ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH
ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS

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Prepared by the U.S. Department of State
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ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Report is transmitted pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2593a), which requires that the President submit a report each year on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This Report assesses U.S. compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements in 2022, as well as the compliance and adherence of other nations, to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, including confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) and the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the United States is a participating State.

The issues addressed in this Report primarily reflect activities from January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022. This Report recounts as much information as possible at the unclassified level. However, certain information, including some compliance findings and concerns, is addressed only in the SECRET or TOP SECRET/SCI-level annexes to this Report.

ADHERENCE AND COMPLIANCE

Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments continue to be important tools that can protect and advance U.S. interests. They can limit or reduce threats to the United States, allies, and partners, including by limiting participating States’ access to or engagement in dangerous or destabilizing capabilities or activities, providing insight and transparency into the actions of participating States, and encouraging stabilizing patterns of behavior and interaction. In these ways, such agreements and commitments can contribute broadly to transparency and stability on a global scale.

Effective arms control requires countries to comply fully with arms control obligations and commitments. In evaluating any country’s compliance with its arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation obligations, the United States considers a variety of factors. These include the nature and precise language of the obligations undertaken, interpreted in accordance with international law, information regarding the country’s activities, including that acquired by intelligence collection, cooperative verification measures, open source information, and diplomatic means – and any information provided by the country in question.
In this Report, the term “violation” refers to any action or omission by a State Party to an international agreement that has been determined by the United States to be contrary to obligations of that State Party under the agreement in question. Such violations may give rise to international legal remedies.

There can sometimes be legal or factual uncertainty as to whether a violation has occurred. Accordingly, this Report distinguishes between “violations” and instances in which the U.S. Government is considering but has not yet determined whether a violation has occurred. The Report refers to the latter category as “compliance concerns.”

In general, this Report uses the terms “violation” and “compliance” only in reference to legal obligations undertaken in international agreements. When discussing politically binding commitments, the Report generally uses the term “adherence” instead of “compliance.”

When compliance and adherence concerns arise regarding the actions of other nations, the United States seeks, whenever possible, to address its concerns through diplomatic engagement. However, the United States also has a range of options and means to try to convince violators it is in their interest to return to compliance and to prevent violators from benefitting from their violations. Where possible, the United States continues to pursue resolution of those issues with the States in question, as well as to assess the implications of these States’ actions and how best the United States should respond to them.

**U.S. Organizations and Programs to Evaluate and Ensure U.S. and Other Countries’ Compliance with and Adherence to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments**

The U.S. Department of State, in its role as the lead U.S. agency on arms control matters, is responsible for providing policy advice and legal expertise related to compliance. To do so, it relies on underlying factual evidence that is supplied by the Intelligence Community, along with its own interactions and communications with other countries. The U.S. Department of Defense’s compliance review groups oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments.

The Department of State prepares the annual compliance report, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, the interagency conducts a review in appropriate cases, including when other states formally raise concerns regarding U.S. implementation of its obligations. Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.
PART I: U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

U.S. COMPLIANCE

In 2022, the United States continued to be in compliance with all of its obligations under arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. When other countries have formally raised a legitimate compliance concern regarding U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to confirm its actions were in compliance with its obligations.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC)

All U.S. activities during 2022 were consistent with the obligations set forth in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States continues to work toward enhancing transparency of biodefense work and effective national implementation of BWC obligations using the BWC confidence-building measures and a range of voluntary measures and initiatives. Additionally, the United States continues to be transparent about U.S. scientific and technical engagements and laboratory support provided over time, consistent with Article X that improve the international community’s capacity to detect, prepare for, and respond to disease outbreaks and other biological threats. The United States further demonstrated its commitment to the treaty in 2022 in BWC Article V consultative meetings and meetings at the UN Security Council held to consider a complaint lodged by the Russian Federation pursuant to Article VI. The United States recognizes the importance of these mechanisms despite Russia’s bad-faith efforts and disinformation to use the BWC to further justify its war in Ukraine.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)

The United States has provided a full and complete declaration of its chemical weapons (CW) and associated CW facilities and continues to work toward completing the destruction of CW and associated CW facilities, in accordance with its CWC obligations. Pursuant to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Conference of the States Parties (CSP) decision regarding “Final Extended Deadlines of 29 April, 2012,” the United States provides a report and briefing to each regular session of the OPCW Executive Council, as well as to the CSP annually, on the progress achieved towards complete destruction of remaining stockpiles.

The United States has completed destruction of its Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons and has completed destruction of more than 98.71 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile.
There are two CW destruction facilities in the United States, one located in Pueblo, Colorado and one in Blue Grass, Kentucky, that are scheduled to complete destruction of the remaining stockpile not later than September 30, 2023.

The United States remains fully committed to complete destruction of its entire stockpile, working with the OPCW, and consistent with the Convention's imperatives of public safety, environmental protection, and international transparency and oversight.

The United States also is compliant with its CWC obligations related to commercial activities. U.S. CWC Regulations (15 CFR § 710 et seq.) require commercial facilities exceeding CWC-specified activity thresholds to submit annual declarations, notifications, and other reports, including on past and anticipated activities, and to permit systematic and routine verification through on-site inspections of declared commercial facilities.

**Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes Treaty (PNET), and Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)**

The United States has not conducted any nuclear weapon explosive tests or any nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes since 1992. All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the TTBT, PNET, and LTBT.

Since 1992, the United States has maintained a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and remains committed to assuring the safety, security, and reliability of our arsenal through a rigorous science-based stockpile stewardship program. For more than twenty years, the directors of the national security laboratories and the Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command have annually assessed that our nuclear stockpile is safe, reliable, and effective, and that there is no current need to conduct nuclear explosive tests to ensure stockpile reliability.

**1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare**

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

**Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)**

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The United States continues to implement lawful countermeasures vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, specifically the cessation of implementation of certain CFE Treaty obligations (notifications, data exchange, and inspections) vis-a-vis Russia in response to Russia’s continued violation of its obligations to the United States under the CFE Treaty. These measures were closely coordinated with NATO Allies, who also continued to implement the same
countermeasures in their respective national capacities. Russia has not challenged this action. The United States continues to perform its obligations under the CFE Treaty vis-à-vis all other States Parties.

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT)**

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT.

The United States remains committed to all three NPT Pillars, the commitment to pursue good faith efforts towards disarmament progress, the pursuit of the highest nonproliferation standards, and the fulfillment of all of its obligations under the U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement and U.S. Additional Protocol.

**Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty or NST)**

All U.S. activities in 2022 were consistent with the obligations set forth in the New START Treaty (NST).

U.S. conversion procedures for B-52H heavy bombers and launchers of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fully comply with Treaty provisions, and the United States has met its obligations under the Treaty to remove these items from accountability.
PART II: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR ISSUES

TREATY ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE NEW START TREATY OR NST)

For a discussion of Russia’s implementation of its obligations under the New START Treaty, see the Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty submitted pursuant to paragraph (a)(10) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the “Condition (a)(10) Report”), and appended to this Report.
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PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR INITIATIVES CONCERNING TACTICAL (NONSTRATEGIC) NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

This chapter of the Report covers developments relevant to other nations’ compliance with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT), including their compliance with related obligations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¹ This chapter also addresses, where relevant, the status of countries’ efforts to conclude and implement a modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA and their efforts to conclude and implement an Additional Protocol (AP) to their CSA.² The chapter focuses on developments in Burma, Iran, the DPRK, and Syria.

