Country Reports on Terrorism 2022

BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.
For More Information

The Human Rights Report

Significant human rights issues influenced the state of terrorist activity in many countries in this report, which may have impeded effective counterterrorism policies and programs or supported causes and conditions for further violence. Such human rights issues included, among others, unlawful and arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention (all of the preceding by both government and nonstate actors); harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; violence against and unjustified arrests of journalists; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; widespread and pervasive corruption; repression of religious freedom and violence against religious minorities; and forced and bonded labor.


The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes regarding many of the countries in this report, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: https://www.state.gov/2022-international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/
Foreword

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States established a strong and sophisticated counterterrorism enterprise to reduce the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks on the homeland. More than 20 years later, the terrorist threats we currently face are more ideologically and geographically diffuse. At the same time, the United States is confronting a diverse and dynamic range of other national security challenges, including strategic competition, cybersecurity threats, and climate change.

To tackle evolving and emerging terrorist threats within the context of broader national security priorities, the United States inaugurated a new counterterrorism policy, shifting from a U.S.-led, military-centric approach to one that prioritizes diplomacy, partner capacity building, and prevention. Striking a new balance between military and civilian counterterrorism efforts recognizes the need to deploy the full range of counterterrorism (CT) tools and ensures a more sustainable whole-of-government and whole-of-society CT approach with allies and partners around the world.

In 2022, under this new framework, the United States and its partners continued to succeed against terrorist organizations, bolstering diplomatic and multilateral engagements and partner capacity building efforts. Through U.S. leadership, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Defeat-ISIS) raised more than $440 million in stabilization pledges – including a U.S. pledge of $107 million – to support infrastructure and other critical projects in Iraq and northeastern Syria. In November the United States and the United Kingdom co-hosted a donors’ conference with 14 governments, and with numerous UN and humanitarian organizations, to discuss steps to improve the security and humanitarian conditions at the al-Hol displaced persons camp in northeast Syria.

The Department of State led Defeat-ISIS’s renewed focus on countering ISIS branches across Africa. In 2022 the Coalition welcomed Benin as its 85th member and 13th member from sub-Saharan Africa. In March, Defeat-ISIS’s Africa Focus Group (AFFG), established in 2021 to address the growing ISIS threat in sub-Saharan Africa, convened its first working-level meeting in Rome and met again in May on the margins of the Defeat-ISIS ministerial. In October the AFFG co-chairs of Morocco, Niger, Italy, and the United States met in Niamey to identify programmatic gaps and deconflict existing partner efforts in the region. The AFFG will continue to utilize existing coordination mechanisms and enhance African members’ counterterrorism capacities.

In May the Department of State, in partnership with the Department of Justice, launched the first-ever Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum (CTLEF) to improve information sharing and international coordination to counter racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE). The CTLEF, which was co-hosted by the United States and the Government of Germany, brought more than 100 criminal justice practitioners, financial regulators, and security professionals from over 30 countries and multilateral organizations to Berlin. The inaugural meeting increased the United States and our partners’ collective understanding of REMVE networks, groups, and individuals, including transnational links between and among REMVE actors.
Despite key counterterrorism successes, terrorist groups remained resilient and determined to attack. ISIS maintained an enduring global enterprise, promoting a large-scale terrorism campaign across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. While the death of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in February marked an important milestone against the terrorist group, ISIS remained capable of conducting large-scale attacks. In 2022, ISIS maintained a significant underground operational structure and conducted terrorist operations throughout Iraq and Syria. An estimated 10,000 ISIS fighters, including 1,800 Iraqis and 2,000 ISIS fighters from outside Syria and Iraq, also remained in detention facilities controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Additionally, 18,000 Syrians, 26,000 Iraqis, and roughly 10,000 third-country nationals from more than 60 countries remain in al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps in northeast Syria. In West Africa, ISIS affiliates increasingly expanded across borders and coordinated asymmetric attacks, including a July prison break near the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. ISIS expanded its recruitment and operations across key locales, growing its global network to approximately 20 branches and affiliates.

In 2022, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates remained resilient and determined, even following the death of leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July. Senior al-Qa'ida leaders continued to oversee a global network to target the United States and U.S. interests, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. In East Africa, al-Shabaab (AS) sustained de facto control over significant portions of south-central Somalia. AS also maintained its capability to conduct high-profile attacks in the region, including against U.S. citizens and infrastructure, and aspired to coordinate attacks against the U.S. homeland and Europe. In West Africa, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) intensified attacks in the Sahel, increasingly threatening capital cities and U.S. embassies in the region, and expanded operations in the northern border regions of Coastal West Africa.

In Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida elements, ISIS, and regionally focused terrorist groups remained active in the country. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continued to conduct terrorist attacks against Afghan civilians, particularly members of the Shia community, and the Taliban. In 2022, ISIS-K conducted cross-border attacks in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and maintained ambitions to attack the West. Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, particularly al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent, also remained intent — but lacked the capability — to directly attack the United States from Afghanistan. While the Taliban committed to preventing terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to conduct attacks against the United States and its allies, its ability to prevent al-Qa’ida elements, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and ISIS-K from mounting external operations remained unclear. The Taliban hosted and sheltered al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul before his death in a U.S. airstrike on July 30, 2022.

Iran continued to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities around the world. In 2022, Iran increasingly encouraged and plotted attacks against the United States, including against former U.S. officials, in retaliation for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani. In August an Iran-based IRGC member was charged with attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor. Regionally, Iran
supported acts of terrorism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through proxies and partner groups such as Hizballah and al-Ashtar Brigades. Globally, the IRGC-QF and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran’s primary actors involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plotting across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America.

**Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism constituted a growing, transnational threat to the United States and U.S. allies.** Violent white supremacists and anti-government, accelerationist, and like-minded individuals continued to promote violent extremist narratives, recruit new adherents, raise funds, and conduct terrorist activities in the United States and worldwide. The October 12 shooting at an LGBTQI+ bar in Slovakia, which left two persons dead and one injured, demonstrated how individuals can be inspired by U.S.-based REMVE attacks and the broader REMVE movement. The perpetrator posted an online so-called manifesto that pointed to previous REMVE attacks worldwide, including the recent U.S.-based attacks in Buffalo, New York, and El Paso, Texas, and the 2019 attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, and Poway, California.

**As terrorist threats morphed and metastasized, the United States adapted its counterterrorism approach and marshalled international efforts to counter global terrorism.** The United States prioritized multilateral engagements to advance U.S. counterterrorism priorities, bolster partner capacity to implement international obligations and commitments, and promote greater burden sharing.

**In 2022 the Department of State provided more than $16 million in FY 2021 foreign assistance funding to support an array of United Nations counterterrorism capacity building efforts implemented by members of the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Compact.** To maintain international momentum on the use of battlefield evidence to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases, the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) — supported through U.S. funding in 2022 — trained more than 450 criminal justice practitioners on critical issues such as REMVE, battlefield evidence, counterterrorism prosecutions, mutual legal assistance, and juvenile justice. In September, our Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau partnered with the IIJ to convene a dialogue regarding battlefield evidence from Afghanistan. The event brought together 50 military, law enforcement, and criminal justice practitioners and policymakers from the United States, the European Union, and select countries to discuss practical steps for successfully sharing and using battlefield evidence to enhance broader security and support criminal justice proceedings and international accountability efforts.

The Department of State co-led the U.S. delegation to the first in-person meeting of the Heads of Delegation G-7 Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime since 2019. The group’s dialogue focused on addressing issues such as REMVE and the situation in Afghanistan, and emerging threats such as voluntary foreign fighters, the use of unmanned aerial systems for terrorist purposes, and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The United States also leveraged other multilateral organizations, such as NATO, INTERPOL, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Council of Europe, and Hedayah to advance these issues.

Additionally, the United States continued to bolster partner capabilities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks. The CT Bureau and the Terrorist Screening Center continued to explore new and expanded information sharing arrangements under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6) with foreign partners that allow the United States and these HSPD-6 partners to exchange terrorist screening information to identify known and suspected terrorists. These efforts also improve compliance with UN Security Council resolution 2396, which includes international obligations for countries to screen for and collect information to prevent terrorist travel and strengthen border security. As of the end of 2022, the Department of State’s comprehensive border system, PISCES, was deployed in 23 countries, providing real-time border security for partners across the globe. In 2022, the CT Bureau completed 21 visits to foreign partners to conduct system updates, reduced the support backlog resulting from COVID-19 travel restrictions, and continued to reconstitute the PISCES program at ports of entry in Yemen. Two new countries — Colombia and Eswatini — signed a Memorandum of Intent in 2022 to establish PISCES programs in their countries.

Another major effort in 2022 was facilitating the repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and, where appropriate, prosecution of ISIS foreign terrorist fighters and family members. To ensure that ISIS fighters and family members captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) never return to the battlefield, the United States continued to lead by example in bringing back its citizens and prosecuting them when applicable. As of 2022 the United States has repatriated a total of 39 U.S. citizens from Syria and Iraq. In 2022 the CT Coordinator also served as the Defeat-ISIS Detainee Coordinator and established the al-Hol Working Group to coordinate the United States’ effort to address the security and humanitarian crisis in al-Hol displaced persons camp and detention facilities in northeast Syria. Additionally, in 2022, more than 3,000 fighters and family members were repatriated to 14 different countries of origin — more than 2020 and 2021 combined. The CT Bureau worked closely with the SDF and partner governments, as well as with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Defense and the intelligence community, on these engagements.

The United States continued to promote a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach to prevent and counter violent extremism (CVE) by engaging with governments, local religious leaders, and tech companies. In October the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF) launched its replenishment campaign. Through this campaign, GCERF raised more than $75 million to provide alternatives for millions of people directly at risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence, and to build a safety net among 10 million other people in their communities. Since its inception, GCERF has expanded its work to more than 20 countries and has raised more than $160 million from 18 government partners. With CT Bureau funding support, GCERF will look to expand programming to countries in Central Asia, Mozambique, and Coastal West Africa with a concentration on rehabilitation and reintegration, digital literacy programming, and countering terrorist radicalization.
The Strong Cities Network (SCN) grew to more than 160 cities around the world, with 10 new members in 2022. These included the Slovak cities of Bratislava and Žilina in April, which became the first SCN members from Central and Eastern Europe. In November the network also launched a Western Balkans Regional Hub, which aims to engage more municipalities in the region on CVE efforts within their respective communities.

Finally, the United States continued to support the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online (CCTA), an international partnership involving governments, private sector technology companies, and civil society organizations to address terrorism and violent extremist content online. In October, CT Bureau supported U.S. participation in the 2022 CCTA Leaders’ Summit, closely coordinating with the White House and interagency partners to engage with governments, tech companies, and civil society in the forum’s workstreams to better ensure that online platforms are not exploited for terrorist or violent extremist purposes, while respecting our commitments to human rights such as freedom of expression and an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable internet.

This constitutes a brief overview of the United States’ ongoing work to protect our people and our allies from the threat of terrorism. The Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 provides a detailed review of last year’s successes and the ongoing challenges facing our country and our partners — challenges that will require a continued commitment to and investment in global counterterrorism efforts going forward.
## Members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

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Chapter 1. Country Reports on Terrorism

AFRICA

Overview

Terrorist groups primarily aligned with al-Qa’ida and ISIS conducted attacks against civilian infrastructure and civilians, including humanitarian workers and government personnel, as well as against security forces. These attacks resulted in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the capture and destruction of property across Sub-Saharan Africa during 2022. Terrorists routinely manipulated intercommunal disputes by supporting longstanding claims against other groups to gain support for terrorist operations. These actors continued to attack military outposts; attack civil servants and politicians; attack churches, mosques, and schools; and kidnap or attack foreign nationals, including humanitarian workers. African countries, as well as regional and multinational organizations, sustained counterterrorism efforts against terrorist groups with varying degrees of success throughout 2022.

In East Africa, Somalia and its partners increased pressure on al-Qa’ida-affiliate al-Shabaab in central Somalia, although the group retained the ability to mobilize substantial financial resources and launch coordinated and often coordinated attacks on civilians, government personnel and facilities, and security forces, including Somali and African Union peace support operations. ISIS-linked fighters in East Africa continued to conduct small-scale local attacks. In Central Africa, ISIS-linked fighters conducted attacks primarily against civilians and security forces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the Lake Chad region, ISIS-West Africa and (to a lesser extent) Boko Haram continued to conduct attacks primarily in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.

In the Sahel region, terrorist groups continued their operations in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and expanded into Coastal West Africa, primarily into Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. These groups included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and ISIS-Sahel — formerly known as ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) before rebranding in 2022. In Southern Africa, ISIS-linked fighters continued operations in northern Mozambique, and ISIS-linked facilitation networks continued alleged activity in South Africa.

The United States continued to support partners across affected regions of Sub-Saharan Africa in their efforts to build counterterrorism capacity in areas such as aviation and border security, improving regional security forces, countering terrorist finance, advancing criminal justice sector reforms, and training and mentoring of law enforcement to manage crisis response and conduct investigations. African partners continued to undertake efforts to develop and expand regional cooperation mechanisms, but these efforts often were stymied by political and security instability.
BURKINA FASO

Overview: The number of terrorist attacks in 2022 surpassed the total number from 2021. ISIS-Sahel, formerly known as ISIS-GS, and the al-Qa‘ida-affiliated JNIM operate in Burkina Faso. According to open-source reporting, JNIM carried out more than 400 total attacks across 10 of the 13 regions in Burkina Faso in 2022.

Both JNIM and ISIS-Sahel increased attacks against civilians, with 2022 recording a significantly higher number of civilian casualties, per public data. Methods included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, targeted assassinations, and targeted critical infrastructure attacks on cell phone towers, the water supply, and government offices. The Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, Est, Centre-Est and Boucle du Mouhoun Regions experienced the greatest impact of violent extremist organization (VEO) activity.

U.S. bilateral security assistance for the Government of Burkina Faso is restricted, as a result of the January coup d’état.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorists carried out dozens of attacks throughout Burkina Faso in 2022 against civilians, including humanitarian workers and community leaders, and against defense and security forces. Multiple mass casualty events occurred, including instances of specifically targeting civilians, using ambushes and IEDs.

- On March 13, VEOs ambushed a group of gendarmes responding to an IED attack northeast of Kaya (Centre-Nord Region), killing at least 13 and wounding five.
- During June 9-11, VEOs attacked Seytenga (Sahel Region), killing 11 police and at least 100 civilians, primarily men.
- On July 4, armed assailants killed at least 22 civilians during an attack in Kossi province (Boucle du Mouhoun Region).
- On September 6, 37 civilians were killed and another 37 wounded when a vehicle transporting supplies and passengers hit an IED near the towns of Djibo and Bourzanga (Sahel Region).
- On September 26, 10 civilians and 27 soldiers were killed in Gaskindé (Sahel Region) during an ambush on a supply convoy bound for Djibo.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The state of emergency declared in six regions and 14 provinces since 2019 remained in effect through 2022. In June, former transition president Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba established two military “zones of interest,” requiring civilians to vacate them. In October, Transition President Capt. Ibrahim Traore announced a recruitment effort to add 50,000 civilian defense volunteers to assist government forces in combating terrorism. The country’s specialized military counterterrorism capabilities nest within the army’s Special Forces. Both the National Gendarmerie and the National Police have their respective specialized law enforcement counterterrorism units, proficient in crisis response and rural border patrol capabilities. The Brigade Spéciale des Investigations
**Antiterroristes** (or BSIAT) is Burkina Faso’s hybrid police-gendarmerie unit charged with handling terrorism investigations and referring cases to the counterterrorism court for prosecution. There were no terrorism trials in 2022.

Approximately 15 out of 21 fixed border posts installed at the land border crossings remain operational. Immigration border police have access to systems to conduct, analyze, and store biometric enrollment for travelers. Burkina Faso’s border with Côte d’Ivoire remained officially closed throughout 2022.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Burkina Faso is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa and its Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Financial Information Processing Unit-Burkina Faso (or CENTIF-BF), is a member of the Egmont Group. Burkina Faso remained on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported Burkina Faso took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime, including by adopting and implementing follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions in its national strategy, conducting targeted financial sanctions awareness-raising programs, and strengthening efforts to pursue confiscation as a policy objective.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In March, then-Transition President Lt. Col. Damiba announced the establishment of Local Dialogues for the Restoration of Peace, aimed at bringing local leaders and low-level VEO members together to resolve conflicts. This was an expansion of an initiative begun by former-President Kaboré. Current Transition President Traoré has discontinued the initiative, noting, “We can’t negotiate our values.” Damiba also publicly pushed efforts for deradicalization to violence and touted a government center to receive and reintegrate former violent extremist fighters, while Traoré has been silent on those efforts.

**International and Regional Cooperation**
- **G-5 Sahel:** Burkina Faso is part of the G-5 Sahel, along with Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. The group’s effectiveness has been called into question after Mali’s withdrawal in May.

- **Accra Initiative:** In November, the member states decided to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force with 10,000 troops. Burkina Faso has not stated whether or how it would work together with that force.

- **ECOWAS:** Following the January coup, Burkina was suspended from full participation in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) until elections are held, currently envisioned for mid-2024. ECOWAS announced the development of a regional peacekeeping force in December.
Overview: Government of Cameroon (GRC) military commanders described the situation in the Far North (FN) Region as relatively calm, compared with 2020 and 2021, during a security briefing in October reported by the media. However, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project indicated that Boko Haram and ISIS affiliates were involved in an estimated 425 terrorist attacks in 2022, compared with about 350 in 2021, representing a 21 percent increase. NGOs working in the region also reported a comparable number of terrorist incidents in 2022, and anecdotal reporting from civilians indicated continued significant terrorist activity in the FN Region. The GRC continued to not distinguish between Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), attributing all terrorist attacks to Boko Haram. Yet both organizations conducted attacks, according to multiple credible sources.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attacks took place mainly in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari Divisions. According to media, security officers described assaults as uncoordinated and predatory, maintaining that criminal behavior more than ideology drove the attacks. ISIS-WA maintained a strong presence in Lake Chad and regularly attacked villagers in Logone-et-Chari. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that as of August there had been an annual increase of 2 percent in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), bringing the total in the FN Region to more than 385,000 — with 88 percent of internal displacements attributed to terrorist activity.

In May, residents of Tourou, Mayo-Tsanaga, protested at the FN governor’s office about the frequent attacks, claiming the violence forced them to spend their nights in the hills, leading many to abandon their villages. They blamed the attacks on a reduced military presence in the FN and the dismantling of border security posts, which facilitated the entry of terrorists from Nigeria. Media outlets claimed vigilance committee members continued to abandon their roles owing to lack of governmental support.

Hundreds of ex-combatants continued to join the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Transit center in Meri, FN, where living conditions remained poor. Despite the center’s growing numbers, the government offered little vocational training and did not initiate formal reintegration. Some residents reported they had been at the center for more than three years.

Countering terrorist threats remained a top security priority for the GRC, which continued to work with the United States to improve the capacity of its security forces. The GRC maintained cooperation with the international community on counterterrorism initiatives; through the Multinational Joint Task Force, the army implemented “Operation Lake Sanity” from March to June, resulting in the killing of 800 terrorists. Cameroon remained a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
2022 Terrorist Incidents: Incidents included raids in search of supplies, ambushes, indiscriminate killings, targeted murders, beheadings, abductions, arsons, and lootings against civilians and security personnel. A representative sample follows:

- On February 23, Boko Haram terrorists killed three civilians during a raid in Koza.
- On May 30, Boko Haram terrorists from Nigeria set fire to a military post in Hitawa, Tourou, and killed three soldiers and four civilians.
- On July 2, ISIS-WA terrorists burned down a hospital in Mada, killing one security guard.
- On August 22, ISIS-WA terrorists kidnapped 20 fishermen in Hile-Alifa, Logone-et-Chari.
- On October 10, Boko Haram terrorists killed four civilians during a siege of Mokolo.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Representatives from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of External Relations, and the National Magistrate School drafted a revision of the 2014 antiterrorism law, which was submitted to MOJ and MOD leadership for consideration. Among other changes, the revision proposed a narrower definition of terrorism acts.

Countering Financing of Terrorism: Cameroon is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC). Its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the National Agency for Financial Investigation, is a member of the Egmont Group. In March, Cameroon completed its GABAC mutual evaluation, which noted that while the country has a good understanding of the high money laundering and terrorist financing risks it was facing, it lacked an authority responsible for coordinating national Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism policies.

Countering Violent Extremism: In July, FN Governor Midjiyawa Barkary launched a $2.5 million project financed by WHO and the IOM to promote peace and counter violent extremism. The project built the capacity of 15 health committees that support dialogue within communities and coordinate vocational training programs, economic reinforcement, and capacity building for vulnerable groups, ex-combatants, IDPs, local authorities, and staff at DDR centers.

The National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee approved a five-year strategy focused on gender-based violence, stigmatization, and women’s needs to promote women’s engagement in the DDR process.

The government adopted a $10 million budget to implement the Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project (PROLAC) in areas affected by terrorism. PROLAC constructed boreholes, provided improved seedlings and logistical support to farmers, and established national identification cards for 5,000 people in Logone-et-Chari.

Military engineers used funding from the French Development Agency to construct 150 classrooms in 46 localities affected by terrorism in the FN. The project aimed to facilitate the return and reinsertion of IDPs to their original communities.
The Inclusive Economic and Social Recovery Program for Lake Chad (RESILAC) continued to reinforce resilience and promote social cohesion by creating employment and supporting apprenticeships and entrepreneurship for communities affected by terrorism. RESILAC’s first phase, which ended in 2022, benefited 32,965 people within Dargala, Koza, Mindif, and Mora in the FN.

During a three-day workshop organized in August by Plan International, 50 youth leaders identified strategies and actions to promote peaceful coexistence within communities. The training was part of the Lake Chad Regional Stabilization Strategy, which intends to build resilience in zones where youths are vulnerable to ISIS-WA and Boko Haram.

In February and March, the Commonwealth Countering Violent Extremism Unit organized a series of workshops in Yaoundé. The sessions focused on the role of government in CVE, explored the relationship between gender and violent extremism, and provided capacity building on prevention through education.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Cameroon continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the international community, contributing significantly to operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force.

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**CHAD**

**Overview:** Chad has experienced persistent terrorist threats in the border areas near population centers surrounding Lake Chad and suffered five attacks against military and civilian targets in 2022 in the Lake and neighboring Hadjer-Lamis regions. Boko Haram (BH) continued using IEDs in the Lake Chad region, but more often carried out raids with semiautomatic rifles. BH and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) maintained minimal presence in Chad, with BH conducting the most activity within Chad.

Security forces and basic government services remained underresourced, which limited the Chadian government’s ability to address all security concerns, but Chadian armed forces led missions within the Sahel to contribute to regional security. Chad continued to support the following counterterrorism efforts: deploying soldiers to Mali to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); supporting the Lake Chad region’s Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); and committing forces to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

On November 9, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the end of Operation Barkhane, France’s counterterrorism (CT) mission to the Sahel, but French troops remained in N’Djamena under a new arrangement.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** BH and ISIS-WA in 2022 continued attacks around the eastern and northern shores of Lake Chad, including attacks carried out by BH in Chadian territory. Local authorities often conflate BH and ISIS-WA.
• On February 22, members of Boko Haram ambushed Chadian troops who were refueling, killing five soldiers.
• On August 14, members of Boko Haram killed two civilians near Bol in the Lac region.
• On August 15, members of Boko Haram killed two Chadian soldiers near Bol in the Lac region.
• On September 17, members of Boko Haram killed four soldiers, including a brigade commander and judicial police officer, in Hadjer-Lamis, 12 miles from N’Djamena.
• On November 22, members of Boko Haram attacked a Chadian Army outpost in Bouka-Toulloroum, Lac region, and killed 38 soldiers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The United States continued support for Chad’s Special Antiterrorism Group Division, which is deployed to fight terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin and across the Sahel, and for other Chadian military organizations involved in the counterterrorism fight, for the majority of 2022. The Director General of National Police remained supportive of U.S. CT efforts, and the Counterterrorism Investigation Unit has already had success in supporting an operation to seize illegal weapons in the Lake Chad region and led an operation to seize a substantial quantity of drugs in N’Djamena. Illicit trade often has been used to fund terrorist groups operating in the Lake Chad region.

Securing borders remains challenging. Porous borders, particularly across Lake Chad, provide easy passage for terrorists and criminal entities. Border security remained a shared task of the Gendarmes, Army, Customs, and the National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT), none of which is resourced sufficiently. The army and GNNT constituted the front line in nearly all major incidents involving BH and ISIS-WA. At ports of entry, both air and ground, Chad continued to be a partner in the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) program, which builds capacity for partners to screen travelers against known terrorist databases.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Chad is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa. The nation’s FIU, Agence Nationale d’Investigation Financière du Tchad, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: Chad actively opposed violent extremism. The High Council of Islamic Affairs promoted peaceful coexistence and tolerance, and diverse faith groups used the Dialogue to mitigate conflict. The national coordination office for the G-5 Sahel maintained its radicalization to violence prevention unit, which initiates coordination meetings of CVE practitioners.

International and Regional Cooperation: Chad engaged actively in the following organizations:
The Lake Chad Basin Commission

Surrounded by conflict, Chad deploys security forces to contribute to regional stability in the Sahel. Chad contributed 1,425 soldiers trained by the United States to the most challenging regions of Mali as part of MINUSMA, 2,000 soldiers in support of the MNJTF, and 650 soldiers in northern Chad as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force East Zone Headquarters. And Chad deployed 1,200 soldiers in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region joining Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. Chad also supported the Chad-Sudan Mixed Force by contributing close to 900 soldiers as part of the joint border security effort with Sudan.

N’Djamena hosts the headquarters of the five-nation (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) MNJTF, which was formed to counter the threat posed by ISIS-WA, al-Qa’ida, and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. N’Djamena also hosts France’s largest operational military deployment in the world, formerly known as Task Force Barkhane, which provides French military planners with strategic command position while it reevaluates the array of French forces throughout the Sahel.

Chad has received security resource support from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and Türkiye in the past, and continued resources shortfalls are forcing Chad to re-assess its need for military capabilities to address encroaching security challenges, including terrorism.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Overview: In January, Prime Minister Achi launched a social welfare program to render more resilient those communities at the front lines of the terrorist threat spilling over from the Sahel. While Côte d’Ivoire did not experience any new terrorist attacks in 2022, it assessed the security situation to have further deteriorated because of democratic backsliding in Burkina Faso and Mali. In response to the increased risk, the Ivoirian government has undertaken a whole-of-government approach to counter the expansion of violent extremism and the threat of terrorism encroaching from the Sahel.

The new social welfare program, PS-Gouv-2, sought to improve livelihoods in communities along the nation’s northern border. It did so by increasing the availability of government-provided education and training, empowering women, and making available financial resources for youth employment. On the security side, the Ivoirian government continued to maintain the Northern Operational Zone (known by the French acronym ZON and comprising an estimated 3,000 soldiers on active patrol). It successfully launched and sustained the operations of a counterterrorism fusion cell, the Counterterrorism Operational Intelligence Center (CROAT).

CROAT is leading the way in francophone West Africa on the capacity to use intelligence as evidence in civilian criminal trials, to enable the authorities to better identify, detain, and prosecute alleged terrorists. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire assesses the Macina Liberation
Front (aka Katiba Macina), part of the al-Qa’ida affiliate Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), to be responsible for the series of attacks that took place during 2020 and 2021 in northern Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM exploits historic tensions between ethnic communities and is trying to expand into Coastal West Africa.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Côte d’Ivoire did not experience any confirmed terrorist incidents in 2022. Recent military coups and other military takeovers in countries to its north, uncertainty around the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, rising inflation and economic pressure attributable to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a six-month-long detention of Ivorian soldiers in Bamako on reportedly false pretexts, and the breakdown in cross-border counterterrorism coordination since the arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali all aggravate a worsening situation.

Law Enforcement and Border Security: Antiterrorism Act No. 2015-493 of 2015 remains in effect. Those convicted of terrorism under this law may face penalties of up to 20 years in prison and fines up to $80,000 (CFA franc 50 million). There were no changes to report.

- There were no counterterrorism-related government policies that suppress political opposition or dissent; however, there were accounts of individuals from one specific ethnicity being subjected to more-frequent questioning and temporary detention by civilian law enforcement in the northern regions of Côte d’Ivoire. Aware of the negative impact this pattern of behavior undertaken by civilian law enforcement has had on the subject population, the Ivorian government took steps to reduce stigmatization of historically vulnerable and marginalized communities, especially members of this vulnerable ethnicity, and work in this space should be built into any CVE programming.
- There are seven law enforcement units responsible for and contributing to the country’s counterterrorism effort. Their names are provided in French for consistency: the Brigade Antiterroriste, Centre de Coordination des Décisions Opérationnelles, Force de Recherche et d’Assistance, Unité de Lutte Contre le Criminalité Organisée Transnationale, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières, Police Criminelle, and Police Économique.
- The units responsible for the Ivorian government’s counterterrorism efforts include the CROAT, CCDO (the Center of Coordination for Decision making Operations), UIGN (Intervention Units of the National Gendarmerie), FRAP (the Research and Assault and Protection Force), GMI (the Mobile Intervention Group), and CTM (the Maritime Counterterrorism Group). The Ivorian armed forces also maintain a counterterrorism unit called the Forces Spéciales Ivoiriennes. While these units collaborate with one another, they also acknowledge the need to improve coordination. Côte d’Ivoire partners with INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on counterterrorism. The Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) carries out systematic controls at land, air, and sea borders. DST relies on INTERPOL-provided international databases to verify individual identities. Most of Côte d’Ivoire’s borders with its neighbors are poorly demarcated and difficult to monitor. When not prevented
by flooding during the rainy season, migrants and others take advantage of the lack of
demarcations or barriers to enter Côte d’Ivoire.

- On November 30 the Ivoirian courts opened a trial against 18 individuals accused of
taking part in the 2016 terrorist attack in Grand-Bassam. Press reported the trial
concluded on December 28, with 11 individuals receiving life sentences for their role in
the attack that killed 19 people. Four of the defendants were present in the Ivoirian
court. Currently, Ivoirian authorities are holding seven individuals with ties to Burkina
Faso and armed terrorist groups on charges of financing terrorism and recruitment.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Côte d’Ivoire is a member of the Intergovernmental
Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa, and its FIU, the National Unit for the
Processing of Financial Information in Côte d’Ivoire (or CENTIF-CI), is a member of the Egmont
Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2022 the Ivoirian Government undertook actions to reduce
the vulnerability of communities in the North by launching a series of social welfare
programs. The PS-Gouv-2 program funded youth employment, improved access to capital, and
increased population touchpoints with the government (such as health and other public
services). The government also established a youth employment fund specifically for the
northern regions of Bagoué, Bounkani, and Tchologo. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire is
aware that civilian law enforcement patterns of behavior result in individuals from one specific
ethnic group being subject more frequently to scrutiny and the possibility of detention. The
Ivoirian government has taken steps to reduce stigmatization of this community through public
messaging and senior leadership engagement. But it recognized that much more work yet
needs to be done in this space. In 2019, Cote d’Ivoire, with support from France, launched the
International Counterterrorism Academy (AILCT) to provide classroom and kinetic training to
law enforcement, gendarme, and military officials across the region and conduct research to
strengthen regional counterterrorism and countering violent extremism efforts. The AILCT
hosted SOCAFRICA’s annual multinational exercise FLINTLOCK in 2022.

International and Regional CT Cooperation: These include the following:

International
- The United Nations — member state
- The UN Office of Counterterrorism
- UNODC
- The Global Counterterrorism Forum
- AILCT — founder

Regional
- The African Union — member state
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — member state
- The ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff Committee — member state
- The Accra Initiative — member state
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Overview: More than a dozen significant armed groups and about 100 criminal gangs and local militias operate in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). ISIS’s regional affiliate in the DRC, which it calls its Central Africa Province, is locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) or Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen. The United States designated ISIS-DRC as a foreign terrorist organization in March 2021.

Before pledging allegiance to ISIS in 2017, ADF had operated in the eastern DRC for years. Since 2013, ADF has perpetrated large-scale violence against civilians and asymmetric attacks against the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (or MONUSCO) Peacekeepers, often in retaliation for military operations conducted against it. From 2020 to the end of 2022, ISIS-DRC increased its area of operation across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces by 210 percent, as military operations have dispersed the group but not reduced its activities. Although these operations have somewhat disrupted the organization’s recruitment, financing, and community networks, ISIS-DRC units remained highly mobile and deadly. Further, Congolese security resources have been diverted away from the ISIS-DRC theater to concentrate on securing the population against the growing threat of the March 23 Movement, a U.S.- and UN-sanctioned armed group that relies heavily on support from Rwanda.

ISIS-DRC historically relied on local resources and on former leader Jamil Mukulu’s international connections to raise funds but has received funding from ISIS-linked financing networks since 2017. About one third of ISIS-DRC members, including its top leaders, are of Ugandan origin. The group recruits primarily through coercion or deception, although in recent years it has attracted ideologically motivated foreign recruits from Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Rwanda. Since 2021, DRC security forces have arrested Burundian, Jordanian, Kenyan, Rwandan, Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Congolese ISIS-DRC suspects.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: In 2022 the Kivu Security Tracker documented 271 incidents in the DRC involving ISIS-DRC. The UN documented 636 human rights abuses attributed to ISIS-DRC, a 14 percent decrease from 2021. ISIS-DRC reportedly killed between 1,063 and 1,198 people, abducted between 714 and 839, and injured at least 174 in 2022, according to UN and Kivu Security Tracker data.

The DRC-Uganda joint military operations (Operation Shujaa) that began in November 2021 initially correlated with a sharp rise in ISIS-DRC attacks against civilians and other soft targets, including in Uganda, with ISIS-DRC expanding its operational territory into other areas of North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Many of these attacks took place in areas outside the operational area of Shujaa in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces, where ISIS-DRC had not previously operated. The frequency of ISIS-DRC attacks began to decline steadily in mid-2022, as Shujaa military operations diminished their capability to resupply and recruit. Military operations continued throughout 2022, resulting in at least 272 ISIS-DRC combatant deaths.
ISIS-DRC struck civilian targets primarily in rural areas but increased attacks in urban areas as well. ISIS-DRC attempted a failed prison break in Beni in July and conducted a successful prison break in Butembo in August, releasing more than 800 prisoners, many of whom ISIS-DRC recruited into its ranks shortly thereafter. The terrorist group continued to detonate IEDs, including in suicide bombings, in urban areas of North Kivu Province, including the cities of Beni, Butembo, Erengeti, and Goma. ISIS-DRC conducted attacks on churches and health clinics, killing patients and medical professionals. The organization regularly claims responsibility for these acts on ISIS propaganda websites. Although an overwhelming majority of ISIS-DRC attacks in 2022 were within the DRC, the group continued to demonstrate its ability and willingness to conduct operations in Uganda. In December, ISIS-DRC combatants entered Uganda and fought with Ugandan security forces, continuing ISIS-DRC’s strategy to launch attacks within Uganda to draw Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) assets back to positions inside of Uganda.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The DRC has no comprehensive counterterrorism (CT) legislation. Its National Assembly passed a draft CT bill in 2018 that stalled in the Senate.

The DRC shares 6,835 miles of land, lake, and river borders with nine countries but lacks the capacity to effectively patrol or secure them. The DRC’s border authority, the Directorate General of Migration, uses the IOM Migration Information and Data Analysis System at only a fraction of the DRC’s more than 400 official border crossings. ISIS-DRC recruitment networks rarely use official border crossings.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The DRC is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), and its FIU is the National Financial Intelligence Unit. The DRC was added to the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In October FATF reported the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report in 2020, the DRC has made progress on some of the report’s recommended actions including making confiscation of proceeds of crime a policy priority.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in 2022.

International and Regional Cooperation: The DRC is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and participated in the Defeat-ISIS Ministerial in Marrakesh in May. As the DRC joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2022, the EAC established the EAC Regional Force in part to compel foreign armed groups, including ISIS-DRC, to return to their countries of origin. In 2022 the FARDC and the UPDF signed an MOU to facilitate the return of ISIS-DRC defectors to Uganda to benefit from Uganda’s amnesty and reintegration program.
Overview: Djibouti is a critical partner for the United States and the region in the fight against terrorism. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted Camp Lemonnier, the headquarters of AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, among several other U.S. military and government tenants, and the only enduring U.S. military installation in Africa. Given Djibouti’s proximity to prominent terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab that control territory in neighboring Somalia, Djiboutian government officials — particularly those in law enforcement and the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs — prioritize counterterrorism (CT) efforts and identify and address potential terrorist activity. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organization headquartered in Djibouti, also maintains a Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), providing training and resources to counter violent extremism throughout the region. Djibouti’s armed forces deploy two battalions to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

2022 Terrorist Attacks: There were no significant incidents in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Following an attack by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)-Armée movement on Djiboutian military forces in October, the National Assembly of Djibouti adopted a law to designate the small armed rebel group as a domestic terrorist organization, a major shift in the two-decade rebellion. The governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti subsequently increased cross-border security cooperation. Djibouti has a legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes and can try those charged of terrorism-related offenses in criminal courts, using its penal code. The United States has not designated the FRUD-Armée as a terrorist group.

Djiboutian law enforcement agencies consist of the Djiboutian National Police (DNP), the Djiboutian National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie), the General Directorate for Services of Documentation and Security, and the Djiboutian National Coast Guard — all of which proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism in the country. The DNP, the Gendarmerie, and the Coast Guard use a biometric program that utilizes handheld biometric capture devices, which can generate a DNA profile. Once populated, the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard DNA database can help law enforcement with identity and limited network analysis, tracking familial relationships. The DNP will manage and populate its own separate DNA database.

Djibouti continued to enhance border security and deter terrorist travel, with security protocols and increased use of criminal databases such as those provided by/acquired from INTERPOL. The Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (or PISCES) also continued to assist Djiboutian border security officials with conducting traveler screening and processing travelers through entry and exit points at the international airport and seaports. While these entry points remain critical, most travelers enter Djibouti by land at one of four border points, one of them at the Somali-Djibouti border. In addition to Djibouti city area
ports, maritime travelers also enter at Obock, located on the north side of the Gulf of Tadjoura. Djiboutian law enforcement agencies coordinate their CT functions and information sharing. The DNP controls border checkpoints, with support from the Gendarmerie patrolling between border posts, and the country’s armed forces are responsible for patrolling land borders in remote locations. To screen for potential security threats, law enforcement agencies also maintain checkpoints and conduct vehicle cordon-and-search operations on the way into and within the capital city.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Djibouti is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is *Le Service de Renseignements Financiers*. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Justice continued to convene the National Antiterrorism Taskforce, consisting of a national commission of experts, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ICEPCVE. The task force also held several terrorism-related exercises on responses to and the prevention of terrorist attacks, enhancing protection of soft targets such as restaurants, hotels, and grocery stores. Although law enforcement measures constituted the bulk of Djibouti’s national CT strategy, community engagement — including with youth, sports, culture, and civil society organizations — was an increasingly important feature of its PCVE efforts. Law enforcement agencies continued to work with the High Islamic Council within the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs to identify and monitor activity that promotes violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Djibouti hosts IGAD’s executive secretariat. Additionally, the IGAD ICEPCVE is based in Djibouti and provides training and resources on PCVE throughout the region, including representatives from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Djiboutian military continued its participation in ATMIS, which counts Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda as the other four Troop Contributing Countries.

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**ETHIOPIA**

**Overview:** The Government of Ethiopia (GOE) continued to partner with the United States on counterterrorism issues in 2022, though in a diminished capacity because of assistance restrictions brought on by concerns about human rights abuses. Al-Shabaab and ISIS terrorist threats emanating from Somalia remained a high priority for the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). Armed groups espousing ethnonationalist causes were the greatest and most persistent domestic violent extremist threats.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Al-Shabaab attacked the town of Hulhul in Somali region on July 21. Al-Shabaab subsequently attempted a second attack at Ferfer in Somali region on July 25. In both incidents, regional security forces repelled the terrorists.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In November, NISS and its counterpart in Somalia signed an MOU to carry out coordinated information exchange and joint operations to prevent al-Shabaab, a threat in the Horn of Africa, from carrying out terrorist activities. That same month, NISS signed an agreement with the Sudanese General Intelligence Service in which “the two parties agree to cooperate in the field of joint training and sharing of experiences, enhance joint efforts in combating terrorism, organized crime and transient economic crimes, and address the issues of the nationals of the two countries.”

Al-Shabaab attacked two villages inside Ethiopia after attacking regional security force encampments inside Somalia in July. Following the attacks, there were unconfirmed reports of a significant number of Ethiopian Federal Police entering Somalia to establish a security buffer zone, which allegedly was maintained until at least October. The Federal Police were also reported to have coordinated this activity with the Somali National Army and local clan militia groups opposed to al-Shabaab. The force reportedly has long been present in Somalia’s southwestern Bakool region.

The GOE’s counterterrorism (CT) capacity decreased in 2022 as resources were reassigned to other domestic priorities. However, the government continued to deploy CT units along Ethiopia’s borders with Kenya and Somalia. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) completed an airport and air carrier assessment in February, which indicated that half of the vulnerabilities identified in previous inspections had been addressed. TSA’s priority for 2022 was to provide capacity development training and aviation security mentorship to Ethiopia security stakeholders to mitigate remaining security vulnerabilities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Ethiopia is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. Its FIU, the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Center, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The GOE’s CVE strategy focuses on reducing poverty and ethnic strife to eliminate factors that drive recruitment by al-Shabaab. The GOE remains engaged in local mediation and conflict mitigation strategies to defuse ethnic and religious tensions, especially in Afar, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray Regions, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** U.S. security engagement with the GOE has normally involved combating terrorist threats, particularly those posed by al-Shabaab and Violent Extremist Organizations associated with ISIS. Because of concerns related to human rights, most assistance (including security assistance) for Ethiopia is restricted.

In December the Ethiopian Federal Police and its Somali counterpart signed a cooperation agreement. The agreement is intended to enable the two institutions to work jointly on transnational crimes, particularly through the prevention of terrorism, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. The agreement also provides opportunities to Somalia Police officers to attend training at the Ethiopian Police University.
Ethiopia is one of the top-five largest troop- and police-contributing countries in UN and AU peacekeeping, though its contributions are declining. At the beginning of 2022, Ethiopia deployed around 3,500 troops for the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia but recalled an unknown number to reinforce units engaged in the conflict in northern Ethiopia. Roughly 1,500 Ethiopian peacekeepers are deployed in support of the UN Mission in South Sudan. Ethiopia also participates in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its CT programs and training, including the IGAD Security Sector Program, which builds regional capacity to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity.

KENYA

Overview: Al-Shabaab continued to pose the primary terrorism threat in Kenya. In 2022, sporadic terrorist attacks in Kenya continued, primarily along the Kenyan-Somali border. IEDs and ambushes against Kenyan security forces and important infrastructure were the primary means of attack. Attacks along roads used by Kenyan security forces and other government officials resulted in numerous additional civilian casualties. While Kenyan security forces were the principal targets, key infrastructure also was affected. NGO reporting indicated a 10 percent to 25 percent uptick in terrorist attacks in 2022 over 2021.

Kenya plays a leading role in regional counterterrorism cooperation. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) continued to participate in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and supported border security and counter-IED efforts within Kenya. Security services responded to numerous terrorist incidents, while also disrupting al-Shabaab and ISIS attack planning, recruitment, and travel. Kenyan security forces continued to demonstrate improved procedures regarding protection of human rights in response to terrorist threats and attacks.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist incidents in 2022 included the following:

- On January 31 an IED placed by suspected al-Shabaab militants struck a passenger vehicle in Mandera County near the Somali border, killing seven persons and injuring 13 others.
- On March 11, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for killing four construction workers and injuring two in an attack in Lamu County.
- On August 1, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacking a police base in Mandera with explosive devices, injuring three officers.
- On October 8, suspected al-Shabaab militants attacked a pub near a military base in Lamu County.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kenya’s government continued to rely on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (amended in 2014) to investigate and prosecute terrorism. Two defendants in separate terrorism cases at the U.S.-funded, CT-focused Kahawa Law Court in Nairobi pleaded guilty to terrorism-related charges within the past year. In May the prosecution began its case-in-chief against three defendants regarding the 2019 Dusit D2
attack, which resulted in the deaths of 22 individuals (including one U.S. citizen). All defendants were accused of assisting the coordinators and attackers through the provision of internet services and fake identification documents and facilitating financial transactions. The Kenyan judiciary proposed creating a specialized High Court at Kahawa Law Court that would specialize in terrorism and transnational crime and handle terrorism appeals. The creation of this court should also reduce greatly the time between verdict and final conviction as well as improve the quality of appellate decisions in terrorism cases.

CT functions are divided among the three branches of the National Police Service:

1. The Kenya Police Service (including the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU); the Traffic Police; and the regional, county, and local police).
2. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative Antiterrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit).
3. The Administration Police (including the Border Police Unit).

The National Intelligence Service, elements of the KDF, and cabinet ministries also share responsibility for CT functions. Uneven coordination, resource constraints, insufficient training, and unclear command and control continue to hinder CT effectiveness. Kenya’s National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) continued to work with private sector organizations to prevent soft target attacks.

Kenya’s interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force charged its first case in 2022, which resulted in the defendant pleading guilty to association and facilitation charges, and maintains active investigations.

Kenyan officials continue to work to secure the nation’s porous land borders to prevent terrorist exploitation, but hurdles remain. Aviation safety and security at Nairobi’s international airport and other ports of entry are generally adequate and watchlist screening and basic equipment at smaller ports of entry have improved. Allegations of corruption at border entry and exit points continue and a government study recommended strengthening border controls and ensuring greater oversight of security officials at border points to counter human trafficking and smuggling.

The Kenyan government worked to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, including Kenyans attempting to join al-Shabaab or ISIS, and those returning from abroad. Kenyan security services also detected and deterred terrorist plots and responded to dozens of terrorism-related incidents. The Kenyan government cooperated with the United States on threat information and security, including through a dedicated GSU CT response team funded by the United States.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, and its FIU is the Financial Reporting Center. In June, Kenya
helped host a regional counterterrorism financing meeting in Nairobi, where Kenyan officials discussed collaboration with their Djiboutian and Somali counterparts.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Kenyan NCTC’s County Action Plans for CVE in all 47 counties continued to be the primary framework for CVE programming at the local level, but implementation of action plans in some counties continued to be slowed by a lack of funding. Police in Nairobi and from coastal and northeastern counties participated in community engagement training and early warning- and-response programs. Judicial officials continued to improve management of remand prisoners through plea bargaining and other methods.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Nairobi hosts the UN headquarters in Africa. In March, the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism opened a new Program Office in Nairobi to support countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. The KDF continued its participation in ATMIS. Although not a member, Kenya participated in regional meetings of the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

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**MALI**

**Overview:** Terrorist activities increased in number and lethality throughout the country, and terrorists continued to attack civilians, Mali’s Armed Forces (FAMa), international Peacekeepers, and international military forces. Terrorist groups active in Mali included ISIS-Sahel (formerly ISIS-GS), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). ISIS-Sahel’s actions over the reporting period demonstrated its intention to establish territorial control in the Sahel. Mali’s longstanding counterterrorism partnerships with foreign forces were disrupted significantly in 2022. Notably, France’s Operation Barkhane completed a full withdrawal from Mali, with the last of the French troops departing Mali on August 15. Meanwhile, the FAMa moved to occupy the vacated bases along with Kremlin-backed Wagner Group forces.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Available data indicated 2022 was the deadliest year in Mali’s history resulting both from terrorist attacks and FAMa’s counterterrorism efforts alongside Wagner forces. JNIM and ISIS-Sahel clashed in the eastern part of the country and continued to conduct terrorist attacks, primarily attacking Malian and international peacekeeping and military forces. While attacks principally occurred in the central area of Mali, terrorist groups continued to press farther south along the Burkinabe border into the Sikasso Region. Additionally, attacks occurred along Mali’s borders with Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, further enveloping Bamako and other population centers. Methods included IEDs, vehicle borne IEDs, ambushes, and kidnappings.

In 2022 there were hundreds of terrorist attacks, including the following significant incidents:
• During June 18-19, JNIM-affiliated Katiba Macina killed 132 civilians in multiple attacks in central Mali.
• On July 22, JNIM conducted a complex attack against the Malian military base in Kati — 15 kilometers from Bamako — killing one soldier.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes to Mali’s counterterrorism legal framework in 2022. However, draft amendments to the penal code and the criminal code of procedure would further criminalize association with acts of terrorism, concealment of terrorists, and recruitment of terrorists. Mali’s vast and porous borders extend some 4,500 miles and touch seven neighboring countries. The Gendarmerie, the National Border Police, and the Special Intervention Brigade (BIS) all provide security and law enforcement support to prevent and deter criminal activity. The BIS has demonstrated a continuing willingness to exchange information on individuals accused of international terrorism with U.S. law enforcement partners, including the FBI, and is actively seeking additional assistance. However, all agencies are understaffed, are poorly trained, and lack essential equipment and resources as well as access to terrorism-related crime scenes.

In late March, FAMa reported it had “neutralized” more than 200 jihadists in a major operation in Moura (in Mopti region). NGO Human Rights Watch reported the operation as an alleged massacre committed by FAMa and Wagner forces of up to 300 civilians. The transition government of Mali and the United Nations have yet to release a report of their investigation on the incident after nearly one year.

Exit and entry stamps used by border officials have inconsistent size and shape, undermining efforts to authenticate travel documents. The government receives Public Key Infrastructure certificates for passport security information from the International Civil Aviation Organization; however, the information sharing is done manually and inconsistently. Security features for Malian passports remain unchanged. Imposters obtain fraudulent documents, such as birth and marriage certificates, with relative ease, undermining the veracity of Malian identification documents.

The transition government has shown willingness to honor extradition requests from the United States for individuals accused of acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests. Fawaz Ould Ahmed Ould Ahemeid, a Mauritanian national previously in Malian custody, was extradited to the United States in December after being indicted on multiple terrorism offenses in the Eastern District of New York.

The transition government has made little progress toward implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2396 regarding border security. Mali previously implemented biometric fingerprint and facial recognition screening at established ports of entry. However, Mali has little or no control over its many and vast territorial borders, allowing terrorists to move across borders with ease.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mali is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa. Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CENTIF-Mali), is a member of the Egmont Group. Mali remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022. In 2022, FATF reported that Mali took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, including by adopting its national risk assessment, conducting AML/CFT trainings for financial institutions and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, and enhancing the FIU and law enforcement agency cooperation mechanisms on the use of financial intelligence.

Countering Violent Extremism: Despite the inclusion of armed group representatives in the transition government, progress on the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the Algiers Accord) remains stalled. This lack of progress is due to disagreements between transition government officials and signatory groups on meeting participation; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants stalling; and to signatory armed groups’ lacking authority to implement local governance. The transition government finalized a 2021-25 national action plan to counter and prevent violent extremism. FAMa reports of widespread success against terrorist organizations remained difficult to verify. ISIS-Sahel’s growing sophistication and capability over the reporting period demonstrated its intent to establish a caliphate in the Sahel.

International and Regional Cooperation: The transition government has grown increasingly insular since the May 2021 consolidation of military power. It continues to build its relationship with Russia and other non-Western partners. Following the 2020 military coup, U.S. foreign assistance for the Government of Mali has been restricted pursuant to section 7008 of the annual appropriations act and because of Child Soldiers Prevention Act restrictions. Mali is currently suspended from the Economic Community of West African States and the AU. In April the European Union announced the full suspension of the EU Capacity Building Mission and the EU Training Mission in Mali. In May, Mali withdrew from the G-5 Sahel.

MAURITANIA

Overview: The country remained an excellent security and regional counterterrorism (CT) partner for the United States. Despite continued terrorist violence in neighboring Mali, the country has not suffered a terrorist attack on its soil since 2011. Countering terrorist activity remains the top priority for the Mauritanian government, and Mauritanian military leadership underscores this message when appealing to donor nations for additional equipment and training assistance. During the past year, the government continued to focus its efforts on preventing what it termed “extremism,” and it took steps to increase its capacity to deter and respond to terrorist attacks, including by working with the Mine Advisory Group and the United States to better manage ammunition stockpiles to prevent them from falling into terrorists’ hands.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Mauritania in 2022.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Mauritanian government did not pass or amend any laws regarding terrorism during the year. The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, in cooperation with the Regional Security Office (RSO) and host-nation partner forces, currently provides numerous training opportunities for more than 200 National Gendarmerie personnel. Training topics include tactical medicine, facilities protection, active shooter response, managing terrorism investigations, and emergency preparedness. The National Gendarmerie has benefited from this training program, which reorganizes and equips the Crisis Response Team of the Groupe de Sécurité et d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (or GSIGN). The RSO, in coordination with the National Security Directorate, was finalizing implementation of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) program. Once implemented, this program will promote border security by installing PISCES at all of Mauritania’s land, air, and sea ports of entry to assist the Mauritanian government in identifying, disrupting, and deterring terrorist travel. The RSO also connected Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials with Mauritanian judges, prosecutors, and investigators to foster a more robust legal system for addressing terrorism. DHS also provided training for 24 law enforcement officers on detecting counterfeit documents.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mauritania is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is the Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: On May 24, Sid’Ahmed Beylilatou, a member of the National Cell for the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism of the G-5 Sahel Alliance, praised Mauritania’s focus on supporting the work of 70 Mourchidates (religious women guides) from Sahelian countries and Morocco who are promoting anti-radicalization to violence discourse. The grassroots efforts, supported by the Mauritanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, have ramped up efforts on training to sensitize populations at all levels (mosques, Quranic schools, and vulnerable neighborhoods) and have been a leading example of anti-radicalization to violence efforts in the Sahel.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Tamkeen (Arabic for “Empowerment”) activity is sponsored by the Sahel Regional Office of the USAID Senegal Mission and was launched in May, with the administrative support of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The $7 million, five-year program — implemented by U.S. NGO FHI 360 — was designed to promote social cohesion and prevent violent extremism by working with youth-focused civil society organizations across the country. During its first year of operations, the Tamkeen program established partnerships with local organizations in four regions and laid the framework for its learning platform for youth to foster civic engagement and counter disinformation.

USAID’s Nafoore activity was launched by Mercy Corps in October, with the collaboration of the Ministry of Employment. Nafoore is a five-year, $17 million program that seeks to counter violent extremism through the prevention of radicalization to violence of young people. It uses
a positive youth development approach that strengthens individual capacities, social networks, and economic opportunities for vulnerable Mauritanian youth in urban and peri-urban communities that have heightened exposure to Violent Extremist Organization messaging and radicalization to violence efforts.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Mauritania is a member of the following international organizations that have CT equities:

- UN
- African Union
- G-5 Sahel
- Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition
- Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue

Mauritania continued to work with international partners to combat instability in the Sahel, particularly through its engagement with the G-5 Sahel. In April the G-5 Sahel Defense College, located in Nouakchott, conducted a training program for 50 participants, including 21 Mauritanian officers, on the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights. In July the defense college graduated 45 international students, including six students from Saudi Arabia, in its fourth cohort. According to the G-5 Executive Secretary, this marked the last cohort to include students from Mali after the country’s withdrawal from the G-5 Sahel. Also in July, the defense college hosted a four-day NATO-sponsored seminar. Nearly 80 military and civilian officials participated in the forum, which concentrated on security and geopolitical topics.

On May 11 the Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, participated in the ministerial-level meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Foreign Minister of Morocco and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland co-hosted the meeting.

Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug also participated in a high-level conference on human rights, civil society, and the fight against terrorism held in Málaga, Spain, on May 10.

During the Madrid Summit in June, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that the organization approved a Defense Capacity Building (DCB) package for Mauritania. Stoltenberg said that insecurity in the Sahel has a direct impact on NATO Allies. The DCB package highlights six lines of effort for future cooperation: special forces development, intelligence, maritime security, career military transition program, stockpile management, and military education.
MOZAMBIQUE

Overview: ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) insurgents continued to carry out attacks in northern Mozambique in 2022, despite pressure from Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and their regional military partners from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF). FDS, SAMIM, and RDF continued to hold key territory recaptured from ISIS-M in 2021, which facilitated the return of some IDPs. Open-source reporting indicated an overall decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in 2022, compared with 2021. Ongoing violence in the northern provinces has displaced an estimated one million people since it began in 2017.

From January to March, FDS, SAMIM, and RDF security operations continued to displace ISIS-M from strongholds, capturing a primary ISIS-M base in Cabo Delgado Province (CDP). ISIS-M attacks in eastern Niassa Province stopped in early January. The majority of ISIS-M activity in early 2022 concentrated on raiding supplies from local villages and communities in CDP. In June, ISIS-M cells conducted attacks in southern CDP, and in September, they attacked villages in two districts in northern Nampula Province. In November and December, ISIS-M increasingly attacked security forces. The security situation continued to disrupt economic activity in northern Mozambique, including prolonging TotalEnergies’ force majeure declared in March 2021.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The following list details a sample of significant attacks:

- On December 20, in Nova Zambezia, Chai, Macomia, Cabo Delgado Province, ISIS-M militants attacked and looted a national army base, killing four persons including a member of the local militia. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On November 28, in Nanungu, Macomia, Cabo Delgado Province, ISIS-M militants killed five Mozambican soldiers at a vehicle patrolling position. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On November 20, on a road in Xitaxi, Muidumbe District, Cabo Delgado Province, ISIS-M militants ambushed a vehicle by burning it, killing a police chief and an NGO worker from Solidarités International. Three others were killed in the attack. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. In a second attack that day, ISIS-M militants shot at a vehicle from the same convoy that was pulled over on the side of the road; however, no fatalities were reported and no claim of responsibility was made for the second attack.
- On November 14, in Muambala, Muidumbe District, Cabo Delgado Province, ISIS-M militants attacked the village from two directions, killing three persons and kidnapping three others. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On September 6, in Chipene, Nacala Diocese, Nampula Province, ISIS-M militants attacked a Catholic mission, shooting and killing a nun. The perpetrators also burned down and destroyed a church, a hospital, schools, and vehicles. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.
On August 2, in Litandacua, Macomia, Cabo Delgado Province, ISIS-M militants beheaded three Christians and burned down homes. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) passed a domestic antiterrorism and counterproliferation amendment law that allows for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, including the imposition of targeted sanctions and the freezing of terrorist assets. Civil society organizations and journalists, however, warned the law could suppress free speech and press freedom in addition to prolonging the detention of persons accused of terrorism.

There were no significant changes in 2022 to Mozambique’s law enforcement counterterrorism capacity. Border security remained a challenge for Mozambique, with no significant changes in 2022.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mozambique is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Its FIU is the Gabinete de Informação Financeira de Moçambique (or GIFiM). Mozambique was added to the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report in April 2021, FATF reported that Mozambique has made progress on some of the report’s recommended actions to improve its system, including by finalizing its national risk assessment and strengthening its asset confiscation efforts. In May, Mozambique passed an antiterrorism and counterproliferation law that provides for the imposition of targeted sanctions, including the freezing of terrorist assets. In July, another law was passed establishing further Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) measures. In October, Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: In June the GRM approved the Program for Resilience and Integrated Development for Northern Mozambique (PREDIN) to address instability in the northern provinces. PREDIN outlined a plan to advance resilience and peace through the reestablishment of peace and security; promotion of good governance and civic space; and socioeconomic reconstruction and development.

Throughout 2022, the GRM committed to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) initiative, with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) serving as co-chair of the National Working Group (NWG). In March the NWG launched a provincial working group in CDP to conduct a baseline study of the drivers and indicators of insecurity and human rights violations. Later that month, President Filipe Nyusi voiced support for VPSHR at a human rights conference hosted by the MOJ. In November the GRM engaged at the ministerial level with a Voluntary
Principles Initiative (VPI) delegation and expressed openness toward applying for VPI membership.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Mozambique continued to accept military assistance from SADC, Rwanda, the EU, and the United Kingdom. In April the EU announced it would increase its EU Training Mission (EUTM) assistance to the FDS by about $50 million, almost doubling its total contribution to about $98 million. The EUTM trained two classes of FDS Quick Reaction Force cadets during 2022. The EU also announced nearly $22 million in funding for RDF and about $16.5 million for SAMIM operations in Mozambique. In March, President Nyusi attended an “Aqaba Process” conference in Jordan that focused on violent extremism.

**NIGER**

**Overview:** Niger faces terrorist threats on most of its borders. Terrorist organizations exploit Niger’s extensive borders and sparsely populated regions to attack and recruit among populations where access to government services is weak and economic opportunity is negligible. The modest size of Niger’s defense force stresses its efforts to fight terrorism, as do budget shortfalls, ineffective coordination among security services, and instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin.

Terrorist groups active in Niger include ISIS-Sahel (formerly known as ISIS-GS), Boko Haram, Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), and al-Qa’ida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist organizations carried out at least 180 attacks in Niger during 2022. Two main fronts saw attacks from Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the Southeast, and from JNIM and ISIS-Sahel in the West and Northwest. The following five incidents are examples of the most significant attacks:

- On February 20, presumed ISIS-Sahel militants attacked a communal transport vehicle near the village of Tizegorou (Banibangou, Tillabéri Region). At least 18 people were killed and eight others wounded, including five severely, and the vehicle burned.
- On March 7, Boko Haram militants attacked the village of Lada, Diffa Region. At least 10 people were killed, several others were wounded, and an unknown number of women were abducted.
- On March 16, ISIS-Sahel militants attacked a communal transport bus and a truck between the villages of Fono and Zelengue (Téra, Tillabéri Region). Twenty-one people were killed including drivers, two off-duty policemen, and passengers. Also, seven persons were wounded, including a severely wounded off-duty policeman.
- On June 6 and August 11, JNIM conducted a small arms attack against a Gendarme checkpoint and detonated an IED, killing two civilians. Both attacks occurred within 10 miles of Embassy Niamey near the village of Bougoum (Say, Tillabéri Region).
- On September 20, ISIS-WA militants killed 11 lumberjacks a few kilometers south of Tounour (Diffa Region).
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Niger reinforced its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorists, consistent with the rule of law and international human rights. Its counterterrorism investigations are managed by the Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (the SCLCT-CTO), an interagency body formed by members of the National Police, the National Guard, and the Gendarmerie.

Niger is recognized by regional partners as a leader in prosecuting terrorism suspects through its specialized antiterrorism court. An Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training Resident Legal Advisor stationed at the embassy worked to improve the capabilities of counterterrorism investigators, prosecutors, and judges to support proactive investigations, to increase efficiency in case processing, and to reduce the number of pending cases.

Niger continued to enhance its capacity to detect and deter terrorist incursions at its borders and ports of entry through the expansion of new technologies, public outreach, critical infrastructure development, and additional specialized security forces assigned along the border. However, it remained dependent on international partners to fund and implement border security initiatives.

The country uses border security systems through the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, a bureau within the national police responsible for travel documents, identification credentials, and border security.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Niger is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa. Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence and Processing unit of Niger, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: Niger’s national Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Reconciliation (DDRR) framework provides Violent Extremist Organization defector screening by the SCLCT-CTO and the national prosecutor to determine rehabilitation eligibility. In addition to the regional defections center in Goudoumaria, in Diffa Region, Niger opened a second center in 2022 in Hamdallaye, Tillabéri Region. While the Ministry of Interior led the DDRR program, the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace used French funding to rehabilitate and release 113 defectors from Goudoumaria Center in 2022.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) strengthened women’s representation, capacity, and leadership, including support for the G-5 Sahel Women’s Platform, and established local peace committees to strengthen local conflict monitoring, prevention of violent extremism, and management. USAID and the Department of State supported youth-led conflict mitigation and stabilization efforts in northern and central Tillabéri. These efforts included support for community radio stations in delivering positive messages to counter Violent Extremist Organizations’ ideology and activities to prevent and resolve community-level conflict.
USAID supported three operational and pilot research activities on gendered drivers of violent extremism, the role of traditional leaders in resilience to violent extremism, and the effectiveness of community-level programming in building social cohesion and resilience. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives concentrated on critical regions affected by emerging security threats in the southern areas of Tillabéri and Dosso Regions. Under the Niger Stability Support Initiative, USAID partnered with local leaders in these target areas to strengthen government action in response to security threats.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Niger is a co-lead of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Africa Focus Group. Niger is a member of the G-5 Sahel, the Sahel Alliance, and the Economic Community of West African States. Niger contributes troops to the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

**NIGERIA**

**Overview:** ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), Boko Haram (BH), and Ansaru continued attacks against Nigerian government and security forces and civilians across the northern and central regions of Nigeria, resulting in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the destruction of property. BH attacks did not appear to discriminate between civilians and government officials, whereas ISIS-WA generally concentrated its attacks on government and security forces and expanded efforts to implement shadow governance structures. BH and ISIS-WA continued to fight one another, and BH was significantly degraded, while ISIS-WA expanded its geographic presence.

