is a useful resource for policy-makers, law enforcement officials, immigration and consular officers, and agencies that manage and operate watchlists. As states adopt the practices put forth in the toolkit, it should not only increase border security but also, through the standardized management of watchlist information, increase trust in global information-sharing initiatives to stop terrorists. These practices also will help countries further implement recommendations in the *New York Memorandum on Good Practices for Interdicting Terrorist Travel* and obligations established in UNSCR 2396. The United States and the UN co-chaired four global webinars in 2020 and 2021. In 2022 the Maritime Security Initiative will couple with the Watchlisting Toolkit Initiative to host the first combined event to address best practices in security and border control with an emphasis on maritime efforts.

• ‘The Initiative on Maritime Security and Terrorist Travel’ addresses potential vulnerabilities in the maritime sector that could be exploited by terrorists. In 2021, this initiative examined how to improve information sharing between and among governments on topics such as KSTs transitioning through official ports, the use of ships and small vessels as weapons, and the smuggling or trafficking of narcotics or arms through subregional workshops focused on West Africa, East Africa, and East Asia Pacific’s tri-maritime border (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines) culminating in the adoption of the *Maritime Addendum to the New York Memorandum* in October.

• ‘Initiative on Criminal Justice Responses to the Linkages Between Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crimes, and International Crimes.’ In 2021 the GCTF Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group held virtual workshops to examine the links between terrorism and international crimes, which resulted in the adoption of the *GCTF Memorandum on Criminal Justice Approaches to the Linkages Between Terrorism and Core International Crimes, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Crimes, Crimes, Human Trafficking, Migrant Smuggling, Slavery, and Crimes Against Children* in October.
- **‘Initiative on National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Policy Toolkit Initiative.’** Australia and Indonesia, as co-chairs of the CVE Working Group, held workshops in 2021, with further planned workshops in 2022, to provide context- and sector-specific tools, advice, and expertise to facilitate the translation of good practices into national and local action. The co-chairs plan to resend a draft Gender and Preventing CVE (P/CVE) Policy Toolkit at the Twentieth GCTF Coordinating Committee in 2022.

- **The GCTF’s ‘Strategic Vision Initiative,’** launched by GCTF co-chairs Canada and Morocco, reaffirmed GCTF founding principles as reflected in the 2011 Political Declaration and emphasized the importance of the GCTF’s contributions to the civilian counterterrorism landscape. This initiative resulted in the adoption of the “GCTF Strategic Vision for the Next Decade” in 2021. This Strategic Vision seeks to provide new momentum to the Forum’s work, builds on its achievements, and strengthens its overall impact and relevance, including considering proposals on ways to deepen and broaden the implementation of GCTF Framework Documents.

- **Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE) Initiative:** The United States launched the GCTF’s work in addressing REMVE-related challenges in 2021. In April the United States led two GCTF Exploratory Dialogues — among the first multilateral events focused exclusively on international REMVE threats and challenges. The dialogues featured keynote remarks from Acting CT Coordinator John Godfrey and were attended virtually by nearly 150 participants, representing more than 50 countries and 70 organizations and academic institutions. During two online webinars, discussions focused on varying definitions, the current REMVE landscape, current legal frameworks, and practical operational and policy responses to the REMVE threat. Speakers examined existing GCTF resources pertaining to the REMVE threat, current gaps in available resources, and how the GCTF could best address REMVE-related challenges. As a result of these dialogues, the United States partnered with Norway (a non-GCTF Member) in October to initiate the development of a GCTF REMVE Toolkit that will outline good practices in addressing the REMVE radicalization lifecycle, drawing on and complementing the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law’s *Criminal Justice Practitioner’s Guide Addressing Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism.* The GCTF REMVE Toolkit will be developed through a series of virtual seminars and workshops and presented to the GCTF’s 21st Coordinating Committee in September 2022 for review and adoption.

**GCTF-Inspired Institutions.** The following three institutions were developed to operationalize GCTF good practices and to serve as mechanisms for strengthening civilian criminal justice responses to terrorism:

- **The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law.** Since its establishment in Malta in 2014, the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) has become a widely respected training institution for sustainable rule-of-law capacity building activities to criminal justice sector practitioners, including lawmakers, police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, policymakers, and other justice sector
stakeholders on how to address terrorism and related transnational criminal activities. In the last five years, the IIJ has trained more than 7,000 criminal justice practitioners from 123 participating countries. In 2021 the IIJ continued its steady increase in investment from donors, including from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the EU. Through funding from the United States, the IIJ trained more than 700 practitioners in 2021 on issues related to battlefield evidence, REMVE, addressing homegrown terrorism, combating prison radicalization, successfully prosecuting terrorism, increasing international cooperation in terrorism investigations and prosecutions, juvenile justice, and the successful launch of the first-ever counterterrorism academic curriculum (CTAC) for midlevel practitioners. Despite the COVID-19 global pandemic, the IIJ’s new Academic Unit adapted the CTAC course, designed to provide a baseline counterterrorism knowledge for midlevel law enforcement and criminal justice actors for a virtual environment. Additionally, the IIJ and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime continued a Department of State-supported initiative to identify practical approaches to managing remote access for judicial proceedings in terrorism cases in response to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the IIJ, in partnership with the United States and the UK, published its Criminal Justice Practitioner’s Guide Addressing Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism in July and launched a follow-on initiative to socialize these practices with partner governments at a UN General Assembly side event in September.

- **Hedayah.** Hedayah is the first-ever international center of excellence for CVE, headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Hedayah concentrates on capacity building, dialogue and CVE communications, and research and analysis. Hedayah continued to organize capacity building workshops on CVE communications, education-based approaches to CVE, countering REMVE efforts, rehabilitation and reintegration workshops, and CVE national action plans. In 2021, Hedayah supported Tunisia and Tajikistan to improve these governments’ awareness of P/CVE strategic communication approaches and tools through a new CVE communication strategy. Hedayah also helped find innovative solutions to counter terrorist use of the internet by helping counter terrorist and violent extremist narratives working with tech companies, youths, and students to develop their own solutions to online violent extremist propaganda. Hedayah also continued to promote its “Blueprint for a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center,” a best-practices tool developed to help rehabilitate and reintegrate FTFs and their family members. In 2021, Hedayah raised almost $13 million for programs and operating expenses from donors including Australia, Japan, Spain, the UAE, the UK, the United States, and the EU.

- **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.** In 2013 the GCTF called for the establishment of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) to serve as the first global fund to strengthen community resilience to terrorism. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, GCERF focuses on preventing and countering terrorism by building the capacity of small, local, community-based organizations. Since its inception, GCERF has raised more than $150 million from the United States, Switzerland, the European Union, Japan, Qatar, Canada, Norway, Australia, the United
Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Sweden, Liechtenstein, Morocco, and Niger (a recipient and donor country). The United States has contributed $20.8 million thus far. GCERF has launched a public-private partnership program to encourage private companies to invest in its prevention programming. To date, several private-sector organizations have provided in-kind contributions. GCERF supports 35 grants in 14 partner countries: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. Estimated conservatively, GCERF projects have reached 2.2 million direct beneficiaries and 13.2 million indirect beneficiaries. In 2021, Niger became the first partner and donor country for GCERF.

**Strong Cities Network.** In 2015 the Strong Cities Network (SCN) launched at the UN General Assembly with support from the United States. With 25 founding members, the SCN now includes more than 150 local governments across six continents. The SCN provides local governments with a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned on CVE, including through global summits, regional workshops, exchanges, and an online portal. The London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue serves as the SCN secretariat and conducts in-depth capacity building training and mentorship to members in Central Asia, East and West Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Balkans. With support from the United States, SCN members in Bangladesh, Kenya, and North Macedonia have developed local action plans. In January the SCN and the U.S. Conference of Mayors organized a virtual discussion between the Dalai Lama and more than 70 local leaders from around the world on using kindness and compassion to counter hate and division. In October, the SCN partnered with other organizations to host REMOVE-focused workshops in Bratislava for Slovak stakeholders and Brussels for stakeholders from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States.

**The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).** Through its I-24/7 secure global police communications system, INTERPOL connects member states’ law enforcement officials to its investigative and analytical databases, and to its system for requesting assistance in criminal investigative matters by sending messages and the publication of notices for various purposes. The U.S. Department of State funds INTERPOL counterterrorism-related programs through INTERPOL’s General Secretariat and INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) of the U.S. Department of Justice, to help countries affected by the FTF phenomenon provide access to I-24/7 to frontline officials. By extending these connections beyond a country’s national central bureau to strategic, high-volume airports, seaports, and land ports of entry — as well as other government agencies with investigative responsibilities — national authorities are better enabled to identify, deter, and interdict FTFs and other transnational criminals. Acknowledging the value of this initiative and the importance of addressing connectivity gaps in countries at risk of FTF travel, in 2016 the G-7 pledged to extend I-24/7 connectivity to 41 priority countries by the end of 2021. Since that pledge, the U.S. Department of State has engaged INTERPOL through the USNCB to help fulfill the G-7 commitment by providing funding for projects aimed at extending connectivity in 19 countries. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State has provided resources directly to INTERPOL to enhance its capacity to receive, analyze, and disseminate information regarding the identities and
movements of FTFs. Developing the organization’s capacity to process and disseminate this critical information supports the provision to member country law enforcement and border control authorities of actionable information to support screening procedures and investigations into terrorism-related crimes. To further support this initiative, the U.S. Department of State also has provided funding to support the development of a platform that will enhance INTERPOL’s analytic capability by allowing its disparate datasets to be easily filtered, queried, and cross-referenced to efficiently process associations, such as between an FTF identity profile and a reported lost or stolen travel document. The United States recognizes the great value in its long partnership with INTERPOL and the role of the USNCB to ensure critical FTF data are shared and accessible throughout the global law enforcement community.

**European Union.** The EU and its member states remain top counterterrorism partners for the United States. The EU and the United States share a common definition of terrorism and have established a common list of terrorist groups. Most recently, the United States began working closely with the EU and its members states on countering racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE), which the Europeans often refer to as “right wing extremism” or “far-right extremism.” These threats, largely from violent white supremacists, are on the rise in both Europe and the United States, where these actors’ movements appear to be centered and based. There are significant transnational linkages between REMVE actors and networks on both sides of the Atlantic, and both the United States and the EU work together to tackle these threats. By working together, the United States and the EU made progress in elevating REMVE issues, both at the political and policy levels.

While the military campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria is now largely complete, the detention of terrorists, seizure of their associated materials, and management of evidence collected are critical to successfully prosecute and secure convictions of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The EU is an integral partner in tackling these challenges associated with battlefield evidence, particularly in promoting its use to support investigations and prosecutions of FTFs. During COVID the U.S. government continued to encourage EU member states to take responsibility for their FTFs and associated family members located in al-Hol and al-Roj displaced persons camps by repatriating, prosecuting, rehabilitating, and reintegrating them as appropriate. Although EU institutions note that decisions related to repatriating FTFs and their family members from the battlefield in Syria are reserved for the member states, the EU has stated that rehabilitating and reintegrating returning citizens is a priority both at the EU and the national level. However, few repatriations took place during 2021, and human rights and humanitarian groups continue to criticize the inaction of EU member states to repatriate their citizens. The U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice, and State continue efforts with the EU and its members states to facilitate the sharing of battlefield evidence, as well as emphasize that counterterrorism cooperation is an important area for NATO-EU cooperation.

In May the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) announced its first joint operation outside of the EU, deploying 50 officers to Albania in support of border security and managing migratory flows from Greece. In July and October, Frontex announced two additional operations in Montenegro to bolster the country’s sea borders, with a particular concentration on anti-smuggling of drugs, weapons, trafficked humans, and terror material. The European Commission also signed two nonbinding counterterrorism arrangements with Albania and North
Macedonia in October, and in December proposed revising Europol’s mandate to improve the agency’s ability to collect and analyze data relevant to cross-border crimes and terrorist offenses. The revised mandate would also allow Europol to create its own special category of “information alerts” in the Schengen Information System, using information sourced from third countries or international organizations and subject to certain restrictions. Europol has officers and personnel in Italy and Greece who work alongside border security and immigration officers to assist in screening incoming migrants against Europol databases.

Following adoption of its “Counterterrorism Agenda” in 2020, the European Commission proposed a variety of legislative tools in 2021 intended to improve the EU’s collective defense against terrorism. In January, it issued a draft revision of the Europol Regulation that would allow, for the first time, Europol to establish lookouts in the EU’s Schengen Information System for use by EU border and police authorities. The regulation is expected to be adopted by the Council and Parliament in 2022. In June the Regulation on Addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online entered into force, requiring service providers operating in the EU to remove content within one hour of notification by a competent authority in the EU. Also in June, the Commission published its Strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen Area, outlining plans to improve border management within the EU. In December it proposed an update to the Prüm Decision that would further codify cross-border law enforcement cooperation in EU law and establish a consistent, EU-operated technical infrastructure for the exchange of data under Prüm. This step, if approved, will bring Prüm, first adopted in 2006, more in line with the EU’s recent interoperability efforts. Despite these improvements, the EU’s constantly evolving data privacy framework also continues to make law enforcement and border security cooperation between EU member states and non-EU countries, including the United States, more challenging.

Internationally, the EU Council adopted a decision in October launching a European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mozambique to counter terrorism in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. The EUTM became fully operational in December, with 84 military personnel (from EU member states) providing training in two centers. The two-year program is funded by the European Peace Facility to train 11 companies of Mozambican marines and commandos to serve as a quick reaction force to terrorist threats. The EU also continued six military and law enforcement capacity building missions in the Horn of Africa, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel, working closely with U.S. elements in counterterrorism, border security, and stabilization efforts. To date, the EU has pledged almost $270 million for the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, a coalition of five West African nations providing border security and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. The EU has also initiated the Partnership for Stability and Security in the Sahel to assess the security sector in West African countries and coordinate donor funding to fulfill their needs.

**Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.** Under Sweden as the 2021 Chair in Office, the OSCE approach to counterterrorism focused on working to address the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, mainstreaming a gender-responsive approach to counterterrorism, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under the Swedish chairmanship, the OSCE in April held its annual OSCE-wide Counterterrorism Conference as a virtual/in-person
hybrid event. With an emphasis on using a whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism, common themes highlighted by the participating states included addressing terrorism, violent extremism, and other potentially “harmful” online content, including through strengthening public-private partnerships and enhancing law enforcement cooperation, while respecting human rights such as freedom of expression. The United States in October also participated in the fifth OSCE-wide Seminar on Passenger Data Exchange, urging OSCE participating states to establish Passenger Name Record systems based on International Civil Aviation Organization standards and practices. OSCE staff actively participated in global and regional efforts supported by the United States through the GCTF, the IIJ, and NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the June Summit, NATO allies reaffirmed NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism, as it contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance.

Following the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and security forces in August and the end of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, NATO launched a comprehensive assessment of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. This assessment concluded, in part, that NATO made significant gains in the fight against terrorism, but that the wider ambition of building a stable Afghanistan proved extremely challenging. NATO formally updated the Counterterrorism Action Plan (CTAP) with continued emphases on awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships, and operations. The United States continued to invest foreign assistance resources to support implementation of the CTAP. With this support, NATO strengthened criminal justice actors’ ability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism cases and enhance civilian-military coordination in the Middle East and North Africa through a Battlefield Evidence training at the Stability Policing Center of Excellence in Vicenza, Italy, from November 29 through December 3. In June, Allies endorsed a Strengthened Resilience Commitment to continue to take a whole-of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of Allies’ societies and achieving the seven NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagements with Allies’ populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and the centers of expertise on resilience established by Allies. NATO is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and provides Airborne Warning and Control System surveillance flights and staff-to-staff support.

NATO international staff members regularly collaborate with the AU, the EU, the IIJ, the OSCE, the UN, and other international and regional organizations.

Council of Europe. The United States participates in the Council of Europe (the CoE) as an observer. The CoE’s counterterrorism priorities, as established in its current 2018-22 Strategy, include preventing terrorism through criminal law and law enforcement measures, ensuring terrorist offenses are investigated in the most efficient and quickest manner possible, and protecting persons against terrorism. The CoE’s counterterrorism committee (CDCT) convened several working groups throughout the year on the Risk Assessment of Individuals Indicted or Convicted for Terrorist Offenses; Emerging Terrorist Threats; Best Practices Relating to
Deradicalization, Disengagement and Social Reintegration; and the Use of Information Collected in Conflict Zones as Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Related to Terrorist Offenses. The Council of Europe hosted a December 7-8 conference on the Roles of Women and Children in Terrorism, where the United States highlighted funding for the Mother Schools: Parenting for Peace program. The biennial CDCT plenary addressed topics including battlefield evidence, addressing radicalization, increasing information sharing, and bioterrorism. During the plenary, the United States worked with member states to advance critical support on battlefield evidence, terrorist radicalization, information sharing, and emerging terrorist threats, including REMVE. CoE staff members regularly coordinate with countries and other multilateral organizations and entities such as the EU, the OAS, the OSCE, and the UN.

