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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

At the intersection of enduring U.S. national security interests in the Middle East, U.S. Embassy Beirut operates in a country with diverse political orientations located on a geostrategic edge of the eastern Mediterranean. The country is wedged between Israel, which must defend its security interests against constant threats posed by Hizballah and other hostile actors, and Syria, where destructive conflict has pushed 1.5 million Syrians to seek refuge in Lebanon and impose persistent economic and political hardships on the Lebanese people, leading Lebanon to have more refugees per capita than any country in the world. The influence of Hizballah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, remains particularly insidious, as the group labors at the behest of its Iranian patron to expand its malign military, political, economic, and security presence while undermining the viability and security of the Lebanese state, as well as the core security interests of the United States and our allies.

Lebanon’s democracy represents a rich diversity of religious and sectarian identities coexisting in a multi-confessional, consensus-based political system. While certainly imperfect, that system has a unique place within the tapestry of the Middle East. The United States and responsible partners in Lebanon also share a vital interest in strengthening the rule of law, including ridding the Lebanese financial system of terror financing and money laundering. Moreover, an estimated 43,000 U.S. citizens reside in Lebanon, requiring the service and protection that the United States affords its citizens abroad – something this Mission knows well from having evacuated nearly 15,000 people from Lebanon during conflict in 2006.

Defending U.S. interests in Lebanon is becoming increasingly difficult amid mounting challenges. Chief among them is the collapse of the Lebanese economy and a crisis of confidence in the state’s willingness and ability to correct the decades of mismanagement and corruption that caused it, let alone to capably perform the core functions of government. The horrific 2020 Port of Beirut explosion, which killed over 200 people and injured thousands, was a symptom and symbol of the negligence of Lebanon’s leaders. Three years hence, few have any hope that Lebanese courts will deliver justice and accountability.

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The combination of inept governance and intrinsically weak state institutions creates vulnerabilities that Hizballah and its allies exploit for their own benefit and for that of Iran. Hizballah routinely blames the United States for Lebanon’s collapsing economy and asserts itself as Lebanon’s defender against Israel, with which Lebanon technically remains in a state of war. Other terrorist organizations, including ISIS, have also sought to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.

Like other pillars of the state in Lebanon, the security services have been under-resourced and undermined by the political and economic crisis for years. Inflation has decimated civil servant salaries and their medical benefits, including members of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). This leaves the overall force readiness heavily dependent on international donor assistance, not only to provide equipment, maintenance, and supplies and in preserving critical skills, but also for the provision of basic needs. This dynamic has led to an unprecedented effort by the Department, working with the United Nations Development Programme, to implement more than $70 million in livelihood support of $100 per month for six months to more than 100,000 soldiers and service members. This temporary measure will help alleviate some of the economic hardship security forces are facing and help maintain security throughout the country. U.S. assistance is also bolstering the LAF’s and ISF’s presence and their ability to maintain stability with our provision of more than $3 billion since 2006 to the LAF and $226 million to the ISF, which has maintained morale and force readiness at levels that permit the basic state functions, such as the May 2022 elections, to take place in relative safety and with minimal disruption.

In our bilateral relationship, Lebanon retains important economic links with the United States having imported $766 million in U.S. goods in 2022. However, decades of corruption and mismanagement, coupled with political sclerosis have resulted in an economic crisis that has brought the country to the brink of collapse. Since October 2019, inflation reached 186 percent, the Lebanese pound (LBP) lost more than 98 percent of its value against the dollar, and nearly three-quarters of Lebanese now live below the income poverty line. At the same time, the political establishment has done little to implement the structural reforms necessary to put
the economy back onto a healthy track, or to ensure an impoverished population can meet their basic needs. As a result, many Lebanese are increasingly dependent on international humanitarian assistance. The United States is Lebanon’s single largest international donor, having donated $738.2 million in bilateral assistance in FY 2022 alone and $4.6 billion since FY 2016.