The Nigerian Air Force’s extensive use of A-29 Super Tucanos — purchased from the United States — against BH and ISIS-WA limited Boko Haram’s and ISIS-WA’s abilities to mass and conduct large-scale attacks in the Northeast. However, BH and ISIS-WA exploited the military’s absence outside of “super camps” by abducting aid workers, attacking humanitarian operations hubs, and controlling security along many of the major roads. The difficult security environment exacerbated conditions for civilians and severely constrained relief operations in northeast Nigeria.

Nigeria worked with neighboring countries under the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter terrorist activity in the region. ISIS-WA continued to enjoy a large degree of freedom of movement throughout Borno State and eastern Yobe State. BH and ISIS-WA terrorist actions contributed to the internal displacement of an estimated two million people in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States, and the external displacement of more than 333,000 Nigerian refugees to neighboring countries, principally Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Attacks and kidnappings in the Northwest by criminal gangs, colloquially known as “bandits,” reportedly caused more civilian deaths in 2022 than did BH and ISIS-WA attacks in the Northeast. Nigeria’s designation of these groups as terrorists under domestic law the previous year allowed increased use of the military in the Northwest. The Indigenous People of Biafra,
proscribed by the Nigerian government as a terrorist group, reportedly conducted violent attacks in the Southeast.

Nigeria is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program. The U.S. Mission to Nigeria coordinated with the Nigerian military through the Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Fusion Center, the Geospatial Intelligence Directorate Analysis Center, and the Nigeria Defense Intelligence College.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: ISIS-WA and BH carried out hundreds of attacks in Nigeria using small arms, captured military equipment, IEDs, ambushes, and kidnappings. The following list details a small sample:

- On March 28, suspected terrorists attacked a passenger train on the Abuja-Kaduna route of the state-run Nigeria Railway Corporation. News reports said eight persons were killed in the attack and 62 were kidnapped, though some suspect the number was far higher. All kidnap victims were eventually released, many after their families paid ransom.
- On May 29, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for an IED attack on a bar in Kabba, Kogi State.
- On June 5, a large group of assailants attacked the St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Ondo State in southwest Nigeria and killed more than 40 people, including children. Some gunmen entered the church disguised as congregants, while others surrounded the church outside. ISIS-WA was widely believed to have been behind the attack, though it has never claimed responsibility.
- On July 5, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for an armed attack on Kuje Medium Security Prison, located 27 miles from Embassy Abuja and 14 miles from Abuja’s international airport. The prison housed about 1,000 inmates, including more than 60 known terrorists. Once inside the prison, the attackers opened all the holding cells and released hundreds of prisoners.
- On July 28, gunmen believed to be ISIS-WA conducted an attack on the Abuja-Niger highway, Suleja, Niger State, near Zuma Rock, about 18 miles from Abuja.


The Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), the Ministry of Justice, and Nigeria Police Force (NPF), which has a Counterterrorism Unit and Terrorist Investigation Branch. Border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, DSS, NSCDC, Customs, Immigration, and the Nigerian military. Coordination among agencies remained limited.

The Nigerian government continued to participate in U.S. capacity building programs and to work with the FBI to investigate specific terrorism matters, predominantly through the DSS.
The Nigerian government has cooperated with the United States and other international partners to prevent further acts of terrorism in Nigeria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Nigeria is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). Its FIU, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Nigeria’s November GIABA follow-up report noted that the country had made significant progress in addressing the technical compliance deficiencies identified in its 2021 mutual evaluation.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no updates in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Nigeria continued high-level participation in regional security and counterterrorism conferences. Nigeria participated in several counterterrorism training sessions sponsored by the United Nations. Nigeria is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and co-chairs the GCTF’s Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group with Italy. Nigeria also is an International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law Board member.

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**SENEGAL**

**Overview:** Although there were no reported terrorist attacks in Senegal in 2022, the Government of Senegal increasingly considers itself a likely target given ongoing terrorist activities in West Africa and instability in neighboring countries. In light of these concerns, Senegal continued to work closely with foreign partners, including U.S. military and law enforcement officials, to strengthen its counterterrorism (CT) capabilities.

The risk of terrorist activity in Senegal arises primarily from increasing political instability and the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups in neighboring Mali. These factors increase the risk of violent extremism spilling across the border into Senegal and threatening stability. Senegal has taken steps to combat this threat by contributing troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, establishing new military and Gendarmerie camps along its eastern border, and substantially increasing the number of Gendarmerie among its ranks. Internally, there are secondary risks with the promotion of “extremist ideologies” by a small number of religious leaders. However, these ideologies remain outside Senegal’s prevailing Islamic norms.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Senegal in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes to Senegal’s CT legal framework in 2022. Senegal continued to enhance the capabilities of its
Interministerial Framework for Intervention and Coordination of CT Operations (or CICO), formed in 2016 to coordinate the government’s response to terrorism.

Senegal’s gendarmerie and national police have specialized units to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism, and the Ministry of Justice has a specialized pool of magistrates to investigate and prosecute terrorist-related activity. Challenges remain to effective interagency cooperation and information sharing between the various governmental bodies that have CT functions in the country.

The country continued to improve its law enforcement capacity by participating in multilateral efforts, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF’s) West Africa working group, AU programs, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Additionally, Senegal continued to work with the International Organization for Migration to promote cooperation and coordination between border agencies.

Senegalese officials remained concerned that gaps in border protection resources and regional cooperation created security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were exacerbated by the absence of systems to verify travel document security, to screen travelers using terrorist screening watchlists, and to capture biographic and biometric information for travelers entering the country outside major ports of entry. The Government of Senegal is near implementation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Automated Targeting System-Global (or ATS-G) software with the National Police, paving the way for Senegal to capture and analyze Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records in a move toward implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2396.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Senegal is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa. Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Senegal remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported Senegal took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, including by providing training to the investigative and judicial authorities on the use of financial intelligence to identify and investigate money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) cases, establishing and implementing a risk-based AML/CFT monitoring system, continuing to enhance the FIU’s resources to ensure effective operational analysis, ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks across relevant authorities through training and outreach, and seeking mutual legal assistance and other forms of international cooperation.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In partnership with the Institute of Security Studies, the Senegalese government’s Director General of the Centre des Hautes Études de Défense et de
Sécurité (CHEDS) completed a study, *Preventing Violent Extremism in Senegal: The Threats of Gold Mining*. The Director General has used the findings to advise the government on steps that could be taken to help manage artisanal and illegal gold mining and prevent Violent Extremist Organizations from exploiting the mining regions.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Senegal is a member of the AU, ECOWAS, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The country remains a large security exporter, including being the ninth-largest global contributor of peacekeepers. Although not a member of the GCTF, Senegal participated in regional workshops and activities held by the GCTF West Africa Region Capacity Building Working Group. France and the EU provide continued financial support and training to reinforce Senegal’s CT and border security capabilities.

**SOMALIA**

**Overview:** Al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant terrorist threat in Somalia and the region, despite shared efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), neighboring countries, and the African Union. Al-Shabaab continued to leverage its influence in Somalia to extort millions of dollars in revenue from residents and businesses. The group regularly conducted deadly operations, including IED attacks, suicide bombings, complex attacks, targeted assassinations, ambushes along supply routes, and indirect fire. Al-Shabaab’s tactics, techniques, and procedures preserved its ability to strike U.S. interests in the region, and the group conducted a major propaganda campaign distributed in local Kenyan and Ethiopian languages and dialects to increase foreign fighter recruitment.

ISIS-Somalia remains isolated in Puntland, northern Somalia, owing to pressure from al-Shabaab, and in 2022 focused its efforts on revenue generation and extortion activities rather than on high-profile attacks, with some reports of intent to expand revenue generation into the neighboring Somaliland region. In November, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated eight individuals and one entity as part of the weapons trafficking networks integrated with ISIS-Somalia.

The FGS made security gains against al-Shabaab in 2022 with international assistance. Led by the U.S.-trained Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade, the Somali National Army (SNA) and local clan militias dubbed Ma’awisley conducted clearing operations against al-Shabaab in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions and transitioned control of some of these areas to local authorities. Holding recovered areas remained a significant challenge. International stabilization assistance has helped establish governance structures and repaired community infrastructure in newly liberated areas, which in turn has contributed to greater security in some areas. Al-Shabaab fighters contested SNA control of defensive positions and supply lines.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Somalia suffered continual, low-intensity conflict between government-aligned forces and terrorists in 2022. High-profile terrorist incidents included the following:

• On July 20, al-Shabaab militants attacked towns located along the border with Ethiopia in Bakool region, where they clashed with Ethiopian paramilitary forces. Following a three-day battle, Ethiopian officials reported more than 100 fighters had been killed after the militants crossed the border, reportedly traveling about 100 kilometers into Ethiopia. Numbers of civilian and security forces killed or wounded were not published.

• On August 19, al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Hayat Hotel, which ended after a 40-hour siege, with at least 32 killed. This marked the first hotel attack in Mogadishu since January 2021.

• On October 3, at least 20 people were killed in a triple car bombing attack by al-Shabaab in the city of Beledweyne in central Somalia.

• On October 29, two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) detonated near Zobe junction in Mogadishu, killing about 121 people and injuring more than 330, the largest civilian casualty attack since a suicide VBIED attack in the same area in 2017.

• On November 27, al-Shabaab launched a high-profile, complex attack on Villa Rays Hotel, located adjacent to Mogadishu’s highly protected government mall area. The subsequent attack and siege lasted 22 hours, with nine persons killed and five wounded, including the Minister of Internal Security.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The FGS and local authorities demonstrated a continued commitment to improve Somalia’s law enforcement and judicial entities and made progress on U.S.-supported counterterrorism initiatives. In 2022 the Somali Police Force leveraged U.S. mentorship and increased its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases. Draft legislation on counterterrorism, the National Intelligence and Security Agency Act and the National Identification and Registration Act were introduced to Parliament in December 2021 and approved in mid-January, but they have yet to be signed.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Somalia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU is the Financial Reporting Center. In December the FGS closed around 250 bank and 70 mobile money accounts with suspected al-Shabaab connections, and it will continue to investigate the suspicious accounts.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating FGS efforts and international support for the prevention and countering of violent extremism. The FGS has gathered religious leaders to counter al-Shabaab religious narratives, supported in part by the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 2022, U.S. support enabled continuance of a messaging and hotline campaign that boosted enrollments in defector rehabilitation centers.
International and Regional Cooperation: The African Union Mission on Somalia evolved into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in March, as endorsed and authorized by the UN Security Council in resolution 2628 with a mandate (subsequently extended in United Nations Security Council resolution 2670) through midyear 2023. ATMIS’s anticipated exit is envisioned as year-end 2024, when Somalia is expected to assume full responsibility for its own security.

SOUTH AFRICA

Overview: ISIS remained a threat after the South African government first publicly acknowledged its presence in 2016. Regional dynamics continued to be a source of concern as terrorist groups made gains in the South African Development Community region, including in Mozambique. The government successfully convicted Johannesburg brothers Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie (the Thulsie twins) for international terrorism and continues to prosecute, albeit inconsistently, alleged terrorists charged in previous years.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in 2022. Embassy Pretoria, however, released a message warning U.S. citizens of a potential terrorist threat in Johannesburg during the weekend of October 29-30. The planners failed to carry out the planned attack. U.S. Embassy officers held more than a dozen meetings with South African working-level and senior counterparts in advance of the warden’s message publication, including to coordinate the warden’s message text and the substance of the threat.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (Pocdata) criminalizes acts of terrorism and terrorist financing, and it specifies international cooperation obligations. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 applies to nationals who attempt to or who join terrorist organizations like ISIS. The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation’s Crimes Against the State Unit and South Africa’s State Security Agency are tasked with detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa. The South African Police Service (SAPS) Special Task Force is specifically trained and proficient in counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) prosecutes terrorism and international crime cases.

South Africa’s border security is challenging because of its numerous land, sea, and air ports of entry for international travelers. Multiple South African law enforcement agencies police its borders, but they often are stove piped. Inadequate communication and equipment limit their border control ability. The Department of Home Affairs in 2016 submitted to Parliament the Border Management Authority Bill to create an integrated and coordinated agency to ensure effective control of the border. President Ramaphosa signed the bill into law in 2020. CT measures at the international airports include screening with advanced technology X-ray machines, but land borders do not have advanced technology or infrastructure. Trafficking networks used these land borders for illicit smuggling, and South Africa does not require neighboring countries’ citizens to obtain visas for brief visits. SAPS’s internal affairs office
investigated corruption allegations related to the illicit sale of passports and other identity documents in the Department of Home Affairs, but illegitimately obtained identity documents continued to be used. In March a Pakistani national along with a group of 26 men (South Africans and foreign nationals) were arrested in Krugersdorp for issuing fraudulent passports at a Home Affairs branch.

During the year, South Africa’s NPA continued to prosecute a few terrorism crimes. To decentralize terrorism case prosecution and provide provincially based prosecutors with relevant experience, the NPA’s Gauteng-based Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) returned prosecutors who had been seconded to the central unit to their previous provincial assignments and reassigned terrorism cases to attorneys in judicial districts where the crimes occurred. While the PCLU retained an oversight role, it gave provincial prosecutors substantial autonomy to direct terrorism cases. Progress in several high-profile cases slowed as newly assigned NPA provincial prosecutors familiarized themselves with the cases and developed prosecution strategies. Affected cases included the previously reported prosecutions of the terrorist group allegedly responsible for the 2018 deadly attacks on a Shia mosque and firebomb attacks against commercial Durban interests, and the prosecutions of Sayfudeen Del Vecchio and Fatima Patel, charged in 2018 with murdering British-South African dual nationals Rodney and Rachel Saunders. The Del Vecchio/Patel trial finally got under way in October in Durban.

In 2019, South African Police arrested four members of the National Christian Resistance Movement, a white supremacist group that allegedly planned attacks on shopping malls, informal settlements, and government installations. In 2019 the four suspects were charged under Pocdataa. Two members were found guilty and sentenced in 2020 for an effective eight years’ imprisonment for preparing and planning to carry out acts of terrorism. Charges against another individual were dropped. Harry Knoesen, the alleged leader of the group and self-proclaimed pastor, was found guilty in June and given two life sentences plus 21 years’ imprisonment on September 28.

On February 7, Thulsie twins Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie were sentenced to eight and 11 years in prison, respectively, for attempting to leave South Africa to join ISIS in Syria in 2015 and conspiring to conduct terror attacks against foreign embassies and local Jewish and Shia interests in South Africa. The convictions were South Africa’s first for international terrorism under Pocdataa. Previous convictions under the act have been against local violent extremists.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** South Africa is a member of FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Center, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no updates in 2022.
**International and Regional Cooperation:** South Africa is a member of the African Union, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the Southern African Development Corporation Community.

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**SUDAN**

**Overview:** Even after the October 2021 military takeover, Sudan continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism efforts, including through consistent information sharing and efforts to build capacity to identify terrorists and deny them safe haven within Sudan. Despite the lack of any terrorist attacks in 2022, ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and Harakat Sawa’d Misr continued to use Sudan as a facilitation and logistics hub. Public calls for jihad by prominent al-Qa’ida clerics in Sudan in late 2022 — including public messages specifically identifying the U.S. Ambassador, Embassy Khartoum, and American organizations in Sudan as legitimate targets — could inspire lone actors and violent extremists, who generally lack direction from senior leadership, to launch attacks in Sudan.

Historically, terrorist groups opted against conducting organized, large-scale attacks inside Sudan to preserve their facilitation lines. Sudanese security services continue to focus on identifying terrorist actors and denying them safe haven, which could cause terrorists to reconsider this calculus. As further detailed below, increased calls for violent action by terrorist-linked figures in Sudan in late 2022 could also affect the historical moratorium on attacks inside Sudan. The government continued to view foreign terrorist fighters as the predominant threat.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist attacks in Sudan in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Previous efforts by the civilian-led transitional government (CLTG) to amend the overarching counterterrorism (CT) legal framework in Sudan were stalled by the military takeover in 2021. The military-led government granted additional authorities to security services, namely the General Intelligence Service, to target terrorists in late 2021. There were no significant developments regarding CT authorities in 2022.

Regarding law enforcement actions against terrorism, Sudanese security forces continued to actively target and interdict terrorist cells in Sudan. Sudan continued to focus on improving its border security measures to track and interdict terrorist suspects traveling on forged passports, a crucial effort given Sudan’s extensive and porous borders.

On November 2 the newspaper *Almsoul* published a statement attributed to al-Qa’ida-linked Sheikh Abu Hudhaifah al-Sudani calling for jihadist attacks on the Ambassador, Embassy Khartoum, and American organizations in Sudan.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Sudan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the Financial Information Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: Sudan’s efforts to improve CVE have stalled since the 2021 military takeover and did not restart in 2022. Previous efforts by the CLTG concentrated on broadening relationships and engagement on CVE by seeking input from international bodies, civil society, and local experts. The CLTG and security services held numerous joint conferences, led by the Sudan National Commission for Counterterrorism, with local and international stakeholders to discuss various CVE initiatives. However, authorities have not restarted these initiatives.

International and Regional Cooperation: Sudan continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations. As of 2022, Sudan remained a member of the following groups, which have CT equities: the United Nations (UNDP; the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism [UNOCT]); the International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies; INTERPOL; and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization. UNOCT maintains a small team in Khartoum to liaise with Sudanese authorities and UN entities (including UNDP, UNESCO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) to share best practices for counterterrorism strategies, border security, countering the financing of terrorism, and community policing.

TANZANIA

Overview: In 2022 the Government of Tanzania and the United States engaged in limited but increasing counterterrorism and countering violent extremism cooperation. Counterterrorism has risen in importance for the Government of Tanzania as terrorist organizations — namely al-Shabaab, ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M), and ISIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC, locally known as AlliedDemocratic Forces) — have recruited and operated in Tanzania. ISIS-M presents a significant danger to citizens of Tanzania, especially those who live along its shared border with Mozambique. Weapons, provisions, and people from Tanzania cross the porous borders from Tanzania’s southern regions into northern Mozambique to equip ISIS-M. In 2022, al-Shabaab increased its Swahili language propaganda and social media to recruit fighters to Somalia and Kenya, targeting disaffected youth populations throughout both countries. Increasing numbers of youth reportedly disappeared in Zanzibar in 2022, presumably to join violent extremist groups. ISIS-DRC was believed to have crossed frequently into western Tanzania from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Tanzania-Mozambique cross-border security cooperation through multilateral engagement was ongoing — primarily with coordination provided by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). However, bilateral cooperation remained essential to protecting Tanzanian citizens and territory.
**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Tanzania did not experience significant terrorist attacks in 2022. But Tanzanians continued to fill leadership and rank-and-file roles within terrorist groups in Tanzania’s neighboring countries, where violent extremist attacks were carried out with frequency.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Government of Tanzania did not pass or amend any laws regarding terrorism in 2022. However, the Tanzanian Parliament voted unanimously to ratify the Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, a protocol of the 1999 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which recognized the growing threat of terrorism in Africa and the need to coordinate continental efforts in countering international terrorism. This ratification was perhaps in response to the African Union’s call for all AU member states to scale up implementation of all relevant instruments and decisions during the 2022 Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

In response to continued ISIS-M activity in Mozambique, the Government of Tanzania maintained a robust security personnel presence in the southern border regions of Mtwara and Ruvuma, as well as in neighboring Lindi Region. In 2022 the Government of Tanzania deployed additional troops to Tanzania’s southern border, which are separate and independent from the SADC mission. The Government of Tanzania granted limited access for diplomatic missions and humanitarian organizations to some areas along the southern border. In general, the Government of Tanzania’s security forces are proactive and often heavy handed in addressing suspects of violent extremism.

Charges of terrorism, terrorist financing, and money laundering, all of which result in a prohibition on the use of bail, have been used to incarcerate journalists, political party representatives, and other nationals for political reasons. While this practice slowed under President Suluhu, who assumed the presidency in March 2021, political opposition leader Freeman Mbowe was held in custody for more than seven months on terrorism charges until the Government of Tanzania dropped all charges in April.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit - Tanzania, is a member of the Egmont Group. Tanzania was added to the FATF “gray list” in 2022. In October, FATF reported that Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report in 2021, Tanzania has made progress on some of the report’s recommended actions to improve its system, including by developing a legal framework for terrorist financing and targeted financial sanctions and disseminating FIU strategic analysis. The Government of Tanzania also continued efforts to regulate the movement of foreign currency in 2022. While the primary purpose of the regulations appeared to be reducing tax evasion, the measures also made it easier to trace transactions, including those associated with the financing of terrorism.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2022, SADC launched its Regional Counterterrorism Center in Dar es Salaam, though Tanzania’s National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) remained Tanzania’s primary liaison with international partners on CVE. Starting in 2017, NCTC partnered with the UNDP on a CVE project that included the development of a national CVE strategy and action plan. Since 2018, NCTC and the UNDP have assured donor countries that the national strategy and action plan would be completed imminently, though the plan has yet to materialize.

In 2022, U.S. funding supported CVE programs in both southern and western border regions that provide training of community stakeholders to identify violent extremism (VE) risks and radicalization to violence trends. These programs analyzed the VE dynamics along these borders and contributed to community resilience. A separate program engaged with gender-based civil society organizations to provide training and capacity building on gender conflict analysis, community-level dialogue, advocacy, CVE trends, and mentorship. Additionally, U.S. funding supported a counter-IED program that provided training and capacity building for Tanzania’s police and military forces.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Throughout 2022, the Government of Tanzania engaged in multilateral efforts through SADC to address regional security and counterterrorism issues. Tanzania maintained a contingent of troops for SADC’s Standby Force Mission in Mozambique, which also included forces from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa. The SADC Mission joined Mozambiquan and Rwandan military efforts to combat the uprising of ISIS-M violent extremism in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique.

In eastern DRC, the Government of Tanzania increased financial support to regional operations under the newly established East African Community Regional Force, but has yet to commit to sending additional troops, maintaining that its troops would undermine UN mission efforts, in which Tanzanian troops participate. Throughout 2022, the Government of Tanzania continued to pursue training from bilateral and multilateral donors to enhance counterterrorism-related security units and efforts.

**UGANDA**

**Overview:** There were three terrorist incidents in Uganda in 2022, with the worst of these resulting in three to 12 civilian casualties. Ugandan security forces arrested numerous ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo members, including the leader of the cell responsible for the November 2021 bombings in Kampala, and prevented several attack plots from coming to fruition. In August, the Ugandan Parliament passed its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) amendments to seven existing laws, leading to an improved rating from FATF. The Government of Uganda (GOU) officially approved the National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in February; however, as of December it had
not been released to the public. The Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) continued its joint operation with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat ISIS-DRC in the eastern DRC. Uganda also continued its role as the top troop-contributing country to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), an AU-led and UN-authorized effort to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab in Somalia, among other aspects of ATMIS’s mandate. The GOU remains a capable partner in countering violent extremism, although human rights concerns still exist within some security services.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The following two incidents are examples of the most significant attacks:

- On April 17 and April 23, two IEDs detonated near the Kampala-Masaka Highway in southwest Uganda, resulting in vehicle damage but no casualties. No terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attacks, but Ugandan security services suspected ISIS-DRC.
- On December 13, as many as 50 ISIS-DRC fighters of Congolese and Ugandan origin crossed the Semliki River in western Uganda and attacked two villages with guns. Various sources reported that from three to 12 civilians were injured or killed in the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There have been no changes to legislation, law enforcement capacity, or border security since 2021. During 2022, security services prevented several attack plots from materializing and arrested several ISIS-DRC operatives.

Jamal Kiyemba, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay from 2002 until 2006 and an imam at a mosque in Wakiso District outside Kampala, was arrested in January, after allegedly joining ISIS-DRC and rallying support for the group in Kampala. On May 16, Kiyemba was charged with one count of belonging to a terrorist organization, which he denied. His trial has been repeatedly postponed.

On March 15, Ugandan security forces arrested Kabanda Abdallah Musa (aka Mogo), the leader of an ISIS-DRC cell allegedly involved in the November 2021 bombings in Kampala, as well as other operatives allegedly involved in building a vehicle-borne IED.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Authority, is a member of the Egmont Group. Uganda remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported Uganda demonstrated progress toward strengthening the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, including conducting terrorist financing (TF) investigations and prosecutions, and completing the money laundering (ML) and TF risk assessment of legal persons and arrangements. In August, as mentioned above, the Ugandan Parliament passed AML/CFT amendments to seven existing laws. The bills’ provisions addressed deficiencies in Uganda’s AML/CFT legal framework by identifying beneficial owners; requiring the designation of accountable individuals to assess and monitor ML, TF, and proliferation financing risks; and
empowering the FIU and other authorities to levy administrative penalties to include targeted financial sanctions to prevent, suppress, and disrupt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These amendments contributed to significant overall progress made in resolving technical compliance shortcomings identified in its mutual evaluation report.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The GOU officially approved the National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in February; however, as of December it had not been released to the public because of intra-government wrangling over the communications strategy. Government funding for rehabilitation and reintegration of defectors from ISIS-DRC remained extremely limited, and even defectors who have received amnesty faced harassment from security services. NGOs working in the rehabilitation or prevention spaces reported scrutiny and even obstruction from security services. The GOU has a draft strategy for preventing CVE communications developed with United Kingdom assistance.

**International and Regional CT Cooperation:** Operation Shujaa, the UPDF’s joint operation with the Armed Forces of the DRC to combat ISIS-DRC continued throughout 2022. Uganda continued to be the largest troop-contributing country to ATMIS in 2022, with close to 6,000 personnel, and was responsible for Somalia’s Sector 1 — which includes the Mogadishu airport — the region that has suffered the largest number of al-Shabaab attacks, especially from IEDs.
Overview

The threat to governments in East Asia and the Pacific from U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations and terrorists inspired by ISIS remained diminished in 2022, despite the easing of COVID-19-related travel restrictions in the region. Counterterrorism (CT) pressure from regional security forces on the leadership structure of several ISIS-affiliated terrorist organizations in the Philippines and Indonesia during the previous year, and sustained pressure from Philippine and Indonesian law enforcement and security forces in 2022, continued to have significant effects on the organizations’ abilities to conduct attacks in those countries.

Most terrorist incidents perpetrated by ISIS-affiliated terrorist organizations in 2022 involved attacks against military or police targets. Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia reported repatriating some foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) or their families in 2022. Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (or REMVE) continues to be a key concern for Australia and New Zealand.

Authorities in East Asia and the Pacific continued efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases, increase regional cooperation and information sharing, and address critical border and aviation security gaps. Authorities in the region additionally increased efforts in 2022 to counter the financing of terrorism through domestic efforts and participation in multilateral fora such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In 2021, Singapore officially opened the Counterterrorism Information Facility, a Singapore-led initiative for Southeast Asian countries, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to increase information sharing among one another and between military and law enforcement agencies.

Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the People’s Republic of China (the PRC), and New Zealand are members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Regional multilateral organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum, continued to share best practices on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism.

The PRC continued to use counterterrorism as a pretext to repress members of religious and ethnic minority groups, particularly Muslim Uyghurs, and continued efforts to internationalize repressive domestic counterterrorism tactics through regional cooperation and efforts to institutionalize its approach within the UN system.

AUSTRALIA

Overview: In 2022, Australia introduced legislation to strengthen counterterrorism laws, investigated and disrupted suspected terrorist plots, and maintained high levels of cooperation with the United States and other international partners. The Counterterrorism Coordination Center within the Department of Home Affairs is responsible for policy development; whole-of-government coordination, including the use of CT laws relating to citizenship cessation; listing
of terrorist organizations; and treatment of high-risk terrorism offenders. In March, Australia also released its Counterterrorism Strategy 2022, *Safeguarding Our Community Together*, which aims to safeguard Australia from terrorism and violent extremism.

In 2022 the Australian federal budget included AUS$86.7 million ($56.4 million) to support this strategy and protect communities from high-risk terrorists currently serving custodial sentences. The Australian government in March also listed Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist organization for the purposes of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Previously, Australia’s listing was restricted to the Hamas paramilitary wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. In April the government also listed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization. On November 28 the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization lowered the national terrorism threat level from “probable” to “possible” for the first time since 2014, the second-highest level on a five-level scale. The downgrade reflected a domestic assessment and was not reflective of the offshore threat to Australian interests.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** On December 12 an attack by three alleged fundamentalist Christian extremists killed two police officers and a civilian in Wieambilla, Queensland. The three extremists were killed by responding police. The Queensland police deputy commissioner stated it was a religiously motivated terrorist attack.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In September the Australian Parliament introduced the Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorism Financing Amendment (Making Gambling Businesses Accountable) Bill 2022, which would require gambling companies to report if they have reason to believe illegal money was used in gambling. It also would enable the Federal Court to make compensation orders where gambling companies have provided gambling services to a person it suspects has paid for the gambling service with money obtained illegally. In October, Parliament passed the Counterterrorism Legislation Amendment (Australia Federal Police Powers and Other Matters) Bill 2022, which extends for 12 months the sunsetting dates for stop-search-and-seizure powers, control orders, and preventive detention orders. In October, Australia repatriated four women and 13 children from detention camps in Syria that were family members of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). At least 50 Australians, including an estimated 30 children, remain in the camps.

Significant law enforcement actions and judicial determinations in 2022 included the following:

- In February a man was charged with six terrorism-related offenses, including engaging in an act of terrorism with the maximum penalty of life imprisonment following an investigation by the New South Wales Joint Counter Terrorism Team. The man fired at several passing vehicles and pedestrians.
- In April a convicted terrorist was sentenced to a maximum of two years and three months in prison for breaching conditions of a control order.
- In August, former academic Abdussalam Adina-Zada was convicted of inciting terrorism abroad and sentenced to 42 months in prison.
In December, accused ISIS jihadist Neil Prakash was extradited from Türkiye to Victoria state and charged with six terrorism offenses with the maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Australia is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, is a member of the Egmont Group. In November the Australian government reviewed and relisted 27 persons and 36 entities for counterterrorism sanctions until 2025.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Department of Home Affairs coordinates a comprehensive national approach to preventing and countering violent extremism — whether politically, religiously, or racially motivated — as a shared effort involving federal, state, and territorial government agencies. The program’s stated objectives are to combat the threat posed by homegrown terrorism and to discourage Australians from traveling overseas to participate in conflicts. The government’s approach comprises four complementary streams of activity: 1) building strength in diversity and social participation, 2) targeted work with vulnerable communities and institutions, 3) addressing terrorist propaganda online, and 4) diversion and deradicalization. In February, Australia designated the National Socialist Order, formerly known as Atomwaffen Division, as a terrorist group — making it a criminal offense in Australia to be a member.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Australia continued to play an active role in the Global Counterterrorism Forum and was a leading contributor of military support, humanitarian assistance, and efforts to disrupt FTFs. The nation is a financial supporter and board member of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia currently co-chairs the GCTF CVE Working Group with Indonesia. Established in 2012, the Australia-New Zealand Counterterrorism Committee functions as a high-level body. It consists of representatives from the two countries’ federal, state, and territorial governments.

In 2022 the Office of the Counterterrorism Ambassador, within Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, led Australia’s whole-of-government international counterterrorism engagement effort. The prime objective of this effort was to strengthen and deepen international and regional cooperation and build partnerships to counter the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. Through International Counterterrorism Engagement Program grants, Australia funded programs in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to build whole-of-society capacity and capability to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Australia hosted the Likeminded Senior Officials’ Meeting in Sydney for representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States in October and hosted in Sydney (with the United States, India, and Japan) the third Quad Counterterrorism Tabletop Exercise the same month. Australia continues to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partners and in ASEAN-related fora on counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, including technical and regulatory
assistance to develop and implement counterterrorism legislation. The Australian Federal Police works with policing agencies in Southeast Asia.

**PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU)**

**CHINA**

**Overview:** The counterterrorism efforts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to target ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang as so-called extremists for engaging in standard practices of Islam. Beijing considers the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) the primary source of terrorism in Xinjiang. However, the United States has not seen clear and convincing evidence of ETIM’s existence.

The PRC government’s counterterrorism measures have included sprawling detention camps, known officially as “vocational education and training centers,” in which more than one million people are believed to have been detained. The PRC also has prosecuted and imprisoned a large but indeterminate number of Xinjiang residents under its campaign to “strike hard” against alleged terrorists and “extremists,” which was launched in 2014 and under which the PRC continued new prosecutions through the end of 2022, according to PRC law enforcement reporting. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ August 31 assessment of Xinjiang stated the PRC’s imprecise definition of “extremism” and overly broad application of its antiterrorism laws led to a “pattern of large-scale arbitrary detention.” The PRC denies its Xinjiang policies involve human rights abuses, claiming its system of “reeducation” camps exist to “combat separatism and Islamist militancy in the region.” The PRC continued to expand law enforcement tools and enhance its military and counterterrorism capabilities to justify and improve its ability to carry out this repressive campaign.

Since 1999, the People’s Republic of China has been designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated a CPC in 2022.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** PRC officials stated that no violent terrorist incidents occurred in the country. International media reported terrorist-related incidents targeting PRC citizens outside China in 2022, including these two:

- A targeted attack on December 13 of a hotel frequented by PRC citizens by ISIS-Khorasan Province in downtown Kabul, Afghanistan, wounded five PRC citizens.
- A female suicide bomber, working under orders from the Baloch Liberation Army, killed three Chinese teachers from the Confucius Institute in Karachi, Pakistan, on April 27.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The PRC continued to advance and defend its counterterrorism policies, including so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang. In June 2021, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued a revised draft anti-money laundering law for public comment, with the goal of preventing and curbing money laundering and terrorist financing as
well as safeguarding national security. As of this report’s publication, the legislation has not been passed. The PRC routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur “extremists,” and seeks public endorsement of its CT efforts in multilateral forums.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The PRC is a member of FATF, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Its FIU is composed of the PBC headquarters' Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Bureau, the China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center (or CAMLMAC), and PBC branches’ AML divisions. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: The PRC continued to implement broad repressive campaigns in Xinjiang under the guise of countering what the PRC calls extremism, including mass “reeducation” and “vocational training” of predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. The PRC defended its policies in Xinjiang and, in March, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Spokesperson Xu Guixiang stated the United States and other western countries “stepped up their plan to ‘contain China with Xinjiang’ and tried their best to politicize, label, and smear the governance measures adopted in Xinjiang.” Under the pretext of counterterrorism efforts, the PRC used existing domestic laws to actively screen, monitor, and censor its citizens on the internet.

International and Regional Cooperation: The 2022 China Military Power Report catalogued PRC diplomatic and military outreach in support of its global counterterrorism aims, stating that the PRC seeks to “garner the assistance of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens abroad.” The PRC further leveraged involvement in regional security forums, joint border patrols, and international exercises to press its neighbors into adopting its approach to CT operations. In December, countries from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including China, announced they would hold a joint “counterterrorism exercise” in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, scheduled to take place in 2023. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) hosted an international CT forum in August, the first such gathering since 2019 — to focus on international CT cooperation by police and the development of unmanned and intelligent weapons platforms for CT operations. Hosted by the PAP Special Police Academy, military police from 30 countries were invited to the forum, including members of the Beijing Military Attaché Corps.

The PRC also continued efforts to normalize and internationalize its repressive domestic counterterrorism tactics by institutionalizing its approach within the UN system, which the PRC has promoted as the primary international forum for combating terrorism. During a December 15 address to the UN Security Council and the UN Office of Counterterrorism, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations Zhang Jun called on all countries to support the “UN’s central coordinating role” on CT issues and emphasized the “major practical significance” of the PRC’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) for advancing UN
goals to “deepen international CT cooperation, eliminate the root causes of terrorism, and maintain common security and development.” While still ill-defined, both GDI and GSI are major PRC foreign policy initiatives that seek to redefine core tenets of the international system — such as democracy, human rights, and the right to collective security — that the PRC assesses to be in opposition to its counterterrorism, domestic stability, and foreign policy objectives. The PRC also has harnessed the legitimacy provided by its cooperation with UNOCT and other UN agencies to export practical elements of its repressive counterterrorism model when providing training and equipment to governments worldwide, including in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific.

The PRC is also a member of

- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
- The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
- The East Asia Summit
- The Global Counterterrorism Forum
- The SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure

Hong Kong

**Overview:** Historically, Hong Kong has not been a hub or a target for international terrorism groups or violent extremists and has long maintained highly efficient security forces. However, Hong Kong remains an important financial center and transportation hub and is geographically close to countries with known domestic and foreign terrorism issues — including Indonesia and the Philippines — providing a potential nexus for terrorist financing flows or travel. Hong Kong continued security cooperation with the United States through the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s joint implementation of the Container Security Initiative. Hong Kong refuses to cooperate bilaterally with the U.S. government on counterterrorism issues; however, the government cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations. Despite these multilateral efforts, Hong Kong and its law enforcement apparatus could be a stronger partner on counterterrorism and other security challenges, including by sharing more information related to terrorist financing.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** No terrorist incidents were reported in Hong Kong in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Counterterrorism remained an operational priority for the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF). The Police Counterterrorism Response Unit provides a strong deterrent presence, assisting police districts with CT strategy implementation and complementing the tactical and professional support of existing police specialist units, such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, the Special Duties Unit, the Airport Security Unit, and the VIP Protection Unit.

In 2018, the HKG set up the Interdepartmental Counterterrorism Unit (ICTU) to strengthen overall counterterrorism efforts by monitoring global trends, reviewing and improving
counterterrorism strategies in Hong Kong, developing specialized counterterrorism training, and optimizing emergency response plans. The ICTU held its most recent CT exercise in November 2021. It launched a counterterrorism reporting hotline in June, to encourage members of the public to provide intelligence on terrorism or violence-related crimes.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Hong Kong is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In December the Hong Kong Legislative Council passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorist Financing (Amendment) Bill to enhance Hong Kong’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime through the introduction of a licensing requirement for virtual asset services providers and a registration system for dealers in precious metals and stones.

Also in 2022, Hong Kong took disciplinary actions against two foreign banks and a Hong Kong-based prepaid card issuer for major international card organizations. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CFT measures, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 2022 continued to host AML Regtech (regulatory technology) Lab, or AMLab, to allow experimentation with technologies and data analytics for preventing and detecting financial crimes.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no changes to Hong Kong’s CVE programming in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Presidential Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization ended U.S. government-sponsored capacity building training programs for Hong Kong law enforcement in 2020.

The Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) joined an INTERPOL operation conducted during March to May in combating transnational financial crimes and arrested more than 500 people with about a $28 million seizure.

**Macau**

**Overview:** Historically, the Macau government has not been a proactive partner on counterterrorism matters, including intelligence sharing. Macau is not a known hub or a target for international terrorism groups or violent extremists and maintains highly efficient security services. The strict travel restrictions put in place by the Macau government for much of the last three years because of the COVID-19 pandemic further reduced the likelihood of foreign terrorist threats to the city.
Macau is one of the most popular destinations for gambling globally and is geographically close to countries with known domestic and foreign terrorism issues, including Indonesia and the Philippines. When international travel returns to prepandemic levels, the city could potentially become a location for facilitating terrorist financing activities. The Police Intervention Tactical Unit (UTIP) branch of the Macau Public Security Police Force is responsible for counterterrorism issues. UTIP’s responsibilities include protecting important installations and dignitaries and deactivateing IEDs. Macau cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations. Despite these efforts, Macau and its law enforcement apparatus could be a stronger partner on counterterrorism and other security challenges, including by sharing more information related to terrorist financing.

In 2020 the Macau government devised and published Law No. 14/2020 and Administrative Regulation No. 35/2020. The legislation created the Terrorism Crimes Alert Division under the framework of the Judiciary Police (PJ) and empowered the new division with the mission to create an information system for combating terrorism and monitoring, alerting, and communicating information related to terrorism activities.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: No terrorist incidents were reported in Macau in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Macau is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Office (GIF), is a member of the Egmont Group.

In November the GIF provided training for officials and practitioners on topics such as common money laundering crimes encountered by the financial industry.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no changes to Macau’s CVE programming in 2022.

International and Regional Cooperation: Macau’s PJ conducted its annual Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau tripartite “Thunderbolt” policing operation with the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department and the HKPF in two phases from May to July, and again in September, with AML/CFT being one of the primary emphases of the operation.

In November the GIF held an online exchange meeting with the China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center to discuss trends and analysis of cross-border suspicious transactions involving the two regions and raised suggestions for optimizing the execution of financial intelligence exchanges.

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INDONESIA
Overview: Indonesia continued efforts to detect, disrupt, degrade, and deny safe haven for terrorist groups operating within its borders. The country’s counterterrorism agencies work cooperatively with U.S. government law enforcement agencies. While not a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Indonesian government and most civil society leaders denounce ISIS and support CVE efforts in tandem with a robust civilian-led law enforcement effort against terrorists. The Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) considers Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to be the most dangerous terrorist group currently operating in the country. BNPT assesses that Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) is dangerous but disorganized, and thus also remains a priority for law enforcement.

In 2022, Indonesia arrested and charged several hundred individuals for their affiliation with terrorist groups, including members of JI and JAD, demonstrating Indonesia’s sustained counterterrorism effort. However, because the average sentence for convicted terrorists is less than three years, the need for post-release deradicalization programs and monitoring resources is expected to increase.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: According to the Indonesian National Police (INP), there were two terrorist attacks in Indonesia in 2022:

- On December 7, a 34-year-old Indonesian man with alleged membership in JAD detonated an explosive device that killed one police officer and wounded 11 people at a police station in Bandung, West Java. The Indonesian Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) identified the attacker as Agus Sujatno, who was also killed in the attack. Sujatno previously had been convicted of providing explosives and material support for an attack in Bandung in 2017, but he was released in 2021 after a four-year prison sentence.

- On October 25, a 24-year-old Indonesian woman, Siti Elina, attempted to trespass onto the Presidential Palace of Indonesia, armed with a pistol, and was arrested by the INP. Indonesian counterterrorism agencies suspected Elina of being an Islamic State of Indonesia sympathizer who was radicalized to violence by a religious teacher seeking to indoctrinate students to wage war on the Indonesian state.

Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security: The 2018 Law on Counterterrorism is the controlling legal mandate and authority for Indonesian counterterrorism agencies. In 2022, Indonesia’s Congress passed a revised criminal code that incorporates the 2018 counterterrorism law but does not modify it. To provide a secure trial, terrorist suspects are currently tried in two courts in Jakarta. Although courts report a 100 percent conviction rate on counterterrorism cases, sentences average only about three years. Reluctance to share information broadly within the Indonesian government impedes the work of investigators and prosecutors, and in some high-profile cases the sentences for convicted terrorists were lenient.

Indonesian counterterrorism efforts are led by civilians within the INP with primary investigative responsibility assigned to the special counterterrorism unit “Densus 88.” The INP, including Densus 88, received ongoing training and capacity building assistance from the U.S.
government. In 2022, Densus 88 reported the arrests of several hundred suspected terrorists from JI and JAD in addition to the elimination of the terrorist group Mujahidin Indonesia Timur. The INP also claimed successes in its deradicalization programs, which encouraged several prominent terrorists to renounce violence. In addition to Densus 88, the INP uses its Mobile Brigade Corps (Korps BRIMOB l) for counterterrorism, riot control, hostage rescue, and bomb disposal operations. Although Indonesian counterterrorism efforts are civilian led, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) are authorized to support counterterrorism primarily through the TNI Special Forces Command (Kopassus).

The Indonesian government has integrated INTERPOL databases for terrorist screening at points of entry, but ongoing information-sharing challenges at times hinder the effectiveness of screening efforts. The BNPT has committed to developing a national terrorist watchlist and acknowledges that responsibility, consistent with UN Security Council resolutions 2396 and 2309. However, significant roadblocks to information-sharing persist owing to unconnected technology platforms that vary across provinces and government agencies.

Indonesian government policy is to refuse the return of Indonesian FTFs to Indonesia. The government considers repatriation of children of FTFs under age 10 on a case-by-case basis. In 2022, the Indonesian Embassy in Baghdad coordinated the repatriation of four children of alleged FTFs serving jail sentences. According to civil society organizations, the children have undergone deradicalization programming sponsored by Indonesian counterterrorism agencies. However, the deradicalization programs appeared to be case specific and not part of a formalized approach.

Although some Indonesian government officials have publicly proposed designating Papuan armed groups as terrorist organizations, government agencies have yet to officially designate them as such. After a July 16 attack by a Papuan armed group that killed 10 people, a senior Indonesian official said that the Indonesian Cabinet classified Papuan armed groups as terrorist organizations. But by the end of 2022, prosecutors and investigators working for CT agencies reported that they had not received formal authorization to prosecute or investigate Papuan groups under the counterterrorism law. In 2022, three UN Special Rapporteurs raised concerns about extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and the forced displacement of an estimated 5,000 Indigenous Papuans since April. In addition, there were concerns that extrajudicial killings in Papua could increase further, should Indonesian government agencies formally label the Papuan groups as terrorist organizations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Indonesia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and currently an observer at FATF. Its FIU, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, is a member of the Egmont Group. The results of Indonesia’s 2022 FATF mutual evaluation fell short of requirements for FATF membership. However, Indonesia is seeking to adopt recommendations that would allow it to become a full member in 2023. From 2017 to 2022, Indonesia froze 134 financial institutions’ accounts in response to designations made by Indonesian counterterrorism agencies and the United Nations.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The BNPT and INP lead Indonesian government efforts on CVE with assistance from ministries dealing with social and religious affairs. Indonesia’s National Action Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (NAP-CVE) is a multiagency effort based on a Presidential Executive Order from 2021. In 2022, the BNPT evaluated progress on NAP-CVE implementation, reporting that there were successes but also noting that the COVID pandemic delayed program implementation on most goals. In 2022 the INP continued to use former terrorists in its public messaging to demonstrate the success of its deradicalization program. Umar Patek, a terrorist convicted for his role in the Bali bombings in 2002, has featured prominently in the messaging campaign. Patek was released from prison in December after serving 11 years of his 20-year sentence. In exchange for leniency, Patek pledged loyalty to Indonesia and renounced terrorism.

In 2022, Indonesian government messaging was focused on narratives intended to weaken the appeal of terrorism. Both the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, which oversees public schools and universities, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which oversees Islamic boarding schools and universities, have programs intended to prevent student radicalization. The national mosque, Istiqlal, whose head imam is a government appointee, has led training programs on counter radicalization for youth. The government disseminated these programs throughout mosque networks and media entities to promote messages of tolerance.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Indonesia continued to support counterterrorism efforts in several regional and multilateral organizations:

- The United Nations
- The Global Counterterrorism Forum
- The Aqaba Process (hosted by the Jordanian Government)
- ASEAN
  - ASEAN Regional Forum on Countering Violent Extremism
  - ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings
  - ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights

The BNPT is the chair of the Working Group on Counterterrorism of the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime. In 2022, Indonesia led coordination among ASEAN sectoral bodies to implement CVE efforts under the Bali Workplan. In August, Indonesia, in partnership with the Department of State and the United Nations Office on Counterterrorism, hosted the second ASEAN-U.S. Regional Workshop on CVE. Indonesia continued to use the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation as a regional training center for counterterrorism officials. Indonesia also continued to participate in multilateral fora, including the Aqaba process, which held its Southeast Asia Expert-Level Meeting in Bali in November. Indonesia co-chairs the GCTF’s CVE Working Group with Australia.
**Overview:** Malaysia sustained counterterrorism efforts to monitor, arrest, deport, prosecute, and rehabilitate suspected terrorists and supporters of terrorist groups in 2022. Malaysian law enforcement and other officials cooperated with the United States and regional partners to detect and disrupt terrorist travel, deny safe haven for terrorist networks, and prevent violent extremism. The country is a transit point and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for members of terrorist groups, including ISIS, Abu Sayyaf Group, and al-Qa’ida. Malaysia promotes a whole-of-government approach to counter radicalization and recruitment.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Malaysia in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Malaysian government did not make any changes to its security-related laws, including the Security Offense Special Measures Act, the Prevention Against Terrorism Act, or the Sedition Act in 2022. Human rights organizations advocated for a repeal of the laws, expressing concern that provisions that allow detention without trial are inconsistent with widely accepted practices and standards. The government announced plans to create a single border control agency, which will consolidate the functions of more than 20 government agencies. It also was developing a new electronic national immigration database to replace the current, 20-year-old, system.

The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit has the lead counterterrorism law enforcement role for detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism and terrorist travel in the country. The RMP reported two terrorism-related arrests in 2022. There were no media reports of prosecution of terrorism-related suspects.

**Foreign Terrorist Fighters:** Malaysian authorities reported one Malaysian repatriated from Syria in 2022. The government has reportedly repatriated 18 foreign terrorist fighters and related family members to Malaysia from Syria and Iraq since 2019. The returnees included 14 adults and four children, with eight of the adults serving criminal sentences, according to media reports. Malaysian officials estimate that about 50 of its citizens remain in Syria. The Malaysian government allowed its citizens to return, provided they participate in a government-run rehabilitation program.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Malaysia is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit Malaysia, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Malaysian government prepared a draft national action plan on preventing and countering violent extremism in 2022 and expects to finalize it in 2023.
It will provide an integrated and coordinated approach to the government’s efforts to counter violent extremism, according to officials.

In 2022 the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) actively promoted a whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering violent extremism. SEARCCT organized 28 programs for government officials, academics, civil society organizations, media, and youth in 2022. These efforts included public awareness campaigns, capacity building workshops, webinars, and publications on detecting and countering radicalization, crisis communications, and cybersecurity. SEARCCT produced a podcast, video clips, digital campaigns, and public service announcements on counterterrorism narratives to encourage youth engagement and prevent radicalization. Episodes have been published in both Malay and English. SEARCCT officials participated in several multilateral and UN-organized regional and international events.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Malaysia continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Malaysian officials participated in numerous counterterrorism events hosted by the UN, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit.

**PHILIPPINES**

**Overview:** The Government of the Philippines (GPH) continued to dedicate significant resources to countering threats from terrorist groups that operate primarily, but not exclusively, in the country’s southern regions. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and civilian law enforcement units remained engaged in CT operations. AFP, law enforcement, judicial authorities, and corrections participated in numerous U.S. capacity building programs, using received training and donated logistics to detect, degrade, prevent, and respond to terrorist incidents.

Under the Kapit Bisig agreement, the U.S. military continues to partner with the AFP in an “advise and assist” capacity in Mindanao focused on the threat from ISIS-East Asia (ISIS-EA) and affiliated groups. ISIS affiliates, in addition to ISIS-EA, that remained active in 2022 included elements of the following groups: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines, and rogue elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF accepted a peace plan that created the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (or BARMM) in 2019 and formally renounced terrorism. The attacks listed in the Statistical Annex (Appendix A) attributed to MILF are presumably carried out by rogue elements of that organization.

The Communist Party of the Philippines/The National People’s Army (aka the New People’s Army) carried out the most terrorist attacks in the Philippines during this reporting period. The National People’s Army (NPA) continued to recruit, fundraise, and stage attacks on security forces and civilians alike.
In 2022 the GPH continued plans to recast the AFP from an agency responsible primarily for combating terrorism, to one focusing on territorial defense / external security. Eventually, the lead CT agency will be the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). SAF has received numerous trainings and logistical donations for several years, including in 2022.

SAF primarily works with the U.S. military in the Mindanao region. As a result of the upcoming transition, the Bureau of Counterterrorism Programs Office has conducted several assessments of the Mindanao region’s civilian rule-of-law units, to include police, justice, and corrections. Because of the continued pressure by Philippine authorities, the number of arrests and surrenders of individuals facing terrorism charges increased in 2022.

Human rights organizations continued to raise concerns over security forces’ “red tagging” of civil society advocates and human rights defenders as communists or terrorists or both, which has led to threats, harassment, and killings of the red-tagged individuals.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist attacks using explosive devices and firearms continued to target civilians, critical infrastructure, and security forces. Significant attacks in 2022 included these three:

- On August 10, rogue elements of the MILF carried out an assault in Cotabato using small arms against an unidentified target. Four civilians were killed.
- On October 15 the ASG assaulted the AFP in Basilan. One soldier died, and two soldiers were wounded.
- On November 10, rogue elements of the MILF attacked the AFP in Basilan, killing three soldiers and injuring 17.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Antiterrorism Act (ATA) was signed into law in 2020 and was developed with assistance from the United States. The GPH maintains that that the ATA is one of the most important pieces of legislation that addresses security and protection of its citizens from potential terrorist acts. In addition to numerous police, justice, aviation security, and border programs, a corrections pilot program was resumed by Philippine authorities post-COVID in a Manila jail that holds the most terrorist detainees. The goal is better management of high-profile detainees while maintaining human rights and best practices. With international assistance and interagency cooperation, the GPH has made significant progress in 2022 by increasing its ability to identify, investigate, and prosecute terrorist actions.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Council, is a member of the Egmont Group. The Philippines remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported the Philippines had taken steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime, including by increasing the resources
of its FIU, using its targeted financial sanctions (TFS) framework for terrorist financing (TF), implementing registration requirements and applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators, increasing TF investigation and prosecution capacity, demonstrating that appropriate measures are being taken with respect to the non-profit sector, and implementing supervision for TFS. The Philippines has until the end of 2023 to resolve all strategic deficiencies.

Philippine units working on TF have also increased their capabilities in proportion to the number of cases. In 2022 an additional four TF cases were filed for prosecution, involving 60 criminal counts and 20 defendants. During TF investigations, five additional money laundering cases, not related to terrorism, were opened against nine defendants.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The GPH has a National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and has developed and implemented CVE training for security forces and civil servants. Local governments, NGOs, and the private sector partner on CVE programs. The AFP and the PNP work with local stakeholders to encourage surrenders from the NPA, ASG, BIFF, and the ISIS-East Asia, as well as to reintegrate former terrorist fighters and family members.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The Philippines continued to support CT efforts in several regional and multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, and APEC.

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**SINGAPORE**

**Overview:** Singapore continued to identify counterterrorism as the nation’s top security policy priority and has a comprehensive CT strategy based on global and regional trends. The strategy included vigilant security measures, regional and international law enforcement cooperation, efforts to counter radicalization to violence, and a campaign to prepare the populace for possible attacks. Singapore was a committed, active, and effective CT partner in 2022. CT remained a pillar of the security relationship between Singaporean and U.S. law enforcement and security services. Cooperation on CT and information sharing continued throughout the year. Singapore’s domestic CT apparatus and its ability to detect, deter, and disrupt threats remained effective. The government’s “Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2022” identified global terrorist networks and domestically self-radicalized individuals influenced by online material as the prime terrorism threats.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Singapore in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists. The ISA authorizes the Ministry of Home Affairs,
with the consent of the president, to order arrests and detentions without a warrant, a trial, or full judicial due process, if it is determined that individuals pose a threat to national security. In February, Singapore amended legislation to criminalize the use of aircrafts as weapons, the use of nuclear and biochemical weapons on planes, and cyberattacks on air navigation facilities.

Singapore detained at least four individuals under the ISA for terrorism-related activities in 2022. Three suspects had allegedly planned to travel overseas to partake in armed violence or to stage attacks in Singapore. One case involved a senior member of the Singapore Jemaah Islamiah network who was deported to Singapore upon completion of a prison sentence overseas. The Government of Singapore (GoS) released three citizens who were previously detained under the ISA after assessing their rehabilitation progress and determining the individuals no longer posed a security threat that required preventive detention. The GoS allowed restriction orders against three individuals to lapse.

Security forces continued to be on heightened alert and the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) enhanced border security measures and patrols. Singapore’s law enforcement and security services were capable of proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism, including through interagency cooperation, regular exercises, and information sharing. In May, SPF and the Singapore Armed Forces conducted a countrywide counterterrorism exercise focused on soft targets.

Singapore maintained a “not if, but when” stance regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the country. The government’s SGSecure public awareness campaign, which aimed to enhance emergency preparedness and community resilience, used online programs and training sessions during the COVID-19 global pandemic. Under SGSecure, different government agencies also reached out to various segments of the community — such as schools, workplaces, and religious organizations — to heighten awareness of terrorism and coordinate on possible responses.

To detect possible terrorist movements by air into or transiting through the country, Singapore’s primary border security agency, ICA, implemented Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data collection in 2019. ICA enhanced its border capabilities by operationalizing a multi-modal biometrics clearance concept to detect fraudulent travel documents. In May, Singapore denied entry by sea to an Indonesian preacher and his six travel companions over his “extremist” and segregationist teachings.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Singapore is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In July, Singapore assumed a two-year term as FATF president. In October, Singapore published a national strategy to counter terrorist financing. This strategy, based on findings from an assessment of terrorist financing risks from 2020, focuses on a coordinated and comprehensive risk identification, a strong legal and sanctions framework, a robust regulatory regime, decisive
law enforcement actions, and international partnerships and cooperation. Also in 2022, Singapore convicted and sentenced a Bangladeshi man under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act to more than two years in prison for financially supporting ISIS and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government encourages interreligious and interethnic dialogue through Racial and Religious Harmony Circles, the interagency Aftercare Group, and the local community fora that bring leaders from Singapore’s religious and ethnic communities together to discuss issues of concern and build trust. The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Islamic authority in charge of Muslim affairs, maintains a social media presence and holds outreach and educational events to counter terrorist propaganda and recruitment efforts. MUIS manages the Asatizah Recognition Scheme that vets Islamic Religious Council teachers and scholars in Singapore.

The International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) both counter violent extremism. The RRG, a volunteer organization made up of religious scholars and teachers, counseled detainees held under the ISA through a comprehensive program involving religious and psychological counseling. RRG’s goal is to prevent radicalization to violence in the first place and deradicalize individuals before their successful reintegration into society. RRG also operates a resource and counseling center for the Muslim community and held virtual community events and engagement sessions during the pandemic, including to raise awareness about the threats of online radicalization to violence. The group resumed in-person events in 2022. RRG and the Interagency Aftercare Group also conduct counter-ideology outreach activities for students and youths. In February the government launched the Logistical Transport Industry Safety and Security Watch Group together with the Singapore Transport Association to share information to counter threats of terrorism and crime involving vehicles.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Singapore is an active participant in CT cooperation efforts in ASEAN and APEC. The nation is a strong advocate for the ASEAN “Our Eyes” regional initiative, which strives for ministerial-level CT information sharing. Singapore participated in the Third Subregional Meeting on Counterterrorism in December and the “No Money for Terror” Ministerial Conference on counterterrorism financing in India. Singapore also participated in the Aqaba Process Meeting in Jordan in September that focused on enhancing global coordination and cooperation to counter terrorism and in INTERPOL’s Project Pacific working group to discuss counterterrorism issues in November. Singapore founded and hosts the Counterterrorism Information Facility (CTIF), a Singapore-led initiative to increase information sharing between military and law enforcement agencies with representatives from nine countries. In operation since January 2021, the United States supports the CTIF by maintaining a U.S. law enforcement and military official at the facility to contribute to CT information sharing.
Overview: Thailand did not experience any attacks attributed to transnational terrorist groups in 2022. Violence was limited to attacks attributed to ethnonationalist insurgents in the country’s Deep South, comprising the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and parts of Songkhla, which have endured episodic violence since the conflict reignited in 2004. Violence levels in the Deep South in 2022 remained low, sustaining a multiyear trend. There is no evidence to date of any operational links between domestic insurgents and international terrorist networks. In 2022, Thailand remained a productive counterterrorism partner and party to several international cooperations fora. Thai officials covering counterterrorism portfolios focused on updating domestic counterterrorism policies.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The number of violent extremist attacks in 2022 likely increased slightly from 2021, with a correspondingly slight increase in fatalities, though a lack of accurate reporting prevents confirmation of the number of attacks and the parties responsible. Violence remained confined to Thailand’s southernmost provinces, where insurgents used a combination of small arms, IEDs, and vehicle-borne IEDs to attack mostly security or government-linked targets.

- On May 25, a combined IED and small-arms attack on a police station injured one soldier and two territorial defense volunteers in Narathiwat province.
- On June 20, violent extremists used a VBIED to attack a police checkpoint on a highway in Pattani Province, injuring three officials.
- On August 17, a series of IED and arson attacks on 18 gas stations in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala Provinces left one civilian dead and seven others injured. The targeted stores are owned by a business conglomerate with close ties to the Thai government.
- On November 22, a VBIED attack on a police barracks in Narathiwat killed one police official and injured 31 other people.
- On December 3, an IED attack on a freight train in Songkhla province derailed the train. Three days later, an IED attack targeting the railway repair workers killed three railway employees and injured four other persons.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2022, Thailand continued drafting its updated four-year National Counterterrorism Strategy for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. Under the previous strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained plans for collaboration with foreign governments, and it is expected that this updated plan will follow suit.

Thailand’s law enforcement authorities continue to demonstrate capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Multiple entities including the Royal Thai Police (RTP), the Department of Special Investigation, and components of the Thai military have law enforcement responsibilities on counterterrorism cases. In the Deep South, the military and law enforcement share counterterrorism responsibilities.

Information sharing and interagency coordination between offices with counterterrorism responsibilities remained an occasional challenge, including on border security.
issues. Thailand’s immigration system is connected in real time with INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database. Since 2016, Thailand has collected and analyzed Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record data on commercial flights at all international airports.

Thailand has continued to host and participate in courses to boost its counterterrorism capabilities, including at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. In 2022 the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance program provided extensive training to the RTP, covering counterterrorism-related topics such as cyber investigation techniques, explosive ordnance disposal workshops, and training on information sharing.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Thailand is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Office, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2022, Thai officials drafted, but had not yet published, a new action plan on CVE. The plan will focus on mental health resources and bullying, after a former police official killed 37 people, including himself, in an attack on a school in Uthai Sawan, Nong Bua Lamphu province, on October 7. The national counterterrorism strategy, published in 2017, included a CVE component, and the National Security Policy and Plan (2019-22), published in 2019, includes regionally specific security plans that concentrate on extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** There were no changes in 2022. Thailand remains a member of regional and international multilateral fora, through which it participates in counterterrorism efforts, including ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings+, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC.
EUROPE

Overview

U.S. and European partner counterterrorism (CT) strategies continued to align in 2022, as the United States increased its CT emphasis on diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and building partners’ capacity. The Biden Administration made repatriation of foreign ISIS fighters and associated family members remaining in northeast Syria following the territorial defeat of ISIS a priority, and European partners worked in partnership with the United States to repatriate their nationals from detention centers and al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps. ISIS remained an ideological influence, despite its lack of any physical territory, and continued seeking to project power by recruiting from European countries and inspiring attacks against European targets and public spaces.

U.S. policy, programs, and relations with European states and the European Union were strengthened by the outbreak of a major war on the European continent. Central, Eastern, and Southern European countries continued to be the target of state-sponsored Russian disinformation and propaganda, seeking to co-opt racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) movements to undermine current and candidate members of NATO and the EU.

Foreign terrorist groups in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans sought to take advantage of active illicit smuggling and trafficking networks to attempt to facilitate entry of terrorists into Europe from the Middle East and South Asia. Türkiye, given its geographic location, remained a transit point for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) departing neighboring countries. Most terrorist incidents in Europe involved simple plots with easily executable tactics, using knives, guns, or vehicles to injure or kill targets of opportunity in France, Germany, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Europe continued to face ongoing terrorist threats and concerns, including from U.S.-designated terrorist groups, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVEs), and Islamist terrorism. Many European governments expressed concern about the growing threat posed by REMVE actors since they actively work to engage, recruit, and radicalize to violence online.

The United States supported partners across Europe in their efforts to build counterterrorism capacity through technical assistance, trainings, and mentorship.

The key areas of counterterrorism assistance were:

- Strengthening aviation and border security
- Countering terrorist financing
- Increasing information and intelligence sharing
- Preventing the spread of violent extremism in communities
- Understanding the collection of battlefield evidence
Increasing capacity of local law enforcement and rule-of-law practitioners to conduct terrorism and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and appropriate sentencing

In 2022, both the United States and European countries grappled with the threat of lone actors attacking public spaces and citizens and European partners undertook additional efforts to further develop and expand regional cooperation mechanisms to detect and interdict terrorist travel and other terrorism-related activities.

ALBANIA

Overview: Albania continued its strong support of international counterterrorism efforts in 2022, repatriating 13 of its nationals from al-Hol displaced persons camp in Syria and engaging in the process of reintegrating and rehabilitating them throughout the year. The country has adopted national strategies on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) through 2025 and is revising the CVE strategy. The terrorism threat in Albania consists of foreign terrorist organizations’ attempts to radicalize Albanian youth to violence.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Albania in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In Albania it is illegal to join a terrorist organization, to provide and participate in terrorism-related training, to provide material support (including financing) to a terrorist organization, and to participate in a foreign army.

