



U.S.-Peru Child Protection Compact Partnership Endline Evaluation

Performance Evaluation

U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons

June 2022

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Acronyms

Acronym	Description
ABA-ROLI	American Bar Association-Rule of Law Initiative
CHS	Capital Humano y Social Alternativo
CPC	Child Protection Compact Partnership
CAG	Community Accompaniment Groups
CAR	Residential Shelter Centers
CARE	Specialized Residential Shelter Centers for Human Trafficking
CEM	Emergency Centers for Women
CSO	Civil society organization
DAIS	Data analysis, interpretation, and synthesis
DRE	Regional Directory of Education
FISTRAP	Provincial Prosecutor's Office Specialized in Crimes of Trafficking in Persons
IDL	Legal Defense Institute
ILO	International Labour Organization
INEI	National Institute of Statistics and Information
INABIF	National Comprehensive Program for Family Welfare
KII	Key informant interview
LGBTI	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex
MINEDU	Ministry of Education
MIMP	Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations
MININTER	Ministry of Interior
MINJUS	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights

Acronym	Description
MINSA	Ministry of Health
MPFN	Public Prosecutor's Office
MSC	Multisectoral Commission against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Trafficking in Migrants
MTPE	Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
PNP	National Police of Peru
RETA	System for Registration and Statistics of Trafficking in Persons and Related Crimes
TIP	Trafficking in persons
UGEL	Local Management Education Unit
UPE	Special Protection Unit

Executive Summary

Background and Context

On June 15, 2017, the U.S. Department of State and the Government of Peru (GoP) signed the U.S.-Peru Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnership. Applying the 3 Ps approach of the Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office), the CPC Partnership sought to improve the efforts of the Peruvian government and civil society to investigate, **prosecute**, and convict child traffickers, provide specialized **protection** services to child trafficking victims, and **prevent** child trafficking. To achieve these goals, the TIP Office funded three projects. The International Labour Organization (ILO) and sub-recipients Capital Humano Social y Alternativo (CHS) and Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) worked in Cusco, Lima, and Loreto. Centro Yanapanakusun worked in Cusco, and the American Bar Association-Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI) worked in Puno and Madre de Dios.¹

Evaluation Purpose, Design, and Questions

The purpose of this endline evaluation is to assess the performance of CPC Partnership activities and gauge progress toward the achievement of its objectives. The final evaluation design is the result of a participatory co-creation process. It builds on the 2018 baseline evaluation, and contains nine evaluation questions exploring four lines of inquiry:

1. **Implementation:** How was CPC Partnership programming implemented in Peru?
2. **Capacity:** How did the capacity of Peruvian stakeholders to address and combat child trafficking change?

¹**NOTE:** ILO and ABA ROLI programming was still ongoing during the evaluation period, despite the use of past tense to describe their projects in this paragraph (and elsewhere in this report).

3. **Partnership Contribution:** How did the CPC Partnership contribute to observed changes in the capacity of government stakeholders to address and combat child trafficking?
4. **Context:** How did environmental factors affect CPC Partnership programming?

This evaluation aims to generate evidence that the TIP Office, the GoP, CPC implementing partners, and others can use to combat child trafficking in Peru. The evaluation also intends to inform future CPC Partnerships.

Evaluation Methods and Limitations

Evaluation methods included (1) key informant interviews (KIIs), (2) virtual structured observations of CPC implementing partners' activities, and (3) an extensive review of project documents, as well as other relevant documents. Evaluation limitations included restricted access to respondents because of COVID-19 and approval requirements within government ministries, and the potential for project stakeholder and social desirability biases.

Conclusions and Recommendations



Conclusions

1. **Close collaboration** between the GoP, the U.S. Embassy, and the TIP Office **facilitated the creation of CPC Partnership objectives and goals** that aligned with Peru's needs. **These objectives and goals remained consistent** throughout implementation, even in the face of significant challenges.
2. **CPC implementing partner activities included training, awareness-raising efforts, and the development of protocols, guides, and policies that engaged government officials** from various sectors. Most **activities were implemented as originally designed**, despite unforeseen challenges.
3. **CPC implementing partners responded to emerging challenges** (like the COVID-19 pandemic) and opportunities **by moving programming online and investing in relationship**

building with key partners in a virtual environment to stay on track towards achieving CPC Partnership goals and objectives.

4. Since 2017, **many GoP agencies have experienced improvements in their capacity to implement the 3 Ps. Coordination and collaboration** across the anti-TIP community **has also improved. CPC implementing partner activities contributed** to these improvements.
5. Despite observed improvements, **child trafficking remains a serious problem in Peru.** Throughout the country, and especially outside of Lima, the **broader socioeconomic context, persistent capacity and resource gaps, and systemic factors mean that child trafficking remains common, and prevention and protection services are limited.**



Recommendations

1. The **TIP Office and USG colleagues should continue to encourage** government and CPC implementing partners to analyze the root causes of child trafficking, and develop **programming that aims to drive sustainable changes in behavior and social norms.**
2. Those working to combat child trafficking in Peru—the **GoP, implementing partners, and funders—should develop, maintain, and leverage collaborative relationships** with key partners **throughout the design and implementation of anti-trafficking programs** within the framework of the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030.
3. The **GoP and key partners in civil society should build on the promising community-based approaches** undertaken as part of the CPC Partnership, and work with regional multisectoral commissions **to further expand prevention-focused programming**, especially beyond Lima and in rural areas.
4. **Organizations in Peru** working to combat child trafficking **should**—in collaboration with local bodies like regional multisectoral commissions—intentionally **integrate practices that support evidence-based, opportunistic decision-making**, such as context monitoring, careful engagement with local networks and partners, and reflection and learning moments, **into their programming.**

U.S-Peru CPC Partnership Background and Context

A Brief Review of the U.S.-Peru Child Protection Compact Partnership

On June 15, 2017, building on an existing bilateral partnership on child trafficking issues, the U.S. Department of State and the Government of Peru (GoP) signed the U.S.-Peru Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnership.² Originally envisioned as a four-year initiative, the CPC Partnership was extended through June 2022 in early 2020, with another extension currently under consideration. Jointly developed and implemented by the United States and Peru, the CPC Partnership aimed to bolster the capacity of Peruvian state and civil society actors to address all forms of child trafficking. The CPC Partnership's three objectives reflect the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Office's fundamental "3 Ps" (prosecution, prevention, and protection) approach³ to combating TIP:

1. **Prosecution:** Improve the quality of victim-centered investigations and increase the number of effective prosecutions and convictions of child trafficking cases.
2. **Protection:** Strengthen state and civil society capacity to identify and provide comprehensive specialized services to more child trafficking victims.
3. **Prevention:** Increase efforts to prevent child trafficking, including through community-based mechanisms and enforcement of laws and regulations against acts that may facilitate child trafficking.

As part of these objectives, the CPC sought to strengthen the capacity of the Permanent Multisectoral Commission Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (MSC),⁴

² [U.S. Peru Child Protection Compact](#), U.S. Department of State, 2017b

³ [3Ps: Prosecution, Protection, and Prevention](#). Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.

⁴ The Multisectoral Commission was established in 2016. Decreto Supremo, 2016

ensure the implementation of the GoP's 2017–2021 National Plan Against Trafficking in Persons,⁵ and support the design and implementation of the more extensive National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030.⁶

The TIP Office awarded \$5 million in foreign assistance to three implementing partners—the International Labour Organization (ILO) (and sub-recipients Capital Humano Social y Alternativo (CHS) and Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL)), Centro Yanapanakusun, and the American Bar Association-Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI)—in Peru, so that they could collaborate with relevant MSC members and the USG to develop and execute activities supporting CPC Partnership objectives. The GoP committed at least 8 million soles (\$2.4 million) to increase the number of personnel in the MSC's member entities. Member entities intended to support the CPC Partnership by cooperating with CPC implementing partners on policies and operational responsibilities. More information about CPC Partnership activities is available in Annex 8.

⁵ U.S. Department of State, 2017b

⁶ MININTER, 2021

Evaluation Purpose and Questions

Evaluation Purpose

The United States has signed CPC Partnerships with the governments of Ghana (2015), the Philippines (2017), Peru (2017), Jamaica (2018), Mongolia (2020), and Colombia (2022). This endline performance evaluation of the U.S.-Peru CPC Partnership aims to help the TIP Office improve future CPC Partnerships, and to help the GoP and Peruvian civil society eliminate child trafficking. For a full description of the evaluation’s purpose, see Annex 7.

Evaluation Questions and Lines of Inquiry

This evaluation explored nine evaluation questions across four lines of inquiry (Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1: Lines of Inquiry and Evaluation Questions

Implementation

1. What was the original vision for CPC programming and how has it evolved throughout implementation?
2. To what extent have CPC implementing partners implemented activities as originally designed?
3. What adjustments were made, and why (with particular focus on the impact of COVID-19)?

Capacity

4. Have the CPC Partnership goals been achieved?
5. In what way/to what extent has the capacity of Peruvian stakeholders—government officials, NGOs and frontline service providers, and community members—to effectively contribute to the prosecution, prevention, and protection of child trafficking changed since the 2017 baseline?

CPC Partnership Contribution

6. How has the CPC Partnership contributed to changes in government capacity?
7. What other outcomes has the CPC Partnership contributed to?
8. What elements of the CPC Partnership enabled its success or lack thereof?

Context

9. What external or environmental factors contributed to and/or hindered achieving CPC Partnership objectives, and how have those factors changed since the start of the CPC?