**Group of Seven Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Counter-Crime:** The UK served as the 2021 Group of Seven (G-7) President and set an ambitious agenda for the year that culminated in the adoption of the G-7 Interior and Security Ministerial Statement that focused on counterterrorism-related priorities and deliverables, including data sharing on threats from Afghanistan; countering REMVE; preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism online; and collaboration on Passenger Name Record data and International Civil Aviation Organization standards. The United States participated in the experts working group on some key issues, including terrorist use of the internet. The United States participated in the Roma-Lyon Group’s Heads of Delegation meetings and the Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Crime’s six subgroups, ensuring the facilitation and implementation of ongoing projects that develop good practices for counterterrorism and law enforcement. The United States also continued chairing the Roma Lyon Group’s cross-modal Transportation Security Subgroup, including overseeing ongoing collaboration related to foreign investment in the transportation sector and on flight school security.

**Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism.** The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE), which has 34 member states and 70 observers, focused activities in 2021 on cybersecurity, border security, preventing the financing of terrorism, preventing the proliferation of WMD, preventing violent extremism, the security of mass gatherings (including tourist destinations), and addressing the FTF phenomenon. OAS/CICTE led the commemoration of June 3 as Inter-American Day Against Terrorism, encouraging member states to counter terrorism in the Western Hemisphere and around the world. The committee held its 21st regular session in a virtual format during October 7-8. In 2021, 17 member states including the United States participated in the Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism. The network operates on a 24/7 basis to facilitate communication among points of contact designated by each member state, so they can respond more effectively to terrorist threats. OAS/CICTE staff regularly collaborate with other multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the GCTF, and the UN.

**The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit.** Counterterrorism activities with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 27-member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) countries in 2021 included annual meetings on counterterrorism and transnational crime and capacity building through ASEAN-related institutions. The United States is leading a three-part ARF workshop series on information sharing and aviation security, designed to raise awareness of countries’
obligations under UNSCR 2396 and to explain helpful tools for implementation. The first workshop was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2019. The second occurred virtually, in February. The third and final workshop in this series is anticipated for 2022. Building on these ARF workshops, the United States co-hosted, along with the governments of Indonesia and South Korea, workshops on watchlisting as well as on aviation security in the time of COVID with the 10 ASEAN countries. These workshops were postponed from 2020 but occurred in November. The United States also funded and participated in ASEAN workshops during the development of an ASEAN Training of Trainers Program to Address Disinformation and Promote Media Literacy in 2021, which will be incorporated into the Second Annual ASEAN-U.S. CVE workshop to be held in 2022.

The East Asia Summit — which includes the 10 ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States — issued several statements in 2021, including one on Women, Peace, and Security, noting the importance of women’s roles to addressing root causes of terrorism. In 2020 the United States and ASEAN negotiated a new five-year “Plan of Action,” which outlined continued and increased engagement on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism efforts. ASEAN in 2019 adopted the Bali Work Plan to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism 2019-25. The objective of this workplan is to provide an implementation framework to guide relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies, organs, and entities in carrying out the necessary activities and monitor effectiveness in preventing and countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The United States supported the process of developing the workplan through participation in CVE workshops and providing technical assistance and consultations with various stakeholders, such as ASEAN sectoral bodies and civil society organizations, to provide input on the implementation of the workplan. CVE consultations for 2020 were largely focused on countering violent extremism through media literacy and advancing critical thinking. Owing to COVID-19 conditions in the region, the Second Annual ASEAN-U.S. CVE workshop, co-chaired with Indonesia, was postponed to 2022. The United States also works on counterterrorism issues, including in the maritime space, through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus.

**Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.** Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) continued to work under the Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy adopted in 2019 and updated its annual workplan in 2021. The strategy, first adopted in 2011, endorses the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience and advocates for risk-based approaches to security challenges across supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. Members also concentrated on furthering the APEC Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) Strategic Plan 2018-22, which set priorities in areas such as the evolving threat of FTFs, terrorist financing, border and critical infrastructure security, and information sharing. In 2021 the United States hosted a workshop on soft target protection in an aviation ecosystem. The CTWG Terms of Reference expired in 2021, and member economies did not reach consensus to endorse a new Terms of Reference. Senior officials did not renew the mandate of the group by year’s end. Despite the sunsetting of the CTWG, APEC’s counterterrorism efforts will continue through relevant existing subfora.

**The African Union.** There are two main bodies within the AU that lead its counterterrorism efforts — the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department’s Conflict Management
Division, located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (CAERT) in Algiers. CAERT is the lead for all the AU’s CVE activity. CAERT priorities include: 1) building capacity of member states on CT/CVE; 2) developing and/or implementing member-state CVE national action plans; and 3) enhancing international cooperation to ensure relevant regional approaches are taken fully into account. In 2020 the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) established the Special Unit on Counterterrorism within the framework of the African Standby Force, which has yet to be operationalized. Once in operation, the Special Unit will aim to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the PSC and the Regional Economic Communities. It also will share experiences and best practices, as well as lessons arising from continental and regional mechanisms deployed against terrorism and violent extremism, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (or AMISOM), the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, the G-5 Sahel, and the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic slowed AU implementation of deepened counterterrorism focus.

**G-5 Sahel.** Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger formed the G-5 Sahel in 2014 to concentrate on the four pillars of security, resilience, infrastructure, and governance. In 2021 the G-5 Sahel Joint Force conducted military operations to disrupt the activities of terrorist operations in transborder regions of the five member states. Multiple countries, including the United States and France, and the EU have provided or pledged donor support to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

**The League of Arab States:** The League of Arab States (LAS) is a regional organization consisting of 22 member states that promotes the interests of the Arab world. The LAS serves as a forum for member states to coordinate policy on matters of concern, including countering violent extremism and other threats. The LAS also is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

**The International Civil Aviation Organization.** The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that promotes the development of international air navigation safety and security standards and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth. The ICAO adopts standards and recommended practices concerning air navigation, its infrastructure, flight inspection, prevention of unlawful interference, and facilitation of border-crossing procedures for international civil aviation. The ICAO’s AVSEC2021 event, which concluded on the eve of the anniversary of the September 11 attacks of 20 years ago, featured substantive and compelling discussions on aviation security, including contributions from current and former colleagues in government and industry. The ICAO’s involvement during the crisis in Afghanistan progressed from issuing guidance to avoid Afghanistan’s airspace to tackling the technical issues that culminate in the safety and security of civil aviation. The 2020 Council of ICAO approval of amendments to Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention establishing new Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) regarding states’ development and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems took effect in February. These SARPs are a direct response to UNSCR 2396 of 2017, which requires states to develop the capability to collect, process, and analyze PNR data, in furtherance of ICAO SARPs. UNSCR 2396 also requires states to ensure PNR data are used by and shared with all their competent national authorities, with full respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorist offenses and related travel. The United States continues to seek to raise the profile of aviation security within the ICAO Secretariat, with the objective of parity between safety and security in the ICAO.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In 2021 the United States continued to serve as co-chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. In 2021 the GICNT held three virtual multinational engagements that provided an interactive forum to share and discuss best practices around plans, policies, and procedures to detect and respond to radiological/nuclear terrorism incidents.

Financial Action Task Force. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing. FATF’s efforts to improve understanding and compliance with global FATF standards are supported by FATF-style regional bodies worldwide. In 2021, FATF continued to address terrorist financing through ongoing work. This included regular, nonpublic updates to the FATF global network on the financing of ISIS and al-Qa’ida and their affiliates, and the completion of a nonpublic best practices paper on investigating and prosecuting terrorist financing and an update to previously issued terrorist financing risk indicators. FATF also published a report on ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing in July.

Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online (Christchurch Call). In May the United States officially joined the New Zealand- and France-led Christchurch Call, established in a 2019 Summit after the horrific livestreamed terrorist attacks in Christchurch earlier that year, and Secretary Blinken participated in the second annual Christchurch Call Summit.

When the decision was announced, the United States applauded language in the Christchurch Call emphasizing the importance of respecting human rights and the rule of law, including the protection of freedom of expression, and noted that in participating in the Christchurch Call, the United States would not take steps that would violate the freedoms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, nor violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. The United States engaged in active partnership with governments, tech companies, and civil society in the forum’s workstreams on key issues such as algorithms and positive interventions to better ensure that online platforms are not exploited for terrorist or violent extremist purposes.

Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. The United States continued to participate in the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). The GIFCT was established by Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Microsoft in 2017, in close partnership with UN-affiliated Tech Against Terrorism, and reorganized as an NGO in 2020 to prevent and counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of online platforms through developing and sharing technology, including providing assistance to smaller companies, research, and
prevention programs. In 2021 the United States continued to serve on the GIFCT Independent Advisory Committee and participated in GIFCT Working Groups on Crisis Response, Legal Frameworks, Technical Approaches (including algorithmic amplification), and Positive Interventions.

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.** In 2021 the United States continued its efforts with government, tech company, civil society, and other expert stakeholders to develop the OECD’s Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content (TVEC) Voluntary Transparency Reporting Framework (VTRF). The aim of the VTRF as a tool is to increase voluntary reporting by all platforms of all sizes to help build the evidence base for sound policy-making as well as to avoid regulatory fragmentation. The first phase of the OECD TVEC VTRF project was effectively completed under the auspices of the OECD Committee on Digital Economy Policy in 2021. A basic reporting template is expected to be released publicly in 2022, to allow implementation and feedback from tech companies to inform further work.

**Aqaba Process.** In 2021 the United States participated with other governments, private-sector companies, and selected stakeholders in Jordan’s counterterrorism-focused Aqaba Process. King Abdullah II of Jordan launched the Aqaba Process in 2015 as an informal international platform that aimed to bring together government decisionmakers and other stakeholders to coordinate, at a strategic level, confronting terrorists and violent extremists both offline and online. Jordan started the Aqaba Process to address the need for a holistic approach that addresses all terrorist threats collectively and simultaneously, sometimes regionally or thematically. Jordan co-chaired with the United States the first Aqaba Process Tech Meeting in Napa, California, in 2019.

**Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens and Recruitment**

**Countering Violent Extremism**
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) refers to proactive assistance and engagements designed to reduce the ability of violent extremist groups and their affiliates and adherents to influence, radicalize, recruit, and mobilize individuals and communities to terrorism and violent extremism. Countering radicalization and recruitment to violence is an essential counterterrorism tool. The U.S. government’s strategy to minimize the impact of terrorism and violent extremism includes efforts to build the capacity of local actors to address their drivers at the source. CVE requires a comprehensive rule-of-law-based and human-rights-respecting approach involving national and local governments, religious leaders, civil society, educators, women, youth, the private sector, and affected communities. In 2021, through bilateral and multilateral engagement, the Counterterrorism Bureau (the CT Bureau) emphasized four key areas in strategy formulation, diplomatic engagement, and foreign assistance programming: 1) countering racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism; 2) countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes; 3) rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters and associated family members; and 4) strategic messaging. The CT Bureau partnered with government officials, community leaders, NGOs, mental health professionals and social workers, religious figures, and others to build a prevention architecture to counter radicalization and recruitment to violence.
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
The CT Bureau increased its efforts to combat racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE). REMVE — in particular, white-identity terrorism — continues to be a threat to the global community, with violence both on the rise and spreading geographically, as white-supremacist and nativist movements and individuals increasingly target immigrants; Jewish, Muslim, and other religious minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and/or intersex individuals; governments; and other perceived enemies. The CT Bureau is working with law enforcement, civil society, social services, and foreign partners to take concrete actions to address this growing threat. In October the CT Bureau sponsored REMVE-focused workshops in Bratislava and Brussels to increase awareness of and political will to counter the threat from REMVE with European partners.

Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes
The CT Bureau continued promoting U.S. policy on this issue in bilateral and multilateral engagements. As global attention on preventing and countering terrorists’ exploitation of internet-based platforms continues to grow, the CT Bureau worked to ensure the U.S. response was measured and aligned with U.S. policy and legal frameworks for internet freedom and freedom of expression. The United States believes that protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, is an important part of our counterterrorism strategy because increased censorship and other restrictions on human rights can actually undermine counterterrorism efforts and lead to greater instances of terrorist radicalization. The CT Bureau played a leading role in coordinating and negotiating language that promoted U.S. policy consistent with our longstanding guiding principles.

The United States endorsed the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online in May, and the CT Bureau worked to ensure the U.S. position was reflected in the G-7 Statement on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online, as well as the G-20 leaders’ statement. The CT Bureau engaged regularly with technology companies to improve voluntary information sharing, particularly on the presence of designated terrorist organizations and their members online, as well as terrorist trends and tactics. The CT Bureau also engaged regularly with the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), including participating in a GIFCT working group, and UN-affiliated Tech Against Terrorism, demonstrating the U.S. approach in working collaboratively with the private sector and other stakeholders such as civil society organizations to counter the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist fighters and their family members has continued to be a pressing concern for the global community. The CT Bureau coordinated global engagement on the rehabilitation and reintegration of FTF families repatriated from Syria and Iraq, though pandemic restrictions complicated these efforts. The bureau sponsored practitioner exchanges and partnered with the Government of Kazakhstan on a side event at the OSCE’s counterterrorism conference in Vienna in March to share best practices on rehabilitation and reintegration. The CT Bureau also supported rehabilitation and reintegration training for civil society organizations in Indonesia. These engagements, which emphasized the importance of providing returnees with psychosocial services and involving community-level stakeholders in
the reintegration process, led multiple countries to agree to repatriate their citizens and update their approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration, which could, in turn, encourage other nations to agree to repatriate their citizens from Syria and Iraq.

**Strategic Messaging**

The CT Bureau continues to work with the Global Engagement Center’s Resiliency Campaign focused on Iraq, Syria, and Jordan as part of the Defeat-ISIS effort. This campaign focused on four areas: 1) creating a local environment inhospitable to ISIS; 2) sustaining global support to defeat ISIS; 3) portraying ISIS as another failed movement; and 4) reducing ISIS’s ability to disseminate propaganda used to recruit, radicalize, or mobilize supporters. This campaign brought together elements within the U.S. Department of Defense to coordinate messaging efforts within specified countries.

The CT Bureau in coordination with Hedayah — the Abu Dhabi-based CVE Center of Excellence — trained and supported government and civil society officials from Kosovo and Kyrgyzstan in developing communication strategies to complement CVE national action plans, building positive messaging campaigns, and developing interventions and better understanding of the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.

ASEAN in 2019 adopted the Bali Work Plan to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism 2019-25. The objective of this workplan is to provide an implementation framework to guide relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies, organs, and entities in carrying out the necessary activities and monitor effectiveness in preventing and countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. In 2021 the CT Bureau, in coordination with ASEAN and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office to ASEAN, supported programs that counter disinformation by providing consultations and presentations on media literacy and critical thinking skills in Indonesia. Regionally, in Southeast Asia, the CT Bureau also supported the USAID Office’s program “ASEAN Training of Trainers Program to Address Disinformation and Promote Media Literacy.”

**International Platforms to Advance CVE**

In 2021 the CT Bureau maintained robust support for key international platforms that serve to push global CVE initiatives, while sharing the burden of CVE programs with global partners. In the past year, the CT Bureau has helped multilateral institutions raise millions of dollars for local CVE programming in targeted localities.

- **Strong Cities Network:** The Strong Cities Network (SCN) launched in 2015 at the UN General Assembly with support from the United States. With 25 founding members, the SCN now includes more than 150 local governments across six continents. The SCN provides local governments with a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned on CVE, including through global summits, regional workshops, exchanges, and an online portal. The London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue serves as the SCN secretariat and conducts in-depth capacity building training and mentorship to members in Central Asia, East and West Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Balkans. With support from the United States, SCN members in Bangladesh, Kenya, and North Macedonia have developed local action plans,
while engagement between U.S. mayors and their global counterparts will increase in 2022.

- **Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund:** The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) supported 35 active grants in 14 partner countries: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. In November, the CT Bureau participated in high-level site visits to Tirana, Albania, and to Kosovo to see the newly launched rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) initiative in the Western Balkans. The CT Bureau also supported GCERF’s efforts to establish a Regional Accelerated Funding Panel consisting of national governments, the donor community, and key actors in the R&R landscape to ensure effective coordination and impact in the Western Balkan region. Additionally, GCERF continued to increase its international donor base and contributions, with Niger joining as both a donor and recipient country. Since GCERF’s inception five years ago, 17 international donors have provided roughly $150 million for the organization, complementing U.S. contributions of about $21 million. In 2021, Niger became the first partner and donor country for GCERF. To date, several private sector organizations have provided in-kind contributions. Estimated conservatively, GCERF projects have reached 2.2 million direct beneficiaries and 13.2 million indirect beneficiaries. GCERF launched its 2021-25 Replenishment Campaign, led by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Through this campaign, GCERF aims to raise an additional $120 million to provide better alternatives for two million people directly at risk of radicalization and recruitment, and to build a safety net among 10 million other people in their communities in more than 20 countries.

- **Hedayah:** In 2021, Hedayah continued advising and assisting governments and training civil society in CVE strategies and approaches, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, and rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters and associated family members. Hedayah also continued to support Tunisia and Tajikistan, to develop and disseminate countermessaging content for vulnerable communities, build resiliency to terrorist narratives to counter the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, improve government awareness of CVE strategic communication approaches, and assist governments in implementing their CVE national action plans. In direct response to the ongoing global need to address returning FTFs, Hedayah continued to promote its Blueprint of a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center: Guiding Principles for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Family Members. In 2021, Hedayah raised almost $13 million for programs and operating expenses from donors including Australia, Japan, Spain, the UAE, the UK, the United States, and the EU.