The Albanian State Police Counterterrorism Unit (the CTU) worked closely with U.S. agencies to align Albanian government CT efforts with U.S. expertise and resources, ensuring the Albanian government develops focused CT capabilities. The CTU received extensive training and equipment throughout the year from the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program.

The Special Prosecution Office for Organized Crime and Corruption charged two persons with incitement and propaganda in favor of terrorist organization ISIS based on investigations performed by the Albanian State Police Counterterrorism Unit (CTU). In December the Special Court for Organized Crime and Corruption sentenced an Iranian citizen to 15 years in prison for preparing terrorist acts.

On May 28, Albania successfully repatriated 13 nationals from displaced persons camps in Syria. The Albanian government’s CVE Center directed the rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals and coordinated the efforts of various ministries, international donors, civil society members, and non-governmental organizations to support these efforts. This was the second repatriation in a 12-month period conducted by the Albanian authorities, for a total of 38 repatriated women and children.
Corruption and barriers to information sharing among government agencies, insufficient intra-agency coordination, and a weak judicial system continued to hinder Albania’s law enforcement efforts at all levels, including those related to countering terrorism. Implementation of deep reforms in the judicial sector continued. Vetting of Albania’s 800 judges and prosecutors for corruption, competence, and ties to organized crime was 75 percent complete at year’s end.

Albania has committed to enhancing its border security and screening efforts to interdict terrorist travel, with support from U.S. experts and programs. Albanian law enforcement services cooperate extensively with INTERPOL and other international law enforcement bodies. The country continues work to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 2396 regarding Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records data and established a Passenger Information Unit with support from the United States. Albania sustains a port security oversight system to implement the requirements under the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Albania is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group. Albania remained on FATF’s “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported that Albania took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime, including by finalizing the registration of real estate property, completing a long-term project to reduce the informal economy, enhancing the focus and efforts of law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities on applying the full range of seizure and confiscation measures, enacting an adequate legal framework for violations of company and non-profit organization registration obligations, and implementing proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against entities that failed to declare their beneficial owners in the registry by the deadline. In its May follow-up report, Albania noted progress in addressing identified technical compliance deficiencies.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Government of Albania has a national CVE strategy through 2025 and has been drafting a new one. The National CVE center coordinates and manages CVE programming among international donors and seeks to ensure all ministries cooperate effectively and avoid duplication of efforts. The National CVE center coordinated and managed the reception, rehabilitation, and reintegration of all women and children returnees. The National CVE center has been sought out for advice by other countries because of its successes with reintegration.

Embassy Tirana supports CVE efforts with a wide range of assistance programs and diplomatic engagement, including to local community groups that identify and mitigate factors underlying violent extremism. The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, in close
coordination with the National CVE Center, funds three organizations that work on CVE issues: The Institute for Democracy and Mediation, the Counseling Line for Women, and *Terre des Hommes*.

The Department of State oversaw the implementation of a sixth CVE grant to the Albanian Muslim Community, which included engagement by Islamic clergy with at-risk youths, their parents, and civic leaders to steer youth away from radicalization to violence, as well as informing them about democratic principles, human rights, civic engagement, and tolerance.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Albania is a member of the Adriatic Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, the United Nations, and the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (Hedayah). In 2022, it continued to serve as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council. Albanian criminal-justice officials participated regularly in various regional associations, conferences, and other counterterrorism information-sharing exchanges.

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**AUSTRIA**

**Overview:** U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation remained strong in 2022. Austria passed new antiterrorism legislation regarding the imprisonment of those convicted twice for terrorism offenses. Parliament continued to implement 2021 reforms that replaced the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism, Austria’s key counterterrorism agency within the Interior Ministry, with the Directorate for State Security and Intelligence.

Austrian authorities monitor an estimated 100 people who returned to Austria from conflict zones. About 70 of them are believed to still be in Austria, and seven are serving prison sentences. The government estimated that about 100 Austrian FTFs were still in conflict zones. Overall, Austrian officials note that “Islamist terrorist” mobilization substantially declined after 2015.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist attacks in Austria in 2022. Since the 2020 attack by an ISIS sympathizer in Vienna, investigators determined the terrorist carried out the attack alone but received encouragement from four ISIS sympathizers, and he received support, including assistance obtaining ammunition, from three others. Six suspected accomplices were charged. Their trial began in October and continued to the end of the year.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Parliament passed a law in 2022 granting courts the authority to impose tougher criminal penalties on those convicted twice for terrorism offenses. Offenders who were convicted of a terrorist offense and served a prison sentence of at least 12 months and were then convicted a second time with a sentence of at least 16 months, can be imprisoned up to an additional 10 years in a high-security prison and receive anti-radicalization from violence measures during that time.
Austria continued to investigate those suspected of promoting REMVE, as well as around 100 individuals believed to be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas suspected of possible involvement in terrorism. Austrian law enforcement and DSN officials routinely cooperated with U.S. law enforcement in a range of areas, such as counterterrorism, including through joint investigative projects and enforcement operations.

Austria has taken a whole-of-government approach to implementing UN Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism, as well as the Global Counterterrorism Forum Good Practices on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of FTFs. Austrian law criminalizes “travel for terrorism purposes” with prison sentences of six months to five years, extends domestic jurisdiction to individuals in Austria who committed a crime abroad, and ensures legal counsel for terror victims. Austrian law implements the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Temporary border checks with Schengen Zone neighbor countries, introduced in 2016, remained in place. In December, Austria decided to end additional border controls at checkpoints on the border with Slovakia, implemented as a temporary measure to counter irregular migration in September. Regulations allow border authorities to prevent minors from leaving Austria on suspicion they would participate in foreign fighting activities. Border security forces continued to make use of security measures, including biographic and biometric screening at ports of entry, as well as information sharing internally and with other EU member states. Austria’s rigorous processes to register and screen individuals applying for asylum, lawful residence, and citizenship remained unchanged in 2022. EU and Austrian privacy statutes occasionally limit Austria’s ability to fully utilize tools available through international cooperation.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Austria is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Austria’s national action plan on “Extremism Prevention and Deradicalization” calls for improved networking among law enforcement agencies and civil society institutions; extension of exit programs for individuals radicalized to violence; better “transition management” through decoupling of terrorism convicts from their terrorist communities; increased civics and democracy education in schools; research on violent extremist and antidemocratic movements; providing counternarratives to radicalization to violence myths through information campaigns; and inclusion of the findings of Austria’s Documentation Center of Political Islam, which was established in 2020. As part of this effort, Austria in 2022 hosted the Vienna Forum on Countering Segregation and Extremism in the Context of Integration.
The Ministry of European and International Affairs continued its cooperation with the Islamic faith community to conduct information campaigns, including on CVE, in mosques, Islamic organizations, community centers, and prisons.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Austria agreed to have biennial consultations on police cooperation and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism with Türkiye. Austria participates in Eurojust’s EU-wide register, which lists ongoing terrorism investigations by EU member states.

Austria’s membership in International Organizations with a CT Focus:

- UN
- EU
- Council of Europe
- OSCE
- Salzburg Forum
- Central European Initiative
- Western Balkans Counterterrorism Initiative

**BELGIUM**

**Overview:** Belgium in 2022 had an active counterterrorism policy that included robust domestic security efforts, international information sharing, and support for multilateral efforts. The country’s greatest terrorism threat remained homegrown terrorism carried out by lone actors, whether inspired by Islamist terrorism or, to a lesser extent, REMVE, which Belgium calls “violent right-wing extremism.” The general threat level during 2022 remained at 2 on a four-point scale, with 4 the most severe. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, authorities noted an increase in “right-wing extremist propaganda,” especially online.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There was a stabbing attack in Brussels in November that authorities claimed was related to violent extremism. The attack resulted in the death of one police officer and the serious injuring of a second.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Belgium’s primary CT-related agencies included the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice, together with both federal and local police, the civilian and military security and intelligence services, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor, the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, and the National Security Council. The Ministry of Interior maintained a crisis center. An interagency body called the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), comprising representatives of the relevant ministries, was responsible for setting nationwide threat-level ratings and maintaining Belgium’s database of individuals with a nexus to terror. Belgium’s law enforcement capacity, though underfunded, was capable and experienced in responding to and deterring terrorist activity. During 2022, CUTA reportedly was tracking about 700 people for links to terrorism, up from 675 the year before.
During 2022, Belgium’s Parliament did not pass any legislation that would alter Belgium’s ability to investigate, prosecute, or deter terrorism. Challenges to effective counterterrorism efforts continued to include Belgium’s complex government structure; the difficulty of information sharing between various agencies at different levels of government; data collection and retention regulations; short prison sentences; and bureaucratic hurdles to the full use of civil informants. Belgium implemented United Nations Security Council resolution 2396 through, among other actions, the implementation of the EU Passenger Name Record directive for air travelers, through its aggressive prosecution of known FTFs, often *in absentia*, and through its maintenance of databases to track known and suspected terrorists.

On December 4 the Belgian judiciary began the trial of 10 individuals accused of participating in or aiding the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels. The trial is the largest in Belgium’s history and was expected to take several months before a verdict is reached.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Belgium is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2021, Belgium replaced its plan to counter radicalization to violence, “Plan R,” with a new counterterrorism strategy. Known as “StrategyTer,” the new plan expands the strategy to include “far right” and “far-left extremism.” It better incorporates the various federal, regional, and community government and social actors in concentrating on preventing violent extremism. The plan reinforces the local task forces established under Plan R to coordinate the CVE response among local security, municipal, NGO, and social services personnel. During 2022, the Belgian cities of Antwerp, Liège, and Vilvoorde remained part of the Strong Cities Network and participated in SCN events in the Netherlands.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Belgium participated in CT efforts with the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, and it was a member of the advisory board of the UN Counterterrorism Center. The country also was an active contributor to the subcommittees of the UNSC responsible for counterterrorism. Belgium was a troop-contributing member of Operation Inherent Resolve, the European Union Training Mission in Mali, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Belgium participated in EU efforts to interdict FTF travel across land and maritime borders, encouraged efforts to strengthen Schengen Zone external borders, and maintained a leading role in the European Strategic Communication Network.

The nation was not a member of the GCTF but often participated as an observer. CUTA represents Belgium on the newly created EU Network of Prevent Policy-Makers, which is dedicated primarily to the fight against violent extremism.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner, despite its limited capacity. BiH has outlawed travel overseas to fight in foreign armed forces since 2014. More than 100 BiH nationals, including FTFs and associated family members, remain in Iraq and Syria. BiH continued to be a willing partner in repatriating FTFs and their family members. In December the presidency authorized the Ministry of Security (MoS) to coordinate the repatriation of BiH nationals from Syria and Iraq, although BiH’s capacity to undertake such an operation remains limited. On CT investigations, infighting and stove piping continued to undermine effective cooperation, although the State Prosecutor’s Office (SPO)-led CT Task Force and a separate CT Working Group continued to meet.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in BiH in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Council of Ministers (CoM) in November adopted the long-delayed 2021-26 Strategy for the Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism. The document is required by several international organizations and is part of the country’s EU integration process. The strategy attempts to establish mechanisms at all levels of government for the prevention of terrorism and to mitigate radicalization to violence and violent extremism. The MoS-led Intersectoral Coordination Body plan for the repatriation of BiH nationals from Syria and Iraq was adopted by the CoM in August.

The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) continues to be the lead law enforcement unit performing CT functions. However, poor cooperation with the SPO limits its effectiveness. Though SIPA leadership has long advocated for changes to its Rulebook on Internal Organization that would create a CT department, bureaucratic inaction has delayed the process. BiH does not have clear guidelines governing cooperation among prosecutors, law enforcement, and the intelligence community in national security investigations.

The SPO and SIPA continue to receive training provided by the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and the Department of Defense’s Special Operations Command Europe. The SPO-led task force met twice in 2022, and the law enforcement-led operational CT working group met seven times. Law enforcement cooperation at a more strategic level suffers from jurisdictional disputes and bureaucratic malaise stemming from BiH’s complex governmental structure and the politicization of sensitive criminal justice matters such as terrorism.

In November the CoM adopted the new Law on Border Control, which improves the regulatory framework on the collection and use of Advance Passenger Information (API). The CoM also adopted a decision establishing an interagency working group on API and Passenger Name Records (PNR) to develop a regulatory framework for the collection and use of both API and PNR. The deployment of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES) terminals at BiH’s four airports continues to progress slowly and requires constant communication between the U.S. and BiH governments to prevent backsliding. The Service for Foreigners’ Affairs (SFA) continues to share information with international partners on migrants entering BiH, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Investigations TDY support has provided much-needed training to SFA and expanded the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (or BITMAP) to BiH Border Police.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** BiH is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Department, is a member of the Egmont Group. In May, BiH prosecuted its first terrorist financing case, which ended in acquittal. Despite the outcome, the case represented a milestone for BiH in building its capacity to counter terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2022 the BiH national elections generated divisive rhetoric by the country’s ethnonationalist political leaders, unseen since it declared its independence in the early 1990s. BiH’s main religious communities (Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, and Eastern Orthodox) made very limited progress through the Interreligious Council to promote tolerance and confront acts of bigotry and violence directed at religious communities. International and local actors working on countering radicalization to violence made significant efforts to focus beyond Islamist terrorism to include extreme ethnonationalism and foreign influence, as well as domestic drivers of violent extremist ideologies, but BiH authorities are not focused on REMVE groups.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The SPO continues to work with the United States, regional neighbors, and EU member states on CT investigations. BiH is a member of or a participating state in the United Nations, the OSCE, the Regional Cooperation Council for Southeast Europe, and the Council of Europe.

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**BULGARIA**

**Overview:** Bulgaria remained a strong counterterrorism partner of the United States. While the threat of terrorism in Bulgaria remains low, foreign terrorist groups take advantage of Bulgaria’s active illicit smuggling and trafficking networks to attempt to facilitate entry of terrorists into Europe from the Middle East and South Asia. In 2022 the government continued counterterrorism capacity building and maintained close cooperation with U.S. government agencies, though capability gaps continued to hinder overall effectiveness. Given Bulgaria’s strategic location as a crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, most of Bulgaria’s CT efforts focus on disrupting FTFs’ transit through enhanced border security activities, traveler screening, and information sharing.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist attacks reported in Bulgaria in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The State Agency for National Security (DANS) is the lead agency for counterterrorism in Bulgaria. A separate National
Counterterrorism Center, operating within DANS since 2014, aims to identify suspects, exchange information, and disrupt terrorist activities. The State Intelligence Agency also contains a small, primarily analytic CT capability and an equally small operational capability focused on threats to Bulgarian interests abroad. The Ministry of Interior contains a separate Special Weapons and Tactics team that concentrates internally on domestic threats.

In April, Bulgaria’s Parliament amended the Judiciary Act, closing the Specialized Criminal Courts with previous jurisdiction over terrorism cases and transferring jurisdiction to the Sofia City Court. In July, Parliament amended Bulgaria’s Countering Terrorism Act to provide specific procedures for cases involving online incitement to terrorism.

Throughout 2022, Bulgaria continued to conduct counterterrorism activities at its borders, executing strong migration control programs, U.S.-enabled biographic and biometric screening programs, and information sharing with the United States and other partners to identify and apprehend terrorist suspects crossing the borders or illegally residing in the country. Throughout the reporting period, U.S. government agencies worked closely with Bulgarian counterparts through a variety of border-focused CT capacity building programs.

The volume of illegal immigration from regions hosting terrorist networks (primarily Syria and Afghanistan) and corruption in law enforcement remain enduring obstacles to reliable interdiction of Known and Suspected Terrorists (KSTs) entering Bulgaria. The number of KST identified through biometrics increased substantially in 2022, but a large portion of those identified are not apprehended at the border. Instead, they are apprehended within Bulgaria’s interior. Bulgarian asylum law, aligned with EU asylum regulations, limits Bulgaria’s ability to restrict the onward travel of KSTs.

Notable terrorism cases included the following:

- In May, Bulgarian authorities arrested a Norwegian citizen on suspicion of involvement in a terrorist organization. The arrest was made in coordination with Norwegian authorities, and the individual was extradited in June to Norway, where prosecution is ongoing. The Bulgarian authorities responsible for the arrest benefited from U.S.-provided assistance.
- In July the Appellate Specialized Criminal Court revoked a lower court’s six-month suspended sentence for a self-radicalized youth arrested in 2019 on charges of plotting a terrorist attack in the city of Plovdiv with homemade explosive devices he built using ISIS online tutorials. The court noted a series of procedural violations and returned the case for retrial. In November the Sofia City Court exonerated the young defendant from the terrorism charges and sentenced him for illegal possession of explosive materials.
- In November, Bulgarian prosecutors charged five persons for supporting terrorist acts in connection with the November 13 terrorist attack in Istanbul. Prosecutors alleged that the individuals provided logistical and communications assistance to a perpetrator of the attack, smuggling him out of Türkiye to evade authorities.
Countering Terrorist Financing: Bulgaria is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Directorate - State Agency for National Security is a member of the Egmont Group. In June, MONEYVAL published Bulgaria’s mutual evaluation report. The report identified several key findings, including that Bulgarian authorities had an uneven and limited understanding of terrorist financing (TF) risks, as well as low understanding of TF risks by Bulgarian financial institutions and other stakeholders.

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2020 the government attempted to revise its 2015-20 Strategy for Countering Radicalization and Terrorism. The strategy’s aim is to prevent “forced radicalization”; to combat “radical propaganda” and terrorist recruitment; to prevent terrorist activity within Bulgaria; to prosecute terrorist activities, leaders, and enablers involved in “radicalization” or terrorist activities in Bulgaria or abroad; to minimize the effects of terrorist activities; and to build societal trust and support for CT and CVE programs and activities. However, the revision of the strategy was not completed under any of Bulgaria’s regular or caretaker governments in 2021 or 2022.

In April the Supreme Cassation Court overturned the Plovdiv Appellate Court’s 2021 verdict convicting 12 Romani Muslims on charges of supporting ISIS, assisting foreign fighters, propagating Salafi Islam (characterized by the government as an antidemocratic ideology), and incitement to war. It then returned the case to the Pazardjik District Court for retrial.

International and Regional Cooperation: Bulgaria is a member of and active contributor to CT initiatives at the United Nations, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

CYPRUS

Overview: The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) collaborated closely with the United States, the European Union, and others — bilaterally and multilaterally — in international counterterrorism efforts in 2022. Since 1974, the island of Cyprus has been de facto divided into the ROC government-controlled area in the southern two thirds of the island and the northern third administered by Turkish Cypriots. A UN peacekeeping force patrols a Buffer Zone, also called the Green Line, that separates the two sides. The Buffer Zone is largely open to civilian traffic and remains a significant route for the illicit transit of people, narcotics, and other contraband. The division of the island has impeded counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities and between the ROC and Türkiye, which do not maintain diplomatic relations.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Cyprus in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Since 2020 there have been no changes to the ROC’s legal system pertaining to counterterrorism. ROC authorities arrested six individuals suspected of planning an attack on a prominent businessman residing in Cyprus. The
individuals were charged with terrorism and are awaiting trial. The U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program funded the construction of a $7 million regional security training center, the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS) in Larnaca. The facility became operational in March. Since then, the center has hosted 400 training participants from nine different nations. The center strengthens regional border security, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation efforts, including customs and export controls, port and maritime security, counter-IED training, and cybersecurity. Training has been provided on various counterterrorism-related topics, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction investigations; prevention, detection, and investigation of chemical and biological weapon threats; and WMD incident response and countering WMD-enabled drones.

In January 2021, the Cypriot National Police executed a search warrant and arrested a Syrian national based on his violation of ROC terrorism laws and for providing material support to ISIS. The Ministry of Justice prosecuted the individual in 2022, resulting in a conviction under article 9 of the National Law 75(1)/2019 for providing material support with the intention to commit or to contribute to the commission of a terrorist offense. This case was the first ISIS-related counterterrorism conviction in Cyprus.

The ROC participated in an Embassy Nicosia-facilitated, National Counterterrorism Center-led International Counterterrorism Exercise in September. The exercise provided all key ROC ministries and responders with an opportunity to discuss their current state of readiness for a mass-casualty terror event response. Separately, EXBS has trained 40 ROC government personnel to serve as trainers at CYCLOPS and to develop their own capabilities. The main ROC partners for this training are Port and Maritime Police, Customs, Civil Defense, the National Guard, and the Digital Security Agency.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The ROC is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no significant changes in Cyprus’s CVE efforts in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The ROC participates in regional and multinational counterterrorism exercises with partners including Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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**DENMARK**
Overview: The Kingdom of Denmark, which includes the semi-autonomous Faroe Islands and Greenland regions, remained an important partner in the global fight against terrorism. As an active participant in the GCTF, the Kingdom cooperates closely with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives. Denmark devotes significant assets to CT programs and CVE initiatives.

According to the Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), administered by the Danish National Police’s Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the terror threat to Denmark remained “significant”—the fourth of a five-level ranking system (minimal, limited, general, significant, very significant). CTA characterizes the terror threat to Greenland and the Faroe Islands as minimal. The center assesses the primary threat to Denmark as attacks perpetrated by individuals in Denmark and abroad who sympathize with and are inspired by what CTA labels militant Islamist terrorist groups, including ISIS and al-Qa’ida.

According to PET, at least 161 individuals from Denmark have traveled to Iraq or Syria to join militant Islamist terrorist groups since 2012. At year’s end, around half of these 161 travelers had returned to Denmark or have taken up residence in other countries, mainly in Europe, while roughly one third were presumed to have died in the conflict zone.

CTA assesses the domestic terrorist threat from REMVEs as general, from “anti-establishment extremists” as limited, and from “left-wing violent extremists” as minimal.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in 2022 in the Kingdom of Denmark.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes to CT legislation in 2022. In January the government announced the creation of its Special Crimes Unit, an organization like the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When fully operational, it will investigate and prosecute organized, financial, trafficking-in-persons, and cyber crimes.

The Danish National Police, Politi, is responsible for law enforcement and security services in all regions governed by the Kingdom of Denmark, while Danish Defense and Intelligence Service (DDIS) handles foreign intelligence activities. The collective authorities share responsibility for preventing terrorist attacks against Danish interests in Denmark and overseas. Exchange of information between PET and DDIS is regulated in the legislation covering each. Efforts to counter terrorism are also shared with the Public Prosecution Service and with the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Danish security and law enforcement information is shared through CTA, which — as the Danish government’s intelligence center — constitutes the focal point for reporting from the Danish National Police, DDIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

In 2022, 18 individuals were sentenced under terrorism-related charges in Chapter 13 of the Criminal Code.
No FTFs were repatriated from Syria or Iraq in 2022. Since 2016, six of the adults who left Denmark for the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq have returned to Denmark, as have 16 children. All six adults have been charged with crimes under the Criminal Code’s provisions in Chapter 12, which covers treason and other crimes against the state’s sovereignty and security, and under the terrorism-related Chapter 13.

In December the High Court of Western Denmark sentenced a 35-year-old woman to four years in prison under Chapter 13 of the Criminal Code for 1) having stayed in Raqqa and Deir al-Zour provinces without permission from the Danish government during a period when these were classified as conflict areas and 2) for acting as a housewife for a person who was active within ISIS, thus having promoted ISIS activities. This was the first sentencing for the three Danish women who were repatriated to Denmark in October 2021 together with their 14 children. The other two women have pending cases and have not been sentenced.

Five Danish children remain in Syria with their three mothers, who were stripped of Danish citizenship and thus are ineligible for repatriation to Denmark. The mothers have not consented to their children, who retain Danish citizenship, being repatriated to Denmark without them.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Denmark is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Money Laundering Secretariat, is a member of the Egmont Group. In July, Denmark released its national strategy for preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing, covering 2022-25.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Established in October, the Center for Documentation and Counter Extremism is responsible for preventing violent extremism nationally, locally, and virtually. The center replaced the former Danish Center for Prevention of Extremism.

The Ministry for Immigration and Integration added one individual and three organizations in 2022 to its list of foreign entities barred from sending financial donations to recipients in Denmark because they are deemed to “oppose or undermine democracy and fundamental freedoms and human rights,” in accordance with the law. The first three additions were the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, the International Islamic Charity Organization, and Assalam Charity. The fourth was an individual, Rashed Sad Rashed Ali Alolaimi, a religious leader who also is banned from entering the country because officials deem his presence a threat to public order.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Much of Denmark’s multilateral engagement to prevent and counter terrorism is guided by the United Nations’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy. Denmark continued to strongly support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including:

- European Union
- Global Counterterrorism Forum
In May, Denmark handed over the command of NATO Mission Iraq (NMI). However, Denmark continued to contribute civilian and military advisors, staff officers, and force protection personnel to NMI throughout 2022. In 2022, Denmark also provided staff officers to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA). Denmark had contributed to Operation Barkhane and the EU’s Takuba Task Force with 90 special forces soldiers but withdrew them later that same month after Malian officials requested their removal in response to sanctions proposed by the Danish foreign minister and the EU for Malian transition government officials.

Five Danish cities – Copenhagen, Aarhus, Gentofte, Guldborgsund, and Viborg – are members of the Strong Cities Network.

FRANCE

Overview: France is a key partner of the United States in the global fight against terrorism. Bilateral U.S.-France CT cooperation is strong.

Per the Secretary General of National Defense and Security, the terrorist threat in France remained “very high.” Security services are concerned about “Sunni terrorism” and “ultraright” groups and consider endogenous attacks (lone-actor attacks) to pose the most significant current threat. They also note concern about the threat posed by the recent and impending release from prison of dozens of convicted terrorists tied to the 2015 terrorist attacks in France. The National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) continued to pose a terrorist threat. French law enforcement and intelligence agencies have thwarted at least 39 attacks they labeled “Islamic” since 2017 and interrupted nine REMVE terrorist plots tied to the ultraright.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: At least a dozen attacks occurred or were thwarted in 2022, including these three:

- On July 11, the FLNC claimed 16 attacks in Corsica, against homes, construction companies, and police vehicles.
- On November 22, a 22-year-old man with a “Fiche S” (on a French government watchlist) attacked a police officer shouting “Allah Akbar” while in custody at the Annecy police station. He was charged with “intentional violence against a person in authority, in relation to a terrorist undertaking.”
On November 18, in Strasbourg, police arrested seven individuals suspected of preparing a terrorist attack in France, according to France’s domestic intelligence agency. Two of the seven, Russian and Tajik nationals, had recently arrived in France.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Under the 2021 Upholding Republican Values law, acts of online hate speech are punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and a substantial fine. France in 2022 adopted the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Law that expanded the CT tools available to security agencies and made permanent some of the temporary measures imposed by the 2015 state of emergency.

According to statistics released by the Ministry of the Armed Forces in March 2021, the government continued to deploy 3,000 military personnel throughout the country to patrol vulnerable sites under Operation Sentinelle.

In 2022, France established a new interministerial Passenger Information Unit that uses Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record data from the Agence Nationale des Données de Voyage to screen arriving and departing passenger data against other police and administrative databases.

In 2022, France modified its longstanding policy against the repatriation of French foreign terrorist fighters’ associated family members, repatriating since January more than 100 women and children from northern Syrian displaced persons camps. All adult FTFs returning to France since 2016 have been prosecuted. Minors, depending on their age, may face legal action if they are suspected of having participated in terrorist activities. Minors not believed to have participated in terrorist activities are placed into child protective services or with family members who do not pose a threat of radicalization to violence and are enrolled in an extensive rehabilitation and reintegration program.

High-profile terrorist cases in the judicial system included the following:

- The appeals of Ali Riza Polat and Amar Ramdani were denied before the Paris Special (Terrorism) Criminal Court on October 20. The two defendants were charged in the 2015 attacks against satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, police in Montrouge, and a kosher supermarket in Paris. The court determined that Polat would receive a life sentence after his appeal. Ramdani was found guilty but had his sentence reduced to 13 years.
- The Paris Special Criminal Court upheld a life sentence for Moroccan national Ayoub El Khazzani on December 8. El Khazzani was seeking to overturn his 2020 conviction related to the foiled Thalys train attack in 2015.
- On December 13 the Paris Special Criminal Court ordered prison terms of two to 18 years for all eight suspects charged in the 2016 Nice terrorist attack that killed 86 people.
- On December 14 the Paris Special Criminal Court sentenced 30-year-old French Moroccan national Siham Idrissi to 12 years in prison for cooperation with a criminal
enterprise. Idrissi married two ISIS fighters, one of whom was close to the mastermind behind the 2015 coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris.

France observed a rise in ultraright violent extremism, also described locally as “ideologically or politically motivated terrorism.” The Government of France identified and labeled 1,300 “ultraright radicalized individuals” as Fiche S, indicating inclusion on France’s national security watchlist. On May 17 the General Directorate for Internal Security (FBI equivalent) arrested 11 activists linked to the ultranationalist movement “Patriotic Vengeance.” The group reportedly aspired to seize power after the “collapse of the republic,” following the start of an anticipated race war. On December 14 a group of 47 armed individuals close to the “far right” were arrested as they prepared to move toward the Champs-Elysées after a French soccer victory.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** France is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Intelligence Processing and Action Against Illicit Financial Networks Unit (Tracfin), is a member of the Egmont Group. In May the Paris Court of Appeals confirmed the indictment of French cement maker Lafarge for paying millions of euros to terrorist groups, including ISIS, in 2013 and 2014 to ensure the continuation of Lafarge’s operations.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** As part of its efforts to counter “Islamist separatism,” the government announced it would end foreign government funding of imams from Türkiye, Algeria, and Morocco by 2023, replacing this program with imams trained within France. France increased scrutiny of religious schools to identify and close “illegal schools” that are run by “religious extremists.”

**International and Regional Cooperation:** France is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and is active on the UN Security Council ISIL and al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee.

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**GEORGIA**

**Overview:** Georgia continued its robust engagement on counterterrorism issues in 2022 and remained a strong U.S. security partner. The terrorism situation in Georgia remained quiet and stable, although the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) thwarted an attempted assassination of an Israeli national in a plot allegedly led by Iranians associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in November. In 2022, Georgia convicted five Georgian citizens who had been detained in 2021 for affiliation with ISIS and arrested another individual on similar charges. Georgia enacted its 2022-26 National Counterterrorism Strategy and Action Plan, introduced harsher measures for the false reporting of terrorist acts, and enhanced its anti-money laundering/threat finance and countering WMD efforts. The country worked to improve its land border and maritime security by participating in international exercises and U.S.-conducted trainings.
2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents in Georgia during 2022. However, in November the SSSG reported that it had detained a Pakistani national and dual Iranian-Georgian national in connection with an attempted murder of an Israeli national in Georgia.

Legislation Law Enforcement and Border Security: The Georgian Criminal Code criminalizes terrorism and acts that support terrorism, including terror financing, cyberterrorism, training, incitement, and recruitment into terrorist organizations, as well as foreign terrorist fighters.

In 2022, Georgia began implementation of its second National Counterterrorism Strategy and Action Plan for 2022-26, following the conclusion of the 2019-21 Action Plan. The Georgian government also introduced harsher measures for the false reporting of terrorist acts.

Georgia is generally capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorism incidents. The SSSG has the mandate for terrorism-related incidents and investigations and works closely through its Counterterrorism Center with the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Defense and the Prosecution Service of Georgia, among others, as well as with international partners. SSSG is generally well equipped and well trained, and its Counterterrorism Unit continues to receive regular training and equipment from international partners and conducts internal training.

Because Russia occupies the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia does not control a portion of its internationally recognized land border with Russia and therefore must enforce security along administrative boundary lines with its occupied territories. Georgia’s Border Police and Coast Guard, both competent and organized, provide the initial response capability along Georgia’s land and maritime borders, respectively, except along the occupied territories.

In 2022, Georgia worked to improve its land border, aviation, and maritime security. It finalized the 2023-27 Integrated Border Management Strategy in December. Early in 2022 the country operationalized its Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record systems in close cooperation with airlines, international partners, and relevant government agencies. In May, NATO recognized Georgia’s Border Police Coast Guard Boarding Team as an Operational Partner to the NATO-led maritime antiterrorist operation “Sea Guardian.” Georgia equipped a substantial segment of its border with Azerbaijan with a 24/7 video surveillance system. Additionally, authorities increased security measures and reinforced the border protection by constructing e-fences and barrier ditches across the perimeter of the southern border of Georgia. Georgia regularly participates in INTERPOL document and traveler information sharing, to include stolen and lost travel documents.

No Georgian nationals were identified as traveling to Syria or Iraq in 2022 for terrorist activities. Georgia did not repatriate any FTFs or associated family members from Syria or Iraq. In May, Tbilisi City Court convicted five individuals who had been arrested in August 2021 for membership in ISIS and plans to travel to a terrorist camp in Syria. In December, SSSG detained
Tsiskara Tokhosashvili, the brother of ISIS commander Tsezar Tokhosashvili, on charges of joining ISIS and assisting terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has requested U.S. government support to address resource constraints that inhibit efforts to secure the borders, such as procuring iris readers for airports, replacement engines for patrol boats, and equipment for Rapid Response teams. The Border Police maintains control of Georgia’s green borders by patrolling from 65 border outposts, about 10 of which are primitive or in poor condition — inadequate for housing personnel year-round. As a result, sections of the border in high-altitude locations along the northern border with Russia cannot be manned during the winter months, leaving these areas open to illicit activity.

Georgia’s law enforcement prevented far-right, pro-Russia group Alt-Info’s plans from disrupting Tbilisi Pride in June 2022. Alt-Info is a far-right, pro-Russia group associated with violent extremism including with the organization of and the execution of violent attacks against dozens of journalists and activists during the July 5, 2021 Tbilisi Pride event and a July 6, 2021 protest against the July 5 violence. Alt-Info protestors demonstrated in a separate location during the event. No group leaders or organizers of the violence at the 2021 event, including Alt-Info and far-right networks associated with violent extremism, were held legally responsible in 2022. Alt-Info and its political party arm Conservative Movement also expanded its presence throughout the country.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Georgia is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In May, Georgia established a new commission aimed at preventing, detecting, and suppressing money laundering/threat finance and WMD proliferation. The commission held two sessions in 2022 dedicated to implementing MONEYVAL recommendations, including the application of targeted financial sanctions in relation to persons linked to terrorism and terrorist financing and strengthening its capacities on practical enforcement of UNSC sanctions at the national level. In December, Georgia became a member of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation’s (Europol’s) Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In 2022, Georgia continued efforts, including CVE, focused on minority integration, education, media access, youth, and cultural diversity.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Georgia is actively engaged on CT issues at international, regional, and bilateral levels. Georgia is a member of the following organizations:

- The United Nations
In 2022, Georgia participated in UN, EU, U.S., and NATO training and conferences, including the Eighth Council of Europe Committee on Counterterrorism in May. The nation also joined Europol’s Counterterrorism Joint Liaison Team in December. Georgia cooperates closely with NATO. Georgia applied to join the European Union in March. In June the European Commission established Georgia’s eligibility to become a member of the EU, but deferred giving it official candidate status until after certain conditions are met.

**GERMANY**

**Overview:** Germany continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and the international community as a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and in multilateral CT operations in Africa and the Middle East. German officials consider racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist actors to be the greatest threat to domestic security. The most recent statistics (from 2021) estimated 28,290 “Islamist extremists,” 13,500 potential REMVEs, and 10,300 potentially violent “left-wing extremists” in the country. In May, Germany, together with the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, hosted the launch of the Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum in Berlin.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Germany.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Both federal and state law enforcement agencies conduct CT investigations. They coordinate through the Joint Counterterrorism Center (or GTAZ), consisting of 40 internal law enforcement, security, and migration agencies cooperating in the fight against Islamist-based terrorism. For right-, left-, and nationalist-based violent extremism and terrorism, the Joint Extremism and Terrorism Prevention Center (or GETZ) in Cologne is the site of interagency coordination.

In 2022 the Federal Prosecutor’s Office opened approximately 256 new terrorism investigations. German authorities collect Advance Passenger Information and use Passenger Name Record analysis to combat serious crime and terrorism in a manner consistent with the relevant EU laws. German border management data systems, equipment, and infrastructure are highly developed.

In October and November, Germany, with U.S. logistical support, repatriated five ISIS-affiliated women, 11 children, and a 20-year-old male from Roj displaced persons camp in Syria. This was the first operation to bring back an adult male, who was taken to Syria by his parents in 2013. In March, Germany repatriated 10 women and 27 children. Investigations are ongoing.
against all adult returnees from the three 2022 repatriation missions, and police arrested 12 on their arrival, including the adult male.

Germany uses a comprehensive approach to deradicalization from violence and reintegration under the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, which includes cooperation and services at state and local levels.

Significant law enforcement actions in 2022 included these two:

- On April 14, more than 270 police officers from nine federal states searched 20 locations and arrested five suspected members of a domestic terrorist group. The group allegedly aimed to destroy power supply facilities and initiate a prolonged, nationwide blackout to instigate a civil war and ultimately overthrow the democratic government. They also allegedly planned to kidnap well-known public figures, including federal health minister Karl Lauterbach. Authorities believe the suspects are associated with anti-COVID restrictions protesters and the Reichsbürger movement.

- On December 7, on behalf of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, over 3,000 German police and special forces across 11 German states raided more than 150 residential and commercial properties of 54 alleged associates of a “right wing” domestic terrorist group and detained 25 individuals suspected of plotting to overthrow the government.

The trial against 12 alleged supporters of the right-wing terrorist group “Gruppe S” continued. The defendants, arrested in 2020, stood accused of amassing weapons and developing plans to commit political assassinations and attack migrants and Muslims.

Germany is limited by its postwar security architecture with a strict organizational separation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Privacy and data protection laws place significant limits on the collection and retention of data.

Germany’s domestic security agency in 2021 reported a total of 33,900 “right wing” violent extremists. The number of violent crimes committed by right-wing actors decreased by 7.6 percent from 2020 (1,023) to 2021 (945).

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Germany is a member of FATF. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit Germany, is a member of the Egmont Group. In August, following recommendations from its FATF mutual evaluation, the Federal Minister of Finance proposed a plan to create a new agency — the Higher Federal Authority for Combating Financial Crime — to address shortcomings within Germany’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime.

Also in August, a federal court confirmed the ban of the right-wing violent extremist association Nordadler. Germany’s Law on Associations gives the Interior Ministry authority to ban groups if their goals violate the criminal code. Germany has banned more than 50 REMVE groups to
In March, the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Bremen, respectively, banned the Imam Mahdi Zentrum/Fatime Versammlung e.V. and the Al Mustafa Gemeinschaft e.V., both associations linked to Hizballah. In December a federal court confirmed the Interior Ministry’s 2021 ban against three associations suspected of fundraising for Hizballah.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy (2016) guides the government’s activities. Most programs are federally funded, led jointly by the federal interior and family ministries, and implemented through the states and NGOs. In March, the Ministry of Interior released a *10-Point Action Plan for Tackling Right-Wing Extremism* to set legislative priorities on “extremism.”

The federal Live Democracy! program is a cornerstone of the government’s strategy. In 2022 the budget for the program was increased to $176 million to expand its programs on REMVE and the polarization of society.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Germany is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and co-chairs the West Africa Working Group with Algeria, and works on maritime and border security initiatives within the GCTF. Germany cooperates with other OSCE states and within the G7 Roma-Lyon Group in the fight against terrorism. The German cities of Augsburg, Berlin, Dresden, Düsseldorf, and Halle are members of the Strong Cities Network. Germany plays a critical role as a co-lead for the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Stabilization Working Group, working closely with the United States to identify stabilization funding needs in Iraq and Syria.

**GREECE**

**Overview:** The Greek government remained a highly collaborative CT partner in 2022. It operationalized the Hellenic Passenger Information Unit (HPIU), mentored Western Balkan countries in implementing their respective Passenger Information Units (PIUs), implemented the Joint Security Program (JSP) pilot at the Athens International airport, and decided to issue biometrically-enabled national ID cards, a hurdle that has prevented Greece’s full participation in the Visa Waiver Program for more than six years.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no major terrorist incidents in Greece in 2022. However, there were bombings and several arson attacks throughout the year by anarchist groups that targeted media establishments, private residences of journalists, and Orthodox Church-affiliated premises and institutions. And in one instance, a homemade bomb damaged a vehicle parked at the home of an Italian Embassy official in an Athens suburb. In all cases, there were no victims or injuries reported, only minor property damage. The following list details some of these incidents:

- On December 2, two explosive devices targeted cars belonging to the Italian Embassy, including one outside the home of the Italian Deputy Chief of Mission. One of these
exploded, causing no injuries. Both attacks were believed to have been carried out by anarchists.

- On July 13 an anarchist group, Thousands of Night Suns, bombed REAL Media Group, claiming that it was aligned with the government and its policies on energy, environment, the pandemic, and aid to Ukraine. The fire was brought under control after 18 firefighters battled the blaze for two hours, with all employees evacuated from the building. The police arrested a 27-year-old male anarchist in connection to this incident in November.

- On July 6, anarchist group Nuclei of Immediate Action-Nucleus Julian Assange claimed responsibility for arson outside the residence of MP Babis Papadimitriou, announcing it was meant to “honor real freedom of speech,” while portraying Papadimitriou, a former journalist, as compromised for going into politics. The same group claimed responsibility for a February arson attack at the residence of journalist Dimitris Kambourakis in the Athens suburb of Argyroupoli.

- On February 9, three Greek citizens allegedly belonging to a group named Organization Anarchist Action carried out an arson attack against an Orthodox Christian religious society in Thessaloniki. The incendiary device damaged the entrance of the building but caused no injuries. All three were charged for carrying out a terrorist act, endangering life, damaging property, and for belonging to a terrorist organization.

- On January 23, unknown individuals placed an incendiary device outside an unofficial mosque in Patisia in central Athens, causing damage to the property but no injuries.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The following relevant laws were passed in 2022:


- Law 4998, on November 30, on the “Organization and operation of the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) National Unit,” provided for the establishment and operation of such a unit in Greece. ETIAS is the EU’s Visa Waiver Program. The National Units are responsible for deciding whether an individual can be granted access to the Schengen Area, or whether they pose a risk to public safety.

- Law 4920/2022 in April transposed EU Directive 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and Council of June 20, 2019, establishing rules to facilitate the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of certain criminal offenses and repeal of Decision 200/642/JHA of the Council (L 186). Its stated purpose was to “introduce a unified institutional framework that will allow control of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the establishment of clear
procedures during the exchange of information with Europol [the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation].”

- Other related initiatives were the imposition of sanctions on terrorism suspects through a) the replacement of Par. 1, Art. 50, of Law 4557/2018 (originally Greece’s main law against money laundering) with Par. 1, Art. 76, of Law 5001/22, and b) the replacement of Par. 4, Art. 50, of Law 4557/2018 with Par. 2, Art. 76, of Law 5001/22. Finally, added to paragraphs 1 and 4 of Art. 50 was Art. 187B of the Penal Code, which concerns the financing of terrorism.

- On December 9, the government passed a bill that criminalizes the sale or possession of spyware and makes the private use of spyware a felony, punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. Per the new law, only Greece’s National Intelligence Service and the counterterrorism unit can request a prosecutor’s approval to monitor persons for a range of crimes specified under the bill, and a second prosecutor must sign the request. Politicians can be monitored only for national security reasons, and the Parliament’s speaker must also approve such requests. Those surveilled on national security grounds can be informed about the surveillance three years after the completion of surveillance. The same law provides for the establishment of a Committee for the Coordination of Cybersecurity-Related Issues (provisions regarding the Committee’s area of jurisdiction and competence, administrative support to the Committee, working groups convened under the committee, etc.) and for the staffing of the National Authority for Cybersecurity (Law 5002, December 9).

The Ministry of Citizens Protection implemented the JSP pilot at the Athens International Airport starting in June, where Customs and Border Protection officers work closely with airport police and counterterrorism unit in an advisory capacity to identify and screen suspicious passengers traveling within Europe and to the United States.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Greece is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Counterterrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority (Hellenic FIU), is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** There were no changes in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Greece is a member of various international bodies and acts as a regional leader and a willing partner in sharing its counterterrorism experience with its neighbors in the Western Balkans. Greece maintains excellent cooperation with its neighbors at the land borders and has established regular information exchange mechanisms.

On May 9, Greek Minister for Citizen Protection Panagiotis Theodorikakos signed an MOU on security cooperation, fighting organized crime, and counterterrorism, with Sultan bin Ahmed Al Jaber, UAE minister of industry and advanced technology.

The HPIU made great strides in collecting, processing, and analyzing Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, substantially capturing close to 90 percent of
airline traffic strengthening aviation security. Additionally, the HPIU co-hosted a study tour and a workshop in Athens with Embassy Athens and U.S. Customs and Border Protection with five Western Balkan countries in the region attending. The HPIU continues to mentor Albania, Cyprus, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Ukraine in standing up their respective PIUs through visits, regular meetings, and ongoing communication.

ITALY

Overview: Italy collaborated closely with the United States and other partners in its international counterterrorism efforts in 2022. Domestically, Italy aggressively investigated and prosecuted terrorist suspects and regularly deported foreign nationals for terrorism-related security reasons.

As a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-lead of the Counter-ISIS Finance and Africa Focus Groups, Italy was among the largest contributors of troops in Iraq and led the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s efforts to train Iraqi police and security forces. Italy remained one of the top troop contributors to NATO, the EU, the United Nations, and other bilateral and multilateral operations that promote global security, with a particular focus on the wider Mediterranean region.

Italy hosts NATO’s Strategic Direction — South Hub — as a forum to connect NATO allies with partners and institutions in North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel to promote dialogue and stability. Italian authorities have identified several potential threats to the country, including terrorists from North Africa, returning FTFs, anarchists, REMVEs, and militants from the Western Balkans.

Italian and U.S. authorities regularly share CT best practices under the auspices of the U.S.-Italy Counterterrorism Working Group, a component of the U.S.-Italy Strategic Dialogue. Italy is working to improve its screening — including for terrorism, of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees — in consultation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Italy in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There have been no changes since 2021. Italian law enforcement has advanced capacity to detect and deter terrorist activity, links, and associations within its borders. Authorities employ those capabilities to counter terrorist recruitment, radicalization to violence, and networking. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence services coordinate their efforts and meet regularly to review terrorist threats and share information. The Italian government continued to make use of 2005 legislation facilitating the detention of terrorist suspects and expedited procedures for expelling noncitizens suspected of endangering national security. Police monitoring of jihadist media sites revealed that Italy remains a potential target of terror attacks, owing in part to the presence of the Vatican.
Prominent arrests and expulsions included the following:

- On May 13, police in Turin arrested Italian national Federico Buono, suspected of plotting to bomb a local courthouse. Investigators found an explosive device in his home. Buono was close to the South American violent extremist group *Individualistas Tendiendo a lo Salvaje*.
- On June 15, police in Trento arrested a husband and wife of Kosovar descent who had allegedly planned a violent attack with an explosive device on behalf of ISIS. They were both born in Italy, were radicalized to violence online, and hoped to join a terrorist organization in Nigeria. They were accused of recruitment, association, and training for the purpose of terrorism.
- On November 15, prosecutors in Naples ordered the arrest of four Italian nationals, members of a neo-Nazi group called the Order of Hagal. They were suspected of planning a terrorist attack against a police station in Campania. Two other persons were under investigation for links to similar organizations, including a Ukrainian former resident of Naples suspected of links with the Azov Regiment and Ukrainian ultranationalist groups Pravi Sector and Centuria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Italy is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Italy (UIF), is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Penitentiary Administration’s Central Investigative Center continued to carry out investigations and respond to cases of possible radicalization to violence in Italian jails and prisons. Italian authorities also increased monitoring and prevention efforts to identify potential lone-actor attackers online.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Italy continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the following:

- UN
- NATO
- European Union
- G-7
- G-20
- OSCE
- Global Counterterrorism Forum
- Council of Europe
- Financial Action Task Force
Italy continued its bilateral capacity building efforts in Libya, focusing on coast guard cooperation and border-security measures. Italy also hosted and led EU Operation Irini, charged with implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya. The Italian military continued its training activities with local security forces in Niger to strengthen border security, counter illicit trafficking, and combat threats to regional security, including threats from terrorism. Italian forces also were in Mali as part of the Takuba Task Force, which trains and assists the Malian Armed Forces in the fight against armed jihadist groups and as part of the EU Training Mission in Mali.

Italy made a substantial contribution to the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), including as a co-chair of the Criminal Justice and Rule of Law working group with Nigeria. Italy has also contributed to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, an Inspired Institution of the GCTF, and finalized a project to provide technical assistance on battlefield evidence to multiagency stakeholders in Burkina Faso. The project began in 2021 in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Italy also hosted an Africa Focus Group meeting in March for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

KOSOVO

Overview: Kosovo continued CT and CVE efforts in partnership with the United States and the international community. It is drafting a National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Terrorism for 2023-28.

Kosovo continued repatriating nationals from detention centers and displaced persons camps in Syria. In May, two male Kosovan citizens were repatriated from Syria in a joint operation with the Albanian government that was supported by the United States. These two adults were charged with terrorism offenses. This was the third return operation. To date Kosovo has repatriated more than 120 nationals. An estimated 80 nationals remained in displaced persons camps or detention centers, or were unaccounted for on the battlefield in Syria. Short sentencing for terrorism-related offenses in Kosovo persisted.

Citizens of Kosovo, domestically and abroad, are potential targets for recruitment by Violent Extremist Organizations with ethnonationalist or religious political orientation. Separately, security issues and political instability in northern Kosovo continued restricting the Government of Kosovo’s ability to assert its authority in that region. The NATO-led Kosovo Force and EU Rule of Law Mission collaborate with the Kosovo Police (KP) to promote a secure environment and to strengthen rule of law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Embassy Pristina has noted an uptick in Russian disinformation and assessed that it is an increasingly present driver of violent extremist thinking and interethnic polarization contributing to interethnic tensions in northern Kosovo.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: In April the Government of Kosovo denounced armed attacks against police officers in northern Kosovo as acts of terrorism. The Kosovar prosecutors classified these incidents as terrorist-related offenses and acts against the constitutional order.
In December the KP arrested former KP officer Dejan Pantic on terrorism-related offenses after an attack involving an explosive device on local election premises and municipal election staff in North Mitrovica.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Kosovo’s legislative framework broadly allows the prosecution and incarceration of individuals suspected of supporting terrorist activities or participating in foreign wars. However, short sentences, conditional and early releases, and disorganized post-release supervision pose security threats.

The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program provided technical equipment grants to bolster operational readiness of KP’s Counterterrorist Directorate and conducted trainings on investigative skills, terrorist plot disruption, and border security. The United States provided training and case-specific advice for Kosovar prosecutors and continued to train Kosovar judges on sentencing guidelines and analysis. Policing and correctional systems helped reduce prison radicalization to violence by identifying trends and threats inside penal institutions; by strengthening police, intelligence, and corrections agencies’ coordination; and by preparing security institutions with a better understanding of how violent extremism spreads post-incarceration.

Significant law enforcement actions included the following:

- Throughout 2022, Kosovo prosecuted seven FTFs and one repatriated woman, with U.S. assistance. Though the woman received a two-year suspended sentence for joining ISIS, Kosovo courts sentenced the repatriated FTFs to between three and four and a half years in prison for organizing and participating in ISIS’s terrorist activities.
- In June the Basic Court in Pristina (BCP) acquitted four defendants — two charged with preparing terrorist attacks in nightclubs and churches, and against Kosovo Force, and two charged with failure to report a criminal offense — owing to lack of evidence, following a partial retrial ordered by the Court of Appeals (CoA). In November the CoA rejected the prosecution’s appeal and upheld the BCP’s decision.
- In October the Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK) indicted FTF Ylber Bela for organizing and participating in a terrorist group. Bela was repatriated in May during a joint repatriation effort.
- In December the SPRK announced an indictment against four persons for “preparation of terrorist offenses against the constitutional order.” According to the SPRK, the four suspects attempted to create an organizational structure for committing terrorist acts in Kosovo by contacting a high-ranking ISIS individual.
- In December the BCP acquitted Adea Batusha, Atdhe Arifi, Egzon Haliti and Frasher Krasniqi on terrorism charges. The individuals were accused of attacking the Kosovo Assembly in 2016.
- Throughout 2022, 11 individuals sentenced with terrorism-related offenses were released from prison. Four individuals were released on completion of sentences, two more on conditional release, and the remaining five on early release.
**Countering and Financing Terrorism:** Kosovo’s legislative framework against money laundering and terrorist financing follows international standards. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Kosovo, is a member of the Egmont Group. In December, Kosovo passed a law on Implementing International Targeted Financial Sanctions that equips the FIU with tools to obtain, analyze, and distribute information related to money laundering and terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Kosovo currently lacks a thorough CVE strategy to address emerging terrorist-related threats. While faced with many returnees, it operates with an outdated strategy and action plan. An interministerial group together with international organizations and civil society are developing a combined CT and CVE strategy that is expected to be approved by the Government of Kosovo in 2023. Challenges include lack of coordination between institutions and an overly securitized CVE approach.

Kosovo continues cooperation through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, through which Kosovo is strengthening the network of actors working on reintegrating and rehabilitating women and children who returned from conflict zones. Thirteen Kosovo municipalities are members of the Strong Cities Network. The United States continued CVE programming in Kosovo, such as the Embassy Pristina Public Diplomacy Section’s project focused on issues of violent extremism resulting in the documentary *Extremism in the Modern World*.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2022, Kosovo continued its cooperation with Albania and North Macedonia to enhance CT and CVE efforts and foster regional cooperation.

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**THE NETHERLANDS**

**Overview:** The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in border and transportation security, counterterrorist financing, CVE, and bilateral and multilateral CT cooperation. The national threat level remained “significant” (Level 3 of 5) throughout the reporting period, with the government emphasizing the diffuse and multifaceted nature of the terrorist threat. The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) noted that jihadist-inspired attacks remained a principal though decreasing threat to the Netherlands. The government determined terrorist attacks prompted by “right-wing extremist accelerationism” were also conceivable and warned that belief in conspiracy theories among anti-government protestors could lead to terrorist attacks. The Netherlands published a new comprehensive national CT strategy in 2022, rooted in prevention and interagency cooperation across the government and in close collaboration with local municipalities.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents during the reporting period.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Netherlands saw no significant changes in law enforcement structures, capacity, international cooperation, or border security legislation in 2022. A new National Counterterrorism Strategy covering a four-year period, 2022-26, reflected the government’s assessment that “violent, extremist lone actors” pose the greatest terrorist risk to the Netherlands. It prioritizes the detection and combating of “violent extremist and terrorist content” in the online domain and gives special attention to ensuring the safe reintegration of individuals into society after detention. The strategy highlights the detection of terrorist travel movements, through improvements in interoperability between border and detection systems such as the Schengen Information System and the European Travel Information and Authorization System, while further developing and strengthening the Netherlands’ passenger information unit.

Significant law enforcement and judicial actions related to CT included these two:

- In August a man was sentenced to 30 months in prison for financing terrorism. He was convicted for transferring $107,000 to 25 female Dutch and Belgian ISIS supporters in Syria through a hawala banker, including helping these individuals escape from camps.
- In October a man was convicted of incitement to commit criminal offenses against public authorities and disseminating right-wing terrorist material online.

While the government does not actively repatriate FTFs or their associated family members from camps in Syria, several exceptions were made in 2022 to support prosecutions for individuals suspected of terrorist offenses. The Cabinet approved a November 1 operation that brought back 12 women and 28 children from northeastern Syria. This operation followed a separate February 4 action which brought five women and 11 children back to the Netherlands from the Roj displaced persons camp in Syria.

The NCTV assessed adherents of so-called accelerationism as the principal REMVE, or “right-wing extremism,” threat in the Netherlands. Dutch-speaking REMVE actors continued to skew young (ages 13 to 30), coming from unstable socioeconomic situations, and encountering REMVE ideologies largely through the internet and online gaming. NCTV emphasized growing concerns over the “normalization” of antisemitic “replacement theory” in mainstream public debate, as well as the resumption of public rallies among REMVE groups following the relaxation of COVID-19 measures in early 2022. While the government assessed little risk in direct violence from REMVE groups, it stressed that these ideologies threaten to undermine democratic institutions, the rule-of-law, and social cohesion.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Netherlands is a member of FATF and is one of the Cooperating and Supporting Nations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit-Netherlands, contributes to European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation’s (Europol’s) financial intelligence team. As of December, the government’s national terrorist watchlists included 143 individuals and two organizations whose assets were frozen. There were no significant changes in 2022.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Netherlands’ 2022-26 National Counterterrorism Strategy adopted more targeted measures toward preventing “potentially violent, extremist lone actors.” In addition to the National Police, Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministries of Social Affairs and Education, local governments also work with civil society, religious, and community leaders both to identify potential radicalization to violence and to reintegrate individuals back into society. Given the prevalence of underlying psychiatric problems common to lone actors, the government plans to strengthen cooperation between security and medical stakeholders, particularly in resolving potential conflicts around personal privacy law and rules governing medical data. Regarding tackling violent extremist and terrorist content online, the government will develop a course of action to better combat the effect of algorithms in disseminating such content online, while seeking to balance freedom-of-expression concerns and improve societal resilience to violent extremist messaging.

International and Regional Cooperation: The Netherlands actively participates in international and regional organizations or groupings regarding counterterrorism priorities, including these five:

- The United Nations: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) contributed $1.5 million to increase integration of human rights into UN member states and relevant UN counterterrorism entities’ responses to terrorist and crisis situations. The Netherlands also supported initiatives under the United Nations, and in cooperation with the Government of Iraq, to help facilitate returns of Iraqi nationals from Syria.
- The European Union: The Netherlands is an active participant in Europol’s European Counterterrorism Center and contributed personnel to relevant EU training missions.
- NATO: The Netherlands contributed two military advisors and four civilian experts to NATO Mission Iraq. Dutch military personnel continued to provide security protection for Erbil International Airport.
- The Global Counterterrorism Forum: T.M.C. Asser Instituut is host to the GCTF’s Administrative Unit in the Netherlands. The Netherlands sits on the governing board of the three GCTF-inspired institutions: the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (Hedayah), the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). The MFA has allocated $5.3 million in core funding to the GCERF for 2022-24.
- The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS: In December the Netherlands hosted the Political Director’s meeting for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and continues to be a key contributor to the Defeat-ISIS Coalition as a co-lead of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group.

The Netherlands continued to finance a wide variety of capacity building projects with third countries, including supporting prison systems in Albania and Algeria, as well as probation services in Kosovo. Other CVE programs in Somalia and Kenya were aimed at rehabilitating and
reintegrating ex-al-Shabaab fighters and building community resources for relevant CVE interventions.

**NORTH MACEDONIA**

**Overview:** The country’s CT efforts during 2022 included harmonization with EU legislation and with international standards on investigation, prosecution, and information exchange. Government and civil society stakeholders finalized the 2023-27 National Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism strategies and respective action plans. North Macedonia cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including in early detection. There were no terrorist attacks in 2022 and no reported departures to join ISIS.

The main terrorist threat stemmed from previously repatriated FTFs from Syria and Iraq. The National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (NCCVECT) estimated that 143 citizens of North Macedonia (excluding children) traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or to Iraq, or both, to join terrorist groups in recent years. Of these 143 adults (133 male, 10 female), 38 were killed, 79 returned, five are believed to remain in Syria, and two are in prison or a displaced persons camp. Authorities assessed the terrorist threat level to be “medium-low,” although former ISIS members and sympathizers maintained a presence in the country. The government announced a decision to establish a Cyber Security Agency and a hybrid threats expert body at the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in North Macedonia during 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** North Macedonia’s legislative framework allows prosecution of individuals suspected of committing or aiding terrorist activities or participating in foreign wars. Sentencing for terrorism-related offenses improved significantly, compared with previous years, and sentences are now longer than in other Western Balkans countries. The U.S. Department of Justice provided mentoring and battlefield evidence to case prosecutors and investigators. The authorities did not repatriate any individuals in 2022.

In January the Skopje Basic Criminal Court sentenced two of the four FTFs repatriated in 2021 to 10 years in prison each. In October the Skopje Basic Criminal Court sentenced one of them to another six years on additional charges of spreading ISIS propaganda.

In several cases, the appellate court increased the sentences of convicted FTFs and convicted terrorists.

The MOI led law enforcement-related CT efforts. However, the ministry’s CT Sector did not regularly have internet access and consequently was unable to lead online investigations. In July the government adopted the 2021-25 National Strategy for Developing the Penitentiary System, which includes components for deradicalizing and rehabilitating FTFs and for improving prison conditions and medical care for detainees.
The U.S. International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provided workshop sessions for women in law enforcement on using social media in terrorism prosecutions, forensics and counterterrorism investigations, and terrorism in correctional institutions, in line with the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace and Security. In March, ICITAP provided women in CT/CVE units with advanced professional training.

North Macedonia continued its partnership with the United States on traveler screening tools, including Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. In November, Parliament passed legal amendments to the Law on Border Police to allow the collection and analysis of API and PNR for border security. Authorities continued to meet with U.S. Watch listing Assistance and Support Program experts to improve watch listing efforts, and they cooperated with INTERPOL, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (or Eurojust), the European CT Center, and the FBI.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** North Macedonia is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Office (FIO), is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2022 the FIO received five reports for suspicion of terrorist financing from obliged entities, and it submitted three reports on suspicion of terrorist financing to competent authorities for processing.

On June 2, Parliament adopted a Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing to implement the provisions of Directive V (2018/843) and harmonize it with EU legislation and FATF standards. In September, in line with the Law on International Restrictive Measures, the government published a decision freezing the assets and taking other restrictive financial measures against 15 FTFs.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Government and civil society stakeholders finalized the 2023-27 National CVE Strategy, pending government adoption. The strategy aligns with the four pillars (prevention, protection, enforcement, and response) of the United Nations and European Union CVE strategies.

**Prevention and Intervention:** Local Prevention Councils (LPCs), Community Action Teams (CATs), and Local Multidisciplinary Teams (LMTs) worked on preventing and countering violent extremism at the local level. Thirteen municipal LPCs were functional, but only five were consistently active. Six municipalities had regularly active CATs.

**Rehabilitation and Reintegration:** The nine LMTs consist of social workers, community leaders, and religious group representatives who work on reintegration of FTFs and their associated family members. The International Organization for Migration and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) provide support to the NCCVECT and the LMTs.
Online Radicalization to Violence: In March, state institutions and private companies signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in Countering Violent Radicalization, as part of an EU project on capacity building.

The MotherSchools program continued, with U.S. funding, to teach mothers to recognize and respond to early warning signs of radicalization to violence.

International and Regional Cooperation: North Macedonia participated in the implementation of the EU Western Balkans Joint Action Plan on counter terrorism. In December the EU and North Macedonia signed a revised bilateral agreement on counterterrorism. North Macedonia signed an agreement with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in October. The country participated in the implementation of Western Balkans projects funded by GCERF, Hedayah, the Strong Cities Network, Integrative Internal Security Governance, and others.

NORWAY

Overview: Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) raised the annual threat assessment to High (Level 4 of its five-tier threat scale), following a June 25 attack during Oslo Pride festivities, then lowered it to Moderate (Level 3) in September. The University of Oslo’s Center for Research on Extremism (or C-REX) reported greater organization among jihadi groups representing an increased threat of attacks. Lone-actor attacks continued to be the greatest threat driven by online recruitment and radicalization to violence. Norway’s law enforcement capacity for proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in its territory remained strong, despite underfunding in some areas. Norway is postured to prevent acts of terrorism, and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the United States is strong. Operational cooperation is high.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist charges raised in connection with incidents in Norway.

PST is investigating a potential terror link in connection with the June 25 mass shooting attack in Oslo. Police arrested, in addition to the perpetrator, members of the group Profetens Ummah (Prophet’s Community) and issued an arrest warrant for “known Islamist” Arfan Bhatti, but to date no terrorism charges have been filed.

Legislation Law Enforcement and Border Security: There were no significant updates to the legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism in 2022.

Norway issued new passports with enhanced security features in 2020. Norwegian passports are immediately canceled when they are reported lost or stolen, to prevent misuse. The adjudication process for new passports includes automatic biometric comparisons and more training for adjudicators at 79 passport and ID offices around the country, including at Oslo Gardermoen Airport. Biometric emergency passports issued at Gardermoen are valid for one exit and one entry to Norway and must be surrendered upon the traveler’s return.
Legislation to establish a national system for the collection and use of passenger name records for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime came into effect on May 1. Parliament passed legislation that was required to implement the European Travel Information and Authorization System and Entry/Exit System Schengen border control systems.