Evaluation Design, Methods, and Limitations

Performance Evaluation Design and Methods

This endline performance evaluation used a mixed-methods approach, leveraging primary and secondary data to evaluate the performance of the CPC Partnership against its objectives.⁷

Primary data sources included:

- Key informant interviews (KIIs): the evaluation team conducted 64 semi-structured virtual interviews and six virtual group KIIs with key evaluation stakeholders and individuals familiar with the human trafficking landscape in Peru
- Training observations: the evaluation team carried out four virtual structured observation sessions of training events implemented by ILO, two offered to Ministry of Health (MINSA) staff and two given to frontline health workers. The evaluation team captured data from observation events in structured observation templates.

Secondary data sources consisted of policies and standard operating procedures related to the prosecution of child trafficking cases, CPC training curricula, GoP and implementing partner reports, and other relevant documents. In total, the evaluation team reviewed 113 such documents. More information on the evaluation design and approach, including on sampling, ethical considerations, and limitations can be found in Annex 3.

⁷ Although this endline evaluation builds on the 2018 U.S.-Peru CPC Partnership baseline evaluation, the baseline sought to address too many evaluation questions. The evaluation team therefore undertook a participatory design process with the TIP Office, CPC implementing partners, and the GoP to develop a condensed, updated set of evaluation questions. Given the updated evaluation questions, this assessment is not fully comparable to the baseline evaluation report. Nevertheless, the evaluation was designed to enable comparisons against the 2018 baseline where possible. For more information, see Annex 9.

Evidence and Findings

Line of Inquiry 1: Implementation

Finding 1: The original purpose of the CPC Partnership remained consistent throughout implementation and closely aligned with the policies, needs, and priorities of the GoP and other stakeholders.

Programming under the CPC Partnership reflected priorities of the USG, represented by the TIP Office and the U.S. Embassy, and Peruvian stakeholders. In line with the TIP Office’s 3 Ps approach, the CPC sought “to strengthen efforts of the Peruvian State and civil society to effectively prosecute and convict child traffickers, to provide comprehensive care for child victims of these crimes, and to prevent child trafficking in all its forms,”⁸ while incorporating a victim-centered approach.

CPC programming aligned with the Peruvian government’s broader existing anti-trafficking strategy, as articulated in various international regulatory instruments ratified by Peru, the National Vision for 2050,⁹ the National Plan Against Trafficking in Persons, 2017–2021,¹⁰ a series of National Action Plans for Children and Adolescents dating to 1992,¹¹ and the Permanent Multisectoral Commission against Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants.¹² The

⁸ [U.S. Peru Child Protection Compact](#). U.S. Department of State, 2017b

⁹ The National Vision for 2050 was approved on April 29, 2019, by the National Agreement Forum.

¹⁰ The National Plan against Trafficking in Persons (PNAT) 2017-2021 was approved on June 8, 2017, by [Supreme Decree No. 017-2017-IN](#).

¹¹ The National Vision for 2050, in particular, influenced CPC implementation by not only providing specific approaches that would later be used in CPC activities, such as gender perspective, interculturality, childhood and adolescence, disability, life cycle, intersectionality, territoriality and public safety, but also providing activities themselves, such as a comprehensive data system that centralizes all efforts and statistics.

¹² Originated in 2016 through the “Law against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants” (No. 28950) which created the Permanent Multisectoral Commission against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants. ([Supreme Decree No 001-2016-IN](#))














CPC Partnership sought to reduce child trafficking in Peru, specifically in the regions in which it was most prevalent.




The overarching vision for the CPC Partnership and the activities conducted under it remained consistent throughout its implementation. While some activities evolved from their original design for a variety of reasons (see Finding 3), interviewees and documents reviewed for this evaluation confirmed that the vision and goals of the CPC Partnership did not change.

Finding 2: Taken together, CPC Partnership activities cover all 3 Ps, fall into three overarching categories of training, awareness raising, and protocol/guide development, and target a variety of stakeholders.

CPC implementing partner activities varied by intervention region. ILO's project, in coordination with CHS and IDL, cut across all 3 Ps, and took place primarily in Lima, Cusco, and Loreto. Centro Yanapanakusun focused primarily on prevention in Cusco, and the American Bar Association-Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI) focused on prosecution in Madre de Dios and Puno.

Exhibit 2. Summary of implementing partner activities

	ILO and subrecipients	CentroYanapanakusun	ABA -ROLI
 Project focus and activity category	Prosecution:   — Protection:   — Prevention:  — 	Prosecution: — — — Protection: — — — Prevention:   	Prosecution:  — — Protection: — — — Prevention: — — —
 Target geographies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lima Cusco Loreto Puno Madre de Dios 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cusco 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Puno Madre de Dios
 Key partners/ targets of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Office of Ombudsman MINEDU MPFN UPEs and CARE (MIMP) MIMP Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (Patrol Guards and Municipal Inspectors) MOI/MININTER MFA MINJUS Judiciary Branch National Police of Peru Journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cusco UGELs Cusco Night Schools (teachers, directors, and psychologists) Community members (parents, adolescents, Indigenous youth) MOI/MININTER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MPFN (lawyers, psychologists, social assistants) Police officers and fiscals specialized in oral litigation MOI/MININTER

 Training sessions
  Protocols/guides/policies
  Awareness-raising activities

[\[Full image description for Exhibit 2\]](#)

CPC implementing partners engaged stakeholders from the GoP, frontline service providers and communities in three main ways: capacity-strengthening activities, awareness-raising activities, and the development and dissemination of guidelines and protocols. For more information on CPC implementing partner activities and the stakeholders involved, see Exhibit 2 and Annex 8.

Finding 3: CPC implementing partners faced a variety of challenges, including a lack of consistent buy-in from key partners in the GoP, high rates of turnover among partners in some government agencies, and significant resource constraints. Despite these challenges, CPC implementing partners carried out activities largely as originally designed.

Lack of consistent buy-in manifested in various ways. Regional MSC members in Loreto and Cusco reported that local government officials often failed to prioritize work related to the fight against TIP. Winning the support of such officials often required regional MSC members to convince government bodies, such as the Ombudsman of the People, to push local governments to act. Lack of support for regional MSC work was compounded by the fact that many regional and local actors are simply unaware of the regional MSCs and their functions. Furthermore, those who were aware found MSCs at times too bureaucratic and policy-focused, while multiple respondents reported that government agencies often appointed members to national and regional MSCs who lacked the authority to make decisions. For their part, judges—according to a respondent from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPFN)—failed to consistently prioritize TIP cases and other crimes of exploitation under Peruvian criminal case law, for two reasons. First, TIP-related investigations tend to be lengthier. Second, judges and prosecutors saw labor exploitation as something normal, unrelated to TIP, that should be prosecuted under separate laws. Finally, one interviewee shared that government counterparts sometimes refused or were unable to share statistical data related to child TIP with CPC implementing partners.

Staff turnover was also an issue. Interview respondents across government ministries reported that high staff turnover disrupted project implementation, forcing CPC implementing partners to devote significant time and resources to onboarding new staff across government agencies and service providers, and, in some cases, training them on TIP. For example, one shelter in Cusco experienced a change of directors, tutors, health personnel, and psychologists every 2–3 months. Moreover, quarterly reports from CPC implementing partners explained that high turnover rates at the ministerial and vice-ministerial levels contributed to delays in regional and municipal plans for combating trafficking in Lima, a lack of quorum in MSC meetings, and

uncertainty regarding the future of regional MSCs. An ILO case study explained that better pay in border regions drove high turnover among some police officers. Other agencies, according to an official from the Ministry of Women (MIMP) speaking at the 2nd Annual U.S. Peru CPC Bilateral Dialogue, also lost employees seeking better pay. Constant shifts in the appointment of government personnel due to an on-going political crisis caused even more turnover. CPC implementing partners also faced staffing shortages in their own organizations, and experienced difficulties identifying and hiring new candidates for employment. These factors, combined with the amount of time needed for new staff to be vetted and trained, caused significant delays in some cases.

“You always have to be starting over because there are changes in the people who work, let's say, in the State directorates and that takes time and delays things”. - KII, Government Official, MIMP

Resource constraints and gaps—in funding, technology, and capacity— are cited in written assessments by CPC implementing partners and interview respondents. In 2019, an ILO case study identified numerous gaps in funding and human resources in the Peruvian National Police (PNP), the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the judiciary, and the MSC, and logistical resource gaps in the PNP and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. For example, the Directorate for the Investigation of Crimes of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants of the PNP was found to have an insufficient budget for carrying out intelligence operations needed to effectively combat child trafficking. KIIs with staff in government ministries confirmed these gaps. Frontline workers also noted persistent funding and staffing gaps in emergency care centers and police units, despite advances made under the CPC Partnership. Furthermore, national and regional plans lacked specific, standalone budgets, requiring ministries to pull money from other sources to support implementation.

Despite having to make some adjustments to account for these challenges and for COVID-19 (see Finding 5), project reports and interviewees suggest that the CPC implementing partners carried out program activities largely as designed, and generated expected products and outputs.

Finding 4: CPC implementing partners responded to the above challenges by amplifying existing efforts to build relationships with government partners.

CPC implementing partners responded to challenges described in Finding 3 by increasing existing efforts to build strong relationships and strengthen the capacity of government partners, both key goals of the CPC Partnership.

Amplifying efforts to build relationships: In order to mediate turnover at all levels of government, ILO frequently used meetings and visits to Loreto, Lima, and Cusco to create lines of communication, meeting strategically with new officials and staff to introduce them to the project, provide technical assistance, and encourage coordination among government agencies involved in ILO activities. Centro Yanapanakusun also leveraged strategic meetings with relevant government agencies to resolve initial delays in initiating program implementation, overcome conflicts of interest with those agencies, and address coordination challenges with subgrantees that they eventually removed from the project. Evidence from KIIs suggests that more direct communication between government agencies and implementing partners, as well as among government agencies, enabled quicker responses, improved efficiency, and increased coordination. ILO and Centro Yanapanakusun, as well as respondents from the Ministry of the Interior (MININTER), noted that communication improved over time, which strengthened trust between organizations and government agencies involved in CPC activities.