More broadly, the CT Bureau leveraged other U.S. and donor government support for Hedayah programming — including USAID support for CVE communications work in Kenya.
Civilian Counterterrorism Capacity Building Programs

As the terrorist threat has evolved and significantly expanded geographically in recent years, it has become clear that mitigating this threat depends on the political will and enhanced capabilities of our partners to counter terrorism. To succeed over the long term, the United States must have partners who not only prevent, disrupt, and degrade networks militarily or through law enforcement — while comporting with international laws and norms — but also leverage robust civilian capabilities. The United States needs partners in law enforcement, the justice sector, and corrections that can prevent and disrupt attacks and investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists and their facilitation networks.

The United States supports various programs to build partners’ law enforcement capacity to counter terrorism, including by strengthening the ability of justice and corrections officials to counter terrorism. The CT Bureau funds, plans, and oversees capacity building programs that provide law enforcement and criminal justice officials with the tools needed to address security vulnerabilities and counter terrorist threats on their own.

- The Antiterrorism Assistance program
- The Countering Terrorism Finance program
- Counterterrorism Engagement With Allies
- The Terrorist Interdiction Program
- The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund

In 2021, CT resources allowed the Department of State to significantly expand civilian law enforcement counterterrorism capacity building activities with key partner nations in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and other regions to mitigate the threat posed by FTFs, prevent and counter terrorist safe havens and recruitment, and counter Iran-sponsored terrorism.

Counterterrorism programs enabled multiple partner nations to pursue terrorist organizations and share information with U.S. law enforcement agencies charged with global counterterrorism operations. Counterterrorism support strengthened security at airports and land borders, augmenting security for direct flights to the United States. CT programs also supported multilateral efforts to strengthen law enforcement and build CVE capabilities. Recipient law enforcement organizations have used the skills and assistance to crack down on terrorists globally and save hundreds of lives from planned attacks.

Rewards for Justice

The Department of State’s national security rewards program, Rewards for Justice (RFJ), was established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-533 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2708). Rewards for Justice is managed by the Diplomatic Security Service. RFJ’s goal is to generate information that helps protect U.S. national security.

Under this program, the Secretary of State may authorize reward payments to individuals who furnish information leading to the arrest or conviction of anyone for committing, or conspiring or
attempting, or aiding or abetting, an act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property; the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property, including by dismantling an organization in whole or significant part; the identification or location of an individual who holds a key leadership position in a terrorist organization; or the disruption of financial mechanisms of a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Pursuant to legislative amendments, the Secretary may also authorize reward payments to individuals who furnish certain other national security information related to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and foreign election interference.

Since RFJ’s inception in 1984, the Secretary has authorized payments of more than $250 million through this program to individuals who provided actionable information that helped resolve threats to national security and continued to do so in 2021.

To generate leads, RFJ issues reward offers for information covered by its statutory authority. In 2021 the RFJ program announced the following new reward offers for information:

**January 12.** A reward of up to $7 million for information on Muhammad Abbatay, known as ’Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. Al-Maghrebi is an Iran-based key leader of al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the longtime director of AQ’s media arm, al-Sahab, and is the son-in-law and senior advisor to former AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

**March 29.** A reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the location or identification of Salim Jamil Ayyash, a senior operative in the assassination unit of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah, or information leading to preventing him from engaging in an act of international terrorism against a U.S. person or U.S. property.

**April 13.** A reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the location, recovery, and safe return of U.S. citizen Abdulbari al-Kotf, who was taken from his home in Sana’a, Yemen, in 2018.

**May 18.** A reward of up to $5 million for information concerning the kidnapping of Cydney Mizell, a humanitarian aid worker who went missing in Afghanistan in 2008.

**June 2.** A reward of up to $7 million for information leading to the location or identification of Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, the leader of the terrorist organization al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.

**November 2.** A reward of up to $5 million for information leading to those responsible for the 2019 abduction of U.S. citizen Ihsan Ashour in Baghdad.

**December 20.** A reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of anyone involved in the 2015 terrorist attack that left U.S. citizen Avijit Roy dead and his wife, Rafida Bonya Ahmed, seriously injured in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Throughout 2021, RFJ readvertised reward offers across the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, for:

- Information leading to the identification or location of terrorist senior leaders
- Information on those responsible for terrorist attacks or terrorism-related kidnappings
- Information leading to the disruption of Hizballah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps financial networks
- Information on past, planned, or future attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions or personnel

**Support for Pakistan**

The United States continues to cooperate with Pakistan on regional security and counterterrorism. The U.S. government provides robust law enforcement, counternarcotics, and rule of law assistance for Pakistan, as well as limited defense, counterterrorism, and anti-money laundering assistance.

The United States also continues to provide civilian assistance on a focused set of priorities. The United States and Pakistan cooperate to address COVID-19 and other infectious diseases, with the United States providing nearly 38 million COVID-19 vaccine doses and $35.4 million for COVID-19-related assistance in 2021. The United States also provides assistance to support trade and economic growth, including partnering with U.S. businesses, civil society, and the regions bordering Afghanistan. This assistance is intended to improve the lives of the Pakistani people and support U.S. objectives. The United States continues to support people-to-people exchanges to alleviate misunderstandings and complications in the bilateral relationship.

The table below shows bilateral assistance provided to Pakistan for fiscal years FY 2019, FY 2020, and FY 2021.

<table>
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<th>Account</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Bilateral Foreign Assistance*</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>73.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Peace Title II</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Figures in millions, U.S. $
Counterterrorism Coordination With Saudi Arabia

**Countering Violent Extremism.** In 2021, Saudi Arabia continued to be a premier counterterrorism partner of the United States. Saudi authorities worked closely with the United States to implement counterterrorism commitments and remained eager to enhance defense and security cooperation with the United States, including on countering violent extremism (CVE) issues. Regular high-level consultations and cooperation with the United States played a crucial role in the Saudi government’s ability to address domestic and regional terrorism threats, and U.S. government-implemented programs helped Saudi Arabia increase its capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. Saudi Arabia maintained adequate legal frameworks, security forces, and institutional preparedness to combat extremist threats. The main threat was the Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthis, whose cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia totaled over 400 in 2021, more than double the number of attacks in 2020. Saudi Arabia remained a regional leader in countering terrorist financing, hosting the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center that brings together the United States and Persian Gulf region partners to confront new and evolving networks and lead efforts on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures.

On the multilateral front, Saudi Arabia worked closely on capacity building efforts to increase regional cooperation, minimize duplication of efforts, enhance information sharing, and address border security gaps. Saudi leadership worked to advance counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim-majority states, including through the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. Saudi Arabia participated actively in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and provided significant support in facilitating U.S. military operations in the region.

Saudi CVE activities concentrated on identifying pathways to terrorist radicalization and recruitment with a heavy emphasis on the close monitoring of social media and other internet activity. CVE institutions focused on refuting extremist interpretations of Islam, emphasizing nationalism, and cultivating appreciation for Saudi culture and heritage as the basis for national identity. Saudi Arabia’s ideological approach to countering terrorist propaganda also included family outreach initiatives; integration of gender considerations in CVE work; and public messaging campaigns to amplify moderate voices in mainstream media, mosques, Islamic organizations, community centers, and prisons, to curb the appeal of radical ideology and to counter extremist messages. Security authorities continued to employ the Center for Counseling and Care to deprogram, monitor, and rehabilitate former Saudi terrorists or foreign fighters.

With the goal of reducing the potential for interfaith extremism and terrorist acts, the Saudi government-affiliated Muslim World League promoted tolerance and encouraged interfaith dialogue through religious conferences and visits that brought Saudi religious scholars together with counterparts from other faiths to increase acceptance of other religions. The Saudi government made further progress in revising textbooks used in the public K-12 curriculum to reduce intolerant and extremist content. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Call, and Guidance issued circulars to every Saudi mosque that included a directive to remove extremist literature and a prohibition on proselytizing. In contrast, antisemitic language was used in several Friday sermons at the Two Holy Mosques. Social, legal, economic, and political discrimination against the country’s Shia minority continued. The Saudi government’s potential use of terrorism laws to prosecute political dissidents remained a concern.
U.S. Agency for Global Media Initiatives:
Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences

This section is provided by the U.S. Agency for Global Media.


Visas for Participants in United States Programs

The Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs’ visa policies and procedures have two fundamental missions: 1) protecting national security by helping secure U.S. borders against actual or potential threats, while 2) facilitating legitimate travel and international exchange. Focusing on these two missions safeguards our nation’s borders and ensures efficient adjudications of visa applications for individuals seeking to participate in visitor exchange programs.

Visa applicants are subject to a thorough interagency screening process that draws on biographic and biometric data. Some applications may undergo further interagency screening and vetting after the interview. Because of this, program sponsors and applicants should coordinate to initiate visa applications well in advance of planned travel. We advise applicants to obtain passports immediately, as they must have a passport to apply for a visa.

USAID Basic Education in Muslim-Majority Countries

The U.S. Government Strategy on International Basic Education for Fiscal Years 2019-23 (the Strategy) was released on September 14, 2018. The Strategy demonstrates the U.S. government’s commitment to international education and presents an opportunity to advance global diplomatic and development leadership on pressing international education challenges, as called for in the Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development (aka READ) Act, Division 2, P.L. 115-56. The goal of the Strategy is to achieve a world where education systems in partner countries enable all individuals to acquire the education and skills needed to be productive members of society. To accomplish this goal, the U.S. government has two principal objectives: 1) improve learning outcomes; and 2) expand access to quality basic education for all, particularly marginalized populations. The U.S. government recognizes that its investments in international education serve as a force multiplier for all its work in international development. Strengthening education systems in developing countries advances U.S. foreign policy goals, promotes U.S. and international security, and helps accelerate economic growth at home and abroad.

Under the U.S. Government Strategy on International Basic Education, agencies and departments are working together to improve learning outcomes and expand access to quality basic education for all. The U.S. Government Support to Basic Education Map and the Fiscal Year 2020 U.S. Government Strategy Report to Congress highlight where the U.S. government is working,
program education levels for each country, and examples of the type of coordination that is currently happening across agencies.

The USAID Education Policy, released in 2018, further articulates the Agency’s vision and direction for supporting partner countries in strengthening their capacity to deliver quality learning opportunities for children and youth. The primary purpose of programming in education by USAID is to achieve sustained, measurable improvements in learning outcomes and skills development. The policy applies to education programming across all levels (from preprimary through higher education), contexts (stable contexts to crisis and conflict-affected environments), settings (formal and nonformal), and providers (state and nonstate). The principles laid out in the policy drive decision making for new education investments supporting the vision that partner country education systems must enable all children and youths to acquire the education and skills needed to be productive members of society.

Economic Reform in Muslim-Majority Countries

Chapter 5. Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters. Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments.

In 2021 the Department of State designated Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) — of ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC), ISIS-Mozambique, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) — and Segunda Marquetalia as FTOs. The Department also amended the FTO designation of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) to add additional aliases. The Department revoked the designations of Ansarallah, which had been designated earlier that year, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

On May 20, 2022, the Department announced revocation of five Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations: 1) Basque Fatherland and Liberty, 2) Aum Shinrikyo, 3) Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, 4) Kahane Chai, and 5) Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Although these revocations occurred outside of the reporting period for this report, they have been included in the 2021 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT) to avoid confusion. Please refer to previous editions of the CRT for further information about these groups.

Legal Criteria for Designation Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as Amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.

3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
### U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2021

#### AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Dine</td>
<td>AAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
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#### EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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<td>Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army</td>
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<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/</td>
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<td>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</td>
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<td>Army of Islam</td>
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<td><strong>Hamas</strong></td>
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<td>Harakat Sawa’d Misr Harakat</td>
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<td><strong>ISIS Sinai Province</strong></td>
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<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</td>
<td><strong>IRGC</strong></td>
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<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya</td>
<td><strong>ISIL-Libya</strong></td>
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<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>Kata’iib Hizbullah</td>
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<td><strong>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem</td>
<td><strong>MSC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine Islamic Jihad</td>
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<td><strong>Palestine Liberation Front–Abu Abbas Faction</strong></td>
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<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command</td>
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**SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

| Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent | **AQIS** |
| Haqqani Network | **HQN** |
| Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami | **HUJI** |
| Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh | **HUJI-B** |
| Harakat ul-Mujahideen | **HUM** |
| Hizbul Mujahideen | **HM** |
| Indian Mujahideen | **IM** |
| Islamic Jihad Union | **IJJU** |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan | **IMU** |
| **ISIS-Bangladesh** | **ISIS-K** |
| ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K) | **ISIS-K** |
| Jaish-e-Mohammed | **JeM** |
| Jaysh al-Adl | **JeM** |
| Lashkar e-Tayyiba | **LeT** |
| Lashkar i Jhangvi | **LJ** |
| Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam | **LTTE** |
| Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan | **TTP** |

**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

| National Liberation Army | **ELN** |
| Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army | **FARC-EP** |
| Segunda Marquetalia | **SL** |
| Shining Path | **SL** |
AFRICA

Ansar al-Dine

Aka Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine;
Defenders of the Faith

Description: The Mali-based group Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia on the civilian population living in the areas under its control.

Beginning in 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers it had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).


Activities: In 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group’s laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but it increased its activities between 2015 and 2017, conducting multiple attacks against UN, French, and Malian forces.

AAD did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD is also said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.
**Boko Haram**

*Aka* Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad

**Description:** Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in the northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led BH to split. Shekau maintained a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction became known as BH, while al-Barnawi’s group separated and was designated as ISIS-West Africa. On May 19, 2021, Shekau was reportedly killed during a clash with ISIS-West Africa.

**Activities:** BH crosses porous Lake Chad-region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

In 2014, BH kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. BH has continued to abduct women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members.

During 2017 and 2018, BH increased its forced abduction of women and girls and ordered them to carry out suicide attacks on civilians. During 2019, BH reportedly killed at least 275 people, mostly civilians, and displaced thousands in the Far North Region of Cameroon.

In 2020, suspected BH fighters attacked trucks carrying passengers along a military checkpoint in Nigeria, killing at least 30 people; killed at least 92 Chadian soldiers in Boma, Chad; attacked villages in northeast Nigeria and killing hundreds of people; and claimed responsibility for the abduction of more than 330 students from an all-boys school in Nigeria’s northern Katsina State.

In February 2021, suspected Boko Haram militants launched rocket-propelled grenades into densely populated areas from the outskirts of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least 10 people. In August, hundreds of Boko Haram fighters attacked a military post in southern Niger, killing at least 16 soldiers and wounding at least nine others.

**Strength:** BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.
Location/Area of Operation: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria

Funding and External Aid: BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and bank robberies.

**ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Aka ISIS-DRC; Allied Democratic Forces, Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahideen; City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors; Islamic State Central Africa Province; Wilayah Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa Media Office; Wilayah Wasat Ifriqiyah; ISIS-Central Africa

Description: ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) was designated as an FTO on March 11, 2021. ISIS-DRC is responsible for many attacks across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in eastern DRC. Under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku, ISIS-DRC has been notorious in this region for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-DRC attacked the villages of Kamwiri, Kitsimba, and Lisasa in Beni, North Kivu Province, killing 21 people, abducting 20 others, and desecrating the Catholic Church in Lisasa. Also in 2020, ISIS-DRC launched an attack on Kangbayi Central Prison in Beni, freeing 1,337 detainees.

In 2021, ISIS-DRC attacked displacement camps near the towns of Boga and Tchabi in Ituri Province, killing 57 people and abducting 25 others. Also in 2021, ISIS-DRC conducted simultaneous suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed three people and wounded 33 others.

Strength: ISIS-DRC was assessed in 2019 to have at least 400 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Funding and External Aid: Although ISIS-DRC’s sources of funding remain largely unknown, the group probably does receive some support from ISIS. The group has seized weapons and ammunition from the Congolese military.

**ISIS in the Greater Sahara**

Aka ISIS-GS; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Islamic Sahel

Description: ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in 2016.
Activities: In 2017, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol in the region of Tongo Tongo, Niger, which killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers. In 2018, ISIS-GS was reportedly involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali and Niger, including ones that targeted French troops and civilians. In 2019, ISIS-GS attacked a Malian military base, killing 54 soldiers.

In 2020, ISIS-GS militants attacked a Nigerien military base on the border between Niger and Mali, killing 89 soldiers, and were suspected of killing 6 French NGO workers, their Nigerien guide, and 1 other Nigerien citizen near Niamey, Niger.