Oslo Police opened an investigation into the June 25 mass shooting attack as a suspected terrorist attack. A 16-year-old Syrian boy was found guilty of planning an act of terrorism in June 2021 and was sentenced to five years in prison, three years of which were suspended. The Supreme Court reviewed the three-year, May 2021, prison sentence of a Norwegian-Pakistani woman who traveled to Syria to be with her husband, a member of the al-Nusra Front and ISIL, and reduced her sentence to 1 year and 4 months.

Authorities arrested 35 members of the Nordic Resistance Movement at an October 29 neo-Nazi rally in Oslo for not complying with police orders, following physical confrontations with counter-demonstrators. Only four of those arrested were Norwegian citizens; the remaining were foreign citizens, primarily from Sweden and Denmark, who traveled to Oslo for the rally.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Norway is a member of FATF, and its FIU, Financial Intelligence Unit Norway, is a member of the Egmont Group. In November the government updated the National Risk Assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government launched an update of the national CT strategy in November, with a keener focus on the potential of violence from seriously mentally ill individuals. The strategy also sought to address counterterrorism challenges through enhanced regulatory and technology development, threat communication, knowledge and expertise development, and cooperation. Norway continues to implement its Action Plan Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism. The government established an Extremism Commission in June, charged with evaluating the sharing of information among the health sector, security services, and the police. The commission also evaluates the drivers of violent extremism and how to follow up with persons at risk of radicalization to violence. The commission will present recommendations at the end of 2023.

Four Norwegian women known to have traveled from Norway to Syria to join ISIS remained in displaced persons camps in Syria, along with their four children. PST charged the women with participating in a terrorist organization *in absentia*. No Norwegian nationals were repatriated from displaced persons camps in Syria in 2022. PST estimated that 20 out of at least 140 Norwegian nationals who traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight on behalf of ISIS remain in those countries.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Norway’s 2022 global security funding, which covers counterterror collaboration, dropped by $2.9 million (29 million Norwegian kroner) down to $7.5 million (75.1 million Norwegian kroner) in a revised state budget for 2022 because of
across-the-board cuts made necessary by redirected funds for relief and assistance efforts related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Norway subsequently dropped several planned initiatives, including contributions to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and counterthreat measures under the revised budget.

Norway continued to support multilateral organizations, such as the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, to ensure they play a continued role in global CT prevention efforts. Norway supported the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and has contributed $3.75 million to the UN Trust Fund for Counterterrorism since its inception in 2009. Kristiansand and Oslo are members of the Strong Cities Network. Ten Norwegian cities are part of the Nordic Safe Cities Network.

RUSSIA

Overview: The Russian Federation continued to use terrorist and “extremist” threats as pretexts to suppress political opposition and the exercise of human rights, or for other objectives in both domestic and foreign policy.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: On September 26, at least 15 people were killed and 24 injured when a gunman opened fire on a school building in central Izhevsk. The gunman, 34-year-old Artem Kazantsev, was a former student; he wore a shirt with a Nazi symbol and held references to U.S. school massacre perpetrators. He killed himself after the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Under the coordination of the National Antiterrorism Committee, the Federal Security Service (FSB) — with aid from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Rosgvardiya (the National Guard) — perform counterterrorism functions. The FSB is a federal body with the authority to implement national security policy in the Russian Federation, including counterterrorism. The FSB Border Guard Service has responsibility for securing Russia’s borders, and the FSB has the right, in some cases, to command army units, including the right to issue orders to shoot down airplanes, if necessary. The National Guard assists the Border Guard Service in securing borders, administers gun control, combats terrorism and organized crime, protects public order, and guards important state facilities. Russia’s Ministry of Transport manages the Integrated National Transportation Security Information System to enable prompt detection of individuals involved in terrorist and violent extremist activities traveling on international or domestic airline routes. However, Russian legislation on transport security issues is fragmented and requires systematization, particularly with regard to increasing the level of antiterrorist protection of transport infrastructure.

Russia’s state-centric approach to addressing terrorism differs from whole-of-society approaches to the prevention of terrorism, which include the participation of civil society. The government increased use of counterterrorism and anti-extremism legislation as a tool to stifle political opposition, independent media, and certain religious organizations, and to criminalize the exercise of freedoms of religion or belief, expression, and association. Russia remained
concerned about violent extremist Islamist groups, including those with ideological ties to ISIS and al-Qa’ida.

The legal code allows the government to silence individuals who express dissent toward the government and to prevent them from participating in public life by targeting Russians who support civil society and religious organizations that have been declared “extremist” or “terrorist” under the law that designates organizations as “undesirable.” Russian authorities have the power to label any political group or entity as “extremist.” Leaders, staff, and supporters of organizations labeled as “extremist” are banned from running for public office. Those who have been designated as affiliates of “undesirable” organizations can face criminal charges. And citizens can be banned from participating in activities of these organizations. Laws also impose strict measures on finances for organizations that receive money from those who have been labeled as “foreign agents.” Those designated as foreign agents are barred from participating in civic life and educational activities. New legal amendments entered into force on December 1, which allowed the government to declare any individual or entity a foreign agent if it finds “foreign influence.”

In 2022 the Duma passed a law raising the minimum age for purchasing firearms to 21 years old.

In February the Supreme Court upheld its December 2021 decision to shut down the human rights organization Memorial’s two primary bodies, Memorial Human Rights Center and International Memorial, for ostensibly “justifying terrorism and extremism” and violating the foreign agents law.

In October the Russian government repatriated 38 children from camps in Syria for families of suspected ISIS fighters; most of the children were orphans, according to Agence France-Presse.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In 2022, Russia was a member of FATF, MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism), and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Russia was suspended from the Council of Europe in March and by consequence, from MONEYVAL, because of its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. In June, FATF members voted to restrict Russia’s ability to participate in FATF. Russia’s FIU, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring), is a member of the Egmont Group, but its ability to participate was limited in December.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Russian government authorities, including the Ministry of Internal Affair’s Center for Countering Extremism and the FSB, continued to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism to curtail freedoms of expression, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association. In 2022 the government pursued baseless charges against opposition leader Aleksey Navalny and the former leader of his campaign office in Ufas, Lilia Chanyshева, for “organizing an extremist organization.” It charged citizens with “extremism” for displaying pictures of Navalny, and symbols of his “Smart Voting” electoral project and the
Anti-Corruption Foundation. Those with extremism-related convictions are prevented from running for political office. The government also designated Meta, a social media company, as an extremist organization and outlawed the use of social media sites Facebook and Twitter. It continued to ban certain peaceful religious groups as extremist.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Russia is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and a participating state in the OSCE. The country was excluded from the Council of Europe (the CoE) on March 16. Russia remains a member of select partial agreements that are open to global accession, including the CoE’s Counterterrorism Committee.

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**SERBIA**

**Overview:** With no terrorist attacks in 2022, the main concerns in Serbia were repatriation of FTFs, self-radicalization to violence, bomb threats constituting acts of terrorism, and movement of migrants, money, and weapons. Serbia continued efforts to counter terrorism and terrorist financing. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Serbia suspended exercises with international partners, leading to the cancellation of CT training with the United States.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported incidents.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes since 2021. The Ministry of Interior’s (MOI’s) CT Service works on detection and deterrence and includes a Department for Preventing and Combating Extremism. Serbia criminalizes terrorism-related offenses, including recruitment and financing. The Criminal Code allows for life imprisonment for terrorist acts resulting in death.

Serbia has convicted seven of the 10 Serbian FTFs, some *in absentia*, who returned from Syria or Iraq, for terrorist-related activities, with sentences up to 11 years. There were no new convictions of such FTFs in 2022. Under Serbia’s Criminal Code, only suspects associated with UN-designated terrorist groups may be charged with terrorism-related offenses. Serbia lacks legislation that fully addresses all aspects of terrorist training, funding, and recruitment. However, in 2022, Serbia created action plans to eliminate international terrorism, conducted risk assessments for countering the financing of terrorism, and tracked financing of terrorism.

In 2022, police detained two suspected former members of the Taliban and, separately, one suspect for possession and trafficking of weapons for terrorist acts.

There was a significant increase in bomb threats: threats totaled 140, many of which originated from outside of Serbia and targeted critical infrastructure. A suspect was indicted on terrorism-related charges for threats targeting the Belgrade airport.

Although United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2396 calls on member states to develop Passenger Name Records (PNR) screening systems, Advance Passenger Information
and PNR programs were not in place. Third-party services handle the data Serbian airlines are required to transmit. Serbia pledged in the 2020 “Washington Commitments” to increase airline passenger information sharing with Kosovo within the framework of broader cooperation with the United States and to strengthen screening. Serbia is integrating with the European Common Aviation Area and cooperates with international partners in line with UNSCR 2309.

There were up to 27 Serbian FTFs and associated family members in Syria in 2022, and Serbia did not conduct any repatriations. Serbia established reintegration teams and adopted an associated action plan to eventually receive repatriated individuals.

Under the Washington Commitments, signed in 2020, Serbia pledged to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist group and restrict its operations and financial activities. Serbia has not made this designation or implemented measures, as it reported that it only adheres to UN designations.

There was no change to how courts address terrorism. The Belgrade Higher Court’s Department for Organized Crime hears cases, the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) prosecutes them, and the Belgrade Appellate Court’s Department for Organized Crime hears appeals.

Serbia’s CT Operational Working Group consists of the MOI, the Security and Intelligence Service, and the OCPO. Soft targets must have terrorism contingency plans, with MOI consultation and oversight. The MOI’s Special Antiterrorist Unit and the Ministry of Defense Military Police CT units provide tactical response.

The Border Police’s System to Check Persons and Vehicles (SZPLIV) screens passengers and vehicles at border crossings and ports of entry. SZPLIV verifies travel documents, collects biographic and biometric data, and searches national and international databases. However, data transmission to the central system can take days.

There were no terrorist attacks by REMOVE groups, although such groups — notably pro-Russia groups — were active.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Serbia is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism) and has observer status in the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Its FIU, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML), is a member of the Egmont Group. Serbia implements a 2020-24 National Strategy for Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and adopted a new 2022-24 action plan for implementation.

The CT Service reported conducting inspections of 286 individuals, eight legal entities, and six associations, and the APML provided intelligence to the CT Service on more than 40 occasions.
Serbia froze assets of a domestically designated individual on four occasions. The APML flagged transfers by designated nationals to FIUs in other countries.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Serbia implemented a 2017-21 National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism. An impact study of this strategy — a prerequisite for creation of a new strategy — was pending adoption by the government. In 2022, Serbia conducted training for teams of police, psychologists, and social workers that address deradicalization from violence and reintegration. The municipalities of Bujanovac, Novi Pazar, Presevo, and Tutin are members of the Strong Cities Network.

On February 17, police arrested a suspect for posting ISIS content and instructions to commit terrorist acts on the internet. The Belgrade High Court announced proceedings for public incitement to commit terrorist acts would begin in 2023.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Serbia engages in international cooperation, including with INTERPOL and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, on watchlists. The country maintains border security mechanisms with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania. Serbia cooperates bilaterally with Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro on border security. Serbia cooperated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for arms control, border security, and anti-illicit finance and money laundering programs that bolstered CT efforts. The OSCE supported Serbia’s CT efforts, including to enhance border security, and to counter violent extremism and terrorist recruitment.

**SPAIN**

**Overview:** Spain continued to respond effectively to the global terrorism threat in border and transportation security, countering terrorist financing, and countering violent extremism through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The country remained on “high” national alert for terrorism throughout 2022, for the eighth year in a row. Spanish authorities continued to arrest individuals suspected of planning terror attacks, facilitating terrorist financing, and engaging in ISIS- and al-Qa’ida-related recruitment and radicalization, both online and in these individuals’ communities. During the year, Spanish CT cooperation with the United States was excellent.

Spain hosted the May 10-11 UN High-Level International Conference on Human Rights, Civil Society, and Counterterrorism, which was preceded by a May 9 civil society workshop. Spain also served as co-chair of the Victims of Terrorism Group of Friends and hosted the May 23-25 Hedayah CVE research conference. Throughout 2022, Spain contributed to counterterrorism and security by deploying about 150 personnel to Iraq and some 600 personnel to the Sahel and the Horn of Africa in military and police training missions. Spain continued to exercise leadership in regional and global CT fora.
2022 Terrorist Incidents: On or around November 30, packages containing explosive devices were delivered to the Ukrainian and U.S. embassies in Spain, and to other sites, including the office of the Spanish presidency. One injury resulted at the Ukrainian embassy. Spanish National Police (SNP) tracked the devices to a Spanish national and held him in preventive custody for terrorism as they completed their investigation.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There have been no changes since 2020.

Law Enforcement: During the year, the Spanish government continued to implement its National Strategy Against Terrorism. The Ministry of Interior, through its Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime (or CITCO) — and with contributions from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Justice — developed the strategy to align with the four pillars of CT strategies of the EU and the United Nations: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. The strategy includes measures to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets such as hotels, stadia, tourist resorts, and cultural sites, in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 2341 on protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

Spanish authorities reported they had undertaken 35 counterterrorist operations and detained 56 suspects on terrorism-related charges during the year.

Significant law enforcement actions related to CT included these three:

- On February 24, SNP arrested five Pakistani nationals allegedly linked to a Pakistani violent extremist movement and charged them with collaboration with a terrorist organization, incitement, and glorification of terrorism.
- On June 7, as part of a large international counterterrorism operation, SNP arrested six Spanish nationals and charged them with collaboration with a Pakistani violent extremist movement and incitement to murder.
- On August 3, SNP arrested two men for allegedly traveling to Syria for the purpose of receiving terrorist training from al-Qa’ida.

Border Security: On August 21, Spain announced it will implement the European Travel Information and Authorization System in 2023 to improve border security.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Spain is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses (or SEPBLAC), is a member of the Egmont Group. On February 1, SNP arrested three Spanish nationals and charged them with creating a financial network in support of ISIS in Libya.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: On February 21, the Ministry of Interior approved a refocused Plan for the Prevention, Protection, and Response to Terrorism, a component of Spain’s
National Strategy Against Terrorism. This plan directly addresses countering violent extremism by reinforcing regional police cooperation to fight and prevent radicalization to violence, Islamist terrorism, and lone-actor attacks. The new plan specifically addresses “jihadist terrorists,” including returning foreign fighters affiliated with ISIS and al-Qa’ida. The plan also identifies and supports deradicalization from violence programs for Spanish prisons.

International and Regional Cooperation
Throughout 2022, Spain contributed troops to EU training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, and Somalia, seeking to support stability and address security threats — including terrorism in host nations. Spain’s Guardia Civil led the EU’s Groupes d’Action Rapides-Surveillance et Intervention (or GAR-SI) Sahel mission to build rapid response units within the Sahel’s gendarme and police forces, which was designed to improve stability and reduce domestic terror. Spain cooperated with regional partners on CT investigations and arrests.

During May 23-25, Spain hosted the Hedayah Seventh Annual International CVE Research Conference in Granada. On June 21 the Spanish government announced an agreement with the United Nations to host the UN Office of Counterterrorism in Madrid. On October 27, Deputy Minister of Interior Rafael Perez announced that counterterrorism is among Spain’s priorities for the 2023 Spanish presidency of the Council of the European Union. Throughout 2022, Spain contributed troops to EU training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, and Somalia, seeking to support stability and address security threats including terrorism in host nations.

During the year, Spain’s Guardia Civil led the EU’s GAR-SI Sahel mission to build rapid response units within the Sahel’s gendarme and police forces which are designed to improve stability and reduce domestic terror.

Spain is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and supports counterterrorism initiatives at the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE. The country is a donor nation to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). Spain continues to support the 5+5 Defense Initiative bringing together European (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) and North African (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia) countries to build capacity on CT maritime and aviation security and disaster management. The Spanish cities of Fuenlabrada and Málaga are both members of the Strong Cities Network. Spain is a donor nation to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. The country is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and supports counterterrorism initiatives at the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE.

SWEDEN

Overview: The National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT) assessed that lone actors from REMVE and Islamist terrorist movements posed the main terrorist threat to Sweden in 2022. Violent “left wing” extremists were active but posed no defined threat. Islamist terrorism had the largest number of adherents, while REMVE played an increasingly prominent
role. Quran burnings carried out during 2022 raised Sweden’s profile as a potential target for Islamist terrorists. Authorities assessed that a small number of individuals in violent extremist environments could possibly carry out terrorist attacks in Sweden. NCT noted that violent extremism gained ground, and an increasing number of young individuals, including minors, were attracted to online-based REMVE.

The Swedish Security Service reported that the pandemic benefited violent extremist disinformation and the normalization of conspiracy theories. Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism had coordinating bodies at the national level, unlike Islamist terrorism, which lacked the same level of cohesive leadership and organizational structure. Islamist terrorists received the most funding from abroad and had the greatest capability to generate income. Digital currencies, including crypto, played an important role in violent extremist groups’ financing, and Violent Extremist Organizations increasingly used digital platforms rather than meeting in person. The Swedish Security Service regularly received information on firearms and explosives with links to REMVE, Islamist, or violent left-wing extremism. At the end of 2022, the national alert level remained at Level 3 (elevated threat, no evidence of planning) on a scale of 5 (attack imminent, evidence of planning).

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Swedish citizen Theodor Engström fatally stabbed Ing-Marie Wieselgren, national coordinator for psychiatric issues in Sweden’s municipalities and regions, on July 6 at Sweden’s premier political gathering. The assailant had a history of mental illness and was previously active in the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement. Engström told the court that he had wanted “to hit back at the Swedish people” and added that he had also included Center Party leader Annie Lööf and Hanna Stjärne, the CEO of Sweden’s state broadcaster SVT, among hundreds of possible targets. Engström was convicted of murder and preparation to commit terrorism.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2022 the government continued efforts to strengthen its counterterrorism laws.

A new Terrorism Offenses Act entered into force in July, replacing three earlier laws relating to terrorism and increasing prison sentences for terrorism offenses.

A new law took effect in July that expanded the authorities’ powers to expel foreigners who pose a threat to Sweden’s security. The law clarified the conditions for taking foreigners into custody and gave authorities more tools to detain, search, and secretly conduct surveillance of suspects.

In November, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment allowing limitations on freedom of association for groups engaged in terrorism.

Sweden repatriated at least four female FTFs and six children who had previously been in Syrian Democratic Forces-run displaced persons camps in Syria. The Security Service estimated that around 300 Swedish citizens traveled to join ISIS- and al-Qa’ida-linked groups. Around 160 have
returned during the last few years. One repatriated female foreign terrorist was convicted in District Court in Stockholm and sentenced to six years in prison after her son became a child soldier in Syria. Other women were being investigated for war crimes. Swedish authorities collaborated closely with the FBI to build criminal cases against Swedish foreign terrorist fighters. The Swedish Center for CVE had a network of nine agencies and organizations to support the rehabilitation and integration of the returnees.

Sweden is party to the EU’s identity verification and border management tools, such as the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System. The country collects and uses Advance Passenger Information, and some Passenger Name Records, and exchanges information with other member states on irregular migration and border control. Sweden used the “serious threat to public policy or internal security” justification permitted under the Schengen Border Code to unilaterally prolong the temporary border controls first introduced in 2015 until midyear 2023.

The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) and Nordic Strength are the two major neo-Nazi movements in the Nordic countries. The two groups have around 200 active members in Sweden. NRM conducted several acts of harassment and vandalism during 2022, with the Swedish Jewish community as one of the most targeted groups. The neo-Nazi movements continued to integrate into the antivaccine movement.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sweden is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Service, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism promotes and coordinates preventive efforts at the national, regional, and local levels. The center supports municipalities, government agencies, and others in preventing violent extremism.

The Security Service, together with other authorities, closed two schools that reportedly had been under the influence of leading figures in the Islamist terrorism environment and had been suspected of receiving funds from organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Malmö and Stockholm are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Sweden is a member of the EU. It supports CT efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including the European Commission’s Radicalization Awareness Network, the EU-9 (focusing on FTFs), the Counterterrorism Group, the Police Working Group on Terrorism, and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. EU Regulation 2021/784 on measures against the spread of terrorist content online (the so-called TCO regulation) took effect in June.

Sweden engaged in the following efforts to combat terrorism internationally:
• Funding international CT capacity building projects through development assistance
• Funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch
• Funding to the OSCE
• Contributing 220 troops (a rifle company and a support unit) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
• Joining the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL
• Extending Sweden’s regional crisis strategy for Syria ($425 million for 2016-23), which includes resilience support for groups affected by ISIS’s progress.

TÜRKİYE

Overview: Türkiye continued its efforts to defeat terrorist organizations both inside and outside its borders, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, and ISIS. The country is an active contributor to international counterterrorism fora, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS as a co-lead for the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group.

Türkiye is a source and transit country for FTFs seeking to join ISIS and other terrorist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, as well as for FTFs who seek to depart Syria and Iraq. According to its Ministry of Interior, Türkiye has deported 9,000 FTFs representing 102 different nationalities since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, including 20 FTFs from six EU member states, as of September. Türkiye reportedly deported an alleged member of an ISIS execution cell known as “the Beatles” to the UK. On September 8, Turkish President Erdogan announced that the Turkish security forces in Istanbul captured alleged ISIS executive Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai. According to officials, Turkish security forces captured 19 ISIS-linked potential suicide bombers plotting attacks in Türkiye in 2022.

The Turkish Minister of Interior said that Turkish security forces wounded, killed, or captured 1,220 terrorists belonging to various organizations, including 57 individuals on Türkiye’s wanted list. Public data indicated that at year’s end Turkish authorities detained 29,751 people suspected of links to terrorist groups or aiding them. The PKK continued to conduct terrorist attacks in Türkiye and against Turkish interests outside of Türkiye. Türkiye’s security forces conducted operations domestically along with military operations in northern Iraq and northern Syria. Turkish airstrikes reportedly aimed at fighting the PKK in Syria and Iraq have also resulted in civilian casualties. The International Crisis Group, an NGO, assessed that at year’s end 92 state security forces, 323 PKK members, and 20 civilians were killed in PKK-linked clashes or attacks.

On November 19, Turkish Armed Forces launched an operation with airstrikes in northern Syria and Iraq following the deadly terror attack in Istanbul. Politically motivated detentions and arrests of individuals — including journalists, human rights activists, lawyers, and politicians accused of supporting or aiding the PKK — continued in 2022.
In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, the government labeled the movement of self-exiled cleric and political figure Fethullah Gulen as the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organization” (FETO). FETO is not a designated terrorist organization in the United States. The Turkish government continued to detain and arrest Turkish citizens as well as foreign citizens residing in Türkiye for alleged FETO or terrorism-related links, often based on scant evidence and minimal due process. A locally employed staff member at U.S. Mission Türkiye remained unjustly detained for alleged FETO links. The government also continued to dismiss military, security, and civil servants from public office in 2022. Since the 2016 coup attempt, authorities have dismissed or suspended tens of thousands of civil servants and government workers, including more than 60,000 police and military personnel and more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors, arrested or imprisoned more than 95,000 citizens, and closed more than 1,500 NGOs on terrorism-related grounds, primarily for alleged FETO ties.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The following are notable incidents:

- On April 21 a bus carrying prison security personnel in Türkiye’s northwestern Bursa province was struck by an IED, killing a prison guard, and injuring four others, including one in critical condition. Turkish authorities said “radical leftist organizations” were behind the attack.
- On September 26 one Turkish National Police officer was killed, and another was wounded, in a complex terror attack targeting a police housing compound in the Tece neighborhood of Mersin, in southeastern Türkiye. The PKK claimed the attack.
- On November 13 a bomb exploded on a busy pedestrian street in Istanbul, İstiklal Avenue, killing six Turkish citizens, including two children, and wounding 81. The attack was not claimed; however, Turkish authorities have blamed the PKK for the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Türkiye has a broad definition of terrorism that includes so-called crimes against the constitutional order and internal and external security of the state, which the government regularly used to criminalize the exercise of freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. The General Directorate of Security announced on September 27 that it took legal action against 22 social media users who posted content about the terrorist attack against the police house in Mersin, for “inciting the public to hatred and enmity.” Legal actions taken by Türkiye against the accused included a mix of charges related to terrorism or other criminal activity under Turkish law. Türkiye has advanced law enforcement capacity to combat terrorism, and efforts continued to streamline interagency information sharing.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Türkiye is a member of FATF, and its FIU, the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK), is a member of the Egmont Group. Türkiye remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported that Türkiye took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime, including by increasing the human resources at
the FIU to conduct analysis, conducting some outreach to the non-profit organization sector about its risks and vulnerabilities to terrorist financing activity, and pursuing numerous domestic designations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 to target terrorist financing in line with Türkiye’s risk profile. MASAK also released several communiqués to tighten practices for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in 2022. On June 3, MASAK announced a strategy document for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in Türkiye and increasing efficiency in confiscation practices. On November 26, MASAK published two guides for fighting the financing of terrorism. To date, AML/CFT audits have focused on NPOs working on human rights issues and vulnerable communities, particularly groups that focus on the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. Human rights NGOs reported the government used supposed counterterrorist financing legislation to conduct increased and more onerous audits of organizations and associations focusing on human rights, rule of law, LGBTQI+ issues, or topics otherwise sensitive to the ruling party, and had a substantial chilling effect on civil society.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Turkish National Police (TNP) undertook social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers. Programs prepared medical, community, and religious officials for intervening to undermine terrorist messaging and prevent recruitment. The Ministry of Justice implemented some rehabilitation and reintegration programs for convicts and former criminals. The Ministry of Interior claimed that, by year’s end, 124 PKK members had surrendered to Turkish security forces through persuasion efforts. On November 1, Türkiye repatriated a PKK member who has surrendered in Algeria. Türkiye’s Religious Affairs Presidency (Diyanet) reported that it worked to “undermine terrorist messaging by promoting its inclusive version of Islam.” Antalya is a member of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Türkiye is a member of the United Nations, NATO, the Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Türkiye also contributed to the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, a GCTF-inspired institution, and provided expert support to assist in training for judges and prosecutors handling terrorism cases. Türkiye participated in OSCE expert meetings on the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, organized by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Secretariat.

Türkiye has bilateral security cooperation agreements with more than 70 countries. The TNP contributed to CT capacity building programs of partner countries and offers specialized international law enforcement training in a variety of sectors, including counterterrorism.
Overview: The UK remained a key U.S. partner in the global fight against terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries was excellent. As a Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS partner, the UK continued to contribute to Iraq and northeastern Syria stabilization efforts and expanded coordination on ISIS in the Sahel and Afghanistan. The UK also serves as the coalition’s Communications Working Group co-leader, in partnership with the United Arab Emirates and the United States on countering ISIS propaganda and messaging.

The UK’s terrorism threat level was at the third-highest rating (“substantial”) for most of 2022. On February 9 the UK lowered its threat level from “severe” to “substantial,” indicating a terrorist attack remained “likely” rather than “highly likely.” The UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center assessed that the nature and scale of the UK terrorist threat was consistent with the level of threat seen before the two attacks in October and November 2021. UK officials categorized Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to national security, though they recognized the growing threat of REMVE, also referred to as “extreme right-wing” terrorism.

The Home Office reported that, during the fiscal year ending in March, the UK’s Prevent Counterterrorism program received 6,406 referrals, an increase of 30 percent compared with the year ending in March 2021 (4,915), attributing it to the impact of lifting COVID-19 restrictions. The Home Office reported more referrals related to “extreme right-wing” radicalization (1,309) than “Islamist” radicalization (1,027) for the second year running. From 2017 through November 2022, police and security services disrupted 37 late-stage attack plots.

The terrorist threat level for Northern Ireland — set separately from England, Scotland, and Wales — was lowered from severe to substantial in March. The main terrorist threat in Northern Ireland remained dissident Republican groups, who oppose British governance and use paramilitary-style attacks and intimidation to exert control over communities. Loyalist paramilitary groups also posed a threat in the region. In December the Independent Reporting Commission published its fifth annual report assessing Loyalist and Republican paramilitarism, which remain clear and present dangers in Northern Ireland.

2022 Terrorist Attacks: The UK suffered one terrorist attack in 2022:

- On October 30 a British national threw numerous crude incendiary devices directed toward an immigration center in Dover before killing himself, resulting in minor injuries for two persons. CT Policing UK noted that, while there were strong indications that mental health was a likely factor, the suspect’s actions were driven primarily by “extreme right-wing” ideology.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In April, Parliament passed the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which gives the police three new powers to manage the risk posed by terrorist offenders and terrorist risk offenders released from prison who are on probation. The bill permits the police to apply to a court for a warrant to search the premises of individuals on probation and makes it possible to conduct personal searches, and urgent arrests in rare circumstances, provided they pose a high risk. Parliament also passed the
Nationality and Borders Bill, which enables the Home Secretary to remove an individual’s British citizenship in the interest of national security in cases involving acts of terrorism, or unacceptable behavior, such as the glorification of terrorism.

UK law enforcement made 190 arrests for suspected terrorism-related activity, of which 47 resulted in charges for terrorism-related offenses, according to Home Office statistics in the year ending September. Of the 49 people convicted of terrorism-related offenses, 34 received sentences of less than 10 years and two received a life sentence. As of September, 239 people were in custody for terrorism-related offenses in the UK, with 155 of these individuals associated with “Islamist extremism” and 66 with “extreme right-wing” terrorism, and 18 as “other.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UK is a member of FATF and has observer or cooperating status in the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. The UK FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE), a nonstatutory expert committee of the Home Office, hosted its inaugural CCE conference in February, bringing together government policy officials, academics, and public sector practitioners to consider how extremism manifests itself in the UK and how the sector should respond. In December the CCE hosted its second conference, with panel discussions focused on radical environmentalism, Barelvi extremism, how grievances are exploited by extremists, and the personal costs of countering extremism. The UK is a contributor to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. Birmingham, Derry/Londonderry, Leicester, London, Luton, and Manchester are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The UK continued to strongly support CT and counter-unmanned aircraft system threat efforts in the Global Counterterrorism Forum and other regional and multilateral organizations. The UK also hosted a Communications Working Group meeting for the Defeat-ISIS Coalition in March. The United Kingdom also remains a firm supporter of the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and international efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of ISIS violence. The UK and the United States remain in close coordination on sanctions targets. As the UK government seeks to update its counterterrorism strategy (or CONTEST) in 2023, the UK and the United States will coordinate closely on numerous strategic alignment issues and to develop a shared picture on emerging risks. The UK is a key member of the Five-Country Ministerial, which promotes multilateral, ministerial dialogue on border security and counterterrorism. The UK cooperates with other OSCE participating states in countering terrorism.
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Overview

Throughout 2022, terrorist groups continued to operate and maintain safe havens in the Middle East and North Africa. ISIS and its entities, al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, and Iran-backed groups continued to pose the greatest terrorist threats to the region. These groups especially looked to operate and benefit from under governed areas or regions affected by conflict, such as within Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. However, ISIS and al-Qa’ida suffered significant leadership losses during the reporting period, including the deaths of al-Qa’ida emir Ayman al-Zawahiri and ISIS emirs Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi and Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.

Iran continued its extensive support for terrorism in 2022. Iran used the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its proxies and partners to destabilize the region and advance its influence abroad. Through the IRGC-QF, Iran provided funding, training, weapons, and equipment to several U.S.-designated terrorist groups in the region. Iran-backed militias continued sporadic attacks on bases hosting U.S. and other Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. Senior al-Qa’ida members continued to reside in Iran. Outside the region, Iran plotted attacks against dissidents and other perceived enemies of the regime based abroad.

In Iraq, there was a significant decrease in terrorist attacks in 2022, compared with the previous two years, because of the increasing effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in combating terrorism. There has been significant progress in reducing ISIS’s ability to recapture physical territory and ability to operate. Despite this progress, ISIS remained active and continued to claim responsibility for attacks in Syria, Iraq, and regionally, while also presenting an ongoing threat to U.S. interests abroad and domestically.

Across northeast Syria, approximately 10,000 ISIS fighters are held in detention facilities. An estimated 55,000 displaced persons — including 10,000 non-Syrian, non-Iraqi third country nationals, most of them children and many of them family members of ISIS fighters — remain in al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps. The United States continues to increase advocacy and support for countries of origin to repatriate their nationals and to rehabilitate, reintegrate, and (as appropriate) prosecute them. In 2022, more than 3,000 foreign nationals, including large numbers of Iraqis, were repatriated from northeast Syria, surpassing total repatriations from 2020 and 2021 combined. During 2022, Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS partners and international organizations including the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), and Hedayah offered legal and practical assistance in ensuring safe and successful reintegration of returnees into society, once appropriate. The 85-member U.S.-led Defeat-ISIS Coalition continued comprehensive efforts to prevent a resurgence of ISIS, stabilizing liberated areas and denying ISIS-aligned groups access to territory, to movement of persons and goods, and to financial gain.

Al-Qa’ida and affiliates remained a threat to U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East and North Africa. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has a continued presence in central
Yemen — most notably in al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwah governorates — and has carried out attacks on Yemeni officials and Southern Transitional Council (STC) representatives as well as kidnappings of UN workers transiting through central Yemen to Aden. Though al-Qa‘ida continued to suffer losses of territory, membership, and access to financial resources, al-Qa‘ida remained a resilient adversary.

In North Africa, terrorist groups continued to be degraded and destroyed, with only small numbers of ISIS-aligned and al-Qa‘ida-affiliated terrorists remaining in areas of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sinai province of Egypt, and Tunisia. In parts of the neighboring Sahel region, ISIS and al-Qa‘ida affiliates enjoyed greater freedom of movement and access to territory.

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**ALGERIA**

**Overview:** The United States and Algeria continued to strengthen their CT partnership in 2022 through regular dialogue and exchanges of technical expertise. Algeria maintained its significant efforts to prevent terrorist activity within its borders through a consistent tempo of CT operations to arrest and eliminate terrorist suspects, dismantle and disrupt terrorist cells, and destroy hideouts, arms, and other equipment. These operations further diminished the terrorist organizations’ already-limited capacities to operate within Algeria. Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb and allied groups and ISIS’s Algeria branch, including the local group Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), remained in the country — though in ever-smaller numbers, as they have been unable to attract new recruits or significant new resources. These groups did not conduct any terrorist attacks in 2022. The U.S. government assessed that the country’s security forces could credibly reduce the likelihood of domestic terrorist threats to a negligible level within the coming year.

Terrorist activity in Libya, Mali, and Niger — as well as human, weapons, and narcotics trafficking — contributed to the regional threat, particularly in border areas, and Algeria’s security apparatus focused on preventing these elements from threatening Algeria. Additionally, in 2022, Algerian authorities targeted the Berber separatist Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (or MAK) and the Islamist movement Rachad, which the government designated as terrorist organizations in 2021. The United States considered this attention to have been more political than security related, as both groups are highly critical of the government and do not appear to have committed what the United States defines as terrorist acts. The Algerian government occasionally charged individuals with terrorism-related crimes for activities that appeared to constitute protected expression and peaceful activism.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Algeria-based terrorist groups did not conduct any domestic terrorist attacks in 2022. According to the Algerian Army’s yearly report, it killed 20 terrorists in CT operations; arrested 385 terrorists and affiliates; and destroyed more than 64 terrorist caches, approximately 97 homemade bombs, and 623 other weapons during CT operations in 2022. Algerian security forces sometimes engaged in armed violence with extremists during these operations, occasionally suffering casualties.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In February the Algerian government issued an executive order requiring the registration on a national list of terrorist persons and entities.

The Algerian judicial system tried and convicted several terrorists and their affiliates, and the government maintained its strict “no concessions” policy regarding individuals or groups holding its citizens hostage. Algerian military forces and multiple law enforcement, intelligence, and security services addressed CT, counterintelligence, investigations, border security, and crisis response. These included the various branches of the Joint Staff, the Algerian Army, the National Gendarmerie, and border guards under the Ministry of National Defense (MND); the Directorate General of Internal Security; and the national police (the General Directorate of National Security) under the Ministry of Interior. The MND’s public announcements provided timely reporting on incidents during which its forces captured or eliminated terrorists, dismantled terrorist cells, and seized equipment and arms.

Border security remained a top priority for Algeria in 2022. The Algerian government closely monitored passenger manifests of inbound and outbound flights. A January interministerial decree was given to strengthen the interoperability of government CT services relevant to the international organization of the National Unit of Passenger Information (UIP). Algeria also added provisions requiring the communication of passenger data (Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record) to the UIP unit, which was accompanied by a decree defining the processes for doing so.

Algerian security and law enforcement agencies participated in training and exchanges offered by the U.S. government and by third countries. Algerian participants attended numerous workshops conducted under the GCTF, the United Nations, the EU, the AU, and other multilateral organizations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF), is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2022, the government announced it would restructure the CTRF to revitalize its FIU and implement FATF recommendations. The restructuring established and strengthened five thematic working groups to counter money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF).

In December, Algeria’s lower house of Parliament passed amendments to Algeria’s anti-ML/TF laws. The upper chamber of Congress was expected to review and pass the legislation in early 2023.

The proposed amendments to Algeria’s anti-ML/TF laws prescribe new penalties for institutions or individuals accused of either crime, and add provisions to the existing legal framework to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The proposed amendments would also establish a new institution controlled by the executive branch to regulate all funding received by civil society organizations.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: Algeria maintained a robust, multidimensional approach to CVE. In February, President Tebboune — in his capacity as AU coordinator on efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism — provided a report for the AU Summit in Addis Ababa underscoring the importance of comprehensive CVE and deradicalization efforts in Africa.

International and Regional Cooperation: Algeria continued to support CT and security efforts through participation in international, multilateral, and regional organizations. It engages actively with United Nations affiliates such as the UN Office of Counterterrorism and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as other organizations such as INTERPOL. Algeria is an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs the GCTF’s West Africa Region Working Group, hosting and participating in numerous workshops and working group meetings.

Algeria hosts the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (Afripol) police union, and it plays a leading role in CT-related matters in the AU, including by hosting its Center for Study and Research on Terrorism. Algeria remains chair of the implementation committee for the peace accord in Mali and continues to support the UN political process in Libya. Algeria also hosted and participated in various Sahel-Saharan fora to discuss development and security policies and the evolution of regional terrorism. Notably, Algeria leads the Joint Military Staff Committee (or CEMOC), which exists to coordinate CT cooperation among Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria remained an impediment to bilateral and regional CT cooperation.

BAHRAIN

Overview: There were no terrorist attacks in Bahrain in 2022, and domestic security forces conducted numerous operations to preempt and disrupt attack planning. The Public Prosecution Office’s 2022 annual report announced that its Terrorism Crimes Unit prosecuted seven terrorism cases during the year, including criminal cases in appeals courts. The Government of Bahrain (GOB) is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) and supports U.S. government counterterrorism efforts. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and participates in U.S.-led military coalitions, including the International Maritime Security Construct and the Combined Maritime Forces. The United States and Bahrain signed several agreements to enhance cooperation on countering terrorism and border security. Bahrain continued to provide support for countering Iran’s malign activities in the region. The GOB initiated numerous programs intended to improve relations between the citizen community and security forces, and to counter violent extremism. The Department of State funded training and capacity building opportunities for Bahraini officials.
2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist attacks reported in Bahrain in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: During the second U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue in March, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior signed instruments to formalize the implementation of a) Automated Targeting System-Global to enhance airport passenger security and b) Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program to identify high-risk cargo shipments.

On April 18, according to Government of Bahrain press statements, the Court of Cassation upheld a 15-year prison sentence against two defendants who were found guilty of having links to the U.S.-designated terrorist group al-Ashtar Brigades and attempting to plant explosives at two bank ATMs in February 2021. The court also upheld a 10-year prison sentence for a third defendant in the same case. According to the Ministry of Interior, 13 other defendants were tried in the same case and received prison sentences ranging from three years to life in prison.

On June 27 the Supreme Criminal Court of Appeals upheld guilty verdicts against Hasan Mubarak, Jasim Muhammed, and Salman Ali Salman, charged with burning an ATM machine in Samahheej in September 2021. According to the Bahraini government, the three defendants set fire to the ATM machine because the bank signed an agreement to cooperate with an Israeli bank. The three defendants were sentenced to three, 10, and 15 years in prison, respectively.

In October the Supreme Criminal Court of Appeals upheld guilty verdicts against six former Future Bank officials. They were sentenced to between five and 10 years in prison and were each fined one million Bahraini dinars ($2.66 million) for money laundering and carrying out 166 illegal transactions. According to the Bahraini government, the former Future Bank officials were third-country nationals and will be deported following completion of their prison sentences. Bahrain-based Future Bank, which was controlled by the National Bank of Iran (Bank-e Melli) and Iran’s Export Bank (Bank-e Saderat), laundered more than a billion U.S. dollars between 2008 and 2012 and shielded Iranian entities that financed terrorism from international sanctions.

There were reports that the Bahraini government used counterterrorism laws to restrict freedoms of expression, association, assembly and religion or belief by prosecuting law-abiding government critics. According to NGOs, the government held an unverified number of political prisoners, and charges against individuals identified by NGOs as political prisoners included terrorism, treason, espionage, and attempting to overthrow the monarchy. The antiterrorism law prohibits unlicensed gatherings of more than five persons, and the Ministry of Interior maintained a prohibition on public demonstrations to “maintain public order.”

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Directorate, is a member of the Egmont Group. Bahrain is also a member of the regional TFTC.
In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Bahrain in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram. The targets also included Bahraini U.S.-designated terrorist groups al-Ashtar Brigades and al-Mukhtar Brigades.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Government of Bahrain continued public outreach initiatives such as the community police program that works to bridge the divide between the Bahraini Shia community and police force in neighborhoods and public schools. The Ministry of Interior continued to implement the *Bahrainuna* (“Our Bahrain”) initiative to promote a shared, national Bahraini identity.

Al-Mukhtar Brigades and al-Ashtar Brigades seek to destabilize Bahraini society and pave the way for Iran to exert greater influence in Bahrain. A UN Counterterrorism Center’s 2020 report recommended that the Bahraini government enhance civil society’s capacity to adhere to countering terrorism finance regulations in a manner that is commensurate to the risk posed to civil society organizations by terrorist groups.

In September the Ministry of Interior’s drug abuse and CVE prevention program, Ma’an, in partnership with DARE USA, introduced curricula in public and private schools that focused on CVE and promoting coexistence, as well as cybersecurity. Ma’an worked in partnership with the University of North Carolina and DARE USA to develop a tolerance and CVE student curriculum as part of the National Action Plan to Combat Extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** As of December, small elements of the Bahrain Defense Force continue to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Bahrain is a member of the GCC, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League. Bahrain participates in and hosts the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) — the largest maritime partnership in the world. CMF is a 34-nation maritime partnership that upholds the rules-based international order by countering illicit nonstate actors carrying weapons, narcotics, trafficking victims, and other contraband on the high seas, thus promoting security, stability, and prosperity.

In February, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken and Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani convened the second U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue, which included a working group to discuss bilateral and regional efforts to counter terrorism and transnational threats.

On July 2, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Interior Minister General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa signed three MOUs to enhance cooperation in countering terrorist financing, cybersecurity, and unmanned aerial vehicles systems.

The U.S. Mission in Manama facilitated nine Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) courses with the Ministry of Interior:

1. Social Media Investigations Consultation
2. Advanced Social Media Investigations Consultation  
3. Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course (EDCHC)  
4. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience  
5. Behavioral Observation Skills-Countering Lebanese Hizballah Consultation  
6. Social Media Investigations Consultation Train the Trainer  
7. Digital Forensics Lab Mentoring  
9. Advanced Travel Document Recognition Countering Lebanese Hizballah Consultation

ATA conducted a two-week Assessment Monitoring Unit visit in June and published a report that focused on border security, crisis management, and cyber functional areas. Embassy Manama facilitated several predeployment site surveys by ATA subject-matter experts to facilitate and enhance the training deliveries. The February EDCHC course in the United States included an equipment grant of 10 explosive-detection canines to the Ministry of Interior.

In May and September, the Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the Department of State’s ATA program successfully completed the second and third of five phases in the Counter-Lebanese Hizballah Training Program, which builds terrorism investigations and prosecution capabilities through information integration and capacity building for investigators, prosecutors, and judges.

In March the OPDAT Resident Legal Advisor, funded by Department of State’s CT Bureau, hosted a three-day regional conference in Manama, attended by prosecutors, investigators, and FIUs from 10 Middle Eastern and North African countries. The conference discussed strengthening international judicial cooperation and equipping judges and prosecutors with Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism knowledge to fight international organized crime and money laundering, and outlined the challenges in investigating and prosecuting money-laundering cases.

EGYPT

OVERVIEW: Egypt saw a decrease in terrorist activity in 2022, compared with previous years. Egypt is committed to counterterrorism (CT) and CVE. The nation continued military and social development campaigns in North Sinai, where a degraded ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) targeted security forces, pro-government Bedouin groups, and civilians. ISIS-SP struck near the Suez Canal four times, including in the first terrorist attack on Egyptian soil west of the canal since 2019. There were not confirmed numbers for civilian, military, and terrorist casualties, given security constraints in North Sinai and limited media and government reporting. The government reported that it spent $224 million through 2020 on compensation for property damaged in CT operations and economic development to support North Sinai residents.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Based on government press releases and media reporting, at least 95 terrorist incidents occurred in the Sinai Peninsula, with roughly 260 casualties, in 2022. ISIS-SP
claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. The methodology for the attacks included small arms, IEDs, kidnappings, killings, complex assaults, ambushes, and targeted assassinations. There was a significant decrease in the number, frequency, and severity of IEDs and sniper attacks, and fewer complex operations with large-scale casualties against Egyptian security forces. Opportunistic attacks led to most security force casualties. While most attacks occurred in northeast Sinai, there were four attacks near the Suez Canal, including one attack west of the canal.

- On March 28, ISIS-SP alleged sniper attacks, killing two Sinai Tribal Union militiamen: a rocket-propelled grenade attack on an army checkpoint near Rafah, and a separate IED attack near Sheikh Zuweid.
- In May, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for attacks at an outpost near Rafah and near a water pumping station near the Suez Canal that together killed or wounded 26 Egyptian security personnel.
- On November 18, ISIS-SP attacked the town of East Qantara, killing seven Egyptian soldiers. ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On December 31, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for a checkpoint attack in Ismailia that killed four Egyptian security personnel and wounded 16.

ISIS-SP was the only group to publicly claim responsibility for terrorist attacks in Egypt during 2022. Local security services were aware of attempts by unknown individuals to target churches and infrastructure across the year.

Egyptian security operations continued to degrade ISIS-SP, including by killing midlevel ISIS-SP leader Hamza al-Zamili in August. The government continued to target terrorists through military operations and limited airstrikes in the Sinai Peninsula, largely in unpopulated areas.

The United States supported Egypt’s efforts to combat ISIS-SP with mine-resistant and ambush-protected vehicles, counter-IED training, mobile sensor towers, special operations training, air-to-ground integration, and border security. The United States routinely engages in bilateral discussions regarding strategies to defeat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt, including by mitigating the risk of civilian harm and encouraging credible investigation into any allegations of human rights violations and abuses by the Egyptian government.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no significant changes since the government ended the nationwide state of emergency in October 2021, which had been in effect since 2017 (and previously during 1981-2012). While the national state of emergency ended in 2021, laws ratified by President Sisi that same year codified many emergency powers into the criminal law. Other laws give the government special powers in North Sinai where CT operations are focused. Human rights groups reported that the government continued to use CT authorities to pursue activists, political candidates, and critics of the government. The government has proactively detected, deterred, and prevented terrorist attacks along the Nile Basin, within tourist areas and cultural sites, and against critical infrastructure.
At border crossings and airports, authorities continued to authenticate travel documents, conduct checks on individuals, and share derogatory information among border authorities for further action. Egypt maintains a terrorist watchlist used by immigration officials at ports of entry with detailed information maintained by the security services. Individuals are placed on the terrorism list for five years by court order, subject to appeal. The United States assisted Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts with training, equipment, and other assistance to its law enforcement and armed forces.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Egypt is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Egyptian Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Combating Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Endowments and the Ministry of Education condemned extremism and promoted respect and moderation. Analysts from al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism worked in 13 languages to find and debunk online propaganda from ISIS and other violent extremist groups as well as examples of Islamophobic rhetoric.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Egypt is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs the GCTF with the EU. Egypt hosts a regional counterterrorism center for Sahel-Saharan states. The country is party to several international, Arab, and African CT cooperation agreements and protocols.

**IRAQ**

**Overview:** The primary terrorist threats within Iraq are the remnants of ISIS’s Iraq province and Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs), which include U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat al-Nujaba. The U.S.-designated Kurdistan Workers’ Party, headquartered in the mountains of northern Iraq, operates in the vicinity of Sinjar, Ninewa province, in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR).

There was a significant decrease in terrorist attacks in 2022, compared with the previous two years, thanks to the increasing effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in combating terrorism. The ISF generally acted decisively in engagements and demonstrated increasing capabilities in counterterrorism (CT) planning, operations, and investigations. After the killing of ISIS leaders Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi in February and Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in October, new ISIS leader Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurayshi assumed control of the group in November per ISIS social media accounts. Despite the decline in ISIS’s ability to carry out large attacks in Iraq, it maintained operational outposts in locations along the border of Syria. During 2022, ISIS continued to conduct operations, but at a smaller scale, particularly in the North and the West of Iraq and in rural areas with limited ISF presence. ISIS sought to reestablish footholds in Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din provinces, particularly in areas infrequently patrolled by the Kurdistan Regional Government or ISF.
Iraqi counterterrorism functions are principally executed by the Counterterrorism Service (CTS), a Cabinet-level entity reporting directly to the prime minister, as well as by various security forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Kurdish Peshmerga. In limited instances, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) augment Iraqi Army- and CTS-led operations. While all PMF are required by law to operate as part of the ISF, many PMF groups continued to defy central government command and control and engaged in violent and destabilizing activities in Iraq and neighboring Syria. Attacks by IAMGs against U.S. interests in Iraq decreased in 2022.

**Terrorist Incidents**

During 2022, Iraq saw a decrease in the volume of terrorist attacks, but ISIS and other groups continued to execute attacks using complex tactics. Iraq’s CTS estimates that 408 terrorist attacks occurred in 2022. Noteworthy incidents included these three:

- **On January 21,** ISIS members launched a complex attack on an Iraqi Army outpost in Diyala province, killing 11 soldiers, according to national and international press reports and government sources.
- **On May 24,** in two separate ambushes, ISIS killed 12 and wounded six victims in the South of the Kirkuk province, per Iraqi press and government sources.
- **On December 18,** nine Iraqi federal police members were killed in an IED attack against a patrol in the Riyadh district of Kirkuk province, according to government sources.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security**

Iraq has multiple security, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations with overlapping responsibilities, including the CTS, the National Security Services, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, military intelligence, and assorted Ministry of Interior units, including national and local police. The United States assisted Iraqi CT efforts by providing training, equipment, and other assistance to these organizations.

Iraq made no significant changes to its CT legal and law enforcement framework in 2022. Human rights groups reported that authorities arrested suspects in security sweeps without warrants and frequently held them for prolonged periods without charge. Human rights groups allege that security forces use the threat of terrorism to detain, arrest, prosecute, and harass independent journalists and civil society activists perceived as critical to the government. Courts routinely accepted forced confessions as evidence; in some ISIS-related cases, this was the only evidence.

The Government of Iraq (GOI) issued Executive Order 237 in 2019 to further its control over Iran-aligned, Iraq-backed PMF. However, several of these groups continued to defy central government command and control and instigated violent and destabilizing activities in Iraq and neighboring Syria.

Border security and corruption remained a critical vulnerability. The ISF has limited capability to fully secure Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran. Border security along Iraq’s borders (including
in the IKR) is administered by the Border Guard Security Force, with the ISF or Peshmerga deployed in support. The border with Syria near Türkiye remained especially porous. Iranian-backed PMF units continued to maintain a presence at and around Iraq’s major border crossings. The GOI reopened the Iraq-Syria border crossing in al-Qa‘im under the Federal Border Police’s control. However, various PMF units positioned themselves north and south of the main checkpoint.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Export Control and Related Border Security continued a two-year train-the-trainer program for several hundred Iraqi border guards.

While the Ministry of Interior shared biometric information on suspected terrorists upon request with the United States, INTERPOL, and other partners, a biometric information-sharing program was not finalized by the government. The GOI engaged in preliminary discussions with INTERPOL to eventually make use of INTERPOL databases.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Iraq is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Office. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Iraq continued strategic messaging to discredit ISIS, in part by providing significant content to the Coalition Communications Cell. Many Iraqi ISIS fighters remained in Iraqi custody, while many Iraqi civilians, including some family members of ISIS members, remained in displaced persons camps. Iraq acknowledged that the return and social reintegration of family members of suspected ISIS supporters, as well as the provision of fair and equal justice, is important to prevent future terrorism and radicalization to violence.

However, almost 1.2 million Iraqis remained displaced within Iraq and an estimated 27,000 Iraqis — predominantly women and children — resided in the al-Hol refugee camp in Syria. The GOI repatriated 200 suspected ISIS fighters from detention facilities in northeastern Syria, as well as 2,366 Iraqi nationals, mostly women and children, from al-Hol. IAMGs routinely used threatening messaging to promote violent extremism and protect their power throughout Iraq.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Iraq continued to work with multilateral and regional organizations — including the United Nations, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, INTERPOL, and the League of Arab States — to support counterterrorism efforts.

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**ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA**

**ISRAEL**

**Overview:** Israel remained a committed counterterrorism (CT) partner of the United States and closely coordinated on a wide range of CT initiatives. During an interagency CT dialogue in
December, Israel and the United States shared information on regional threats and discussed ways to apply new sanctions on those that threaten the national security of both countries.

With a series of deadly terror attacks across the country and near-nightly clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants in the West Bank, 2022 saw an increase in violence compared with recent years. According to Israeli authorities, 32 Israelis and foreigners were killed by terrorist attacks in 2022 (21 Israeli civilians, eight members of Israeli security forces, and three foreigners), the highest level of violence since the 2015-16 “stabbing Intifada,” when 30 Israelis and two U.S. citizens were killed. After 21 Israelis were killed by terrorist attacks from March to May, the IDF launched a targeted counterterrorism campaign, “Operation Break the Wave,” with almost daily raids in the West Bank through the remainder of the year.

From its north, Israel faced threats from Hizballah and Palestinian militants in Lebanon. Some Israeli officials estimate Hizballah has as many as 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel. Israeli officials expressed concern that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, including precision-guided missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

To the south, Israel faced threats from terrorist organizations including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In August, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck PIJ targets in Gaza for three days to preempt what it stated was an imminent terrorist attack, before a ceasefire was reached. In response, the PIJ launched more than 1,000 rockets toward Israel, though Israel sustained no casualties, as the rockets were intercepted by Iron Dome, fell in open fields, or landed in Gaza.

2022 saw the emergence of new militant groups not directly affiliated with established terrorist organizations. The Lion’s Den, based in the West Bank city of Nablus, was the most prominent of these new militant groups. Though Israeli authorities assessed that the Lion’s Den had fewer than 100 members, the group demonstrated social media savvy and claimed responsibility for several shooting attacks, including the killing of a 21-year-old IDF soldier in October.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The IDF reported 305 shooting attacks in 2022, triple the 91 reported in 2021. Most of the shootings occurred as Israeli troops entered Palestinian cities to arrest suspects allegedly involved in terror activities, but more than 40 of the shootings targeted Israeli civilians. The following is a representative list of terrorist attacks provided by Israeli authorities:

- In March, a 26-year-old Palestinian from the West Bank killed five persons in Bnei Brak, a suburb of Tel Aviv. The attacker, who was killed by police, was not affiliated with a terrorist organization and had previously been imprisoned for planning a terrorist attack.
- In March, a 35-year-old Arab-Israeli Bedouin man killed four persons and wounded two others in the southern Israeli city of Be’er Sheva by stabbing some of them and running
over others with a car before being shot by an armed bus driver. According to Israeli authorities, the attacker was inspired by ISIS and had been imprisoned for five years for attempting to travel to Syria to join ISIS forces.

- In March, two Arab-Israeli attackers shot and killed two Israeli Border Police Officers and injured 10 civilians in the Israeli city of Hadera. The attackers were killed by Israeli police shortly after the attack began. The two terrorists, from the city of Umm al-Fahm, posted a video before the attack in which they swore allegiance to ISIS.

- In April, a 28-year-old Palestinian killed three persons who were sitting outside a bar in downtown Tel Aviv. The gunman was a resident of the refugee camp in the northern West Bank city of Jenin. The attacker fled to a mosque in Jaffa and was later killed by Israeli security forces. According to Israeli authorities, the attacker was unaffiliated with a terrorist group, had no previous arrests, and was in Israel without an entry permit.

- In May, two Palestinians killed four persons and wounded two others who were celebrating Israel’s Independence Day in the central Israeli city of El’ad. The attackers, from the West Bank city of Jenin, entered Israel illegally and killed their victims with an axe and a knife. After hiding in a nearby forest for three days, the attackers were found and arrested by Israeli authorities.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and promote international legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists. There were no changes to legislation related to terrorism in 2022.

- Israeli security forces took law enforcement actions against suspected terrorists and terrorist groups. In April, Israeli security forces arrested a Hamas member who had killed an Israeli in a drive-by shooting in 2015. According to Israeli authorities, the Hamas member had been imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority but had escaped to the West Bank town of Silwad, where he was apprehended.

- Israeli authorities successfully disrupted a Hamas financial operation in the West Bank that lured young people to unwittingly transport cash that Hamas operatives later used to purchase weapons. Israeli authorities claimed some of the confiscated weapons had been used in terror attacks inside Israel.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Israel is a member of FATF and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism. Its FIU, the Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority (or IMPA), is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: There have been no changes since 2021.

International and Regional Cooperation: In 2022, Israel held 10 counterterrorism dialogues with foreign countries and multinational organizations. Israeli officials discussed the defense of critical infrastructure, threat assessments, targets for sanctions designations, the threat from Iran and its proxies, and the threat from UAVs.
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Overview: Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) maintained security control of 17.5 percent (called Area A) of the West Bank, as agreed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in the Oslo Accords. Israeli security forces (ISF) maintained responsibility for the remaining 82.5 percent of the West Bank, including Area B (22.5 percent), where the Palestinian Authority (PA) had administrative control, and Area C (60.0 percent), where Israel maintained administrative control. PASF and ISF continued counterterrorism (CT) and law enforcement efforts in the West Bank, where U.S. designated terrorist groups such as Hamas, the PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operated. PASF and ISF constrained the ability of those organizations to conduct attacks, including by arresting terrorist members.

PASF continued proactively to arrest individuals planning attacks against Palestinian and Israeli targets or those suspected of supporting terrorist organizations, though not at the pace Israeli authorities have requested, and to arrest Palestinians wanted for weapons smuggling or illegal weapons possession. PASF turned over to ISF Israelis arrested in the West Bank for smuggling weapons or possessing illegal arms.

The United States, through the multinational office of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, worked with the PA Ministry of Interior and PASF on reform efforts and training, including CT. Hamas, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, maintained de facto control over Gaza in 2022 and provided safe haven for itself and other terrorist groups, such as PIJ.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported 154 Palestinians killed in the West Bank, 97 percent by gunfire, and 49 killed in Gaza, all by explosive weapons, in 2022. UN OCHA reported 850 incidents of settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, including 620 attacks against Palestinian property, 125 attacks that caused physical injury, and 105 attacks that caused both property damage and injury, the highest level of incidents recorded since the United Nations started reporting settler-related violence in 2005. These were 71 percent and 137 percent increases, compared with 2021 and 2020, respectively. PA (and some Israeli) officials described settler violence as terrorism. ISF reported 305 shooting attacks committed in or emanating from the West Bank in 2022, more than triple the attacks (91) recorded in 2021. In press reports, Israeli officials described these incidents as terror attacks:

- From late March to early May, there were several attacks against Israeli civilians. Four of the perpetrators of these attacks were West Bank residents. These attacks included two mass shootings in Bnei Brak and Tel Aviv on March 29 and April 7, respectively; and a stabbing attack in El’ad on May 5.
- In November an 18-year-old Palestinian killed three persons and wounded four in the Israeli settlement of Ariel. The attacker stabbed a security guard and three others at a
gas station, stole a car, which he used to run over a bystander, exited, stabbed another civilian, and was then shot and killed by an Israeli soldier.

- On August 1, ISF arrested senior PIJ member Bassam al-Saadi in Jenin. In anticipation of retaliatory action, ISF on August 5 launched 147 airstrikes against targets in Gaza. PIJ responded by firing 1,100 rockets at targets in Israel. Gazan authorities reported 49 Palestinians killed, including 12 members of the PIJ. Israel reported 35 Palestinians killed, including 15 by PIJ rockets. Israel and Gazan authorities reported tens of Israelis and Palestinians were injured.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes in laws applicable to the West Bank and Gaza in 2022.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The PA is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the Palestinian Financial Follow-Up Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: PA President Abbas maintained a public position against incitement of violence and terrorism and frequently reiterated his commitment to non-violence, a two-state solution, and other PLO commitments. In April, Abbas condemned late March and early April attacks on Israeli civilians in Israel, committed by Palestinian or Arab Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank. Hamas, the de facto authority in Gaza, praised attacks against Israeli civilians in Israel.

The PA and PLO continued payments to Palestinian security prisoners, some of whom were connected to terrorism, and the families of “martyrs” likewise connected to acts of terrorism. The PA’s 2017 cybercrime law prohibited the production or sharing of content that jeopardizes “the public order,” including promoting human trafficking, drugs, and terrorism. However, PA enforcement has been inconsistent. Certain official PA traditional and social media, affiliated with the Fatah political party, featured content praising or condoning acts of terrorism. In March the PA official news agency Wafa’s Facebook page posted a portrait of Dalal al-Moghrabi to mark the 44th anniversary of her death and praised her as “the icon of struggle and resistance.” Al-Moghrabi in 1978 carried out a terrorist attack that killed 38 Israelis.

Few cases of settler violence in the West Bank against Palestinians have resulted in arrests or convictions; there were no convictions related to settler violence in 2022. Media also reported incidents where the IDF was present during settler attacks.

International and Regional Cooperation: PA justice and security leaders, including security force leadership, continued to participate in regional conferences and meetings to combat terrorism.

JORDAN
Overview: Jordan remained a committed partner on counterterrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism in 2022. The nation hosted many regional and international initiatives in both the military and civic spheres and participated in international CT and CVE fora.

There were no successful terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2022. However, the country faced a continued threat from terrorist groups. Jordan’s geographical location increases the possibility of a terrorist attack planned in Syria or Iraq against tourist and government locations. While Jordanian security forces thwarted plots and apprehended suspected terrorists in 2022, the threat of domestic radicalization to violence persisted, especially online.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Jordan in 2022.

Legislation Law Enforcement and Border Security: There were no significant changes in counterterrorism legislation, law enforcement capacity, or the State Security Court.

The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the primary government agency responsible for counterterrorism, while the Public Security Directorate’s (PSD) Police Special Operations group is the primary responder to active terrorist incidents. These two organizations operate with support from various elements within the Jordan Armed Forces and PSD’s Gendarmerie. In 2022 the Government of Jordan continued to implement measures and conduct joint exercises to improve interagency coordination among security agencies. Enhanced overt security measures continued across Jordan, most visibly at some hotels and shopping centers.

Jordan continued to reinforce its border defenses and surveillance capabilities in response to terrorist and criminal threats emanating from its 230-mile border with Syria and 112-mile border with Iraq. The government has made interdicting drugs smuggled across its borders a top security priority. The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program continued its Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience project, which trains first-response teams for a critical infrastructure incident and convenes entities, such as PSD and the Water and Energy Ministries, to jointly develop plans and exercises that enable holistic responses to such incidents.

During 2022, Jordanian authorities remained vigilant in tracking and countering terrorist plots and preventing attacks that target civilians and security forces. Speaking at a conference in November, GID Director Ahmed Husni stated that, since early 2021, GID had thwarted 34 terrorist operations and contributed to stopping 54 additional terrorist plots globally, but he did not specify how many operations occurred in 2022.

On December 15, during protests initially sparked by a fuel price increase, a PSD colonel was killed by an individual who, according to the Jordanian government, had ties to ISIS. During the subsequent raid on that individual’s house, three more PSD officers were killed, the main suspect in the death of the colonel was killed, and eight other suspects were arrested. The
individual who killed the PSD colonel was identified by the PSD forensic lab, using ATA-provided equipment and techniques.

The United States has continually emphasized to Jordanian authorities the importance of holding Ahlam al-Tamimi accountable in a U.S. court for her admitted role in a 2001 bombing in Jerusalem that killed 16 people, including Americans Malki Roth, Shoshana Greenbaum, and Chana Nachenberg. While the United States considers the extradition treaty with Jordan to be in force as a matter of international law, the Government of Jordan’s position, citing the ruling of its highest court, is that its Constitution forbids the extradition of Jordanian nationals. The United States continued to impress upon the GoJ the importance of this case and continued to seek all viable options to bring Tamimi to justice.