Capacity strengthening for key partners: Throughout quarterly reports, CPC implementing partners describe opportunistically addressing capacity gaps among key stakeholders. For example, when ILO found a lack of knowledge on TIP among the professional staff and new appointees in institutions in charge of reintegration services, it implemented additional training to address this. ILO also used training to improve subrecipients' organizational processes, helping both IDL and CHS tackle staffing challenges. Centro Yanapanakusun attempted to address knowledge gaps regarding human trafficking, gender, and cultural sensitivity among municipal public officials with some (though not total) success. These extra trainings required additional time and resources.

Finding 5: CPC implementing partners adjusted to the COVID-19 pandemic by shifting programming online and continuing to coordinate with and secure the buy-in of key partners. However, pandemic restrictions still hindered collaboration between CPC implementing partners and government actors, reduced beneficiaries' access to health and legal services, and affected beneficiary participation .

The COVID-19 pandemic had serious implications for CPC programming. CPC implementing partners responded to pandemic restrictions by shifting activities to virtual engagements, through methods such as phone and video calls, and by redoubling their efforts to coordinate and build relationships with key government partners. Nevertheless, the pandemic reduced coordination between CPC implementing partners, their government counterparts, and beneficiaries, such as children at risk for/survivors of TIP.

According to one respondent from MIMP, the lack of in-person coordination caused relationships between stakeholders involved in the fight against child TIP to deteriorate. Another official from MIMP corroborated this point, mentioning that when meetings, workshops, and seminars moved online, officials would often join calls but disconnect shortly thereafter. A respondent from the Ministry of Education (MINEDU) mentioned that the lack of a “person-to-person” element hampered work and connections with and between program beneficiaries. According to the respondent, the lack of fluidity in communications in online settings prevented children and adolescents from expressing their emotions and deeply connecting with other participants and program implementers.

“The pandemic has caused a distancing between institutions precisely because of the possibility of not doing face-to-face coordination, so some have been doing it by phone, and that does not help us much. It is unfortunate, we hope that this passes so that we can recover coordination actions that were previously carried out, but yes, the pandemic has not helped us.” - KII, Frontline worker, MIMP

Respondents also pointed out that government officials' priorities shifted from addressing TIP to dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. This was especially the case for the Ministry of Health (MINSa). Executive decrees directed MINSa to shift resources to the pandemic and frontline




workers. Emergency Centers for Women (CEM) were reduced to working through mobile units because of an increased demand for health services, while public defenders' office closures reportedly caused many TIP reports and complaints to remain unattended or lost.

Interviewees also reported that CPC implementing partners and frontline workers lost contact with some beneficiaries. Prosecutors shared that online work made it harder to develop trust with victims and sources in investigations, an essential part of both protection and prosecution work, because they primarily develop relationships in face-to-face interactions. The pandemic has also affected law enforcement officers' ability to intervene in crime related to child trafficking, as resources were shifted elsewhere, in-person investigations were hampered, and officers themselves fell ill to COVID-19.

Some respondents, however, described increased online connectivity as beneficial, as it enabled virtual meetings, workshops, and consultations, and necessitated improvements in the technology available in their workplaces. MINJUS officials observed that holding hearings online allowed victims to attend from home, decreasing the cost of attendance and saving time for prosecutors and victims. A MINSAs official pointed out that virtual meetings allow for more agility and increase accessibility for more individuals from different regions, though Loreto faced particular challenges given limited telecommunications access and distance from urban centers.

Exhibit 3 summarizes Findings 3, 4, and 5, laying out the challenges implementing partners faced, and the various ways in which they responded to those challenges.

Exhibit 3. Challenges faced and adaptations made by implementing partners

CHALLENGES	ADAPTATIONS
 COVID-19 pandemic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pivot to online programming • Additional coordination efforts
 High turnover and lack of consistent buy-in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build/leverage relationships
 Resource constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic focus on capacity building and efficiency

[\[Full image description for Exhibit 3\]](#)

Finding 6: The TIP Office’s flexible, collaborative approach when working with CPC implementing partners facilitated implementing partners’ efforts to effectively respond to challenges and build on emerging successes and needs.

The TIP Office collaborated with CPC implementing partners to identify challenges and agree on modifications to their project work plans. This enabled CPC implementing partners to engage new partners and communities, both within the GoP and at community level. According to one respondent from ILO, the TIP Office approved activities in which ILO contributed to policies and guides that were developed during the CPC Partnership, such as the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030.¹³ ILO’s capacity-strengthening activities also evolved. In one case, judges found training modules so useful that, with support from ILO, the judicial authorities published module materials as a book, and made it available as an academic resource for staff. Two additional communities asked to be incorporated into Centro Yanapanakusun’s project. Because of the quality of Centro

¹³ As ILO was already providing technical assistance on the implementation of the National Plan, contributing to the National Policy – the Plan’s successor – was a natural fit for the project.

Yanapanakusun's work in targeted communities, the TIP Office authorized the inclusion of Ccarhuayo district in Quispicanchi in January 2020.¹⁴

Line of Inquiry 2: Capacity

Finding 7: Relative to 2017, actors within the criminal justice system have improved their capacity to investigate and prosecute child TIP in three ways: (1) police, judges, and prosecutors better understand how to engage victims, (2) more police and prosecutors are specifically dedicated to combating child trafficking, and (3) new protocols guide more investigations and prosecutions.

Since 2017, the capacity of criminal justice system actors in Peru has improved in three ways. First, judges, judicial staff, and prosecutors **are better equipped to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases while protecting victims**. KIIs reveal that more judges have been trained on human trafficking and other crimes of exploitation under Peruvian law, and that specialized prosecutors received training on different investigation techniques to provide reparation for victims and effectively argue cases. Judges and judiciary staff investigating and prosecuting TIP have received ongoing training on how to interpret and apply child TIP laws. Guides and digital resources on how to respect victims' dignity are also available.

"Over the past year we've done training courses on human trafficking, forced labor, and other types of exploitation...Specialized prosecutors have been trained so they can recognize how to employ different investigation techniques. Based on the actions, indicated in the manual on how to prepare cases of human trafficking, they ensure these can be brought forward and analyzed and provide necessary evidence to lead to a

¹⁴ Based on the good reception that the work conducted by Centro Yanapanakusun has received, the authorities of the Ccarhuayo district, Quispicanchi, which suffers from high rates of TIP, requested to be incorporated into the project. Specifically, the Ccarhuayo district was incorporated into Activity 1.2 of the project, which sought to create a community referral and response system for suspected child trafficking victims, suspected traffickers, or potential trafficking situations among rural communities of the intervention (Ocongate, Kcauri, Huacaycancha, Huasquillay, Misanpata).

conviction and provide reparations for the victim. “- MINJUS Official speaking at 2nd Annual U.S. Peru CPC Bilateral Dialogue

Second, KII respondents from MININTER report that as a result of the National Plan against Trafficking in Persons 2017–2021, **specialized trafficking units** within the PNP were created and are currently active in every department but the Amazonas. Respondents from MPFN report that **specialized prosecution offices** exist in 14 of the 24 departments of Peru, up from 8 in 2017.¹⁵ Finally, relative to 2017, MINJUS developed **investigation and prosecution-related protocols** that incorporate a victim-centered approach, as well as protocols governing coordination between public defenders and CEMs. Other protocols include a Guideline for the Coordination between Provincial Prosecutor's Offices Specialized in Crimes of Trafficking in Persons (FISTRAPs) and non-specialized Provincial Criminal Prosecutors' Offices on how to approach child and adolescent trafficking cases, MPFN's Protocol for the Care of Victims of TIP in the Context of Migration (aimed at specialized prosecutors, provincial criminal prosecutors, and family prosecutors) and the MININTER/MPFN Operational Guide to Investigate the Crime of Trafficking in Persons.¹⁶

Finding 8: The capacity of government workers, frontline service providers, and civil society to identify child trafficking victims and provide specialized protection services has improved since 2017, though with some variation across institutions.

Both GoP and NGO respondents report that key government agencies improved their capacity to rescue victims of child trafficking, and are more sensitive to victims' needs, relative to 2017.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, [2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Peru](#).

¹⁶ Determining changes in the number of child trafficking prosecutions from 2017 to 2020 has not been possible due to data limitations in Peru (see Finding 11). Data available from INEI suggests that the number of TIP cases reported declined from 1,480 in 2017 to 692 in 2020. This data, however, is not disaggregated by victim age or by cases leading to convictions. MININTER has its own data portal for TIP statistics, but that portal has been offline during the writing of this report. Given the limitations of available data, it remains unclear whether and how the decline in reported cases reflects changes in government capacity related to child TIP, especially considering the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

MININTER: MININTER oversaw government actions across all three CPC Partnership objectives and led the MSC. MININTER coordinates with offices, including the PNP and MPFN, to ensure the provision of protection services. While police previously tended to view potential victims as delinquents, according to respondents they are now more able to coordinate with health care workers to assist children using techniques grounded in analysis of each potential victim's circumstances and demographics.

MPFN: The CPC Partnership tasks MPFN with the provision of temporary accommodations and mental, physical, and emotional assistance to children and adolescents involved in trafficking cases. According to KIIs, prior to 2017 MPFN services were limited to helping victims establish a legal case. Today, interviewees report that MPFN better directs victims to the housing, care, and reintegration services offered by MIMP. Prosecutors appear to better understand the needs and rights of trafficking victims, including the importance of providing differentiated care. For example, several respondents from the Public Prosecutor's Office report regularly evaluating risk and vulnerability factors when engaging potential victims, and using the results to determine care decisions.