As of the end of 2022, there were five non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Parties to the NPT that had not yet brought into force a CSA with the IAEA.³ Although the CSA was designed to meet the requirements of the NPT, the AP in combination with the CSA is now widely considered to be the de facto standard for achieving the NPT’s safeguards objectives. The AP contains measures that increase the IAEA’s ability to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State, and thereby to provide assurances that the NPT NNWS Parties have met their NPT obligation to place all nuclear material in peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. The United States supports universal adoption of the AP by States Parties to the NPT, and believes that AP adherence is essential to ensuring the effectiveness and credibility of IAEA safeguards. As of the end of 2022, 140 States Parties had an AP in force.

Additional information on country assessments provided at a higher classification.

See previous years’ reports for additional compliance history and background information.

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¹ Article III of the NPT requires each NPT non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS) Party to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under [the] Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Concluding and implementing a CSA with the IAEA fulfills this obligation. In the case of a State with very limited quantities of nuclear material, the State also may enter into a Small Quantities Protocol to the CSA that reduces the safeguards implementation burden for such States.

² The Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (AP) was developed in 1997 to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, and thereby to increase the IAEA’s ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States Parties. With a supermajority of NPT States Parties now implementing APs, the combination of a CSA together with an AP has become the de facto standard for achieving the safeguards objectives of the NPT.

³ According to the IAEA, the NPT States Parties without a CSA in force as of November 28, 2022, are as follows: Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and Timor-Leste.
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COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

MYANMAR (BURMA)

FINDING

The available evidence does not support a conclusion that Myanmar (Burma) violated the NPT; however, the United States remains concerned about Burma’s lack of transparency regarding past nuclear work. Much of this information was not reported to the civilian government and remains under control of the military, which deposed the civilian government in a coup d’état on February 1, 2021.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

There are no new compliance concerns to report in 2022.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

There is no new analysis to report in 2022.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States continues to call upon Burma to complete the work necessary to bring its AP and a modified SQP into force. The United States also continues to prepare and plan internally on how to work efficiently with a future Burmese civilian government to help resolve concerns about Burma’s lack of transparency regarding past nuclear work.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)

FINDING

During the 2022 reporting period, Iran continued to expand its uranium enrichment activities and stocks of enriched uranium, including the deployment of advanced centrifuges. Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and the enrichment efficiency of its centrifuges are key factors in the amount of time the United States assesses would be required for it to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon should Iran decide to build one. The United States continues to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-developments activities that we assess would be necessary to produce a nuclear device. If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

Based on reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP), the United
States has concluded that concerns remained outstanding regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran as of the end of the reporting period. Iran’s continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards investigations raise concerns with regard to Iran’s compliance with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT. Our concerns have increased over time as Iran has continued to fail to provide the cooperation required under its CSA.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE/ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Iran became a State Party to the NPT in 1970, and its CSA entered into force in 1974. Iran signed, but did not ratify, an AP in 2003 and implemented its measures from late 2003 to early 2006, and, pursuant to its commitment to provisionally apply the AP under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from 2016 to early 2021.

IAEA NPT Safeguards Reports – Compliance Concerns Related to Iran’s Safeguards Obligations

The IAEA continues to investigate outstanding safeguards issues related to possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in the past at three undeclared locations (Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan) in Iran, where the IAEA detected chemically processed uranium particles. Based on the IAEA’s technical analysis, including evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information, the IAEA has reported the need for required clarifications from Iran related to the three locations.

Throughout the reporting period, the IAEA Director General (DG) has stated that unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at the three undeclared locations noted above and informs the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or the contaminated equipment, the Agency will not be able to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its CSA and, therefore, will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

The IAEA’s Board of Governors (BOG) adopted two resolutions during the reporting period urging Iran to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigations. The June 2022 resolution called upon Iran to “act on an urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up the Director General’s offer of further engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.”

Despite exchanges between the IAEA and Iran, the DG reported that as of November 2022 Iran had not provided technically credible answers to the IAEA’s questions regarding Turquzabad, Varamin, and/or Marivan. The DG reported his serious concern over the lack of progress toward clarifying the outstanding safeguards issues.
Cessation of Implementation of Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s CSA

As of the end of the reporting period, the issue remains unresolved.

Enrichment and Stockpile of Uranium-235

Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium continued to expand during the reporting period. As of October 22, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3,673.7 kilograms.

Iran continued to produce low-enriched uranium of 2 and 5 percent U-235. Iran also produced 386.4 kilograms of uranium (in the form of UF6) enriched up to 20 percent U-235 and 62.3 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent U-235, representing an increase of 272.6 kilograms and 44.6 kilograms, respectively, from the previous year.

The production of enriched uranium does not constitute a violation of the NPT. However, Iran’s uranium production, particularly of highly-enriched uranium, and growing stockpile are key factors in the length of time it would take for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, if a political decision was made to do so.

Production of Uranium Metal

No uranium metal was produced during the reporting year.

Cessation of Additional Protocol Implementation and JCPOA Verification and Monitoring

Iran notified the IAEA in a letter dated February 15, 2021 that it would halt the implementation of the transparency measures under the JCPOA, including implementation of provisions of Iran’s AP and other JCPOA verification and monitoring measures, effective February 23, 2021. Since that time, Iran has provided information on and access to declared nuclear facilities as required under its CSA, but has not provided updated AP declarations. As of the end of the reporting period, Iran has not permitted the IAEA to implement JCPOA-related verification and monitoring measures.

On January 19, 2022, Iran informed the IAEA of its intent to produce centrifuge rotor tubes at a new location in Esfahan instead of at the Karaj workshop. The IAEA re-installed cameras removed from Karaj at the Esfahan facility on January 24.

On June 8, 2022, Iran requested that the IAEA remove equipment that was “utilized beyond Iran’s CSA commitments,” including the cameras, the On-Line Enrichment Measurement device at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, and the flow meter at the Heavy Water Production Plant. Agency inspectors removed surveillance cameras from the Tehran Research Centre and the two centrifuge component workshops at Esfahan on June 9.
It is possible that Iran continues to store data recorded by the surveillance cameras at the Karaj workshop from February to June 2021 and from December 2021 to January 2022, and at the Esfahan facility from January 2022 to June 2022.

Iran’s cessation of implementation of its AP and the JCPOA’s verification and monitoring measures does not violate its obligations under the NPT. However, the removal of certain IAEA equipment related to JCPOA verification and monitoring ended the IAEA’s ability to verify the nature of the activities undertaken at the Karaj workshop or at the Esfahan facility, as well as activities related to uranium ore concentrate and heavy water production in Iran, after June 9, 2022.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE/ADHERENCE QUESTIONS

The United States continues to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that we assess would be necessary to produce a nuclear device. If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

At the end of the reporting period, outstanding concerns remained regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran today, as evidenced by the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards investigations. As of November 2022, the IAEA DG continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under its CSA and AP and investigate outstanding safeguards issues related to three undeclared locations in Iran where chemically processed uranium particles were detected.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States remains committed to denying Iran any pathway to a nuclear weapon and will work through the IAEA’s Board of Governors to provide the IAEA the support it needs to resolve these serious, outstanding safeguards matters. In June 2022 and November 2022, the United States joined other IAEA Member States in censuring Iran through the Board’s adoption of resolutions calling on Iran to cooperate, without delay, with the IAEA’s ongoing investigations to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. The United States has underscored that Iran must immediately provide the IAEA full cooperation and comply with its legal obligations under its CSA with the IAEA. Iran is legally obligated to provide the IAEA with required clarifications and access.