In 2022, some Jordanians engaged in an online celebration of the killing of Israeli Jews in Palestinian terror attacks in Israel and the West Bank.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Jordan remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.

In 2022, FATF reported that Jordan took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, including by finalizing its national risk assessment; rectifying its legal framework for terrorist financing (TF) and targeted financial sanctions (TFS); demonstrating an effective process by the national committee and supervisory authorities to implement TFS without delay; strengthening its legal and operational TF-related TFS framework; increasing capacity for risk-based supervision; making basic and beneficial ownership information accessible by competent authorities; maintaining statistics on money-laundering investigations and prosecutions; and strengthening its legal framework with respect to confiscation.

In July, 22 individuals and 12 entities were added to Jordan’s national sanctions list, increasing the total to 32 individuals and 12 entities. In August the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) governor publicly highlighted Jordan’s guidelines and capacity building trainings on combating financial and electronic organized crimes. Also in August, the Judicial Council launched its four-year Justice Sector strategy for 2022–26. One of the strategy’s key pillars was “specialization of the judiciary,” whereby assigned judges and prosecutors specialize in handling AML/CFT cases.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Jordan continued to implement a national strategy on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) coordinated by an office in the Prime Ministry. Priority engagement areas include countering violent extremist ideology, building social cohesion among civil society, and assisting law enforcement. PSD engaged with local actors through community peace centers and local police departments to use innovative approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), such as interactive theater, creative writing, and strategic communications. In January the West Asia North Africa (or WANA)
Institute, under the umbrella of the “Strong Cities Network in Lebanon and Jordan,” conducted a six-day training workshop in Irbid, Zarqa, and Karak on “Human Security and Definitions of P/CVE.” The training aimed to build the capacity of local prevention networks to engage effectively with policymakers to implement national strategies to prevent violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Jordan is a major non-NATO ally and founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Within the GCTF, the Hashemite Kingdom co-chairs the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group with the United States. Through this capacity, Jordan also co-leads the GCTF Maritime Security initiative. Jordan is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Jordan is not a signatory to all the UN conventions against terrorism, as Jordan has not ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. In December, Jordan hosted the Baghdad II conference to promote cooperation among Iraq, regional states, and France on various topics, including combating terrorism.

In September, Jordan hosted the “Eager Lion” exercise, one of the largest joint military exercises held in the region, with 28 partner nations participating. Eager Lion included scenarios related to countering terrorism and drones, and to combating smuggling of radioactive materials. In November the Aqaba Process, a Jordanian initiative started by King Abdullah in 2015 focused on CVE, co-hosted a meeting with Australia and Indonesia on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism online in Southeast Asia. In December, Jordan co-hosted an Aqaba Process meeting with Brazil, focused on encouraging information sharing on radicalization to violence and deradicalization initiatives in Latin America.

In November, Jordan hosted the al-Hol Donor Coordination Conference (the Amman Conference) to address the humanitarian and security crisis in the al-Hol displaced persons camp in northeast Syria. Participants came to consensus on key priorities for al-Hol; reiterated that voluntary repatriations and returns are the only durable solutions; and reaffirmed the continued need for sustained, coordinated investment in communities of return.

**KUWAIT**

**Overview:** Kuwait is an active participant in international fora and regularly participates in counterterrorism (CT) training. It is a co-lead on the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group and hosted the group’s May meeting. Kuwait also hosted Terrorist Financing Targeting Center meetings in September. Kuwait is scheduled to complete its FATF mutual evaluation on the implementation of its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime in 2023.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Kuwait in 2022.
Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security: There were no changes to Kuwait’s CT legal framework. Government resignations and continued political gridlock between the government and the elected National Assembly often prevented the passage of legislation more broadly in any field.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kuwait is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Kuwait Financial Intelligence Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Kuwait is also a member of the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Kuwait sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram in June.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Ministry of Information runs TV and radio programming aimed at audiences believed to be at higher risk of radicalization to violence. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs launched a five-year strategic plan to promote moderation and confront extremism. That ministry operates the Kuwait Moderation Center, which sponsors programs designed to promote religious tolerance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored an outreach program to a private high school to warn youth against engaging in acts that could be construed as support for terrorism.

International and Regional Cooperation: A Kuwaiti national has held the position of Secretary General of the GCC since 2020. The country is a member of the Governing Board of Administrators of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law. Kuwait continued to offer itself as mediator in several regional disputes, including after several GCC countries temporarily withdrew their ambassadors from Lebanon. Additionally, Kuwait hosts the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

Kuwait is a member of the following international organizations and entities engaged in CT cooperation:

- UN
- Arab League
- GCC
- International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
- Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition
- CJTF-OIR
- Terrorist Financing Targeting Center
Overview: In 2022 the United States provided security assistance and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and worked with law enforcement organizations, such as the Internal Security Forces (ISF), to enhance their ability to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations and to investigate and prosecute local terrorism cases. Terrorist groups operating in Lebanon included U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) such as Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and ISIS. The primary method of U.S. assistance in building CT capacity is funded through CT Bureau Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) funds. In 2022, ATA spent more than $6 million providing training and equipment to the ISF and LAF, focusing on counter-IED, protection of national leadership, response to terrorist activities, and cyber-based investigations with digital forensics.

As ISIS and other Violent Extremist Organizations seized on Lebanon’s economic collapse to attempt their resurgence in the country, the LAF drew on U.S. training to counter terrorist plots and increased coordination with U.S. and other like-minded partners to mitigate terrorist threats and interdict terrorist travel. In February, Lebanese security forces used ATA-provided training to detect and disrupt an ISIS terrorist plot percolating in a Palestinian refugee camp. In an October operation, the LAF arrested an ISIS combatant who had returned from fighting in Syria to recruit individuals within Lebanon and plan attacks.

Despite the Lebanese government’s official policy of disassociation from regional conflicts, Hizballah continued its militant role in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in collaboration with the Iranian regime. Separately, Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps remained largely outside the control of Lebanese security forces and posed a security threat because of the potential for militant recruitment and terrorist infiltration. Terrorist groups, including ISIS, continued efforts to recruit Lebanese to fight in Iraq and Syria. Several individuals on the FBI’s most wanted list and the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice list reportedly remained in Lebanon.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: On April 27 the LAF announced that an individual attempted to run over Lebanese soldiers in the Wadi Khaled region of northeast Lebanon. LAF intelligence stated that the individual was involved in procuring arms and explosive material for ISIS.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Lebanon does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism law, but several articles of Lebanon’s criminal code are used effectively to prosecute acts of terrorism. No new laws related to terrorism were passed in 2022. The LAF, the ISF, the Directorate of General Security (DGS), and the General Directorate of State Security were the primary government agencies responsible for counterterrorism. Although cooperation among the services was inconsistent, they took steps to improve information sharing. Structural limitations in the justice system and judicial strikes created barriers to the timely conduct of terrorism-related trials. Because of these trial delays, some individuals suspected of terrorism were held in pretrial detention for extended periods. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
funded programs to train judges and prosecutors on the skills needed to adjudicate cases. In 2022, INL completed a program to provide virtual courtroom equipment in 23 courtrooms across Lebanon to more effectively and efficiently adjudicate cases.

The LAF held primary responsibility for securing Lebanon’s land and maritime borders, while DGS and Customs were responsible for official points of entry. The LAF improved its ability to monitor Lebanon’s land border with Syria through the Land Border Security Project funded by the United States, the UK, and Canada. U.S.-funded advanced observation capabilities, interdiction training, and physical infrastructure enhanced the LAF’s ability to interdict terrorist and criminal travel.

Lebanon made efforts to implement UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2396 and 2309 by collecting biographic data for travelers at the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, passenger name record data for commercial flights, and Advanced Passenger Information. DGS regularly updated INTERPOL watchlist information at border security terminals at Beirut airport. DGS routinely shared information about falsified travel documents with foreign embassies in Lebanon. Because of Government of Lebanon (GOL) budget shortfalls, the ISF did not make significant progress on completion of an INL-funded project to increase the ISF’s biometric collection and storage capabilities in 2022. In 2022, Lebanese security services coordinated with the United States on numerous instances to investigate individuals involved in terrorism. LAF and ISF units, including those receiving U.S. capacity building assistance, undertook enforcement actions against suspected terrorists in 2022. While the GOL did not repatriate FTFs from Syria in 2022, security agencies prioritized investigation and arrest of FTFs who had entered Lebanon. From July to October, the ISF carried out arrests of 30 individuals from eight terrorist cells in multiple regions of Lebanon. According to ISF statements, the cells were affiliated with ISIS and were planning to carry out operations targeting military and security centers and various religious and civil gatherings. Most of the individuals arrested were Lebanese, although the group included Syrians, Palestinians, and an Egyptian national.

The participation of Hizballah in the Lebanese government continued to impede effective host government action against terrorist incidents associated with Hizballah. Investigations into politically sensitive murders, including the suspected assassination by Hizballah of civil society activist Lokman Slim in 2021 and the killing of an Irish UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Peacekeeper in December, suffer from political obstruction. Two years after Slim’s murder, UN Special Rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, criticized the Lebanese government for the lack of progress and insufficient speed in its investigation. The GOL continued to investigate the shooting of the Irish UNIFIL Peacekeeper, having made one arrest and issued six in absentia indictments. Despite repeated attempts by UNIFIL to gain access to sites within its area of responsibility where Hizballah is suspected of having stored or used weapons, Lebanese authorities continued to deny UNIFIL permission to enter these areas in many instances. Some Lebanese security forces personnel may interact with Hizballah as part of official duties, but they are not beholden to the terrorist group and are not permitted to
be Hizballah members. The LAF screens personnel for, and removes those found to have, Hizballah affiliation.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is a tribunal of international character with jurisdiction over persons responsible for the 2005 attack that killed former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and 21 other victims, as well as certain other connected attacks. In June the Appeals Chamber unanimously sentenced Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi _in absentia_ to five concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. In July the tribunal entered a residual phase. The GOL and the United States and other international donors provided financial support to the STL.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2022 the SIC received 32 terrorism and terrorism-financing cases. The SIC reported that there were 27 individuals and one entity on Lebanon’s national terrorism-financing list as of year’s end.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Lebanon in 2019 passed a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) to implement UNSCR 1325. The WPS National Action Plan prioritized the establishment of women-led mediation groups to constitute an early warning and conflict prevention network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Lebanon supported counterterrorism efforts in regional organizations and participated in CT finance programs. Lebanese municipalities continued to engage in activities organized by the Strong Cities Network.

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**LIBYA**

**Overview:** Libyan government officials continued to work with U.S. counterparts to combat terrorism, although fractured security institutions limited cooperation. After elections scheduled for December 2021 were “postponed,” the Libyan House of Representatives, with the backing of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), appointed a new interim “Government of National Stability” to replace the Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli; however, the United Nations and most countries, including the United States, continued to recognize the Government of National Unity (GNU) as the Government of Libya.

Despite the political impasse, terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb were unable to regroup or exploit the political uncertainty. While terrorist groups controlled no territory in Libya and have been significantly degraded in terms of numbers and capacity, they remained a threat. The GNU is a reliable and willing U.S. counterterrorism (CT) partner, although the GNU’s capacity to eliminate terrorist safe havens, deter the flow of foreign fighters, counter terrorist financing, and ensure effective counterproliferation efforts across Libya’s territory were limited. The LNA, which exerts control over most of the areas outside the northwestern part of the country, countered terrorism in the east and the south of the country, but its counterterrorism gains were limited to areas under its direct control.
2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no confirmed significant terrorist incidents in Libya in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no changes since 2021.

The GNU retained the former Government of National Accord’s 2020 CT Strategy and its national CT coordinator. In practice, however, because of the fractured political situation, coordination between relevant authorities occurred largely on an ad hoc basis, and an implementation plan for the 2020 CT Strategy was not promulgated. Throughout 2022 the GNU and the LNA conducted CT operations in areas where they exerted control.

Although Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, the Libyan penal code criminalizes offenses that may threaten national security, including terrorism, the promotion of terrorist acts, and the handling of money in support of such acts.

Libya’s porous southern border was nominally controlled by the LNA, but the LNA relied on local armed groups, militias, and foreign fighters to exert control over the southern frontier. Smuggling and trafficking, including in persons and arms, were rampant. The LNA conducted CT operations in the South, where and when it could.

Libya’s four largest international airports, located throughout the country and falling in areas under the control of the GNU and the LNA, continued to participate in the CT Bureau’s Aviation Security Program, which trains airport screeners and managers. The GNU did not make any tangible progress in 2022 on the installation of the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (or MIDAS), which the CT Bureau funded through the International Organization for Migration, despite receiving the equipment and agreeing to do so in November 2021.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU is in the Central Bank of Libya. There were no significant changes in 2022.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Libya Antiterrorism Center’s Community Protection Department, which was launched in 2021, continued in 2022 its efforts to counter “extremist ideology” through education and media outreach in partnership with civil society organizations, and religious and educational institutions.

International and Regional Cooperation: Libya regularly votes in favor of counterterrorism measures in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
**Overview:** The United States and Morocco have a long history of strong counterterrorism (CT) cooperation. The Government of Morocco continued its comprehensive strategy, which includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter radicalization policies. In 2022, Morocco’s CT efforts continued to mitigate the risk of terrorism. The country continued to face sporadic threats from small, independent terrorist cells, the majority of which claimed to be inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. In May, Morocco hosted the 2022 ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and convened the Counter-ISIS Finance and Africa Focus Groups on the margins of the ministerial. Morocco is also a member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and will take over the GCTF co-chair seat from Egypt in 2023.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Morocco in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Morocco investigates, prosecutes, and sentences defendants under counterterrorism legislation, enacted in 2003 and expanded in 2015, which is in line with UN Security Council resolution 2178.

In 2022, Moroccan law enforcement under the coordination of the Ministry of Interior targeted and arrested at least 20 individuals in 10 CT operations, effectively dismantling cells in the early stages of planning attacks against a range of targets, including public buildings, prominent figures, government security service buildings, and (as reported in local press) foreigners. The number of arrests in 2022 was much fewer than those made before the COVID-19 pandemic. Moroccan law enforcement leveraged intelligence collection, police work, and collaboration with international partners to conduct CT operations. The Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ) remained the primary law enforcement agency responsible for CT prosecutions. The BCIJ reports to the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals.

The following offers a snapshot of arrests in 2022:

- In March the BCIJ and the DGST arrested five suspected violent extremists alleged to be affiliated with ISIS. The suspects were arrested in separate security operations in Kenitra, Larache, Souk Sebt Ouled Nemma, Taroudant, and the rural commune of Souihla. The suspects planned to attack high officials and public figures in Morocco.
- In October, authorities arrested five persons in several cities suspected of supporting ISIS and involved in the preparation of “terrorist attacks.” The BCIJ specified that the suspects, aged between 20 and 45, announced their affiliation with ISIS and planned terrorist acts, including sabotage against infrastructure and targeting security and law enforcement personnel.
- In November the BCIJ arrested an ISIS-affiliated suspect near Rabat for planning a terrorist act. The 22-year-old suspect had previously been detained on terrorist
charges. Investigations revealed that the suspect had been searching for raw materials necessary to create an explosive device. Security services kept the suspect in custody pending an investigation into possible links with terrorist groups inside and outside Morocco.

Moroccan law enforcement agencies participated in a wide range of U.S.-sponsored programs to improve the country’s technical and investigative capabilities, including financial investigation, intelligence analysis, forensics, and cybersecurity.

Border security remained a top priority for Moroccan authorities. The General Directorate for National Security has primary responsibility for conducting border inspections at ports of entry such as Casablanca’s Mohammed V International Airport. Law enforcement officials and private airline carriers worked regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempting to transit illegally and to address watchlisted travelers. Moroccan airport authorities have excellent capabilities in detecting fraudulent documents. In addition, police, customs officers, and the Royal Gendarmerie operated mobile and fixed checkpoints along the roads in border areas and at the entrances to major municipalities. Moroccan Naval and Coast Guard units monitored and patrolled the country’s extensive coastal waters, including the Strait of Gibraltar, to interdict illicit traffickers.

Morocco did not repatriate any Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) or family members in 2022. The number of Moroccan citizen terrorist fighters and associated family members outside the country is in the hundreds. The eight FTFs whom Morocco repatriated in 2019 from Syria were prosecuted, sentenced, and remain incarcerated.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Morocco is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Authority, is a member of the Egmont Group. Morocco remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022. During 2022, FATF reported that Morocco took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, including by providing additional training and awareness-raising to financial institutions and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to detect and file suspicious transactions, licensing and monitoring the registration of DNFBPs, and addressing technical deficiencies related to targeted financial sanctions. In October, FATF made an initial determination that Morocco had substantially completed its action plan and warranted an onsite assessment to verify that the implementation of Morocco’s AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Morocco is a co-chair for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Africa Focus Group. Morocco has a comprehensive CVE strategy that prioritizes economic and human development in addition to countering radicalization to violence and oversight of the
religious sphere. To counter what it views as “religious extremism,” Morocco promotes an interpretation of the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an educational curriculum for Morocco’s nearly 50,000 imams as well as for female Islamic guides (Mourchidates). Morocco’s imam training center in Rabat trains imams mostly from West Africa. The Royal Mohammedan League of Ulema (Rabita Mohammedia) counters radicalization by producing scholarly research, reviewing educational curricula, and conducting youth outreach on religious and social topics. The General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, in cooperation with other ministries, conducted several training workshops of its deradicalization program, Moussalaha (Reconciliation) for both women and men.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Morocco is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and has been co-chair along with Canada. Egypt will be taking over for Morocco as co-chair in 2023, alongside the European Union.

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**OMAN**

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism (CT) partner. The nation remained concerned about the conflict in Yemen and the potential for AQAP and ISIS-Yemen to threaten its land and maritime borders. Omani and U.S. officials regularly engaged on efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Oman sought training and equipment from the U.S. government, other countries, and commercial entities to support its efforts to control its land, air, and maritime borders. The country welcomed U.S. security assistance to improve its crisis management capacity, as well as its CT tactics and procedures, and it requested training in CT financing and cybersecurity. Oman issued statements condemning terrorist attacks around the world in 2022.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** On February 3, a third-country national violent extremist followed a U.S. citizen to his apartment building in Muscat and attacked and injured him with a knife. Omani authorities later captured the violent extremist and deported him to his home country.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes to Oman’s counterterrorism legislation in 2022.

Local capacity and a challenging operating environment owing to Oman’s extensive coastline and long, remote borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen remain obstacles for counterterrorism investigations, crisis response, and border security capabilities. Nevertheless, Oman had sufficient communication and coordination among its many CT-related agencies and National Security Council. The Sultan’s Special Forces and the Royal Oman Police (ROP) Special Task Force are Oman’s primary tactical counterterrorism response forces. The Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service, the Internal Security Service, and ROP’s Special Branch play key roles in securing Oman from terrorist threats. Omani authorities have developed specific plans to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets.
Oman recognizes the need to improve its counterterrorism capabilities and the value of U.S. counterterrorism, military, and law enforcement training and assistance. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program targeted skills related to crisis management and advanced counterterrorism operations and response. Omani officials from the ROP and other agencies participated in ATA training. The Omani military received U.S. training and equipment to help interdict the movement of people, weapons, and illicit materials across the Yemen border and through sea shipping lanes. The Ministry of Defense applied for Section 1226 Border Security Reimbursement for operational expenditures related to border security.

The ROP Coast Guard, ROP Customs, the Maritime Security Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Royal Office participated in several training activities through the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. EXBS programming supported the government’s efforts to build its capacity to interdict weapons and conduct investigations at airports and seaports. EXBS programming also increased Omani officials’ understanding of UN sanctions implementation through virtual webinars and tabletop exercises.

The major impediments to effective law enforcement and border security in Oman remained limited resources, challenges with Omani interagency coordination, and the need for continued training to develop advanced law enforcement skills. The rugged mountainous terrain along Oman’s border with Yemen presents an additional challenge. Oman continued to seek opportunities for additional U.S. border security training.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Oman is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is the National Center for Financial Information. The country also is a member of the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Oman in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The full nature and scope of Oman’s CVE initiatives remained opaque in 2022, but engagement with the Omani government suggests that Oman continued to counter terrorist recruitment through unpublicized initiatives.

There were no reports of foreign government or foreign non-governmental support for religious schools, mosques, or other organizations that may be conducive to the spread of violent extremism.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Oman is a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, and of the TFTC. Oman regularly votes in favor of counterterrorism measures in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
QATAR

**Overview:** The United States and Qatar continued to increase counterterrorism (CT) cooperation, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of State and the Qatari foreign minister signed a counterterrorism MOU in 2017. During the November U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue’s Counterterrorism Session, the two governments reviewed the significant progress made on CT cooperation and committed to maintaining ongoing momentum. Qatar facilitated U.S. military operations in the region and hosts roughly 6,500 U.S. servicemembers at military installations critical to Defeat-ISIS efforts.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Qatar in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes in counterterrorism legislation.

Qatar maintains an interagency National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC) with representatives from more than 10 government agencies. The NCTC formulates Qatar’s CT policy, ensuring interagency coordination, fulfilling Qatar’s CT-related obligations under international legal instruments, and participating in multilateral conferences on terrorism. U.S. officials regularly met with the NCTC chairman to discuss overall counterterrorism cooperation. The Qatar State Security Bureau (SSB) maintained an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal terrorism-related activities. The Ministry of Interior and the Internal Security Force (ISF) continued to participate in structured CT training and exercises, including with U.S. agencies.

Qatar and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security signed security arrangements in July to further cooperation to counter smuggling, detect fraudulent documents, and enhance border security, including a memorandum of cooperation establishing a Joint Security Program to identify air passengers linked to terrorism and trafficking of narcotics, weapons, currency, and humans. The memorandum also reaffirmed the decision to implement a visa validation program to detect fraudulent visas. The two parties also committed to collaborate to counter threats from unmanned aircraft systems. The United States and Qatar continued to partner on terrorist screening and aviation security. Ministry of Interior authorities cooperated with officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and Homeland Security Investigations to screen the nearly 40 million travelers who transit Hamad International Airport, in capital Doha, annually.

U.S. technical assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies increased during 2022. The U.S. Departments of Justice (DOJ), State, and the Treasury, as well as the FBI, led or participated in several capacity building initiatives involving the Ministry of Interior, the ISF, the SSB, the Public Prosecution, the Central Bank, and other Qatari agencies. A DOJ resident legal advisor has been stationed in Qatar since 2018, providing technical assistance to Qatar’s CT efforts and building prosecutorial capacity.
U.S. Central Command and Embassy Doha participated in six Joint Operational Planning Groups with the Government of Qatar and partner nations focused on mitigating the threat of terrorism during Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Men’s World Cup, culminating in the October “Watan 22” security field exercise observed by Department of Defense personnel from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Embassy Doha and with the participation of two Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear companies and Task Force 51-5, all under CENTCOM’s operational control. Watan 22 involved a set of on-the-ground scenarios simulating a set of plans and assumptions that required activating emergency plans to meet various organizational and security needs in the event of a terrorist attack. CENTCOM also provided intelligence support in preparation for and during the World Cup, to include the Combined Air Operation Center and the Air Defense Operations Center (both located at Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base) and personnel to man a Joint Task Force Operations Center and an Open-Source Center (both located at the embassy).

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Qatar is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Qatar Financial Information Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Qatar is also a member of the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Qatar in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram.

In 2022, Qatar maintained restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring all such activity to be conducted through one of four approved charities — to enhance accountability, transparency, and protect charitable giving from terrorist financing abuse.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Qatar’s primary CVE strategy remained investment in education, sports diplomacy, and increasing economic opportunities for youth around the globe, largely through the Qatar Foundation and related organizations, such as Silatech and Education Above All (non-profit organizations that receive government funding). Since 2020, Qatar has hosted the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism’s (UNOCT’s) first International Hub on Behavioral Insights to Counter Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, to better understand the underlying roots of violent extremism and determine the best use of sports as a CVE tool. Qatar has made strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence.

Qatar is a major funder of the GCERF and sits on its Governing Board of Directors. The Qatar Fund for Development supported GCERF’s efforts to build awareness among community leaders about the impact of terrorist radicalization and recruitment, to share information on how to respond to terrorism, to promote peace through community engagement activities, and to provide educational initiatives.
Qatar’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) supported English-language programming in MEHE schools to counter terrorist influence and messaging. The MEHE undersecretary, who also serves as chairman of the semigovernmental Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue, consulted with the Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom on revisions to Qatar’s Islamic studies public school textbooks, to increase understanding of religious pluralism and tolerance. However, recommendations from the Office of International Religious Freedom were not implemented.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Qatar is an active participant in the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League. Qatar is also a member of the GCTF and the TFTC. Since June 2021, Qatar has hosted the UNOCT Program Office on Parliamentary Engagement, which seeks to strengthen the contributions, coordination, and capacity of parliaments at national, regional, and global levels to enhance international efforts against terrorism.

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**KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA**

**Overview:** In 2022 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued to work closely with U.S. and international counterparts to deploy a comprehensive and well-resourced counterterrorism (CT) strategy that included strong security measures, threat detection and deterrence, measures to counter terrorist financing, and counter radicalization efforts.

The leading terrorist threats were Iran-backed proxies and partners. While not a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, the Yemen-based Houthis committed several cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia during the first three months of the reporting period, some of which the United States publicly described as terrorist attacks. No additional cross border attacks originating from Yemen were reported following the United Nations-brokered truce in Yemen went into effect in April. Saudi Arabia served as a co-lead of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group and provided significant operational and logistical support to Defeat-ISIS Coalition activities.

Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has been designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated a CPC in 2022.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist incidents fell sharply in 2022. Significant attacks in 2022 included the following:

- On February 10, shrapnel from a Houthi explosive drone injured 12 after it was intercepted by Saudi air defenses at Abha International Airport.
- On March 19 and 20, Houthis fired a barrage of missiles and drones, targeting a Saudi petroleum products distribution terminal in the southern Jizan region, a water desalination plant in al-Shaqeeq, a power station in Dhahran Al Janub, a gas station in Khamis Mushayt, and a liquified natural gas facility in the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
- On March 25, Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack that caused an oil fire in Jeddah immediately before F1 races that took place in the city.
- On August 10, a Saudi man detonated an explosive belt in Jeddah during a Saudi CT operation, killing himself and injuring four others.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Comprehensive counterterrorism legislation has been in place since 2017, and no substantial changes were made in 2022. Saudi Arabia was committed to securing its borders and denying safe haven to terrorists. The Ministry of Interior monitored passenger manifests for inbound and outbound flights and used travel document security technology, advance passenger name record information, and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Saudi passports meet international security standards, as promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organization. New Saudi passport security features are comparable to the U.S. next-generation passport.

The Saudi government continued to work with the United States through Saudi-funded and U.S.-implemented programs that, among other objectives, improved the country’s counterterrorism capacities. Projects included providing training to protect critical infrastructure sites such as maritime ports, aviation, oil platforms, power grids, and desalination plants from terrorist threats. Saudi Arabia also participated in multilateral engagements with Persian Gulf state counterparts aimed at improving regional CT cooperation.

Terrorist and violent extremist discourse on social media was monitored heavily by the Saudi government and affiliated organizations and formed a major component of the Kingdom’s CVE strategy. Government authorities regularly surveilled websites, blogs, chat rooms, social media sites, emails, and text messages. The CT law allowed the government to access a terrorism suspect’s private communications and banking information in a manner inconsistent with the legal protections provided by the law of criminal procedure. In addition, this monitoring was sometimes used to target family members of activists and critics of the government.

The U.S. government, foreign missions in Saudi Arabia, and international human rights groups remained concerned about the Saudi government’s misuse of CT laws to restrict freedoms of expression, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association by prosecuting otherwise law-abiding dissidents, human rights activists, and members of the Shia minority, as well as individuals (including U.S. citizens) whose commentary on social media was perceived as critical of the Saudi regime.

The counterterrorism law’s definition of terrorism included “any conduct... intended to disturb public order... or destabilize the state or endanger its national unity.” Local human rights activists, international human rights organizations, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism criticized the law for its overly broad and vague definitions of terrorism and criticized the government for using it to prosecute the exercise of freedom of expression, including dissent.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Saudi Arabia is a member of FATF and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Its FIU, the Saudi Arabia Financial Investigation Unit (or SAFIU), is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2022, Saudi Arabia completed a Virtual Asset/Virtual Asset Service Provider risk assessment in line with FATF recommendations, which will serve as the basis for a national action plan focused on the mitigation of money laundering and terrorist finance risks.

Alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia co-chairs the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), which is headquartered in Riyadh. The TFTC is a multilateral body created to strengthen cooperation among the GCC and the United States to disrupt terrorist financing networks and coordinate related activities of mutual concern.

In 2022 the TFTC sponsored three collaborative workshops and two information sharing sessions in Riyadh and one workshop in Kuwait. These sessions covered terrorist financing threats from regional terrorist organizations, the basics of the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control's sanctions designation process, virtual asset-enabled terrorist financing, asset forfeiture, and links between illicit narcotics and sanctioned entities.

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Saudi Arabia in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram. The Government of Saudi Arabia rolled out six additional designation packages on ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hizballah, Boko Haram, and the Houthis. In total, Saudi Arabia designated 57 individuals, 44 entities, and 5 vessels.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Saudi Arabia had numerous government and government-affiliated entities devoted to CVE, including the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal), the Intellectual Warfare Center, and various entities within universities and the military and security services. Major CVE organizations focused on refuting “extremist ideology” through scholarly interpretation of the Quran and other Islamic religious sources. Following the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Saudi officials have become increasingly concerned by actions of the Taliban and supported calls for Taliban leadership to reverse extremist decisions such as the one denying women’s right to university education.

Saudi Arabia continued its flagship program at the Center for Counseling and Care, which seeks to deradicalize former terrorists and facilitate their reentry into society.

The Saudi-based NGO Muslim World League (MWL) promoted a message of tolerance and focused efforts on acceptance of other faiths. In May the MWL convened the first-ever “Forum on Common Values Among Religious Followers” in Riyadh, which was attended by 90 Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim leaders. The forum’s purpose was “to enhance cooperation and trust between [sic] global spiritual leaders, ... promote values of moderation and harmony, effectively support efforts to advance tolerance and peace, and ... immunize against the dangers of extremist ideology and behavior.”
International and Regional Cooperation: Saudi Arabia is a member of the following organizations engaged in CT cooperation:

- G-20
- GCTF
- GCC
- Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition
- Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- UN Counterterrorism Center

TUNISIA

Overview: Counterterrorism (CT) and border security continued to be a top priority of the Government of Tunisia in 2022. The risk of terrorist activity remained elevated, exacerbated by sustained Libyan instability. However, no notable terrorist attacks occurred in 2022. Tunisia continued to professionalize its security apparatus in partnership with the United States. Its commitment to joint Ministries of Interior (MOI) and Defense (MOD) CT operations steadily degraded Violent Extremist Organization capacity within the country. However, the Government of Tunisia misused terrorism-related charges to arrest and prosecute individuals for expression and peaceful activism. Tunisia demonstrated consistent security force readiness and carried out CT operations throughout the year. It continued implementation of a national preventing/countering violent extremism strategy and freezing of terrorist assets, and it demonstrated improvements in CT crisis response, coordination, and investigation.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents of note in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no major changes to CT legislation in 2022.

Overall, the Government of Tunisia’s (GOT’s) CT efforts continued to demonstrate advances in successful CT operations and improved coordination between MOI and MOD security elements. There was cooperation with Embassy Tunis on investigations, prosecutions, and prevention of terrorist activity aimed at U.S. interests in Tunisia and beyond.

The Tunisian National Counterterrorism Commission (CNLCT) worked on revising the National Counterterrorism Strategy through a consultative process with ministries and civil society organization stakeholders. The strategy is meant to include Tunisian civil society and multiple government agencies in countering violent extremism. CNLCT presented it to the presidency for approval in the fall, and it remained under review at year’s end.

The GOT had specific capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets, such as hotels, stadia, tourist resorts, and cultural sites, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2341’s call for UN member states to improve efforts to protect critical infrastructure.
from terrorist attacks. Safeguarding tourist zones remained a GOT emphasis, with work continuing in the context of the G-7+7 Tourist and Cultural Sites Protection project group.

Border security remained a top GOT priority in 2022 owing to continued Libyan instability. The Tunisian Armed Forces, along with the MOI’s National Guard, successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, vehicles, and weapons in joint operations throughout 2022. The second phase of the southern electronic border surveillance system, a joint Tunisian-U.S.-German project launched in 2016, was completed in March. The maritime coastal surveillance system continued to provide full coverage along the entire Tunisian coast. As part of interdiction and border security support efforts, the United States provided training in advanced travel document examination.

Regarding the repatriation and reintegration of Tunisians from foreign conflict zones, namely fighters and associated family members, Tunisia did not repatriate any such nationals in 2022. Tunisia’s ability to reintegrate such individuals remained very limited. The GOT had limited prosecutorial, prison, and social services-related capacity necessary for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.

Significant CT-related law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups reported publicly included the following:

- Between January 1 and April 1, the MOI announced that 148 terrorist cells were identified and dismantled. One of the terrorism-linked arrests was a March 16 operation dismantling an ISIS-affiliated cell in the Libyan-Tunisian border region of Tataouine. According to the MOI, the group manufactured IEDs and recruited youth in the region.
- On January 10 the MOI arrested a 22-year-old woman returning from Syria. Investigations revealed that her partner was a known terrorist who had recently been arrested for planning terrorist operations targeting senior government officials.
- The GOT conducted two significant operations in September that led to multiple arrests, the deaths of wanted terrorists, and the seizure of weapons and IEDs. The first was along the Algeria-Tunisia border, the second along the Libyan-Tunisian border. The MOI reported that the targets of the operation along the Algeria-Tunisia border were allegedly part of the ISIS-affiliated Jund al-Khilafah Brigade. These counterterrorism raids reflected the persistent terrorist threat in the region and along Tunisia’s southern and western borders and highlighted the efficacy of U.S. assistance in improving capacity and interagency cooperation among MOI and MOD forces, both of which are engaged in CT operations.

Tunisia has been under a state of emergency since 2015, and President Saied continued to extend it. Human rights organizations have criticized the repeated extensions for giving the executive extraordinary powers that limit judicial transparency and due process. Human rights organizations also have objected to the counterterrorism law for its vague definition of terrorism, the broad leeway it gives judges to admit testimony by anonymous witnesses, and
the way it can be misused to prosecute individuals for exercising their freedom of expression. The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists has criticized what it characterizes as a pattern of Tunisian authorities’ misusing CT laws to intimidate journalists and activists.

For example, on March 18, the National Guard’s Counterterrorism Unit detained and interrogated Radio Mosaique FM journalist Khelifa Guesmi, charging him under the country’s CT law for publishing and refusing to reveal his sources for a story covering the dismantling of a terrorist group in Kairouan. The CT Unit also interrogated Mosaique journalist Amal Manai and editor Houcine Dabbabi in the same case; Guesmi later was sentenced to one year in prison.

The National Police, the National Guard, and the military continued to benefit from U.S.-provided capacity building assistance, including training focused on investigative skills, interagency cooperation, and tactical skills; embedded mentors within the National Guard and National Police antiterrorism units; and train-the-trainer courses. The National Guard, the National Police, and members of civil society were trained on community policing techniques, and U.S. assistance rehabilitated and refurbished buildings for community police stations. Additional assistance included the completion of a National Guard operations room and the renovation of CT judicial facilities. The first of six tethered aerostat systems were delivered to the National Guard in late 2022, which will provide a long-endurance tactical surveillance capability for a more secure western border.

The GOT continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement authorities to prevent acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests in the country; however, owing to significant and troubling democratic backsliding and concerns over the use of CT units to target government critics and other political figures, broader cooperation at times remained challenging and inefficient.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism**: Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In 2022 the CNLCT monitored numerous individuals, organizations, and entities with ties to terrorist organizations and made periodic updates to the frozen assets list. In October the CNLCT froze the funds and assets of 26 Tunisians suspected of links to terrorists. As of December 6, the list included 57 individuals, organizations, and entities with ties to terror groups whose assets were frozen.

**Countering Violent Extremism**: Tunisia remained committed to preventing radicalization to violence through youth and educational programs coordinated among its ministries and civil society organizations. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s MA3AN program (“Together” in Arabic) — a 7-year, $60 million youth resilience and community empowerment program, worked with the CNLCT and local and national stakeholders to develop the National Counterterrorism Strategy. The complementary Solutions to Violent Extremism program worked with local governorates to analyze drivers and dynamics of violent extremism and
develop methodologies for countering violent extremism. In 2022 the Tunisian Scouts expanded their CT Bureau-funded Scouts Impact CVE program to export their CVE merit badge concept to national scouting organizations in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Tunisia is a board member for the International Institute of Justice and Rule of Law, participated in Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS events, and is a recipient country for CVE assistance from the Global Community Engagement and Resiliency Fund. The MOI agreed to second a representative to a multinational platform focused on battlefield evidence for use in prosecution of foreign fighters.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

**Overview:** The United Arab Emirates (UAE) advanced counterterrorism (CT) efforts in 2022 particularly in countering terrorist financing and in the international cooperation domain. The UAE added one individual and five entities to its list of persons and organizations supporting terrorism for their role in supporting the Houthis in Yemen. The UAE remained a leader on a global level in CVE narratives, supporting CVE education, and participating in and hosting international fora to promote tolerance and coexistence. The UAE continued valuable support for CT efforts against ISIS, and in Yemen against AQAP, including providing support to local forces in CT operations.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Significant terrorist incidents in 2022 included these two:

- On January 17 the Houthis attacked vital facilities in the UAE, using missiles and drones that set off explosions in the industrial Musaffah area near Abu Dhabi. The attack killed three persons and wounded six others. A separate strike caused a fire at the new terminal building under construction at Abu Dhabi International Airport, which briefly disrupted a small number of flights.
- On February 2 the UAE Ministry of Defense announced on Twitter that it had intercepted three hostile drones in Emirati airspace, which were destroyed “away from populated areas.” The Iran-backed Iraqi militia group Righteous Promise Brigades (Alwiyat al-Wa’ad al-Haq) claimed responsibility for the attack in a letter published on social media.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The UAE implemented a new “Crimes and Punishment” law in January, updating the Penal Code. The maximum punishments under the law for individuals joining terrorist organizations include the death penalty and life sentences. The new “Countering Rumors and Cybercrimes” law that came into effect in 2022 criminalizes expression that “propagates or favors” terrorism, making it punishable with one year of imprisonment and a fine of not less than 100,000 Emirati Dirhams ($27,200). Facilitating communication with terrorist leaders, recruiting followers, or promoting terrorist ideologies online may result in a prison sentence ranging from 10 to 25 years.
The State Security Directorate (SSD) in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai State Security (DSS) remained primarily responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement efforts. Local, emirate-level police forces, especially the Abu Dhabi Police and the Dubai Police, were the first responders in such cases and provided technical assistance to SSD and DSS. The UAE security apparatus demonstrated capability in investigations, crisis response, and border security, and forces were trained and equipped to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents.

As in previous years, the UAE worked closely with the United States, through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to improve its border security posture. Information sharing between the Abu Dhabi Police’s Criminal Investigations Division and DHS Investigations helped counter transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UAE is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), and its FIU, the United Arab Emirates Financial Intelligence Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. The UAE is also a member of the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).

The UAE was added to the FATF “gray list” in 2022. In February, FATF reported that the UAE made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report in 2020, the UAE has made significant progress across its recommended actions to improve its AML/CFT regime, including by finalizing a terrorist financing risk assessment and creating an AML/CFT coordination committee. The UAE also established an effective system to implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) without delay, significantly improving its ability to confiscate criminal proceeds and engage in international cooperation. The UAE also provided additional resources to the FIU to strengthen analysis and provide financial intelligence to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to counter high-risk money laundering threats.

In September, U.S. and UAE officials launched the AML/CFT Working Group to formalize existing bilateral technical cooperation and AML/CFT capacity building. In October the Executive Office for Control and Nonproliferation issued updated guidance on TFS for financial institutions, virtual assets service providers, and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions. In December, the Central Bank of UAE issued new AML/CFT guidance for Licensed Financial Institutions (LFIs) in the insurance sector. The guidance requires LFIs to conduct enterprise risk assessments, perform enhanced customer due diligence practices, and maintain transaction monitoring systems aimed at countering illicit activity.

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, the UAE in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram. The UAE also updated its domestic terrorist sanctions list in February to add a U.S.-designated IRGC-QF and Houthi financier and five related entities.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The UAE government continued to play a leadership role in global efforts to counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment, including by hosting meetings of the Global Coalition to Defeat-ISIS’s Stabilization and Communications Working Groups in November. The meetings focused on the threat of violent extremism in the Arab world, support for stability in liberated areas, rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, and CVE communications efforts. In addition to being a founding member of the GCTF, the UAE continued to support Hedayah, an international center of excellence for CVE and a GCTF Inspired Institution based in Abu Dhabi. Hedayah carried out CVE programs and research projects around the world, including a U.S. Department of State-supported countermessaging effort for religious and community leaders in Tunisia. The UAE also hosted the Sawab Center to counter ISIS messaging and online propaganda by ISIS and ISIS-affiliated organizations.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The UAE led or was actively engaged in a range of CT cooperation efforts within international, multilateral, and regional organizations and groupings that align with U.S. and like-minded policy priorities. Relevant UAE engagements are highlighted below:

- In February the UAE hosted the Targeted Financial Sanctions Summit 2022-Countering Terrorist and Proliferation Financing, with participation from GCC countries, a UN team, UK representatives, and a U.S. delegation, among others.
- In October the UAE participated in the High-Level Conference on International and Regional Border Security and Management Cooperation to Counter Terrorism and Prevent the Movement of Terrorists, which was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
- In November the UAE participated in the “No Money for Terror” ministerial conference on countering the financing of terrorism, held in New Delhi.

**YEMEN**

**Overview:** AQAP, ISIS-Yemen, the IRGC-QF, and Iran-backed terrorist groups such as Hizballah exploited the political and security vacuum created by tension between the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the STC.

The ROYG controlled about two thirds of the country’s territory, but only 30 percent of the country’s population. On April 7, then-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi issued a presidential declaration transferring his powers to a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) consisting of one president and seven deputy chairmen. Although one PLC chairman concurrently served as the president of the STC, tensions between the government and the STC persisted in the south. AQAP and ISIS-Yemen maintained significant areas of influence in the south — though in 2022, AQAP was displaced from its stronghold in al-Bayda governorate.
The ROYG cooperated with the U.S. government on counterterrorism (CT) efforts but could not fully enforce CT measures or consistently undertake operations across the country because of instability, violence, and degraded capabilities. A security vacuum persisted, which provided AQAP and ISIS-Yemen room to operate. STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces continued to play a notable role in CT efforts, as they exercised control over significant parts of Aden and Abyan. ISIS-Yemen was considerably smaller in size and influence, compared with AQAP, but remained active and claimed attacks. AQAP remained active in central Yemen, most notably in al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwah governorates. Human rights organizations reported that both ROYG- and STC-aligned security forces leveraged allegations of terrorism to detain and silence independent journalists for reporting deemed critical of local authorities.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** AQAP militants carried out numerous attacks throughout Yemen in 2022. Methods included suicide bombers, vehicle borne IEDs, ambushes and armed clashes, sniper fire, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. Notable terrorist incidents included these two:

- In February, AQAP kidnapped five UN workers in the southern governorate of Abyan as they were heading to Aden.
- In May, AQAP assassinated two senior Yemeni security officials in al-Dhale governorate.

As reported by the UN Panel of Experts, the STC launched in August what it described to be a counterterrorism operation, “Arrows of the East,” against AQAP militants in Abyan and Shabwah governorates. AQAP responded by carrying out a series of counterattacks against the STC, the deadliest of which occurred in Abyan governorate in September and resulted in the deaths of at least 20 fighters from the STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no significant changes.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Yemen is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is hosted in the government-controlled Central Bank of Yemen (CBY). Yemen remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022. Although FATF determined that Yemen completed its agreed action plan in 2014, it has been unable to conduct an onsite visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained, because of ongoing security concerns.

Between December 2021 and October, the FIU signed or renewed information-sharing MOUs with Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, and other Yemeni institutions such as the Yemen Customs Authority. The FIU also released in May its first annual report since 2012 containing all suspicious transactions and money laundering cases in 2021.

Throughout 2022, the CBY continued incremental efforts to implement IMF Diagnostic Report recommendations to enhance Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) capacity. The CBY reactivated its AML/CFT National Committee and, with U.S. support, began updating its bylaws and internal procedures in line with FATF
recommendations. The CBY also established an AML/CFT unit within its Banking Supervision Department in November.

The ROYG has a domestic designations regime in place that allows it to impose sanctions on terrorists and/or terrorist groups. In 2022, the ROYG designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization under domestic authorities. The consequences of those sanctions are unclear but include a “blacklist” that prohibits entities and individuals from conducting banking transactions and that is communicated to jurisdictions with which the ROYG FIU has bilateral information-sharing relationships.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in 2022.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration: The ROYG developed a 2022-24 National Plan for the Rehabilitation of Child Recruits. This plan reportedly aims to provide the necessary psychosocial and educational support to reintegrate former child soldiers into society.

International and Regional Cooperation: The ROYG continued to cooperate with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, the GCC, the United States, and other countries in pursuit of a political solution to the conflict. Yemen is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League.
Overview
In 2022, South and Central Asia saw continued terrorist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, continued insurgent attacks against security forces and incidents of terrorism in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and threats by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) against Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Al-Qa’ida and its regional affiliate, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), appeared to keep a low profile, presumably in accordance with Taliban directives.

The United States has not yet decided to recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan. The Taliban hosted and sheltered al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul before his death in a U.S. airstrike on July 30. The Taliban repeatedly stated they would uphold their commitment to prevent any group or individual from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. The Taliban fought ISIS-K, which they viewed as their primary threat, but continued to harbor other terrorist groups.

Afghanistan’s neighbors remained deeply concerned about regional security and potential terrorist threats emanating from the country. In 2022, terrorist groups, including ISIS-K, launched attacks from Afghanistan against Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. ISIS-K also conducted attacks against Afghan civilians, often attacking members of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority populations. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for attacks on the Russian embassy in September, the Pakistani embassy in December, and a hotel frequented by People’s Republic of China (PRC) nationals, also in December.

ISIS-K, elements of al-Qa’ida including AQIS, and terrorist groups targeting Pakistan — such as Tehrik -e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — continued to use Afghan territory near the Pakistan border as a safe haven.

Central Asian states remained on guard against violent extremist elements from Afghanistan crossing their borders or committing cross-border rocket attacks, as well as the potential threat posed by returning citizens who traveled to Iraq or Syria to fight with terrorist groups.

In Tajikistan, U.S. assistance largely focused on building capacity to secure the 843-mile border with Afghanistan through technical assistance and equipment. Additional U.S. assistance is expected to continue to support improved border security in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2023. Countries in the region also receive security assistance from Russia, the PRC, and others. Tajikistan cooperates with international organizations such as the EU, the OSCE, and the UN on combating terrorism. Tajikistan hosted a UN High-Level Counterterrorism Conference in October, which focused on international border security and management cooperation.

Tajikistani law enforcement authorities began implementing a new Law on Combating Terrorism, which was enacted in December 2021 and established the legal and organizational basis for CT operations in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan drafted a 2022-2025 action plan on the
reintegration of returnees while also adopting a law on infrastructure security. Government officials report they are developing Uzbekistan’s first national action plan on the implementation of UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.

Turkmen authorities maintain close surveillance on the country’s population and its borders, particularly its 462-mile border with Afghanistan. Turkmenistan actively cooperates with international organizations and participates in the C5+1 diplomatic platform (the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States) to prevent violent extremism and counter international terrorism, but it did not host any CT-related events in 2022.

The United States bolstered regional security cooperation in Central Asia through the C5+1 diplomatic platform with programs that develop the region’s ability to secure its borders and increase information sharing. These programs included a C5+1 Border Security training program in Almaty, Kazakhstan, which will deliver several courses in 2023 ranging from border management to low-light environment operations.

Further on the multilateral front, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan are members of the GCTF. At the GCTF – as well as at the UN – India has been extensively involved in discussions regarding countering the use of unmanned aircraft systems and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. The United States continued to build on its strategic partnership with India, including through the annual Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and the Quad counterterrorism tabletop exercise alongside Australia and Japan. The U.S. and Indian governments collaborated on improving border security and information sharing capabilities as well as aviation security measures, including those on data collection consistent with UNSCR 2309.

AFGHANISTAN

Overview: The United States has not yet decided whether to recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan. The Taliban hosted and sheltered al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul before his death from a U.S. airstrike on July 30. The Taliban facilitated talks between Pakistan and the TTP in Kabul that led to a ceasefire in May; however, TTP formally ended the ceasefire in November.

Throughout the reporting period, the Taliban fought against the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), which they viewed as their primary threat. The United States pressed the Taliban to uphold their counterterrorism commitments under the 2020 Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (the Doha Agreement) between the United States and the Taliban, which signed it as the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban repeatedly promised to meet their Doha Agreement commitments to prevent any group or individual from using Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. However, terrorist groups remained present in Afghanistan.
In 2022, terrorist groups launched attacks from Afghanistan against Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Specifically, ISIS-K launched rocket attacks from Afghan soil against Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. ISIS-K also conducted attacks against Afghan civilians, often attacking members of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority populations. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on the Russian embassy in September and attacks in December on the Pakistani embassy and on a hotel frequented by PRC nationals. Ayman al-Zawahiri and his family moved to Kabul in early 2022; he died in a U.S. airstrike in July.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist attacks on mosques, schools, public transportation, and places of public gathering were common in Afghanistan. Significant terrorist incidents follow below:

- On April 22 an unclaimed suicide bombing at a mosque and madrassa in Kunduz during a Sufi religious gathering killed at least 33 people and wounded 43 others.
- On April 29 an unclaimed explosion at a mosque in Kabul during a Sufi religious gathering killed at least 10 people and wounded 30 others.
- On August 17 an unclaimed bombing at a mosque in Kabul killed at least 21 people, including a prominent cleric, and wounded at least 33 others.
- On September 5, a suicide bombing claimed by ISIS-K at the Russian embassy in Kabul killed at least six persons, including a Russian diplomat, and wounded at least 10 others. On September 30 an unclaimed suicide bombing at an educational center in Kabul killed 54 people and wounded 114 others, mostly Hazara Shia women and girls.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the Taliban conducted 40 operations against ISIS-K during the reporting period. The Taliban on several occasions publicly announced they had detained or killed ISIS-K members, including those responsible for attacks. In July, Human Rights Watch reported cases in which the Taliban reportedly summarily executed and forcibly disappeared alleged ISIS-K members. It was unclear whether the Taliban had the capability to fully dismantle clandestine terrorist networks in urban areas.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: There have been no changes since 2021. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: There have been no changes since 2021.

International and Regional Cooperation: There have been no changes since 2021.

BANGLADESH

Overview: In 2022, Bangladesh experienced few instances of terrorist violence as authorities continued to pursue militants rigorously, particularly al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB), and an ISIS-affiliated JMB offshoot, Neo-JMB. PM Sheikh Hasina and other
Bangladeshi government officials frequently emphasized Bangladesh’s zero-tolerance policy on terrorism, though Bangladesh continued to deny the presence of globally organized jihadist militant groups such as al-Qa’ida and ISIS. In October, Bangladesh authorities announced operations to disrupt Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAHS), an allegedly al-Qa’ida inspired group. U.S.-trained Bangladesh police units arrested dozens of terrorist suspects. However, other elements of the security forces have conducted extrajudicial killings and committed other human rights violations.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist incidents in 2022 included:

- In October the Bangladeshi counterterrorism Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) announced operations to disrupt JAHS, an allegedly al-Qa’ida-inspired group training in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to carry out attacks elsewhere, according to Bangladeshi authorities. Authorities alleged that JAHS cooperated with the Kuki-Chin National Front, an ethnic separatist militant organization. Authorities announced the arrest of dozens of JAHS members throughout the rest of the year.
- On November 20, militants freed Moinul Hasan Shamim and Abu Siddiq Sohel, both convicted for their role in the 2015 murder of Bangladeshi publisher Faisal Arefin Dipan, in an attack on the Dhaka Chief Judicial Magistrate building. Authorities charged 20 suspected members of banned al-Qa’ida-affiliate Ansar al-Islam with helping plan and/or execute the escape. The freed convicts remained at large at the end of 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Antiterrorism Act of 2009, as amended, remained the basis for the arrest and detention of terrorist suspects. Under the 2018 Digital Security Act (DSA), police can arrest “extremists” propagating, funding, radicalizing, recruiting, or distributing hate speech online. Domestic and international critics asserted the DSA is used predominantly to target, harass, and arrest perceived government critics.

The Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTCU) of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police, the Antiterrorism Unit (ATU) of the National Police, and the RAB continued raids against and arrests of suspected terrorists. The CTTCU investigated 27 cases, conducted 27 operations, and made 61 arrests, mostly in Dhaka. The Chattogram Metropolitan CT police responded to multiple incidents and made several arrests. The ATU, though continuing to develop its nationally mandated CT capabilities, increased its performance, completing 27 investigations and carrying out 42 operations that resulted in 45 arrests. Other CT-related units included the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence’s Counterterrorism Investigation Bureau, Border Guards, Special Branch, Aviation Security, the Airport Immigration Police, and the Airport Armed Police Battalion. Each worked independently.

Bangladesh cooperated with the United States to strengthen its internal security and response to terrorism. The U.S. government provided various forms of assistance to CTTCU, the ATU, and other police units around the country. The U.S. government also provided training to Antiterrorism Tribunal (ATT) judges and prosecutors courses on handling evidence, conducting investigations, and prosecuting terrorists and terrorist financing cases.
Bangladesh has the capacity to patrol land and maritime borders and has improved cargo and passenger screening with updated equipment, procedures, and increased staff. Bangladeshi authorities implemented notable improvements in port security, particularly at Bangladesh’s principal port in Chittagong. Bangladeshi authorities also undertook planning to implement effective security measures at a new international airport terminal currently under construction in Dhaka and procured appropriate high-quality equipment. Both airport and port authorities were enthusiastic about cooperation with the U.S. government to improve port and airport security.

The country shares information with INTERPOL but has no national terrorist watchlist. Special Branch has its own internal watchlist that provides read-only privileges to the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence and the Directorate General of National Security Intelligence. A U.S. “Alert List” project remains under government consideration, which would be led by Special Branch in coordination with ATU, CTTCU, and Metropolitan Police. Bangladesh does not systematically use API or PNR data to screen travelers before flights arrive.

Bangladesh is host to more than one million Rohingya refugees. Though violence in the camps remained a concern and Bangladeshi officials publicly highlighted the potential of refugee radicalization to increase terrorist group recruitment and violence, no information emerged about significant terrorist threats from the camps in 2022.

In 2019 the ATT sentenced seven terrorists to death for their supporting roles in the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack. The Supreme Court still has not ruled on their appeal. The seven ATTs carried a caseload of about 680 cases, a slight decrease from 2021. A National Intelligence Agency court on June 3 sentenced Mohammed Masiuddin, aka Abu Musa — an ISIS and JMB member — to life in prison for involvement in a 2014 IED explosion in Khagragarh, India.

In March, ATT in Sylhet sentenced four men to death for the 2015 murder of blogger and writer Ananta Bijoy Das, who had promoted secularism in the Muslim-majority country. In August, ATT in Chattogram sentenced five members of banned militant outfit JMB to death for the 2015 Chattogram naval base bomb blasts.

**Counter Terrorist Financing:** Bangladesh is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Police, academics, civil society organizations, and others reportedly continued drafting a National Counterterrorism Coordination Strategy, but the process may have stalled, according to UN observers. The CTTCU, think tanks, the United Nations, and universities cooperated to conduct CVE-related research on such topics as terrorist organization mapping, social profiling, motivating factors, and radicalization of women. Bangladeshi organizations continued cooperative activities through the Country Support
Mechanism under the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, though activities likely will wind down soon.

Radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment in the prison system remained a serious concern. The CTTCU and Dhaka University began to develop a unified deradicalization from violence program to be implemented in select Bangladeshi prisons in 2023. Dhaka North, Dhaka South, and Narayanganj are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Bangladesh was active in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s activities in the CT arena.

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**INDIA**

**Overview:** Terrorism affected the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the northwest, the northeast, and some parts of central and southern India. Active terrorist groups included Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hizbul Mujahideen, ISIS, AQIS, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, the Communist Party of India-Maoist, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Terrorists remained focused on attacking civilians and government officials, primarily by using IEDs. The Indian government made significant efforts to detect, disrupt, and degrade operations of terrorist organizations. U.S.-India CT cooperation included special forces exercises on joint CT operations, a Quad counterterrorism tabletop exercise, and the U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** J&K experienced 222 incidents of terrorism resulting in 152 deaths, including 97 alleged terrorists, according to the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center.

- On April 22, suspected Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists attacked an Indian security force bus in Jammu city, using firearms and hand grenades. Two suspected terrorists and one security official were killed, and 10 security officials were injured.
- On October 23 a man was killed after the premature explosion in his car of a liquefied petroleum gas cylinder, which he allegedly planned to use in a suicide attack on a Hindu temple in Coimbatore in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** There were no changes in terrorism-related legislation. India implements UNSCR 2396 by utilizing watchlists, implementing biographic and biometric screening at ports of entry, and prioritizing information sharing. The U.S. and Indian governments collaborate on improving border security and information sharing capabilities.

India collaborates with the United States on implementing aviation security measures, including those on data collection consistent with UNSCR 2309.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) is the lead federal agency investigating terrorism. While many states have dedicated CT police units, Maharashtra has two separate police units.
for dealing with terrorism. The Anti Terrorism Squad is focused on preventing terrorism attacks and rooting out networks; Force One serves to respond to threatened and active attacks. Several police units as well as the National Security Guard also conduct drills to protect infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

In October, the Popular Front of India was banned for five years for its alleged role in supporting terrorism. Around 53 alleged members of terror groups linked to AQIS were arrested in Assam. The NIA investigated 35 cases related to jihadi terrorism in 12 states. Indian law enforcement faced budgetary, staffing, and equipment constraints. Capacity to patrol and secure extensive maritime and land borders improved but was not adequate.

The Government of India does not recognize the category of racial and ethnically motivated violent extremism and opposes labeling terrorism based on motivation.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** India is a member of FATF, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Its FIU, Financial Intelligence Unit India, is part of the Egmont Group. In 2022, the NIA investigated one new case of possible terrorism funding.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** India did not adopt any new strategies or programs for countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The Ministry of Home Affairs maintains a Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization division, but there is no national CVE coordinator. State governments have the lead on CVE and deradicalization from violence.

Reports claim donations from private groups in Western countries and the Middle East made to religious institutions, social organizations, and schools have contributed to radicalization to violence. Some human rights and civil society groups advocating for the rights of Kashmiris and their freedom of expression have been accused of contributing funds or support to radicalization to violence.

In J&K, the Indian Army runs schools, training courses, recruitment drives, medical camps, and emergency services to prevent radicalization. It also launched skill-development programs in partnership with a financial services company. Assam, in northeast India, became the sixth state to develop a CVE strategy. CVE efforts vary based on local contexts. CVE programs target demographics at the highest risk of vulnerability for terrorist recruitment.

India does not have a program to repatriate FTFs or their associated family members. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs for Indians who have joined domestic terrorist or Violent Extremist Organizations operate at the state or local levels.
The Ministry of Home Affairs has not yet released a draft action plan on strategic messaging to counter radicalization to violence.

Online platforms were monitored for violent extremist content and messaging by federal and state police forces. In October, the NIA arrested a person from the northern state of Uttar Pradesh for allegedly working with the ISIS-K publication *Voice of Khorasan*.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** India headed the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee and the Libyan Sanctions Committee of the UNSC.

India promoted multilateral CT cooperation in:

- GCTF
- ASEAN Regional Forum
- Council of Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (or RATS SCO)
- UN Office of Drugs and Crime
- G-20

India hosted:

- Special meetings of the United Nations Security Council Counterterrorism Committee in Mumbai and New Delhi, October 28-29
- INTERPOL’s 90th General Assembly for finding solutions supporting national and regional security
- The third “No Money for Terror” Ministerial Conference on Counterterrorism Financing

India cooperates multilaterally on terrorism and related issues with Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, the UAE, and Uzbekistan.

India’s defense relationships with Israel, Australia, Russia, the UK, France, Japan, Burma, and Bhutan extend to CT issues, as do its military exercises with Nepal and other countries.

Mumbai is a member of the Strong Cities Network.

**KAZAKHSTAN**

**Overview:** Kazakhstan remained alert to the potential for both externally directed and homegrown terrorist attacks. The government described widespread civil unrest in early January as a terrorist attack. The government continued rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for Kazakh foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated family members repatriated from Syria and Iraq. NGOs and independent observers expressed concerns that terrorism and
“extremism” laws were applied overly broadly, in some cases against political opponents and adherents of non-violent religious movements.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: The government described widespread civil unrest in early January as a terrorist attack, and later as an attempted coup. The unrest included armed attacks against government buildings and security servicemembers by criminal groups aligned with elites opposed to the current government. At least 238 individuals died because of the violence and the government’s response. Trials against the accused Kazakh citizen organizers of the violence were ongoing at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kazakhstan has a comprehensive CT legal framework. The lead CT agency is the Committee for National Security (KNB), which coordinates efforts at both the central and local levels. In 2022, the government concluded a five-year program to counter religious “extremism” and terrorism. Law-enforcement officers and prosecutors continued to have wide discretion to determine what qualifies as terrorism or “extremism,” leaving political opponents and adherents of non-violent but unregistered religious groups vulnerable to prosecution.

Kazakhstan bans its citizens from fighting in foreign wars. The government has prosecuted fighters and others suspected of active participation in terrorism in Iraq and Syria while assisting other returnees with reintegrating into their communities, including by providing access to state-supported theological counseling and psychological, social, and educational services. From 2019 to 2021, Kazakhstan returned more than 600 of its nationals, mostly women and children, from Iraq and Syria. There were no new repatriations in 2022.

Law-enforcement units demonstrated a strong capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The KNB reported it disrupted three terrorist attacks in 2022 and prevented 134 foreign citizens involved in terrorism or religious “extremism” from entering the country. The government convicted 56 persons for terrorism or “extremism” related crimes. Local researchers have estimated that up to 90 percent of charges filed under laws against terrorism and “extremism” do not involve real or planned violent acts, and in some cases appeared to be connected to political opposition activity. For example, police in Uralsk arrested two civil society activists in April for alleged participation in a political party banned as an “extremist” organization. Courts also continued to deliver harsh sentences for the promotion of “extremism” online. For example, an Almaty court in March handed down a sentence of five years’ imprisonment to a blogger for posting online “propaganda” critical of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service (part of the KNB) and other agencies proactively worked to prevent Kazaks and foreign citizens with suspected terrorist links from traveling to, from, or through Kazakhstan in line with UNSC 2396. This included the use of specialized equipment to interdict suspicious or unauthorized travelers at both official and unofficial air, land, and sea crossing points. Through a 10-year contract with the multinational security technology
company IDEMIA, Kazakhstan has been working since 2018 to install and operate an API and PNR system to screen travelers.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (the EAG), and its FIU, the Financial Monitoring Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2022, Kazakhstan updated its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism law in preparation for an EAG mutual evaluation planned for completion in 2023. The new amendments require legal entities to disclose their beneficial owners; increase authorities’ ability to freeze funds and other assets of entities associated with the financing of terrorism, “extremism,” or weapons of mass destruction proliferation; and formalize practices for reporting entities to monitor activities for money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks. The Prosecutor General’s Office transferred three terrorist financing cases to the court system in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Kazakhstan continued efforts to promulgate officially approved versions of Islam to youth and provide alternatives to “extremism” through social programs and economic opportunities. Working with religious experts, psychologists, and theologians, the Ministry of Information and Social Development conducted direct outreach in communities across the country; maintained an educational website on religion, state policy, and prevention of terrorism; and operated a nationwide hotline offering consultations on religious questions. At the same time, the government continued to block online content it considered “extremist.” In 2022 the government identified more than 120,000 websites as promoting “religious extremism” and terrorism, blocking more than 11,000. The government also continued to implement rehabilitation and reintegration programs for individuals convicted of “extremism”-related offenses and their relatives.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Kazakhstan partnered with the United States and international organizations such as the UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the OSCE on a variety of CT and CVE projects. As a member of the C5+1 diplomatic platform, Kazakhstan participates in the associated C5+1 Security Working Group, which focuses on regional CT and CVE cooperation. The Department of State’s CT Bureau continued implementation of technical assistance projects focused on managing FTF and terrorist inmates in prisons and building the capacity of practitioners supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of family members from Syria and Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International Development also launched in October a five-year, $15 million regional program to reduce the risk of, and increase resilience to, violent extremism.

