

IN THE ARBITRATION UNDER CHAPTER TEN OF  
THE UNITED STATES-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT AND  
THE ICSID CONVENTION

FREEPORT MCMORAN INC. ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF  
SOCIEDAD MINERA CERRO VERDE S.A.A.,

*Claimant*

*-and-*

REPUBLIC OF PERU,

*Respondent.*

ICSID CASE NO. ARB/20/8

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**SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

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1. Pursuant to Article 10.20.2 of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (“U.S.-Peru TPA” or “Agreement”), the United States of America makes this submission on questions of interpretation of the Agreement. The United States does not take a position, in this submission, on how the interpretation offered below applies to the facts of this case, and no inference should be drawn from the absence of comment on any issue not addressed below.<sup>1</sup>

**Article 10.1.3 (Non-Retroactivity)**

2. Article 10.1.3 states: “[f]or greater certainty, this Chapter does not bind any Party in relation to any act or fact that took place or any situation that ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”<sup>2</sup> Whereas a host State’s conduct prior to the entry into force

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<sup>1</sup> In footnotes to this submission, the symbol ¶ denotes the relevant paragraph(s) of the referenced document and the symbol § denotes the relevant section(s) of the referenced document.

<sup>2</sup> The phrase “for greater certainty” signals that the sentence it introduces reflects what the agreement would mean even if that sentence were absent. *See* Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, *opened for signature* May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 28 (“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,

of an obligation may be relevant to determining whether the State subsequently breached that obligation, under the rule against retroactivity, there must exist “conduct of the State after that date which is itself a breach.”<sup>3</sup> To that effect, the *Carrizosa v. Colombia* tribunal recently observed with respect to the identical provision of the U.S.-Colombia TPA, “unless the post-treaty conduct . . . is itself capable of constituting a breach of the [treaty], independently from the question of (un)lawfulness of the pre-treaty conduct, claims arising out of such post-treaty conduct would also fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”<sup>4</sup> This echoes the *Berkowitz v. Costa Rica* tribunal’s earlier holding under the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) that “pre-entry into force conduct cannot be relied upon to establish the breach in circumstances in which the post-entry into force conduct would not otherwise constitute an actionable breach in its own right. Pre-entry into force acts and facts cannot . . . constitute a cause of action.”<sup>5</sup>

### **Article 10.16 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration)**

3. As the United States has previously explained with respect to substantively identical language in NAFTA Articles 1116 and 1117, each claim by an investor must fall within either

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its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”). While the United States is not a party to the VCLT, it has recognized since at least 1971 that the Convention is the “authoritative guide” to treaty law and practice. *See* Letter from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, October 18, 1971, *reprinted in* 65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971). *See also* *Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues ¶ 62 (Dec. 6, 2000) (“*Feldman* Interim Decision”) (“Given that NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994, no obligations adopted under NAFTA existed, and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend, before that date. NAFTA itself did not purport to have any retroactive effect. Accordingly, this Tribunal may not deal with acts or omissions that occurred before January 1, 1994.”).

<sup>3</sup> *Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award ¶ 70 (Oct. 11, 2002) (“*Mondev* Award”). As the *Mondev* tribunal also observed, “there is a distinction between an act of a continuing character and an act, already completed, which continues to cause loss or damage.” *Id.* ¶ 58; *see also* *Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.)*, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 129 (Dec. 2) (Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice) (“An act which did not, in relation to the party complaining of it, constitute a wrong at the time it took place, obviously cannot *ex post facto* become one.”); International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 13 (U.N. Doc. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4 (2001)) (“An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”).

<sup>4</sup> *Astrida Benita Carrizosa v. Colombia*, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/5, Award ¶ 153 (Apr. 19, 2021) (finding “no jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of the [respondent’s] pre-treaty conduct, be it under the [treaty] or under any other source, such as customary international law”).

<sup>5</sup> *Spence Int’l Invests., Berkowitz et al. v. Costa Rica*, CAFTA/ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/2, Interim Award (Corrected) ¶ 217 (May 30, 2017) (“*Berkowitz* Interim Award”).

Article 10.16.1(a) or Article 10.16.1(b) and is limited to the type of loss or damage available under the Article invoked.<sup>6</sup> Article 10.16.1(a) permits an investor to present a claim for loss or damage incurred by the investor itself:

[T]he *claimant, on its own behalf*, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim (i) that the respondent has breached (A) an obligation under Section A, (B) an investment authorization, or (C) an investment agreement; and (ii) that the *claimant* has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach[.]

(Emphases added.)

4. Article 10.16.1(b), in contrast, permits a claimant to present a claim on behalf of an enterprise of the other Party that it owns or controls for loss or damage incurred by that enterprise:

[T]he *claimant, on behalf of an enterprise of the respondent* that is a juridical person that the claimant owns or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim (i) that the respondent has breached (A) an obligation under Section A, (B) an investment authorization, or (C) an investment agreement; and (ii) that the *enterprise* has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach[.]

(Emphases added.)