MINJUS: The National Policy tasks MINJUS with providing legal defense services and care to victims throughout justice proceedings. Not only is it now easier for victims to report cases to MINJUS and access care (via newly established email addresses and WhatsApp channels), but interviewees agree that judges and police have improved coordination with CEMs and Special Protection Units (UPEs) of MIMP to provide differentiated services to potential victims, regardless of who first receives the victim. According to respondents, the differentiated approach that MINJUS offers helps limit revictimization and avoid absolving perpetrators due to victims not wanting to testify.

MIMP: Under the National Policy, no institution bears more responsibility for protection efforts than MIMP. MIMP is responsible for the care and reintegration of children and adolescents affected by trafficking across Peru, via Specialized Residential Shelter Centers for Human

Trafficking (CAREs) that operate under the National Comprehensive Program for Family Welfare (INABIF). According to the baseline evaluation, in 2017 MIMP officials received limited training on victim-centered procedures, but failed to consistently and systematically attend to the needs and rights of children. The baseline also reported that, as of 2017, only three CAREs existed in Peru, and even those failed to provide services to male and LGBTQI+ child trafficking victims. MIMP now runs 25 specialized units for assisting children in need of special protection, including all child trafficking victims, seven specialized shelters exclusively for girls exploited in sex trafficking, and 24 UPEs focusing exclusively on trafficking. UPEs have more social workers, lawyers, and psychologists on staff to attend to victims' needs, and are consistently well trained in using victim-centered approaches¹⁷ and considering the best interest of the child.¹⁸ CAR, CARE and UPE staff have increased access to protocols on coordination, increased access to telephone directories of other service providers, and are equipped to deploy mental health services. INABIF has seen an increase in capacity in residences, shelters, and agencies across integration efforts, while national legislation created a network to provide mental health services and made it easier for primary care personnel to emphasize detection.

"... In the case of minors, there are the Special Protection Units of the Ministry of Women, which, when the project began, had just modified their procedural rules for dealing with cases. So, it was very complicated for them to, let's say, take the time to specialize in the issue of trafficking because they were trying to understand their new procedures, but now that some time has passed, what I have seen is that they already know procedures well and there are already people who are more specialized in caring for victims of trafficking, and this specialization has helped them to care for victims with

¹⁷ A victim-centered approach seeks to avoid the revictimization of victims of human trafficking and, on the contrary, to focus on their needs and concerns. For this purpose, the services provided must be performed in a sensitive and non-prejudice-based manner, giving priority to their well-being and various interests, such as support, information about their rights, protection of their physical integrity, a period of reflection and recovery before making any decision, and psychological care, that victims may have. For more information, see the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030 or the Procedure Guide of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Coordinate the Provision of Assistance to Foreign Tip Victims in Peru.

¹⁸ As described in GoP Procedure Guides, "The rights of children and adolescents should prevail over other interests... Policies and actions carried out by public servants and officials should give priority to the interests of children and adolescents and to the comprehensive enjoyment of their rights." For more information, see the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030 or the Procedure Guide of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Coordinate the Provision of Assistance to Foreign Tip Victims in Peru.

distinct profiles, and also understand the characteristics of the victims or the people they care for.” - KII, Government Official, MIMP

MINSA: Under the National Policy, MINSA is meant to provide specialized mental health care services for girls, boys, adolescents, and young people who are victims of violence through Community Mental Health Centers and through comprehensive care to victims of sexual violence. CEM staff report that they have received more training, and that they have access to resources regarding the provision of protection services, such as telephone directories. Many health centers—though by no means all 400 throughout Peru—now also provide continuing care to trauma victims, including trafficking victims.

Finding 9: Child trafficking has become more visible as an issue since 2017.

According to respondents in government ministries, frontline workers, and civil society organizations, child trafficking issues have become more visible in Peru since 2017. For example, a frontline worker from Lima has observed an increase in the number of people who know about, and are willing to discuss, child trafficking, while other frontline workers note an increase in priority given to TIP issues in their work. The joint efforts of the Municipal Governments, the Ministry of Education, the Educational Management Units (UGEL), and of NGOs in the north of Lima raised awareness of how to recognize and report trafficking. Staff from Centro Yanapanakusun see more families and communities in Cusco recognizing child trafficking and feeling responsible for raising awareness to prevent trafficking. Following Centro Yanapanakusun’s work in Cusco to strengthen anti-trafficking efforts through training and technical assistance to night schools, the MINEDU carried out similar activities with communities, families, and students in Cusco to train them to identify trafficking risks. An ILO case study found these citizen training courses to be successful, contributing to a higher level of awareness of child trafficking issues. However, the study also recognized the need for additional training in rural areas.

Finding 10: Since 2017, the capacity of government entities, NGOs and frontline service workers, and community members to coordinate and collaborate on initiatives to address child trafficking has improved. Actors throughout the anti-child trafficking system better understand how responsibilities are divided across institutions and share information with each other.

According to KII respondents, national-level policies on trafficking paved the way for CPC implementing partners to work collaboratively with government agencies to develop, disseminate, and implement guides and training throughout the country, including at the local level with schools, education institutes, local boards, and police officers. As a result, relative to 2017, the capacity of government actors and others tackling child trafficking to coordinate efforts has improved in two ways. First, they better understand child trafficking as an issue and their individual responsibilities in the fight against trafficking; second, GoP agencies and officials engage in collaborative decision-making and action in the application of joint policies, training, and protocols related to prevention. Respondents across ministries report that they now know who to contact and through what procedures, regardless of the “P” in question, and that they coordinate more with, and observe more coordination among, frontline workers, civil society, and community members than in the past.

For example, during the Second Annual Bilateral CPC Partnership Dialogue in 2021, attendees from relevant ministries described improved coordination among **protection** service providers. Attendees from MIMP cited higher quality service provision, and those from INABIF noted that a more comprehensive array of services are now available for victims. CHS also highlighted the availability of more effective reintegration services. Improvements in coordination also affected the way in which public defenders, police, and health care service providers represent and provide services to potential trafficking victims. Relative to 2017, prosecutors reportedly work more closely with health care providers to ensure that the relevant authorities meet victims’ emotional and psychological needs at each stage of victim protection. In terms of **prosecution**, respondents also note that prosecutors’ offices now coordinate more frequently with police and judges (who are more equipped to apply victim and trauma-centered approaches and the

best interest of the child to cases). Exhibit 4 See Exhibit 4 for a summary of changes in capacity since 2017 and factors that contributed to those changes (Findings 7–10 and 13–18).

Finding 11: Despite improvements in the capacity of key stakeholders across the 3 Ps, significant room for growth remains, especially regarding: (1) institutional policy, (2) coordination, (3) capacity-strengthening opportunities, (4) attention to prevention, (5) protection services, and (6) systematizing data on TIP in Peru.

Operationalizing institutional policy: Institution-level policies and guidebooks have been a key part of the MSC’s work under the CPC Partnership, particularly regarding protection efforts. While respondents consistently noted an increased level of capacity because of the dissemination of policies and guides, particularly within MININTER and PNP, others felt that protocols took too long to develop, and reported mixed results in terms of implementation. These respondents note that the protocols are often hard to fully implement in practice because users must tailor them to the work of each agency and office charged with applying them. Some respondents see the language of the protocols as too technical, limiting their application, or too conflicting. For example, inconsistency about whether a crime should be classified as exploitation or trafficking means that prosecutors often apply different procedures to similar cases. In some cases, frontline workers report not even being aware of protocols, reflecting the patchy implementation of institutional policies.

Improving coordination: Despite meaningful advances in coordination, a significant number of interviewees reported that institutions still struggle occasionally with operationalizing joint action plans. Some cite a continued need for greater coordination between MINJUS and specialized police in the prosecution of cases. Other respondents reported that coordination often depends on the willingness of specific individuals and breaks down when those people are unwilling to compromise. Actors involved in the CPC Partnership also note the importance of bringing other actors into the fight against child trafficking, like the armed forces, the Ministry of Defense, and regional governments.

Capacity-strengthening opportunities: Respondents desire more training opportunities. While MIMP, MININTER, and MPFN respondents spoke favorably of the training they received, some respondents within the Ministry of Labor (MTPE) and MINJUS felt that government employees would benefit from more consistent follow-up training to cement the concepts they learned. For example, judges' ability to sentence proportionally while differentiating among the characteristics of each case is inconsistent. This is due in part to substantial variations in their level of training. Respondents also cited a need for more training focused on sensitizing key stakeholders within government, civil society, schools, and communities to the issue of trafficking.

An increased focus on prevention: CPC implementing partners, government officials, frontline workers, and criminal justice system actors expressed a need to prioritize prevention to a greater degree, since a greater focus on prevention may make protection and prosecution efforts less necessary. Furthermore, a focus on the illegal nature of trafficking in prevention work often stigmatizes victims as implicated in their own trafficking. Respondents also found many people do not understand what trafficking means, so they are less able to absorb anti-trafficking messages. Many interviewees suggested adjusting prevention messaging to address the wider implications of trafficking, particularly its effects on victims, the social fabric, and communities.

Protection services: NGO staff report that there are still many residential care centers (CARs and CAREs) where best practices regarding child trafficking victims, like the best interest of the child approach, are not regularly applied. Staff continue to operate under archaic care models where children are seen as problems in need of re-education. NGO and frontline workers reported that health care workers in shelters limit victims' communication with their loved ones despite CAREs having a mandate to work with families to rehabilitate victims. Many respondents also expressed that more CAREs that exclusively serve TIP victims are needed, and that existing shelters continue to lack enough trained, properly paid professionals, particularly psychologists, to provide adequate care to children. Staff at many CAREs, including those

specializing in providing services to girls, also reported a lack of resources and space to house and attend to all victims. Regarding the provision of care, UPE staff still often fail to adhere to best practices in protection. For example, one local prosecutor cited cases where UPEs discharged victims before they had been successfully rehabilitated. Further, while nearly every region has a UPE, most UPEs have limited reach outside of large cities, leaving untrained local family judges to fulfill the role of the UPEs, and negatively affecting quality of care.