Kazakhstan also participated in CT-related exercises and training through membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), CSTO, and SCO.
Overview: The Kyrgyz Republic’s CT efforts continued to concentrate on CVE, rooting out “extremists,” countering violent extremism, preventing those returning from conflicts abroad from engaging in terrorist activities, and repatriating FTF-associated family members. The Kyrgyz government restricts public information on national security issues, making it difficult to assess the efficacy of its CT operations or the extent of the threat. The country did remain vulnerable to transnational threats, especially in its remote southern region, where ill-defined and porous borders allow for the relatively free movement of people and illicit goods. According to government statistics, since 2014 an estimated 850 Kyrgyz citizens have left the country to join terrorism groups. The government faces limitations on its ability to rehabilitate, investigate, and prosecute, as appropriate, returning FTFs owing to a lack of expertise, resources, and potential shortcomings in its legal framework.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were some changes to terrorism-related legislation in 2022. The existing law entitled “On Terrorism and Extremism” was separated into two separate pieces of legislation, called “On Terrorism” and “On Extremism,” with responsibility for implementation given to the State Committee for National Security (the GKNB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, respectively. While the extremism law is still under review, the terrorism legislation was adopted. The new law defines “terrorism” to exclude “calls for acts of violence” [emphasis added] and focuses instead on actions.

There were no reports in 2022 of the government using CT laws to prosecute political opponents.

The Kyrgyz Republic has issued biometric passports since 2021, but the government does not yet operate an API or PNR system for commercial flights.

International organizations and Kyrgyz government officials have expressed concerns that the Prosecutor General’s Office and the GKNB lack adequate tools and a legal framework to properly prosecute nationals suspected of committing terrorism acts abroad.

Authorities reported several “extremism” or terrorism-related arrests in 2022, including of individuals accused of recruiting Kyrgyz nationals to join international terrorist organizations. The GKNB arrested the organizers of the 2016 terrorist attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and its FIU, the State Financial...
Intelligence Service, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Kyrgyz government is developing a 2023-27 national program entitled “On Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism.” Religious experts noted that for the first time the program includes rehabilitation of FTFs’ associated family members.

The Ministry of Education, with the State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA), continued to implement a curriculum for high school-age students on “moderate” Islam and to identify terrorist recruitment tactics. The Ministry of Interior and the SCRA, in cooperation with local religious leaders and civil society, organizes CVE training to prevent radicalization to violence and religious “extremism” among youth. The SCRA, both independently and in cooperation with the Muftiyat (state-run board of Islamic clergy) conducted joint CVE trainings for heads of religious educational institutions nationwide, as well as for Muslim women. Both the SCRA and civil society representatives participated in conferences and fora organized by the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) within the joint EU-UN initiative Strengthening Resilience Against Violent Extremism in Asia (or STRIVE Asia).

The SCRA Research Center partnered with the Civic Internet Policy Initiative, an NGO, to study how to improve the system of monitoring and analysis of the religious situation in rural areas of the Kyrgyz Republic. The SCRA Research Center, in partnership with the local public fund Interfaith Council and the British firm REOC Communications, was also implementing a media campaign focused on countering online radicalization to violence and warning the general population about existing threats in cyberspace. The Muftiyat, jointly with Mutakalim (the latter an organization focused on peace building through religious tolerance), and with the support of the United Nations Population Fund, conducted CVE-related trainings for religious leaders on the prevention of domestic violence.

The Probation Department of the Ministry of Justice, with the SCRA and UNDP, holds training on preventing violent extremism among its clients. Together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the department continued a project on post-release monitoring and probation of FTFs and violent extremist prisoners.

The Kyrgyz Republic cooperates with the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations and governments to facilitate CVE training and other CVE-related assistance programs.

The SCRA is working with the Embassy Bishkek-supported Ulybka Public Foundation to establish an Interfaith Council in three southern regions to promote and support the development of interfaith dialogue.
UNODC worked with the prison administration to secure violent extremists while developing a system to ensure they are not able to radicalize other inmates to violence. In 2022, UNODC tested a newly developed risk assessment system.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The PRC and Russia provided assistance to law enforcement agencies in Central Asian countries, including the Kyrgyz Republic, in 2022. Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Talas are members of the Strong Cities Network, and Bishkek City Hall hosted a City Exchange workshop in December. The Kyrgyz Republic participated in a joint UNOCT-OSCE conference on Regional Cooperation among Central Asian states within the Framework of the Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in March.

**MALDIVES**

**Overview:** The Government of Maldives is cognizant of the threat of terrorism and in 2022 continued to focus its CT efforts on CVE and arrests of Maldivians suspected of planning terrorist attacks or of “supporting or promoting a terrorist organization.” Those within the penal system or involved in criminal gangs are at heightened risk of terrorist radicalization. Maldives works with the United States and international partners to strengthen CT efforts and capacity.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** On June 21 a group of men, 17 of whom were later charged with terrorism-related crimes, attacked participants at a public International Day of Yoga event in Male with water bottles and flags. Before the event, religious NGOs and scholars asked authorities to stop it, alleging it was “irreligious.”

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Maldives established general regulations and a regulation on rehabilitation and reintegration under the Antiterrorism Act (ATA) and passed a Prohibition on Chemical Weapons.

There were no significant changes to law enforcement capacity. The Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF), including the marines and coast guard, and Maldives Police Service (MPS) remained jointly responsible for CT response. The MPS established a Joint Intelligence and Investigations Team (JITT), which covers terrorism and other transnational crimes. The JITT requires the MPS to coordinate early on with the Prosecutor General’s Office on investigations. The MNDF conducted multiple cooperative engagements with U.S. forces focused on CT operations and enhancing maritime security capabilities to increase domain awareness and security. Maldives also continued cooperating with the United States to strengthen its border security, including by using the U.S.-provided Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) integrated border security management system to screen arriving and departing travelers, and through the Maldives Customs Service’s use of the World Customs Organization’s Global Travel Assessment System.
In January the MPS, working with international law enforcement officials, arrested Hoodh Mohamed Zahir, a Maldivian national suspected of promoting ISIS ideology and inciting acts of terrorism. Zahir was charged with inciting acts of terrorism, promoting terrorism online, membership in a terrorist organization, supporting a terrorist organization, and possession of materials supporting a terrorist organization. In December the case was in the pretrial motions stage, with the last hearing held on December 5.

In March the MNDF and the MPS conducted a joint operation in Addu, arresting six individuals suspected of planning to carry out an act of terrorism. None of the suspects were charged with terrorism crimes and they were subsequently released. In November the MNDF and the MPS conducted joint operations in Male, Addu, and Guraihoo Island, arresting 14 individuals also suspected of planning an act of terrorism. At year’s end this investigation remained under way, with seven individuals in detention, and no charges yet filed.

In October, 17 men were charged with crimes under the ATA and the Penal Code relating to the violent disruption of the International Yoga Day event. The charges include encouraging to commit an act of terrorism, committing and aiding to commit acts of terrorism, possession of documents supporting terrorist organizations, committing assault with a dangerous weapon, attempted battery with a dangerous weapon, obstruction of law enforcement, and obstruction of justice. Defendants have been released under police supervision, pending the appointment of lawyers.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Maldives is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering; its FIU is established within the Maldives Monetary Authority. There were no significant changes in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** On March 11 the government facilitated the return of a Maldivian mother and her four children from northeast Syria, the first group of returnees under Maldives’ efforts to repatriate Maldivian families located in refugee camps and conflict zones. They were placed in the National Reintegration Center following an initial screening and were undergoing a rehabilitation program at year’s end. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) held numerous regional workshops and capacity building exercises with both public and private sector groups, to include counternarrative creation and the role of civil society and local leaders in countering what it considers “violent extremism and terrorism.” USAID supported some of the NCTC’s programming. In partnership with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Family, Gender & Social Services, the MPS continued Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) programs in islands with violent extremist activities. Male is a member of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** The government continued to work with multilateral and bilateral partners to strengthen its CT and countering terrorism financing (CTF) efforts. The NCTC conducted national and regional-level capacity building consultations and workshops focusing on addressing the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning FTFs and their associated family members. The NCTC also worked with UNDP Maldives, the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime, and the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate to increase capacity of law enforcement agencies, the legal sector, and the resilience of civil society organizations.

In 2020, USAID initiated a $5 million program in cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs on PCVE by conducting evidence-based research on violent extremism and improving career prospects, education, and employment opportunities for youth. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance conducted quarterly CTF consultations with the Maldives Monetary Authority, and case-based mentoring for the Maldives Police Service and the Prosecutor General’s Office. The U.S. Department of Justice held programmatic activities on CT and CTF, including a regional CT prosecutors’ workshop, and provided case-based mentoring on CT and CTF investigations and prosecutions. A corrections advisor from the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program worked with the Maldives Correctional Service on developing protocols and procedures for managing prisoners, and a CTF advisor embedded with MPS provided case-based investigation mentoring.

PAKISTAN

Overview: In 2022, Pakistan took steps to counter terrorism financing and restrain some India-focused terrorist groups. In May, Pakistan successfully prosecuted FBI most-wanted criminal and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba senior leader Sajid Mir on terrorist financing charges; he was then sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. In September, Pakistan deported three U.S. citizens to the United States, after completion of custodial sentences in Pakistan, to face prosecution for terrorism-related crimes. Pakistan took steps to curtail the activities of terrorist groups, though it has yet to complete its pledge to dismantle all terrorist organizations without delay or discrimination.

In October, the FATF removed Pakistan from the “gray list” of countries identified as jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT systems. Pakistan had been on the gray list since 2018.

Pakistan experienced increased terrorist threats in 2022. The number of attacks and casualties was higher than in 2021. Major terrorist groups that focused on conducting attacks in the country included the TTP, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and ISIS-K. Separatist militant groups conducted terrorist attacks against varied targets in Balochistan, Punjab, and Sindh provinces. TTP posed a significant threat to Pakistani police, military, and security services in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In attacking various targets, terrorists used a range of tactics, including IEDs, VBIEDs, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations.

Since 2018, Pakistan has been designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated a CPC in 2022.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Pakistan experienced increased terrorist attacks in 2022. All posts across U.S. Mission Pakistan carried “high” or “critical” threat ratings on the Security Environment Threat List. Members of religious minority groups faced significant threats from
violent extremist groups. The following examples are some of the more-destructive and higher-profile incidents and show a variety of methods, targets, and perpetrators:

- On February 2, militants attacked two Pakistani paramilitary bases in Balochistan. The BLA claimed responsibility for the coordinated attacks, which employed VBIEDs, small arms, and rocket propelled grenades. At least four soldiers were killed and more than 20 were injured according to Pakistan’s military public relations branch, Inter-Services Public Relations.
- On March 4 a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in central Peshawar during Friday prayers killed more than 60 people and wounded over 100. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On April 26 a BLA suicide bomber detonated an explosive device outside the Confucius Institute in Karachi, killing five employees – three PRC and two Pakistani nationals. Several others were injured in the attack, for which the BLA claimed responsibility. The attack was the first time the BLA deployed a woman suicide bomber.
- On November 15, six police officers were killed during an attack on a police convoy in KP. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On December 23 a suicide IED detonation on the outskirts of Islamabad killed one police officer and injured several others. The TTP attacker was intercepted at a security checkpoint en route to a high-profile target in Islamabad.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Pakistani government continued to implement the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) Act, the 2014 Investigation for Fair Trial Act, and major 2014 and 2020 amendments to the Antiterrorism Act, all of which give law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts enhanced powers in terrorism cases.

Military, paramilitary, and civilian security forces conducted CT operations throughout Pakistan against anti-state militants in 2022. Pakistani law allows for preventive detention, permits the death penalty for terrorism offenses, and creates specialized courts to try terrorism cases.

Pakistan collects biometric information at land crossings through its International Border Management Security System. The Customs Service attempted to enforce anti-money laundering laws and foreign exchange regulations at all major airports, in coordination with other agencies. Customs managed the entry of dual-use chemicals for legitimate purposes through end-use verification, while also attempting to prevent their diversion for use in IEDs.

Consistent with United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, returning foreign terrorist fighters may be prosecuted under Pakistani law.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Pakistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and its FIU is the Financial Monitoring Unit Pakistan. FATF removed Pakistan from its gray list in October. Pakistan continued to face significant money-laundering and terrorist financing risks. In 2022, several terrorist organizations, including UN-listed groups,
operated in the country, raising funds through a variety of means such as direct support, public fundraising, abuse of non-profit organizations, and criminal activities. Funds are moved through formal and informal (hawala/hundi) channels and through bulk cash smuggling. Pakistan’s geographic landscape and porous borders increase its vulnerability and risk to terrorist financing.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government in 2022 continued to operate “deradicalization” camps offering “corrective religious education,” vocational training, counseling, and therapy. A Pakistani NGO administered the juvenile-focused Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center in Swat Valley, which it founded in partnership with the Pakistani military. Additional deradicalization centers operate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Some madrassas continued to teach “extremist” doctrine. Some failed to register with the government, to provide documentation of their sources of funding, or to comply with laws governing acceptance of foreign students. Pakistan promotes an “official narrative” to counter religious-based violent extremism though the Paigham-e-Pakistan initiative, coordinated through the NACTA. In 2022, top religious authorities utilized the initiative to issue fatwas against terrorism.

The Pakistani cities of Nowshera, Peshawar, and Quetta are members of the Strong Cities Network.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Pakistan participated in several formal and informal multilateral fora where CT cooperation was discussed, including the GCTF and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

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**SRI LANKA**

**Overview:** The Sri Lankan government prioritizes increasing CT capabilities and in 2022 continued judicial proceedings regarding the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. The ISIS-inspired Easter Sunday attacks continue to shape national politics. The Supreme Court is expected in 2023 to issue a decision on whether to take punitive action on former President Maithripala Sirisena and other high-ranking former defense officials for their alleged failure to act on intelligence that could have prevented the attacks. The country’s economic and political crisis affected funding for key security services, such as the police, but there were no terrorist incidents during the reporting period. Sri Lankan authorities cooperated with Treasury Department sanctions imposed in November against Mohamad Irshad Mohamed Haris Nizar, a Sri Lanka-based business executive who had links to an al-Qa’ida financial facilitator. Sri Lankan officials face ongoing challenges in monitoring social media and preventing violent extremism.
Media reported links between perpetrators of the Easter Sunday attacks and ISIS-inspired cells in the nearby southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Law enforcement officers acknowledged difficulties in addressing cross-border terrorism but reported cooperating closely with Indian security services. Sri Lankan officials participated in numerous U.S.-funded workshops and trainings and sought additional assistance, including to improve technical capabilities.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no terrorist incidents reported in Sri Lanka in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979 remained Sri Lanka’s primary law on terrorism in 2022. The PTA received widespread criticism over its longstanding arbitrary use, including against members of ethnic and religious minority groups and protesters critical of the government. The Sri Lankan parliament passed minor amendments to the PTA in 2022 but had not yet taken steps to adopt new terrorism legislation in 2022.

The Sri Lanka Police Counterterrorism Investigation Division (CTID) and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) are the primary law enforcement agencies tasked with CT. The CTID cooperates closely with the State Intelligence Service on intelligence-sharing for terrorism investigations. The Department of Immigration and Emigration Border Surveillance Unit is the lead agency for border security and actively uses INTERPOL’s nominal and stolen and lost travel documents databases, including MIND/FIND for biographic and biometric screening. Sri Lanka established the Border Risk Assessment Center in 2018 with IOM support to increase interagency cooperation on border security activities, including CT.

The Ministry of Defense is concerned about the risk of separatist ideology from Tamil diaspora groups, often characterizing these groups’ political or non-violent advocacy activities as CT concerns, as well as about Islamic “extremism.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sri Lanka is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. The FIU faced challenges monitoring informal Islamic financing networks and saw a rise in real estate-based money laundering in 2022.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** No FTFs or associated family members were repatriated in 2022. The government identified 27 Sri Lankan nationals as FTFs and associated family members in northeast Syria, four of whom were allegedly killed there. Sri Lanka receives funding for CVE programming from the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and cooperates with NGOs such as Helvetas on community-level CVE programs. Sri Lanka conducts CVE campaigns through Religious Councils, which collaborate with the Department of Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs and the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Sri Lanka is an active member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral, Technical, and Economic Cooperation and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, both of which aim to increase law enforcement and
security coordination. Sri Lanka is also a member of the South Asian Network of Prevention of Violent Extremism and the GCTF. Sri Lankan security officials participated in counterterrorism and border security trainings held by the U.S., Australian, and Canadian governments, and maintains close coordination with the UNODC.

**TAJIKISTAN**

**Overview:** Tajikistan has intensified counterterrorism efforts since the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, with which it shares an 843-mile border. Tajikistan’s government asserts that northern Afghanistan is a primary source of terrorist activity and host to thousands of violent extremists. Tajikistan’s primary concerns are with ISIS-K and Jamaat Ansarullah, which operates from Afghanistan and seeks to overthrow the Tajik government to establish an Islamic emirate. In 2022 the U.S. government continued assistance to renovate and build border outposts and checkpoints along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and provided equipment and training to enhance Tajikistan’s border security and counterterrorism capabilities.

Tajikistan conducted more than 50 bilateral engagements with the U.S. Department of Defense during 2022. The country participated in exercises with the United States and regional partners, including the U.S. Central Command-sponsored annual security exercise Regional Cooperation that Tajikistan hosted in August. Tajikistan also took part in CT-focused exercises with Russia, other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states, and the PRC.

Tajikistan cooperates with international organizations, such as the EU, the OSCE, and UN, on combating terrorism. Tajikistan hosted a UN High-Level Counterterrorism Conference in October, on international border security and management cooperation.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** ISIS-K publicly claimed that it fired seven Katyusha rockets from Afghanistan’s Takhar province May 7 and struck Tajik military facilities across the border. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), 31 terrorist actions were prevented in Tajikistan in 2022.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Parliament did not pass any new counterterrorism legislation in 2022. Law enforcement authorities began implementing a new Law on Combating Terrorism, which was enacted in December 2021 and established the legal and organizational basis for counterterrorism operations in Tajikistan.

The MoIA stated that it arrested 365 members of terrorist or “extremist” organizations in 2022. The MoIA stated that many members of terrorist or “extremist” organizations were arrested abroad and returned to Tajikistan, without specifying a number. It did specify that 247 members of terrorist organizations or participants in hostilities abroad voluntarily repatriated to Tajikistan in 2022.
Tajikistan repatriated 146 associated family members of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from northeastern Syria in July. The government placed the 104 children and 42 women in a rehabilitation and reintegration program.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and its FIU, the National Bank of Tajikistan’s (NBT’s) Financial Monitoring Department (FMD), is a member of the Egmont Group. The government continued its efforts to improve the banking sector’s capacity to counter terrorist financing in 2022. The MoIA reported 24 cases of terrorist financing in 2022. The NBT-FMD website maintained a list of individuals and entities allegedly involved in terrorism, including those sanctioned under UNSC resolutions. In 2022 the NBT’s list included opposition activists and journalists in exile. The NBT also continued to operate a national money transfer center that centralized the receipt of remittances from abroad. The NBT asserted that this system allowed it to monitor and regulate alternative remittance services, wire transfers, and non-profit organizations to prevent terrorist financing.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** In April, Tajikistan partnered with the UN Office on Counterterrorism to present the country’s 2021-25 CVE national strategy/action plan at UN Headquarters in New York. The government invited the international community to contribute to the strategy and action plan in meetings throughout the year in Dushanbe.

Hedayah, an internationally backed CVE center of excellence, continued a project to assist Tajikistan with implementing its CVE National Action Plan and developing an effective communications strategy to counter the radicalization and recruitment of FTFs.

In August the Office of the Ombudsperson for Children’s Rights announced that the government was preparing the approximately 190 children repatriated from Iraq and Syria in 2019 and 2022 for reintegration into society. The office underscored that authorities had hired specialists and psychologists to work with the children; Tajikistan received assistance from the non-governmental organization Green Light Project to train mental health practitioners who work with FTF-associated family members.

The government continued to place heavy restrictions on the political and religious expressions of groups it classifies as “extremist.” Since 2015, Tajikistan has been designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated a CPC in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** UNODC conducted a series of seminars on managing violent extremists and returned FTFs in prison settings to Tajik law enforcement and prison
authorities. In July, UNODC provided capacity building training courses to State Committee for National Security Border Guard officials on countering terrorism and “radical extremism.”

In September the OSCE Program Office in Dushanbe trained Tajik government experts on the design and implementation of targeted financial sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1267 against individuals and entities associated with ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and associated individuals and entities. Representatives from the MoIA, NBT, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Agency on State Financial Control and the Fight Against Corruption participated.

Tajikistan participates in regional security arrangements such as the CSTO and the SCO.

Tajikistan’s government supports the C5+1, a diplomatic platform for coordination among the five Central Asian states plus the United States, and serves as co-chair of the C5+1 Security Working Group.

TURKMENISTAN

Overview: In 2022 the Government of Turkmenistan (GoTM) continued its efforts to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, ensure border security, and detect terrorist financing. Turkmenistan actively cooperates with international organizations and participates in the C5+1 diplomatic platform to prevent violent extremism and counter international terrorism. Turkmen authorities maintain close surveillance on the country’s population and its borders.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no reported terrorist incidents in Turkmenistan in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no significant changes in the legislation pertaining to counterterrorism. Turkmen border and customs officials attended the OSCE and UNODC-organized 17th Central Asia Border Management Initiative in December to discuss potential challenges to border security emanating from Afghanistan. During a March ministerial conference on developing a joint action plan with other Central Asian countries to implement the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy, Turkmenistan proposed to establish a regional counterterrorism office to provide activities tailored to the needs of the post-Soviet Central Asian states.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Turkmenistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and its FIU, the Financial Monitoring Service of Turkmenistan FMS, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.
**Countering Violent Extremism:** The GoTM continued cooperation with international organizations and participated in the C5+1 diplomatic platform on countering violent extremism. GoTM employees also participated in the following activities:

- Regional training on preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism in May co-organized by the United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and UNOCT co-organized regional training on preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism in May.
- A June high-level forum on the role of Central Asian women legislators in implementing national action plans to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- An OSCE-organized training course to raise awareness of the threat of Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Leads to Terrorism (VERLT) in October.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Turkmenistan works with international and regional organizations such as the UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, UNODC, the UN Counterterrorism Center, UNRCCA, the EU, and the OSCE. As a member of the C5+1, Turkmenistan also participates in the associated Security Working Group with the United States.

The GoTM sent delegations to the following events:

- The above-mentioned March ministerial conference on developing a joint action plan with other Central Asian countries to implement the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy.
- UNRCCA, UNOCT, and INTERPOL co-organized regional consultations in April as part of the UN Global Counterterrorism Program on Cybersecurity and New Technologies.
- An e-learning course launched in May by UNRCCA and UNOCT on the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law in the context of counterterrorism in Central Asia.
- A May UNODC and UNOCT event on Central Asian responses to transnational organized crime and terrorism.
- A June OSCE-organized regional workshop on countering terrorism, with a particular concentration on protecting critical infrastructures such as hydropower systems, energy grids, and transport lines, held in Ashgabat.
- A December regional open briefing focused on Central Asia, organized in New York by the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee.

**UZBEKISTAN**

**Overview:** At least one attempted rocket attack on Uzbekistan from the territory of Afghanistan heightened Uzbekistan’s concerns about the potential spillover of terrorist activity from its neighbors. The main terrorist group of concern for Uzbekistan is ISIS-K, with additional concerns regarding Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari, the Islamic Jihad Union, and Jamaat Ansarullah. President
Mirziyoyev publicly called on the Taliban to cut ties with terrorist groups. Concerns continued over terrorism and violent extremism (VE) linked to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning from Syria and Uzbekistani migrant laborers abroad. The government began implementing its first national CT/CVE strategy and national Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism strategy and continued rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) of repatriated FTF-associated family members. Uzbekistan continued active regional security cooperation, including through the C5+1 diplomatic platform. Uzbekistani ministries, agencies, civil society, and NGOs coordinated with the U.S. Departments of Energy, Defense, Justice, and State as well as USAID on various CT and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism initiatives.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: On April 18, ISIS-K claimed it fired 10 rockets from Afghanistan at an Uzbekistani military base in Termez, Surkhandarya, in southern Uzbekistan. Media suggested the group fired 10 rockets from the Afghan border town of Hairatan. The Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) refuted the reports and refused to categorize the incident as an attempted attack on Uzbekistan. No injuries were reported.

On July 5 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported five rockets were fired from Afghanistan toward Termez. The attack damaged a small amount of residential infrastructure; no people were injured. By the end of 2022 the GOU reported it would not decide whether to classify the incident as a terrorist attack until the end of an ongoing investigation into the incident.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The GOU drafted its action plan for 2022-25 on the reintegration of returnees from northeast Syria and released a law on infrastructure security. Government officials reported they are developing Uzbekistan’s first national action plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.

Uzbekistan continued implementing an identification card system to replace biometric internal passports. Citizens caught without valid passports or ID cards are administratively liable for a fine between $13-$80.

Uzbekistan did not repatriate additional FTFs or associated family members in 2022; up to 200 FTFs and associated family members likely remain in northeast Syria. The government continued to monitor returnees’ progress and provide R&R services to returnees. The GOU does not permit substantial third-party monitoring of detention facilities.

Law enforcement detained several groups and cells allegedly recruiting members and financing terrorist groups — mainly ISIS and KTJ. Several citizens were detained on VE charges after returning from Syria, and courts tried at least 40 citizens for planning to join terrorist groups in Syria. Uzbekistani and Turkish authorities coordinated on the arrest and deportation of an Uzbekistani national accused of plotting a terrorist attack in Istanbul. Despite the conclusion of multiple CT investigations, corruption continued to impede more effective law enforcement. Hesitancy to share information with interagency, regional, and international counterparts also impeded more-effective border security.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), and its FIU, the Department on Struggle Against Tax Currency Crimes and Legalization of Criminal Incomes at the General Prosecutor’s Office, is a member of the Egmont Group. Uzbekistan underwent a mutual evaluation in 2022. The EAG found that Uzbekistani authorities are well-aware of terrorist financing (TF) risks, with good progress on mitigation. The report recommended improving domestic TF threat and instance identification, prioritizing parallel financial investigations, enhancing sanctions mechanisms and referrals, regularly updating the list of designated terrorist organizations and its national risk assessment, and improving access to threat information. The EAG identified the movement of funds through intermediaries, payment systems, online bank cards, and money remittance systems, along with the purchase of airline tickets and other travel documents for FTFs as the main methods of TF.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: The government and non-governmental organizations continued to use advertisements, counter messaging campaigns, and training to prevent radicalization to violence and terrorist radicalization of at-risk nationals and labor migrants. Law enforcement shut down channels for spreading VE propaganda and promoting terrorism on social media, particularly on the popular Telegram messaging application. The government continued to restrict certain forms of political and religious expression in the name of countering broadly defined “extremism.” Law enforcement reported providing R&R assistance to pardoned Uzbekistani citizens, partly to mitigate vulnerability to radicalization to violence.

The GOU continued its active role in the C5+1 regional CVE and FTF framework through virtual and hybrid CVE, repatriation, and R&R meetings and workshops; through online youth resilience building; and through community leader and R&R care provider training.

International and Regional Cooperation: Uzbekistan’s multilateral CT/CVE engagements included the following (with organizer[s] in parentheses):

- The ministerial conference on developing a Joint Plan of Action for the implementation of the Global Counterterrorism Strategy in Central Asia (GOU, UN)
- The Counterterrorism cooperation roadmap (UNOCT)
- Third-country nationals returned from Syria and Iraq project (UNOCT, the UN Counterterrorism Center, UNICEF)
- The assessment, training plan, and conference on gender-sensitive approaches to the R&R of FTFs and their family members (the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, UNODC, UNICEF)
- The Strategic Concept Workshop (NATO)
- The Cross-Border and Cross-Sector Dialogue for Tolerance and Peace in Central Asia project (UNOCT, EU)
Through the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS SCO) framework, Uzbekistan participated in regional CT activities — including the Manesar Antiterror 2022 joint exercise hosted by the National Security Guard of India. Uzbekistan established a joint security commission with Iran to counter terrorism, “extremism,” and other transnational organized crimes. It also joined the first Central Asia-India Meeting of Secretaries of Security Councils. Uzbekistani law enforcement cooperates on terrorism detection and investigation with foreign countries.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Overview

Terrorism remained a security concern for some countries in various parts of the Western Hemisphere in 2022. Transnational terrorist organizations have a limited presence, with small pockets of supporters in the region. National or locally oriented groups — such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), Segunda Marquetalia, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) in Colombia and Venezuela, and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru — remained the region’s most significant terrorist threats. Corruption, weak governmental institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or nonexistent legislation, and limited resources remained obstacles to improving security in 2022. Nevertheless, governments in the hemisphere made significant progress in CT efforts and strengthened regional cooperation against terrorism.

Lebanon-based and Iran-backed terrorist group Hizballah continued its long history of activity in the Western Hemisphere, including fundraising by its supporters and financiers in key locations. Hizballah supporters seek to generate funding through licit and illicit activity and then transfer it to the group’s headquarters to enable Hizballah to advance its broader agenda. In recent years, Hizballah supporters and members have been identified in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and the United States.

Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela all continued to experience terrorist activity. Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, and the ELN continued to commit acts of terror throughout Colombia and Venezuela, including bombings, kidnappings, violence against civilian populations and demobilized FARC members, attacks against utilities infrastructure, and violent attacks against military and police facilities.

Authorities in the Western Hemisphere actively participated in multilateral and regional efforts to counter terrorism. The OAS’s Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) held its Consultation of States Parties to the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism for the first time, hosted by Peru with the United States as co-host. Members endorsed recommendations of states for the 20-year-old Convention. They also examined how the terrorism threat has evolved and what must still be undertaken to strengthen the region against it. Several countries in the region have joined the Chile-founded OAS-CICTE 24/7 Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism (subsequently funded by both Chile and the United States), which seeks to strengthen cooperation among member states to prevent and address terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere.

ARGENTINA

Overview: In 2022, Argentina continued to focus its counterterrorism strategy on the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where suspected terrorist financing networks operate. Robust U.S.-Argentine law enforcement and security cooperation continued
in 2022. Argentina maintained Hizballah’s listing on its domestic registry of terrorist groups and entities for the third consecutive year.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no reported terrorist incidents in Argentina during 2022.

Argentine citizens and public officials continue to criticize the lack of justice for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) – both of which took place in Buenos Aires. On July 22 the *New York Times* reported on an investigation into the terrorist attacks by Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, which shared the written findings of its internal study with the *Times*. The report, intensively covered by the Argentine press, concluded that Hizballah had created a cell in Buenos Aires to conduct the attacks, further assessing that Iran “approved and funded the attacks and supplied training and equipment as a supporter of Hizballah, but did not have an operational role on the ground. AMIA and the national Jewish community’s umbrella organization, the Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA) immediately rejected the report and stated there should be no differentiation between Hizballah and the Iranian state.

On January 19, in a joint declaration that it led at the OAS, Argentina and 20 other OAS Member States formally condemned the presence of Iranian Vice President Mohsen Rezai, who is the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice because of his alleged involvement in the AMIA bombing, at the January 10 inauguration of Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega. The statement called on all members of the OAS to “act appropriately in relation to INTERPOL’s Red Notice regarding the AMIA attack.” Argentine ambassador to Nicaragua Daniel Capitanich attended the inauguration; however, Argentine officials claimed Capitanich did not know Rezai would attend and swiftly condemned Rezai’s presence.

In 2019, former president Mauricio Macri signed a presidential decree creating a Public Register of People and Entities Linked to Acts of Terrorism and Their Financing and added UNSC-designated terrorist groups and individuals linked to Hizballah and the AMIA bombing. No new names were added in 2022.

On June 8, Argentine authorities detained a plane and its crew while a judge investigated them for possible links to terrorist organizations. The Argentine investigation ultimately identified the captain of the aircraft as an ex-commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Argentine law enforcement searched the aircraft and found a Mahan Air flight log documenting the aircraft’s flights after the unlawful transfer to Emtrasur. The crew members eventually departed Argentina in September and October after a federal judge determined there was insufficient evidence of links to terrorist activity or other criminal activity. Although the investigative case was no longer active, it remained open, which allows for subsequent legal actions — to include mutual legal assistance treaty requests. A U.S. seizure warrant, as well as significant logistical challenges such as refueling and maintenance, kept the aircraft in Argentina.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Argentina is a member of FATF and GADEFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America). Its FIU, the Financial Information Unit Argentina, is a member of the Egmont Group. The TBA continues to be one of the principal routes into Argentina for multi-billion-dollar trade-based money laundering, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and other smuggling operations. In addition, many of the money laundering organizations in the TBA have suspected links to Hizballah.

In May the executive branch sent a bill to Argentina’s congress to modify the criminal code to improve the effectiveness of the prevention and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing. In June the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing approved Argentina’s first AML national risk assessment, and subsequently approved a national strategy for the prevention and prosecution of AML and financing of terrorism crimes.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Plans to change the criminal code’s legal framework for terrorism cases remained delayed in 2022. While the executive branch drafted and submitted legislation to congress for approval in both 2019 and 2022, the legislature has not yet approved the proposals.

Argentine security agencies maintain specialized law enforcement units that have substantial capabilities to respond to criminal activities, including terrorist incidents. Argentina continued to develop its nationwide network of law enforcement intelligence fusion centers and to incorporate biometric data at ports of entry to fight against international terrorism and transnational crime.

The nation continued cross-border coordination through its participation in the Tripartite Command, an interagency security mechanism created by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to exchange information and combat transnational threats in the TBA, including terrorism.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Government of Argentina has continued to issue statements of condemnation against major acts of terrorism.

International and Regional Cooperation: Argentina participated in the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in July.

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BRAZIL

Overview: Brazil and the United States maintained strong counterterrorism cooperation in 2022. The Brazilian Federal Police (PF), Brazil’s lead CT agency, worked closely with law enforcement from the United States and other nations to assess and mitigate potential terrorist
threats. The Brazilian government continued to support CT activities, including controlling sensitive technologies and investigating fraudulent travel documents.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no significant terrorist incidents in Brazil in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no major changes to CT legislation in 2022. Nevertheless, the Embassy Law-Enforcement Working Group worked closely with its Brazilian colleagues to enforce existing CT laws.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Brazil is a member of FATF and GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America). Its FIU, the Council for Financial Activities Control, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations agency (HSI) routinely shares information on online threats to schools with Brazil’s Ciberlab; the latter then distributes information to contacts in appropriate states for investigation and action. In 2022, HSI shared information on 131 social media users who had stated their intention to commit school massacres or other acts of violence. Using that information, Brazilian law enforcement identified 24 subjects and made eight arrests.

International and Regional Cooperation: Brazil participated in regional CT fora, including the following:

- The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
- The Brazil, India, PRC, Russia, and South Africa Joint Working Group on CT
- The MERCOSUR working group on terrorism and sub-working group on financial issues

Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay coordinated law enforcement efforts in the TBA by means of their Trilateral TBA Command.

CANADA

Overview: The United States and Canada enjoy longstanding coordination on defense and security, including counterterrorism cooperation. Canada’s National Terrorism Threat Level remained at “medium” through 2022, meaning authorities assessed a violent act of terrorism could occur.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: On March 19, Mohammad Moiz Omar allegedly entered Dar Al-Tawheed Islamic Center in Mississauga, Ontario, and discharged bear spray while brandishing a hatchet. Worshipers tackled Omar before anyone was seriously hurt. Omar faces six charges, including assault with a weapon and administering a noxious substance with intent to endanger
life or cause bodily harm. On June 8 the deputy attorney general consented to begin terrorism proceedings against Omar, noting his alleged offenses constituted terrorist activity pursuant to Sections 2, 83.01(1)(b) and 83.27 of Canada’s Criminal Code.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Canada’s strict privacy policies continued to complicate CT-related intelligence sharing within Canada, and between Canada and other countries.

On October 26, Canada repatriated Kimberly Polman, Oumaima Chouay, and Chouay’s two children from a displaced persons camp in Syria. Both adults were arrested upon arrival in Canada. On October 27, Polman appeared in Chilliwack Provincial Court, British Columbia, for a bail hearing related to a Terrorism Peace Bond application initiated under Section 810.011 of Canada’s Criminal Code. Polman was released, subject to bail conditions. Chouay, who had been under investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP’s) Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (or INSET) since 2014, had four terrorism-related charges filed against her.

In 2022, Canada’s Federal Court (a federal first-instance trial court equivalent to a U.S. district court) held hearings on a September 2021 lawsuit filed by family members of several Canadian citizens detained in camps in Syria. Applicants seek to force the government to repatriate detainees based on the “right of return” to Canada guaranteed to citizens under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In a December 1 filing, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) informed the court it had determined 19 detainees (six women and 13 children) met a threshold under the government’s 2021 policy for providing “extraordinary assistance” to Canadians abroad, and GAC was assessing whether to provide repatriation assistance. Some 40 Canadians remained in Syrian camps as of December 31.

In 2022 there were developments in ongoing legal proceedings with a terror nexus:

- On May 6, Seth Bertrand was charged under Section 83.18(1) of Canada’s Criminal Code, in part for his participation in listed terrorist entity the Atomwaffen Division, subsequently renamed the National Socialist Order (NSO). Bertrand, arrested in 2021, pleaded guilty to derivative offenses and not guilty to terrorism. This was the first national security charge against an NSO member in Canada since its listing as a terrorist entity by Canadian authorities.
- On May 26 the Court of Queen’s Bench (a provincial superior trial court) in Edmonton, Alberta, sentenced Hussein Borhot to 12 years in prison for partaking in ISIS activities in Syria, including kidnapping. The trial for Borhot’s cousin, Jamal Borhot — also charged with participating in terrorist activity — was delayed until 2023 after his lawyer withdrew from the case.
- On September 14 the perpetrator of a 2020 attack in Toronto motivated by “incel” (involuntary celibate) ideology pleaded guilty to charges of murder and attempted murder. The plea did not cover an associated terror charge; a ruling on that charge is expected in 2023. This was the first time terror charges were laid in Canada for an act
motivated by incel ideology. The perpetrator, who killed one and wounded two during the attack, was 17 at the time the offenses were committed and thus cannot be named under Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Thirteen Freedom Convoy protestors were arrested on the Canadian side of the Sweetgrass, Montana-Coutts, Alberta joint border inspection station on February 14. Four ultimately were charged with plotting to kill RCMP officers. An RCMP search of property associated with the group uncovered weapons, ammunition, and tactical gear. Patches on seized body armor included a white supremacist symbol and the emblem of Diagolon, a Canadian far-right “extremist” group.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Canada is a member of FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Its FIU, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center (or FINTRAC), is a member of the Egmont Group.

On April 27, Canada amended regulations under its Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act that broaden the legislation’s scope to cover crowdfunding platforms and certain implicated payment service providers. The changes came in response to the January/February Freedom Convoy protests, which were partly financed through crowdfunding platforms. On June 3, the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia released its final report. It recommended closing gaps in the province’s AML/CFT regime and identified areas for deepened federal-provincial collaboration. On November 14, Canada designated Iran as a regime that has engaged in terrorism. This designation precludes senior regime officials, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, from entering Canada.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The Public Safety Canada (PSC)-U.S. DHS-led Ideologically Motivated/Domestic Violent Extremism (IM/DVE) Working Group developed a joint threat assessment in October, examining commonalities and associations between IM/DVE individuals and groups in North America and how these parties connect, with an eye toward mitigating difficulties in cross-border collaboration.

PSC’s Canada Center for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence continued its close collaboration with its U.S. counterpart, DHS’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, and engaged with Five Eyes CVE working groups. On September 20, Canada pledged $1.4 million (1.9 million Canadian dollars) through the Center’s Community Resilience Fund to support Phase 2 of Tech Against Terrorism’s Terrorist Content Analytics Platform.

In August, Canadian media reported on intelligence assessments from the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Center (ITAC) on the January/February Freedom Convoy protests; partially redacted versions of these classified documents were released following a request under Canada’s Access to Information Act. While the protests by the Freedom Convoy and related
groups were not considered “extremist” events, ITAC assessed they fueled anti-authority sentiments among adherents of ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) and that “IMVE threats to political figures and government symbols will persist into the foreseeable future.”

**International and Regional Cooperation:** In 2022, Canada completed its term as co-chair of the GCTF but remained an active member. Canada also remained active in counterterrorism efforts of numerous international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Canada renewed its financial support to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and remained a board member.

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**COLOMBIA**

**Overview:** On August 7, Colombian President Petro took office and began implementing a Total Peace strategy, which included a process of initiating talks with armed groups, including designated terrorist groups, across the country. On November 21 the Colombian government began a dialogue with the ELN, a U.S.-designated terrorist group. The first round of negotiations, which took place during November and December in Caracas, Venezuela, were largely considered positive and productive. On December 31 Petro announced a temporary bilateral ceasefire with the ELN and two other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia. But on January 3 the ELN denied having agreed to a bilateral ceasefire and accused the government of risking the future of the peace talks with Petro’s announcement. ELN has now replaced the FARC as the most powerful armed group not only in Colombia but also in Venezuela.

The Petro administration’s Total Peace plan concentrates on accelerating implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord and on negotiating with illegal armed groups to demobilize. The government publicly urged a multilateral ceasefire with several illegal armed groups throughout the country in support of this plan.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** In 2022, U.S.-designated terrorist groups Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, and ELN continued to commit acts of terrorism throughout the country, including bombings, violence against civilian populations, kidnappings, and violent attacks against military and police facilities. The Colombian ministry of defense recorded a 131 percent increase in terrorist acts in 2022, as compared with 2021. The following incidents were especially noteworthy:

- On January 7 the ELN claimed responsibility for an attack in Cali that resulted in the injury of more than a dozen police officers.
- On March 5 an IED caused structural damage to a police substation in the Ciudad Bolívar locality (administrative subdivision) of Bogotá. The attack was attributed to FARC-EP.
- On March 26, FARC-EP detonated an IED outside a police station in the south of Bogotá. The bombing killed two children and injured 39 other people.
- On September 2, FARC-EP carried out an ambush against police officers in the south-central department of Huila, killing seven.
• On November 19, a clash between FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia resulted in the deaths of 23 terrorist group members in the town of Puerto Guzmán in Putumayo department, less than 40 miles from the border with Ecuador.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On October 25 the Colombian congress approved the first part of Petro’s Total Peace legislation. The legislation expanded the authorities granted in Public Order Law 418 of 1997 to allow the government to negotiate peace with politically motivated terrorist groups, such as the ELN, and created a separate mechanism for the government to facilitate “discussions” with illegal, apolitical narcotrafficking groups. As of the end of 2022, a proposed Submission Law that would facilitate negotiations with illegal, apolitical narcotrafficking groups was still pending the legislature’s review. On December 28, Colombian and Ecuadorian senior military leaders signed a bilateral agreement to contain drug trafficking and organized crime along the border.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Colombia is a member of GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America), and its FIU, the Financial Information and Analysis Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2022, 12,759 FARC ex-combatants and former militia members who demobilized under the 2016 Peace Accord continued to participate in social and economic reintegration activities. Colombia continued to employ a modern, multiagency approach to CVE. The number of members of armed groups — including ELN, Segunda Marquetalia, FARC-EP, Clan del Golfo, Los Pelusos, and Los Caparros — who demobilized individually in 2022 was 115. Of those 115, 21 were women.

International and Regional Cooperation: Colombia is a GCTF member.

MEXICO

Overview: CT cooperation between Mexico and the United States remained strong in 2022. No credible evidence indicated that international terrorist groups established bases in Mexico, worked directly with Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations, or sent operatives via Mexico into the United States in 2022. No one who gained entry to the United States through Mexico has ever carried out a terrorist attack in the United States. However, the United States remains vigilant against individuals inspired by international terrorist groups possibly targeting U.S. interests or persons in Mexico. The U.S. southern border also remains vulnerable to terrorist transit. In 2022 the Government of Mexico (GOM) did not detain any individuals on the U.S. terrorism watchlist near the U.S. southern border.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: No reported terrorist incidents occurred in Mexico in 2022. However, transnational criminal organizations expanded their use of explosives to target rivals, resulting
in the killing of bystanders. Several loosely organized, violent anarchist groups have used IEDs to target Mexican security forces and thus posed a domestic terror threat in 2022.

**Legislation Law Enforcement and Border Security:** Mexico made no changes to its CT legislation in 2022. The country lacks adequate laws prohibiting material support to terrorists, and relies on other countries to thwart potential threats. U.S. law enforcement reported increased collaboration with the GOM in 2022 to identify potential CT threats among the growing number of third-country nationals transiting Mexico. In 2022 the Secretariat of National Defense and Mexican National Guard coordinated border security and customs operations with U.S. law enforcement, and the GOM committed to modernize its ports of entry along the U.S. border. The Center for National Intelligence in the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection was the lead agency for detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorist threats in 2022. The Mexican Attorney General’s Office was the lead agency for investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related offenses. Impunity and low prosecution rates for all crimes persisted.

**Countering Terrorism Finance:** Mexico is a member of FATF and GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America), as well as a cooperating and supporting nation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and an observer at MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Mexico’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit-Mexico (UIF-Mexico) is a member of the Egmont Group. In February the Mexican congress passed legislation granting UIF-Mexico authority to place individuals on its domestic sanctions list without a request from an international partner or judicial blocking order, bringing Mexico in line with FATF standards.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Mexico took no action in 2022 to establish official CVE policies, initiatives, or programs.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** As a 2021-22 member of the UNSC, Mexico reiterated its commitment to counterterrorism efforts in 2022 at several UN discussions. It argued that, rather than the UNSC alone, the UN General Assembly should play a leading role in preventing terrorism through development, improving living standards, and creating educational and employment opportunities. Mexico supports the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and has underscored the need to combat arms trafficking to deprive terrorists of weapons.

Mexico is a member of the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). In July, Mexico became CICTE chair.
Overview: Because Panama is a transit country for both licit and illicit goods, money, and migrants, the Government of Panama’s (GoP’s) willingness to engage in bilateral and multilateral CT initiatives is critically important for regional security. Under President Cortizo, the GoP continued to cooperate on CT, especially through maritime sanctions and migration policy. Panama is a key partner in the implementation and enforcement of sanctions on entities and individuals designated by U.S. and UN sanctions regimes, including sanctions relating to Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela.

In support of various U.S. sanctions regimes — including those related to countering terrorist financing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing — Panama cancelled the registration of 235 Panamanian-flagged vessels in 2022. Panama cooperated with U.S. authorities on several CT-related cases this year through the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Transnational Criminal Investigations Unit in Panama and additional interagency partnerships with other U.S. security and law enforcement agencies. The country continued to lead the region in BITMAP enrollments. Panama has been on the FATF “gray list” for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime since 2019.

The GoP must address deficiencies in its judicial system’s ability to prosecute white-collar criminals and improve the transparency of beneficial ownership or face the risk of FATF encouraging enhanced due diligence in business relations and transactions with the country.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no incidents related to international terrorism in Panama in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Although Panama does not have comprehensive CT legislation or a robust CT legal framework, it has an executive decree to control dual-use goods and has adopted a national control list for dual-use goods in accordance with its UNSCR 1540 obligations. Panama also has an executive decree to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. While the country does not have a formal coordinating authority on migration below cabinet level, officials from the GoP’s National Security Council, National Border Service, National Migration Service, and National Police met frequently among themselves and with U.S. officials to efficiently coordinate and act on migration alerts and detain and deport travelers who represented a security risk. Panama fully complied with its UNSCR 2396 obligations for the collection of biographic and biometric data, information sharing with regional partners, sharing of API, and participation in INTERPOL.

The Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) Joint Task Force — a bilateral mechanism to share information on SIAs and Known or Suspected Terrorists and detain and/or deport them as needed — cooperated on several CT-related cases. The SIAs Joint Task Force continues to process Panama’s BITMAP data and provide intelligence information, analytical products, and migration trends to Panamanian officers. The GoP’s biometric enrollments provide U.S. agencies with
information on foreign partners’ law enforcement and border encounters with SIAs, gang members, and other persons of interest.

While Panama’s own intelligence capacity was limited, the GoP acted as a willing partner in responding to U.S. CT-related alerts. Lack of diplomatic relationships with some migrants’ countries of origin and logistical challenges such as arranging flights continued to limit the GoP’s ability to deport.

The Ministry of Security and the National Customs Authority made progress in a bidding process to address the country’s lack of cargo scanners. In May, three GoP-purchased scanners arrived in Panama; four additional U.S. government-procured scanners are set to arrive in 2023. This will help the GoP analyze cargo transiting the country, including at Tocumen International Airport — which has the highest number of passenger transits in the region — and entry to and exit from the Colón Free Trade Zone. Limited scanner capabilities, along with a lack of proper institutional and interagency protocols at ports, had greatly increased the risk of illicit cargo transiting undetected to and through Panama. Current GoP efforts, supported by Embassy Panama City, will continue to increase interagency information sharing and expand situational awareness in the land, air, and maritime border security environments.

Panama continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement on ongoing CT cases this year. However, the GoP’s ability to investigate financial support to terrorist-related organizations remained limited.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Panama is a member of GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America), and its FIU, the Financial Analysis Unit-Panama, is a member of the Egmont Group. Panama remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022. Panama’s action plan to address strategic deficiencies expired in January 2021. FATF has repeatedly called on Panama to swiftly complete all measures on its expired action plan or it would consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Panama.

In 2022, FATF reported that Panama took steps toward improving its AML/CFT. Panama did so by strengthening its understanding of the ML and terrorist financing risk of legal persons and improving the monitoring of the corporate sector. It also focused on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas (particularly those investigations involving foreign predicates and the seizing and confiscation of proceeds of crime), and ensured effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in response to AML/CFT violations.

Panama is a key partner in the implementation and enforcement of sanctions on entities and individuals designated by U.S. and UN sanctions regimes. In 2022, Panama’s Maritime Authority reported canceling the registration of 235 Panamanian-flagged vessels to comply with various sanctions regimes, including those related to countering terrorist financing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no changes in 2022.

International and Regional Cooperation: Panama continued working to strengthen its implementation of UN resolutions that promote the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism received funding from the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program in 2022 to strengthen Panama’s implementation of UNSCR 1540 and contribute to increasing the effectiveness of customs administration in Panama. The project focuses on providing legislative assistance to help Panama comply with international instruments and obligations; promoting outreach to the private sector, industry, and academia to increase awareness of potential proliferation risks; and building capacity to strengthen national capabilities to mitigate and combat potential risks. OAS is also engaging academia as part of this initiative.

Panama continued its active participation in regional security initiatives. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction and the Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted virtual workshops on countering the financing of terrorism in Panama, focusing on proliferation financing and sanctions evasion. The workshops included detailed overviews of best practices for risk assessment and mitigation strategies for government regulators and representatives from the judicial sector. EXBS also is providing funding to help Panama draft its National Action Plan for Proliferation Financing, a new FATF requirement that all countries must complete by 2024. In 2022, Embassy Panama City carried out training for Panamanian prosecutors, judges, police, forensic experts, bank supervisors, stock market personnel, and Financial Analysis Unit staff on money-laundering investigation techniques, trade-based money laundering, and cryptocurrency as a method of money-laundering.

PARAGUAY

Overview: In 2022 the Government of Paraguay continued to be a receptive partner on counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. Paraguay’s challenges on CT cooperation stem from ineffective immigration, customs, financial, and law enforcement controls along its porous borders, particularly the TBA with Argentina and Brazil, and its dry border with Brazil from the TBA to Pedro Juan Caballero.

Since 2008, persons claiming to be part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) — a domestic criminal group initially dedicated to a socialist revolution in Paraguay — have conducted violent acts meant to extort and intimidate the population and local governments in the northern departments of Amambay, Concepción, and San Pedro. Paraguayan authorities officially consider the EPP and its offshoots — the Ejército del Mariscal López (EML) and Agrupación Campesina Armada (ACA), the latter of which reemerged in 2020 — as organized criminal
groups rather than terrorist organizations. However, in public remarks, Paraguayan leaders occasionally refer to them informally as such.

On October 23 the Government of Paraguay’s Joint Task Force (FTC) killed EPP leader Osvaldo Villalba moments after Villalba executed two Indigenous persons he believed were cooperating with the authorities. The Government of Paraguay believes the death of Villalba severely degraded the EPP’s operational capabilities and estimates the group currently contains fewer than 20 members. The activities of the ACA, EML, and EPP have consisted largely of isolated attacks either on remote police and army posts, or against ranchers and peasants accused of aiding Paraguayan security forces. Ranchers and ranch workers in northeastern Paraguay, including members of the Mennonite community, claimed the EPP frequently threatened both their livelihoods and personal security. Three individuals — including former vice president Oscar Denis — remained missing after kidnappings attributed to the EPP.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: Alleged elements of the EPP and ACA continued to conduct killings and sabotage operations:

- On April 27 an EPP-conducted IED attack injured three FTC soldiers on the border between Concepción and Amambay Departments.
- On November 21 a group of suspected EPP members wounded three police officers when attempting to overrun a police outpost in Amambay Department.


Paraguay’s efforts to provide more effective law enforcement and border security suffered from a lack of interagency cooperation and information sharing, a chronic lack of resources, as well as pervasive corruption within security, border control, and judicial institutions. The TBA remained particularly vulnerable, as the ineffective — and often corrupt — police, military, customs, and migration agency presence along these borders allows for a largely unregulated flow of people, goods, and money.

Paraguay struggles to deter terrorist travel. On May 13, airport authorities in Ciudad del Este permitted a cargo plane owned by a Venezuelan airline subject to U.S. sanctions to land at the Guaraní International Airport. According to the flight manifest, the plane contained 11 Venezuelan crew members and seven Iranians, one with ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force. According to government sources, airport officials did not follow proper security procedures by allowing the plane to land. The plane departed Ciudad del Este on May 16, reportedly loaded with cigarettes produced by a company owned by former president Horacio Cartes consigned for delivery to a separate Cartes-owned company in the United States. The plane later landed in Argentina, where on August 11 authorities seized it in response to a U.S. court order. Paraguay currently is receiving international assistance to better utilize API and improve its border screening technology and capabilities.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Paraguay is a member of GAFILAT; its FIU, Financial Intelligence Unit Paraguay, is a member of the Egmont Group. GAFILAT adopted Paraguay’s mutual evaluation report in July and assessed that the country made significant improvements to comply with global AML/CFT standards but had achieved only a moderate level of effectiveness. GAFILAT further noted that, while Paraguay had not achieved any convictions for terrorist financing, it had continued to increase the number of investigations initiated under its terrorism statutes.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Paraguay had no CVE program in 2022.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** Paraguay continued to support CT efforts in regional and multilateral organizations, including by participation in CICTE. It continued to collaborate with Argentina and Brazil on border security initiatives, regional exchanges, and law enforcement projects. The three countries coordinated law enforcement efforts in the TBA through their Trilateral Tri-Border Area Command.

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**PERU**

**Overview:** The Peruvian National Police (PNP) and armed forces continued operations in 2022 targeting alleged Sendero Luminoso (SL) remnants. The government also continued investigating SL front organizations and its legal political branch, called the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights.

Peruvian citizen Brian Eugenio Alvarado Huari, arrested in 2019 for alleged links to ISIS and with plans to “attack foreigners,” remained confined to the city of Lima in 2022 as requirements for his trial continued to move forward. SL remnants continued to operate in the Valley of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM) region. Estimates varied, but most experts as well as the Peruvian security services assessed that these SL members numbered between 250 and 300, including from 60 to as many as 150 armed fighters. To support its terrorist activities, SL collects “revolutionary taxes” from drug trafficking organizations operating in the area.

Victor Quispe Palomino (aka Comrade José), a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency Most Wanted Fugitive, leads SL’s remnants in the VRAEM; he calls his group the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP). Quispe allegedly oversees all MPCP illicit activities, including extortion, murder, and drug trafficking. According to Peru’s armed forces, his brother Jorge Quispe Palomino (aka Comrade Raul) died in January from medical complications following an earlier counterterrorism raid in the VRAEM.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** The overall number of terrorist incidents increased from four in 2021 to five in 2022, but deaths attributable to terrorist incidents decreased from 16 to three.
- On March 24, soldiers came under fire while patrolling in Ayacucho, Huanta Province, and were extracted by air assets. Two soldiers suffered injuries in the attack.
- On April 8, a counterterrorism base in Ayacucho took small arms fire. The attackers did not breach the base, but one soldier was injured.
- On August 15 an IED detonated during a CT patrol in Junín, Satipo Province, resulting in two injuries.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Peru adopted multiple CT laws over the past 30 years; these generally have broad public support. Enforcement of the COVID-19 pandemic national lockdown took a toll on security forces’ ability to focus on CT, but according to detailed reporting shared by the Peruvian government, military and police teams nevertheless completed more than 400 CT operations in 2022.

The international terrorism trial against Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar, a Lebanese citizen suspected of links to Hizballah, continued in 2022. The prosecution presented the testimony of FBI Hizballah subject-matter experts to demonstrate common elements between the Hamdar case and other cases successfully prosecuted in the United States. Justice sector contacts say Hamdar’s case should move to closing arguments and sentencing in 2023.

Immigration authorities continued to collect biometric information from visitors at ports of entry to protect Peruvian border security. Visas were not required for visitors from Europe, Southeast Asia, or Central America (except El Salvador and Nicaragua). Since 2019 the United States and Peru have had a Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism screening information sharing arrangement in place that facilitates the exchange of data on known or suspected terrorists and complements other programs such as the ATS-G.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security expanded its cooperation with Peru in 2021 via BITMAP, a program that leverages three key U.S. databases to search, enroll, and identify known or suspected terrorists, violent international gang members, and other individuals of interest. The program also serves as a capacity building mechanism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Peru is a member of GAFILAT; its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The government’s multisectoral VRAEM 2021 Development Strategy, part of Peru’s bicentennial vision, aims to foster economic development and social inclusion, and complements aggressive actions against SL terrorism, propaganda, and recruitment.
International and Regional Cooperation: Peruvian officials participate in counterterrorism activities with international organizations, including the United Nations, CICTE, and the APEC. The PNP Counterterrorism Directorate also coordinates with police in other countries to track terrorist activities. In September, Peru and the United States co-hosted a Conference of States Parties to CICTE, bringing together leaders from across the Western Hemisphere.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Overview: The threat of domestic radicalization and recruitment to violence, and the possible return of individuals who traveled, or attempted to travel, to Syria or Iraq to fight with ISIS, are the primary terrorism concerns in Trinidad and Tobago (TT).

TT and the United States continued to cooperate on counterterrorism investigations involving TT nationals. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GoTT) approved a returning FTF policy in 2022 and is currently working on draft legislation that would address a variety of repatriation, R&R, and security matters related to returning FTFs.

2022 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in TT in 2022.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: There were no arrests or prosecutions initiated against any terrorist groups or individuals suspected of terrorist activity in 2022. In 2022 the GoTT obtained 11 court orders related to 12 individuals and entities related to designations and de-listings. Since the 2005 passage of its Antiterrorism Act, the GoTT has obtained 145 court orders for matters related to terrorist financing and has designated 489 individuals and entities, whose assets have been declared frozen.

The GoTT is undertaking reforms, including the introduction of plea bargaining and judge-only trials, aimed at speeding up the lengthy judicial process. These developments may lead to increased prosecutions of serious crimes, including terrorism.

As noted above, the GoTT approved a returning FTF policy in 2022 and is working on a draft bill that would address a variety of issues, including R&R, prosecution, and other security matters related to repatriating FTFs and their families from Syria. At year’s end, the draft bill was still in the law review committee stage.

The GoTT continues to convene an interagency taskforce known as Taskforce Nightingale (TFN). This task force is charged with developing recommendations related to the possible return of FTFs and others who traveled to the Middle East and joined ISIS. TFN consists of various law enforcement, judicial, foreign affairs, military, immigration, and border protection officers. Separate from TFN, the National Operations Fusion Center and the National Intelligence Fusion Center are tasked with coordinating the GoTT’s counterterrorism operations.
TT’s institutions demonstrated the capability to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism with the assistance of international partners. The TT Police Service is the law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for investigating terrorism and terrorism-finance cases. The GoTT conducts vulnerability assessments on critical public infrastructure on a periodic basis. Nonetheless, TT’s southern coast, which is approximately seven miles from the Venezuelan coast, remained porous and vulnerable to drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, and illegal migration.

The CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, with funding from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, is assisting TT in the development of updated API and PNR legislation that would permit the capture and use of PNR data. The implementation of API/PNR data is critical to the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime. Together with UNODC, the GoTT began implementing the regional Seaport Cooperation Project and Airport Communications Project, both of which help address border security challenges and include numerous CT-focused initiatives.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** TT is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.*

**Countering Violent Extremism:** The GoTT developed a National Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism; however, the plan still was awaiting approval at year’s end. The GoTT partners with UNDP on the Prevention of Violent Extremism-Youth Empowerment and Strengthening Project in TT. This project is a peacebuilding effort that seeks to engage youth-led and youth-focused organizations, women’s rights groups, other NGOs, and community-based organizations in the development and implementation of projects that promote peace at the community level.

**International and Regional Cooperation:** TT is a member of CICTE. The GoTT continued to work with its CARICOM and international partners on CT issues. For example:

In 2022, various TT law enforcement officials participated in training on terrorism and intelligence awareness facilitated under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. In May, TT officials participated in the seventh annual International Countering Violent Extremism Research Conference in Spain, organized by Hedayah and the Euro-Arab Foundation. In September, TT’s Minister of National Security also participated in an OAS-hosted high-level dialogue at the first meeting of Consultation of States Parties to the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.
Finally, the Borough of Chaguanas (located in central TT) remains a member of the Strong City Network, which is a global U.S.-funded network of mayors, policy makers, and practitioners united in building social cohesion and resilience to countering violent extremism in all its forms.

**VENEZUELA**

**Overview:** The Maduro regime continued to engage in criminal activities through usurpation of the judicial system and links with military/security services that further corruption and other illicit ends. The regime cooperates with non-state armed actors where its interests align, including the provision of safe haven for Colombian-origin U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia. As enabled by the regime, terrorist groups, insurgents, and criminals have operated in large stretches of the nation’s territory for profits from illicit activities and have built financial ties with elements of the Venezuelan state.

The regime treats non-state armed groups selectively, at times dealing with them through cooperation and at other times through conflict. In Venezuela, ELN has been known to form symbiotic relationships with military and security officials to facilitate and protect drug and human trafficking routes and other forms of illicit activity. ELN has undertaken major growth and expansion since FARC demobilized in 2017. Credible open-source researchers estimated that the ELN has presence in 40 Venezuelan municipalities across eight states, more than double the geographic reach of FARC dissidents. ELN has replaced the former FARC as the most significant armed group in both Colombia and Venezuela.

**2022 Terrorist Incidents:** Select areas of Venezuela witnessed continued conflict between two rival FARC dissident factions, one led by FARC-EP commander Gentil Duarte, and the second, Segunda Marquetalia, led by Iván Márquez. Both factions fought to take over former FARC territories, alliances, and criminal economies in the country. In early 2022, ELN became involved because of disputes with FARC-EP’s 10th Front in the Venezuela-Colombia border area.

On January 1, violent clashes broke out between ELN and FARC-EP’s 10th Front in the border area between Colombia’s Arauca department and Venezuela’s Apure state. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), Venezuelan security, military, and national guard forces directly coordinated operations against FARC dissidents with ELN and were complicit in committing abuses against civilians. HRW reported armed groups were involved in killings, disappearances, child recruitment, and forced displacement. The conflicts forced more than 3,300 people to flee their homes in Apure and displaced at least 3,860 people in Arauca, many of whom were members of Indigenous communities.

- In May, Duarte was assassinated in the Zulia state of Venezuela. After Duarte’s death, Iván Mordisco was presumed to take charge. In July, Colombian defense minister Diego Molano said Mordisco was killed in an air raid in southern Colombia, though later reports stated that FARC-EP leaders claimed he was alive.
• On July 2, Iván Márquez was reportedly killed in Venezuela near the Colombian border, though later reports confirmed he was alive but seriously injured and had been treated in Caracas.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: According to the UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela’s third report, published in September, the Venezuelan justice system continued to suffer from a severe lack of independence and impartiality — including on CT issues.