5. Article 10.16 further provides that with respect to claims that the respondent has breached an investment agreement:

[A] *claimant* may submit pursuant to subparagraph (a)(i)(C) or (b)(i)(C) a claim for breach of an investment agreement only if the subject matter of the claim and the claimed damages directly relate to the covered investment that was established or acquired, or sought

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<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., *Legacy Vulcan v. Mexico*, ICSID Case No. ARB/19/1, Submission of the United States ¶¶ 29-38 (June 7, 2021). An investor may bring separate claims under both Articles 10.16.1(a) and 10.16.1(b); however, the relief available for each claim is limited to the article under which that particular claim falls.

to be established or acquired, *in reliance on the relevant investment agreement*.

(Emphases added.)

6. Article 10.16.1 of the U.S.-Peru TPA thereby imposes an additional condition on a claimant's claims of breach of an investment agreement, regardless of whether the claim is direct under 10.16.1(a) or on behalf of an enterprise under 10.16.1(b): "the subject matter of the claim and the claimed damages [must] directly relate to the covered investment that was established or acquired, or sought to be established or acquired, in reliance on the relevant investment agreement." For claims of breach of an investment agreement, therefore, a claimant must show a direct relation between the claim and the covered investment that was established or acquired in reliance on the relevant investment agreement. The U.S.-Peru TPA forecloses recovery for injuries that fall outside the scope of Article 10.16.1, including where the covered investment that is the subject of the claim was not established or acquired, or sought to be established or acquired, in reliance on the relevant investment agreement.

### **Article 10.18.1 (Limitations Period)**

7. Article 10.18.1 of the U.S.-Peru TPA provides:

No claim may be submitted to arbitration under this Section if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach alleged under Article 10.16.1 and knowledge that the claimant (for claims brought under Article 10.16.1(a)) or the enterprise (for claims brought under Article 10.16.1(b)) has incurred loss or damage.

8. Article 10.18.1 imposes a *ratione temporis* jurisdictional limitation on the authority of a tribunal to act on the merits of a dispute.<sup>7</sup> As is made explicit by Article 10.18.1, the Parties did

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<sup>7</sup> Investment tribunals interpreting similarly worded treaty provisions have routinely reached this conclusion. *See, e.g., Corona Materials LLC v. Dominican Republic*, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/3, Award on the Respondent's Expedited Preliminary Objections in Accordance with Article 10.20.5 of the DR-CAFTA ¶ 280 (May 31, 2016) (finding that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction due to application of the time-bar); *Berkowitz*, Interim Award ¶¶ 235-236 (addressing the time-bar defense as a jurisdictional issue); *see also Resolute Forest Products, Inc. v. Canada*, NAFTA/PCA Case No. 2016-13, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility ¶¶ 82-83 (Jan. 30, 2018) ("*Resolute* Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility") (holding that compliance with the time bar specified in NAFTA

not consent to arbitrate an investment dispute if “more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach” and “knowledge that the claimant . . . or the enterprise . . . has incurred loss or damage.” Accordingly, a tribunal must find that a claim satisfies the requirements of, *inter alia*, Article 10.18.1, in order to establish a Party’s consent to (and therefore the tribunal’s jurisdiction over) an arbitration claim. Because the claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the factual elements necessary to establish jurisdiction under Chapter Ten, including with respect to Article 10.18.1,<sup>8</sup> the claimant must prove the necessary and relevant facts to establish that each of its claims falls within the three-year limitations period.<sup>9</sup>

9. The limitations period is a “clear and rigid” requirement that is not subject to any “suspension,” “prolongation,” or “other qualification.”<sup>10</sup> An investor *first* acquires knowledge of an alleged breach and loss under Article 10.18.1 as of a particular “date.” Such knowledge cannot *first* be acquired at multiple points in time or on a recurring basis. As the *Grand River*

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Articles 1116 and 1117 “goes to jurisdiction”); *Apotex Inc. v. United States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. UNCT/10/2, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility ¶¶ 314, 335 (June 14, 2013) (“*Apotex I & II Award*”) (parties treated the United States’ time-bar objection as a jurisdictional issue, and the tribunal expressly found that NAFTA Article 1116(2) deprived it of “jurisdiction *ratione temporis*” with respect to one of the claimant’s alleged breaches); *Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 2 (Revised) ¶ 18 (May 31, 2005) (finding that that “an objection based on a limitation period for the raising of a claim is a plea as to jurisdiction for purposes of Article 21(4)” of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)).

<sup>8</sup> See *Apotex I & II Award* ¶ 150. See also *Vito G. Gallo v. Canada*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award ¶ 277 (Sept. 15, 2011) (“[A] claimant bears the burden of proving that he has standing and the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claims submitted. If jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts, these must be proven at the jurisdictional stage . . . .”); *Mesa Power Group, v. Canada*, NAFTA/PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award ¶ 236 (Mar. 24, 2016) (“It is for the Claimant to establish the factual elements necessary to sustain the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the challenged measures.”); *Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic*, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award ¶¶ 58-64 (Apr. 15, 2009) (summarizing relevant investment treaty arbitral awards and concluding that “if jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts, they have to be proven [rather than merely established *prima facie*] at the jurisdictional phase.”); *Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 190-192 (Nov. 14, 2005) (finding that claimant “has the burden of demonstrating that its claims fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”); *Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 79 (Apr. 22, 2005) (acknowledging claimant had to satisfy the burden of proof “required at the jurisdictional phase”).