Chief among the challenges Lebanon is facing is the collapse of Lebanon’s financial and banking sectors since 2020. The World Bank characterized Lebanon’s economic depression as likely to ranks among the world’s worst economic crises since the 1850s, noting the “brutal and rapid” contraction in Lebanon’s gross domestic product (GDP) –over 15 percent in two years. Lebanon reached a Staff Level Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2022 and committed to the implementation of eight “prior actions,” reforms that the IMF would require to approve a $3 billion loan package. Unfortunately, Lebanese leaders have thus far made limited progress implementing these necessary prior actions or other meaningful reforms.

Lebanon’s political and economic crisis has also contributed to the deterioration of public services and infrastructure. For example, since the start of the country’s economic crisis, Lebanon’s national electricity utility has provided no more than four or five hours of electricity per day to most businesses and households, negatively affecting citizens, businesses, and public institutions. The United States has called on the GOL to implement long-overdue reforms to the sector, which for decades has been marred by inefficiency and corruption, and help it qualify for a World Bank loan to purchase gas from Egypt and excess electricity from Jordan.

Although Lebanon was once globally recognized for its academic excellence, the education sector is now experiencing decline. Due to first the COVID pandemic, then increasing numbers of public-school teachers and administrators going on strike or resigning due to low salaries, Lebanon’s last undisrupted academic year was 2018-2019. Furthermore, the cost of attending private schools is now out of reach for many average Lebanese.

The economic crisis has also exacerbated the protracted refugee crisis in the country. Lebanon hosts the highest per capita number of refugees in the world, and the second highest number of Syrian refugees. The Government of Lebanon opposes integration and advocates for the Originally approved: April 29, 2022
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return of refugees to Syria. Only Syrians with legal residency are authorized to work, and only in the sectors of construction, cleaning and sanitation, and agriculture.

In spite of all this, entrenched political establishment has done precious little to reassure a beleaguered and skeptical population that they are willing to deconstruct their constellations of corruption in favor of delivering the economic and political reforms essential to the state’s survival.

As a result of the compounding economic and social issues, a growing number of Lebanese have felt compelled to emigrate in search of a better life. Unfortunately, their departures have come just when Lebanon most needs their talents to help correct course. Left unaddressed, these challenges are likely to transform Lebanon in ways detrimental to U.S. interests. Failure to break Lebanon’s cycles of crisis and transcend the status quo would worsen the humanitarian suffering that evolved out of economic and political dysfunction, precipitate deeper instability both domestically and regionally, and invite malign actors to further exploit the devastation.

While the United States cannot want solutions more than Lebanese leaders, we retain a vital national interest in preventing the further descent in Lebanon’s cycle of crisis, which in a worst-case-scenario could result in a state collapse. More aspirationally, we want to see Lebanon take the necessary steps to get its economy back on track and political system functioning, such that the government can once again provide basic services to its people, and the country can achieve the full measure of its promise. In seeking such solutions to Lebanon’s myriad crises, we should also be aware of the shrinking number of possible partners interested in participating in Lebanon’s economic morass. Lebanese independent media, long renowned in the region for its resilience, is a victim of the economic crisis, with rising Gulf state investment in the media sector attracting Lebanese talent, regional hubs moving to more stable environments, and Hizballah-affiliated media receiving influxes of support from our adversaries.

Nevertheless, we find ourselves in good company among an array of like-minded international allies and reform-oriented members of Lebanon’s diverse civil society, civic-minded diaspora and business communities, and many dedicated public servants striving within Lebanese

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institutions to help make the government better serve the Lebanese people. Embassy Beirut has a talented team of interagency colleagues working together to advance U.S. national interests in Lebanon, with a special emphasis on showing hospitality to all our partners and visitors, extending collegiality to members our diverse team, and demonstrating commitment to security through our words and deeds.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Improve the state’s performance in maintaining security nationwide.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Improve the capabilities of Lebanese security forces to maintain internal stability and security, including for private American citizens, while upholding respect for human rights.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Strengthen Lebanon’s land, air, and maritime capabilities to enhance the integrity of all borders and enable Government of Lebanon (GoL) independence from malign foreign interference.