The United States has made it clear that any diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program must be built on effective verification. The United States continues to sanction critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as its energy, petrochemical, metals, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, the provision of insurance to designated persons or for sanctionable activities, and transactions involving designated Iranian financial institutions.
During 2022, the United States continued to engage in diplomatic efforts to address concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. As of the end of the reporting period, no understanding to address those concerns had been reached.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

FINDING

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was in violation of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA with the IAEA at the time it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The DPRK’s continuing nuclear activities and recent official statements make clear it is also not adhering to its commitments in the 2018 Singapore Summit Joint Statement, the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, or the 1994 Agreed Framework, and is in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations as well. Recent activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site indicates a likely return to nuclear testing.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

During an 8 September speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), Kim Jong Un declared the DPRK’s nuclear status “irreversible,” decried nuclear negotiations, and derided sanctions as a tool to force denuclearization, according to state media.

Previous editions of this Report described DPRK violations of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA before it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Irrespective of one’s interpretation of whether or not the DPRK’s 2003 notice of withdrawal from the NPT became legally effective, the DPRK remains subject to IAEA safeguards obligations. If that withdrawal did become effective, the DPRK’s 1992 CSA would have terminated and its prior 1977 safeguards agreement with the IAEA would have resumed applicability. Alternatively, if the DPRK’s withdrawal did not become effective in 2003, the DPRK’s 1992 CSA would still be in force today. In either case, the DPRK remains in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations in 2022.

Production Facilities

The DPRK continued fissile material production, maintaining its plutonium production program and probably expanding its uranium enrichment program.

In 2022, activities consistent with the 5 MWe reactor’s operation at Yongbyon, including discharge of cooling water, have continued, according to the IAEA. For January through August of 2022, the IAEA reported no indication of reprocessing of irradiated fuel at the Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory.
Since 2012, the IAEA has noted activities consistent with the operation of a reported centrifuge enrichment facility, located at Yongbyon. In September 2021, construction began on a new annex to the building housing the reported centrifuge enrichment facility, according to the Agency, which assessed the annex will increase the floor area of the building by about one third. During the reporting period, the roof to the annex was installed in May 2022 and the annex is now externally complete, according to the Agency.

As it revealed publicly in 2010, the DPRK is constructing an experimental light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon. For January through August 2022, the IAEA did not observe indications the LWR was operating. The IAEA reiterated that, based on the information available, it cannot estimate when the LWR will become operational.

For the reporting period, the IAEA reported ongoing indications of mining, milling and concentration activities at the Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate plant.

**Testing**

The DPRK has not conducted a nuclear test since its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, which it claimed was of a “two-stage thermonuclear weapon.” In 2018, the regime claimed the “northern test ground of the DPRK was completely dismantled.” On January 19, 2022, Kim Jong Un publicly instructed relevant DPRK agencies to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.”

In March 2022, excavation work commenced near the southernmost tunnel of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to reopen the test tunnel after its partial demolition in 2018, according to the IAEA, which assessed that this work may have been complete by May 2022. In June 2022, the Agency then observed repair work on a washed out road connecting support areas to two tunnels. After a brief hiatus, the roadwork started up again in late August 2022, according to the Agency.

**ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS**

The DPRK was in violation of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA before it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The DPRK is also in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations.

Throughout 2022, the United States continued to have significant concerns regarding the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, its continued production of fissile material, and its apparent refurbishing at Punggye-ri nuclear test site which the IAEA believes is an indication of plans to resume nuclear testing.

**EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS**

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During the reporting period, in multilateral fora that include the UN General Assembly, the IAEA General Conference, and meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors, countries from every region of the world recognized the threat the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear weapons program poses to international peace and security.

The goal of the United States remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States harbors no hostile intent toward the DPRK. The United States is prepared to meet with the DPRK with no preconditions and continues to consult closely with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners about how to best engage the DPRK. For example, during the reporting period the President traveled to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to Japan and discussed DPRK issues with then President Moon and Prime Minister Kishida. The President also met and discussed the DPRK with new ROK president Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in June of 2022.

The United States has a vital interest in deterring DPRK aggression and limiting the risks posed by its dangerous and destabilizing weapons programs. UN sanctions relating to the DPRK remain in place, and the United States will continue to implement them, including through diplomacy at the United Nations and with the DPRK’s neighbors. The United States also works closely with allies and partners to identify and combat methods of sanctions evasion, as well as to counter illicit money-making activities by the DPRK, such as crypto currency theft. The United States also remains engaged with the IAEA and welcomes the IAEA’s efforts to enhance readiness to resume monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK at the appropriate time.

**SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)**

**FINDING**

The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) remains in violation of its obligations under Article III of the NPT and its CSA with the IAEA. Given the IAEA’s finding of particles of chemically-processed uranium compounds at al-Kibar in Deir Ezzour governorate, the United States remains concerned regarding whether any undeclared nuclear material might exist in Syria.

**CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS**

There is no new compliance information to report in 2022.

**ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS**

The United States continues to judge Syria to be in violation of its obligations under Article III of the NPT. However, it has no new information to provide in 2022.

**EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS**
The United States and likeminded partners continued to deliver strong national statements in the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) calling on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA to remedy its safeguards noncompliance and to refute misinformation on the issue propagated by Russia, Syria, and Iran. The United States and likeminded partners also called for continued reporting on Syria by the IAEA Director General (DG), and for maintaining Syria on the agenda for each quarterly BOG meeting. The DG continued to produce an annual report on Syria and to provide an oral update on Syria at each quarterly BOG meeting. The DG confirmed during his introductory statement to the November 2022 BOG meeting that Syria had still not responded to a letter he sent in May 2022 inviting Syria to reengage with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards issues. The United States continued to raise the issue of Syria’s NPT noncompliance in national statements in other multilateral fora as well, including at the Tenth NPT Review Conference in August 2022. In addition, the United States coordinated a joint statement at the NPT Review Conference co-sponsored by 52 NPT Parties stressing that Syria’s safeguards noncompliance constitutes noncompliance with Article III of the NPT and urging Syria to cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.

The United States will continue to support the IAEA’s investigation of Syria’s undeclared nuclear activities and the DG’s efforts to reengage with Syria; to mobilize likeminded support for maintaining pressure on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA; and to work to ensure that the BOG and DG remain seized of the issue until Syria has fully cooperated with the IAEA to address all outstanding issues.
THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), was signed in 1974 with a Protocol signed in 1990. The Treaty entered into force in 1990. It establishes a nuclear testing “threshold” by prohibiting each Party from undertaking underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and it provides for notification and verification of testing activities.

Additional information is provided at a higher classification.

See previous years’ reports for additional compliance history and background information.