“So, for example, psychiatrists are needed, there are none dedicated to this, it seems to me that they have one and that he sees a lot of issues. For example, INABIF does not have a psychiatrist for—or it has one who looks at various issues, it seems to me, but it should have someone looking at [trafficking] issues. Another limitation that I find is that there is not much knowledge generation. Many victims are cared for, in fact, there is experience caring for victims, there is a lot of data on victims in the files, but knowledge is not generated, there is no investigation. So, we don't know which methodologies have worked best and which have not. So, the same thing continues and knowledge comes from outside.” - KII, Government Official, MIMP


More systematic, shared data collection: Consistent with findings from the baseline evaluation, several respondents reported that demographic data collection on child trafficking is still fragmented across various institutions. INABIF, MPFN, INEI, MPFN, MINJUS, MINSAs, and MININTER all maintain their own data systems to varying degrees, hindering coordination and strategic thinking across anti-TIP stakeholders. See Annex 11 for more detail on what each institution collects and existing limitations. MININTER had a system, RETA, to centralize and homogenize all TIP data, but after inconsistent updating and use, MININTER now plans to replace the current system. RETA 2 is still being formalized, and the extent to which it will resolve existing discrepancies is unclear.

Finding 12: Many of the identified capacity improvements are concentrated in Lima. In more rural areas, social norms and economic disparities exacerbate existing trafficking vulnerabilities, and prosecution and protection services are rare.

Rural areas present challenges because of socioeconomic conditions that incentivize children to work, a pervasive normalization of child labor, and other factors (see Finding 19). CPC

Partnership programming accounted for these challenges, to an extent, but evaluation respondents reported a profound disparity between the quality of services available in rural areas and those in urban areas. Rural areas, which are more expensive to reach, have fewer prosecution and protection services relative to Lima. Police and judicial capacity outside of Lima is still limited, and referral of victims to care centers is inconsistent. Similarly, MININTER's Directorate for Trafficking staff in Lima are well trained in investigation and protection, but they lack a regional presence that would allow them to offer comparable services in regions like Puno or Madre de Dios. Further, ABA-ROLI found a limited number of justice sector operators specialized in TIP in both Madre de Dios and Puno, including within the PNP, and no specialized judges handling criminal cases. Respondents cite that UPEs in Lima are quicker to resolve cases than regional UPEs because regional personnel lack comparable levels of professionalization.

Exhibit 4. Summary of changes in capacity and contributing factors



STAKEHOLDER GROUP	OBSERVED CHANGE IN CAPACITY					CONTRIBUTING FACTORS				
	Investigate/ prosecute trafficking cases in line with best practices	Identify / refer victims / provide differentiated services	Creation of new infrastructure and dedicated units	Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking	Stronger coordination and collaboration	Training	Resource allocations	Protocols, guides, etc.	MSC actions	Awareness-raising campaigns
Peruvian National Police	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Public Prosecutor's Office (MPFN)	●	●		●	●	●	●	●		
Ministry of Justice (MINJUS)		●		●		●		●		
Ministry of Interior (MININTER)				●	●	●		●	●	
Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP)		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	
Ministry of Health (MINSA)		●		●		●		●		
Frontline service providers		●		●		●	●	●		
CSOs		●		●	●				●	●
Community members		●		●		●		●		●

[Full image description for Exhibit 4.]

Line of Inquiry 3: Contribution

Finding 13: The skills-based training, toolkits, and other resources that CPC implementing partners created and provided to criminal justice system actors and frontline service providers strengthened the capacity of prosecutors, judges, and police to navigate trafficking cases and provide services for victims of trafficking.

Respondents in the criminal justice system reported that training, guidance, and protocols provided by ILO and CHS increased the ability of judges, police, and prosecutors to identify and engage potential trafficking victims using trauma-informed and victim-centered approaches.

According to the Director of FISTRAP, these efforts contributed to an uptick in trafficking investigations and successful prosecutions. Beyond individual-level capacity strengthening, respondents noted that GoP agencies collaborate and share resources and information, and use published guidelines and written materials to train new staff.

“I have seen it very clearly at the level of the Public Prosecutor's Office... because here in Lima we had the opportunity to visit the Public Prosecutor's Office facilities that have set up spaces that have precisely the task of not re-victimizing the victims, in order to be able to carry out investigations where, truly, the work is focused on fighting for rights of victims that have been violated by criminal organizations. At the level of the judiciary, we have not found the same response from the institutional point of view, but we have found it on a personal level. There is a greater awareness.”- KII, Implementing partner

ILO and CHS programming contributed to improvements in protection services through training, staff orientations, and documented institution-specific guidance emphasizing the best interest of the child and victim-centered approaches. Government and NGO staff witnessed improvements in action in CARs and CAREs, and CARE employees reported that CHS technical assistance helped them offer individualized support to victims. CHS, in turn, reported that the networks of residents, victim defense groups, and community health centers that they curated helped improve efforts to tailor reintegration plans to victim needs.

Finding 14: The GoP's creation of specialized anti-trafficking units within the police and prosecutors' offices and specialized protection units under MIMP boosted the availability and quality of prosecution and protection services.

The CPC Partnership contributed to strengthening the 14 specialized prosecutorial units created under MFPN in regions key to fighting trafficking and 24 specialized trafficking units within the PNP (one in every region but Amazonas). While these units were not a direct result of CPC Partnership activities, respondents from the PNP and Public Prosecutor's Office noted that the policies and guidelines elaborated under the CPC Partnership led the GoP to establish more such units, increase coordination and TIP specialization among prosecutors and police, and further prioritize anti-TIP work. The GoP created specialized units to decentralize anti-trafficking efforts and decrease disparities in TIP training between the capital and other regions. These units increased police capacity to identify and respond to trafficking cases outside of Lima, and provided citizens with a means to report suspected trafficking more easily. The new units further systematized the approach to investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes across Peru, improving the investigation and prosecution of cases and increasing the visibility of trafficking as an issue.

"Despite all this, we have had important convictions in Cusco. We have around 35 convictions, which is a very important number. Bearing in mind that before the creation of the specialized prosecutor's offices, there were not this number of convictions. We are talking about one or two before 2016, that's a lot." KII – Government Official, Public Prosecutor's Office

Under the CPC Partnership, MIMP created UPEs nationwide and established systematic procedures for UPE operation and cross-coordination. Respondents reported a greater presence of mental health professionals equipped to respond to child and adolescent victims of trafficking and higher quality protection services, while acknowledging funding, staffing, and capacity concerns remain.

Finding 15: Campaigns and training focused on building understanding and awareness of child trafficking, especially at the regional and community levels, contributed to increased public sensitivity to TIP.

According to project reports, Centro Yanapanakusun's awareness-building activities made community members more sensitive to and able to identify and detect child trafficking. Centro Yanapanakusun's activities engaged students, teachers, principals, and related professionals in academic settings; government officials; and community groups such as the Network of Indigenous Communicators of Peru. Education officials in Cusco described these activities as relevant, and reported that students participating in radio program activities felt more empowered. One school director, after noticing deep engagement from student participants in the Centro Yanapanakusun's activities, followed the project's example by creating a permanent radio program in which community members can discuss TIP. By including heads of families, in addition to children, in their community efforts, Centro Yanapanakusun helped parents realize that they had experienced trafficking themselves, thereby de-normalizing trafficking and exploitation among families. Further, community support groups developed under Centro Yanapanakusun's activities participated in their respective Citizen Security District Communities to support prevention efforts.

CPC Partnership government stakeholders recognized the value of Centro Yanapanakusun's community-level campaigns. A MININTER representative noted that Centro Yanapanakusun's fieldwork was useful, and that the regional MSC was prioritizing prevention-focused activities and engaging with vulnerable groups. Provincial entities like CEM and Municipal Defence for Children and Adolescents (DEMUNA) recognized the importance of Centro Yanapanakusun's awareness building work, which led to a workshop for citizen security personnel in numerous Cusco districts. Because of the success of this workshop, the Technical Secretary of the Provincial Committee for Citizen Security (COPROSEC) requested replication of the workshop in other districts. The regional government also noticed Centro Yanapanakusun's work and invited them to participate in Cusco's Provincial Network to Combat Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants.

Finding 16: The actions of national and regional multisectoral commissions strengthened coordination and collaboration on anti-TIP issues throughout Peru.

The work of national and regional MSCs, in conjunction with the policies these commissions promulgated under the CPC Partnership, clarified the roles and responsibilities of key actors in the fight against trafficking, while also providing a monthly space for relevant stakeholders to meet, thereby facilitating the coordination improvements described in Finding 10.

As the chair of the MSC, MININTER has, according to ILO respondents, introduced joint protocols and intervention manuals that improved the ability of the PNP and MPFN to identify and act on possible trafficking cases, while also providing care grounded in analysis of each potential victim's circumstances and needs. The MSC and its members also contributed to supreme decrees that strengthened the implementation of CAREs for TIP victims, and approved guidelines for specialized victim re-integration plans. For example, the presence of MINJUS and MIMP on the MSC, along with the development and promulgation of protocols—supported by ILO and CHS in particular—guiding how these institutions should work together, has encouraged prosecutors to work more closely with health care providers to meet victims' emotional and psychological needs.