Mission Goal 2: Reestablish good governance and prevent further state collapse by promoting long-overdue reforms, judicial independence, and civil society.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Hold the GoL accountable for enacting the economic, political, and anti-corruption reforms needed to obtain international financial support to stave off state collapse.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Press Lebanese leaders to organize timely, free, and fair elections. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 3: Effectiveness of Public Services Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced)
- **Mission Objective 2.3:** Advance human rights, including those of underserved communities and marginalized groups. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 3: Effectiveness of Public Services Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced; and USAID CDCS Special Obj: Basic Humanitarian Needs of Vulnerable Populations Met.)
- **Mission Objective 2.4:** Increase citizen access to quality public service delivery and limit the influence of Lebanese politicians over public service delivery so these services are no longer seen as spoils to curry political favor. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 2: Effectiveness of Educational Institutions Improved; and USAID CDCS DO 3: Effectiveness of Public Services Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced)
Mission Goal 3: Promote inclusive economic growth and enhanced GoL commitments on climate change.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Promote economic reforms that enable Lebanon to attract private international investment and bolster the private sector, while also supporting U.S. firms willing to do business in Lebanon, particularly in energy and healthcare. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 1: Inclusive Economic Opportunities Enhanced through Private Sector Engagement)

- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Secure GoL commitments on climate change and improve Lebanon’s access to economical, reliable, and clean energy. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 3: Effectiveness of Public Services Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced)

- **Mission Objective 3.3:** Improve socio-economic conditions and reduce poverty, including among Lebanese citizens, refugees, and other vulnerable communities. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 1: Inclusive Economic Opportunities Enhanced through Private Sector Engagement; and USAID CDCS Special Obj: Basic Humanitarian Needs of Vulnerable Populations Met)

Mission Goal 4: Leverage U.S. soft power to encourage Lebanon’s Western orientation and solidify the United States as the preferred partner among strategic competitors.

- **Mission Objective 4.1:** Convey to diverse Lebanese audiences the United States’ unrivaled positive role in Lebanon, while also countering disinformation, propaganda, and malign influence of state and non-state actors. (Links to USAID CDCS DO 3: Effectiveness of Public Services Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced)
Management Objective 1: Develop visionary leaders who ensure all employees have the opportunity, skills, and voice to contribute successfully to Mission objectives.

Management Objective 2: Bolster management controls to improve efficiency and ensure proper oversight against fraud, waste, and mismanagement.

Management Objective 3: Enhance productivity and resilience of U.S. Direct Hires (USDH), employed family members, and Locally Employed (LE) staff through improved personnel management initiatives, innovative technologies, and personal security measures.

Management Objective 4: Maximize office and residential space on the compound consistent with Mission needs in compliance with Diplomatic Security and POSHO regulations.

Management Objective 5: Recruit and retain a dynamic, inclusive, and equitable USDH and LE workforce that reflects the diversity and strengths of our two countries.
3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1 | Improve the state’s performance in maintaining security nationwide.

Description | U.S. interests in combating terrorism and promoting regional stability are served by building the GoL’s capacity to govern and secure its territory. Lebanon’s security institutions, particularly the LAF and ISF, have historically served as pillars of stability in a country facing extraordinary challenges. The unprecedented economic crisis has adversely affected the LAF and ISF, especially their operational missions and the morale of the forces. These institutions are under significant pressures, including from the economic upheaval in the country. The LAF and ISF must maintain minimal security standards while their salaries depreciated by 90% since 2019 when Lebanon’s complex and multifaceted economic crisis began. The United States is Lebanon's paramount security partner and has invested nearly $3 billion in the LAF and ISF since 2006, yielding dividends for U.S. interests in the Middle East. For the security services to sustain their mission, basic needs must be met, including food, medicine, equipment, and salaries of the security forces and personnel. Support to the LAF and ISF bolsters this investment and helps mitigate insecurity and state failure in Lebanon.