FINDING

There are no new compliance developments for 2022; however, previous reports have assessed that Russia has conducted supercritical nuclear weapons tests without TTBT notification since renewing its nuclear explosive testing moratorium in 1996, and concerns remain due to these past activities and the uncertainty and lack of transparency relating to Russia’s activities at Novaya Zemlya.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Russia’s conduct since it renewed its unilateral nuclear explosive testing moratorium in 1996 raises compliance concerns with Russia’s TTBT obligation to notify nuclear weapons tests if it plans to conduct them.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

A failure on the part of Russia to provide an accurate annual notification of planned nuclear explosive “tests,” as defined in the treaty, for the following calendar year, and to provide timely revised notifications as may be required, would prevent the United States from exercising its verification rights, as specified in paragraph 2(b) of Section III of the Protocol.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will engage with Russia, as appropriate, in order to address nuclear test site activities of concern relative to the treaty.
NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIA

No new issue related to nuclear testing moratoria was identified for this unclassified section of the Compliance Report. Due to the lack of transparency with regard to their nuclear testing activities, concerns remain about the nature of both China and Russia’s adherence to their respective moratoria. See previous years’ reports for additional adherence history and background information.
PART III: OTHER STATES’ ADHERENCE TO MISSILE COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among Partner governments sharing a common interest in controlling missile proliferation. The MTCR is not a treaty and it does not impose legally binding obligations on participating countries. The MTCR Partners control exports of a common list of items (the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex, also referred to as the MTCR Annex) according to a common export control policy (the MTCR Guidelines). The Guidelines and Annex are implemented through each country’s national legislation and regulations. The MTCR has no regime-wide compliance or verification provisions.

Membership in the MTCR has grown steadily since the regime’s creation in 1987, and as of December 31, 2022, thirty-five countries are now members.

In November 2000, the United States sought and received a bilateral political commitment from People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is not an MTCR Partner Country, to not proliferate certain missile technology.

Additional information on country assessment provided at a higher classification.

See previous years’ reports for additional compliance history and background information.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

FINDING

The PRC has failed to adhere to its November 2000 commitment to the United States not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).”

This failure to adhere to its November 2000 commitment is reflected in PRC-based entities’ continued supply of MTCR-controlled items to missile programs of proliferation concern.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

PRC-based entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern in 2022.
ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

In November 2000, the PRC committed not to assist “in any way, any country in the
development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles
capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300
kilometers),” yet it has continued to do so.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

Throughout 2022, the United States raised a number of cases with the PRC concerning transfers
of missile-related goods and technology by the PRC entities to programs of concern. Although
the United States has asked that the PRC investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of
these cases remain unresolved. In 2022, the United States imposed missile sanctions against
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) First Academy, China Aerospace
Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Fourth Academy, and Poly Technologies Incorporated
(PTI). In addition, the United States imposed sanctions against two PRC-based entities pursuant
to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act for transfers of proliferation-sensitive
goods and technology to Iran.

Based on information included in the classified Annex, the United States will no longer report
on the PRC’s adherence to its 2000 commitment in future Compliance Reports. The missile
proliferation activities of the PRC will continue to be reported to Congress through the
reporting requirements of the missile sanctions law, as well as via semi-annual Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) reports. In order to prevent proliferation of
missile technology by PRC entities to Iran and other programs of concern, the United States will
continue its longstanding efforts to encourage the PRC to fully implement all relevant United
Nations Security Council Resolutions, strengthen its missile-related export control laws and
regulations, devote more priority and resources to nonproliferation, and diligently enforce its
export control laws and regulations to prevent transfers by PRC entities to missile programs of
concern.
PART IV: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO CHEMICAL ISSUES

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

For a detailed discussion of other nations’ compliance with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, see the Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, submitted pursuant to Condition 10(C) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention (also known as the “Condition 10(C) Report”), and appended to this Report.
PART V: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICAL ISSUES

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC or Convention) opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.

As of the end of 2022, there were 183⁴ States Party to the BWC and four signatory States for which the treaty is not yet in force. In 1987, BWC States Party established an annual data exchange, referred to as the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). The CBMs were modified and expanded in 1991 and streamlined in 2011. Submission of CBMs is a politically binding commitment, but not all States Parties routinely submit reports. CBM submission rates have continued to gradually increase in 2022.

The United States’ definition of a state biological warfare program is a leadership-approved effort intended to acquire, develop, modify, produce, or retain biological warfare agents for use or potential use as a weapon. A biological warfare program would probably include one or more of the following:

• Researching, acquiring, developing, modifying, producing, retaining, or testing biological weapons (BW) agents and/or BW agent dispersal devices for use as a weapon;
• Facilities producing or intended to produce BW agents and/or BW agent dispersal devices for use as a weapon;
• Training, doctrine, or plans for use of BW agents as a weapon; and,
• Use or attempted use of a BW agent as a weapon.

Additional information on country assessments provided at a higher classification.

See previous years’ reports for additional compliance history and background information.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

FINDING

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⁴ On January 9, 2018, the Palestinians deposited a purported instrument of accession to the BWC. On March 5, 2018, the United States submitted to the Depositaries for the BWC, a letter detailing U.S. objections to the purported accession of the “State of Palestine” to the BWC.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to engage in biological activities with potential BW applications, which raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have sufficient information to determine whether the PRC has eliminated its assessed historical biological warfare program, as required under Article II of the Convention.

**CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS**

The PRC became a State Party to the BWC in 1984. Questions and concerns on its compliance with the Convention have been raised since the 1993 Report.

Although the PRC has submitted BWC Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) each year since 1989, including in 2022, the PRC’s CBM reporting has never disclosed it ever pursued an offensive BW program, and the PRC has never acknowledged publicly or in diplomatic channels its past offensive program. As part of its historical BW program, the PRC had reportedly weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, and tularemia.

PRC military medical institutions have conducted research to identify, test, and characterize diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use applications. The PRC’s annual CBMs do not include information on this dual-use biological research on pathogens and marine and animal toxins conducted at PLA institutions.

**ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS**

Available information shows the PRC engaged in activities that raise concerns with regard to its obligations under Article I of the BWC, which requires States Parties “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain ...[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.”

The United States has compliance concerns with respect to PRC military medical institutions’ toxin and biotechnology research and development because of the dual-use potential and possible BW applications.

In addition, the United States assesses that the PRC possessed an offensive BW program from the early 1950s to at least the late 1980s. There is no available information to demonstrate that the PRC took steps to fulfill its treaty obligations under Article II of the BWC, which requires the PRC to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes all items specified in Article I of its past offensive BW program. Retention of latent knowledge and technical capability from the PRC’s former undeclared BW program raise concern of the dual-use biological research conducted by the PLA.
EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

In 2021, the United States engaged the PRC about rescheduling the virtual bilateral BWC-related meeting that was postponed in 2020 by PRC officials for unspecified technical reasons. A new date was proposed for early 2022, but the PRC again cancelled the meeting. The United States continued to press the PRC for substantive bilateral engagement on the BWC issues, however, there was no commitment from Beijing by the end of 2022.

On the margins of the 2022 Ninth BWC Review Conference, the United States engaged the PRC bilaterally to encourage its support for U.S. proposals to strengthen the BWC. The PRC indicated receptivity and interest in efforts to strengthen the BWC, but has not engaged in further substantive bilateral discussions related to its biological activities. The United States will continue to monitor and report, as well as pursue substantive bilateral engagement on the PRC’s biological activities in relation to its BWC obligations.

Unresolved questions regarding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic are not part of such dialogues and are not judged to present a BWC compliance issue. The Intelligence Community judges that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was not developed as a biological weapon. The United States continues to assess that there is no connection between the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and the PRC’s compliance with the BWC.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)

FINDING

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s (Iran’s) activities continue to raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. The United States continues to assess that Iran has not abandoned its intention to conduct research and development of biological agents and toxins for offensive purposes. Iran maintains flexibility to use, upon leadership demand, legitimate research underway for biodefense and public health purposes for a capability to produce lethal BW agents; whether maintaining this flexibility is pursuant to decisions by leadership is unknown. The United States remains unable to differentiate some of Iran’s public health research and biodefense activities from those that are prohibited under the BWC, complicating assessments of Iranian compliance.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Iran became a State Party to the BWC in 1973. Its compliance with the Convention has been addressed every year since the 1993 Report.