In 2021, French forces killed the leader of ISIS-GS, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, in a strike in southern Mali. Also in 2021, ISIS-GS claimed to have kidnapped and killed five Christian civilians at a roadblock between Gao and Niamey, Niger.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ISIS-Mozambique

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Helpers of Tradition; Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa; Adherents to the Traditions and the Community; al-Shabaab in Mozambique; Islamic State Central Africa province; Wilayah Central Africa; Ansaar Kalimat Allah; Supporters of the Word of Allah

Description: ISIS-Mozambique reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as April 2018, and was acknowledged by ISIS as an affiliate in 2019. Since 2017, ISIS-Mozambique, led by Abu Yasir Hassan, has killed more than 1,300 civilians, and it is estimated that more than 2,300 civilians, security force members, and suspected ISIS-Mozambique militants have been killed since the terrorist group began its violent extremist insurgency.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-Mozambique launched a series of large-scale attacks that resulted in the capture of the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province (CDP) and killed at least 55 soldiers. In 2021, ISIS-Mozambique attacked the town of Palma for four days, killing dozens of local civilians and foreign expatriate workers and looting about $1 million from banks. Also in 2021, ISIS-Mozambique attacked three villages in Quissanga District, CDP, killing 17 civilians.

Strength: ISIS-Mozambique is estimated to have up to 800 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mozambique

Funding and External Aid: Although sources of funding remain unclear, the group has targeted banks in previous operations. The area’s natural resources — including gas, gems, timber, and wildlife — present opportunities for fund-raising. In addition, the group has taken
control of food supplies in areas under its control and has captured weapons from government security forces.

**ISIS-West Africa**

**Aka** Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA

**Description:** ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2015 a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge, and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

**Activities:** ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region since 2016.

In 2019, ISIS-WA attacked the convoy of the then-governor of Borno State as it drove from the capital of Maiduguri to a town near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, killing as many as 10 people. In 2019, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for two attacks in western Niger, ambushing Niger Army soldiers in Tongo Tongo, resulting in 28 deaths, while also attacking Niger security forces near the Koutoukalé prison that killed 1 soldier.

In 2019, ISIS-WA fighters launched an attack against a military base near Baga in the Lake Chad area, killing 20 Nigerian and five Chadian soldiers. Also in 2019, ISIS-WA attacked a convoy of Action Against Hunger (AAH) and Nigerian health ministry employees in northeastern Nigeria. One AAH driver was killed during the attack, while five persons were taken hostage; ISIS-WA claimed to have killed four of the hostages by year’s end. Later that year, ISIS-WA released a video showing the execution of 11 reported Christians and claimed the killings were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In 2020, ISIS-WA attacked the convoy of the Borno State governor in northeastern Nigeria, killing 15 security personnel. Also in 2020, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for two attacks in the Monguno and Nganzai areas in northeastern Nigeria, killing 20 soldiers and 40 civilians. ISIS-WA also claimed responsibility for raiding a village in the Gubio area, killing 81 people. Later that year, ISIS-WA fighters kidnapped a humanitarian aid worker and two local officials at a checkpoint in the village of Wakilti in Borno State.

In 2021, ISIS-WA fighters launched an attack on a military base near the town of Ajiri in Borno State, killing 5 soldiers, 15 JTF militia members, and 10 civilians, and was responsible for killing a Nigerian Army general and three soldiers during an attack on the local government area Askira Uba in Borno State.

**Strength:** ISIS-WA has an estimated 3,500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region
**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, the capture of military supplies, taxes, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

**Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin**

AKA Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen

**Description:** Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its 2017 formation. That year the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. Multiple JNIM senior leaders have been killed in recent years, including JNIM’s former second in command, Ali Maychou, in 2019, senior JNIM commander Bah Ag Moussa in 2020, and senior leader Abdallaye Ag Albaka in 2021.

**Activities:** In 2017, JNIM carried out an attack at a resort frequented by westerners outside of Bamako, Mali, and was responsible for the large-scale coordinated attacks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in 2018.

In 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an African Defeat-ISIS Coalition base in Mali that killed at least 6 persons and a truck bomb in a residential complex in Gao, killing 3 and injuring 30. In 2019, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack against a UN base in northern Mali, killing 10 Chadian Peacekeepers and wounding 25 others; an assault on a Malian military base, killing 11 soldiers; and a landmine under a passenger bus in central Mali, killing 14 civilians and injuring another 24.

In 2020, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack against a Malian military camp near the border with Mauritania that killed 20 members of Mali’s security forces and wounded 5 others and a March raid on a Malian Army base in the northern town of Tarkint that killed at least 29 soldiers and wounded 5 others.

In 2021, JNIM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks including an April attack on a UN Peacekeeper camp in northern Mali that killed four Chadian Peacekeepers and wounded 34 others; an October complex IED attack in central Mali that killed 16 Malian soldiers and wounded 11 others; and multiple smaller attacks on Malian soldiers throughout the year. JNIM also claimed responsibility for the April abduction of a French reporter working in Mali.

**Strength:** JNIM is estimated to have between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger
**Funding and External Aid:** JNIM receives funding through kidnapping for ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

**Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan**

**Aka** Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan

**Description:** Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. Ansaru publicly splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with Boko Haram’s objectives and struggle, but it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

**Activities:** In 2012, Ansaru kidnapped a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali. In 2013, Ansaru kidnapped and subsequently killed seven international construction workers.


**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru’s membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**al-Murabitoun**

**Aka** al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those Who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; the Sentinels

**Description:** Al-Murabitoun was designated as an FTO on December 19, 2013, originally under the name al-Mulathamun Battalion. Al-Murabitoun was originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but became a separate organization in 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. After the split, Belmokhtar threatened to fight against western interests and announced the creation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion. In 2013 the al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-

**Activities:** In 2013, what is now known as al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. More than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including 3 U.S. citizens.

In 2013, al-Murabitoun participated in twin suicide bombings on a northern Nigerien military base and a French uranium mine in Arlit, Niger. The coordinated attacks killed more than 20 people, including all the attackers.

In 2015, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for an attack at La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali, that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians. Al-Murabitoun also claimed responsibility for the 2015 hotel siege in central Mali that killed 17 people. Also in 2015, al-Murabitoun operatives participated in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking more than 170 people hostage — including U.S. citizens. At least 26 people were killed in the attack, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Al-Murabitoun was reportedly involved in the 2016 AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen. In addition, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for a 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and injured more than 115. In 2018, al-Murabitoun was involved in fighting against French forces in Mali. Al-Murabitoun did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities.

**al-Shabaab**

**Aka** Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra; al Hijra; Muslim Youth Center; the Youth; MYC MYM; Pumwani Muslim Youth; Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islam; al-Shabaab al-Jihaad; the Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement

**Description:** Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated
militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The group’s leader is Ahmed Diriye, aka Ahmed Umar, aka Abu Ubaidah.

Composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters, Al-Shabaab since 2011 has seen its military capacity reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces and to clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab’s loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. The group has claimed responsibility for several high-profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. Al-Shabaab has assassinated numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

In 2010, Al-Shabaab was responsible for suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda — its first attacks outside of Somalia. The attacks, which took place during the World Cup, killed 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. In 2013, al-Shabaab staged a significant attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The multiday siege resulted in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as 6 soldiers and police officers. Hundreds of others were injured. In 2015, al-Shabaab carried out a raid with small arms and grenades on Kenya’s Garissa University College that killed 148 people.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia in 2016. Using a VBIED and small arms fire, al-Shabaab assembled against a Kenyan AMISOM base and killed more than 100 soldiers. Also, that year, al-Shabaab attempted to down Daallo Airlines Flight 159 with 74 passengers on board, but only the suicide bomber was killed in the explosion.

In 2017, al-Shabaab is believed to have conducted a double truck bombing in a Mogadishu intersection with heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic that killed more than 500 people and injured 300 others.

Al-Shabaab was involved in more than 1,000 violent events in Somalia and eastern Kenya in 2019. In 2020, al-Shabaab fighters attacked the United States Armed Forces’ Camp Simba in Manda Bay, killing 3 U.S. citizens; attacked a Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) convoy with small arms and grenades in Mandera County, Kenya, killing 1; detonated a car bomb at the gates of the Elite Hotel in Mogadishu, starting a four-hour gun battle with security official that killed at least 16 people; and claimed responsibility for killing 24 Somali troops in the Afgooye District, northwest of Mogadishu.
In January a suicide bomber on a motorcycle attacked a Turkish construction company in Mogadishu, killing at least 5 people and wounding at least 14 others. In April, at least 7 persons were killed and more than 11 others were injured when an al-Shabaab vehicle exploded outside of a police headquarters in Somalia’s capital city. In August, al-Shabaab fighters stormed a military base and recaptured the town of Amara, which it had lost to government forces earlier that month. In September, al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb at a Presidential Palace checkpoint in Mogadishu, killing at least eight persons. In November, al-Shabaab was responsible for a large explosion outside a school in Mogadishu that killed at least eight people, including students.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 9,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda

**Funding and External Aid:** Al-Shabaab receives enough income to launch attacks throughout Somalia, including against AMISOM bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, “taxation” of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

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**al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb**

**Aka** AQIM; GSPC; *Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat*; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya

**Description:** The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation in 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida in 2006 and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the primary name of the group. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow “apostate” African regimes and create an Islamic state. Following the death of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, who was killed in 2020 by French forces, the group chose Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi as Droukdel’s successor.

**Activities:** Following AQIM’s 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers, which killed 60 people, AQIM’s northern leadership was contained to northeastern Algeria, while the group’s southern battalions focused mostly on kidnapping-for-ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation across Libya, Mali, and Tunisia to expand its operations. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. In 2014, AQIM killed 14 Algerian soldiers in an ambush east of Algiers.
In 2015, AQIM claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on UN personnel in Mali that killed and wounded UN Peacekeepers, and, in cooperation with other terrorist groups, attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking more than 170 hostages, including U.S. citizens. As many as 27 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker.

In 2016, AQIM carried out an attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed 28 people and injured 56 others. Also in 2016, AQIM claimed responsibility for a strike on a popular tourist beach resort in Côte d’Ivoire that killed more than 16 people and wounded another 33. In 2017, AQIM conducted a suicide attack that left more than 50 people dead in Gao, Mali. In 2018, AQIM claimed responsibility for a vehicle suicide attack on an army patrol in Gao that killed 4 civilians and wounded 31 others, including 4 French soldiers.

In 2019, AQIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a UN camp in northern Mali, killing 10 Peacekeepers and wounding 25 others. In 2020, AQIM engaged in clashes with Algerian security forces during sweeping operations in which AQIM primarily used IEDs and small arms.

AQIM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** AQIM has an estimated 1,000 fighters operating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia

**Funding and External Aid:** AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally and receives limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.

**EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC**

**Abu Sayyaf Group**

**Aka** al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement)

**Description:** The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and elements of the group have ties to ISIS’s regional affiliate, ISIS-Philippines.

**Activities:** ASG has committed kidnappings for ransom, bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion.
Throughout 2015, ASG was responsible for multiple attacks, kidnappings, and the killing of hostages. In 2016 and 2017 the group conducted kidnapping-for-ransom operations targeting Canadian, Filipino, German, and Norwegian citizens. In 2017, ASG members killed nine persons and injured others in an attack on Basilan Island. In 2018, ASG detonated a car bomb at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen.

In 2019, ASG militants attacked Philippine soldiers on Jolo, resulting in the deaths of two children. That same year, ASG kidnapped two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga Peninsula region, but they were recovered on Jolo during the following month. In August 2020, ASG killed more than a dozen persons and injured over 70 in twin suicide bomb attacks in Sulu province.

In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG member involved in the abduction of two Canadians who were killed in 2016, an ASG bomb expert linked to the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombings, as well as an ASG member involved in a 2001 kidnapping on Basilan.

**Strength:** ASG is estimated to have hundreds of members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The Philippines and Malaysia

**Funding and External Aid:** ASG is funded primarily through its kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Filipino workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG also has received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

**Aum Shinrikyo**

**Aka** A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute; A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho; Aleph; Aum Supreme Truth

**Description:** Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. It was established in 1987 by leader Shoko Asahara and gained legal status in Japan as a religious entity in 1989. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of AUM as a religious organization following the group’s deadly 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo. Despite claims that the group has renounced violence and Asahara’s teachings, concerns remain regarding its continued adherence to the violence. The group now consists of two factions, both of which have recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprises, and acquired property.

**Activities:** In 1995, AUM members released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains simultaneously, killing 13 people and causing up to 6,000 othersto seek medical treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese government revealed that AUM was responsible for other chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed 7 persons and injured about 500 others. Japanese police
arrested Asahara in 1995; in 2004, authorities sentenced him to death for his role in the 1995 attacks.

In 2000, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian AUM followers who planned to detonate bombs in Japan as part of an operation to free Asahara from prison. In 2012 a Japan Airlines flight to the United States turned back after receiving a bomb threat demanding Asahara’s release.

In 2016, Montenegro expelled 58 people associated with AUM found holding a conference at a hotel in Danilovgrad. One month later, Russian authorities carried out raids on 25 AUM properties and opened a criminal investigation into an AUM cell. In 2017, Japanese police raided the offices of a “successor” group to AUM. In 2018, AUM leader Shoko Asahara was executed. AUM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** AUM is estimated to have around 1,500 followers.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Japan and Russia

**Funding and External Aid:** AUM’s funding comes primarily from member contributions and group-run businesses.

### Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army

**Aka** CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; NPP/CPP

**Description:** The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) — the New People’s Army (NPA) — is a Maoist group formed in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, reportedly directs CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front, also lives in the Netherlands. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads.

**Activities:** The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines. In 1987, for example, the group killed three U.S. soldiers in four separate attacks in Angeles. In 1989 the CPP/NPA issued a press statement claiming responsibility for the ambush and murder of Col. James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Ground Forces Division of the Joint U.S.-Military Advisory Group.
Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Peace efforts ended in 2017 after reported violations from both sides, including reports of the CPP/NPA’s continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians.

Over the past several years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces. In 2018, CPP/NPA members used an antipersonnel mine to attack a military patrol in the city of Catarman. The attack killed four soldiers and two civilians. In 2019, CPP/NPA detonated bombs using an improvised land mine in a surprise early morning attack clash on Samar Island, killing six Philippine troops.

In January the CPP/NPA announced the revival of its urban hit squads to target officials whom it alleged had committed “crimes against the public.”

**Strength:** The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

**ISIS-Philippines**

**Aka** ISIS in the Philippines; ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-east Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik, DIWM; Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS’ “Philippines province”

**Description:** ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2014, militants in the Philippines pledged allegiance to ISIS in support of ISIS’s efforts in the region under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon. Some Abu Sayyaf Group factions have been reported to interact and coordinate with ISIS-P, including participating in attacks that are sometimes claimed by ISIS.

**Activities:** In 2016, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for an attack on Basilan Island, which killed one soldier and injured another. In 2017, ISIS-P participated in five months of fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area. In 2018, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed at least 11 people.

In 2019, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for the Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than 100 others.
In 2021, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for several attacks carried out by ISIS-P, including a September ambush on Basilan Island that killed two Philippian soldiers and a November bomb blast on an electrical tower in Maguing, Lanao del Sur.

**Strength:** ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-P receives some financial assistance from ISIS-core but relies mostly on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion. It maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black market purchases of Philippine military arms. It is estimated to have a few dozen foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and some Malaysians) who tend to assume key responsibilities such as financial and communications/media facilitators, bomb makers, trainers, and attack planners/perpetrators. ISIS-P receives some media support from ISIS-core.

**Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid**

Aka JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem’mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99

**Description:** Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) was designated as an FTO on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, the Indonesia-based group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT maintains ties to JI and other terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

**Activities:** JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of numerous Indonesian police and innocent civilians. In 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in central Sulawesi. Since Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2014, many JAT members have joined Indonesia’s ISIS-affiliated groups, while others have joined al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups. Although JAT did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2021, JAT members are believed to have been involved in ISIS operations in Southeast Asia.

**Strength:** JAT is estimated to have several thousand supporters and members. Internal disagreements over aligning with ISIS have likely reduced its membership.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia

**Funding and External Aid:** JAT raises funds through membership donations and legitimate business activities. JAT also has conducted cyber hacking, robbed banks, and carried out other
illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb making materials.

**Jemaah Islamiya**

**Aka** Jemaah Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; JI

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 23, 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. More than 400 JI operatives have been captured or killed since 2002. In January 2021, Abu Bakar Bashir, the group’s former leader at the time of his arrest in 2002, was released from prison after serving more than two thirds of a 15-year sentence for helping establish a terrorist training camp.

**Activities:** Significant JI attacks include the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people, among them 7 U.S. citizens; the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta; the 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and the 2005 suicide bombing in Bali, which killed 26 people.

In 2009 a JI faction claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta that killed 7 persons and injured more than 50, including 7 U.S. citizens. In 2015, 44 policemen and 3 civilians were killed during a raid targeting 2 JI members in Mamasapano on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

In 2019, Indonesian authorities arrested several JI members, including its emir Para Wijayanto. Indonesian police said that between 2013 and 2018, under Wijayanto’s leadership, JI sent at least six groups to Syria for military training or to participate in the fighting. In 2020, Indonesian authorities arrested a JI leader, Aris Sumarsono, who is suspected of being involved in the making of bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta.

In December 2021, Indonesian authorities sentenced JI member Taufiq Bulaga to life in prison after finding him guilty for his role in making bombs for a 2005 Bali bombing. JI did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2021.