<sup>9</sup> See *Berkowitz Interim Award* ¶¶ 163, 239, 245-246.

<sup>10</sup> The substantively identical NAFTA Chapter Eleven limitations period has been described as “clear and rigid” and not subject to any “suspension, prolongation, or other qualification.” *Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 29 (July 20, 2006) (“*Grand River Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction*”); *Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award ¶ 63 (Dec. 16, 2002) (“*Feldman Award*”); *Apotex I & II Award* ¶ 327 (quoting *Grand River Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction*).

tribunal recognized in interpreting the analogous limitations provisions under Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) of the NAFTA,<sup>11</sup> subsequent transgressions by a Party arising from a continuing course of conduct do not renew the limitations period once an investor knows, or should have known, of the alleged breach and loss or damage incurred thereby.<sup>12</sup>

10. Thus, where a “series of similar and related actions by a respondent state” is at issue, a claimant cannot evade the limitations period by basing its claim on “the most recent transgression” in that series.<sup>13</sup> To allow a claimant to do so would “render the limitations provisions ineffective[.]”<sup>14</sup> An ineffective limitations period would fail to promote the goals of ensuring the availability of sufficient and reliable evidence, as well as providing legal stability and predictability for potential respondents and third parties. An ineffective limitations period would also undermine and be contrary to the State party’s consent because, as noted above, the Parties did not consent to arbitrate an investment dispute if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach and knowledge that the claimant has incurred loss or damage.

11. With regard to knowledge of “incurred loss or damage” under Article 10.18.1, a claimant may have knowledge of loss or damage even if the amount or extent of that loss or damage cannot be precisely quantified until some future date.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the term “incurred” broadly means “to become liable or subject to.”<sup>16</sup> Therefore, an investor may have “incurred” loss or

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<sup>11</sup> See *Grand River* Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 81.

<sup>12</sup> See *Resolute* Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility ¶ 158 (“[W]hether a breach definitively occurring and known to the claimant prior to the critical date continued in force thereafter is irrelevant.”).

<sup>13</sup> *Grand River* Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 81.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* Thus, although a legally distinct injury can give rise to a separate limitations period, a continuing course of conduct does not extend the limitations period under Article 10.18.1. Moreover, while measures taken outside of the three-year limitations period may be taken into account as background or contextual facts, such measures cannot serve as a basis for a finding of a breach under Article 10 of the U.S.-Peru TPA. See *Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award ¶ 348 (June 8, 2009) (“*Glamis Award*”).

<sup>15</sup> See *Mondev Award* ¶ 87 (“A claimant may know that it has suffered loss or damage even if the extent or quantification of the loss or damage is still unclear.”).

<sup>16</sup> “Incur,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incur> (last visited Feb. 15, 2021); see also *United States v. Laney*, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that to “incur” means to “become liable or subject to” and that “a person may become ‘subject to’ an expense before she actually disburses any funds”).

damage even if the financial impact (whether in the form of a disbursement of funds, reduction in profits, or otherwise) of that loss or damage is not immediate.<sup>17</sup>

12. As noted, Article 10.18.1 requires a claimant to submit a claim to arbitration within three years of the “date on which the claimant first acquired, *or should have first acquired*, knowledge” of (i) the alleged breach, and (ii) loss or damage incurred by the claimant. (Emphasis added.) For purposes of assessing what a claimant should have known, the United States agrees with the reasoning of the *Grand River* Tribunal: “a fact is imputed to [*sic*] person if by exercise of reasonable care or diligence, the person would have known of that fact.”<sup>18</sup> As that Tribunal further explained, it is appropriate to “consider in this connection what a reasonably prudent investor should have done in connection with extensive investments and efforts such as those described to the Tribunal.”<sup>19</sup> Similarly, as the *Berkowitz* Tribunal held, endorsing the reasoning in *Grand River* with respect to the analogous limitations provision in the CAFTA-DR, “the ‘should have first acquired knowledge’ test . . . is an objective standard; what a prudent claimant should have known or must reasonably be deemed to have known.”<sup>20</sup>

## **Article 10.5 (Minimum Standard of Treatment)**

13. Article 10.5.1 provides that “[e]ach party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”<sup>21</sup> “[F]or greater certainty,” this provision “prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments.”<sup>22</sup> Specifically, “‘fair and equitable treatment’ includes

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<sup>17</sup> *Grand River* Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 77; *see also Berkowitz* Interim Award ¶ 213 (finding “the date on which the claimant first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of the loss or damage incurred in consequence of the breach implies that such knowledge is triggered by the first appreciation that loss or damage will be (or has been) incurred”).

<sup>18</sup> *Grand River* Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 59.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* ¶ 66 (“In the Tribunal’s view, parties intending to participate in a field of economic activity in a foreign jurisdiction, and to invest substantial funds and efforts to do so, ought to have made reasonable inquiries about significant legal requirements potentially impacting on their activities . . . . This is particularly the case in a field that the prospective investors know from years of past personal experience to be highly regulated and taxed by state authorities.”).

<sup>20</sup> *Berkowitz* Interim Award ¶ 209.