Respondents also credited the MSCs at both national and regional levels with bringing a wider variety of government agencies and NGOs into the fight against child TIP. For example, the MPFN, in collaboration with ILO and members of the MSC, provided guidelines on immediate victim assistance to prosecutors, officials of the Institute for Legal Medicine, and officials of the Office of International Judicial Cooperation. MPFN also worked with the Victim and Witness Assistance Unit to establish the Public Ministry School to train officials throughout government on procedures for victim assistance.

In developing and implementing guides and protocols, MSC members coordinated heavily with CPC implementing partners, specifically with ILO and CHS offering input on both the 2017–2021 National Plan Against Trafficking in Persons, and institution-specific protocols. ILO and CHS also

trained government functionaries in how to implement these protocols and apply victim-centered approaches and act in the best interest of the child. At the same time, Centro Yanapanakusun coordinated with civil society members in Cusco to bring parents, children and community members into prevention and awareness raising activities. Frontline workers and NGO personnel valued the coordination they enjoyed with CPC implementing partners, with several noting the only coordination they had seen in anti-trafficking efforts had been with CPC implementing partners.

Finding 17: The development and use of systematic protocols, guides, and regulations regarding trafficking in persons played a key role in the standardization, harmonization, and improvement of practices and standards across the 3 Ps.

The GoP developed the National Plan against the Trafficking of Persons 2017–2021 before the U.S.-Peru CPC Partnership was signed, but its approval coincided with the CPC Partnership. Those designing the CPC Partnership envisioned it as the driver of the National Plan, as well as its successor, the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030. Overall, respondents view the implementation of the National Plan against trafficking as a sizeable success, pointing to its clarification of roles, legal framework provisions, facilitation of multisectoral efforts, and manuals and guidelines produced as particularly useful. Implementing partners' technical expertise was instrumental to this success. The approval of its successor, the National Policy, in 2021 is viewed as one of the hallmark achievements of the CPC Partnership. The National Policy contributes to institutionalizing trafficking as a priority while laying out division of labor, coordination mechanisms and long-term objectives.

Prior to the CPC Partnership, there was confusion about the legal framework concerning prosecution of cases and protection of victims and a clear disparity of awareness of trafficking between high-level actors and frontline workers. The development of systematic protocols and guides regarding trafficking throughout the government, which created a legal framework guiding prosecution and protection processes, clarified much of that confusion. Moreover, CPC

implementing partners carried out and monitored many actions specified in the National Plan, trained government staff, and contributed to ministry-specific trafficking policies. The resulting set of regulations improved coordination and government agencies' ability to implement more targeted and successful anti-child trafficking efforts, as described in other findings.

ILO continues to provide input into the implementation of the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030, which sets the stage for the next set of government actions aligned with the 3 Ps.

“The achievement of the approval of the National Policy, which is an important achievement for fighting trafficking, and for the country in general, constitutes a milestone of vital importance. We have a public policy that will be in force until the year 2030 and that also includes all the new methodology, structure, and design that establishes the parties responsible or guidelines, planning... and that has been made possible thanks to the support of the ILO.” - KII, Government Official, MINSA

ILO further contributed to developing regional trafficking plans and established a relationship with Peru's Supreme Judge to advocate for greater focus on TIP issues.

Finding 18: CPC implementing partners, GoP agencies, and other service providers took a collaborative, adaptive approach to providing effective, inclusive, and sustainable support for intended beneficiaries and partners.

CPC implementing partners, subrecipients, many government agencies, and frontline service providers were often committed to designing and implementing CPC-related activities in a collaborative way. This strengthened effectiveness and contributed to the sustainability of those activities.

“The community approach has been vital and I think it is something that should be assumed by the State. The other strategy has been to rely on actors that are not the Police, that are not the judges, that are not the Public Prosecutor's Office. Actors in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labor, that can provide opportunities to adolescents” - KII, Implementing Partner

Interviewees reported that working across sectors was necessary to accomplish the goals of the CPC Partnership. The CPC Partnership's capacity-strengthening and outreach strategy provided structured guidance and opportunities for effective collaboration and resource sharing across sectors.

“Community promoters who can be health promoters, educational promoters, APAFAS... Directors of educational institutions willing to develop books on trafficking in their schools, so to speak. They now have at least that guiding framework... And there are also grassroots social organizations, from women who are already organized to report on these issues. We have found those, let's say, these community organizations that are more linked to local governments as well.” - KII, NGO Staff

Further, the willingness of CPC implementing partners and their counterparts to work together flexibly, with activities tailored to the local context, enabled them to inclusively and sustainably support intended beneficiaries. This approach built buy-in and support for implementing partners' activities, including into the future. Government officials and frontline workers expressed strong interest in the continuance of CPC activities, even when they were unaware that activities were part of the CPC Partnership. That said, interviewees throughout the GoP expressed concern about the sustainability of some activities, including training, resource development, and coordination efforts. Interviewees noted that, as such activities end, and as CPC implementing partners wind down their projects, other actors will need to step up, whether through a new CPC Partnership or through direct GoP action.

Finding 19: Service providers continue to lack the skilled personnel and funding required to deliver programming to TIP-affected populations in more remote areas, address beneficiary needs during reintegration, and fulfill staffing needs at shelters.

Interviewees consistently reported that despite improvements, CPC programming still struggles to reach indigenous communities and rural areas.

“But I do believe in any case that the problem is in more remote areas. In other words, it could be that we arrive, for example, at places that are 6 hours, 7 hours, 2 hours from the capital, but in a more remote population, as always, state services no longer reach

there. Sometimes not even civil society organizations, so that is the biggest challenge we have in the country. Populations, for example, clearly Quechua or Aymara speakers or in communal places of Amazonian indigenous population.” - KII, NGO Staff

There also continue to be challenges with victim reintegration efforts. Despite structured programming that provides guidance on victims’ legal treatment and resources for assistance, respondents note that when victims complete treatment, they still may return to trafficking because of extreme poverty and the lack of reintegration services.

“We are very weak in the effective reintegration of the victim from an approach focused on improving their living conditions and reintegration into society. I believe that this should be improved in order to prevent the victim from being revictimized and falling back into trafficking networks. I think that is an important point, that we recognize the rights of the victim, a dignified life, a space where freedom of movement is required. We have to try to address the problem in a comprehensive way, of comprehensive protection of the victim.”-KII, Municipal Ombudsman

Respondents also believe that the magnitude of child trafficking issues in Peru surpasses the resources currently available for combating it. Many frontline workers are not prepared for the jobs they are expected to perform, and there are insufficient resources available to serve all victims in CARs, CAREs, and UPEs across the country.

Line of Inquiry 4: Context

Finding 20: Systemic socioeconomic factors, including deep poverty and the cultural normalization of child exploitation, negatively affected CPC programming.

Annex 10 provides an overview of the context of trafficking in the five regions of Peru and how this context shaped CPC activities. Extreme poverty and low socioeconomic standing, coupled with smaller government presence, less investment, and low education levels, can make rural communities more vulnerable to trafficking. According to interview respondents, when opportunities and state services are scant, children and their families are more easily lured by traffickers’ false promises of employment that turns out to be sex or labor trafficking.

Both CPC implementing partner staff and frontline workers found that rural areas and indigenous communities more commonly accept labor trafficking of children as a norm, rather than seeing it as a crime. Some interviewees note that victims' family members give them to traffickers who promise an education, a place to stay, and additional income. In other cases, parents working long hours leave children unsupervised to look for work, which can result in them being trafficked. Furthermore, adults who were trafficked for labor purposes as children fail to understand that what happened to them was a crime in need of prevention. Traditional gender roles in already vulnerable rural areas normalize boys going to work at a young age and girls being passive and obedient to men. Traditional gender norms can also lead families to reject LGBTQ+ children, driving this already marginalized community into perilous circumstances. These factors, when combined with other challenges described under Findings 3 and 5, meant that CPC implementing partners had less traction in rural areas.

“With the perpetrators, things are not black and white. At the end of the day, they are people who live with victims, who even have relationships. How do you approach this? She is the daughter, the niece... That's right. And that is very clear, for example, the normalization of this type of trafficking.” - KII, NGO Staff

Finding 21: Two ongoing crises—political turmoil within the executive branch and an influx of migrants from Venezuela—hindered the implementation of CPC implementing partner activities.

Political crises, including the dissolution of Congress in 2019, several interim presidencies, and a judicial corruption scandal, caused persistent turnover at high levels of government. This in turn drove staffing changes throughout ministries, agencies, and institutions. These changes hindered coordination, slowed approvals, reduced political buy-in, and made interagency coordination very difficult to initiate and sustain (see Finding 3).

The ongoing crisis in Venezuela likewise posed challenges. The resulting surge in migrants expanded the pool of potential trafficking victims and weakened border security, giving criminal networks from Venezuela easier access to Peru. As a result, the number of victims in need of protection in Peru currently exceeds available resources.

Conclusions

Conclusion 1. Close collaboration between the GoP, the U.S. Embassy, and the TIP Office facilitated the creation of CPC Partnership objectives and goals that aligned with Peru’s needs. These objectives and goals remained consistent throughout implementation, even in the face of significant challenges. (Associated Findings: 1, 3, 4, 21)

The GoP and the USG entered the CPC Partnership with the goal of strengthening existing efforts by the Peruvian government and civil society to address all forms of child trafficking in Peru. Both parties remained committed to and sustained the vision of the CPC Partnership, the signing of which coincided with the approval of the National Plan against the Trafficking of Persons 2017–2021. The CPC Partnership process—in both its design and implementation—was characterized by close collaboration between the GoP and the USG to assess needs and identify gaps within existing TIP infrastructure and work with CPC implementing partners and the MSC to allocate resources to address to those gaps.