**Strength:** Estimates of JI membership vary from 500 to several thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** JI raises funds through membership donations, criminal actions, and business activities. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.
EUROPE

Basque Fatherland and Liberty

Aka ETA; Askatasuna; Batasuna; Ekin; Euskal Herritarrok; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; Herri Batasuna; Jarrai-Haika-Segi; K.A.S.; XAKI; Epanastatiki Pirines; Popular Revolutionary Struggle

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the Spanish Basque provinces of Álava, Guipúzcoa, and Viscaya; the autonomous region of Navarre; and the southwestern French territories of Labourd, Lower Navarre, and Soule.

Activities: ETA primarily has conducted bombings and assassinations against Spanish government officials, businesspersons, politicians, judicial figures, and security and military forces; however, the group also has targeted journalists and major tourist areas. ETA is responsible for killing more than 800 civilians and members of the armed forces and police, as well as injuring thousands, since it formally began its campaign of violence in 1968.

In 2006, ETA exploded a massive car bomb, destroying much of the covered parking garage at Madrid-Barajas International Airport. The group marked its 50th anniversary in 2009 with a series of high-profile and deadly bombings, including an attack on a Civil Guard barracks that injured more than 60 people, including children.

ETA has not conducted any attacks since it announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity” in 2011.

In 2016, authorities seized ETA weapons, including a cache found in a forest north of Paris, and captured the top ETA leader. In 2017, ETA reported that it had relinquished its last weapons caches. In 2018, ETA released a letter announcing the dissolution of its organizational structures. In a 2019 mass trial, a Spanish court accepted a plea deal for 47 ETA members to avoid prison sentences for membership in the group.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Spain and France

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Continuity Irish Republican Army

Aka CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

Description: Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed
wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the Real IRA (RIRA).

**Activities:** CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Also in 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle. In 2020, CIRA claimed responsibility for attaching an IED to a truck destined for an unknown location in England; CIRA had allegedly planned for the bomb to go off on the day the United Kingdom left the European Union. In March 2021, CIRA claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Fermanagh County, Northern Ireland.

**Strength:** CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland

**Funding and External Aid:** CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

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**Real IRA**

Aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh Na Heireann

**Description:** The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001. The group was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the 2005 weapons decommissioning. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members (including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt) for a cease-fire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks. Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after the group renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the group.

**Activities:** Targets have included civilians (the most notorious example is the Omagh bombing in 1998), British security forces, and police officers in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which oversees the peace process, assessed that RIRA likely was
responsible for most of the attacks that occurred after the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was decommissioned in Northern Ireland.

In 2015, Irish police carried out 20 searches aimed at known dissident republicans across Ireland. Six individuals with links to the RIRA and the Continuity Irish Republican Army were arrested after police discovered explosive devices. In 2016 the RIRA bombed the van of an Irish prison officer in east Belfast; the officer died from complications following the attack. Dublin police also linked the RIRA to a cache of explosives found in Dublin in 2016. In 2017, RIRA gunmen fired at police officers in north Belfast, injuring one officer.

**Strength:** The Irish government reports that the RIRA has roughly 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s cease-fire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

**Location/Area of Operation:** United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland

**Funding and External Aid:** RIRA receives funds from money laundering, smuggling, and other criminal activities, is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States, and has attempted to buy weapons from gun dealers in the United States and the Balkans.

**Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front**

**Aka** DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahlı Devimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, and “Front” alludes to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and the Turkish establishment. It strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons.

**Activities:** Since the late 1980s the group primarily has targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials. In 1990 the group began conducting attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. The DHKP/C assassinated two U.S. military contractors, wounded a U.S. Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 2001 the DHKP/C began conducting its first suicide bombing attacks against Turkish police. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used IEDs against official Turkish and U.S. targets.

The DHKP/C was responsible for many high-profile attacks in 2012, including the suicide bombing of a police station in Istanbul. In 2013 a DHKP/C operative exploded a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to Embassy Ankara, killing a Turkish guard and seriously wounding a Turkish journalist. In 2013, three members of the group attacked the Ministry of
Justice and the Ankara headquarters of the Turkish Justice and Development political party, using grenades and rocket launchers.

In 2015 the DHKP/C claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed one police officer and wounded another. That year, Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage and died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by the DHKP/C after police attempted to rescue him. Also that year, two women opened fire on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul; one woman was identified as a member of the DHKP/C.

In 2019, two individuals linked to the DHKP/C were arrested by Turkish security forces after they had entered the Turkish Parliament and taken a staff member hostage.

In 2020, Turkish security forces launched a nationwide operation across 12 provinces, arresting 93 individuals linked to the DHKP/C. Although DHKP/C did not claim any attacks in 2021, Turkish security forces arrested dozens of individuals suspected of being linked to DHKP/C.

Strength: The DHKP/C is estimated to have several dozen members inside Türkiye, with a support network throughout Europe.

Location/Area of Operation: Türkiye and Europe

Funding and External Aid: The DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion. The group raises funds primarily in Europe.

**Revolutionary Struggle**

*Aka Epanastatikos Aghonas*

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on May 18, 2009, Revolutionary Struggle (RS) is a radical Marxist violent extremist group that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups: 17 November and the Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

**Activities:** RS first gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for 2003 bombings at the Athens Courthouse during the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS carried out IED attacks that included a 2004 attack outside a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the 2007 rocket-propelled grenade attack on Embassy Athens, which damaged the building, and the 2009 bombing of a Citibank branch in Athens.

The Greek government has made significant strides in curtailing the group’s terrorist activity. In 2010, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. In 2013, five RS members were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused RS conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Before Maziotis’s recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens in 2014; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties.
In 2016 a Greek court sentenced Maziotis to life in prison plus 129 years. In 2017, Roupa was arrested by Greek police in Athens and later sentenced to life and 25 years’ imprisonment. RS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Greece

**Funding and External Aid:** RS’s sources of funding are unknown, but the group most likely supports itself by means of criminal activities, including bank robbery.

### THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

**Abdallah Azzam Brigades**

**Also known as (aka)** Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uuyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) formally announced its establishment in a 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel earlier that year. The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al-Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

**Activities:** After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers.

In 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. That year, AAB claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded more than 140. In 2014, AAB claimed twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four people. Also, that year, AAB was blamed for a suicide bombing in the Beirut neighborhood of Tayyouneh that killed a security officer and wounded 25 people.

In 2015 the group released photos of a training camp for its “Marwan Hadid Brigade” camp in Syria, likely located in Homs province. From 2016 through 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp. In 2017, AAB called for jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
AAB announced its dissolution in Syria in 2019 and did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Lebanon

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**al-Ashtar Brigades**

Aka Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB

**Description:** Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In 2018, AAB formally adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

**Activities:** Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain. In 2014, AAB conducted a bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates. In 2017, AAB shot and killed another local Bahraini officer. AAB also has promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Uprising-inspired political uprising.

AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq

**Funding and External Aid:** AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

**al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**

Aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists who emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.
**Activities:** During the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002 the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in the country. In 2010 and 2011 the group launched numerous rocket attacks on Israeli communities. In 2012, AAMB claimed that it had fired more than 500 rockets and missiles into Israel during an Israel Defense Forces operation in Gaza. In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast.

AAMB has claimed responsibility for multiple rocket attacks on Israel from the West Bank, including 2 rockets launched in 2017, 6 rockets launched in 2018, and at least 36 rockets launched in 2021.

**Strength:** AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

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**Ansar al-Islam**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

**Description:** Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia.

**Activities:** From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and pro-government militias; seven persons were wounded in the attack.

During 2014, part of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province. AAI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria
**Funding and External Aid:** AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

**Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-B were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens. Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AAS-B controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Mali, and Syria.

In 2017, AAS-B announced its formal dissolution owing to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership and defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Benghazi, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

**Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah**

**Aka** Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.
Activities: Members of AAS-D were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D was believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in that city. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq and Syria.

In 2018, there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the Libyan National Army. AAS-D did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Darnah, Libya

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia

Aka Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine. AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

Activities: AAS-T was involved in the 2012 attack against Embassy Tunis and the American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. Embassy employees. In 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members. AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown

Location/Area of Operation: Libya and Tunisia

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.
Army of Islam

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam

Description: Designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011, the Army of Islam (AOI), founded in late 2005, is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealander, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note: AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

Activities: AOI is responsible for the 2006 and 2007 kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist. AOI also carried out the 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt, and planned the 2011 attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 persons and wounded 100. In 2012, AOI announced that it had launched rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. In 2013 an Israeli official reported that AOI leader Dughmush was running training camps in Gaza.

In 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In 2017 the group released a video meant to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks. In 2020, AOI published more than two dozen images of fighters conducting military training. AOI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt, Gaza, and Israel

Funding and External Aid: AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

Aka: AAH; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq min Al-Iraq; Asaib al Haq; Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq; League of the Righteous; Khazali Network; Khazali Special Group; Qazali Network; the People of the Cave; Khazali Special Groups Network; Al-Tayar al-Risali; the Missionary Current

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 10, 2020, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) — led by Qays and Laith al-Khazali — is an Iran-backed, militant organization. AAH remains ideologically aligned with Iran and loyal to its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining western military forces from the country.
**Activities:** AAH has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces since its creation in 2006. The group has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five U.S. soldiers.

In 2019, two 107-mm rockets were fired at the Taji military training complex, where U.S. personnel provide divisional training. Iraqi security forces arrested two individuals assessed to be members of AAH in connection with the attack.

Also in 2019, AAH members opened fire on a group of protestors trying to set fire to the group’s office in the city of Nasiriya, killing at least six. In February 2021, AAH launched a major rocket attack on the U.S. base in Erbil, in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, followed by additional rocket attacks on Balad Air Base.

**Strength:** AAH membership is estimated at 10,000.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq, Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** AAH receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. AAH also receives funding through illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and “taxing”/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant.

**Asbat al-Ansar**

**Aka** AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-western influences in the country. AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

**Activities:** Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The group remained active in Lebanon but did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.
Location/Area of Operation: AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: AAA likely receives money through international Sunni violent extremist networks.

Gama’a al-Islamiyya

Aka al-Gama’at; Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama’at; IG; Islamic Group

Description: Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in the 1970s, IG was once Egypt’s largest terrorist group. The group’s external wing, composed mainly of exiled members residing in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamist state. IG’s spiritual leader Omar Abd al-Rahman, or the “blind Sheikh,” served a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and died in prison in 2017.

Activities: During the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG is not known to have committed a terrorist attack in recent years; the group did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Hamas

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Hamas was established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017 the group selected a
new leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who is based in Gaza. Hamas remained in de facto control in Gaza in 2021.

Activities: Before 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks. In 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah, the Gaza borders were closed, and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza through the Sinai and maritime routes. Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel beginning in 2008 and concluding in 2009.

During 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Despite the Egypt-mediated cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that year, operatives from Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad coordinated and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv later that year that wounded 29 people.

On July 8, 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza with the intent of preventing rocket fire into Israel; the rocket fire from Gaza had increased following earlier Israeli military operations that targeted Hamas for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel. In 2016 a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20 people.

Hamas was responsible for numerous rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In 2020 the Israeli military accused Hamas of being responsible for launching incendiary devices tied to balloons into Israel, causing more than 400 blazes in southern Israel.

In May 2021, Hamas fought an 11-day war with Israel in which it and other militant groups launched more than 4,000 rockets into Israeli cities. In June the Israeli military accused Hamas of launching incendiary balloons that sparked 20 fires in fields across southern Israel.

Strength: Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon

Funding and External Aid: Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

Harakat Sawa’d Misr

Aka HASM; Harakah Sawa’d Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; HASM Movement; Hassam Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; Movement of Egypt’s Arms; Movement of Egypt’s Forearms; Hassm; Hamms; Hassam; Hasam

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 14, 2021, Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) was formed in Egypt in 2015. With the goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government, HASM attacks Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets.
**Activities:**

In 2016, HASM claimed responsibility for an attack against police officers in Tameeya, Egypt, that killed two policemen and injured another. Later that year, HASM also claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, as well as for an attack on a police checkpoint in Giza, killing six police personnel.

In 2017 the organization claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Egyptian security forces, including the assassination of Egyptian National Security Agency officer Ibrahim Azzazy, as well as for an attack on Burma’s embassy in Cairo.

In 2019, HASM claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack targeting security forces in Giza, killing or wounding 10 soldiers. Later that year, HASM was held responsible for a car bombing on a government health institute in Cairo, killing at least 20 people and injuring dozens. The Egyptian government blamed HASM, though the group denied responsibility. HASM did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

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**Hizballah**

**Aka** Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah

**Description:** Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran, and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad and, like Iran, provides assistance — including fighters — to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

**Activities:** Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which U.S. Navy
diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah was also implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. Hizballah assisted Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, and in 2007 attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers.

In 2012, Hizballah was responsible for an attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria. The explosion killed 5 Israelis and 1 Bulgarian and injured 32 others. In 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying support for the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. Hizballah’s support for Syria’s Assad regime continued into 2021.

In 2017, two Hizballah operatives were arrested in the United States. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal during 2011-12. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003 to 2017.

In 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier and extradited him to Paraguay for prosecution in 2020. In 2019, Hizballah launched attacks directly on the Israeli military, firing antitank missiles targeting an army base and vehicles near the border.

In 2020, Hizballah fighters allegedly fired toward an Israel Defense Forces position in the Israeli town of Menara. In 2020, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed the terrorist group had doubled the size of its Precision Guided Missiles arsenal. Also in 2020, judges at the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon found Hizballah member Salim Ayyash guilty for his central role in the bomb attack in Beirut in 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

In August 2021, Hizballah claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets over Israel’s northern frontier near the Lebanese border.

**Strength:** Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Lebanon and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah — which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually — accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Aka IRGC; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description: Designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran’s military, has played a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

The IRGC was founded in 1979 and since then has gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The organization’s ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the IRGC is also influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks.

The organization is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-QF.

Activities: The IRGC — most prominently through its Qods Force (QF) — directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC in 2011 plotted a brazen attack against the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Türkiye and Kenya for plotting attacks.

An IRGC operative was convicted in 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group. In 2018, Germany uncovered 10 IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. In 2018 a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. citizens. The QF is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

The IRGC is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Persian Gulf. Iran also provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

Strength: The IRGC has upward of 125,000 members.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Gulf

**Funding and External Aid:** The IRGC continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities. In 2017 the IRGC engineered a plot to produce counterfeit currency by deceiving European suppliers to procure advanced printing machinery and other necessary materials. It then printed counterfeit Yemeni bank notes, which were used to support its destabilizing activities in Yemen.

**Islamic State of Iraq and Syria**

Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al-Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; Al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel. In late 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. At that time, his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led the group in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces until his death in 2006.

That year, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2013, it adopted the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate in 2014, but he was killed in 2019. In 2017 the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. Also in 2017, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In 2018 the Syrian Democratic Forces, with support from the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. The year 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate; however, ISIS in Syria remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrates intent to cause attacks abroad, and continues to inspire terrorist attacks around the world.
**Activities:** ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS perpetrated these attacks using foreign, Iraqi, and Syrian operatives. In 2014, ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths that year. ISIS was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria and had participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. In 2015 and 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria. In 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a car bombing at a popular shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people, making it the single deadliest bombing in Iraq’s capital city since 2003.

Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. Further, since 2015, ISIS has abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as 8 years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or subjected to physical and sexual abuse.

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world, including in the United States and Europe. In 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people and injuring more than 350 others; 23-year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez was among the dead. In 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium — one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station. The attacks killed 32 people, including 4 U.S. citizens, and injured more than 250 people. In 2016 a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals and injured 53 others at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Also in 2016, ISIS claimed an attack in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including 3 U.S. citizens. Also in 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five people. In 2017 a man who claimed to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, killing five and injuring many more. Also in 2017, ISIS claimed a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert.

In 2018, ISIS attacked the city of Suweida and nearby towns and villages in southwestern Syria, conducting multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive, killing more than 200 people.

In 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria, that killed 19 persons, including 4 Americans. On Easter Sunday 2019, more than 250 people were killed in Sri Lanka when ISIS-inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels. Later that year, ISIS claimed responsibility for killing a U.S.
servicemember while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninewa province, Iraq. Also, that year, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two persons and injured three others.

In January 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility for twin suicide bombings in a busy market in Tayaran Square in Baghdad that killed at least 32 people and wounded at least 110 more. In July, ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in a busy market in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in east Baghdad, Iraq that killed 30 people and wounded at least 50 others. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights concluded that throughout 2021, ISIS also launched more than 342 terrorist attacks in Syria.

**Strength:** Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 11,000 and 18,000, including several thousand FTFs.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. The organization also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars scattered across Iraq and Syria it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. The territorial defeat of ISIS that eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS’s ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks in Iraq and Syria and provides significant financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

**Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya**

*Aka* Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarabulus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus

**Description:** The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) was designated as an FTO on May 20, 2016. In 2014, then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched a group of ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch of the terrorist group. In 2014, several hundred operatives set up a base in Darnah. The following month, Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya.

**Activities:** Since becoming established, ISIL-Libya has carried out multiple attacks throughout Libya and threatened to expand ISIS’s presence into other countries in Africa.