The only CBM submitted by Iran since 2011 was an incomplete CBM in 2016. Previous Iranian CBM submissions asserted that Iran did not have a biodefense program, but “has carried out some defensive studies on identification, decontamination, protection, and treatment against
some agents and toxins.” Lack of reporting in CBMs contributes to uncertainty about the nature of this work.

Iran has engaged in dual-use activities with potential for BW applications such as building a separate plant for pharmaceutical botulinum toxin production. Iranian biotechnology entities, particularly military-affiliated institutions, continued to pursue dual-use technologies. Open source reports note Iranian military-associated universities and affiliated research centers have conducted BW-relevant projects on bioregulators.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Available information shows Iran engaged in activities that raise concern with regard to its Article I obligations under the BWC. Although it remains difficult for the United States to differentiate between some of Iran’s public health research and biodefense activities allowed under the BWC from those that would be prohibited under the Treaty, the nature of Iran’s sophisticated toxin research and production and its capability to produce lethal agents on demand raise concerns regarding Iran’s compliance with its obligations under Article I of the BWC.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

There were no discussions during the reporting period between the United States and Iran regarding Iran’s compliance with the BWC. The United States will continue to monitor Iran’s activities as they relate to Iran’s obligations under the BWC. As appropriate, the United States will continue to assess the feasibility of engaging Iran to clarify activity that may be inconsistent with the BWC.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

FINDING

The United States assesses that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) has an offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligations under Articles I and II of the BWC. North Korea is assessed to have had BW capabilities since at least the 1960s.

North Korea has an offensive BW program, and previous reporting illustrated that North Korea had BW capabilities intended for use to counter U.S. and ROK military superiority.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The DPRK continued its program despite having become a State Party to the BWC in 1987. North Korea submitted a null CBM report in 1990, where it noted there was nothing relevant to report. It has failed to submit a report since 1990.
The United States assesses that North Korea has a dedicated, national level offensive program developed, and produced BW agents.

North Korea probably has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes.

North Korea probably has the technical capability to produce bacteria, viruses, and toxins that could be used as BW agents. North Korea also has at least a limited capability to genetically engineer biological products. Pyongyang probably is capable of weaponizing BW agents with unconventional systems such as sprayers and poison pen injection devices, which have been deployed by North Korea for delivery of chemical weapons (CW) and could be used to covertly deliver BW agents.

North Korea maintains biotechnology and conventional weapons production infrastructures that could support BW development, and it continues to improve its capabilities by collaborating with other countries on dual-use scientific topics or procuring biological equipment and materials.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Nothing in the reporting period affects prior U.S. assessments with respect to the DPRK’s compliance with the BWC. The United States concludes that North Korea is in violation of its obligations under Article I and II of the BWC.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will continue to monitor North Korea’s activities in relation to its obligations under the BWC. As appropriate, the United States will continue to assess the feasibility of engaging North Korea on activities that violate its obligations under the BWC.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

The United States assesses that Russia maintains an offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligations under Articles I and II of the BWC. Russia continues to engage in activities prohibited by Article I of the BWC. Russia has not fulfilled its Article II obligation to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes BW items specified under Article I of its past BW program.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The Soviet Union became a State Party to the BWC in 1975. Russia’s BWC compliance was first addressed in the 1993 Report, though the Soviet Union’s BWC noncompliance was first
addressed in the January 1984 Report to Congress on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements.

Russia inherited the past offensive program of biological research and development from the Soviet Union. Russia has not ended all activities prohibited by Article I of the BWC, nor has it fulfilled its Article II obligation to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes BW items specified under Article I of its past BW program.

Although its annual CBM submissions have consistently reported “nothing new to declare” with respect to its biodefense research and development programs, Russia is extensively modernizing Soviet-era biological warfare infrastructure that could support its present-day offensive program.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Nothing in the reporting period affects prior U.S. assessments with respect to Russia’s compliance with the BWC. Article I of the BWC requires States Party “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or …[r]etain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and Article II requires States Party to “destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes” the BW items specified in Article I of a past offensive program.

While States Parties to the BWC have a political commitment to report a past offensive program, since Yeltsin’s announcement in April 11, 1992, subsequent Russian CBM submissions have remained incomplete and misleading. Russia has provided an incomplete acknowledgment of the former Soviet program, has not furnished evidence of the dismantlement or cessation of key activities, and continues its ongoing secrecy efforts, including legislation criminalizing any disclosure of information about the former Soviet program. Key military biological facilities associated with the Soviet offensive program remain, inaccessible, and untransparent, nearly 30 years after Yeltsin’s decree. The available evidence indicates that Russia has not fulfilled its obligations under Article II to “destroy or divert to peaceful purposes” the BW specified in Article I of the Convention that it inherited from the Soviet Union.

Russian modernizations conducted at the Yekaterinburg branch of Russia’s 48th TsNII, Russia’s premier offensive BW entity, also raise serious concerns about Russia’s activities with respect to the BWC and Moscow’s broader programmatic ambitions.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

There were no specific expert level consultations in 2022 with Russia to discuss their BWC noncompliance. On September 6, 2022, during the Article V formal consultation meeting called by Russia, U.S. Special Representative Ken Ward highlighted U.S. concerns related to Russia’s
compliance with the BWC, noting that “the United States maintains that the Soviet program was absorbed, not dismantled, by the Russian Federation and that program has continued and evolved in violation of Article I and Article II of the BWC.” The United States will monitor Russia’s BW program and will seek to engage Russia on its BWC obligations, as appropriate.
PART VI: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO CONVENTIONAL ISSUES

VIENNA DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

On November 30, 2011, the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted Vienna Document 2011 (VD11), which further developed and revised the commitments adopted in the previous four versions of the Vienna Document. The confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) contained in VD11 and subsequent Vienna Document Plus decisions adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) are not legally binding upon the participating States, but are political commitments.5

The Department undertook a proactive program of direct outreach to states in Central Asia and other regions to promote improved or new participation in this and other confidence-building regimes, and contemplates extending the effort to include additional chronic VD11 non-adherence cases reported below.

Turkmenistan took positive steps to return to adherence with its VD11 commitments following an interagency visit to Ashgabat in October 2022 led by the State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC). Shortly after the visit, Turkmenistan sent experts to Kazakhstan to learn how to conduct military base visits, sent experts to Türkiye for VD11-related training, and started working with the OSCE to correct communications network issues. Most notably, in December 2022, Turkmenistan restored its OSCE communications link and submitted its Annual Exchange of Military Information for the first time since 2015 (the most significant adherence issue the United States had raised), and participated in the inaugural U.S.-Turkmenistan experts working group on VD11 implementation. In a further positive development, Turkmenistan also indicated that it is working towards achieving full performance of other commitments, including submission of defense planning information, annual calendars, and notification of below-threshold exercises.

The number of participating States pausing some or all VD11 on-site activities due to COVID diminished from 18 on January 1, 2022 to only five by the end of the reporting period.

Additional information on country assessments provided at a higher classification.

See previous years’ reports for additional adherence history and background information.