The regime continued to target political dissidents and civil society groups, using terrorism charges. Javier Tarazona, an activist and director of the NGO FundaRedes who had been imprisoned since July 2021, was charged with “treason, terrorism, and incitement to hatred” by the Third Control Court. In July, humanitarian worker Gabriel Blanco, activist Néstor Astudillo, and four other activists were arrested and charged by the Fourth Control Court for Terrorism.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Unit (or UNIF), is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2022.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no known CVE efforts underway in 2022.

International and Regional Cooperation: In August the Maduro regime and the Colombian government restored full diplomatic relations (severed in 2019) and announced intentions to restore military relations. On November 21 the Colombian government and ELN began peace talks in Caracas as the first major step in Colombian President Petro’s efforts to bring “total peace” to Colombia. The Maduro regime assumed the role of guarantor of the talks.

Maduro has managed to perpetuate his hold on power through deepening ties with Iran and Russia. For example, on June 10, Maduro met with Iranian President Raisi in Tehran, Iran, and signed a 20-year cooperation road map and pledged to boost bilateral ties. On July 24, the Russian space agency Roscosmos announced plans to install a GLONASS satellite navigation ground station in Venezuela.
Chapter 2. State Sponsors of Terrorism

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2022 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. It does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations.

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria requiring the President to certify either that a) a designated country has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the previous six months and has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future, or 2) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the designated country, that the country is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the country has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. A wide range of sanctions is imposed because of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the following:

- A ban on arms-related exports and sales
- Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism
- Restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance
- Visa processing requirements
- Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions

CUBA
On January 12, 2021, the Department of State designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the Cuban government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists.

Cuba was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982 because of its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.

Cuba’s designation was rescinded in 2015 after a thorough review found that the country met the statutory criteria for rescission. In 2021 the Secretary of State determined that Cuba had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in the six years since its designation had been rescinded. Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the 2019 bombing of a Bogotá police academy that killed 22 people and injured 87 others.
The Cuban government did not formally respond to the extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka “Pablo Tejada”) and Ramírez Pineda (aka “Pablo Beltrán”) filed by Colombia.

In November, pursuant to an order from Colombian President Petro, the Attorney General announced that arrest warrants would be suspended against 17 ELN commanders, including those whose extradition Colombia had previously requested.

Cuba also continues to harbor several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.

**DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

On November 20, 2017, the Secretary of State designated the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the DPRK government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as the DPRK was implicated in assassinations on foreign soil.

The DPRK was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1988 primarily because of its involvement in the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air passenger flight. The DPRK’s designation was rescinded in 2008 after a thorough review found the DPRK met the statutory criteria for rescission. In 2017 the Secretary of State determined the DPRK had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in the nine years since its designation had been rescinded. The DPRK also has failed to take action to address historical support for acts of international terrorism. Four Japanese Red Army members wanted by the Japanese government for participating in a 1970 Japan Airlines hijacking continue to shelter in the DPRK. The Japanese government also continues to seek a full accounting of the fate of numerous Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s; only five such abductees have been repatriated since 2002.

**IRAN**

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist activity in 2022, including support for Hizballah, U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank and Gaza, and various terrorist and militant groups in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and throughout the Middle East. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region. Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the Iraq and Syria conflicts, and the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad. In 2019 the Secretary of State designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Iran also used regional militant and proxy groups to provide deniability, in an attempt to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.

In Iraq, Iran supported various Iran-aligned militia groups in 2022, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated
weapons — including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) — support, funding, and training. These groups conducted multiple rocket and UAS attacks on U.S. and coalition facilities across Iraq, as well as attacks in Syria from Iraq in 2022. These included multiple attacks on U.S. and coalition forces at Ain al-Assad Airbase in January and May. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups conducted an explosive UAS attack on Erbil in June, which injured three civilians, and two drone attacks on Turkish bases in Iraq in July. Pro-Iranian militias also fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul in July.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime. Iran views the Assad regime as a crucial ally. It considers Iraq and Syria vital routes through which it can supply weapons to Hizballah, Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group. Iranian forces have directly backed militia operations in Syria with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles. Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown in Syria. These Iran-aligned forces conducted multiple attacks on U.S. forces in Syria.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to produce its own rockets and missiles, thereby threatening Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In 2022, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These groups were behind numerous deadly attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, training, advanced equipment such as UAS, and other support to Houthi militants, who engaged in attacks against regional targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On at least five occasions in 2022, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted vessels suspected of traveling from Iran to Yemen, with cargoes that included more than 300 tons of missile fuel component and fertilizer that could be used by Houthi militants to make missiles and explosives, as well as ammunition, small arms, and equipment.
In 2022, Iranian forces continued a pattern of attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, including a November 16 drone attack on the Pacific Zircon, a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-affiliated tanker carrying oil.

Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2022, including thwarted plots to attack Israeli tourists in Türkiye in May and to murder an Israeli citizen in Georgia in November. These plots were being implemented by current and former members of the IRGC-QF.

Senior al-Qa’ida members continued to reside in Iran, where the authorities still refuse to identify publicly members they know to be living in the country. Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting dissidents and other perceived enemies of the regime. A British intelligence agency publicly reported uncovering at least 10 potential threats emanating from Iran’s government to kidnap or kill individuals in the United Kingdom in 2022. In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories. Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in its country. The Albanian government became a victim of cyberattacks emanating from Iran in July and September, likely in response to Albania providing shelter to the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq — an Iranian dissident group that advocates overthrowing the government in Iran. In 2022 the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had disrupted an IRGC-QF-led plot to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton and arrested a suspected Iranian operative accused of planning the assassination.

SYRIA
Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Syria continued its political and military support to various terrorist groups. The regime continued to provide weapons and political support to Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm and finance the terrorist organization. The Assad regime’s relationship with Hizballah and Iran remained strong in 2022 as the regime continued to rely heavily on external actors to fight opponents and secure areas. The U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains present and active in the country with Assad’s permission. Assad remained a staunch defender of Iran’s policies, while Iran exhibited equally energetic support for the Syrian regime. Syrian regime speeches and press releases often included statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, and vice versa.

Over the past two decades, the Assad regime’s permissive attitude toward AQ and other terrorist groups’ FTF facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict fed the growth of AQ, ISIS, and affiliated terrorist networks inside Syria. The Syrian regime’s years of awareness and encouragement of terrorists’ transit to Iraq to fight U.S. forces before 2012 is well
documented. The Assad regime released thousands of violent extremists from its prisons in 2011 and 2012, fueling a rise in terrorism within the country, in an attempt to justify its repression of the Syrian people and fracture international support for the opposition. Those very networks were among the terrorist elements that brutalized the Syrian and Iraqi populations in recent years. Throughout the Syrian conflict, terrorist groups in Syria have often cited the regime’s egregious human rights abuses and violations to justify their activities and recruit members. The Assad regime has frequently used CT laws and special CT courts to detain and imprison protesters, human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, and others on the pretext of fighting terrorism. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups from Iraq, some of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, continued to travel to Syria to fight on behalf of Iran and the Assad regime. Affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party also operated on Syrian soil and represent Türkiye’s primary counterterrorism concern in Syria. ISIS cells remained active in parts of Syria and launched attacks on civilians and U.S. partner forces. In 2019 and 2022, U.S. forces completed operations that resulted in the death of successive ISIS leaders Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. ISIS members in Syria continued to plot or inspire external terrorist operations.

As part of a broader strategy used throughout the past decade, the regime continued to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all internal armed opposition members as “terrorists.”
Chapter 3. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Terrorism

The use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise remained a credible terrorist threat in 2022, and the United States continues to work proactively to disrupt and deny ISIS and other non state actors’ CBRN capabilities.

The international community has established numerous international partnerships to counter the CBRN threat from terrorists and other non state actors. The United States routinely provides technical and financial assistance as well as training to international organizations and partner nations to help strengthen their abilities to prevent terrorist access to CBRN expertise, technologies, and material. Efforts to address CBRN terrorist threats through UNSCR 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are detailed in Chapter 4.

The United States is an active member of the G-7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), launched in 2002 to prevent terrorists and states that support them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To date, the GP has expanded its membership to 31 (30 countries and the European Union), sustaining a vital forum for members to assess the threat landscape, share best practices, exchange information on national priorities for CBRN programmatic efforts worldwide, and coordinate assistance for these efforts. In 2022 the United States also helped lead related efforts in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by hosting a tabletop exercise on countering biological terrorism threats and co-chairing the ARF’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Intersessional Meetings with Sri Lanka and Thailand.

The United States continues to support the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Division of Nuclear Security, which helps member states develop the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to threats of nuclear terrorism through the development of internationally accepted guidance and provides training, technical advice and assistance, peer reviews, and other advisory services.

Through the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the Department of State coordinates its programming internally with other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.

In 2022, WMDT undertook multiple capacity building assistance projects and activities with priority foreign partners across the full spectrum of WMD prevention, detection, response, and prosecution. WMDT conducted several bilateral and regionally focused training workshops on WMD threat assessment and prosecution, cyber-enabled investigations, behavioral threat assessment, and clandestine lab investigations in East Asia and the Pacific (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines), North Africa (Algeria, Morocco), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya, Senegal, South Africa). In addition, WMDT supported the development and execution of practical tabletop
exercises focused on identifying gaps in national or regional CBRN preparedness and response capabilities, the applicability of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and other international legal frameworks and cooperation mechanisms.

The Global Threat Reduction Program (GTR), managed by CTR, continued its work to prevent states and terrorist groups from acquiring or proliferating WMD to attack the United States. In 2022, GTR’s chemical, biological, and nuclear security programs engaged with hundreds of foreign partners through virtual training to strengthen capacities to detect and counter WMD terrorism threats. In Iraq, GTR strengthened physical security at chemical sites previously targeted by ISIS, and worked with partners across Iraq to strengthen chemical transportation security, chemical supply chains, and chemical security curricula.

In response to the threat of transnational terrorists using unrestricted, commercially available material to conduct chemical weapons (CW) attacks, GTR collaborated with security forces around the world to train law enforcement in partner countries to detect and prevent CW attacks against vulnerable transportation networks, such as railroads and urban transit systems. Further, GTR trained partners in academia, industry, and the transport sector to secure chemicals in their custody against malicious access.

GTR’s biosecurity programming continues to support partner capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of high-consequence pathogens — whether intentional, accidental, or natural. GTR worked to strengthen coordination and information sharing between and among ministries as well as security and research sectors to enhance detection and response to outbreaks and bioweapon attacks. It also engaged with government, industry, and academic representatives from Indonesia, Morocco, Somalia, Yemen, and other countries to promote the adoption of security measures to prevent individuals or non state actors from acquiring weaponizable biological material and technology.

The Department of State’s EXBS program funds capacity building programs aimed at strengthening legal and regulatory systems, developing licensing tools, enhancing border security and trade enforcement, providing outreach to key industrial and business sectors, and encouraging information sharing within governments and across national borders. As part of a core national security strategy to counter terrorist organizations, a key objective of EXBS is to provide stakeholders with substantive knowledge, skills, and tools to prevent state and nonstate actors from acquiring WMD, explosives, and conventional arms (including man-portable air-defense systems and antitank guided missiles) – and prevent them from using those materials against U.S. citizens and interests. To achieve this objective, EXBS continued to train partner governments in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, and the Americas to detect, interdict, and counter the materials, technologies, and tactics that terrorists could use to carry out low-technology attacks on public transportation.

Additionally, in 2021, EXBS began implementing curricula for partner-nation security forces to address threats posed by improvised threats, including the use of drones as delivery mechanisms and insider threats focused on the commercial aviation sector. The program also
provided comprehensive training to Middle Eastern and North African border security officials on cargo and passenger interdiction, border security, and counter-IED training. EXBS partnered with the Department of State’s CT Bureau and the interagency to engage with key partners on aviation security programming. Finally, in 2021, EXBS and the CT Bureau furnished equipment and training to strengthen aviation security and mitigate threats to civilian aviation, and provided land border security training for Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Libyan security forces to stem the flow of illicit materials and maintain gains made against ISIS and other nonstate actors.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) launched new projects to address critical gaps in existing U.S. government nonproliferation threat reduction programs, as determined through a deliberative interagency process. Specifically, during 2022, NDF provided capacity building assistance to: enhance the interoperability of Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government CBRN units in responding to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threats in the aviation security sector; to bolster cross-sector coordination and law enforcement information sharing to combat rudimentary, low-technology CBW threats in Libya and Southeast Asia; and to mitigate CBW proliferation and terrorism threats in Central Asia stemming from the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. In addition, NDF sponsored a three-year chemical weapons threat reduction initiative in partnership with the Counterterrorism Agency of Indonesia as part of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction matchmaking process. Lastly, in collaboration with EXBS, NDF is supporting the expansion of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO’s) Program Global Shield through 2025. With NDF’s support, the WCO will:

- Cultivate foreign partners’ analytical capabilities to monitor illicit trade in chemical explosives precursors through risk-based targeting profiles.
- Conduct tactical operations to test participating countries’ capabilities to detect and interdict such trade.
- Provide training and equipment to sustain national-level targeting, detection, interdiction, and investigation of illicit chemical transfers.

The U.S. government continues to work internally and externally to address the global challenge of chemical terrorism at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Such steps include measures aimed at facilitating OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) access to additional response tools against chemical weapons use, including by nonstate actors. U.S. efforts also include ensuring appropriate funding for the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team, which is responsible for identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, regardless of whether the perpetrators are state or nonstate actors.

The U.S. government is also working on developing OPCW States Parties’ capacity to safely analyze and identify chemicals that would be used in an attack, including by nonstate actors, and determine the likely provenance of such chemical weapons agents. For example, the Forensic Science Center of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California is working with
the National Laboratory of Morocco as part of an OPCW labs twinning program. In 2021, U.S. government experts helped draft indicative guidelines for OPCW States Parties on how to secure their chemical value chains, including against malicious non state actors. The Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund also provided funding and personal protective equipment to support the OPCW TS’s special missions and contingency operations related specifically to Syria through the OPCW’s Trust Fund for Syria Missions. Finally, the U.S. government is studying the possibility of assisting African and Southeast Asian countries vulnerable to terrorism with developing chemical protection plans.
Chapter 4. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, and ill-governed physical areas where terrorists can organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” exclude the territory of a country whose government is subject to a determination under section 4605(j)(1)(A) of Title 50 [deemed under Section 1768(c)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 2019 to refer to section 1754(c) of the NDAA FY 2019 as of August 13, 2018]; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22. (For information regarding Cuba, the DPRK, Iran, and Syria, see Chapter 2, State Sponsors of Terrorism.)

Terrorist Safe Havens

Africa

Sahel: Rough terrain, expansive territory, historically weak government presence, and longstanding grievances create conditions for terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and ISIS affiliate ISIS-Sahel (formerly known as ISIS in the Greater Sahara) to recruit fighters and conduct asymmetric attacks against civilians and government personnel. These terrorist groups have freedom of movement throughout large swaths of Mali and Burkina Faso as well as in portions of Niger adjacent to the two countries. The areas where terrorist groups can operate freely continue to grow and over the last year have extended to border regions with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. However, no government in the Sahel is known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

Mozambique: Areas of northern Mozambique remain largely under-governed and susceptible to asymmetric attacks against civilians and government personnel by ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M). While the Mozambican government faces significant capacity challenges in countering terrorism, its willingness to mobilize security forces and engage in security cooperation with international partners means that ISIS-M is not able to operate unchallenged. The Mozambican government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

Somalia: Rough terrain, historical grievances, and under-governed spaces create conditions for AQ affiliate al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliate ISIS-Somalia to conduct asymmetric attacks against civilians and government personnel across the country, despite the Somalian federal government’s campaign to dislodge al-Shabaab from the central portion of the country. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.
Sudan: Sudan’s extensive and porous borders and under-governed spaces continue to make the country vulnerable to transit of FTFs, as well as weapons and other illicit goods. Although Sudan has in general endeavored to tighten its border control measures, continued illicit and unmonitored movement across the borders is likely rampant. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

The Lake Chad Region: In the portions of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria surrounding Lake Chad, remote terrain, historical grievances, and under-governed spaces create conditions for Boko Haram and ISIS affiliate ISIS-West Africa to conduct asymmetric attacks against civilians and government personnel. No government in the Lake Chad Region is known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

Southeast Asia

The Southern Philippines: The Philippines continued to dedicate significant resources to closely track terrorist groups that operate primarily, but not exclusively, in the southern part of the country. Although the Philippines remained a destination for FTFs from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Middle East, and Europe, the Philippines government sustained aggressive military and law enforcement operations to deny safe haven to such groups and prevent the flow of FTFs through its territory. The government further deepened close CT cooperation with the United States, enhancing military and law enforcement efforts to address the full spectrum of terrorist threats.

The Philippine government, with U.S. and international assistance, continued to make progress in increasing interagency cooperation to identify, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activities in 2022. However, the continued ability of terrorist organizations to operate in the southern Philippines reflects the centuries-long challenge of governing effectively in the country’s more remote areas and of establishing consistent security in a region characterized by a strong separatist identity, endemic poverty, and religious differences. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral

Malaysia: The government continued efforts to deny terrorists use of the Sulu and Celebes Seas region as a safe haven by working with Indonesia and the Philippines to prevent the movement of foreign terrorists through the region. Malaysian authorities reported that cooperation with the Philippine government led to the arrest and deportation of a suspected terrorist in 2022. Officials told reporters that possible terrorist transit through sea routes and porous borders remained a concern in Malaysia. The Eastern Sabah Security Command, a multiagency Malaysian government entity that provides additional security along the country’s eastern maritime and terrestrial border with the Philippines and Indonesia in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea, respectively, enforced a dusk-to-dawn curfew at sea and conducted maritime
patrols to safeguard against kidnappings and cross-border threats by criminal groups and the Abu Sayyaf Group. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Indonesia:** The Government of Indonesia conducted monitoring and surveillance of suspected terrorist cells in its territory, including in the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral region. However, the Indonesian government also acknowledged that a lack of naval resources and law enforcement capacity hindered its ability to monitor potential terrorist activity in maritime and remote parts of Indonesia, including the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**The Middle East and North Africa**

**Iraq:** In 2022 a significant portion of northwestern, southeastern, and mountainous northern Iraq remained under-governed and served as potential safe havens for terrorist training, organization, and operations. The Iraqi government is cognizant of this challenge and continues to carry out CT operations and cooperate with U.S. CT efforts to gain better control over these areas. Iraqi authorities, largely members of the Iraqi Security Forces (comprising the army and national police as well as locally recruited police) conducted 269 raids, arrested 139 suspected terrorists, and destroyed an estimated 141 terrorist hideouts. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Lebanon:** Lebanon remained a safe haven for terrorist groups in Hizballah-dominated areas. Hizballah used these areas for terrorist recruitment, training, fundraising, and financing. The government did not take meaningful actions to disarm the group, even though Hizballah’s continued weapons buildup is in open defiance of UNSCR 1701.

Other terrorist groups, including Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, continued to operate with limited government control inside Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps. Lebanon’s lack of a strong control regime for the storage and movement of weaponizable materials posed risks for the spread of WMDs, including for potential terrorism. In 2022 the Lebanese Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces, and other Lebanese authorities partnered with U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent WMD proliferation and trafficking.

**Libya:** The Government of Libya does not provide safe haven to terrorist organizations to carry out terrorist activities from Libyan territory; however, it continues to require assistance in ensuring that its territory is not used for terrorist activities, particularly along its southern border. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Yemen:** The Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) does not provide safe haven to terrorist organizations, but the security vacuum created by ongoing conflict in the country has afforded AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS-Yemen room to operate, primarily in central Yemen. This
instability, coupled with the ROYG’s degraded capabilities, means Yemen will continue to require U.S. and international assistance to combat terrorism effectively. The ROYG was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

South Asia

**Afghanistan:** Terrorist groups – including ISIS-K, AQ, and TTP – continued to be present in Afghanistan. The Taliban continued to harbor terrorist groups despite repeatedly stating they would not allow terrorists to use Afghanistan to threaten the security of other countries. It was unclear whether the Taliban had either the will or the capability to eliminate terrorist safe havens or to control the flow of FTFs in or through Afghanistan. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network remained U.S.-designated terrorist groups in 2022. The Taliban was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through Afghanistan.

**Pakistan:** Several UN- and U.S.-designated terrorist groups that focus on attacks outside the country continued to operate from Pakistani soil in 2022, including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan took some steps in 2022 to counter terror financing and to restrain some India-focused militant groups, but authorities did not take sufficient action to dismantle them. LeT leader Sajid Mir was convicted on terrorist financing charges in June and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Major terrorist groups that concentrated on conducting attacks within Pakistan included TTP, the Balochistan Liberation Army, and ISIS-K. TTP and other designated terrorist groups continue to conduct attacks against Pakistani military and civilian targets. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

Western Hemisphere

**Colombia:** Rough terrain and dense forest cover, combined with low population densities and historically weak government presence, define Colombia’s borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Historically, these conditions have allowed terrorist groups — particularly ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia — to operate with impunity. Ongoing challenges related to the implementation of the 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the bulk of the FARC, as well as continued security vacuums, created opportunities for terrorist activity and attacks on civilians, security forces, and infrastructure in 2022. The Petro administration initiated peace talks with the ELN and plans to expand the effort with other terrorist and criminal groups. The government was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**Venezuela:** The majority of Venezuelan territory is ungoverned or ill-governed. Historically, these conditions and a somewhat permissive environment from the Maduro regime have allowed terrorist groups — particularly ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia, all of Colombian origin — to operate. Colombian authorities contend that members of the three groups are present in Venezuela in significant numbers. The Maduro regime agreed to serve as a guarantor and to host talks between the Petro administration and the ELN in 2022. The
regime was not known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in or through its territory.

**White-Identity Terrorism/Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism**

Pursuant to the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, section 1299F(h), the Department of State was directed to incorporate in the annual Country Reports on Terrorism all credible information about white-identity terrorism (WIT), including relevant attacks, the identification of perpetrators and victims of such attacks, the size and identification of organizations and networks, and the identification of notable ideologues.

In 2022 the Department of State continued implementing the Administration’s *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*, which includes an emphasis on transnational racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE), through targeted engagements, relevant programming, and (where possible) designations of foreign REMVE individuals and entities.

- In June the Department of State designated Anton Thulin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for his continued pursuit of terrorist training, even after serving a prison sentence for his role in a 2017 terrorist attack in Sweden – thus demonstrating that he continued to pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism. In 2016, Thulin traveled to St. Petersburg and received paramilitary training from the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), including in bomb making. In 2017 a Swedish court convicted Thulin and sentenced him to 22 months in prison in connection with the detection of a powerful homemade bomb near a refugee residential center in Gothenburg, Sweden. After serving his sentence, Thulin sought to receive additional paramilitary training in Poland, before being expelled by Polish authorities who cited Thulin’s “serious, real, and current threat to security and public order.”

- Concurrently, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Stanislav Shevchuk and Alexander Zhuchovsky as SDGTs. Shevchuk was designated for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of the RIM, directly or indirectly; Zhuchovsky was designated for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for goods or services to or in support of the same group. RIM, which the Department of State designated as an SDGT in 2020, is an ultranationalist, white-supremacist group based in Russia that provides paramilitary-style training to white supremacists and neo-Nazis; it plays a prominent role in attempting to rally Europeans and Americans into a common front against perceived enemies.

In September the White House convened the United We Stand Summit, designed to counter the effects of hate-fueled violence on democracy and our public safety.

Known WIT attacks in 2022 included the following:
- **Slovakia:** In October, 19-year-old Juraj Krajčík was suspected of having shot dead two members of Slovakia’s LGBTQI+ community and injured a third outside an LGBTQI+ community bar in Bratislava. The suspect, whom the police later found dead, had posted an anti-LGBTQI+ and antisemitic message on Twitter warning about the attacks he would shortly carry out.

- **United Kingdom:** In October, 66-year-old Andrew Leak was suspected of firebombing an immigration center in Dover, injuring two persons before taking his own life shortly afterward. According to British authorities, the suspect likely was driven by some form of hate-filled grievance and had previously espoused violent, anti-immigrant sentiments on social media.

- **France:** In December, a 69-year-old man identified by French media as William K. was arrested for shooting and killing three Kurds in Paris. According to French authorities, the suspect admitted to having a pathological hatred of foreigners and had always wanted to kill migrants or foreigners.

Foreign partners designated, proscribed, banned, or otherwise restricted the activities of the below groups in 2022. It should be noted that statutory criteria and domestic legal authorization to take such actions differ greatly among countries. For example, other governments may rely solely on speech as the basis of the designation, proscription, or banning actions, which raises freedom-of-expression concerns and is not permissible in the United States due to First Amendment protections.

- **The Base** (designated by New Zealand) is a neo-Nazi organization founded in 2018. According to New Zealand authorities, the group’s ideological objectives include bringing about a “race war” in the United States, the mass execution of people of color in a coordinated event labeled “the Day of the Rope,” halting the “great replacement,” and the creation of “white ethno-states” where people of color are either absent or lack democratic rights. New Zealand authorities note that members of The Base plotted to carry out attacks at a 2020 rally in Virginia; the group also organized training camps in weaponry and military tactics throughout North America. Australia, Canada, and the UK designated The Base in 2021.

- **National Socialist Order (NSO)** (designated by Australia), formerly known as the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), was founded in the United States in 2013. Australian authorities note that the group advocates the use of violence to initiate a “race war” to accelerate the collapse of western society and establish a “white ethno-state.” According to Australian authorities, AWD claimed it had disbanded following pressure from U.S. law enforcement agencies. In 2020 the NSO announced itself online as AWD’s “successor.” Australian authorities assess that NSO is a direct continuation of AWD, and the group’s current leadership have declared an intent to pursue the same objectives. Canada and the UK designated NSO in 2021.
• **Proud Boys** (designated by New Zealand) is a neofascist organization that was formed in 2016 and engages in political violence. According to New Zealand authorities, in contrast to other U.S. violent extremist groups, the Proud Boys do not have a single ideological framework or reference point. Instead, they deploy a mosaic of overlapping ideological components intended to obscure the group’s fascism and thereby increase their appeal to a broader audience of American men. Despite this rhetorical and optical smokescreen put up by group leadership, many members are open about their adherence to white nationalism, racism, antisemitism, and Islamophobia. New Zealand authorities note that the group consists of individually autonomous chapters located in the United States, Canada, and Israel. The group upholds violence against opponents as an acceptable solution to solving political disputes and lionizes members who successfully harm ideological opponents. New Zealand authorities note that on January 6, 2021, Proud Boys members coordinated attacks on security and law enforcement protecting the U.S. Capitol and led non-Proud Boys members into positions where they could threaten, and potentially harm or kill, U.S. elected representatives. Canada designated the Proud Boys in 2021.

• **Zouaves Paris** (banned by France) was dissolved by Council of Ministers decree. According to French authorities, Zouaves Paris, which appeared in 2017, is a violent ultranationalist group that propagates openly racist discourse and structures its mode of operation around violent actions. French authorities note that the group was born from the gathering of former members of the Union Défense Group, the Bastion Social, and Génération Identitaire, the latter two of which having also been administratively dissolved. In December 2021, Zouaves Paris claimed responsibility for violence committed against antiracist activists at a political rally.

**Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front**

In 2022 the Department of State designated one new group as an SDGT under the Department’s authorities in Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. In addition, 10 individuals were designated as SDGTs. The Department also reviewed and maintained the foreign terrorist organization designations of five entities.

The Department of the Treasury also designated entities and individuals under E.O. 13224, as amended. For a list of all U.S. designations, see the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

**2022 E.O. 13224 Designations**

On March 7 the Department of State designated KTJ. Affiliated with al-Qa’ida, KTJ operates primarily in Idlib province, Syria, alongside Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and cooperates with other designated terrorist groups such as Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari and the Islamic Jihad Group. KTJ has also conducted external attacks, including the St. Petersburg metro attack in 2017, killing 14
passengers and injuring 50 others, as well as a suicide car bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2016.

On June 15 the Department of State designated Anton Thulin. In 2016, Thulin received paramilitary training from the RIM, including in bomb making. In 2017 a Swedish court convicted Thulin and sentenced him to 22 months in prison in connection with the detection of a powerful homemade bomb near a refugee residential center in Gothenburg. After serving his sentence, Thulin sought to receive additional paramilitary training in Poland before Polish authorities expelled him, citing his “serious, real, and current threat to security and public order.”

On October 17 the Department of State designated five al-Shabaab leaders: Mohamed Mire, Yasir Jiis, Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow, Mustaf ’Ato, and Mohamoud Abdi Aden. Mire is responsible for the group’s strategic decisionmaking and leads the group’s interior wing. Jiis is the commander of the armed wing, Jabha, which conducts attack operations. Nurow is the chief of the intelligence wing, Amniyat, which plays a key role in executing suicide attacks and assassinations. ’Ato is a senior Amniyat official responsible for coordinating and conducting al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and Kenya. Aden was part of the cell that planned the DusitD2 Hotel attack in 2019.

On November 30 the Department of State designated three al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) leaders: Osama Mehmood, Atif Yahya Ghouri, and Muhammad Maruf. Mehmood is the emir of AQIS. Ghouri is the deputy emir of AQIS. Maruf is responsible for AQIS’s recruiting branch.

Also on November 30, the Department of State designated Mufti Hazrat Deroji, aka Qari Amjad. Amjad is the deputy emir of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, overseeing operations and militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism

In 2022 the United States continued to work through multilateral organizations to promote whole-of-government and whole-of-society CT efforts that respect human rights and the rule of law while strengthening complementary regional and international efforts. At the UN and in other multilateral settings, the United States continued to strengthen partnerships, build consensus on evolving threats, and advance U.S. measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Examples of U.S. multilateral engagement are described below.

The UN: Sustained and strategic engagement at the UN on CT issues is a priority for the United States. Throughout 2022, the UN remained actively engaged in addressing the evolving threat of terrorism to international peace and security, including through preparations for the upcoming biennial review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in 2023.
The UN Security Council and its Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED): The United States supported CTC and CTED efforts to assess evolving terrorist trends and to analyze capacity gaps of member states to implement UNSCRs 1373 (2001), 1624 (2004), 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017), and 2617 (2021) and other relevant CT resolutions to facilitate needed training and other technical assistance to UN member states. In 2022 the CTC held open briefings on issues, including the use of emerging technology for terrorist purposes. The United States participated in negotiations of a political declaration associated with the outcomes of the UN CTC Special Meeting on “Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technologies for Terrorist Purposes” on October 29 in New Delhi, India, that focused on three themes: countering use of information and communication technologies, new payment technologies and fundraising methods, and unmanned aerial systems for terrorist purposes.

**UN Security Council Sanctions Regimes:** In 2022 the United States supported the UN listings of Khatiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (an al-Qa’ida-affiliated group operating in Idlib, Syria) and Ali Mohammed Rage (an al-Shabaab spokesperson). The United States continued to work closely with the UN 1267 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh) and Al-Qa’ida, 1988 Taliban, and 751 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committees by proposing listings or amendments. It also continued to engage the UN 1267 ombudsperson regarding petitions for de-listings, provided input to the committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures, and assisted respective monitoring teams or panels of experts with information for its research and reports. The United States also led or supported the negotiation of several other CT-/sanctions-related UNSCRs, including UNSCR 2665, which renewed the mandate of the 1988 Taliban Sanction Regime’s Monitoring Team, and UN SCR 2662, which renewed the newly named 751 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Regime. The US. government additionally co-penned UN SCR 2664 with Ireland, which significantly reformed UN targeted sanctions by establishing a humanitarian carveout to the asset freeze measures across all UN sanctions regimes. The adoption of this resolution enables the flow of legitimate humanitarian assistance and other support for the basic human needs of vulnerable populations while maintaining sanctions on designated individuals and entities. UN SCR 2664 also includes safeguards to protect against abuse and evasion by sanctioned persons and entities, including through a monitoring, reporting, and review process to facilitate detection and mitigation of possible aid diversion.

**The UN General Assembly and UNOCT:** UNOCT continued to work closely with the 45 UN Global Counterterrorism Compact Entities to ensure balanced implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy: 1) measures to address the conditions conducive to terrorism, 2) measures to prevent and combat terrorism, 3) measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard, and 4) measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

The United States participated in the United Nations’ High-Level Conferences organized by UNOCT on “International and Regional Border Security and Management Cooperation to Counter Terrorism and Prevent the Movement of Terrorists” in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and
“Human Rights, Civil Society and Counterterrorism” in Málaga, Spain. The United States also participated in the first-ever UN Congress of Victims of Terrorism, which provided a platform for victims of terrorism to share their experiences and to advocate for upholding and strengthening the protection of their rights. The Congress allowed the audience to learn about good practices undertaken by member states and civil society organizations, while ensuring that victims’ voices were heard and that their experiences helped shape the way forward. Additionally, the United States contributed to the UN Security Council Secretary General’s 2022 report titled *Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief* (A/77/266), which acknowledges the growing, transnational nature of the threat and complements similar efforts by UN Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact Entities.

- **UNODC:** UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) continued to assist countries seeking to ratify and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism, and it provided assistance for countering the financing of terrorism in conjunction with UNODC’s Global Program Against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism. The United States supported UNODC/TPB as a counterterrorism assistance implementer, particularly for programming to strengthen member states’ criminal justice systems response to terrorism. In 2022 the United States participated in consultations to inform the UNODC’s New Global Program on Preventing and Countering Terrorism for 2022-27. The United States also participated in the launch of the *UNODC Manual on the Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief*, which was informed by U.S. government input.

- **The UNSC 1540 Committee:** The 1540 Committee monitors and facilitates efforts to implement UNSCR 1540 (2004), which addresses the nexus of proliferation concerns surrounding chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery, on the one hand, and activities by nonstate actors, who wittingly or unwittingly provide WMD-related assistance to terrorist organizations, on the other. On November 30 the UNSC renewed the 1540 Committee’s mandate for another 10 years. The 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts (GoE) participates in a wide range of multilateral and regional activities designed to facilitate technical assistance to member states when they request it. Using Office for Disarmament Affairs Trust Fund resources to cover expenses, the GoE also has interacted with the OPCW, the IAEA, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the World Customs Organization, INTERPOL, UNODC, the Financial Action Task Force, and other multilateral counterterrorism bodies, as well as with individual countries to this end. The United States is one of 10 countries that together with the EU have contributed to the 1540 Trust Fund, which is used to support these activities and help fund 1540 regional coordinator positions in OAS, OSCE, AU, and ASEAN. U.S. funds also continued to be used to conduct projects that assist African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries in strengthening national 1540 implementation by providing training to national 1540 points of contact and developing voluntary national action plans (NAPs). Given the key role played by current 1540 coordinators in GoE-supported peer reviews, the United States will continue to
promote the idea of establishing additional 1540 regional coordinators, to increase the number and quality of NAPs and encourage greater implementation of UNSCR 1540 and subsequent resolutions.

**GCTF:** Founded in September 2011 by the United States and Türkiye, the GCTF is an informal, apolitical CT body that aims to increase countries’ capacity to deal with regional and global terrorist threats and violent extremist radicalization by strengthening civilian cooperation to counter terrorism. Morocco is Co-Chair of GCTF, serving along Canada until the latter was replaced by the EU in September.

The GCTF has five working groups, three of which are thematic – CVE, Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law (CJ-ROL), and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) – and two others focused on regional capacity-building: Capacity-Building in the East Africa Region, and Capacity-Building in the West Africa Region. In 2017 the United States and Jordan assumed co-chairmanship of the FTFs Working Group, and in 2022 the mandate was extended for an additional two-year term ending in 2024. As of 2022 the co-leads of the other GCTF working groups are Australia and Indonesia for the CVE Working Group, Italy and Nigeria for the CJ-ROL Working Group, and Algeria and Germany for the West Africa Working Group. There were no co-chairs for the East Africa Working Group.

The UN is a close partner of the GCTF and a participant in its activities. The GCTF continued to increase cooperation and partnership as outlined in the 2018 joint GCTF-UN statement marking enhanced cooperation between the two bodies. The GCTF serves as a mechanism to further the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and, more broadly, to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the United Nations. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, the AU, the OAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and ASEAN.

In September, GCTF members produced and successfully presented two new GCTF Toolkits and two Concept Notes:

- **Toolkit on Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE)**
- **Gender and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Policy (P/CVE) Toolkit**
- **GCTF Initiative to Operationalize the Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices for Countering Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems**
- **Gender Identities Platform for Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism**

Moreover, in 2022, the GCTF continued to implement the work of the forum through six virtual and in-person engagement initiatives co-led by the United States:

**1. Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism Toolkit and Initiative:** The United States and Norway (a non-member of GCTF) presented the final GCTF REMVE Toolkit for adoption at the GCTF’s 20th Coordinating Committee in September. Launched in 2021, the Toolkit initiative
built off two GCTF Exploratory Dialogues followed by two online webinars, each bringing together more than 100 participants to discuss critical components of the Toolkit as well as the current global REMVE landscape, the varying definitions and legal frameworks that influence how countries address REMVE threats, and operational and policy responses to REMVE challenges and threats. Speakers examined gaps in international community resources related to the REMVE threat, and how the GCTF could help states, civil society, and private sector organizations address REMVE-related challenges. To leverage momentum the co-leads plan to hold a launch event and two to three interactive tabletop exercises in 2023 to help practitioners conceptualize and implement the 26 recommendations from the Toolkit in local, national, and regional contexts.

2. Initiative on National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Policy Toolkit Initiative: Australia and Indonesia, as co-chairs of the CVE Working Group, held planning workshops to gather insight and context while exploring sector-specific tools and expertise to inform the drafted Gender and Preventing/CVE Policy Toolkit, which was successfully presented at the 20th GCTF Coordinating Committee. The United States provided insight and review throughout the process, contributing to the updated text, and promoting U.S. approaches to respecting gender and identity in CT policies and programs.

3. Initiative on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returning Family Members of Foreign Terrorist Fighters:

Under the Initiative Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, co-led by the United States and Jordan under the FTFs Working Group, the co-leads organized two virtual, regionally focused workshops in 2022. The first workshop in June addressed policies and practices for rehabilitation and reintegration focusing on the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa Regions, and the second workshop in October focused on Central Asia. These events brought together practitioners and civil society actors to promote international best practices based on evidence from relevant reintegration and rehabilitation efforts in the targeted regions while also facilitating international and national-level information exchange and complementing existing initiatives.

4. Watchlisting Toolkit Initiative: In 2022, the Watchlisting Toolkit initiative focused on implementation of the Toolkit’s recommendations to help countries build out and manage their own watchlisting enterprises and screening of known and suspected terrorists (KSTs). This Toolkit is a useful resource for policy-makers, law enforcement officials, immigration and consular officers, and agencies that manage and operate watchlists. The Toolkit complements recommendations from pivotal global security doctrines such as the New York Memorandum on Good Practices for Interdicting Terrorist Travel and obligations established in UNSCR 2396. The FTFs Working Group merged the Watchlisting Initiative and Maritime Security Initiative programming to host the first combined events that addressed best practices in border security management with an emphasis on maritime efforts.

5. Initiative on Maritime Security and Terrorist Travel: The GCTF initiative Operationalizing the Prevention and Interdiction of Maritime Terrorist Travel promotes the recommendations put forth in the Maritime Addendum to the GCTF New York Memorandum on Good Practices for
Interdicting Terrorist Travel addressing potential vulnerabilities in the maritime sector that could be exploited by terrorists. In 2022 this initiative examined how to improve information sharing between and among governments on topics such as KSTs transitioning through official ports, the use of ships and small vessels as weapons, and the smuggling or trafficking of narcotics or arms. Through the combined efforts of the Watchlisting Initiative and Maritime Security Initiative, the FTF Working Group Co-Leads held two virtual workshops focusing on maritime and border security best practices and Africa-wide maritime border challenges.

6. Initiative to Counter Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems: In 2022, the United States and the UK announced a partnership to counter the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (also known as Unmanned Aerial Systems) for terrorist purposes by operationalizing the Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices to Counter Unmanned Aerial System Threats (2019). The leads presented a Concept Note at the 20th GCTF Coordinating Committee outlining plans for a series of webinar workshops in 2023 and 2024 to bring greater awareness of the good practices.

More information on the GCTF is available through its website.

Global Counterterrorism Forum-Inspired Institutions: The first three of the following institutions — 1) the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, 2) Hedayah, and 3) the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund — were developed to operationalize GCTF good practices and to serve as mechanisms for strengthening civilian criminal justice responses to terrorism:

- **The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law:** In 2014 the United States and other GCTF partners established the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) as an institution dedicated to building the capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice stakeholders to address terrorism and related transnational criminal activities based on the work of the GCTF. In coordination with the GCTF and others, the IIJ has become a leading center for helping countries develop capable civilian counterterrorism systems and approaches and trained more than 7,500 lawmakers, police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, and other criminal justice stakeholders from 123 participating countries in issues relating to FTFs, Battlefield Evidence, REMVE, addressing homegrown terrorism, juvenile justice, and mutual legal assistance, among others. The IIJ works closely with the GCTF, supporting the work of the GCTF’s CJ-ROL Working Group, hosting meetings and workshops, and operationalizing and informing the development of GCTF good-practice documents. In partnership with the United States and Norway, the IIJ held a joint side event at the September Coordinating Committee to amplify the recommendations and complementary work of the *Criminal Justice Practitioner’s Guide for Addressing REMVE* and the *GCTF REMVE Toolkit*.

- **Hedayah:** Hedayah is the first-ever international center of excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, and is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Hedayah concentrates on capacity building, dialogue and CVE communications, and research and analysis. The center continued to organize capacity building workshops on CVE
Communications, education-based approaches to CVE, countering REMVE efforts, rehabilitation and reintegration workshops, and CVE national action plans. In 2022, Hedayah supported Tunisia and Tajikistan to improve these governments’ awareness of P/CVE strategic communication approaches and tools through a new CVE communication strategy. Hedayah also helped find innovative solutions to counter use of the internet for terrorist purposes by working with tech companies, youths, and students to develop their own solutions to online violent extremist propaganda. Hedayah also continued to promote its “Blueprint for a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center,” a best-practices tool developed to help rehabilitate and reintegrate FTFs and their family members. In 2022, Hedayah raised approximately $11 million for programs and operating expenses from donors including Australia, Canada, the EU, Morocco, the UAE, the UK, and the United States.

- **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund**: In 2013 the GCTF called for the establishment of Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) to serve as the first global fund to strengthen community resilience to terrorism. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, GCERF focuses on preventing and countering terrorism by building the capacity of small, local, community-based organizations. Since its inception, GCERF has raised more than $150 million from the United States, the EU, Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Liechtenstein, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger (both a recipient and donor country), Norway, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The United States has contributed $20.8 million through 2022. GCERF has launched a public-private partnership program to encourage private companies to invest in its prevention programming. To date, several private-sector organizations have provided in-kind contributions. GCERF supports 35 grants in 14 partner countries: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Nigeria, North Macedonia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. Estimated conservatively, GCERF projects have reached 2.2 million direct beneficiaries and 13.2 million indirect beneficiaries.

**The Strong Cities Network**: In 2015 the Strong Cities Network (SCN) launched at the UN General Assembly, with support from the United States. With 25 founding members, SCN now includes more than 165 local governments across six continents. The network provides local governments with a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned on CVE, including through global summits, regional workshops, exchanges, and an online portal. The London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue serves as the SCN secretariat and conducts in-depth capacity building training and mentorship to members in Central Asia, East and West Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Balkans. With support from the United States and the EU, SCN began to launch regional hubs in East and Southern Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and the Western Balkans. In April, SCN organized a U.S.-Nordic dialogue on countering hate and polarization in Helsinki, Finland. In November, SCN partnered with other organizations to organize workshops on countering hate and polarization for Central and Eastern European stakeholders in Bratislava, Slovakia, and a mayoral summit in The Hague, Netherlands, for city leaders from the United States and Europe.
INTERPOL (the International Criminal Police Organization): Through its I-24/7 secure global police communications system, INTERPOL connects member states’ law enforcement officials to its criminal police databases, and to its system for requesting assistance in criminal investigative matters by sending messages and the publication of notices for various purposes. INTERPOL provides technical assistance to help member countries affected by the FTF challenge by providing frontline officials with access to I-24/7. By extending these connections beyond a country’s national central bureau to strategic, high-volume airports, seaports, and land ports of entry — as well as other government agencies with investigative responsibilities — national authorities are better able to identify, deter, and interdict FTFs and other transnational criminals.

The European Union: The EU remains a top counterterrorism partner of the United States. The EU and the United States share a common definition of terrorism and have established a common list of terrorist groups. Most recently, the United States began working closely with the EU and its member states on REMVE, which some EU members refer to as “right-wing extremism,” “nationalist extremism,” or “far-right extremism.” These threats, largely from violent white supremacists, are on the rise in both Europe and the United States, where these actors’ movements appear to be centered and based. The EU is also concerned by individual “right-wing nationalists” from member states who have been volunteering in Ukraine and later returning to their home countries with battlefield experience – and possibly also with weapons. There are significant transnational links between REMVE actors and networks on both sides of the Atlantic, and the United States and the EU work together to tackle these threats. By working together, the United States and the EU continue to make significant progress in addressing REMVE issues, both at the political and policy levels.

While the military campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria is now largely complete, the detention of terrorists, seizure of their associated materials, and management of evidence collected are critical to successfully prosecuting and securing convictions of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The EU is an integral partner in tackling these challenges associated with battlefield evidence, particularly in promoting its use to support investigations and prosecutions of FTFs. The U.S. government continued to encourage EU member states to take responsibility for their FTFs and associated family members located in the al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps in northeast Syria by repatriating, rehabilitating, reintegrating, and prosecuting them, as appropriate. Although EU institutions note that decisions related to repatriating FTFs and their family members from the battlefield in Syria are reserved for member states, it has stated that rehabilitating and reintegrating returning citizens is a priority at the EU level as well. Human rights and humanitarian groups continue to criticize the inaction of EU member states to repatriate their citizens. The U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice, and State continue efforts with the EU and its member states to facilitate the sharing of battlefield evidence, as well as to emphasize that CT is an important area for NATO-EU cooperation.

The EU continued military and law enforcement capacity building missions in the Horn of Africa, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and the Sahel, working closely with U.S. elements in
In May, following the Mali military junta’s decision to pull out of the G-5 Sahel force, the EU suspended its military training mission in the country. In December the EU established the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger, a new EU Common Security and Defense Policy mission, to support Niger’s fight against terrorist armed groups. The mandate of the mission will initially last three years, and the financial reference amount for the common costs for this period will be roughly $30 million. To date, the EU has pledged almost $270 million for the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, a coalition of five West African nations providing border security and CT operations in the Sahel. The EU has also initiated the Partnership for Stability and Security in the Sahel to assess the security sector in West African countries and coordinate donor funding to fulfill their needs.

The OSCE: The OSCE’s CT work in 2022 was significantly disrupted by the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Under Poland’s leadership as the 2022 Chair in Office, the OSCE approach to CT focused on the protection of vulnerable targets from terrorist attacks and improving border security measures to counter terrorist travel while upholding international human rights law. In March the OSCE, UNOCT, and Uzbekistan hosted a “High-Level Conference on Regional Cooperation Among Central Asian States Within the Framework of the Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the UN GCTS [Global Counterterrorism Strategy].” In October the OSCE, UNOCT, the United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, Tajikistan, the EU, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar hosted a conference entitled “International and Regional Border Security and Management Cooperation to Counter Terrorism and Prevent the Movement of Terrorism.” In September the United States participated in a policy brief organized by the OSCE Action Against Terrorism Unit and the OSCE Gender Issues Program. This meeting of 59 representatives from governments, international organizations, civil society, and academia discussed the “linkages between violent misogyny and violent extremism.” In October the United States participated in the sixth OSCE-wide Seminar on Passenger Data Exchange, urging OSCE participating states to expand the use of watchlists and information sharing for border screening, including in the maritime sector. OSCE staff actively participated in global and regional efforts supported by the United States through the GCTF, the IIJ, and NATO.

NATO: In June, Allies released the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, which affirmed terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of Alliance citizens and to international peace and prosperity. In 2022 the United States continued to invest foreign assistance resources to support implementation of the NATO Counterterrorism Action Plan (CTAP). NATO work under the CTAP focuses on improving awareness of the terrorist threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors. To facilitate information sharing, NATO brought together its own experts in May to meet with those from various UN offices, INTERPOL, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the IIJ, focusing on civilian-military cooperation and communication in support of the collection and use of battlefield evidence. At the NATO Center of Excellence for Stability Policing in Vicenza, Italy, NATO conducted three iterations of institutional-level battlefield evidence training for participants from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia, and the UAE. The NATO Battlefield
Evidence Working Group resumed in-person meetings in Brussels, Belgium. In July, NATO held a CVE-focused meeting for Allies to exchange lessons learned and develop ways to strengthen NATO and national resilience to monitor, prevent, and counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism. The United States also contributed to work of the new NATO Resilience Committee to strengthen national and collective resilience and civil preparedness against military and nonmilitary threats. NATO International Staff members regularly collaborate with the AU, the EU, the IIJ, the OSCE, the United Nations, and other international and regional organizations.

The Council of Europe (CoE): The United States participates in the CoE as an observer. The CoE’s counterterrorism priorities, as established in its 2018-22 Strategy, include preventing terrorism through criminal law and law enforcement measures, ensuring terrorist offenses are investigated in the most efficient and quickest manner possible, and protecting persons against terrorism. The CoE’s counterterrorism committee (CDCT) convened several working groups throughout the year on Emerging Terrorist Threats; Countering Terrorist Communications, Recruitment, and Training; and the Use of Information Collected in Conflict Zones as Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Related to Terrorist Offenses. With significant advocacy and involvement from the United States, the CoE passed Battlefield Evidence (BE) Legal Recommendations under the auspices of the CDCT in the spring. These recommendations are critical in advancing effective prosecution and accountability efforts for terrorists and other criminals, potentially including atrocities committed by Russia’s forces in Ukraine. The United States continued to cooperate on CoE efforts to develop good practices for identifying and using BE as a follow-on to the Legal Recommendations. Representatives from the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury participated in the November CoE conference entitled “Terrorist Threats Emerging from Far-Right Violent Extremist Movements.” The biennial CDCT plenary addressed topics including BE, countering terrorist communications, recruitment and training, increasing information sharing, and transnational threats. CoE staff members regularly coordinate with countries and other multilateral organizations and entities such as the EU, the OAS, the OSCE, and the UN.

Group of Seven Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Counter Crime: Germany served as the 2022 Group of Seven (G-7) President and set a well-considered agenda for the year that culminated in the adoption of the G-7 Interior and Security Ministerial Statement that focused on CT-related priorities and deliverables, including addressing threats from Afghanistan; countering REMVE; preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism online; and emerging issues related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The United States participated in the Roma-Lyon Group’s Heads of Delegation meetings and the Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Counter Crime’s six subgroups, ensuring the facilitation and implementation of ongoing projects that develop good practices for CT and law enforcement efforts. The United States also continued chairing the Roma-Lyon Group’s cross-modal Transportation Security Subgroup, including overseeing collaboration related to flight school security and information sharing on sanction implementation in the maritime domain.

OAS/CICTE: The OAS’s Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) commemorated the 20th anniversary of the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism with a Meeting of
Consultation of States Parties in September. The Convention, adopted shortly after 9/11, was one of the first efforts to combat terrorism in a systematic, strategic way. At the September meeting, States Parties including the United States endorsed a declaration and recommendations intended to enhance coordination and information sharing, support capacity building, and increase resilience and preparedness. In May, OAS member states participated in a virtual training course entitled “Introduction to the Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism.” CICTE also led the commemoration of June 2 as Inter-American Day Against Terrorism, encouraging member states to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Western Hemisphere and worldwide. The committee held its 22nd regular session in a virtual format in July. Led by Guyana and Mexico as outgoing and incoming chairs in office, respectively, the meeting focused on the security of civil aviation and major events, supply-chain security, cybersecurity in the hemisphere, and cooperation to prevent violent extremism that is conducive to terrorism. In 2022, 17 member states including the United States participated in the Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism. The network operates on a 24/7 basis to facilitate communication among points of contact designated by each member state, so they can respond more effectively to terrorist threats.

ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit: CT activities with the 10-member ASEAN bloc and the 27-member ARF in 2022 included annual meetings and capacity building. The United States led a three-part ARF workshop series on information sharing and aviation security, designed to raise awareness of countries’ obligations under UNSCR 2396 and to explain helpful tools for implementation. The first workshop was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2019. The second occurred virtually in 2021. The third and final workshop in this series was held in Manila, Philippines, in May. The United States additionally co-sponsored, with Indonesia, the Second Annual ASEAN-U.S. CVE workshop held in August in Bali, Indonesia, which supported the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (Bali Workplan 2019-25) which set forth a comprehensive framework for preventing and countering violent extremism.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) — which includes the 10 ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States — issued multiple statements in 2022. At the 12th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in August in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, foreign ministers issued a statement that reaffirmed their commitment to CVE, recognized the importance of a collective and comprehensive approach to address terrorism and violent extremism, and expressed continued support for the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism. At the 17th East Asia Summit held in November in Phnom Penh, EAS leaders similarly issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to CT and CVE and to the ASEAN Plan of Action.

APEC: APEC continued to work under the Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy adopted in 2019 and updated its annual workplan in 2021. The strategy, first adopted in 2011, endorses the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience. It advocates for risk-based approaches to security challenges across supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. Members also concentrated on furthering the APEC Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) Strategic Plan
2018-22, which set priorities in areas such as the evolving threat of FTFs, terrorist financing, border and critical infrastructure security, and information sharing. The CTWG Terms of Reference expired in 2021, and member economies did not reach consensus to endorse a new Terms of Reference. Senior officials did not renew the mandate of the group by year’s end. Despite the sunsetting of the CTWG, APEC’s counterterrorism efforts will continue through relevant existing subfora.

**AU:** There are two main bodies within the AU that lead its CT efforts — the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department’s Conflict Management Division, located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (CAERT) in Algiers. CAERT is the lead for all the AU’s CVE activity. CAERT priorities include 1) building capacity of member states on CT/CVE, 2) developing and/or implementing member-state CVE national action plans, and 3) enhancing international cooperation to ensure relevant regional approaches are taken fully into account. In 2020 the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) established the Special Unit on Counterterrorism within the framework of the African Standby Force, which has yet to be operationalized. Once in operation, the Special Unit will aim to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the PSC and the Regional Economic Communities. It also will share experiences and best practices, as well as lessons arising from continental and regional mechanisms deployed against terrorism and violent extremism, such as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, the G-5 Sahel, and the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic slowed AU implementation of expanded CT efforts.

**The G-5 Sahel:** Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger formed the G-5 Sahel in 2014 to concentrate on the four pillars of security, resilience, infrastructure, and governance. In May, Mali withdrew from the G-5 Sahel and Joint Force. However, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (or MINUSMA) continued to provide logistical support to the G-5 Sahel and Joint Force.

**The League of Arab States:** The League of Arab States (LAS) is a regional organization consisting of 22 member states that promotes the interests of the Arab world. The LAS serves as a forum for member states to coordinate policy on matters of concern, including CVE and other threats.

**The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):** The ICAO is a specialized UN agency that promotes the development of international civil air navigation safety and security standards and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth. The organization adopts standards and recommended practices across many areas, including air navigation, its infrastructure, flight inspection, prevention of unlawful interference, and facilitation of border-crossing procedures for international civil aviation. The ICAO’s Aviation Security 2021 (AVSEC2021) event, which concluded on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, featured substantive and compelling discussions on aviation security, including contributions from current and former representatives of
government and industry. The ICAO’s involvement during the 2021 takeover of Kabul by the Taliban progressed from issuing guidance to avoid Afghanistan’s airspace to tackling the full range of technical issues relating to the safety and security of civil aviation. The 2020 Council of ICAO approval of amendments to Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention establishing new Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) regarding states’ development and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems took effect in February. These SARPs are a direct response to UNSCR 2396 of 2017, which requires states to develop the capability to collect, process, and analyze PNR data, in furtherance of ICAO SARPs. UNSCR 2396 also requires states to ensure PNR data are used by and shared with all their competent national authorities, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorist offenses and related travel. The United States continues to seek to raise the profile of aviation security within the ICAO Secretariat, with the objective of parity between safety and security in the ICAO.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): In 2022 the United States continued to serve as co-chair of GICNT, a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. In 2022, GICNT paused all official meetings and working groups until further notice due to Russia’s renewed war of aggression against Ukraine. However, the United States consulted closely with GICNT partners and supported the implementation of three practical exercises and one virtual engagement outside the formal GICNT framework to address global nuclear terrorism threats and challenges without Russia’s involvement.

FATF: FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing. FATF’s efforts to improve understanding and implementation of global FATF standards are supported by FATF-style regional bodies worldwide. In 2022, FATF continued to address terrorist financing through ongoing work. This included regular, nonpublic updates to the FATF global network on the financing of ISIS, AQ, and their affiliates, as well as the completion of a project to identify and analyze unintended consequences of the FATF standards, including de-risking, financial exclusion, and undue targeting of non-profit organizations. FATF also published a report in March on money laundering and terrorist financing risks arising from migrant smuggling.

Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online (Christchurch Call): In May 2021, the United States officially joined the New Zealand- and France-led Christchurch Call, established in a 2019 summit after the livestreamed terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, earlier that year; Secretary Blinken participated in the second annual Christchurch Call Summit. When the decision was announced, the United States applauded language in the Christchurch Call emphasizing the importance of respecting human rights and the rule of law, including the protection of freedom of expression. It also noted that in its Christchurch Call participation, the United States would not take steps that would violate the freedoms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment, nor violate people’s
reasonable expectations of privacy. The United States engaged in active partnership with governments, tech companies, and civil society in the forum’s workstreams on key issues such as algorithms and positive interventions to mitigate the risk of online platforms being exploited for terrorist or violent extremist purposes.

**The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT):** In 2022 the United States continued to participate in the industry-led GIFCT. The GIFCT was established by Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Microsoft in 2017, in close partnership with UN-affiliated Tech Against Terrorism, and reorganized as an NGO in 2020. Its objectives are to prevent and counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of online platforms through developing and sharing technology, including by providing assistance to smaller companies and by implementing, research and prevention programs. In 2022 the United States continued to serve on the GIFCT Independent Advisory Committee and participated in GIFCT Working Groups on Crisis Response, Legal Frameworks, Technical Approaches (including algorithmic amplification), and Positive Interventions. Also in 2022, the United States invited the GIFCT to cross-pollinate ideas and support workshops for the GCTF REMVE Toolkit development and operationalization.

**OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development):** In 2022 the United States continued its efforts with governments, tech companies, civil society, and other expert stakeholders to develop the OECD’s Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content (TVEC) Voluntary Transparency Reporting Framework (VTRF). The aim of the VTRF is to increase voluntary reporting by platforms of all sizes to help build the evidence base for sound policy-making and to avoid regulatory fragmentation. The first phase of the OECD TVEC VTRF project was effectively completed under the auspices of the OECD Committee on Digital Economy Policy.

**The Aqaba Process:** In 2022 the United States participated with other governments, private-sector companies, and selected stakeholders in Jordan’s counterterrorism-focused Aqaba Process. King Abdullah II of Jordan launched the Aqaba Process in 2015 as an informal international platform to bring together government decisionmakers and other stakeholders to coordinate strategic confrontation with terrorists and violent extremists both offline and online. Jordan started the Aqaba Process to address the need for a holistic approach that addresses terrorist threats collectively and simultaneously, sometimes on a regional or thematic basis.

**Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens and Recruitment**

**Countering Violent Extremism**
CVE refers to proactive assistance and engagements designed to reduce the ability of violent extremist groups and their affiliates and adherents to influence, radicalize, recruit, and mobilize individuals and communities to terrorism and violent extremism. Preventing and countering radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence are essential counterterrorism tools. The U.S. government’s strategy to minimize the impact of terrorism and violent extremism includes efforts to build the capacity of local actors to address their drivers at the source. CVE
requires a comprehensive rule-of-law-based and human-rights-respecting approach involving national and local governments, religious leaders, civil society, educators, women, youth, the private sector, and affected communities.

In 2022, through bilateral and multilateral engagement, the Department of State’s CT Bureau emphasized four key areas in strategy formulation, diplomatic engagement, and foreign assistance programming: 1) countering racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, 2) countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, 3) rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters and associated family members, and 4) counter messaging. The CT Bureau partnered with local and national government officials, community leaders, NGOs, educators, mental health professionals and social workers, religious figures, private sector technology companies, and others to build a prevention architecture to counter radicalization and recruitment to violence.

For example, the CT Bureau worked to implement the Bali Workplan 2019-25, which provides an implementation framework to guide relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies, organs, and entities in carrying out the necessary activities and to monitor effectiveness in preventing and countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. In 2022 the CT Bureau, in coordination with ASEAN, USAID’s ASEAN office, and the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, held the second of three scheduled U.S.-ASEAN Workshops on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Indonesia, focusing on developing and implementing ASEAN members’ National Plans of Action on P/CVE, as well as raising awareness of P/CVE online, including promoting media literacy and critical thinking skills.

Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
The CT Bureau increased its efforts to counter racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE). REMVE – in particular, white-identity terrorism – continues to be a threat to the global community, with violence both on the rise and spreading geographically, as white-supremacist and nativist movements and individuals increasingly target immigrants; Jewish, Muslim, and other religious communities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and/or intersex individuals; governments; and other perceived enemies. The CT Bureau is working with law enforcement, civil society, social services, and foreign partners to take concrete actions to address this growing threat. As noted previously, the United States and Norway (a non-member of GCTF) developed the GCTF REMVE Toolkit, which was adopted in September to address complex REMVE challenges with legal, operational, and policy responses and good-practice recommendations. In November the CT Bureau sponsored REMVE-focused workshops in Bratislava and The Hague to increase awareness of and political will to counter the threat from REMVE with European partners.

Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes
The CT Bureau continued promoting U.S. policy on this issue in bilateral and multilateral engagements. As global attention on preventing and countering terrorists’ exploitation of internet-based platforms continued to grow, the CT Bureau worked to ensure the U.S. response was measured and aligned with U.S. policy and legal frameworks for internet freedom and
freedom of expression. The United States believes that protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, is an important part of CT strategy because increased censorship and other restrictions on human rights can undermine CT efforts and lead to greater instances of terrorist radicalization. The CT Bureau played a leading role in coordinating and negotiating language that promoted U.S. policy consistent with longstanding guiding principles and focused on programs and workshops to promote critical thinking skill and digital literacy to build resilience against terrorist and violent extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts.

The United States continued to work with the Christchurch Call and the CT Bureau worked to ensure the U.S. position was reflected in the work of international and other multilateral fora such as the UN, the G-7, and the G-20. The CT Bureau engaged regularly with technology companies to improve voluntary information sharing, particularly on the presence of designated terrorist organizations and their members online, as well as on terrorist trends and tactics. The CT Bureau also engaged regularly with the industry-led GIFCT, including GIFCT working groups, and the UN-affiliated Tech Against Terrorism, demonstrating the U.S. approach in working collaboratively with the private sector and other stakeholders such as civil society organizations to counter the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.

**Rehabilitation and Reintegration**
Rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated family members has continued to be a pressing concern for the global community. The CT Bureau coordinated global engagement on the rehabilitation and reintegration of FTF families repatriated from Syria and Iraq. Through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, the CT Bureau supported rehabilitation and reintegration training for civil society organizations in Indonesia and other countries. These engagements, which emphasized the importance of providing returnees with psychosocial services and involving community-level stakeholders in the reintegration process, led multiple countries to agree to repatriate their nationals and update their approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration, which could, in turn, encourage other nations to agree to repatriate their nationals from Syria and Iraq.

**Strategic Messaging**
The CT Bureau continues to work with the Global Engagement Center to counter terrorist messaging globally, with a particular focus on countering ISIS and AQ propaganda. The CT Bureau supports the GEC’s Resiliency Campaign focused on Iraq, Syria, and Jordan as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS effort. This campaign focused on four areas: 1) creating a local environment inhospitable to ISIS, 2) sustaining global support to defeat ISIS, 3) portraying ISIS as another failed movement, and 4) reducing ISIS’s ability to disseminate propaganda used to recruit, radicalize, or mobilize supporters. This campaign brought together elements within the U.S. Department of Defense to coordinate messaging efforts within specified countries.

In coordination with Hedayah, the CT Bureau trained and supported government and civil society officials from Kosovo and Kyrgyzstan in developing communications strategies to
complement CVE national action plans and building positive messaging campaigns to undermine terrorist narratives and counter the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.

International Platforms to Advance CVE
In 2022 the CT Bureau maintained robust support for key international platforms that serve to push global CVE initiatives, while sharing the burden of CVE programs with global partners. In the past year, the CT Bureau has helped multilateral institutions raise millions of dollars for local CVE programming in targeted localities.