In 2015, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli that killed eight persons, including a U.S. contractor. In 2015, ISIL-Libya released a propaganda video showing the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped from Sirte, Libya, in two separate incidents in 2014 and 2015.
In 2018, ISIL-Libya was responsible for an attack on Libya’s electoral commission headquarters in Tripoli that killed 14 people; a suicide attack on Libya’s National Oil Company headquarters that left 2 dead and 10 others wounded; an attack on a town in central Libya that resulted in 5 killed and 10 others kidnapped; and an attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed 3 persons. In 2019, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on the Libyan National Army (LNA).

In 2020, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for three attacks on LNA forces at an LNA checkpoint in southern Libya and a separate VBIED attack targeting an LNA checkpoint in Taraghin.

In June, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at a police checkpoint in the southern city of Sabhā, Libya, that killed at least two LNA personnel. Later that month, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for activating an IED against an LNA patrol near the city of Fuqaha that killed two persons.

**Strength:** ISIL-Libya is estimated to have 100 to 200 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIL-Libya’s funding comes from a variety of sources, including criminal activity, such as smuggling and extortion, and external funding. The group also receives support from ISIS.

**Islamic State-Sinai Province**

**Aka** Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Islamic State-Sinai Province; Islamic State in the Sinai; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Sinai Province; Supporters of the Holy Place; the State of Sinai; Wilayat Sinai

**Description:** Originally designated as an FTO on April 9, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqqdis (ABM, as it was known then) rose to prominence in 2011 following the uprisings in Egypt. In 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS. In 2015 the Department of State amended ABM’s designation to add the aliases ISIL Sinai Province and Islamic State-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), among others.

**Activities:** Before pledging allegiance to ISIS, ABM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli and Egyptian interests from 2012 through 2014, including attacks on Israeli economic and military assets, as well as attacks on the Egyptian military and tourist sectors. From 2015 through 2020, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the bombing of a Russian passenger plane, the abduction and killing of a Croatian citizen, rockets launched at Israeli cities, attacks on Egyptian Christians, and numerous attacks against Egyptian military and security personnel. In 2020, ISIS-SP increased its attacks against Sinai tribal members, including the killing of a 75-year-old tribal elder who was strapped to a
pole with explosives detonated next to him and a suicide bombing that targeted a tribal family gathering, killing at least three persons.

In 2021, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Egyptian security forces and civilians. In February, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for activating an IED against an Egyptian Army patrol south of the Gaza Strip city of Rafah, killing three Egyptian soldiers. In April, ISIL-SP claimed responsibility for the execution of a Coptic Christian and two tribesmen they accused of collaborating with the Egyptian Army. In December, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for an IED attack that targeted a pro-government militia vehicle.

**Strength:** ISIS-SP is estimated to have between 800 and 1,200 fighters in the Sinai Peninsula and affiliated cells in the Nile valley.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-SP receives funding from external actors, including ISIS-core, and from smuggling.

**Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi**

**Aka** Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Armed Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Naqshbandi Army; Naqshabandi Army; Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way; Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia; JRTN; JRN; AMNO

**Description:** Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) was designated as an FTO on September 30, 2015. The group first announced insurgency operations against international forces in Iraq in 2006 in response to the execution of Saddam Hussein. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, former vice president of Saddam Hussein’s Revolutionary Council, leads the group, which consists of former Baath Party officials, military personnel, and Sunni nationalists. JRTN aims to overthrow the Government of Iraq, install a new Baathist regime, and end external influence in Baghdad.

**Activities:** Between its founding in 2006 and the 2011 withdrawal of Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces from Iraq, JRTN claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on U.S. bases and forces. JRTN also is known to have used VBIEDs against Iraqi government security forces.

In 2014, elements of JRTN joined military forces with ISIS in opposition to the Iraqi government. JRTN played a major role in the capture of Mosul from Iraqi security forces in 2014. However, fissures between ISIS and JRTN quickly emerged after ISIS’s advance in Baiji and Tikrit. Although some elements of JRTN splintered off, most of the organization was subsumed by ISIS. JRTN did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq
**Funding and External Aid:** JRTN has received funding from former regime members, major tribal figures in Iraq, and from Persian Gulf-based financiers of terrorism.

**Kahane Chai**

**Aka** American Friends of the United Yeshiva; American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir; Committee for the Safety of the Roads; Dikuy Bogdim; DOV; Forefront of the Idea; Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva; Jewish Legion; Judean Congress; Kach; Kahane; Kahane Lives; Kahane Tzadak; Kahane.org; Kahanezadak.com; Kfar Tapuah Fund; Koach; Meir’s Youth; New Kach Movement; Newkach.org; No’ar Meir; Repression of Traitors; State of Judea; Sword of David; the Committee Against Racism and Discrimination (CARD); the Hatikva Jewish Identity Center; the International Kahane Movement; the Jewish Idea Yeshiva; the Judean Legion; the Judean Voice; the Qomemiyut Movement; the Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund; the Voice of Judea; the Way of the Torah; the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea; Yeshivat Harav Meir

**Description:** Kahane Chai (KC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Radical Israeli American Rabbi Meir Kahane founded Kach — the precursor to KC — with the aim of restoring Greater Israel (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza) and expelling the Arabs who live there. Its offshoot, Kahane Chai (translation: “Kahane Lives”), was founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin, following his father’s 1990 assassination. In 1994 the Israeli government banned both Kach and Kahane Chai, declaring them terrorist organizations. The Cabinet’s decision was based on evidence, submitted by Israeli security services and police, that implicated the two groups in a series of unsolved murders of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The banning followed the 1994 massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron by a Kach activist.

**Activities:** KC has harassed and threatened Arabs, especially Palestinians, and Israeli government officials and vowed revenge for the 2000 death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. The group is suspected of involvement in numerous low-level attacks dating to the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. KC was last linked to an attack in 2005, when one of its members killed four persons on a bus in Shfaram, Israel.

**Strength:** KC’s core membership has been estimated to be fewer than 100.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel and Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

**Funding and External Aid:** KC has received support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

**Katā’ib Hizballah**

**Aka** Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezballah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah
**Description:** Formed in 2006 as an anti-western Shia group, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was designated as an FTO on July 2, 2009. Before the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, the group conducted attacks against U.S., Iraqi, and Defeat-ISIS Coalition targets in Iraq and threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians supporting the legitimate political process in Iraq. KH is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda, such as filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to and receives support from Iran.

**Activities:** KH has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety for its attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq. In 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in Baghdad when KH assailants fired multiple rockets at a U.S. military base, Camp Victory.

In 2019, KH members stormed the Bahraini Embassy in Baghdad in protest of Bahrain’s hosting the United States’ Israel-Palestine conference. In 2019, KH was reportedly involved in sniper operations against Iraqi protestors. Later that year, KH was blamed for a rocket attack on K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk that killed one U.S. citizen. A few days later, members of KH broke into the U.S. Embassy compound and participated in a violent attack against the facility, setting fires inside, which destroyed security checkpoints and reception rooms.

In 2020, KH reportedly launched rockets at Camp Taji, an American-controlled military base near Baghdad, killing 2 Americans and 1 British soldier, and wounding 14 others.

In 2021, KH remained active in Iraq and Syria and continued to conduct rocket and drone attacks against U.S. military forces and U.S. facilities. KH is believed to be responsible for a March rocket attack on Ain al-Asad Air Base, an Iraqi air base that hosts U.S. soldiers.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** KH depends heavily on support from Iran.

**Kurdistan Workers’ Party**

**Aka** the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; the People’s Defense Force; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; Kurdistan People’s Congress; People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL

**Description:** Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, launched a campaign of violence in 1984. The PKK’s original goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Türkiye.
Activities: In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to engage in urban terrorism. Anatolia became the scene of significant violence, with some estimates suggesting at least 40,000 casualties. The PKK foreswore violence from 1999 until 2004, when its hardline militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire. In 2009 the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after the PKK carried out an attack in 2011 that killed 13 Turkish soldiers. Between 2012 and midyear 2015, the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but the negotiations ultimately broke down — owing partly to domestic political pressures and the conflict in Syria.

In 2016 the group claimed a VBIED strike against Şırnak Province police headquarters, which killed 11 people and wounded more than 70 others. In 2017, Turkish officials blamed the PKK for a car bomb and shooting outside of a courthouse that killed two persons and an attack on a military convoy that killed more than 20 soldiers.

In 2018, numerous attacks by the PKK were reported against Türkiye’s security forces, including an attack claimed by the PKK against a Turkish Army base, which resulted in dozens of causalities. Also in 2018, a roadside bomb struck a bus carrying workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, killing 7 persons and wounding 13 in Diyarbakir Province’s Kulp district. The government blamed the PKK for the attack.

In 2019 the PKK was accused of assassinating a senior Turkish diplomat in Erbil, Iraq. Later that year, the PKK attacked a Turkish military vehicle in Hakkâri province, killing two soldiers and wounding another.

In 2020 a PKK-claimed rocket attack on the Gürbulak Customs Gate with Iran killed two Turkish Customs officials. That same year a PKK affiliate claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing on a natural gas pipeline near the Turkish-Iranian border, taking the pipeline offline for months and PKK militants fired rockets at a Turkish military base in northern Iraq, killing two soldiers and wounding another.

In February the PKK was accused of killing 13 Turkish hostages in Iraq.

Strength: The PKK is estimated to consist of 4,000 to 5,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Türkiye

Funding and External Aid: The PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem

Aka MSC; Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; Mujahideen Shura Council; Shura al-Mujahedin Fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin; Majlis Shura alMujahideen; Magles Shoura al-Mujahiddin
**Description:** The Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) was designated as an FTO on August 19, 2014. The MSC is a consolidation of several Salafi terrorist groups based in Gaza that have claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israel since the group’s founding in 2012.

**Activities:** In 2013, MSC claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting the Israeli city of Eilat. Previously, MSC claimed responsibility for the 2013 attack in which Gaza-based militants fired at least five rockets at Sderot, Israel, and the 2013 attack in which two rockets were fired at Eilat. MSC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** MSC is estimated to have several hundred fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

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**al-Nusrah Front**

**Aka** Jabhat al-Nusrash; Jabhet al-Nusrah; the Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for Liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at

**Description:** Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014, and is al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria. It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. The group was formed in 2011 when then-al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) — now ISIS — then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells. In 2013 the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state. The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting.

In 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency and further its own goals as al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria.

**Activities:** ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict. In 2016 the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian Army, killing both military officials and civilians.
Since 2017, ANF has continued to operate through HTS in pursuit of its objectives. In 2017 the group carried out multiple suicide bombings in Damascus, including suicide attacks using VBIEDs. ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups such as Ahzar al-Sham and Nur ad-Din al-Zinki as it fought against the regime and continued plotting against U.S. and allied interests.

In 2019 the group suffered heavy casualties, estimated in the hundreds, from engagement with Russian-backed Syrian government forces. Also that year, ANF bombed the Syrian town of Kafr Takharim, using heavy weaponry, and killing at least five persons. In 2020 an ANF member threw a grenade and opened fire into a group of civilians in Idlib city, Syria, killing two persons and injuring others.

In 2021, ANF remained an active terrorist group in northwest Syria’s Idlib province.

**Strength:** ANF has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations from external Persian Gulf-based donors. The group also generates revenue by collecting fees from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

**Palestine Islamic Jihad**

**Aka** PIJ; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; Al-Quds Squads; Al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; Al-Awdah Brigades

**Description:** Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, PIJ is committed to the destruction of Israel and to the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, including present-day Israel.

**Activities:** PIJ has conducted numerous attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. Throughout 2014, PIJ operatives carried out attacks on Israeli buses in Tel Aviv. That year, PIJ carried out a wave of rocket attacks into Israeli territory; up to 60 rockets may have reached Israel.

In 2015, Israeli forces blamed PIJ for firing a rocket that landed in Gan Yazne, a region close to the Gaza border. Also that year, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed PIJ operatives in Syria fired four rockets at the Golan Heights and Upper Galilee.

Throughout 2016, PIJ continued to strike Israel, primarily through light arms fire directed at IDF patrols. That year, Israeli authorities arrested PIJ operative Mahmoud Yusuf Hasin Abu Taha upon his entry into Israel from Gaza, interrupting a PIJ plot to abduct and kill an IDF soldier and
carry out a mass-casualty attack on a reception hall in Beersheba. PIJ claimed responsibility for launching rockets into Israel throughout 2018 and 2020.

In 2021, PIJ continued its attacks against Israeli civilians and military targets. In May, PIJ joined Palestinian militants in launching more than 4,000 rockets toward Israel. During this period, PIJ claimed responsibility for launching rockets, mortar shells, and rocket-propelled grenades against Israel. In December, PIJ claimed responsibility for a shooting attack near Homesh at an Israeli vehicle that killed one person and wounded two others.

**Strength:** Estimates of PIJ’s membership range from about 1,000 to several thousand.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** PIJ receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran. PIJ has partnered with Iran- and Syria-sponsored Hizballah to carry out joint operations.

**Palestine Liberation Front — Abu Abbas Faction**

**Aka** PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front

**Description:** The Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. In the late 1970s the PLF splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. It later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (aka Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Activities:** The PLF was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Throughout the 1990s the PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups. In 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq. After not claiming an attack for 16 years, the PLF claimed responsibility for the 2008 assault against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, Israel, and the shooting of an Israeli settler. In 2010 the PLF claimed responsibility for an IED attack against an IDF patrol, which caused minor injuries to a soldier; another IED was discovered during a search of the area. The PLF has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016 but continues to maintain a strong presence in many refugee camps in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Aka PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash after splitting from the Arab Nationalist Movement. The group earned a reputation for committing large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed more than 20 U.S. citizens.

Activities: The PFLP increased its operational activity during the Second Palestinian Intifada. During that time the group assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001, carried out at least two suicide operations, and launched multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups.

In 2014, two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with the PFLP entered a Jerusalem synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing 5 persons — including three U.S. citizens — and injuring 12. A month later the PFLP claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

In 2017, three Palestinian militants launched an attack near East Jerusalem’s Old City, stabbing and killing an Israeli border security agent. Two of the militants were PFLP members, although ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. In 2019, IDF and Israeli Border Patrol forces arrested four PFLP members allegedly responsible for remotely detonating an IED in the West Bank, killing an Israeli teenager and seriously wounding two others.

In 2020, Israeli security forces in the West Bank arrested approximately 50 members of a PFLP cell believed to be behind a string of deadly attacks in the area and seized a large number of weapons and bomb making materials.

In April the PFLP’s Ali Mustapha Brigade claimed responsibility for firing 36 rockets at Israel.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank

Funding and External Aid: Sources of support are unknown.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

Aka PFLP-GC

Description: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The PFLP-GC split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1968, claiming it wanted to concentrate more on resistance and less
on politics. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, led the PFLP-GC until his death in 2021 and was succeeded by Talal Naji. The PFLP-GC has close ties to both Syria and Iran.

**Activities:** The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for conducting cross-border attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Since the early 1990s the group has focused primarily on supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons. More recently the PFLP-GC has been implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel. In 2009 the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Israel.

In 2012 the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although 4 Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives later were arrested for the attack. In 2015 the PFLP-GC reportedly began fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria, while also receiving logistical and military aid from Hizballah and Iran. Separately that year, the PFLP-GC took responsibility for rocket fire aimed at Israeli territory. In that attack, at least three rockets were fired from Lebanon into northern Israel and landed near Shlomi, a small town near the Lebanese frontier with Israel.

Although the PFLP-GC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021, the group remained active in Syria.

**Strength:** The PFLP-GC has several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza

**Funding and External Aid:** The PFLP-GC receives safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria as well as financial support from Iran.

**al-Qa’ida**

**Aka** al-Qa’eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; the Base; the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida (AQ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999. Established in 1988 the group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union. AQ strives to eliminate western influence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia that would ultimately be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. AQ leaders issued a statement in 1998 under the
banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens — civilian and military — and their allies everywhere. AQ merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in 2001. While numerous AQ leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011, AQ’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remains at large.


On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets — two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed. The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed AQ was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015.

In 2015, five senior AQ leaders were released from Iranian custody in exchange for an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen. Of the five, Saif al Adel and Abu Mohammed al Masri are wanted for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In 2016, al-Zawahiri publicly released two audio messages and one seven-page statement, condemning the Government of Saudi Arabia and its role in the Syrian conflict, encouraging AQ activity in Southeast Asia — especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines — and acknowledging support for its affiliate in Syria, al-Nusrah Front.