Objective 1.1 | Improve the capabilities of Lebanese security forces to maintain internal stability and security, including for private American citizens, while upholding respect for human rights.

- Justification | Terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates continue to exploit political instability, economic hardship, and sectarian tensions to radicalize and recruit.
- Linkages | NEA JRS 1.1
- Risks | Any setback in Lebanese security institution’s capacity to enforce internal security and disrupt terrorist attacks would threaten U.S. interests of regional stability and security.

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Objective 1.2 | Strengthen Lebanon’s land, air, and maritime capabilities to enhance the integrity of all borders and enable Government of Lebanon (GoL) sovereignty.

- **Justification** | Curtailing the influence in Lebanon of malign actors is one of the Mission’s primary goals. UN Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701 promote the GoL’s ability to assert full control throughout the country. Nonetheless, outside influences such as Iran’s sponsorship of Hizballah and other malign actors including Russia and China pose threats to Lebanon’s sovereignty. Currently the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Maritime Task Force (MTF) provides the majority of maritime security in Lebanese waters, including territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone. Post supports capacity building for the LAF Navy to eventually assume these missions, acknowledging that it will be some time before the LAF is able to do so given the current budgetary crisis the security forces face.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS 1.1, 1.3

- **Risks** | Inadequate support of the LAF would undermine GoL’s ability to maintain Lebanon’s sovereignty and increase malign actors’ influence in Lebanon and the region.

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**Mission Goal 2 |** Reestablish good governance and prevent further state collapse by promoting long-overdue reforms, judicial independence, and civil society.

**Description |** Increasingly over recent years, the Lebanese state has been buffeted by a series of unrelenting challenges leading to a crisis of confidence in the state’s ability to correct the decades of mismanagement and corruption that caused it, let alone to capably perform the core functions of government. In light of these myriad challenges – including multiple nationwide protest movements, the specter of conflict with regional neighbors, the economic and financial crisis, extended government paralysis, the Beirut port explosion, and the COVID-19 pandemic – ensuring the government’s effective implementation of economic and political reforms remains essential to the state’s future legitimacy, and very survival, in the eyes of a beleaguered and skeptical population. Moreover, the United States retains a core national security interest in joining forces with like-minded partners to help Lebanon correct course and finally realize a Lebanese state that is truly stable, secure, and sovereign.

**Objective 2.1 |** Hold the GoL accountable for enacting the economic, political, and anti-corruption reforms needed to obtain international financial support to stave off state collapse.

- **Justification |** In the protest movement that began in October 2019, the Lebanese people demand change from an entrenched political establishment that has profited at the expense of the people and mismanaged the country for decades. But as much as the international community and domestic constituencies want to see Lebanon realize its full potential – and both can and should help Lebanon – it is ultimately the responsibility of Lebanese political leaders to take the necessary steps to achieve that potential through long-overdue reforms.

- **Linkages |** NEA JRS 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, and 4.2

- **Risks |** Failure of the GoL to enact needed reforms would threaten the legitimacy and viability of the state, and U.S. interests in regional stability and security.

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Objective 2.2 | Press Lebanese leaders to organize timely, free, and fair elections.

- **Justification** | Holding timely, free, and fair elections at both the national and municipal levels is vital to guaranteeing the Lebanese people’s right to political participation and restoring faith in the electoral process. Parliament’s decision to postpone elections and extend its term in 2013, 2014, and 2017 has raised concerns that it will do so in future elections. Electoral fraud – chiefly, vote buying and voter intimidation – remains a key concern. In the months before a given election, traditional political parties often distribute goods and services via vast patronage networks to secure votes, while at the same time applying threats and leveraging familial pressure to maintain support. Lebanon’s electoral law requires voters to return to their ancestral municipality to cast their vote, where party influence and family pressure remain more salient.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS 1.2, 1.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4

- **Risks** | The GoL’s failure to hold timely, free, and fair elections would erode Lebanese public’s faith in the electoral process, forcing many to fully disengage from participatory democracy.