<sup>21</sup> U.S.-Peru TPA, art. 10.5.1.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*, art. 10.5.2.

the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”<sup>23</sup>

14. The above provisions demonstrate the Parties’ express intent to establish the customary international law minimum standard of treatment as the applicable standard in Article 10.5. The minimum standard of treatment is an umbrella concept reflecting a set of rules that, over time, has crystallized into customary international law in specific contexts. The standard establishes a minimum “floor below which treatment of foreign investors must not fall.”<sup>24</sup>

### ***Methodology for determining the content of customary international law***

15. Annex 10-A to the Agreement addresses the methodology for determining whether a customary international law rule covered by Article 10.5.1 has crystalized. The Annex expresses the Parties’ “shared understanding that ‘customary international law’ generally and as specifically referenced in Article 10.5 . . . results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation.” Thus, in Annex 10-A the Parties confirmed their understanding and application of this two-element approach—State practice and *opinio juris*—which is the standard practice of States and international courts, including the International Court of Justice.<sup>25</sup>

16. The International Court of Justice has articulated examples of the types of evidence that can be used to demonstrate, under this two-element approach, that a rule of customary international law exists. In its decision on *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.*

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<sup>23</sup> *Id.*, art. 10.5.2(a).

<sup>24</sup> *S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, First Partial Award ¶ 259 (Nov. 13, 2000); see also *Glamis Award* ¶ 615 (“The customary international law minimum standard of treatment is just that, a minimum standard. It is meant to serve as a floor, an absolute bottom, below which conduct is not accepted by the international community.”); Edwin Borchard, *The “Minimum Standard” of the Treatment of Aliens*, 33 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L PROC. 51, 58 (1939) (“BORCHARD (1939)”).

<sup>25</sup> See *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)*, 2012 I.C.J. 99, 122 (Feb. 3) (“*Jurisdictional Immunities of the State*”) (“In particular . . . the existence of a rule of customary international law requires that there be ‘a settled practice’ together with *opinio juris*.”) (citing *North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands)*, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20)) (“*North Sea Continental Shelf*”); *Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta)*, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30 ¶ 27 (June 3) (“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and *opinio juris* of States . . .”).



*Italy*),<sup>26</sup> the ICJ emphasized that “[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and *opinio juris* of States,” and noted as examples of State practice relevant national court decisions or domestic legislation dealing with the particular issue alleged to be the norm of customary international law, as well as official declarations by relevant State actors on the subject.<sup>27</sup>

17. States may decide expressly by treaty to make policy decisions to extend protections under the rubric of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” beyond that required by customary international law.<sup>28</sup> The practice of adopting such autonomous standards is not relevant to ascertaining the content of Article 10.5 in which “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” are expressly tied to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment.<sup>29</sup> Thus, arbitral decisions interpreting “autonomous” fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security provisions in other treaties, outside the context of

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<sup>26</sup> *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State*, 2012 I.C.J. at 122.

<sup>27</sup> *Id.* at 122-23 (discussing relevant materials that can serve as evidence of State practice and *opinio juris* in the context of jurisdictional immunity in foreign courts); *see also* International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, with Commentaries (2018), Conclusion 6 (“Forms of State practice include, but are not limited to: diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference; conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including operational conduct ‘on the ground’; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of national courts.”).

<sup>28</sup> *See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582, 615, ¶ 90 (May 24) (“The fact invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established special legal régimes governing investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered into directly between States and foreign investors, is not sufficient to show that there has been a change in the customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally show the contrary.”).

<sup>29</sup> U.S.-Peru TPA, art. 10.5.1, 10.5.2 (“[P]aragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment . . . .”); *see also Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award ¶ 176 (Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that an obligation under Article 1105 of the NAFTA (which also prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment) “must be determined by reference to customary international law, not to standards contained in other treaties or other NAFTA provisions, or in other sources, unless those sources reflect relevant customary international law”). While there may be overlap in the substantive protections ensured by the U.S.-Peru TPA and other treaties, a claimant submitting a claim under the U.S.-Peru TPA, in which fair and equitable treatment is defined by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment, still must demonstrate that the obligations invoked are in fact a part of customary international law.

customary international law, cannot constitute evidence of the content of the customary international law standard required by Article 10.5.<sup>30</sup>

18. Moreover, decisions of international courts and arbitral tribunals interpreting “fair and equitable treatment” as a concept of customary international law are not themselves instances of “State practice” for purposes of evidencing customary international law, although such decisions can be relevant for determining State practice when they include an examination of such practice.<sup>31</sup> A formulation of a purported rule of customary international law based entirely on arbitral awards that lack an examination of State practice and *opinio juris* fails to establish a rule of customary international law as incorporated by Article 10.5.

19. The burden is on the claimant to establish the existence and applicability of a relevant obligation under customary international law that meets the requirements of State practice and *opinio juris*.<sup>32</sup> “The party which relies on a custom,” therefore, “must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party.”<sup>33</sup> Tribunals applying the minimum standard of treatment obligation in Article 1105 of NAFTA Chapter 11,

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<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., *Glamis Award* ¶ 608 (concluding that “arbitral decisions that apply an autonomous standard provide no guidance inasmuch as the entire method of reasoning does not bear on an inquiry into custom”); *Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/05/2, Award ¶ 278 (Sept. 18, 2009) (“*Cargill Award*”) (noting that arbitral “decisions are relevant to the issue presented in Article 1105(1) only if the fair and equitable treatment clause of the BIT in question was viewed by the Tribunal as involving, like Article 1105, an incorporation of the customary international law standard rather than autonomous treaty language”).