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5 As this report covers the period from January 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022, the annual VD11 exchange of data pertinent to the reporting period was held on December 15, 2021, for participating States with military forces in the VD11 zone of application to provide data effective as of January 1, 2022. In some instances, important developments reflected in data effective as of January 1, 2023 (provided as part of the annual exchange on December 15, 2022) are noted; in most cases, however, changes to adherence concerns based on this data will be included in next year’s Report.
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA (ARMENIA)

FINDING

In 2022, Armenia did not adhere to a VD11 commitment when it did not submit its annual VD11 data on its armed forces. This is the third year in a row Armenia has not submitted its annual data.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

As of the end of 2022, Armenia had provided no annual data, as has been the case since 2020. On December 15, 2022, Armenia notified a delay of unspecified duration in providing its VD11 data, citing its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan as the cause.

Armenia has not changed its policy, first notified in July 2020, stating that it was not “in a position to accept military inspections by the Republic of Turkey and guest inspectors from Turkey” on its territory under the Vienna Document, a position that raises a question regarding Armenia’s future adherence but is not currently an adherence concern in itself.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11 paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each year. However, Armenia did not provide its annual data on December 15, 2022, just as it did not provide annual data in the prior two years.

Armenia has stated that its continued non-performance of this commitment is due to its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan, as a measure of self-defense.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States and its NATO Allies have continued to raise adherence issues with Armenia in bilateral discussions, including on the margins of meetings in Vienna.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN (AZERBAIJAN)

FINDING

In 2022, Azerbaijan failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for calendar year 2022, despite having conducted such an exercise.
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

On November 15, 2021, Azerbaijan notified that it “does not plan to organize any military activity according to Para 61 of VD-11 for calendar year 2022. The main military activity below notification thresholds will be notified as soon as this information will be available.”

The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense (MoD) website reported on several exercises conducted in 2022 that would appear to be “major” and eligible for notification:

- Battalion-level tactical exercises on November 16.
- Live fire tactical exercises with motorized infantry units on November 18.
- Combined arms tactical live fire exercises on June 9.

However, Azerbaijan did not notify any major exercises or military activity in 2022.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC)’s Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States will notify annually at least one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets VD11 Chapter V notification thresholds.

Even if Azerbaijan concluded that its 2022 exercises were not subject to Chapter V notification under VD11 because they did not meet the notification thresholds, Azerbaijan should have reported at least one of the exercises to fulfill the commitment identified above, as acknowledged in its November 15, 2021, notification.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States and its NATO Allies have continued to raise adherence issues with Azerbaijan in bilateral discussions, including on the margins of meetings in Vienna.

In December 2022, the United States formally conveyed U.S. concerns to Azerbaijan, encouraged a return to full adherence, and offered bilateral assistance to address identified compliance concerns.

BELARUS

FINDING

In 2022, Belarus failed to adhere to several VD11 commitments. It failed 1) to notify an above-threshold military activity occurring on its territory in an accurate and timely manner, namely, the concentration of formations of Russian land forces preparing to attack Ukraine; 2) to invite observers from all participating States to observe this military activity; and 3) to “consult and cooperate” with participating States in good faith under the VD11 risk reduction mechanism.
invoked by its Baltic neighbors, which requested information on exercise Union Resolve and the number, disposition, and timetable for redeployment of forces situated near the Belarus-Ukraine border.

Belarus’s failure to adhere to its VD11 commitments facilitated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by helping Russia to avoid military transparency in the period immediately preceding the February invasion.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

The coordinated activities of Russia and Belarus in late 2021 and early 2022 raised security concerns for many OSCE participating States. In January and February 2022, Belarus hosted an unusual and unscheduled military activity near its border with Ukraine, with the concentration of formations of land forces assessed to be above notification and observation thresholds. Belarus did not issue a prior notification under VD11 regarding this concentration of forces, as it should have done as the host State. Belarus’s failure to provide necessary VD11 notifications and its evasive and disingenuous approach to inquiries relating to these activities, as documented below, demonstrate Belarus’s failure to adhere to its VD11 commitments:

Table 1: Timeline of VD11-associated events involving Belarus in early 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb-3</td>
<td>Belarus declined Latvia’s February 2 request to conduct an inspection in Belarus, made under an arrangement pursuant to VD11’s “regional measures” chapter, citing “a sudden increase in coronavirus infections.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-8</td>
<td>Belarus informed the OSCE participating States that a joint military exercise with Russia, “UNION RESOLVE 2022” would occur from February 10-20. This exercise did not appear on Belarus’s annual calendar submission for 2022. Belarus only invited observers from Latvia and Lithuania, but no other OSCE participating States, to observe the exercise from February 18-20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-9</td>
<td>Lithuania, on its own behalf and on behalf of Latvia and Estonia, requested an explanation of unusual military activities from Belarus under paragraph 16.1 of VD11, noting concern about the limited information Belarus had provided regarding the military buildup on its territory, and the apparent pretext of COVID-19 for denying Latvia’s inspection request. In the notification, Lithuania emphasized the military leadership of Belarus had announced that “almost the entire armed forces of the Republic of Belarus would be involved in the exercise.” With reference to Belarus’s selective observation invitation of February 8, Lithuania noted that “voluntary measures cannot replace the commitments undertaken under the Vienna Document.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-11</td>
<td>Belarus replied to Lithuania’s request of February 9, claiming exemption from prior notification because “UNION RESOLVE 2022” was a so-called “snap” exercise, and further claiming that it was exempt from notification and observation because it did not exceed the relevant VD11 thresholds for forces or weapons systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Feb-12 | Lithuania, also on behalf of Latvia and Estonia, replied to note that Belarus’s reply was unsatisfactory and to request that the OSCE Chairperson in Office (CiO), Poland, organize a meeting to further discuss the matter as provided by paragraph 16.2 of VD11.

Feb-14 | Poland convened the meeting requested by Lithuania, in which Belarus attended but evaded giving any clear answers. Russia declined to attend.

Feb-24 | Russia further invaded Ukraine from Belarus, Russia, and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

 ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, paragraphs 2 and 3, participating States recall the continued validity of commitments on refraining from the threat or use of force contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Document of the Stockholm Conference, as seen in light of the Charter of Paris and the Charter for European Security. Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is contrary to Belarus’s political commitments referenced in paragraphs 2 and 3 of VD11.

Risk Reduction

Per VD11 paragraph 16, OSCE participating States commit to “consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities outside their normal peacetime locations which are military significant, within the zone of application for CSBMs and about which a participating State expresses its security concern.” Latvia properly triggered this mechanism in February 2022. Belarus failed to adhere to its paragraph 16 commitments by refusing to meaningfully consult and cooperate with concerned States in good faith about the unusual military activities, specifically the militarily significant concentration of forces massing in Belarus, including near the Ukrainian border.

Notification/Observation with Respect to Exercise Union Resolve and Russian Forces Buildup in Belarus Prior to the Further Invasion of Ukraine

Per VD11 paragraphs 38-46, a participating State contributing forces to or hosting a military activity that meets certain thresholds (in troops, tanks, armored combat vehicles, or artillery systems), commits to notifying other participating States at least 42 days in advance – or, in the case of certain “no-notice” or “snap” activities, at the time the activity commences. Paragraphs 47-48 additionally require a participating State hosting a military activity meeting certain thresholds, some in excess of those for prior notification in paragraphs 38-46, to invite representatives from all other participating States to observe the activity.