Objective 2.3 | Advance human rights, including those of underserved communities and marginalized groups.

- **Justification** | Lebanon is commonly seen as comparatively tolerant in terms of human rights and social freedoms when viewed against the backdrop of regional neighbors. While this is true in broad terms, there remain significant issues with freedom of expression, LGBTQI+ rights, excessive use of force by security forces, and trafficking in persons. The Embassy will continue to engage government decisionmakers, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to promote freedom of speech, government accountability/transparency, respect for the rule of law, and other basic human rights and civil liberties. Human rights violations contribute to internal instability.

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- **Linkages** | NEA JRS 1.2, 4.1, 4.4, Executive Order 13985 on Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities

- **Risks** | The GoL’s failure to uphold and advance human rights would erode civil liberties and basic rights for all Lebanese people, but especially persons from marginalized communities.

**Objective 2.4** | Increase citizen access to quality public service delivery and limit the influence of Lebanese politicians over public service delivery so these services are no longer seen as spoils to curry political favor.

- **Justification** | An improvement in the delivery of essential services is a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, particularly in a country saddled with an ineffective government. An educated workforce can drive growth if there is a reliable and affordable power supply, sufficient water, and adequate infrastructure backed by a forward-looking policy regime. The burden of providing some of these services, however, has been left to subnational or non-state actors, reducing the quality, reliability, and efficiency of delivery, and opening communities to greater influence by malign non-state and foreign actors. Delivery of essential services is not only a prerequisite for economic growth but respect for human rights, such as right to social services and education.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS 1.3, 3.2, 4.1, Executive Order 13985 on Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities

- **Risks** | The GoL’s subpar performance on service delivery would further erode citizen’s trust in the government and open communities to greater influence by malign non-state and foreign actors.
Mission Goal 3 | Promote inclusive economic growth and enhanced GoL commitments on climate change.

Description | Left unchecked, Lebanon’s economic collapse will threaten social stability, exacerbate brain drain, and increase poverty among its citizens. A return to stability will depend on implementation of long-overdue reforms, including those that will help promote the survival of sectors and firms that employ people, export competitive products and services, remain flexible to market demand, and can obtain financing outside the moribund banking sector. All this must be supported by a targeted array of public and private sector activities and reforms. USG will facilitate resilience in local businesses by providing technical assistance to firms, expanding access to finance beyond the banking sector, improving access to new productive technologies, and supporting start-ups. All these activities will be aligned with needed reforms that focus on the competitiveness of Lebanon and Lebanese firms rather than supporting an entrenched and self-serving political culture. The USG will promote these reforms through private sector partner organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce and other businesses.

Objective 3.1 | Promote economic reforms that enable Lebanon to attract private international investment and bolster the private sector, while also supporting U.S. firms willing to do business in Lebanon, particularly in energy, telecommunications, and healthcare.

- Justification | The twin shocks of a failed financial sector and the impact of the COVID pandemic on key industries, including hospitality and tourism, rendered local businesses vulnerable to catastrophic levels of contraction or failure. The USG will continue to implement activities to help stabilize Lebanon’s key productive sectors, which can be leveraged to promote exports, information and communication technology, services, tourism, and agri-food. These sectors have the potential for growth despite current constraints, potentially boosting Lebanon’s resilience and capacity to resist foreign malign influences. Priority will be given to generating exports
to simultaneously sustain employment, generate foreign exchange, and better insulate firms from instability originating within Lebanon.

- **Linkages |** NEA JRS 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
- **Risks |** Ongoing economic and financial crises, and market instability would deter U.S. firms from investing or pursuing business opportunities in Lebanon.

**Objective 3.2 |** Secure GoL commitments on climate change and improve Lebanon’s access to economical, reliable, and clean energy.