<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., *Glamis Award* ¶ 605 (“Arbitral awards, Respondent rightly notes, do not constitute State practice and thus cannot create or prove customary international law. They can, however, serve as illustrations of customary international law if they involve an examination of customary international law, as opposed to a treaty-based, or autonomous, interpretation.”) (footnote omitted); *Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile)*, Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 507, 559, ¶ 162 (Oct. 1) (“The Court notes that references to legitimate expectations may be found in arbitral awards concerning disputes between a foreign investor and the host State that apply treaty clauses providing for fair and equitable treatment. It does not follow from such references that there exists in general international law a principle that would give rise to an obligation on the basis of what could be considered a legitimate expectation. Bolivia’s argument based on legitimate expectations thus cannot be sustained.”).

<sup>32</sup> *Asylum (Colombia v. Peru)*, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20); see also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, 1969 I.C.J. at 43; *Glamis Award* ¶¶ 601-602 (noting that the claimant bears the burden of establishing a change in customary international law, by showing “(1) a concordant practice of a number of States acquiesced in by others, and (2) a conception that the practice is required by or consistent with the prevailing law (*opinio juris*)”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>33</sup> *Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States)*, 1952 I.C.J. 176, 200 (Aug. 27) (“The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey)*, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25-26, ¶ 66-67 (Sept. 7) (holding that the claimant had failed to “conclusively prove[d]” the existence of a rule of customary international law).

which likewise affixes the standard to customary international law,<sup>34</sup> have confirmed that the party seeking to rely on a rule of customary international law must establish its existence. The tribunal in *Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico*, for example, acknowledged that:

the proof of change in a custom is not an easy matter to establish. However, the burden of doing so falls clearly on Claimant. If Claimant does not provide the Tribunal with the proof of such evolution, it is not the place of the Tribunal to assume this task. Rather, the Tribunal, in such an instance, should hold that Claimant fails to establish the particular standard asserted.<sup>35</sup>

20. Once a rule of customary international law has been established, a claimant must then show that the respondent State has engaged in conduct that violates that rule.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Obligations that have crystallized into the minimum standard of treatment***

21. Currently, customary international law has crystallized to establish a minimum standard of treatment in only a few areas. One such area, expressly addressed in Article 10.5.2(a), concerns the obligation to provide “fair and equitable treatment,” which includes “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.” This obligation is discussed in more detail below.

22. Other areas included within the minimum standard of treatment concern the obligation not to expropriate covered investments except under the conditions specified in Article 10.7 and

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<sup>34</sup> NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter Eleven Provisions ¶ B.1 (July 31, 2001).

<sup>35</sup> *Cargill* Award ¶ 273. The *ADF*, *Glamis*, and *Methanex* tribunals likewise placed on the claimant the burden of establishing the content of customary international law. See *ADF Group, Inc. v. United States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award ¶ 185 (Jan. 9, 2003) (“*ADF* Award”) (“The Investor, of course, in the end has the burden of sustaining its charge of inconsistency with Article 1105(1). That burden has not been discharged here and hence, as a strict technical matter, the Respondent does not have to prove that current customary international law concerning standards of treatment consists only of discrete, specific rules applicable to limited contexts.”); *Glamis* Award ¶ 601 (noting “[a]s a threshold issue . . . that it is Claimant’s burden to sufficiently” show the content of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment); *Methanex Corp. v. United States*, Final Award, Part IV, Ch. C, ¶ 26 (Aug. 3, 2005) (citing *Asylum* for placing burden on claimant to establish the content of customary international law and finding that claimant, which “cited only one case,” had not discharged its burden).

<sup>36</sup> *Feldman* Award ¶ 177 (“[I]t is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a claim or defence.”) (citation omitted).

the obligation to provide “full protection and security,” which, as expressly stated in Article 10.5.2(b), “requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required under customary international law.”<sup>37</sup>

### *Claims for judicial measures*

23. As expressly addressed in Article 10.5.2(a), “fair and equitable treatment,” includes “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.” Denial of justice in its historical and “customary sense” denotes “misconduct or inaction of the judicial branch of the government” and involves “some violation of rights in the administration of justice, or a wrong perpetrated by the abuse of judicial process.”<sup>38</sup> A domestic system of law that conforms to “a reasonable standard of civilized justice” and is fairly administered cannot give rise to a complaint by an alien under international law.<sup>39</sup> “Civilized justice” has been described as requiring “[f]air courts, readily open to aliens, administering justice honestly, impartially, [and] without bias or political control.”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> See *The Loewen Group, et al. v. United States*, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, U.S. Counter-Memorial, at 176-77 (Mar. 30, 2001) (“[C]ases in which the customary international law obligation of full protection and security was found to have been breached are limited to those in which a State failed to provide reasonable police protection against acts of a criminal nature that physically invaded the person or property of an alien.”); *Methanex v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Rejoinder Memorial of Respondent United States of America on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and the Proposed Amendment (June 27, 2001), at 39 (same).