In 2017, those designing the CPC Partnership and planning activities could not predict the significant challenges that would arise during the Partnership, including a global pandemic, political turmoil, and an influx of migrants from Venezuela. The three CPC implementing partners—ILO, Centro Yanapanakusun, and ABA-ROLI—all adjusted to these challenges (see Conclusion 3) but remained focused on the CPC Partnership’s three key objectives, with Centro Yanapanakusun concentrating mostly on preventing child trafficking, ABA-ROLI on supporting prosecution, and ILO on a combination of prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. CPC implementing partners sustained broad commitment to the Partnership’s objectives by prioritizing relationship building and facilitating open communication among relevant government ministries and agencies.

Conclusion 2. CPC implementing partner activities included training, awareness-raising efforts, and the development of protocols, guides, and policies that engaged government officials from various sectors. Most activities were implemented as originally designed, despite unforeseen challenges. (Associated Findings: 1, 2, 3)

While CPC Partnership activities were adapted in response to emerging challenges and opportunities, implementing partners did not stray from the priorities and strategies originally envisioned in their respective scopes of work. CPC implementing partners delivered activities to a range of groups and individuals across all 3 Ps (see Exhibit 2). Trainings were a major component of these activities. This included training judicial actors and law enforcement in TIP procedural knowledge and criminal investigations (prosecution), training law enforcement, judicial actors, health care workers, and municipal guards in identifying cases of child trafficking and providing victim-centered care at residential care centers (protection), and workshops for educators, journalists, and community leaders on how to raise awareness and identify victims (prevention).

CPC implementing partner activities also included strategies to raise awareness and build knowledge through resource development for various government ministries and their employees. Resources developed include guides for law enforcement detailing how to recognize and refer victims for legal assistance (prosecution); guidelines for relevant frontline workers to support victim reintegration and guides for victims themselves (protection); and awareness-raising resources targeted at community members, including adolescents and adults (prevention). Other awareness-raising efforts included activities such as school radio programming. Implementing partners also developed policies and protocols and worked to build relationships and facilitate coordination with government actors and community leaders across all 3 Ps.

Conclusion 3. CPC Implementing partners responded to emerging challenges (like the COVID-19 pandemic) and opportunities by moving programming online and investing in relationship building with key partners in a virtual environment to stay on track towards achieving CPC Partnership goals and activities. (Associated Findings: 3, 4, 5, 6, 18)

CPC implementing partners faced many challenges throughout the implementation of the Partnership. Ongoing political turmoil in the GoP, inconsistent buy-in from key government partners, the COVID-19 pandemic, and resource constraints all posed a variety of complications. Fortunately, from the start of the CPC, the TIP Office encouraged implementing partners to design context-sensitive activities and use monitoring, evaluation, and learning approaches to monitor the broader environment and collect evidence during implementation. Further, the TIP Office enjoyed collegial relationships with implementing partner staff, which made it easy to discuss challenges and potential adaptations. CPC implementing partners' strong relationship with the TIP Office, when combined with the strong, collaborative partnerships and coordination with key GoP officials that implementing partners had intentionally developed throughout the design and implementation of their projects, enabled them to adjust their planned activities by, for example, moving activities online. As a result, CPC implementing partners were able to make adaptations, capitalize on emerging opportunities, and stay on track for the achievement of CPC goals and objectives, even in the face of daunting challenges.

Conclusion 4. Since 2017, many GoP agencies have experienced improvements in their capacity to implement the 3 Ps. Coordination and collaboration across the anti-TIP community has also improved. CPC implementing partner activities contributed to these gains. (Associated Findings: 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)

In the years since the signing of the CPC Partnership, the capacity of anti-trafficking stakeholders to identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking cases, provide protection services, and prevent child trafficking has significantly improved. Collaboration and

coordination on anti-trafficking initiatives has also increased, as partners have learned more about processes, relevant actors, and to whom to refer cases at differing stages. CPC implementing partners played a key role in these improvements.

The skills-based training, toolkits, and other resources developed by implementing partners, especially ILO and ABA-ROLI, have strengthened the capacity of criminal justice system actors, such as police, prosecutors, and judges, to prosecute trafficking cases, and to coordinate with frontline service providers to deliver protection services. Specialized anti-trafficking units in the police and prosecutor's offices, when combined with the expansion of specialized protection units under MIMP, have further improved the quality of prosecutions and protection services. The collaborative development and implementation of protocols, guides, and regulations by CPC implementing partners and key GoP allies like MININTER and MINJUS have established best practices regarding the 3 Ps and equipped more stakeholders throughout the anti-TIP system—from prosecutors to CAR, CARE and UPE staff to schoolteachers—to apply those practices in their work. Finally, the campaigns and training developed by implementing partners have helped actors throughout Peru, including at the level of schools and communities in several intervention areas, understand trafficking as a problem and know how to take action against it.

Actors throughout the GoP played a key role in helping implementing partners achieve these successes. Officials in MININTER, MINJUS, and MIMP, as well as frontline service providers and NGO partners, all displayed a commitment to the goals of the CPC Partnership. By investing resources, time, and energy to facilitate coordination and collaboration across sectors, these stakeholders provided CPC implementing partners with the support they needed to keep moving forward. National and regional MSCs strengthened by the CPC Partnership further provided a platform for collaboration and coordinated action, helping to harmonize practice and action against child trafficking across the 3 Ps.

Conclusion 5. Despite observed improvements, child trafficking remains a serious problem in Peru. Throughout the country, and especially outside of Lima, the broader socioeconomic

context, persistent capacity and resource gaps, and systemic factors mean that child trafficking remains common, and prevention and protection services are limited. (Associated Findings: 11, 12, 19, 20, 21)

Despite gains made under the CPC Partnership, child trafficking is still an issue in Peru for a variety of reasons, including the broader Peruvian socioeconomic context, the limitations of existing anti-trafficking initiatives, and systemic factors such as turmoil in the executive branch and the Venezuelan migrant crisis.

For those families and children whose economic survival relies on working in challenging conditions, the lines between “work” and “exploitation” may be unclear, especially when there is a lack of knowledge about trafficking practices and few resources with which to address and report trafficking. Relatedly, public service delivery in rural areas is often minimal. The absence of a strong government presence can make detecting and preventing child trafficking challenging, and compound obstacles to capacity-strengthening and service provision efforts.

These challenges are even more pressing because, despite improvements, not all government officials and service providers in the fight against child trafficking have the knowledge, capacity, and resources to effectively prosecute and prevent trafficking and provide services to victims. Coordination across sectors and levels of government could still improve. Some officials and service providers still lack adequate training and guidance to help victims navigate the protection system, with reintegration efforts a particular challenge. There is no centralized, systematic data on child trafficking in Peru, making resourcing and directing coordinated anti-trafficking initiatives difficult. CPC implementing partners made inroads against these obstacles, but a dearth of skilled personnel and resource constraints prevented them from progressing further. Government officials and frontline workers likewise consistently cited funding gaps as a hindrance to both achieving and sustaining CPC Partnership objectives.

Ongoing political turmoil in the Peruvian government also diverted resources from anti-trafficking initiatives, reducing buy-in and contributing to coordination challenges. The influx of migrants from Venezuela increased the pool of potential child trafficking victims along the border, and in Lima, stretched resources and complicated efforts to identify and provide services to victims.

The confluence of these factors means that, in many communities across Peru, child trafficking remains prevalent. Protection services are inconsistent and at times absent. Prevention efforts appear comparatively under-resourced, meaning that the root causes of child trafficking remain somewhat unaffected. Making further progress to reduce child trafficking and sustainably institutionalizing the 3 Ps approach throughout Peru would require better-resourced, longer-term efforts, with a particular focus on prevention.

Recommendations

The following recommendations translate the findings and conclusions presented above into actions that the USG, GoP, and others working to reduce child trafficking might take to strengthen their work in Peru and beyond. Recommendations for the USG to consider concerning future CPC Partnerships are first, followed by recommendations for the GoP and others working to address child trafficking in Peru.

Recommendations for the USG

Recommendation 1. The TIP Office and USG colleagues should continue to encourage government and CPC implementing partners to analyze the root causes of child trafficking, and develop programming that aims to drive sustainable changes in behavior and social norms. (Associated Conclusions: 4, 5)

Despite the successes achieved by the CPC Partnership, child trafficking remains a serious issue in Peru. In many cases community members, frontline service providers, actors throughout the judicial system, and even TIP victims themselves struggle to recognize child trafficking. The absence of comprehensive protective services in many parts of the country compounds these deficits and means that child trafficking victims often fail to get the support and protection they need. These challenges are rooted in deep, systemic factors, including prevailing social norms and economic disparities. Sustainably addressing and shifting such root causes over time requires programming that enables key stakeholders to target the drivers of human trafficking, including behaviors and norms. In future CPC Partnerships, the **TIP Office** and colleagues in the USG should therefore facilitate and encourage the use of root-cause analysis and behavior change approaches. In practice, this might entail:

- Lengthening timeframes for anti-child trafficking work, such that implementing partners and other key stakeholders can pursue their goals until they achieve defined targets,

even if that takes longer than five years. In Peru, the newly approved National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030 provides a platform for longer-term work, but it needs an assigned budget at both national and regional levels to ensure full implementation. Building long-term funding plans into future TIP Office programming, such that partner governments and/or other stakeholders can think about and secure resourcing needs, including beyond the timeframe sponsored by the TIP Office specifically, could also be useful.