(S proposed to U) Approximately 19 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) were concentrated in southern Belarus before participating in the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

This concentration of deployed Russian BTGs in the Belarus Force Grouping immediately before the full-scale invasion exceeded VD11 paragraph 40.3.1 notification thresholds in one or more of the following categories, any one of which would be sufficient to trigger the notification.
commitment: in troops (9,000), armored personnel carriers (500), and artillery (250). There is no evidence that this was, as Belarus claimed, a “no-notice” or “snap” activity, and Belarus accordingly should have notified the concentration of forces at least 42 days in advance. Instead, Belarus informed participating States of the activity – inaccurately claiming that it was below the notification threshold – only two days in advance. Additionally, this concentration likely exceeded one or more VD11 paragraph 47.4 observation thresholds, any one of which would be sufficient to trigger the observation commitment: in troops (13,000), armored personnel carriers (500), and artillery (250). Host States are required to invite all participating States to observe military activities that exceed these observation thresholds even if they are conducted on a “snap” basis, which this activity was not. As the host State of a military activity in excess of these thresholds, Belarus failed to adhere to its VD11 commitments to notify and to invite observers from all participating States to this military activity.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

On February 14, 2022 the Polish OSCE Chair-in-Office convened a joint Forum for Security Cooperation – Permanent Council meeting under the Vienna Document paragraph 16 risk reduction mechanism at the request of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to address unusual military activities on Belarus’s territory. At this meeting, the United States urged Belarus to answer questions on the number of troops and equipment participating in the activities on Belarus’s territory, their command and control structure, and when they would return to peacetime locations. Belarus failed to provide any meaningful answers to the inquiries of the United States and the Baltic States at this meeting. The United States also supported the Baltic States’ proposal for Belarus to host a voluntary visit under Vienna Document paragraph 18 to dispel concerns, and to adhere to VD11 transparency and risk reduction commitments.

During 2022, the United States and other participating States persistently raised in the OSCE Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine, which run counter to OSCE security commitments recalled in VD11.

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

FINDING

In 2022, the Kyrgyz Republic failed to adhere to VD11 commitments. Specifically, the Kyrgyz Republic has failed to provide annual VD11 data on its armed forces since 2014, and it also failed to provide its annual calendar or annual defense planning information. The Kyrgyz Republic also failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for calendar year 2022, despite conducting exercises in 2022.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

In 2022, the Kyrgyz Republic did not provide its annual VD11 submissions, including annual calendar, military data, and defense planning information. It last provided its military data
effective as of January 1, 2014, and has never provided a substantive annual calendar or defense planning information. The Kyrgyz Republic remained disconnected from the OSCE network and thus unable to send any VD11 notifications in 2022, including among others those on annual data, annual calendar, and military activity.

The Kyrgyz Republic hosted the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) special forces exercise COBALT 2022 at the Edelweiss training ground from August 2-5, 2022, according to CSTO press releases.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS
Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each year. The Kyrgyz Republic has not provided such annual data since it provided data that was effective as of January 1, 2014, and again failed to provide its annual data during the exchange on December 15, 2022.

Per VD11 Chapter II, paragraph 15, participating States will exchange annually information on their defense policy and doctrine, force planning, previous expenditures, and budgets. The Kyrgyz Republic did not provide this information in 2022, or indicate when the submission would be made if it was delayed.

Per VD11 Chapter VII, paragraphs 61 and 62, each participating State will either exchange an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification or else notify the absence of such planned activity. The Kyrgyz Republic failed to send either such notification.

Per the FSC’s Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States will notify annually at least one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets Chapter V notification thresholds. The Kyrgyz Republic held at least one military activity that should have been notified per this commitment.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

In 2022, the United States actively engaged the Kyrgyz Republic on VD11 adherence concerns in Washington, DC; in Vienna at the OSCE; and in Bishkek. The United States sought the Kyrgyz Republic’s return to adherence by raising awareness, enhancing proficiency, and building capacity. As part of this effort, AVC led an interagency delegation to Bishkek in October 2022 to discuss the implementation of VD11 commitments. The delegation encouraged the Kyrgyz Republic to adhere to all its VD11 commitments, including by returning to its previous practice of providing an annual VD11 data declaration.

The United States will continue to work with the Kyrgyz Republic to implement its Vienna Document commitments. The United States will seek opportunities at future meetings of the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) attended by representatives of the Kyrgyz Republic, including the FSC’s Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the OSCE VD11
data exchange, to encourage the Kyrgyz Republic and other participating States with armed forces in the Vienna Document zone of application to provide CSBM data on a timely basis, consistent with VD11 commitments.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

Russia failed to adhere to numerous VD11 commitments in 2022. Russia failed to 1) notify its concentration of forces in and around Ukraine, which it falsely labeled an “exercise,” prior to its February 24 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 2) invite observers to this concentration of forces, and 3) to participate in the VD11 paragraph 16 risk reduction mechanism initiated by Ukraine in February 2022. The bad faith cultivating these failures became clear with Russia's unlawful and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which was contrary to both international law and commitments in the Helsinki Final Act.

In its VD11 data effective as of January 1, 2022, Russia again failed to provide information on its military forces located in the Russian-occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With regard to reporting major weapons and equipment in its VD11 data effective as of January 1, 2022, Russia again failed to report on two types of combat aircraft and one type of attack helicopter. Russia also continued to exclude improperly the BRM-1K armored infantry fighting vehicle from its reporting. As of the end of the reporting period, Russia had not yet provided its annual VDoc data for 2023. This issue will be addressed as appropriate in next year’s report.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

In January and February 2022, Russia continued an unusual and unscheduled military buildup that had begun in the spring of 2021, and that concentrated Russian forces in Belarus, in Russia near its border with Ukraine, and in Russian-occupied Crimea. Russia did not issue a prior notification under VD11 regarding this large and unusual concentration of forces.

The coordinated military activities of Russia and Belarus naturally raised security concerns for many OSCE participating States, motivating them to use VD11 mechanisms in an effort to gain transparency and reduce tensions. Despite these efforts, Russia’s VD11 notifications and responses to inquiries relating to its military activities before the February 24 full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a willful disregard for its VD11 commitments:

Table 2: Timeline of VD11-associated events involving Russia in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-10</td>
<td>Latvia notified Russia of its intention to conduct a VD11 inspection starting in Bryansk, near the tri-border area of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Jan-11
Russia initially accepted the inspection on January 11, consistent with its VD11 commitments, but later cancelled the inspection on January 21, citing a renewed pause in verification activities on its territory due to an alleged resurgence of COVID-19.

### Feb-11
Ukraine requested an explanation of Russia’s unusual military activities, under VD11 paragraph 16.

### Feb 13-14
Russia sent two notifications in response to Ukraine’s February 11 request, stating in part that, “the Russian Federation is not conducting any type of significant military activity which required that information be provided within the framework of the Vienna Document 2011 on confidence and security building measures.” Ukraine requested a meeting for February 15 with Russia and other interested participating States to discuss Russian military movements near the Ukrainian border and in occupied Crimea. Russia declined the meeting and made counter-accusations against Ukraine.

### Feb-16
Ukraine called for a joint session of the Permanent Council (PC) and the Forum on Security Cooperation of the OSCE pursuant to VD11 paragraph 16, to “objectively evaluate the situation regarding the unusual military activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation located along the state border of Ukraine and to make suitable recommendations to stabilize the situation.”

### Feb-18
Russia declined to attend the joint PC/FSC meeting requested by Ukraine and made further counter-accusations.

### Feb-22
Over 100 BTGs (Battalion Tactical Groups) were deployed near Ukraine in several concentrations. Three roughly equal force concentrations – in Belarus, near Belgorod and Valuyki and in Crimea – accounted for almost 60 of these.