<sup>38</sup> EDWIN M. BORCHARD, *THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS* 330 (1919) (“BORCHARD (1919)”); J.L. BRIERLY, *THE LAW OF NATIONS* 286-87 (1963) (defining a denial of justice as “an injury involving the responsibility of the state committed by a court of justice”).

<sup>39</sup> BORCHARD (1919) at 198 (“Provided the system of law conforms with a reasonable standard of civilized justice and provided that it is fairly administered, aliens have no cause for complaint in the absence of an actual denial of justice.”) (footnote omitted).

<sup>40</sup> BORCHARD (1939) at 63.

24. A denial of justice may occur in instances such as when the final act of a State's judiciary constitutes a "notoriously unjust"<sup>41</sup> or "egregious"<sup>42</sup> administration of justice "which offends a sense of judicial propriety."<sup>43</sup> More specifically, a denial of justice exists where there is, for example, an "obstruction of access to courts," "failure to provide those guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust judgment."<sup>44</sup> Instances of denial of justice also have included corruption in judicial proceedings, discrimination or "ill-will" against aliens, and executive or legislative interference with the freedom of impartiality of the judicial process.<sup>45</sup> At the same time, erroneous domestic court decisions, or misapplications or misinterpretation of domestic law, do not in themselves constitute a denial of justice under customary international law.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, neither the

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<sup>41</sup> JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2005) (citing J. Irizarry y Puente, *The Concept of "Denial of Justice" in Latin America*, 43 MICH. L. REV. 383, 406 (1944)) ("PAULSSON"); *id.* at 4 ("[A] state incurs responsibility if it administers justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner.") (emphasis omitted); *Chattin Case (United States v. Mexico)*, 4 R.I.A.A. 282, 286-87 (1927), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 667, 672 (1928) ("Acts of the judiciary . . . are not considered insufficient unless the wrong committed amounts to an outrage, bad faith, wilful neglect of duty, or insufficiency of action apparent to any unbiased man.") (emphasis omitted).

<sup>42</sup> PAULSSON at 60 ("The modern consensus is clear to the effect that the factual circumstances must be egregious if state responsibility is to arise on the grounds of denial of justice.").

<sup>43</sup> *Loewen Group, Inc. et al. v. United States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award ¶ 132 (June 26, 2003) ("*Loewen Award*") (a denial of justice may arise where there has occurred a "[m]anifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety"); *Mondev Award* ¶ 127 (finding that the test for a denial of justice was "not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome"); see also *Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain)*, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 144 ("Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka") (explaining that "denial of justice occurs in the case of such acts as- corruption, threats, unwarrantable delay, flagrant abuse of judicial procedure, a judgment dictated by the executive, or so manifestly unjust that no court which was both competent and honest could have given it, . . . But no merely erroneous or even unjust judgment of a court will constitute a denial of justice") (citations omitted).

<sup>44</sup> Harvard Research Draft, *The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners*, art. 9, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. SP. SUPP. 131, 134 (1929). The commentary notes that a "manifestly unjust judgment" is one that is a "travesty upon justice or grotesquely unjust." *Id.* at 178.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at 175.

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 134 ("An error of a national court which does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice."); PAULSSON at 81 ("The erroneous application of national law cannot, in itself, be an international denial of justice."); PATRICK DUMBERRY, *THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD: A GUIDE TO NAFTA CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 1105*, 229 (2013) (noting that a simple error, misinterpretation or misapplication of domestic law is not per se a denial of justice) (internal quotation marks omitted); BORCHARD (1919) at 196 (explaining that a government is not responsible for the mistakes or errors of its courts and that: "[A]s a general rule the state is not liable for the acts of its judicial authorities unless there has been some flagrant or notorious injustice or denial of justice sanctioned by the court of last resort."); Christopher Greenwood, *State Responsibility for the Decisions of National Courts*, in *ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS* 61 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004) ("[I]t is well established that a mistake on the part of the court or an irregularity in procedure is not in itself sufficient to amount to a violation of international law; there must be a denial of justice.").

evolution nor development of “new” judge-made law that departs from previous jurisprudence within the confines of common law adjudication implicates a denial of justice.<sup>47</sup>

25. The high threshold required for judicial measures to rise to the level of a denial of justice in customary international law gives due regard to the principle of judicial independence,<sup>48</sup> the particular nature of judicial action,<sup>49</sup> and the unique status of the judiciary in both international and municipal legal systems. As a result, the actions of domestic courts are accorded a greater presumption of regularity under international law than are legislative or administrative acts.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> See *Mondev Award* ¶¶ 131, 133 (finding, in response to the claimant’s allegation that a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court involved a “significant and serious departure” from its previous jurisprudence, it doubtful that the court “made new law . . . [b]ut even if it had done so its decision would have fallen within the limits of common law adjudication. There is nothing here to shock or surprise even a delicate judicial sensibility.”).

<sup>48</sup> See, e.g., Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka at 154-155 (“One of the most important political and legal characteristics of a modern State is the principle of judicial independence.”). Judge Tanaka went on to explain that what distinguishes the judiciary from other organs of government is the “social significance of the judiciary for the settlement of conflicts of vital interest as an impartial third party and, on the other hand, from the extremely scientific and technical nature of judicial questions, the solution of which requires the most highly conscientious activities of specially educated and trained experts. The independence of the judiciary, therefore, despite the existence of differences in degree between various legal systems, may be considered as a universally recognized principle in most of the municipal and international legal systems of the world. It may be admitted to be a ‘general principle of law recognized by civilized nations’ (Article 38, paragraph 1(c), of the Statute).” *Id.* at 154.