In 2017 a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to abetting AQ’s 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs. The following month, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Zawahiri released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

In 2019 a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an AQ-inspired bomb attack on the city’s downtown Independence Day parade. Also in 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to attack Indian forces and appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

While AQ did not claim responsibility for any attacks, it remained active in 2021.
**Strength:** In South Asia, AQ’s core has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives, including Usama bin Laden, has disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots. AQ leaders oversee a network of affiliated groups. Among them are al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Nusrah Front, al-Shabaab, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and other terrorist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network also have ties to AQ. In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are motivated by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from AQ central leadership.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and North Africa

**Funding and External Aid:** AQ primarily depends on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

**al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula**

Aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah, Ansar al Shariah, Partisans of Islamic Law, Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010. In 2009 the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. The announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

**Activities:** AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in 2009. These include a 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. In 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States on cargo planes. In 2015, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi attacked the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris, killing 12 people. One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

In 2017 a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen. That same year, AQAP attacked a Yemeni Army camp, killing at least two soldiers. In 2019, AQAP gunmen killed 19 soldiers in an attack on an army base in southern Yemen. In 2020, AQAP...
released a video claiming “full responsibility” for Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani’s 2019 shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed three persons and injured eight others.

In 2021, AQAP claimed responsibility for several attacks throughout the year, including a March attack on a security forces checkpoint in Abyan province that killed eight soldiers and four civilians and a June kidnapping of six Yemen government security personnel.

**Strength:** AQAP fighters are estimated to be in the low thousands.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Yemen

**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

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**SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

**Haqqani Network**

**Aka** HQN

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on September 19, 2012, the Haqqani Network (HQN) was formed in the late 1980s, around the time of the then-Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. HQN’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid-1980s and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Haqqani retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of his son Sirajuddin, HQN continued to direct and conduct terrorist activity in Afghanistan. In 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed deputy leader of the Taliban. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed as the Taliban’s so-called Minister of the Interior.

**Activities:** Before the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces in 2021, HQN planned and carried out numerous significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Ghani administration officials, and civilian targets. In 2011, HQN wounded 77 U.S. soldiers in a truck bombing in Maidan Wardak province and conducted a 19-hour attack on Embassy Kabul and International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, killing 16 Afghans. In 2012 an HQN suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno killed 2 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100 others.

In 2016, HQN was blamed for an attack in Kabul against a government security agency tasked with providing protection to senior government officials, killing 64 people and injuring more than 300. In 2017, Afghan officials blamed HQN for a truck bomb that exploded in Kabul, killing more than 150 people. Later that year, an American woman and her family were recovered after five years of HQN captivity.

HQN was believed to be responsible for a 2018 ambulance bombing in Kabul that killed more than 100 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for a 2018 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel
in Kabul that killed 22 persons, including Americans. In 2019, HQN released two hostages, including a U.S. citizen, who had been kidnapped at gunpoint in 2016.

In 2020 the Ghani administration identified HQN as responsible for an attack on a military court in Paktika province killing at least five, as well as for a bombing in Kabul that killed three civilians.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August, several HQN leaders were appointed to positions in the so-called “interim government” announced by the Taliban. In addition to Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as the Taliban’s interior minister, Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani was appointed as the so-called Minister of Refugees. In 2021, HQN did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. Some HQN members probably have positions in the so-called Ministries of Interior and Defense.

**Strength:** HQN is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** HQN is funded primarily from taxes on local commerce, extortion, smuggling, and other illicit activities and illicit business ventures. In addition to the funding it receives as part of the broader Afghan Taliban, the group has received some funds from donors in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf region.

**Harakat-ul Jihad-i-Islami**

**Aka** HUJI; Movement of Islamic Holy War; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on August 6, 2010, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was formed in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the group redirected its efforts toward India. HUJI seeks the annexation of the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and has supplied fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

HUJI historically focused its activities on the Afghanistan-Pakistan front and was composed of Pakistani terrorists and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. The group experienced internal splits, and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida.

**Activities:** HUJI claimed responsibility for the 2011 bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 persons dead and an estimated 76 wounded. The group sent an email to the press stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. HUJI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan
Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh


Description: Designated as an FTO on March 5, 2008, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was formed in 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans seeking to establish Islamist rule in Bangladesh. In 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. HUJI-B leaders signed the 1998 Fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared U.S. civilians legitimate targets. HUJI-B has connections to al-Qa’ida and Pakistani terrorist groups advocating similar objectives, including HUJI and Lashkar e-Tayyiba.

Activities: In 2008, three HUJI-B members, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, were convicted for the 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British high commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria in a 2005 grenade attack. In 2013, Bangladesh police arrested a group of terrorists, including HUJI-B members, who were preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals.

In 2017, Bangladeshi authorities executed HUJI-B leader Hannan and two associates for the 2004 grenade attack. In 2019, Dhaka police arrested three HUJI-B operatives reportedly attempting to revive the group’s operations. In 2020 and 2021, Bangladeshi courts continued to sentence members of HUJI-B to death for their involvement in HUJI-B attacks.

Strength: HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans; its total membership is unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bangladesh and India

Funding and External Aid: HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B.

Harakat ul-Mujahideen

Aka HUM; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Ansar ul Ummah

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) seeks the annexation of the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan. In 2005, HUM’s long-time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Defeat-ISIS
Coalition air strikes destroyed them in 2001. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar; Pakistan banned the group in 2003.

**Activities:** HUM has conducted numerous operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in India’s northeastern states. In 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner, which led to the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India also released Ahmed Omar Sheikh as a result of the hijacking. Sheikh was later convicted of the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. HUM has conducted attacks targeting Indian interests including the late 2015 strikes in Handwaur and Poonch, which resulted in the deaths of five Indian Army personnel. HUM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** After 2000 a significant portion of HUM’s membership defected to JeM, and only a small number of cadres are reported to still be active.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HUM conducts operations primarily in Afghanistan and in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It operates from Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir and in other cities in Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUM collects donations from wealthy donors in Pakistan.

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**Hizbul Mujahadeen**

*Aka HM; Hizb-ul-Mujahideen*

**Description:** Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was designated as an FTO on August 17, 2017. The group was formed in 1989 and is one of the largest and oldest militant groups operating in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. HM is led by Mohammad Yusuf Shah, also known as Syed Salahuddin, and officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group concentrates its attacks on Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. HM is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

**Activities:** HM has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. In 2018, HM reportedly killed four police officers in Shopian district in Kashmir. Also in 2018, HM claimed responsibility for abducting and killing three police officials in Jammu and Kashmir.

In 2019, Indian officials accused HM of being behind a grenade attack on a Jammu bus stand that killed a teenager and injured 32 other people. That same year, two Indian soldiers were killed and six others injured when an alleged HM militant attacked their patrol with a VBIED. HM was also suspected by police of having killed five Bengali laborers and a truck driver in 2019. In 2020, three HM militants opened fire on Indian soldiers during a search operation in Jammu and Kashmir, killing one soldier.
In July a top HUM commander was killed in a gunfight with police after opening fire on security personnel accompanying him during a search operation at his hideout in Jammu and Kashmir. In August, another two HUM members were killed after opening fire on security forces during a search operation in Jammu and Kashmir.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown, but HM is suspected to receive some funding from sources in Pakistan as well as from local fundraising.

**Indian Mujahedeen**

Aka Indian Mujahedeen; Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

**Description:** The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as an FTO on September 19, 2011. The India-based terrorist group has been responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other terrorist entities, including ISIS, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami. IM’s stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their alleged oppression of Muslims.

**Activities:** IM is known for carrying out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas to maximize terror and casualties. In 2008, IM was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, including an attack in Delhi that killed 30 people and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38. In 2010, IM bombed a popular German bakery frequented by tourists in Pune, India; 17 people were killed, and more than 60 people were injured in the attack.

In 2015 the arrest of three IM militants linked the group to the 2014 low-intensity blast near a restaurant in Bangalore that killed one woman and injured three other people. The arrest also uncovered that the group planned to carry out attacks on India’s Republic Day and had provided explosives for attacks in other parts of the country.

In 2016, IM was increasingly linked to ISIS. That year, six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India. A month later, it was reported that an IM cell linked to ISIS was plotting attacks on multiple targets in Hyderabad and had purchased chemicals to make high-grade explosives for the planned operations. In 2017, Indian law enforcement uncovered the plans of an IM militant in custody to conduct attacks in India, including targeted killings and bombing a temple in Gaya. IM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.
**Location/Area of Operation:** India

**Funding and External Aid:** IM is suspected of obtaining funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

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**Islamic Jihad Union**

**Aka** Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihad Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; the Jamaa Mojahededin; the Kazakh Jama’at; the Libyan Society

**Description:** The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) was designated as an FTO on June 17, 2005. The group splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s. Najmiddin Jalolov founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group in 2002, but the group was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in 2005. Although IJU remains committed to overthrowing the Government of Uzbekistan, today it is active primarily in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Syria, where many of its members relocated from Afghanistan.

**Activities:** IJU remains a threat to Central Asia. IJU claimed responsibility for attacks in 2004 in Uzbekistan, which targeted police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In 2004 the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbek prosecutor general’s office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent.

In 2007, German authorities detained three IJU operatives, including two German converts, disrupting the group’s plans to attack targets in Germany — including Ramstein Airbase, where the primary targets would have been U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and civilians. In 2013, two IJU videos showed attacks against a U.S. military base in Afghanistan and an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier. In 2015, IJU participated in the five-month-long Taliban siege of Kunduz city. At least 13 police officers were killed in the attacks, and hundreds of civilians also were killed.

In 2017, IJU released a video showing its militants using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades to fight Afghan troops in late 2016. IJU released a second video in 2018 showing a joint raid with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. In 2019 the United Nations confirmed that IJU was operating inside Syria under control of al-Nusra Front. IJU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** IJU consists of 100 to 200 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Syria, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and Europe

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Aka IMU

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on September 25, 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) seeks to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state. For most of the past decade, however, the group has recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe. Despite its stated objective to set up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group operates primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan, where it previously fought against international forces. Several IMU members are also suspected of having traveled to Syria to fight with terrorist groups.

The IMU has had a decade-long relationship with al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Taliban, and Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan. Top IMU leaders integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces when the Taliban battled the Afghan government.

In 2015, IMU leader Usman Ghazi publicly announced the group’s shift of allegiance to ISIS. Numerous IMU members, including possibly Ghazi himself, were subsequently reported to have been killed as a result of hostilities between ISIS and the IMU’s former Taliban allies.

**Activities:** In 2014, IMU claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi’s international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people.

Throughout 2015 the IMU actively threatened the Afghan government, primarily in the northern part of the country. In 2015 the group released a video showing IMU members beheading an individual they claimed to be an Afghan soldier and threatened to behead Hazaras (a historically persecuted ethnic group in Afghanistan) whom they were holding hostage, in supposed retaliation for the Afghan security forces’ capture of several female IMU members. In 2016, Uzbek refugee Fazliddin Kurbanov was sentenced by a U.S. federal court to 25 years in prison for planning a bomb attack in Idaho. Kurbanov had been in online contact with members of IMU, seeking advice on how to make explosives and discussing attacking U.S. military bases.

In 2016 a faction of the IMU announced its continued commitment to the Taliban and AQ, marking a split with its leader Ghazi and the rest of the group, which announced its loyalty to ISIS in 2015 and has since cooperated with Islamic State’s Khorasan Province. IMU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** The IMU consists of up to 700 people.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Türkiye, and Central Asia

**Funding and External Aid:** The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.
**ISIS-Bangladesh**

**Aka** Caliphate in Bangladesh; Caliphate’s Soldiers in Bangladesh; Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh; Khalifa’s Soldiers in Bengal; Islamic State Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bangladesh; ISB; ISISB; Abu Jandal al-Bangali; Neo-JMB; New JMB; Neo-Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh

**Description:** ISIS-Bangladesh was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. Created in 2014, ISIS-Bangladesh has described itself as ISIS’s official branch in Bangladesh and was born out of ISIS’s desire to expand its campaign to the Indian subcontinent. Coinciding with the announcement of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, a group of Bangladeshi nationals pledged allegiance to ISIS and vowed to organize Bengali Muslims under the leadership of then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

**Activities:** In 2015, gunmen belonging to ISIS-Bangladesh shot and killed an Italian aid worker in Dhaka. In 2015, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for injuring 10 people during a Christmas Day suicide attack at a mosque packed with Ahmadi Muslims. In 2016 the group claimed responsibility for an assault on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka that killed 22 people, including an American. In 2017, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for twin explosions that targeted a crowd in Sylhet, Bangladesh, killing six persons.

In 2019, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for two explosions in Dhaka that injured four police officers and two civilians. Also in 2019, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for a small bomb thrown at a Bangladeshi minister in Dhaka, which injured two police officers. Also during that year, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion outside the Awami League office in Khulna.

In 2020, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for an IED blast near a police box in Chattogram and a bomb attack at a Hindu temple in the Naogaon district. That same year, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Dhaka that injured five persons, four of them police officers.

ISIS Bangladesh did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** ISIS-Bangladesh has several hundred armed supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bangladesh

**Funding and External Aid:** Although ISIS-Bangladesh’s sources of funding are largely unknown, the group does receive some support from ISIS.

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**Islamic State’s Khorasan Province**

**Aka** The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham–Khorasan Province; the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan; Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in Khorasan Province; Islamic State Khurasan;
ISIS-K; IS-Khorasan; ISIS Wilayah Khorasan; ISIL’s South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL; ISIL Khorasan

**Description:** Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2016. The group is based in Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is composed primarily of former members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. ISIS-K’s senior leadership pledged allegiance to then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which was accepted in 2015. The group has carried out suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings in Afghanistan against civilians. ISIS-K has also claimed responsibility for attacks on civilians and government officials in Pakistan.

**Activities:** In 2019, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack at the Ministry of Communications in Kabul, killing seven persons; a suicide bombing at a wedding hall in a Shiite minority neighborhood in Kabul, killing 80 people and injuring 154 others; and a bombing of a mosque in Nangarhar province killed at least 70 people. Also in 2019, ISIS-K suffered a series of major defeats and lost much of its territory in Nangarhar in the face of attacks by both the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and Taliban forces.

In 2020, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Sikh house of worship in Kabul that killed 25 worshipers and wounded 8 others. After that attack, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security arrested the then-leader of ISIS-K, Abdullah Orakzai, and two other high-ranking commanders. Also in 2020, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, that killed at least 29 people and injured more than 50 others and a suicide bombing outside an education center in Kabul that killed at least 18 people and injured at least 57 others.

In 2021, ISIS-K attacks increased following the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. In August, ISIS-K conducted a suicide bombing against the Kabul airport as the United States and other governments conducted a large-scale evacuation of their citizens and vulnerable Afghans from the country. At least 185 people were killed in the attack, including 13 U.S. service members supporting evacuation operations; at least another 150 people, including 18 U.S. service members, were wounded.

ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a June car bombing in Kabul that killed seven persons and wounded six others, as well as for a July rocket attack near the presidential palace ahead of a speech. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for multiple IED attacks in Jalalabad in September that killed at least 35 Taliban members and 3 civilians; an October suicide bombing of a mosque in Kunduz that killed at least 50 civilians and injured 143 others; an October suicide bombing of a mosque in Kandahar that killed at least 47 civilians and injured at least 70 more; and a November attack against a military hospital in Kabul that killed at least 20 people and injured dozens more.

**Strength:** ISIS-K is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia
**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-K receives some funding from ISIS-core. Additional funds come from illicit criminal commerce, taxes, and extortion on the local population and businesses.

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**Jaish-e-Mohammed**

**Aka** Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed

**Description:** Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001. JeM was founded in 2000 by former senior Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood Azhar. The group aims to annex the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and expel international forces from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States.

**Activities:** JeM continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan, conducting fatal attacks in the region, despite the country’s 2002 ban on its activities. The group has claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in the Jammu and Kashmir, including a 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government publicly implicated JeM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, in the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed 9 persons and injured 18 others.

In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JeM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. In 2003, Pakistan implicated JeM members in two assassination attempts against then-President Pervez Musharraf.

In 2018, JeM claimed responsibility for killing nine Indian officers at the Sunjuwan military station. Also in 2018, several JeM militants stormed a police outpost in Jammu and Kashmir, killing four police officers and injuring another. In 2019, JeM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed 40 personnel from India’s Central Reserve Police Force in the city of Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir.

In December, JeM claimed responsibility for an attack allegedly conducted by an affiliate on a bus carrying police officers with small arms fire, killing 3 and injuring 11.

**Strength:** JeM has several hundred armed supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** To avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani government, since 2007 JeM has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods. JeM also collects funds through donation requests, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations.
Jaysh al-Adl

Aka People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran; Jundullah; Jundullah; Jundullah; Jundollah; Jundollah; Jundollah; Jundullah; Army of God (God’s Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM); Jeysh al-Adl; Army of Justice; Jaish ul-Adl; Jaish al-Adl; Jaish Aladl; Jeish al-Adl

Description: Jaysh al-Adl was designated as an FTO on November 4, 2010, under the name Jundallah. Since its inception in 2003, Jaysh al-Adl has engaged in numerous attacks, killing and maiming scores of Iranian civilians and government officials. The group’s stated goals are to secure recognition of Baloch cultural, economic, and political rights from the Government of Iran and to spread awareness of the plight of the Baloch people. The group adopted the name Jaysh al-Adl in 2012 and has since claimed responsibility for attacks under that name.