- **Justification |** Lebanon is experiencing myriad crises (financial, economic, and energy), which will only worsen with climate change impacts. The GoL’s priority for the next decade is to spur sustainable growth through the creation of decent jobs and improve the well-being of its population through welfare programs and the conservation of Lebanon’s natural resources. The GoL submitted its updated National Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UN in 2021, marking its renewed commitment to the Paris Agreement to advance efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and embrace renewable energy targets by 2030, which outlines the policies and targets the GoL intends to achieve by 2030. (Note: Paris agreement calls on signatories to revise and enhance its commitment every five years.) Consequently, the GoL considers its implementation of Lebanon’s NDC is an inherent component of its economic recovery path, while reaffirming Lebanon’s commitment to the climate fight. Some of the key components of Lebanon’s updated NDC’s include reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent and reducing its power-demand through energy-efficiency measures by 10 percent. In 2021, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) submitted its National Action Plan (NAP) to Parliament, which outlines GoL priorities to mitigate climate change in three sectors – water, agriculture, and forestry. The United States must encourage the government to pursue policies that limit climate change impacts, including reductions to greenhouse gas emissions, and promote its interest in incorporating “green” solutions in its economic recovery plan.

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The GoL remains committed to combatting global climate change despite the economic, energy, and financial crises that the country is currently facing. The GoL plans to cover 30 percent of the country’s energy consumption from renewables by 2030, a goal, if achieved, would underscore the seriousness of its pursuit of the clean, reliable energy. The Mission must encourage the GoL to meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce GHGs, and to incorporate “green” solutions in its economic recovery.

- **Linkages |** NEA JRS 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 21 STATE 97546 Secretary Blinken’s Policy Guidance on Exercising U.S. Leadership to Tackle the Climate Crisis

- **Risks |** Lebanon’s inability to make significant progress in meeting its climate commitments and embrace renewable energy would leave it more vulnerable to negative climate change impacts, limit Lebanon’s economic recovery, and perpetuate energy shortages.

**Objective 3.3 |** Improve socio-economic conditions and reduce poverty, including among Lebanese citizens, refugees, and other vulnerable communities.

- **Justification |** The presence of an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 28,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, and 200,000 long-term Palestinian refugees in Lebanon imposes significant and potentially destabilizing resource burdens. Additionally, because of the compounded crises, the World Bank estimates that 50 percent of the Lebanese population is living in poverty (as compared to 30 percent in 2019). The Mission is committed to continue work with our local and international partners to enhance the protection and well-being of refugees residing in Lebanon, while at the same time supporting the vulnerable Lebanese, including those in the communities that host refugees.

- **Linkages |** NEA JRS 3.2, 4.1, 4.4, Executive Order 13985 on Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities

- **Risks |** The GoL and its international partners must continue cooperation and coordination to guarantee the wellbeing of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese citizens to stave off a serious humanitarian crisis.

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FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Mission Goal 4 | Leverage U.S. soft power to encourage Lebanon’s Western orientation and solidify the United States as the preferred partner among strategic competitors.

Description | Malign actors opposed to U.S. interests are seeking to increase their influence in Lebanon. Some of these actors use sophisticated disinformation and misinformation campaigns that need to be opposed. To counter these efforts, it is vital that we reinforce the benefits of Lebanon’s partnership with the United States at every opportunity across multiple audiences and fora. This includes using public diplomacy messaging to amplify the positive effects of USG assistance and counter disinformation and misinformation and to highlight that the United States is a force for good.

Objective 4.1 | Convey to diverse Lebanese audiences the United States’ unrivaled positive role in Lebanon, while also countering disinformation, propaganda, and malign influence of state and non-state actors.

- **Justification** | Lebanese officials continue to look to the United States as Lebanon’s most important strategic partner. To senior GoL officials and the public alike, the diverse range of USG assistance to Lebanon must be communicated to demonstrate that the United States is a force for good.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS 1.3, 4.2, 4.3

- **Risks** | The United States’ failure to counter disinformation and misinformation campaigns would increase the influence of malign actors in Lebanon and undermine U.S. interests in Lebanon and the region.