<sup>49</sup> See, e.g., Zachary Douglas, *International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice Deconstructed*, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 867, 876-877 (2014) (“Douglas”) (explaining that the “rationality inherent in decision-making through adjudication, coupled with the opportunity afforded to affected parties to present reasoned arguments during the course of that decision-making process, . . . sets adjudication apart from other institutions of social ordering within the State,” and that an authoritative decision by a domestic adjudicative body “cannot be disturbed by an international court or tribunal simply on the basis that a more rational set of reasons was available to that . . . body. . . . International law is deferential to the particular virtues of adjudication by respecting the integrity of the process and the outcomes it produces.”) (footnotes omitted).

<sup>50</sup> *Loewen Group, Inc. et al. v. United States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Response of the United States of America to the Submissions of Claimants Concerning Matters of Jurisdiction and Competence, at 8 (July 7, 2000) (“[U]nlike actions of the executive or the legislature, judicial acts can violate customary international law obligations in only the most extreme and unusual of circumstances . . . .”) (citing T. BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (1930) (“It is true that courts are organs of the nation; but they are not its organs in the sense in which the executive and the legislature are.”)) (“*Loewen*, Response of the United States of America to the Submissions of Claimants Concerning Matters of Jurisdiction and Competence, at 9 (July 7, 2000”); BORCHARD (1919) at 195-96 (because “[i]n well- regulated states, the courts are more independent of executive control than any other authorities . . . [,] the state is not liable for the acts of its judicial authorities unless there has been some flagrant or notorious injustice or denial of justice sanctioned by the court of last resort.”); ALWYN V. FREEMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 33 (1970) (“[T]he question of proof of illegal action will be more difficult [with respect to judicial action] than is the case with other organs of the State.”). See also *Loewen*, Response of the United States of America to the Submissions of Claimants Concerning Matters of Jurisdiction and Competence, at 9-10 (July 7, 2000) (“Given the unique status of the judiciary in both international and municipal legal systems, the actions of domestic courts are accorded a far greater presumption of regularity under international law than are legislative or administrative acts.”). The United States distinguishes between judicial action and other forms of government action as a matter of domestic law. For example, the U.S. Supreme

Indeed, as a matter of customary international law, international tribunals will defer to domestic courts interpreting matters of domestic law unless there is a denial of justice.<sup>51</sup>

26. In this connection, it is well-established that international arbitral tribunals, such as those established by disputing parties under U.S.-Peru TPA Chapter 10, are not empowered to be supranational courts of appeal on a court's application of domestic law.<sup>52</sup> Thus, an investor's claim challenging judicial measures under Article 10.5.1 is limited to a claim for denial of justice under the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. *A fortiori*, domestic courts performing their ordinary function in the application of domestic law as neutral arbiters of

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Court has long recognized liability for legislative and regulatory actions that violate the economic protections of the U.S. Constitution, but has never recognized liability for judicial action under those same provisions. *See, e.g.*, Jill E. Fisch, *Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach*, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1075 n.121 (1997); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., *Judicial Takings*, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (1990) (observing with disapproval that "[t]he few scholars to have seriously addressed the issue have generally argued that it would be catastrophic to subject the courts to the same constitutional constraints as the legislative and executive branches. . . ."). The status of U.S. law has not changed. *See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection et al.*, 560 U.S. 702 (2010); *Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States*, 112 Fed. Cl. 369, 385 (2013) ("a theory of judicial takings . . . has not been adopted in the federal courts.").

<sup>51</sup> *See Robert Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States*, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award ¶ 99 (Nov. 1, 1999) ("Azinian Award") ("The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seized has plenary appellate jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA. What must be shown is that the court decision itself constitutes a violation of the treaty. Even if the Claimants were to convince this Arbitral Tribunal that the Mexican courts were wrong with respect to the invalidity of the Concession Contract, this would not per se be conclusive as to a violation of NAFTA. More is required; the Claimants must show either a denial of justice, or a pretence of form to achieve an internationally unlawful end."); *Mohammad Ammar Al Bahloul v. Tajikistan*, SCC Case No. V(064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability ¶ 237 (Sept. 2, 2009) ("[I]t is not the role of this Tribunal to sit as an appellate court on questions of Tajik law. Suffice it to say, we do not find the Tajik court's application of Tajik law on this issue to be malicious or clearly wrong, and therefore find no basis for Claimant's claim of denial of justice."). *See also* PAULSSON at 81-84.