Activities: Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for a 2009 suicide bomb attack in Sistan and Balochistan Province that killed more than 40 people and was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s. In a statement on its website, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for the 2010 suicide bomb attack inside the Iman Hussein Mosque in Chabahar, which killed an estimated 35 to 40 civilians and wounded 60 to 100 others. Also in 2010, Jaysh al-Adl attacked the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing about 30 people and injuring an estimated 300. In 2018, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for abducting 12 Iranian security personnel on the border with Pakistan. In 2019, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for a suicide car bombing in southeastern Iran that killed 27 Iranian government officials.

In 2020, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for planting two roadside bombs on the course of an Iranian military convoy; one of the bombs detonated, injuring one person. In 2021, Jaysh al-Adl negotiated the release of four of its fighters from Iran in exchange for the release of two kidnapped Iranian soldiers.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan

Funding and External Aid: Sources of support are unknown.

Lashkar e-Tayyiba

Aka al Mansooreen; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama’at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama’at-i-Dawat; Jamaati-ud-Dawla; Jama’at-ud-Da’awah; Jama’at-ud-Da’wa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmate-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiF; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; FalahelInsaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity;
Description: Designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) is an anti-India-focused terrorist group. LeT was formed in the late 1980s as the terrorist wing of Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad, a Pakistan-based extremist organization and charity originally formed to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The organization is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Shortly after LeT’s FTO designation, Saeed changed the group’s name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and launched humanitarian projects to circumvent sanctions. LeT disseminates its message through JUD’s media outlets.

Elements of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) have combined with other groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen to mount anti-India attacks. The Pakistani government banned LeT in 2002 and arrested Hafiz Saeed temporarily, following the 2008 Mumbai attack. In 2017, Pakistan placed Saeed under house arrest; however, he was released 10 months later after a Lahore High Court judicial body rejected a government request to renew his detention. In 2019, Pakistani police again arrested Saeed and charged him with financing terrorism. In 2020, Saeed was found guilty on charges of terrorism financing and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Activities: LeT has conducted operations, including several high-profile attacks, against Indian troops and civilian targets since 1993. The group also has attacked Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Afghanistan. LeT uses assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

LeT was responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai against luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a popular café that killed 166 people — including 6 U.S. citizens — and injured more than 300. India has charged 38 people in the case; most are at large, however, and thought to be in Pakistan.

In 2010, Pakistani-American businessman David Headley pled guilty in a U.S. court to charges related to his role in the 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai and to charges related to a separate plot to bomb the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. Headley testified in the trials of other LeT supporters in 2011 and 2015.

During a three-month period in 2016, LeT was suspected of engaging in at least three firefights with Indian security forces in Kupwara district, in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, injuring two Indian personnel. Also in 2016, LeT was suspected of conducting an ambush on an Indian security force convoy in Pulwama district, in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 8 persons and injuring 20. Some media reports alleged the group’s involvement in an attack that year on an Indian Army camp in Uri, in Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 20 soldiers.
In 2017, LeT conducted an attack in Jammu and Kashmir that left six police officers dead. The following month, LeT militants attacked a bus of pilgrims returning from the Amarnath Yatra shrine, killing seven persons. In 2018, LeT claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an Indian Army camp in Jammu and Kashmir’s Bandipora district that killed three soldiers.

In January, Pakistani authorities convicted LeT commander Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi on terrorism financing charges and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Lakhvi is alleged to have orchestrated the 2008 Mumbai attacks. LeT did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** LeT collects donations in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states as well as from other donors in the Middle East and Europe — particularly the United Kingdom, where it is a designated terrorist organization as Lashkar e Tayyaba. In 2019, LeT and its front organizations continued to operate and fundraise in Pakistan.

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**Lashkar i Jhangvi**

Aka Army of Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 30, 2003, Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ carries out anti-Shia and other sectarian attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan banned the group in 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence, causing many LJ members to seek refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom the group had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists and have since provided them with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities. LJ works closely with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. LJ chief Asif Chotu was killed along with three other LJ militants in a police operation in Pakistan in 2017.

In 2018, LJ’s Balochistan chief, Salman Badini, and two other LJ militants were killed during a police raid in Quetta, Pakistan.

**Activities:** LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted to numerous killings of Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan. In 1999 the group attempted to assassinate then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab province.

In 2014, more than 24 people were killed and 40 others wounded in a bus bombing by an LJ attack targeting Shia pilgrims. LJ claimed responsibility for the 2015 suicide bombing that targeted a market in the predominantly Shia town of Parachinar, Pakistan, that killed at least 23 people and wounded 50. In 2016, two individuals suspected of belonging to LJ were arrested by police in Pakistan for their alleged involvement in 25 cases of targeted killings, including the
murder of Pakistani singer Amjad Sabri, as well as army and police personnel. In 2019, LJ claimed responsibility for bombing a market in Quetta that killed 20 people and injured 48 others. The attack reportedly targeted the local minority Shia Muslim Hazara community.

In August, three LJ members were allegedly involved in a bomb attack on the Shia minority community in Pakistan’s Punjab province that killed at least 3 persons and wounded 50 others.

**Strength:** LJ’s membership is assessed to be in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** LJ’s funding comes from wealthy donors in Pakistan and the Middle East, particularly Persian Gulf states. The group engages in criminal activity, including extortion, to fund its activities.

**Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**

Aka LTTE; Ellalan Force; Tamil Tigers

**Description:** Founded in 1976 and designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka. Despite its military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government in 2009, the LTTE’s international network of sympathizers and financial support has persisted.

**Activities:** Although largely inactive since 2009, the LTTE was responsible for an integrated insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan leaders. In early 2009, Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE’s key strongholds, including its capital of Kilinochchi. In 2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed members of its leadership including leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, and declared military victory.

There have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka attributed to the LTTE since 2009, but 13 LTTE supporters, several of whom had allegedly planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli diplomatic facilities in India, were arrested in Malaysia in 2014. Additional members were arrested in Malaysia and India in 2015, one of whom was accused of exhorting other Sri Lankans to fund and revive the LTTE.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Sri Lanka, India, and Malaysia

**Funding and External Aid:** The LTTE’s financial network of support continued after the group’s military defeat in 2009. The LTTE has employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for its activities.
al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent

Aka al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent

Description: Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was designated as an FTO on July 1, 2016. Established in 2014, AQIS focuses on terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. In 2019, Asim Umar, the former head of AQIS, was killed in a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation. Its current leader is Usama Mahmood.


In 2020, India’s National Investigation Agency arrested 10 alleged al Qa’ida-affiliated operatives from Kerala and West Bengal.

In July, India’s National Investigation Agency arrested five alleged AQIS operatives in Lucknow on charges of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack in Uttar Pradesh.

Strength: AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 members.

Location/Area of Operations: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan

Funding and External Aid: AQIS likely receives funding from al-Qa’ida senior leadership and engages in general criminal activity, kidnapping, and extortion.

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Aka Pakistani Taliban; Tehreek-e-Taliban; Tehrik-e-Taliban; Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; TTP

Description: Designated as an FTO on September 1, 2010, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based terrorist organization formed in 2007 to oppose Pakistani military efforts in the former tribal areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and other areas of the country.

TTP aims to push the Government of Pakistan out of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and establish Sharia by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani military and state. The organization uses the tribal belt along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to train and deploy its operatives, and the group has ties to al-Qa’ida (AQ). TTP draws ideological guidance from AQ, while elements of AQ rely in part on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This arrangement has given TTP access to both AQ’s global terrorist network and its members’ operational expertise.
Activities: TTP has carried out and claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests, including a 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens, and a 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens. TTP is suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The group directed and facilitated Faisal Shahzad’s failed attempt to detonate an explosive device in New York City’s Times Square in 2010.

Between 2011 and 2018, TTP continued to carry out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and Pakistani civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. These attacks killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and Pakistani government and law enforcement officials. In 2014, TTP carried out two consecutive attacks against Karachi’s international airport and a siege on a primary school in Peshawar that killed 145 people, 132 of whom were children. In 2016 the group claimed responsibility for killing the deputy superintendent of the police counterterrorism department and injuring his son in an attack on their vehicle in Peshawar.

In 2018, TTP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed more than 11 Pakistani security personnel in Swat, Pakistan. TTP also claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that year that targeted a checkpoint on the outskirts of Lahore, resulting in the deaths of four police officers and two civilians. In 2019, TTP claimed responsibility for killing four members of a peace committee who were working with the Pakistani government in its efforts against the Afghan Taliban.

TTP conducted numerous attacks in 2020, most of which targeted Pakistani security forces. TTP’s rate of attacks increased after it announced a merger with splinter groups Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar that year.

In April, TTP claimed responsibility for an attack of the Serena Hotel in Quetta, Pakistan, killing five. TTP claimed responsibility for an increased number of attacks in the months following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, claiming 32 attacks in August and 37 attacks in September.

Strength: TTP is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Funding and External Aid: TTP likely raises most of its funds through kidnapping-for-ransom payments, extortion, and other criminal activity.
**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

**National Liberation Army**

**Aka** ELN; *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*

**Description:** The National Liberation Army (ELN) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The ELN is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964. It remains focused on attacking the security services and economic infrastructure — in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons — and on extorting foreign and local companies. The ELN commits crimes and acts of terror throughout Colombia, including violence against civilian populations there and in Venezuela.

**Activities:** The ELN continued to target Colombia’s infrastructure, particularly oil pipelines. It also launched mortar attacks on police stations and the military; placed explosive devices near roads; and engaged in sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes. Additionally, the ELN continued to kidnap civilians and members of Colombia’s security services.

Throughout 2017 the Government of Colombia and the ELN conducted peace talks but did not ultimately reach an agreement. Peace talks were intermittent throughout 2018 after being suspended early in the year following a series of ELN bombings that killed several police officers and injured dozens more. The government ended talks following a 2019 VBIED attack by the ELN on the General Santander National Police Academy. The attack was the deadliest Bogotá had experienced in years, killing 22 police cadets and injuring 87 more. Colombian officials also attributed numerous oil pipeline bombings to the ELN in 2019.

In 2020, the ELN called for an “armed strike” across the country; authorities reported that ELN executed 23 attacks, killing one soldier and injuring seven police officers.

The ELN continued to commit attacks throughout Colombia in 2021, including multiple attacks against oil infrastructure.

**Strength:** ELN consists of about 2,300 armed combatants.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Colombia and Venezuela

**Funding and External Aid:** The ELN draws its funding from the illicit narcotics trade, extortion of oil and gas companies and landowners, and illegal mining in Colombia and Venezuela. Additional funds are derived from kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

**Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP)**

Description: FARC-EP was designated as an FTO on December 1, 2021. Using the moniker of the former FARC and led by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias Iván Mordisco, and Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, FARC-EP is responsible for the vast majority of the armed attacks attributed to FARC dissident elements since 2019.

Activities: FARC-EP has been responsible for the killing of political candidates and former FARC members, and the kidnapping of a political operative. In March, FARC-EP claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack at the mayor’s office in Corinto, Colombia, which injured 43 people, among them several public officials; and for a June attack against a Colombian Army base, which wounded 44 people, including 2 U.S. military advisers. In late June, FARC-EP shot at a helicopter carrying Colombian President Ivan Duque.

Strength: FARC-EP is estimated to have 2,700 to 3,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Colombia and Venezuela

Funding and External Aid: FARC-EP is funded primarily by involvement in illicit activity, including extortion, international drug trade, and illegal mining.

Segunda Marquetalia

Aka New Marquetalia; Second Marquetalia; La Nueva Marquetalia; FARC dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; FARC-D Segunda Marquetalia; Grupo Armado Organizado Residual Segunda Marquetalia; GAO-R Segunda Marquetalia; Residual Organized Armed Group Segunda Marquetalia; Armed Organized Residual Group Segunda Marquetalia

Description: Segunda Marquetalia was designated as an FTO on December 1, 2021. In 2019, former FARC commanders, including Luciano Marín Arango, alias Iván Márquez, created Segunda Marquetalia after abandoning the 2016 Peace Accord.

Activities: Segunda Marquetalia has been responsible for the killings of former FARC members and community leaders. Segunda Marquetalia has also engaged in mass destruction, assassination, and hostage-taking, including the kidnapping and holding for ransom of government employees and the attempted killings of political leaders. In 2020 the Colombian police foiled an attempt by Segunda Marquetalia to assassinate former FARC commander and current president of the Comunes political party, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, alias Timochenko.

Strength: Segunda Marquetalia is estimated to have 750 to 1,500 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Colombia and Venezuela

Funding and External Aid: Segunda Marquetalia is funded primarily by involvement in illicit activity, including extortion, international drug trade, and illegal mining.
Shining Path

Aka SL; Sendero Luminoso; Ejército Guerrillero Popular; EGP; Ejército Popular de Liberación; EPL; Partido Comunista del Perú (Communist Party of Peru); PCP; Partido Comunista del Perú en el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariategui); Socorro Popular del Perú; SPP, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru, People’s Aid of Peru, People’s Guerrilla Army; People’s Liberation Army

Description: The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The Peru-based terrorist organization was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor Abimael Guzmán, whose teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. In 1992 the Peruvian government captured Guzmán, along with key accomplices, and sentenced them to life in prison.

In September, Guzmán died in a maximum-security prison in Peru. SL is now led by brothers Victor and Jorge Quipe Palomino and Tarcela Loya Vilchez. Under their direction, the group aims to overthrow the Peruvian government and names the United States as a principal enemy.

Activities: In 2016 the group attacked a six-vehicle military caravan transporting election materials ahead of the country’s election; eight soldiers and two civilian contractors were killed by SL members armed with long-range rifles and grenades. In separate incidents in 2017, SL killed several policemen in an area where the group controls territory and facilitates drug trafficking.

In 2018, six soldiers were wounded by SL sharpshooters at the Nueva Libertad Army base in the region of Junín. That same month, a group of SL members killed five soldiers and wounded another in an attack on the Nueva Libertad army base, and attacked a police vehicle using a roadside bomb, killing four policemen. In 2019, suspected SL members conducted an attack on the Peruvian Army, killing three soldiers.

In 2020, Peruvian troops and SL members fought in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers.

Peruvian authorities continued to arrest numerous suspected members of SL in 2021. SL did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Estimates of SL’s strength vary, but experts assess SL to number between 250 and 300 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Peru

Funding and External Aid: SL is primarily funded by the illicit narcotics trade.
Chapter 6. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 is submitted in compliance with Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f or the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutory excerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a discussion of the interpretation and application of those terms in this report are included below.

Excerpts and Summary of Key Statutory Terms.

Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(a)) states as follows:

(a) … The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing -

(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country -

(i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;

(ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to section 4605(j) of Title 50 [deemed under Section 1768(c)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA FY19) to refer to section 1754(c) of the NDAA FY19 as of August 13, 2018]; and

(iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report; and

(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations;

(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 4605(j) of Title 50, any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;

(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on -
(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and

(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656f(a) as follows:

(1) The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(2) The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

**Interpretation and Application of Key Terms.** For purposes of this report, the terms “international terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitions assigned to them in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d) (see above). The term “non-combatant,” which is referred to but not defined in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.

Notably, 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d) is one of many U.S. statutes and international legal instruments that concern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which use definitions for terrorism and related terms that are different from those used in this report. The interpretation and application of defined and related terms concerning terrorism in this report are therefore specific to the statutory and other requirements of the report, and not intended to express the views of the U.S. government on how these terms should be interpreted or applied for any other purpose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlation between the interpretation of terms such as “non-combatant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribed to similar terms pursuant to the law of war (which encapsulates the obligations of states and individuals with respect to their activities in situations of armed conflict).

**Statistical Information.** Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(b), this report should contain “to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year.” This is satisfied through the inclusion of a Statistical Annex
to the report that sets out statistical information provided by Development Services Group, Inc. (DSG). The Statistical Annex includes a discussion of the methodology employed by DSG in compiling the relevant data. This report does not contain statistical information specifically concerning combatants. The focus of the terrorism report, as is clear from the definition of terrorism, is on violence against non-combatant targets.

**Contextual Reporting.** Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national population is not meant to imply that all members of that population are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything other than a tiny fraction of such larger populations. It is terrorist groups — and their actions — that are the focus of this report.

Further, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence.

Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily “international terrorism” and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.
Appendix B. Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, and Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens

Provided by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The term “Private U.S. citizen” refers to any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government; therefore, these figures do not include U.S. military personnel killed or injured in a terrorism-related incident while on active duty or employees of the Department of State and other federal agencies while overseas on U.S. government orders. Members of U.S. government employees’ households and U.S. citizens working for contractors hired by the U.S. government, however, are considered private U.S. citizens for purposes of this report.

Although every effort was made to include all terrorism-related deaths and injuries involving private U.S. citizens overseas, the figures below reflect only those cases reported to, or known by, the Department of State. These figures were acquired through consular systems. Embassies and consulates abroad report overseas deaths in consular systems and specify the cause of death. Terrorism-related deaths are evaluated by first collecting those data and then contacting posts individually to determine whether there is sufficient official documentation to designate the death as terrorism related. These figures may not reflect actual numbers of injured, which may not always be reported, depending on the severity of injuries and other factors. In the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence.

2021 (January 1 to June 30):

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
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2021 (July 1 to December 31):

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
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Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens From January 1 to June 30, 2021 (by Country)

Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens From July 1 to December 31, 2021 (by Country)