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4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1 | Develop visionary leaders who ensure all employees have the opportunity, skills, and voice to contribute successfully to Mission objectives.

- **Justification** | Supervisors have a responsibility to ensure all colleagues feel valued and respected and have an equal opportunity to develop and contribute their talents to the Mission. Supervisors must lead by example and foster the highest attainable degree of employee morale and productivity. Good leaders and role models increase collegiality, inclusiveness, and respect to achieve the highest attainable degree of employee morale and productivity.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS Management Objective 1; Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce (EO 14035); Executive Order on Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council (EO 14020); Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships; Executive Order on Protecting the Federal Workforce (EO 14003)

- **Risks** | Post’s failure to promote an inclusive, respectful environment for all employees and implement staff development best practices would lower employee morale and productivity, and reduce staff retention rates, which would impede Mission operations.

Management Objective 2 | Bolster management controls to improve efficiency and ensure proper oversight against fraud, waste, and mismanagement.

- **Justification** | Embassy Beirut is aggressively modernizing the management platform by streamlining operations, implementing the use of Department of State management systems, and instituting needed process improvement measures, which enhance effectiveness and responsiveness. Management is also using data to identify and address invoicing errors, uncontracted items, asset management challenges, and operational inefficiencies.

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• **Linkages** | NEA JRS Management Objective 2
• **Risks** | Post’s inability to improve management controls and ensure proper oversight would undermine its role as a trustworthy custodian of government resources and taxpayers’ dollars.

**Management Objective 3** | Enhance productivity and resilience of U.S. Direct Hires (USDH), employed family members, and LE staff through improved personnel management initiatives, innovative technologies, and personal security measures.

• **Justification** | Developing and maintaining an adaptable, resilient workforce demands that Post provide all employees with the resources and support their wellness.
• **Linkages** | NEA JRS Management Objective 1, Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships; Executive Order on Protecting the Federal Workforce (EO 14003)
• **Risks** | Post’s failure to develop and maintain an adaptable, resilient workforce would lead to reduced employee retention rates and low morale. Post would not be able to compete for the best talent as it works to complete Mission goals and objectives in an increasingly challenging environment.

**Management Objective 4** | Maximize office and residential space on the compound consistent with Mission needs in compliance with Diplomatic Security and POSHO regulations.

• **Justification** | Embassy Beirut will identify existing space that can be converted into office and residential space until the completion of the NEC.
• **Linkages** | NEA JRC Management Objective 2
• **Risks** | Post’s failure to maximize office and residential space would limit Mission operations and lower community morale.

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Management Objective 5 | Recruit and retain a dynamic, inclusive, and equitable USDH and LE workforce that reflects the diversity and strengths of our two countries.

- **Justification** | Embassy Beirut has experienced challenges recruiting for some key positions, high position vacancy rates, and gaps in USDH positions. In addition, in several sections long-serving local staff are reaching mandatory retirement age and/or opting for Special Issuance Visas (SIVs) due to the ongoing economic deterioration in Lebanon. Post management will continue to work closely with the LE staff employee association to identify and understand local staff concerns and challenges. Management will also continue to partner with GTM/OE in creative and appropriate solutions to these ongoing challenges. Outside pandemic circumstances, Post hosts an average of 35 TDY personnel on the compound at any given time and supporting these TDYers, as well as supporting a billion-dollar construction New Embassy Compound (NEC) project, places a great deal of strain on the Embassy’s limited resources.

- **Linkages** | NEA JRS Management Objective 1; Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce (EO 14035); Executive Order on Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council (EO 14020); Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships; Executive Order on Protecting the Federal Workforce (EO 14003)

- **Risks** | Inadequate staffing would undermine the Mission’s ability to carry out its key goal and objectives, as well as its daily operations.