### Feb-24
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the same day, Russia extended its pause in VD11 verification activities until March 21, 2022, unconvincingly citing the Omicron strain of COVID-19 as its purported reason for the continued pause – and perhaps betraying its expectation for a short war. In May, Russia indicated that it was pausing its participation in VD11 verification activities indefinitely, again citing the Omicron strain as its justification.

**ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS**
Per VD11, paragraphs 2 and 3, participating States recall the continued validity of commitments on refraining from the threat or use of force contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Document of the Stockholm Conference, as seen in light of the Charter of Paris and the Charter for European Security. Russia’s actions during 2022 regarding Ukraine continue to be contrary to Russia’s political commitments referenced in paragraphs 2 and 3 of VD11.

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6 Northeastern Force Grouping on 21-22 February included 22 BTGs @ 750/BTG = ~16,500 personnel, 10 Tanks/30 ACVs per BTG = ~220 Tanks/660 ACVs, 18 Artillery Pieces/BTG = ~396 Artillery Pieces.

7 Southern Force Grouping on 21-22 February included 18 BTGs @ 750/BTG = ~13,500 personnel, 10 Tanks/30 ACVs per BTG = ~180 Tanks/540 ACVs, and 18 Artillery Pieces/BTG = ~324 Artillery Pieces.
Risk Reduction

Per VD11 paragraph 16, participating States commit to “consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities outside their normal peacetime locations which are military significant, within the zone of application for CSBMs and about which a participating State expresses its security concern.” Ukraine properly triggered this risk reduction mechanism in February 2022, but Russia failed to adhere to its paragraph 16 commitments by refusing to engage in the process outlined in the provision. Russia’s apparent claim that the risk reduction mechanism only applies to military activities that exceed VD11 notification thresholds is false, as paragraph 16 has no such caveat.

Notification/Observation with Respect to Russian Forces Buildup in Belarus, Russia, and Occupied Ukraine Prior to the Further Invasion of Ukraine

Per VD11 paragraphs 38-46, each participating State contributing forces in excess of a certain thresholds to a notifiable military activity commits to notify other participating States in advance – or, in the case of certain “no-notice” or “snap” activities, at the time the activity commences. Paragraphs 47-48 additionally require the State hosting a military activity that meets certain thresholds, some in excess of those from paragraph 38-46, to invite representatives from all other participating States to observe the activity.

In order to remain below notification thresholds for concentrations of land forces, the roughly equal force concentrations in Belarus, near Belgorod and Valuyki, and in Crimea, consisting of almost 60 BTGs in total, would all need to have been uniformly and severely understrength in both personnel and equipment. This is assessed to be very unlikely. The nominal size of each force concentration exceeds VD11 thresholds to a degree that the notification and observation thresholds for concentrations of forces were almost certainly met in one or more categories.

Immediately before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, three different concentrations of Russian forces, in Belarus, near Belgorod in Russia, and in occupied Crimea, almost certainly exceeded VD11 paragraph 40.3.1 notification thresholds in one or more of the following categories, any one of which would be sufficient to trigger the notification commitment: in troops (9,000), armored personnel carriers (500), or artillery (250). Russia failed to notify each of these three above-threshold military activities. Additionally, the concentration near Belgorod almost certainly exceeded one or more VD11 paragraph 47.4 observation thresholds in one or more category, any one of which would be sufficient to trigger the observation commitment: in troops (13,000), armored personnel carriers (500), or artillery (250). As the host State for the concentration of forces on its own territory, Russia failed in its VD11 commitment to invite observers to the military activity near Belgorod.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States supported Ukraine’s use of the paragraph 16 risk reduction mechanism to raise concerns about unusual Russian military activities and seek transparency from Russia.
During 2022, the United States and other participating States continued to raise in the OSCE the grave issues of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its attempted annexation of Crimea and, more recently, other regions of Ukraine, which run counter to OSCE security commitments recalled in VD11. The United States continued to work through diplomatic channels, including in cooperation with the 55 other OSCE participating States, to attempt to resolve Russia’s refusal to constructively engage on this issue and other issues. The United States will continue to seek opportunities to work with Allies and partners to hold Russia accountable for its calculated lack of transparency in 2022 that helped enable its unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s return to adherence with the Vienna Document starts with the end of its illegal invasion, and its occupation, of Ukrainian territory. The United States strongly supports Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inherent right to self-defense.

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN (UZBEKISTAN)

FINDING

Uzbekistan failed to meet its VD11 commitments in 2022 by failing to provide data on its armed forces, and failing to provide its annual calendar or annual defense planning information. Uzbekistan also failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for calendar year 2022.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

In 2022, Uzbekistan did not provide its annual VD11 submissions, including annual calendar, military data, and defense planning information. It has not provided its annual VD11 military data since a late submission on February 12, 2003, when it provided data effective as of January 1, 2003.

Uzbekistan failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for 2022. Additional information is available in a classified annex.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each year. Uzbekistan has not provided its annual VD11 data since a late submission on February 12, 2003, when it provided data effective as of January 1, 2003.

Per VD11 Chapter II, paragraph 15, participating States will exchange annually information on their defense policy and doctrine, force planning, previous expenditures, and budgets. Uzbekistan did not provide this information in 2022, or indicate when the submission would be made if it was delayed.
Per VD11 Chapter VII, paragraphs 61 and 62, each participating State will either exchange an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification or else notify the absence of such planned activity. Uzbekistan failed to send to either such notification.

Per the FSC’s Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States will notify annually at least one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets Chapter V notification thresholds. Uzbekistan should have notified at least one exercise for 2022.

EFFECTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

In 2022, the United States actively engaged Uzbekistan on VDoc adherence concerns in Washington, in Vienna at the OSCE, and in Tashkent. Targeting chronic issues from the Compliance Report covering 2021 and prior years that had gone unresolved, the United States sought Uzbekistan’s return to adherence by raising awareness, enhancing proficiency, and building capacity. As part of this effort, AVC led an interagency delegation to Tashkent to discuss the implementation of VD11 commitments. The United States discussed with Uzbekistan the implementation gaps with respect to its VD11 commitments. AVC advocated for a formal work plan to address concrete milestones toward VD11 adherence. As a follow-up, the United States offered to convene a bilateral experts working group to address any technical barriers to VD11 adherence. Furthermore, AVC met with Uzbekistan’s Ambassador Vakhabov in Washington, D.C. to reiterate the United States’ willingness to provide technical assistance, and the USOSCE team had a similar engagement with the Uzbek OSCE team in Vienna.

The United States remains hopeful that the Government of Uzbekistan will take advantage of the USG’s willingness to provide technical capacity-building assistance, but there is no timeline for when the Government of Uzbekistan will take concrete steps to return to full performance of its VD11 commitments. In December 2022, AVC briefed Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov on the importance of VDoc to regional stability.

The United States will continue to work with Uzbekistan to encourage its VD11 implementation, and seek opportunities at future meetings of the FSC attended by an Uzbek representative, including the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and annual Heads of Verification meeting, to encourage Uzbekistan and all other participating States to provide data on a timely basis, consistent with VD11 commitments. The United States will encourage other states to engage Uzbekistan on this topic as well.
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

The Report on Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe, submitted pursuant to Condition 5(C) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the CFE Flank Document (also known as the “Condition 5(C) Report”), is pending at the time of publication. Past reports can be found on the AVC website.
U.S. Department of State
April 2023