- Facilitating even more flexible program designs that task implementing partners with achieving collaboratively defined goals and associated targets based on an analysis of the drivers of child trafficking, with activities and outputs far less prescribed.
- Continuing to fund local actors, embedded in local systems, who have the knowledge, connections, skills, and incentives to pursue problem-driven, context-sensitive, targeted anti-TIP work capable of shifting social norms, and affecting the behavior of target groups. This could take the form of including more civil society actors within regional MSCs, and increasing coordination between these commissions and like-minded networks with strong regional presence in areas key to fighting trafficking, such as, in Peru, the Coordination Mesas (regional bodies comprised of local actors from various sectors that are focused on combating poverty).
- Considering how to support anti-poverty programming, as fighting trafficking and poverty are complementary, to reduce one of the key drivers of child trafficking.
- Continuing to foster collaborative and open relationships with implementing partners, facilitating frank and open conversation around challenges faced and lessons learned, and encouraging partners to thoughtfully adapt activities and programs when warranted.

Recommendations for the Government of Peru and Organizations Working to Address Child Trafficking in Peru

Recommendation 2. Those working to combat child trafficking in Peru—the GoP, implementing partners, and funders—should develop, maintain, and leverage collaborative relationships with key partners throughout the design and implementation of anti-trafficking programs within the framework of the National Policy against Trafficking in Persons and [related] forms of exploitation by 2030. (Associated Conclusions: 1, 2, 4)

Coordination, collaboration, and strong relationships were essential to the successes achieved under the CPC Partnership, making CPC programming more resilient, strengthening the GoP's commitment to combating trafficking, and contributing to the development of policies, plans, and guides on trafficking issues, as well as resources and training, that streamlined and systematized anti-TIP practices. Despite such advances, significant issues with coordination persist that jeopardize the institutionalization of CPC Partnership successes. To address remaining coordination gaps and increase the sustainability of CPC efforts, those working to address child trafficking should redouble their efforts to strengthen coordinated, collaborative action.

The **GoP** should work to strengthen coordination efforts in several ways:

- Decentralize the newly approved National Policy against Trafficking by replacing expiring regional plans with newly updated regional policies grounded in national priorities, assigning both the national and regional plans with specific budgets, and including indicators that go beyond policies and procedures to include results and outcomes. At the same time, regional and municipal government actors need to try to increase awareness of the National Policy against Trafficking.

- Shifting TIP responsibilities from political appointees to career officials and ensuring TIP onboarding is a priority for new staff members would help ensure that CPC efforts remain resilient to staff turnover and political crises. At the same time, GoP officials should meet with newly elected regional government officials to ensure that they support the fight against child trafficking, and to secure commitments to incorporate CPC actions in their governing agenda
- Taking action to reduce turnover among frontline health care workers, judges, police, and prosecutors—by, for example, increasing pay and/or improving benefits—may help increase the sustainability of CPC efforts. While evaluation data offer no consensus as to the reasons for turnover among these crucial positions, better understanding and addressing turnover could be useful.

CPC **implementing partners** should continue focusing on relationships and capacity strengthening with government partners and on codifying training sessions into permanent online or print resources sustained by the government. These efforts would help build the GoP's ownership of the anti-child trafficking movement, make it easier to onboard new officials, and mitigate the negative effects of government turnover.

Funders and others supporting the GoP and implementing partners in Peru, for their part, can strengthen and complement coordination efforts by facilitating even more multistakeholder collaboration during design processes, ensuring that program designs contain collaboratively selected, outcome-level milestones and measures, and extending the timelines for anti-TIP programming.

Recommendation 3. The GoP and key partners in civil society should build on the promising community-based approaches undertaken as part of the CPC Partnership, and work with regional multisectoral commissions to further expand prevention-focused programming, especially beyond Lima and in rural areas. (Associated Conclusions: 2, 3, 4, 5)

Despite advances in CPC-related objectives, prevention continues to be the pillar of the CPC in most need of strengthening and expansion. While Centro Yanapanakusun made clear progress bringing in and educating stakeholders in matters of prevention in Cusco, longer term challenges persist in creating a culture conducive to the protection of child trafficking victims, particularly among communities conditioned to not view human rights violations as exploitation. Though the CPC Partnership focused on the five regions most vulnerable to trafficking in Peru, most prevention efforts were concentrated in Cusco and the project struggled to reach rural areas. Stronger, more widespread prevention efforts at a community level would reduce trafficking at the source and protect potential victims. Increasing the priority given to prevention within the work of national and regional MSCs is essential to closing this gap.

The **GoP** and its partners in **civil society** should consider the community-focused, consultative intervention implemented by Centro Yanapanakusun a model for expanding CPC Partnership prevention efforts to other regions and equipping key service providers—school staff, principals, community leaders, and others—to identify and take action against child trafficking. In practice, this might mean partnering with NGOs—and/or public entities, including regional MSCs—already active in vulnerable regions such as Loreto, Puno, and Madre de Dios, that have a strong local presence, particularly in rural and Indigenous communities, to adapt the training, tools, and workshops developed and implemented by Centro Yanapanakusun. The GoP and partners would need to adjust these activities and materials to reflect the dynamics and reality of trafficking in those regions, using language and concepts that make the messaging more easily received among communities where trafficking may be normalized. These future prevention efforts should emphasize the wider implications of trafficking, particularly its effects on victims, the social fabric, and the communities themselves, rather than focus solely on punitive consequences for engaging in trafficking.

Recommendation 4. Organizations in Peru working to combat child trafficking should—in collaboration with local bodies like regional multisectoral commissions—intentionally

integrate practices that support evidence-based, opportunistic decision-making, such as context monitoring, careful engagement with local networks and partners, and reflection and learning moments, into their programming. (Associated Conclusions: 2, 3)

CPC implementing partners consistently engaged in evidence-based, opportunistic decision-making. They did so in various ways. First, their program designs incorporated a deep understanding of local contexts and paid special attention to the capacity of actors involved in prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. Second, CPC implementing partners engaged, strengthened, and in some cases even helped to develop local networks of community members, community leaders, health care professionals, judicial actors, and others who could provide context-specific updates and suggestions on their programs. Third, CPC implementing partners regularly made space for intentional reflection and learning during implementation.

In the future, **organizations and others working to address child trafficking** in Peru should redouble the use of these and similar practices. Specifically, such organizations should build on lessons from the CPC Partnership, and carefully engage local partners—including regional MSCs and other existing anti-trafficking networks—in program design, and to assess the extent of awareness and knowledge of child trafficking-related issues among key community members and service providers at the local, regional, and sector levels. Implementing organizations should then, in collaboration with their local partners, regularly monitor whether and how the capacity of targeted stakeholders is changing during implementation, and be ready to adapt resources and trainings to respond to persistent capacity gaps. This would inform programming adjustments that better suit the needs of the populations they aim to serve. Implementing partners should also systematically monitor the broader contexts in which they are working, in order to proactively identify and plan responses to potential challenges—like political turmoil, migrant crises, and pandemics—that affect the broader trafficking landscape.

Careful application of such grounded, context-informed monitoring approaches, when combined with regular opportunities for program staff to work with partners, including donors,

to pause, reflect, and identify lessons and challenges, could enable implementing partners to actively and transparently engage in dialogue with key stakeholders, and adapt programming according to shifting needs.

Image Descriptions

Exhibit 2. Summary of implementing partner activities. Supporting data table:

Implementing Partner	Prosecution-focused activity category	Protection-focused activity category	Prevention-focused activity category	Target geographies	Key partners/targets of activities
ILO and subrecipients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training sessions • Protocols / guides / policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training sessions • Protocols / guides / policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training sessions • Awareness-raising activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lima • Cusco • Loreto • Puno • Madre de Dios 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Office of Ombudsman • MINEDU • MPFN • UPEs and CARE (MIMP) • MIMP • Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (Patrol Guards and Municipal Inspectors) • MOI/MININTER • MFA • MINJUS • Judiciary Branch • National Police of Peru • Journalists

Implementing Partner	Prosecution-focused activity category	Protection-focused activity category	Prevention-focused activity category	Target geographies	Key partners/targets of activities
Centro Yanapanakusun			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training sessions • Protocols / guides / policies • Awareness-raising activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cusco • Cusco Region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cusco UGELs • Cusco Night Schools (teachers, directors, and psychologists) • Community members (parents, adolescents, Indigenous youth) • MOI/MININTER
ABA-ROLI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training sessions 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Puno • Madre de Dios 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MFPN (lawyers, psychologists, social assistants) • Police officers and fiscals specialized in oral litigation • MOI/MININTER

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Exhibit 3. Challenges faced and adaptations made by implementing partners:

- COVID-19 pandemic
 - Pivot to online programming
 - Additional coordination efforts
- High turnover and lack of consistent buy-in
 - Build/leverage relationships
- Resource constraints

- Opportunistic focus on capacity building and efficiency

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Exhibit 4. Summary of changes in capacity and contributing factors. Supporting data table:

Stakeholder group	Observed change in capacity	Contributing factors
Peruvian National Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigate/prosecute trafficking cases in line with best practices • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Creation of new infrastructure and dedicated units • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking • Stronger coordination and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Resource allocations • Protocols, guides, etc.
Public Prosecutor's Office (MPFN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigate/prosecute trafficking cases in line with best practices • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking • Stronger coordination and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Resource allocations • Protocols, guides, etc.
Ministry of Justice (MINJUS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Protocols, guides, etc.
Ministry of Interior (MININTER)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking • Stronger coordination and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Protocols, guides, etc. • MSC actions
Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Creation of new infrastructure and dedicated units • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking • Stronger coordination and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Protocols, guides, etc. • MSC actions
Ministry of Health (MINSA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Protocols, guides, etc.

Stakeholder group	Observed change in capacity	Contributing factors
Frontline service providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Resource allocations • Protocols, guides, etc.
CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking • Stronger coordination and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MSC actions • Awareness-raising campaigns
Community members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify/refer victims/provide differentiated services • Improved understanding and awareness of child trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Protocols, guides, etc. • Awareness-raising campaigns

[\[Return to Exhibit 4\]](#)