<sup>52</sup> *Apotex I & II Award* ¶ 278 ("[I]t is not the proper role of an international tribunal established under NAFTA Chapter Eleven to substitute itself for the U.S. Supreme Court, or to act as a supranational appellate court."); *Azinian Award* ¶ 99 ("The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seized has plenary appellate jurisdiction."); *Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award ¶ 129 (Apr. 30, 2004) ("*Waste Management II Award*") ("[T]he Tribunal would observe that it is not a further court of appeal, nor is Chapter 11 of NAFTA a novel form of amparo in respect of the decisions of the federal courts of NAFTA parties."); Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka at 158 (explaining that erroneous decisions of municipal law cannot constitute a denial of justice because the interpretation of municipal law "does not belong to the realm of international law. If an international tribunal were to take up these issues and examine the regularity of the decisions of municipal courts, the international tribunal would turn out to be a '*cour de cassation*', the highest court in the municipal law system. An international tribunal, on the contrary, belongs to quite a different order; it is called upon to deal with international affairs, not municipal affairs.").

the legal rights of litigants before them are not subject to review by international tribunals absent a denial of justice under customary international law.

27. For the foregoing reasons, judicial measures may form the basis of a claim under the customary international law minimum standard of treatment under Article 10.5.1 only if they are final<sup>53</sup> and it is proved that a denial of justice has occurred. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible to prevent Chapter 10 tribunals from becoming supranational appellate courts on matters of the application of substantive domestic law, which customary international law does not permit.<sup>54</sup>

### ***Obligations that have not crystallized into the minimum standard of treatment***

28. As noted, customary international law has crystallized to establish a minimum standard of treatment in only a few areas. In contrast, the concepts of legitimate expectations and transparency are not component elements of “fair and equitable treatment” under customary international law and do not give rise to independent host State obligations.

29. The United States is aware of no general and consistent State practice and *opinio juris* establishing an obligation under the minimum standard of treatment not to frustrate investors’ expectations; instead, something more is required.<sup>55</sup> An investor may develop its own

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<sup>53</sup> See Greenwood at 64 (explaining that it is “inherently implausible that States would intend” for interlocutory or non-final decisions of domestic courts to be subject to challenge on the international plane,” which would have the effect of “set[ting] aside the entire system of checks and balances within the national judicial system”).

<sup>54</sup> See Douglas at 899 (explaining that an exercise of adjudicative power can give rise to State responsibility through the medium of a denial of justice and that “[a]ny other approach would serve to vest international tribunals with appellate jurisdiction over the substantive outcomes in domestic adjudicative procedures”).

<sup>55</sup> See, e.g., *Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. et al. v. United States*, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Counter-Memorial of Respondent United States of America, at 96 (Dec. 22, 2008) (“As a matter of international law, although an investor may develop its own expectations about the legal regime that governs its investment, those expectations do not impose a legal obligation on the State.”). Indeed, NAFTA tribunals have declined to find breaches of Article 1105 even where the claimant’s purported expectations arose from a contract. See *Azinian Award* ¶ 87 (“NAFTA does not, however, allow investors to seek international arbitration for mere contractual breaches. Indeed, NAFTA cannot possibly be read to create such a regime, which would have elevated a multitude of ordinary transactions with public authorities into potential international disputes.”); *Waste Management II Award* ¶ 115 (explaining that “even the persistent non-payment of debts by a municipality is not equated with a violation of Article 1105, provided that it does not amount to an outright and unjustified repudiation of the transaction and . . . some remedy is open to the creditor to address the problem”).



expectations about the legal regime governing its investment, but those expectations impose no obligations on the State under the minimum standard of treatment.

30. The concept of “transparency” also has not crystallized as a component of “fair and equitable treatment” under customary international law giving rise to an independent host-State obligation.<sup>56</sup> The United States is aware of no general and consistent State practice and *opinio juris* establishing an obligation of host State transparency under the minimum standard of treatment.

### **Taxation (Article 22.3.1)**

31. Article 22.3.1 generally excludes taxation measures from the U.S.-Peru TPA’s provisions: “Except as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures.” Article 22.3 includes, however, several exceptions to this general exclusion. For example, Article 22.3.4 specifically subjects certain taxation measures to the national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment requirements of Articles 10.3 and 10.4; and Article 22.3.6 specifically subjects, in certain circumstances, taxation measures to the provisions of Article 10.7 relating to expropriation. By implication, taxation measures are not subject to any Chapter Ten obligations, including those embodied in Article 10.5, that are not expressly identified as exceptions to the Article 22.3.1 general exclusion of taxation measures from the U.S.-Peru TPA.

32. Article 22.3.1, moreover, applies to all “taxation measures.” A “measure” is defined broadly in Article 1.3 to include “any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice.” Any “practice” related to “taxation” is therefore addressed by Article 22.3.1. A “practice” in this context includes not only the application of, or failure to apply a tax, but also the enforcement or failure to enforce a tax.

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<sup>56</sup> See *United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp.*, [2001] 89 B.C.L.R. 3d 359, 2001 B.C.S.C. 664 ¶¶ 68, 72 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (holding that “[n]o authority was cited or evidence introduced [in the *Metalclad* arbitration] to establish that transparency has become part of customary international law,” and that “there are no transparency obligations contained in [NAFTA] Chapter 11”); *Feldman Award* ¶ 133 (finding that “it is doubtful that lack of transparency alone rises to the level of violation of NAFTA and international law,” and holding the British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in *Metalclad* to be “instructive”); *Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada*, NAFTA/ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, ¶¶ 208, 231 (Mar. 31, 2010) (stating that “a requirement for transparency may not at present be proven to be part of the customary law standard, as the judicial review of *Metalclad* rightly concluded,” though speculating that it might be “approaching that stage”).

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