- **The Strong Cities Network**: The Strong Cities Network (SCN) launched in 2015 at the UN General Assembly, with support from the United States. With 25 founding members, SCN now includes more than 165 local governments across six continents. The network provides local governments with a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned on CVE, including through global summits, regional workshops, exchanges, and an online portal. The London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue serves as the SCN secretariat and conducts in-depth capacity building training and mentorship to members in Central Asia, East and West Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Balkans. With support from the United States and the EU, SCN began to launch regional hubs in East and Southern Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and the Western Balkans.

- **The Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund**: The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) supported 75 grants in 14 partner countries: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. In November 2021 the CT Bureau participated in high-level site visits to Tirana, Albania, and to Kosovo to see the newly launched rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) initiative in the Western Balkans. The CT Bureau also supported GCERF’s efforts to establish a Regional Accelerated Funding Panel consisting of national governments, the donor community, and key actors in the R&R landscape to ensure effective coordination and impact in the Western Balkan region. Additionally, GCERF continued to increase its international donor base and contributions, with Niger joining as both a donor and recipient country. Since GCERF’s inception, 19 international donors (18 countries and the EU) have provided roughly $150 million for the organization, complementing U.S. contributions of about $21 million. In 2021, Niger became the first partner and donor country for GCERF. To date, several private-sector organizations have provided in-kind contributions. Estimated conservatively, GCERF projects have reached 2.7 million direct beneficiaries, with 50 percent of direct beneficiaries being women and girls. GCERF launched its 2021-25 Replenishment Campaign, led by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Through this campaign, GCERF aims to raise an additional $120 million to provide better alternatives for two million people directly at risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence, and to build a safety net among 10 million other people in their communities in more than 20 countries.
• **Hedayah:** In 2022, Hedayah continued to support CVE work in Tunisia and Tajikistan that focused on developing and disseminating strategic messaging content for vulnerable communities and build resiliency against terrorist content, strengthen capacity to understand and employ techniques to counter terrorists’ use of the internet, and help the Tunisian and Tajik governments develop and implement their CVE national action plans. Hedayah also advised and assisted governments and civil society on developing CVE strategies and approaches that concentrated on REMVE and on rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters and associated family members. In direct response to the ongoing global need to address returning FTFs, Hedayah continued to promote its *Blueprint of a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center: Guiding Principles for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Family Members.* In 2022, Hedayah raised about $11 million for programs and operating expenses from donors, including the United States, Australia, Canada, Morocco, the UK, the EU, and the UAE.

**Civilian Counterterrorism Capacity Building Programs**

As terrorism has evolved and significantly expanded geographically in recent years, it has become clear that mitigating this threat depends on the political will and enhanced capabilities of U.S. partners. In 2022 the U.S. government shifted its counterterrorism approach to a more sustainable footing, less reliant on military action and more rooted in partnerships, diplomacy, and multilateral relationships. To succeed over the long term, the United States must have partners who not only prevent, disrupt, and degrade networks through law enforcement or militarily — while comporting with international laws and norms — but also leverage robust civilian capabilities. The United States needs partners in law enforcement, the justice sector, and corrections that can prevent and disrupt attacks and investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists and their facilitation networks.

The United States supports various programs to build partners’ law enforcement capacity to counter terrorism, including by strengthening the ability of justice and corrections officials to counter terrorism. Across 14 core competencies ranging from CVE to border management, the CT Bureau funds, plans, and oversees capacity building programs that provide law enforcement and criminal justice officials with the tools needed to address security vulnerabilities and counter terrorist threats on their own.

In 2022, CT resources allowed the Department of State to continue, and in some cases expand, civilian law enforcement CT capacity building activities with key partner nations in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Western Balkans, and the Western Hemisphere to mitigate the threat posed by FTFs, prevent and counter terrorist safe havens and recruitment, and counter Iran-sponsored terrorism.

Counterterrorism programs enabled multiple partner nations to pursue terrorist organizations and share information with U.S. law enforcement agencies charged with global CT operations, protecting both the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Similarly, the CT Bureau developed the capacity of law enforcement partners to respond to terrorist attacks and counter IEDs. CT
support strengthened security at airports, with particular focus on those with direct flights to the United States, while also building law enforcement capacity to secure lengthy, porous borders through technical assistance and equipment. The CT Bureau also supported multilateral efforts to strengthen law enforcement and build CVE capabilities. Recipient law enforcement organizations have used the skills and assistance to counter terrorists globally and save hundreds of lives from planned attacks.

**Rewards for Justice**

The Department of State’s national security rewards program, Rewards for Justice (RFJ), was established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-533 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2708). It is managed by the Diplomatic Security Service. RFJ’s goal is to generate information that helps protect U.S. national security.

Under this program, the Secretary of State may authorize reward payments to individuals who furnish information leading to the arrest or conviction of anyone for committing, conspiring to commit, or attempting to commit, or aiding or abetting in the commission of, an act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property; the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property, including by dismantling an organization in whole or significant part; the identification or location of an individual who holds a key leadership position in a terrorist organization; or the disruption of financial mechanisms of a foreign terrorist organization. Pursuant to legislative amendments, the Secretary may also authorize reward payments to individuals who furnish certain other national security information related to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, foreign election interference, hostage taking of U.S. persons, and terrorism-linked kidnappings of U.S. persons.

To generate leads, RFJ issues reward offers for information covered by its statutory authority. Since RFJ’s inception in 1984, the program has paid in excess of $250 million to more than 125 individuals who provided information that helped resolve threats to national security, and the Secretary continued to authorize such payments in 2022.

In 2022 the RFJ program announced the following new terrorism-related reward offers:

- **February 7.** A reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) leader Sanaullah Ghafari, also known as Shahab al-Muhajir. Ghafari is responsible for approving all ISIS-K operations throughout Afghanistan and arranging funding to conduct operations.

- **February 7.** A reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction in any country of those responsible for the August 26, 2021, terrorist attack at the Kabul airport. At least 185 people were killed in the attack, including 13 U.S. servicemembers who were supporting evacuation operations. More than 150 people,
including 18 U.S. servicemembers, were wounded. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack.

- **November 18.** A reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of al-Shabaab, the East Africa AQ affiliate.

Throughout 2022, RFJ readvertised reward offers worldwide for
- Information leading to the identification or location of senior terrorist leaders.
- Information on those responsible for terrorist attacks.
- Information leading to the disruption of Hizballah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps financial networks.
- Information on past, planned, or future attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions or personnel.

**Support for Pakistan**

While the United States continues to cooperate with Pakistan on regional security and counterterrorism, the bilateral relationship has intensified its focus on shared economic and development priorities, including trade and investment, addressing the climate crisis, and responding to the devastation caused by heavy flooding.

The United States continues to provide civilian assistance on a focused set of priorities. In 2022 the US. government committed more than $97 million for flood response, food security, and disaster preparedness efforts in Pakistan. The United States also provided assistance to support Pakistan’s development, stability, and prosperity, partnering to address the climate crisis and facilitate private sector-led trade and investment. In health, the United States partnered with Pakistan to promote global health security; combat infectious diseases such as COVID-19, other vaccine-preventable diseases, and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis; support maternal and child health; and fund activities in family planning and reproductive health. The United States also supports people-to-people exchanges to strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, improve Pakistan’s perceptions of the United States, and deepen people-to-people ties. The U.S. government continues to provide robust law enforcement, counternarcotics, and rule-of-law assistance for Pakistan.

The table below shows bilateral assistance provided to Pakistan for fiscal years 2020, 2021, and 2022. It does not include humanitarian and other centrally managed assistance for Pakistan’s benefit, including $97 million in flood recovery assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
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<td>Total Bilateral Foreign Assistance a</td>
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<td>Global Health Programs</td>
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<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia

Countering Violent Extremism: In 2022, Saudi Arabia continued to be a premier counterterrorism (CT) partner of the United States. Saudi authorities worked closely with the United States to implement CT commitments and remained eager to enhance defense and security cooperation with the United States, including on CVE issues. Regular high-level consultations and cooperation with the United States played a crucial role in the Saudi government’s ability to address domestic and regional terrorism threats, and U.S. government-implemented programs helped Saudi Arabia increase its capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. Saudi Arabia maintained adequate legal frameworks, security forces, and institutional preparedness to counter violent extremist threats. The main threats were from Iran-backed proxies and Houthi cross-border attacks from Yemen. Saudi Arabia remained a regional leader in countering terrorist financing, in part by hosting and co-chairing the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC). The TFTC brings together the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council partners to confront new and evolving threats through joint multilateral designations aimed at disrupting financial flows to terrorist networks and individuals.

On the multilateral front, Saudi Arabia worked closely on capacity-building efforts to increase regional cooperation, minimize duplication of efforts, enhance information sharing, and address border security gaps. Saudi leadership worked to advance counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim-majority states. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

Saudi CVE activities concentrated on identifying pathways to terrorist radicalization and recruitment, with a heavy emphasis on the close monitoring of social media and other internet activity. CVE institutions focused on refuting violent extremist interpretations of Islam, emphasizing a positive notion of nationalism, and cultivating appreciation for Saudi culture and heritage as the basis for national identity. Saudi Arabia’s ideological approach to countering terrorist propaganda also included family outreach initiatives; integration of gender considerations in CVE work; and public messaging campaigns to amplify moderate voices in mainstream media, mosques, Islamic organizations, community centers, and prisons, to curb the appeal of radical ideology and counter violent extremist messages. The government-supported Etidal Global Center for Countering Extremist Ideology continued its counter-extremism monitoring and messaging strategy online. Security authorities continued to employ the Center for Counseling and Care to monitor, rehabilitate, and reintegrate into society former Saudi terrorists and foreign terrorist fighters.
With the goal of reducing the potential for violent extremism and terrorist acts, the Saudi government-affiliated Muslim World League promoted tolerance and encouraged interfaith dialogue through religious conferences and visits that brought Saudi religious scholars together with counterparts from other faiths. The Saudi government made further progress in revising textbooks used in the public K-12 curriculum to reduce intolerant and “extremist” content. The Minister of Islamic Affairs instructed all mosques to remove books that called for “extremism” and partisanship and banned unlicensed preaching activities, including proselytizing to non-Muslims without permission. In contrast, antisemitic language was used in several Friday sermons at the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina. Social, legal, economic, and political discrimination against the country’s Shia minority continued. The Saudi government’s potential use of terrorism laws to prosecute activists and political dissidents remained a concern.

**U.S. Agency for Global Media Initiatives:**

**Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences**

This section is provided by the U.S. Agency for Global Media. We refer you to [https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/USAGM_CVE_Factsheet-02-16-23.pdf](https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/USAGM_CVE_Factsheet-02-16-23.pdf) for information on U.S. Agency for Global Media’s outreach to foreign Muslim audiences.

**Visas for Participants in United States Programs**

The Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs’ visa policies and procedures have two fundamental missions: 1) protecting national security by helping secure U.S. borders, while 2) facilitating legitimate travel and international exchange. Focusing on these two missions safeguards the nation’s borders and ensures efficient adjudications of visa applications for individuals seeking to participate in visitor exchange programs.

Visa applicants are subject to a thorough interagency screening process that draws on biographic and biometric data. Some applications may require additional processing and vetting after the interview. Because of this, program sponsors and applicants should coordinate to submit visa applications well in advance of planned travel. We advise applicants to obtain passports immediately, as they must have a passport to apply for a visa.

**USAID Basic Education in Muslim-Majority Countries**

In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, USAID is required to report annually on Basic Education programs in Muslim-majority countries for the Country Reports on Terrorism. With the approval of the Department of State, USAID’s Bureau for Development, Democracy, and Innovation’s Center for Education (DDI/EDU) reoriented the 2021 submission to include a description of USAID’s strategic approach to basic education and links to the relevant publicly available documents and information. DDI/EDU’s submission is
now more evergreen; thus, the 2022 submission contains updated links but otherwise mirrors the 2021 submission.

The U.S. Government Strategy on International Basic Education for Fiscal Years 2019-23 (the Strategy) was released in September 2018. The strategy demonstrates the U.S. government’s commitment to international education and presents an opportunity to advance global diplomatic and development leadership on pressing international education challenges, as called for in the Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development (aka READ) Act, Division 2, P.L. 115-56. The goal of the strategy is to achieve a world where education systems in partner countries enable all individuals to acquire the education and skills needed to be productive members of society. To accomplish this goal, the U.S. government has two principal objectives: 1) improve learning outcomes, and 2) expand access to quality basic education for all, particularly marginalized populations. The U.S. government recognizes that its investments in international education serve as a force multiplier for all its work in international development. Strengthening education systems in developing countries advances U.S. foreign policy goals, promotes U.S. and international security, and helps accelerate economic growth at home and abroad.

Under the U.S. Government Strategy on International Basic Education, agencies and departments are working together to improve learning outcomes and expand access to quality basic education for all. The U.S. Government Support to Basic Education Map and the Fiscal Year 2021 U.S. Government Strategy Report to Congress highlight where the U.S. government is working, program education levels for each country, and examples of the type of coordination that is currently happening across agencies.

The USAID Education Policy, released in 2018, further articulates USAID’s vision and direction for supporting partner countries in strengthening their capacity to deliver quality learning opportunities for children and youth. The primary purpose of programming in education by USAID is to achieve sustained, measurable improvements in learning outcomes and skills development. The policy applies to education programming across all levels (from pre-primary through higher education), contexts (stable contexts to crisis and conflict-affected environments), settings (formal and nonformal), and providers (state and nonstate). The principles laid out in the policy drive decision making for new education investments supporting the vision that partner country education systems must enable all children and youths to acquire the education and skills needed to be productive members of society.

Economic Reform in Muslim-Majority Countries

Chapter 5. Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters. Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments. Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) mandates that the Department of State review FTO designations every five years to determine whether an FTO still meets the relevant criteria. The law requires that the Secretary of State revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.

In 2022 following a thorough review, the Department of State revoked the FTO designations of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Aum Shinrikyo, Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environ of Jerusalem (MSC), Kahane Chai, and Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG). Revocation of these designations does not affect any prior law enforcement actions related to the groups’ past terrorist activities and does not allow any former members admissibility into the United States.

Legal Criteria for Designation Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as Amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.

3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government-Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2022

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### EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

| **Abu Sayyaf Group** | ASG |
| **Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army** | CPP/NPA |
| **ISIS-Philippines** | ISIS-P |
| **Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid** | JAT |
| **Jemaah Islamiya** | JI |

### EUROPE

| **Continuity Irish Republican Army** | CIRA |
| **Real IRA** | RIRA |
| **Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front** | DHKP/C |
| **Revolutionary Struggle** | RS |

### THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

<p>| <strong>Abdallah Azzam Brigades</strong> | AAB |
| <strong>al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</strong> | AAMB |
| <strong>al-Ashtar Brigades</strong> | AAB |
| <strong>al-Nusrah Front</strong> | ANF |
| <strong>al-Qa’ida</strong> | AQ |
| <strong>al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula</strong> | AQAP |
| <strong>Ansar al-Islam</strong> | AAI |
| <strong>Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi</strong> | AAS-B |
| <strong>Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah</strong> | AAS-D |
| <strong>Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia</strong> | AAS-T |
| <strong>Army of Islam</strong> | AOI |
| <strong>Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq</strong> | AAH |
| <strong>Asbat al-Ansar</strong> | AAA |
| <strong>Hamas</strong> |  |
| <strong>Harakat Sawa’d Misr</strong> | HASM |
| <strong>Hizballah</strong> |  |
| <strong>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</strong> | IRGC |
| <strong>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</strong> | ISIS |
| <strong>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya</strong> | ISIL-Libya |
| <strong>ISIS-Sinai Province</strong> | ISIS-SP |
| <strong>Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi</strong> | JRTN |
| <strong>Kata’ib Hizballah</strong> | KH |
| <strong>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</strong> | PKK |
| <strong>Palestine Islamic Jihad</strong> | PIJ |
| <strong>Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction</strong> | PLF |</p>
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<th><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></th>
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<td>Ansar al-Dine</td>
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**Description:** Ansar al-Dine (AAD) is now a component of JNIM. The group was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage Sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia on the civilian population living in the areas under its control.
Beginning in 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).


**Activities:** In 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group’s laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but it increased its activities between 2015 and 2017, conducting multiple attacks against UN, French, and Malian forces.

AAD did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mali.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD also is said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.

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**Boko Haram**

*Aka* Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad.

**Description:** Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in the northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA). In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led
BH to split. Shekau maintained a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction became known as BH, while al-Barnawi’s group separated and was designated as ISIS-WA. On May 19, 2021, Shekau was reportedly killed during a clash with ISIS-WA.

**Activities:** BH crosses porous Lake Chad-region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

In 2014, BH kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. Since then, BH has continued to abduct women and girls, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members. Others have been ordered to carry out suicide attacks on civilians.

In 2020, suspected BH fighters attacked trucks carrying passengers along a military checkpoint in Nigeria, attacked villages in northeast Nigeria and killed hundreds of people, and claimed responsibility for the abduction of more than 330 students from an all-boys school in Nigeria’s northern Katsina State. In 2021, suspected BH fighters launched rocket-propelled grenades into densely populated areas from the outskirts of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least 10 people; and hundreds of BH fighters attacked a military post in southern Niger, killing at least 16 soldiers.

In January, BH claimed responsibility for an attack on a village in northeast Nigeria and reportedly abducted 17 girls. In May, BH fighters reportedly killed at least 50 people around the town of Rann in Nigeria’s Borno State. In November, BH attacked an army position in western Chad, killing at least 10 Chadian soldiers.

**Strength:** BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

**Funding and External Aid:** BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and bank robberies.

**ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo**

*Aka* ISIS-DRC; Allied Democratic Forces, Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen; City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors; Islamic State Central Africa Province; Wilayat Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa Media Office; Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiyyah; ISIS-Central Africa.

**Description:** ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) was designated as an FTO on March 11, 2021. ISIS publicly recognized the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as an affiliate in
late 2018 and claimed responsibility for ADF-attributed attacks starting in 2019 after an attack on an Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo base near Kamango. ISIS-DRC is responsible for many attacks across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in eastern DRC. Under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku, ISIS-DRC has been notorious in this region for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces.

**Activities:** In 2020, ISIS-DRC attacked the villages of Kamwiri, Kitsimba, and Lisasa in Beni, North Kivu Province, killing 21 people, abducting 20 others, and desecrating the Catholic Church in Lisasa. In 2021, ISIS-DRC attacked displacement camps near the towns of Boga and Tchabi in Ituri Province, killing 57 people and abducting 25 others. Also in 2021, ISIS-DRC conducted simultaneous suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed three persons and wounded 33 others.

In 2022, ISIS-DRC claimed responsibility for a bomb attack during a service at a Protestant church in Kasindi, North Kivu Province, killing at least 10 people and wounding 39 others. Also in 2022, ISIS-DRC reportedly attacked several villages in Beni, killing 26 people and abducting 12 others.

**Strength:** ISIS-DRC has between 500 to 1500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Funding and External Aid:** Although ISIS-DRC’s sources of funding remain largely unknown, the group probably does receive some support from ISIS. The group has seized weapons and ammunition from the Congolese military.

**ISIS in the Greater Sahara**

**Aka** ISIS-GS; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS-Sahel.

**Description:** ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in 2016. In 2022, ISIS-GS was elevated to a formal ISIS branch and changed its name to ISIS-Sahel (aka ISIS-Sahel Province).

**Activities:** Since 2017, ISIS-GS has been involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, including the 2017 attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol that killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers, as well as other attacks targeting or killing French, Malian, Nigerien, and Burkinabe soldiers and civilians. In 2020, ISIS-GS militants attacked a Nigerien military base on the border between Niger and Mali, killing 89 soldiers, and were suspected of killing 6 French NGO workers, their Nigerien guide and 1 other Nigerien citizen.
near Niamey, Niger. In 2021, French forces killed ISIS-GS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in southern Mali.

In September, ISIS-GS launched an attack on a northern Malian town that killed dozens of civilians. In the same month, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for two attacks in northern Benin in July that killed six soldiers. In August, ISIS-GS was suspected of being responsible for an attack in central Mali that killed 42 soldiers.

**Strength:** ISIS-GS is estimated to have 400 to 1,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and to a lesser extent Benin.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**ISIS-Mozambique**

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Helpers of Tradition; Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa; Adherents to the Traditions and the Community; al-Shabaab in Mozambique; Islamic State Central Africa province; Wilayah Central Africa; Ansaar Kalimat Allah; Supporters of the Word of Allah.

**Description:** ISIS-Mozambique was designated as an FTO on March 10, 2021. ISIS-Mozambique reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as 2018 and was acknowledged by ISIS as an affiliate in 2019. Since 2017, ISIS-Mozambique, led by Abu Yasir Hassan, has killed more than 1,300 civilians, and it is estimated that the terrorist group has killed more than 2,300 civilians, security force members, and suspected ISIS-Mozambique militants since it began its violent extremist insurgency.

**Activities:** In 2020, ISIS-Mozambique captured the strategic port of Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province, killing at least 55 soldiers. In 2021, ISIS-Mozambique attacked the town of Palma for four days, killing dozens of local civilians and foreign expatriate workers and looting about $1 million from banks. In 2022, ISIS-Mozambique attacked a Catholic mission in Chipene, killing an Italian nun and burning down several buildings. Also in 2022, ISIS-Mozambique fighters dressed in Mozambique Defense Armed Forces uniforms attacked multiple villages in Ancuabe District, killing at least four civilians.

**Strength:** ISIS-Mozambique is estimated to have up to 1,200 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mozambique.

**Funding and External Aid:** Although sources of funding remain unclear, the group has targeted banks in previous operations. In addition, the group has taken control of food supplies in areas under its control and has captured weapons from government security forces.

**ISIS-West Africa**
**Aka** Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA.

**Description:** ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2015 a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge, and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

**Activities:** Since 2016, ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, including ones against Nigerian and Chadian military and security personnel. ISIS-WA has also attacked humanitarian aid workers, local officials, critical infrastructure, and other civilians including executing 11 reported Christians in 2019. ISIS-WA claimed the executions were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In February, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for several attacks in northeast Nigeria that killed or wounded at least 30 Nigerian soldiers. In May, ISIS-WA killed 30 civilians in northeast Nigeria in response to military air strikes that killed several ISIS-WA commanders. In July, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria that killed at least one guard and freed more than 800 inmates. In the same month, ISIS-WA fighters ambushed the convoy of a local official in northeast Nigeria, killing four persons. In October, ISIS-WA fighters attacked an army base in central Nigeria but were repelled.

**Strength:** ISIS-WA is estimated to have between 4,000 and 5,000 active fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, taxes, the capture of military supplies, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

**Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin**

**Aka** Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen.

**Description:** Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its 2017 formation. That year the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. Multiple JNIM senior leaders have been killed in recent years, including JNIM’s former second in command, Ali Maychou, in 2019, senior JNIM commander Bah Ag Moussa in 2020, and senior leader Abdallaye Ag Albaka in 2021.
Activities: Since its formation in 2017, JNIM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including a suicide attack against an African Defeat-ISIS Coalition base in Mali and a truck bomb in a residential complex in 2018; an attack against a UN base in northern Mali in 2019; attacks against Malian security and military personnel in 2020; and attacks against UN peacekeepers and Malian soldiers, as well as the abduction of a French reporter working in Mali in 2021.

In May, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a Togolese military base that killed eight soldiers and wounded 13 others. In July, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Mali’s main military base that killed at least one soldier and wounded six others. In October, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy in Burkina Faso that killed more than a dozen soldiers. In November, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Togolese forces near the border of Benin and Burkina Faso that killed at least 17 soldiers.

Strength: JNIM is estimated to have about 2,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: JNIM receives funding through kidnapping for ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan

Aka Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan.

Description: Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. Ansaru publicly splintered from Boko Haram (BH) in 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with BH’s objectives and struggle, but it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

Activities: Since splintering from BH, Ansaru has kidnapped several civilians including a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali in 2012 and seven international construction workers who were subsequently killed in 2013. In 2020, Ansaru claimed responsibility for attacking the convoy of the Emir of Potiskum in northern Nigeria, killing at least 30 Nigerian soldiers.

In January, Ansaru reconfirmed its allegiance to AQIM in a statement released online. Ansaru is suspected of having participated in an attack on a Nigerian passenger train in March from which more than 60 passengers were taken hostage. Ansaru also is suspected to have been behind an attack on a military base in Nigeria in April, which killed 17 soldiers and wounded 40 others. In
July, Ansaru participated in an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria, killing at least one guard and freeing more than 800 inmates, including Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi, and six of his close lieutenants. Al-Barnawi was originally captured by the Nigerian Army in 2016.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru’s membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

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**Al-Murabitoun**

Aka al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those Who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; the Sentinels.

**Description:** Al-Murabitoun is now a component of JNIM and was designated as an FTO on December 19, 2013, originally under the name al-Mulathamun Battalion. Al-Murabitoun was originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but became a separate organization in 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. After the split, Belmokhtar threatened to fight against western interests and announced the creation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion. In 2013 the al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-Murabitoun.” In 2015, al-Murabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM. In 2017 the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

**Activities:** Since 2013, al-Murabitoun has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks involving civilians, including an attack against a gas facility in southeastern Algeria where more than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens; and an attack at the La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali, that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians in 2015. Al-Murabitoun also has been involved in attacks against military personnel, claiming responsibility for a 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and fighting against French forces in Mali in 2018.

Between 2015 and 2016, al-Murabitoun was involved in a series of hotel attacks, claiming responsibility for a hotel siege in central Mali and participating in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in 2015. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S.
international development worker. Al-Murabitoun reportedly also was involved in the 2016 AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen.

In December, Fawaz Ould Ahmed was extradited to the United States to face charges including the murder of a U.S. citizen and conspiracy to provide material support to AQIM and al-Murabitoun. Ahmed admitted to a Malian court in 2020 to carrying out the La Terrasse restaurant attack and planning hotel attacks including the Raddison Blu Hotel attack in 2015. Al-Murabitoun did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger.

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities.

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**Al-Shabaab**

* **Aka** Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra; al Hijra; Muslim Youth Center; the Youth; MYC MYM; Pumwani Muslim Youth; Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islam; al-Shabaab al-Jihaad; the Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement.

**Description:** Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida in 2012 and has ties to other al-Qa’ida affiliates, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Shabaab formed originally as the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters, al-Shabaab since 2011 has seen its military capacity and territorial control reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS; formerly African Union Mission in Somalia [AMISOM]) and Somali forces and to clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab’s loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. Al-Shabaab has
murdered numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous high-profile bombings and shootings throughout East Africa against civilians, AMISOM troops and other foreign forces, and Somali officials, including suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010 — its first attacks outside of Somalia, killing 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. Other attacks include the 2013 multiday siege against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, resulting in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as six soldiers and police officers; the 2015 raid on Kenya’s Garissa University College that killed 148 people; the 2016 attack against a Kenyan AMISOM base that killed more than 100 soldiers, one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia; the 2020 attack against U.S. and Kenyan personnel at the Mandi Bay Airfield in Kenya, killing three U.S. citizens; and several attacks and bombings against civilians, as well as security and military personnel in 2021.

In 2022, al-Shabaab detonated two car bombs at a busy market intersection near the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu, killing at least 121 people and wounding at least 300. Al-Shabaab also continued to expand its cross-border attacks in 2022, sending hundreds of militants to infiltrate the Ethiopian border, killing 17 people including several Ethiopian soldiers.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 12,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

**Funding and External Aid:** Al-Shabaab receives and generates enough income to launch attacks throughout East Africa, including against ATMIS bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, “taxation” of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

**Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb**

**Aka AQIM; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya.**

**Description:** The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation in 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida in 2006 and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the primary name of the group. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow “apostate” African regimes and create an Islamic state. Following the death of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, killed in 2020 by French forces, the group chose Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi as Droukdel’s successor.
Activities: Since becoming an al-Qa’ida affiliate, AQIM has claimed responsibility for or was involved in numerous high-profile attacks including the 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers that killed 60 people. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. AQIM also participated in a 2015 attack against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack, and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Between 2016 and 2020, AQIM carried out several attacks against civilians, as well as security and military personnel, including 2016 attacks on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed 28 people and a popular tourist beach resort in Côte d’Ivoire that killed more than 16 people; a 2018 vehicle suicide attack on an army patrol in Gao that killed four civilians and wounded 31 others, including four French soldiers; and a 2019 attack on a UN camp in northern Mali, killing 10 Peacekeepers and wounding 25 others.

In February 2022, French forces killed Yahia Djouadi, a senior AQIM official responsible for finance and logistics, in Mali. AQIM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: AQIM has an estimated 1,000 fighters operating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia

Funding and External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally and receives limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Abu Sayyaf Group

Aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement).

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In 2014, an ASG faction pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed ISIS’s Philippines branch in 2016.

Activities: Since 2015, ASG has committed kidnappings for ransom (KFR), bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion, including KFR operations targeting Canadian, Philippine, German, and Norwegian citizens in 2016 and 2017; a
2018 car bombing at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, Philippines, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen; and the 2019 kidnapping of two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga Peninsula region.

In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG member involved in the abduction of two Canadians who were killed in 2016, an ASG bomb expert linked to the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombings, as well as an ASG member involved in a 2001 kidnapping on Basilan.

In January, ASG killed one Philippine soldier and wounded two in an attack on a Philippine Army truck.

**Strength:** ASG is assessed to have fewer than 200 armed fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines and Malaysia.

**Funding and External Aid:** ASG is funded primarily through its KFR operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG also has received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

**Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army**

Aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; NPP/CPP.

**Description:** The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) — the New People’s Army (NPA) — is a Maoist group formed in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads. In December the CPP/NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, who reportedly directed CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, died in a hospital in Utrecht.

**Activities:** The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines, including four separate 1987 attacks in Angeles that killed three U.S. soldiers, and claimed responsibility for the 1989 ambush and murder of Col. James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Army division of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Peace efforts ended in
2017 after reported violations, including reports of the CPP/NPA’s continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians. In subsequent years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces.

In December the CPP/NPA ambushed and wounded two civilians in a convoy of Philippine Army soldiers and civilians engaged in a preemptive evacuation because of Super Typhoon Odette.

**Strength:** The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

**ISIS-Philippines**

**Aka** ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; ISIS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-East Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik, DIWM; Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS’ “Philippines province”; ISIS-East Asia.

**Description:** ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2014 a faction of ASG militants under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed the ISIS branch in 2016. Some Abu Sayyaf Group factions have been reported to interact and coordinate with ISIS-P, including participating in attacks that are claimed by ISIS in the Sulu archipelago.

**Activities:** Since 2016, ISIS-P has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Philippine security forces, including 2017 fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area; a 2018 suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed at least 11 people; and several attacks in 2021.

ISIS-P also has claimed responsibility for attacks targeting civilians, including the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than 100 others; and twin suicide bomb attacks in the Sulu province in 2020 that killed more than a dozen people and injured more than 70 others. In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG bomb expert linked to the Jolo cathedral bombings. In November, ISIS-P was suspected of bombing a passenger bus in the southern Philippines that killed one and wounded 11.

**Strength:** ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-P receives some financial assistance from ISIS-core but relies mostly on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion. It maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black-market purchases of arms from the Philippine military.

**Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid**

Aka JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem’mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’a h Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99.

**Description:** Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) was designated as an FTO on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, the Indonesia-based group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh, Indonesia. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT fractured when Ba’asyir pledged the group’s allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Some members who disagreed with the group’s realignment left to form Jemaah Anshorut Syariah, while most members joined various ISIS-inspired groups, including Jemaah Anshorut Daulah and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.

**Activities:** JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of numerous Indonesian police and innocent civilians. In 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in central Sulawesi. JAT has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since at least 2014. Former JAT members have been involved in ISIS-inspired attacks in Indonesia.

**Strength:** JAT is estimated to have fewer than 1,000 former members scattered among various other Indonesia-based groups.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia.

**Funding and External Aid:** JAT has raised funds through membership donations and legitimate business activities. JAT also has conducted cyber hacking, robbed banks, and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb making materials.

**Jemaah Islamiya**

Aka Jemaa Islamiya; Jema’a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Je ma’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; JI.
**Description:** Jemaah Islamiya (JI) was designated as an FTO on October 23, 2002. JI is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region.

**Activities:** Since 2002, JI has conducted numerous significant JI attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, among them seven U.S. citizens; the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta; the 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; the 2005 suicide bombing in Bali that killed 26 people; and the 2009 suicide attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, where a JI faction claimed responsibility, that killed seven persons and injured more than 50, including seven U.S. citizens. JI has kept to a self-imposed moratorium on attacks since 2009.

More than 400 JI operatives have been captured or killed since 2002, including its emir, Para Wijayanto, who was arrested in 2019. Indonesian police said that between 2013 and 2018, under Wijayanto’s leadership, JI sent at least six groups of individuals to Syria for military training or to participate in the fighting. In 2020, Indonesian authorities arrested a JI leader, Aris Sumarsono, who is suspected of being involved in the making of bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta. In 2021, Indonesian authorities sentenced JI member Taufiq Bulaga to life in prison after finding him guilty for his role in making bombs for a 2005 Bali bombing.

In 2021, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, JI’s leader at the time of his arrest in 2002, was released from prison after serving more than two thirds of a 15-year sentence for helping establish a terrorist training camp. In December, one of the 2002 Bali bombers, Umar Patek, was released from an Indonesian prison on parole.

**Strength:** Estimates of JI membership vary from 500 to several thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** JI has raised funds through membership donations, criminal actions, and business activities. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.

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**EUROPE**

**Continuity Irish Republican Army**

_Aka CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein._

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed
wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the Real IRA (RIRA).

Activities: CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Also in 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle. In 2020, CIRA claimed responsibility for attaching an IED to a truck destined for an unknown location in England; CIRA had allegedly planned for the bomb to go off on the day the United Kingdom left the European Union. In 2021, CIRA claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Fermanagh County, Northern Ireland. CIRA did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

Location/Area of Operation: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

Real IRA

Aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh na hEireann.

Description: The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001. The group was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the 2005 weapons decommissioning. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members (including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt) for a cease-fire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks. Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after the group renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the group. In June 2023, the Department of State amended its FTO designations of RIRA to reflect additional aliases including New IRA as its primary name. Although this amendment occurred outside of
the reporting period for this report, it is included to highlight claimed activity under its new primary name through 2022.

**Activities:** Targets have included civilians (the most notorious example is the Omagh bombing in 1998), British security forces, and police officers in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which oversees the peace process, assessed that RIRA likely was responsible for most of the attacks that occurred after the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was decommissioned in Northern Ireland. In 2012, RIRA rebranded itself as the New Irish Republican Army (New IRA) when members of RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), and several independent republicans came together. In 2016, the New IRA bombed the van of an Irish prison officer in east Belfast; the officer died from complications following the attack. Dublin police also linked the New IRA to a cache of explosives found in Dublin in 2016. In 2017, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a gun attack on police in north Belfast that injured an on-duty officer. In 2019, the New IRA claimed responsibility for four parcel bombs mailed to London and Glasgow and an attempt to murder a police officer in Northern Ireland using a car bomb. Also in 2019, the New IRA admitted responsibility and offered apologies for the shooting and killing of Lyra McKee, a journalist in Northern Ireland. In 2021, the New IRA claimed responsibility for an attempted bomb attack on a police officer in Northern Ireland. In November 2022, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a police vehicle in Northern Ireland.

**Strength:** The Irish government reports that RIRA has roughly 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s cease-fire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

**Location/Area of Operation:** United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

**Funding and External Aid:** RIRA receives funds from money laundering, smuggling, and other criminal activities, is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States, and has attempted to buy weapons from gun dealers in the United States and the Balkans.

**Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front**

**Aka** DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; *Dev Sol Silahlı Devrimci Birlikleri*; *Dev Sol SDB*; *Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*; *Devrimci Sol*; Revolutionary Left.

**Description:** The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. DHKP/C formed in 1978 as *Devrimci Sol*, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of *Dev Genc* (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, and “Front” alludes to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and the Turkish establishment. It strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons.
Activities: Since the late 1980s the group primarily has targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials. In 1990 the group began conducting attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. DHKP/C murdered two U.S. military contractors, wounded a U.S. Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 2001, DHKP/C began conducting its first suicide bombing attacks against Turkish police. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used IEDs against official Turkish and U.S. targets.

In 2015, DHKP/C claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed one police officer and wounded another. That year, Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage and died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by DHKP/C after police attempted to rescue him. Also that year, two women opened fire on the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul; one woman was identified as a DHKP/C member. In mid-2019, two individuals linked to DHKP/C were arrested by Turkish security forces after they had entered the Turkish Parliament and taken a staff member hostage. There have been no known attacks by DHKP/C since mid-2019.

In May, German police arrested three senior members of DHKP/C for organizing the group’s propaganda, recruitment, and funding activities across Germany, and are believed to have supplied fake passports to DHKP/C members. In November, Turkish security forces arrested Gülten Matur, the DHKP/C leader responsible for Türkiye.

Strength: DHKP/C is estimated to have several dozen members inside Türkiye, with a support network throughout Europe.

Location/Area of Operation: Türkiye and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion. The group raises funds primarily in Europe.

Revolutionary Struggle

Aka Epanastatikos Aghonas

Description: Revolutionary Struggle (RS) was designated as an FTO on May 18, 2009. RS is a radical Marxist violent extremist group that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups: 17 November and the Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

Activities: RS first gained notoriety in 2003 when it claimed responsibility for bombings at the Athens Courthouse protesting the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS carried out IED attacks that included a 2004 attack outside a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the 2007 rocket-propelled grenade attack on Embassy Athens, which damaged the building, and the 2009 bombing of a Citibank branch in Athens.
The Greek government has made significant strides in curtailing the group’s terrorist activity. In 2010, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. In 2013, five RS members were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused RS conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Before Maziotis’ recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens in 2014; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties. In 2016 a Greek court sentenced Maziotis to life in prison plus 129 years. In 2017, Roupa was arrested by Greek police in Athens and later sentenced to life and 25 years’ imprisonment. RS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Greece.

**Funding and External Aid:** RS’s sources of funding are unknown, but the group most likely supports itself by means of criminal activities, including bank robbery.

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**THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

**Abdallah Azzam Brigades**

*Aka* Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-‘Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade.

**Description:** Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel earlier that year. The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al-Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

**Activities:** After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers. In 2017, AAB called for jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Beginning in 2013, AAB began targeting Hizbullah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. In subsequent years, AAB claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings, including the 2013 bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 23 people; the 2014 twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four persons; and the 2014 AAB-blamed suicide
bombing in Beirut that killed a security officer. From 2016 through 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.

AAB announced its dissolution in 2019 and did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Lebanon.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

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**Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**

**Aka** al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion.

**Description:** Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. AAMB is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists who emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

**Activities:** During the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002 the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in the country. In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast. Since 2010, AAMB has claimed responsibility for multiple rocket attacks on Israel from the West Bank, including at least 36 rockets launched in 2021. In 2022, AAMB claimed responsibility for attacks that killed several Israeli security personnel.

**Strength:** AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

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**Al-Ashtar Brigades**

**Aka** Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB.

**Description:** Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In 2018, AAB adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.
Activities: Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain, including a 2014 bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates and the 2017 killing of another local Bahraini officer. AAB also has promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Uprising-inspired political uprising. AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq.

Funding and External Aid: AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

Al-Nusrah Front

Aka Jabhat al-Nusra; Jabhet al-Nusra; the Victory Front; al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for Liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Administration for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at.

Description: Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014. It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. The group formed in 2011 when then-al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) — now ISIS — then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells. In 2013 the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state. The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting. In 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency.

Activities: ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict. In 2016 the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian Army, killing both military officials and civilians. ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nur ad-Din al-Zinki as it fought against the regime and continued plotting against U.S. and allied interests. In 2019, ANF bombed the Syrian town of Kafr Takharim, using heavy
weaponry and killing at least five persons. In 2020 an ANF member threw a grenade and
opened fire into a group of civilians in Idlib city, Syria, killing two persons and injuring others.

In 2022, ANF remained the largest and most-dominant militant faction in northwest Syria’s Idlib
province. In a mid-October offensive, ANF took full control of the strategic city of Afrin and at
least 26 towns and villages to the southwest. After several days of fighting between ANF and
Turkish-backed rebel groups, an intervention by Türkiye stopped ANF’s expansion and the
group withdrew from the Afrin region. The clashes killed least 58 people, including 10 civilians,
and forced thousands to flee homes or refugee camps.

**Strength:** ANF has as many as 15,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria, headquartered in Syria’s Idlib province; operationally active
in northwest Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including
kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations
from external Persian Gulf-based donors. The group also generates revenue by collecting fees
from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

### Al-Qa’ida

**Aka** al-Qa’eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; the Base; the
Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy
Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden
Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian
Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for
the Liberation of Holy Sites.

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999. Established in 1988, al-
Qa’ida helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the
former Soviet Union. Al-Qa’ida strives to eliminate western influence from the Muslim world,
topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate
governed by its own interpretation of Sharia that would ultimately be at the center of a new
international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public
declaration of war against the United States. Al-Qa’ida leaders issued a statement in 1998
under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” saying it
was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens — civilian and military — and their allies
everywhere. Al-Qa’ida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in 2001. Although
numerous al-Qa’ida leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011
and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, al-Qa’ida’s likely acting leader remains at large in Iran.

**Activities:** In the 1990s, al-Qa’ida conducted three bombings targeting U.S. troops in Aden,
Yemen; claimed responsibility for shooting down U.S. helicopters and killing U.S. soldiers in
Somalia; and carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing up to 300 people and injuring more than 5,000. Two of the individuals wanted for the embassy bombings, Sayf al-Adl and Abu Mohammed al-Masri, were released from Iranian custody in exchange for an Iranian diplomat who had been kidnapped in Yemen and held hostage since 2015. In 2000, al-Qa’ida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 others.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets — two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed. The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed al-Qa’ida was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015. In 2017, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Zawahiri also released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to attack Indian forces and appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

Several individuals supporting or inspired by al-Qa’ida have been convicted or arrested. In 2017 a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to abetting al-Qa’ida’s 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs. In 2019 a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an al-Qa’ida-inspired bomb attack on the city’s downtown Independence Day parade.

In 2022 the United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri. While al-Qa’ida did not claim responsibility for any attacks, it remained active in 2022.

Strength: Fewer than a dozen al-Qa’ida core members with legacy ties to the group remain in Afghanistan. The deaths or arrests of dozens of mid- and senior-level al-Qa’ida operatives, including Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots. Al-Qa’ida leaders, including those located in Iran, oversee a network of affiliated groups. In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are motivated by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from al-Qa’ida central leadership.

Funding and External Aid: Al-Qa’ida depends primarily on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah, Ansar al Shariah, Partisans of Islamic Law, Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010. In 2009 the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. The announcement signaled the rebirth of an al-Qa’ida franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

Activities: AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in 2009, including a 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan; a 2010 foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States on cargo planes; and the 2015 attack by brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing 12 people. One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

In 2017 a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen. That same year, AQAP attacked a Yemeni Army camp, killing at least two soldiers. In 2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three persons and injured eight others in a shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola. AQAP released a video claiming “full responsibility” for the shooting the following year. In 2021, AQAP killed eight Yemen soldiers and four civilians in an attack on a security forces checkpoint in Abyan governorate.

In 2022, AQAP claimed responsibility for several attacks throughout the year. In February, AQAP kidnapped five UN workers in Abyan governorate, and continues to hold them hostage. In June, AQAP carried out two attacks against pro-government forces in Abyan and Shabwah governorates in Yemen, killing 10 soldiers. In September, AQAP ambushed a security forces checkpoint in Abyan, killing at least 21 Yemeni soldiers — the group’s deadliest attack since 2019.

Strength: AQAP fighters are estimated to be in the low thousands.

Location/Area of Operation: Yemen.
**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

**Ansar al-Islam**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan.

**Description:** Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia.

**Activities:** From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and pro-government militias; seven persons were wounded in the attack.

In 2014, parts of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province. AAI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022. However, it remained active in Syria.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

**Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Rayya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

**Description:** Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-B was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has
been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-B were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AAS-B controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Mali, and Syria.

AAS-B announced its formal dissolution in 2017 owing to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership and defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Benghazi, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

### Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah

**Aka** Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah.

**Description:** Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-D was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-D were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D was believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in that city. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq and Syria. In 2018 there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the Libyan National Army.
AAS-D did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Darnah, Libya.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia**

Aka al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia.

**Description:** Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. Founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine, AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

**Activities:** AAS-T was involved in the 2012 attack against Embassy Tunis and the American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. Embassy employees. In 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members.

AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Libya and Tunisia.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**Army of Islam**

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam.

**Description:** Army of Islam (AOI) was designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011. Founded in 2005, AOI is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealander, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Muntaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

**Note:** AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.
**Activities:** Since 2006, AOI has been responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks including kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist; 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt; the 2011 attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 persons and wounded 100; and rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in 2012.

In 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In 2017 the group released a video meant to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks. In 2020, AOI published more than two dozen images of fighters conducting military training. AOI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt, Gaza, and Israel.

**Funding and External Aid:** AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

**Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq**

**Aka:** AAH; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq min al-Iraq; Asaib al Haq; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq; League of the Righteous; Khazali Network; Khazali Special Group; Qazali Network; the People of the Cave; Khazali Special Groups Network; al-Tayar al-Risali; the Missionary Current.

**Description:** Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was designated as an FTO on January 10, 2020. Led by Qays and Laith al-Khazali, AAH is an Iran-backed, militant organization that remains ideologically aligned with Iran and loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining western military forces from the country.

**Activities:** Since its creation in 2006, AAH has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. The group has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five U.S. soldiers.

In 2019, two individuals assessed to be AAH members were arrested in connection to rockets fired at the Camp Taji military training complex, where U.S. personnel provide divisional training. Also in 2019, AAH members opened fire on a group of protestors trying to set fire to the group’s office in Nasiriya, killing at least six. AAH continued to be active in 2022, including
through indirect fire attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq, typically using front names or proxy groups.

**Strength:** AAH membership is estimated at 10,000.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq, Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAH receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. AAH also receives funding through illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and “taxing”/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant.

**Asbat al-Ansar**

Aka AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar.

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-western influences in the country. AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

**Activities:** Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The group remained active in Lebanon but did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAA likely receives money through international Sunni violent extremist networks.

**Hamas**

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units.
Description: Hamas was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, Hamas is an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was selected as Hamas’s new leader. Hamas remained in de facto control in Gaza in 2022.

Activities: Hamas has conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks. In 2012, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad operatives coordinated and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel. In 2016 a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20 people. Since 2018, Hamas has continued rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory, including an 11-day escalation with Israel in 2021 during which Hamas and other militant groups launched more than 4,000 rockets into Israeli cities.

In May 2022, Israeli security forces thwarted an attack planned by a Hamas cell in Jerusalem. The cell planned to shoot Israeli public figures, launch bombing attacks, and kidnap soldiers.

Strength: Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

Harakat Sawa’d Misr

Aka HASM; Harakah Sawa’id Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; HASM Movement; Hassam Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; Movement of Egypt’s Arms; Movement of Egypt’s Forearms; Hassm; Hamms; Hassam; Hasam.

Description: Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2021. Formed in Egypt in 2015 with the goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government, HASM attacks Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets.
**Activities:** Since 2016, HASM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the 2016 attempted assassination of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, the 2017 assassination of Egyptian National Security Agency officer Ibrahim Azzazy; the 2017 attack on Burma’s embassy in Cairo; and the 2019 car bomb attack targeting security forces in Giza, killing or wounding 10 soldiers. HASM was responsible for a car bombing on a government health institute in Cairo, killing at least 20 people and injuring dozens.

HASM did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

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**Hizballah**

**Aka** Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah.

**Description:** Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran, and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah continues to share a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad and, like Iran, provides assistance — including fighters — to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

**Activities:** Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah also was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. Hizballah assisted Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq who in 2007 attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers. In 2012, Hizballah was responsible for an attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and one Bulgarian.
Several Hizballah operatives have been arrested or tried around the world, including two Hizballah operatives arrested in the United States in 2017. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal during 2011-12. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003 to 2017. In 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, extraditing him to Paraguay for prosecution two years later. In 2020, judges at the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon found Hizballah member Salim Ayyash guilty for his central role in the bomb attack in Beirut in 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

In June, appeals judges sentenced two other Hizballah members, Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi, to life imprisonment for their roles as accomplices in the assassination.

In 2022 the Israeli military shot down three Hizballah-launched drones heading toward one of Israel’s offshore rigs at the Karish gas field, located in disputed waters between Israel and Lebanon. Hizballah confirmed responsibility for the unarmed drones and noted they were intended to send a threatening message to Israel.

Strength: Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon and Syria.

Funding and External Aid: Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah — which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually — accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Aka IRGC; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019. As part of Iran’s military, the IRGC has played a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism
as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

Founded in 1979, the IRGC has since gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The organization’s ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the IRGC also is influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks. The organization is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

Activities: The IRGC — most prominently through its Qods Force — directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC in 2011 plotted a brazen attack against the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Türkiye and Kenya for plotting attacks. An IRGC operative was convicted in 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group. In 2018, Germany uncovered 10 IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. Also in 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. citizens. In 2022 an IRGC member was charged for attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor.

The IRGC is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Persian Gulf. Iran provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The IRGC also is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

Strength: The IRGC has upward of 125,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.

Funding and External Aid: The IRGC continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malignant activities. In 2022 the United States designated an international oil smuggling and money laundering network, led by previously U.S.-designated IRGC-QF official Behnam Shahriyari and former IRGC-QF official Rostam Ghasemi. This network facilitated the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of oil for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah, and it spans several jurisdictions, including Iran and Russia.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel. In 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida, pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden, and his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led AQI during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq until he was killed in June 2006.

In 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq before adopting the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate and separated this group from al-Qa’ida in 2014, before he was killed in 2019. In 2017 the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. Also in 2017, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In 2018 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the Defeat-ISIS Coalition, began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate; however, ISIS remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrating intent to cause and inspire terrorist attacks around the world. This report refers to central ISIS leadership as ISIS-core.

Activities: ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS also was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria and participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in 2014 and claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria, including a 2016 car bombing at a shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people — the deadliest
bombing in the city since 2003. In 2018, ISIS conducted multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive in southwestern Syria, killing more than 200 people.

Since 2019, ISIS has claimed responsibility numerous attacks including the 2019 suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria, that killed 19 people, including four U.S. citizens; the 2019 killing of a U.S. servicemember while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninewa province, Iraq; the 2021 twin suicide bombings in a busy market in Tayaran Square in Baghdad that killed at least 32 people; and a 2021 suicide attack in a busy market in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in east Baghdad, Iraq, that killed 30 people.

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world. In 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people, including 23-year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez. In 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium — one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station, killing 32 people, including four U.S. citizens. In 2016 a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. ISIS also claimed responsibility for two attacks in 2016: one in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens; the second a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for two attacks in the United Kingdom: one a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge, when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five persons; the other a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert. That same year, a man claiming to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five persons. In 2019, ISIS-inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels, killing more than 250 people on Easter Sunday. Also in 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two persons.

In 2022, ISIS attacked Hasakah prison in Syria, triggering a 10-day battle that spilled over into the streets, killing at least 121 SDF soldiers, 374 suspected ISIS militants, and four civilians. Also in 2022, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack at the Shāh Chérāgh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, killing at least 15 people.

**Strength:** Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 8,000 and 16,000, including several thousand foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. ISIS also has abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as 8 years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or otherwise subjected to physical and sexual abuse.
Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world

Funding and External Aid: ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. The organization also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars, scattered across Iraq and Syria, which it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. The territorial defeat of ISIS that eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS’s ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate some revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks and provides financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya

Aka Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarablus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus.

Description: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) was designated as an FTO on May 20, 2016. In 2014, then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch. In 2014, several hundred operatives set up a base in Darnah. The following month, Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya.

Activities: Since its establishment, ISIL-Libya has claimed responsibility for and carried out multiple attacks targeting government officials and civilians throughout Libya, including a 2015 suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli that killed eight persons, including a U.S. contractor; 2018 attacks on Libya’s electoral commission headquarters in Tripoli that killed 14 people, a suicide attack on Libya’s National Oil Corporation headquarters that killed two persons, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed three persons; and a 2021 suicide attack at a police checkpoint in Sabhā, Libya, that killed at least two Libyan National Army personnel.

In January, ISIL-Libya attacked and killed three Libyan security personnel in southwest Libya. This followed an attack on the same brigade a week earlier that killed two members.

Strength: ISIL-Libya is estimated to have fewer than 100 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Libya.

Funding and External Aid: ISIL-Libya’s funding comes from a variety of sources, including criminal activity, such as smuggling and extortion, and external funding. The group also receives support from ISIS.
ISIS-Sinai Province

**Aka** Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; ISIS-SP; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Sinai Province; Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham-Sinai Province; Islamic State-Sinai Province; Islamic State in the Sinai; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Sinai Province; Supporters of the Holy Place; the State of Sinai; Wilayat Sayna; Wilayat Sinai.

**Description:** Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) was designated as an FTO on April 9, 2014. ABM emerged in 2011 following the revolution in Egypt. In 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS. The Department of State amended ABM’s designation to add the aliases ISIL Sinai Province and Islamic State-Sinai Province in 2015 and ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) in 2021, among others.

**Activities:** Before pledging allegiance to ISIS, ABM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli and Egyptian interests from 2012 through 2014, including attacks on Israeli economic and military assets, as well as the Egyptian military and tourist sectors. From 2015 through 2022, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the bombing of a Russian passenger plane, the abduction and killing of a Croatian citizen, rockets launched at Israeli cities, attacks on Egyptian Christians and Sufis, and Egyptian military and security personnel.

In 2020, ISIS-SP increased its attacks against Sinai tribal members, including the killing of a 75-year-old tribal elder who was strapped to a pole with explosives detonated next to him and a suicide bombing that targeted a tribal family gathering and killed at least three persons. Although the Egyptian military, in partnership with tribal fighters of the Sinai Tribal Union, has degraded ISIS-SP, the group continued to target Egyptian security services, including by conducting the first terrorist attack west of the Suez Canal since 2019.

In 2022, ISIS-SP ambushed a military checkpoint guarding a water pumping station, killing 11 Egyptian soldiers. Days later, ISIS-SP killed five Egyptian soldiers and injured four others in an ambush at a border guard checkpoint. In November the group attacked and killed seven Egyptian troops in El Qantara in the Sinai.

**Strength:** ISIS-SP is estimated to have an estimated 500 fighters in the Sinai Peninsula and affiliated cells in the Nile valley.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt.

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-SP receives funding from external actors, including ISIS-core, and from smuggling.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi
**Aka** Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Armed Men of the Naqshabandi Order; Naqshbandi Army; Naqshabandi Army; Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way; Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia; JRTN; JRN; AMNO.

**Description:** Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) was designated as an FTO on September 30, 2015. In 2006 the group announced insurgency operations against international forces in Iraq in response to the execution of Saddam Hussein. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, former vice president of Saddam Hussein’s Revolutionary Council, leads the group, which consists of former Baath Party officials, military personnel, and Sunni nationalists. JRTN aims to overthrow the Government of Iraq, install a new Baathist regime, and end external influence in Baghdad.

**Activities:** Between its founding in 2006 and the 2011 withdrawal of Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces from Iraq, JRTN claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on U.S. bases and forces. JRTN also is known to have used VBIEDs against Iraqi government security forces. In 2014, elements of JRTN joined military forces with ISIS in opposition to the Iraqi government. JRTN played a major role in the capture of Mosul from Iraqi security forces in 2014. However, fissures between ISIS and JRTN quickly emerged after ISIS’s advance in Baiji and Tikrit. Although some elements of JRTN splintered off, most of the organization was subsumed by ISIS. JRTN did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq.

**Funding and External Aid:** JRTN has received funding from former regime members, major tribal figures in Iraq, and from Persian Gulf-based financiers of terrorism.

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**Kata’ib Hizballah**

**Aka** Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezballah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah.

**Description:** Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was designated as an FTO on July 2, 2009. Formed in 2006 as an anti-western Shia group, the group conducted attacks against U.S., Iraqi, and Defeat-ISIS Coalition targets in Iraq and threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians supporting the legitimate political process in Iraq. KH is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda, such as filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to and receives support from Iran.

**Activities:** KH has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety for its attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq. In 2011, five U.S.
soldiers were killed in Baghdad when KH assailants fired multiple rockets at a U.S. military base, Camp Victory.

In 2019, KH members stormed the Bahraini Embassy in Baghdad in protest of Bahrain’s hosting the United States’ Israeli-Palestinian peace conference. KH also was reportedly involved in sniper operations against Iraqi protestors in 2019. In December, KH was blamed for a rocket attack on K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk that killed one U.S. citizen. On December 31, KH members broke into the U.S. Embassy Baghdad compound and participated in a violent attack against the facility, setting fires inside, which destroyed security checkpoints and reception rooms. In 2020, KH reportedly launched rockets at Camp Taji, an American-controlled military base near Baghdad, killing two Americans and one British soldier, and wounding 14 others. In 2021, KH was suspected of a March rocket attack on Ain al-Asad Air Base, which hosts U.S. soldiers.

In 2022, KH remained active in Iraq and Syria, typically using front names or proxy groups to obfuscate its involvement in attacks. In August, KH was suspected of launching two Iranian-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) toward the U.S. base at al-Tanf, Syria. The UAVs reportedly were launched from a KH-controlled area in Iraq.

**Strength:** KH is estimated to have as many as 10,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** KH depends heavily on support from Iran.

### Kurdistan Workers’ Party

*Aka* Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; HSK; Kurdistan People’s Congress; People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL; PKK; KGK; KHK; KCK.

**Description:** The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, PKK is composed primarily of Turkish Kurds who launched a campaign of violence in 1984.

**Activities:** In the early 1990s, PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to engage in urban terrorism. Türkiye became the scene of significant violence, with some estimates suggesting there have been at least 40,000 casualties during the 38 year-long conflict. After the arrest of the PKK’s founder in 1999, the group abandoned the insurgency until 2004, when its hardline militant wing solidified control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire. In 2009 the Turkish government and PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after PKK carried out an attack in 2011 that killed 13 Turkish soldiers. Between 2013 and 2015, the Turkish government and PKK resumed peace negotiations, but the negotiations ultimately failed — owing partly to domestic political pressures and the conflict in Syria.
In 2016 the group claimed a VBIED strike against Sirnak Province police headquarters, which killed 11 people and wounded more than 70 others. In 2017, Turkish officials blamed the PKK for a car bomb and shooting outside of a courthouse that killed two persons and an attack on a military convoy that killed more than 20 soldiers.

Between 2018 and 2021, numerous attacks by PKK were reported against Türkiye security forces and government officials, including a 2018 roadside bomb against a bus carrying workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, killing 7 persons and wounding 13 in Diyarbakir Province’s Kulp district; the 2019 assassination of a senior Turkish diplomat in Erbil, Iraq; several 2020 PKK-claimed attacks aimed at a Türkiye-Iran customs border gate, a natural gas pipeline near the Turkish-Iranian border, and a Turkish military base in northern Iraq. In 2021, PKK was accused of killing 13 Turkish hostages in Iraq.

In April 2022, the Turkish Army Forces launched an offensive against PKK targets in northern Iraq and have been engaged in heavy fighting with the group. In September, Türkiye blamed PKK for an attack on a police guesthouse in southern Türkiye in which one policeman was killed and another injured. In November, Türkiye accused the PKK of being responsible for an explosion in Istanbul that killed at least six persons and wounded 81 others. The PKK denied responsibility for the blast.

**Strength:** PKK is estimated to consist of 4,000 to 5,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq, Iran, Syria, Türkiye, and Europe.

**Funding and External Aid:** PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

**Palestine Islamic Jihad**

*Aka* PIJ; PJU-Shqaqi Faction; PJJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; al-Quds Squads; al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; al-Awdah Brigades.

**Description:** Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, PIJ is committed to the destruction of Israel and to the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, including present-day Israel.

**Activities:** PIJ has conducted numerous attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets, including 2014 attacks on Israeli buses in Tel Aviv and a 2016 plot to abduct and kill an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier and carry out a mass-casualty attack on a reception hall in Beersheba. Over the past decade, PIJ has carried out waves of rocket attacks into Israeli territory. In August, PIJ launched more than 1,000 rockets toward Israel during a deadly three-day clash that ended in a ceasefire brokered by Egypt. PIJ’s two most senior commanders, Tayseer Jabari and Khaled Mansour, were killed by Israeli airstrikes in the fighting.
**Strength:** PIJ is estimated to have a thousand to several thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.

**Funding and External Aid:** PIJ receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran. PIJ has partnered with Iran- and Syria-sponsored Hizballah to carry out joint operations.

**Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction**

**Aka** PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front.

**Description:** The Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. In the late 1970s, PLF splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. It later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (aka Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Activities:** PLF was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Throughout the 1990s, PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups. In 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq. After not claiming an attack for 16 years, PLF claimed responsibility for the 2008 assault against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, Israel, and the shooting of an Israeli settler. In 2010, PLF claimed responsibility for an IED attack against an IDF patrol, which caused minor injuries to a soldier; another IED was discovered during a search of the area. PLF has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016 but continues to maintain a strong presence in many refugee camps in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

**Aka** PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion.

**Description:** The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. PLFP is a Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash after splitting from the Arab Nationalist Movement. The group earned a reputation for committing
large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed more than 20 U.S. citizens.

**Activities:** PFLP increased its operational activity during the Second Palestinian Intifada. During that time the group assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001, carried out at least two suicide operations, and with other Palestinian terrorist groups launched multiple joint operations.

Since 2014, PFLP has conducted numerous attacks, including a 2014 attack in which two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with PFLP entered a Jerusalem synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing five persons, including three U.S. citizens; a 2017 attack involving two PFLP members near East Jerusalem’s Old City that killed an Israeli border security agent. Two of the militants were PFLP members, although ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack; and an alleged 2019 PFLP detonation of an IED in the West Bank, killing an Israeli teenager and seriously wounding two others. In 2020, Israeli security forces in the West Bank arrested approximately 50 members of a PFLP cell believed to be behind a string of deadly attacks in the area and seized weapons and bomb making materials. In 2021, PFLP claimed responsibility for 36 rockets fired at Israel. PFLP remained active but did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown.

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**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command**

**Aka** PFLP-GC.

**Description:** The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. PFLP-GC split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1968, claiming it wanted to concentrate more on resistance and less on politics. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, led PFLP-GC until his death in 2021 and was succeeded by Talal Naji. PFLP-GC has close ties to both Syria and Iran.

**Activities:** PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for conducting cross-border attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Since the early 1990s the group has focused primarily on supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons. PFLP-GC also has been implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel. In 2009 the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Israel.
In 2012, PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although four Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives later were arrested for the attack. In 2015, PFLP-GC reportedly began fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria, while also receiving logistical and military aid from Hizballah and Iran. Separately that year, PFLP-GC took responsibility for rocket fire aimed at Israeli territory. In that attack, at least three rockets were fired from Lebanon into northern Israel and landed near Shlomi, a small town near the Lebanese frontier with Israel.

PFLP-GC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** PFLP-GC has several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

**Funding and External Aid:** PFLP-GC receives safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria as well as financial support from Iran.

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**SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

**Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent**

*Aka* al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; *Qaedaat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent.*

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was designated as an FTO on July 1, 2016. Established in 2014, AQIS focuses on terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. In 2019, Asim Umar, the former head of AQIS, was killed in a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation. Its current leader is Osama Mehmood.

**Activities:** In 2014, AQIS claimed responsibility for an attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi, Pakistan, in which militants attempted a hijacking of a Pakistani Navy frigate to attack nearby U.S. warships. AQIS also claimed attacks against human rights activists and secular writers in Bangladesh, including U.S. citizen Avijit Roy, Embassy Dhaka local employee Xulhaz Mannan, and Bangladeshi nationals Oyasiqur Rahman Babu, Ahmed Rajib Haideer, and A.K.M. Shafiul Islam. In 2017, AQAP called on AQIS to launch attacks on Burmese authorities because of Burma’s policies toward Rohingya Muslims.

In 2020, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested 10 alleged al Qa’ida-affiliated operatives from Kerala and West Bengal. In 2021, NIA arrested five alleged AQIS operatives in Lucknow on charges of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack in Uttar Pradesh. Also in 2021, AQIS released two propaganda videos specifically targeting audiences in India and Kashmir.

In June, AQIS threatened to conduct suicide bombings in several Indian cities.

**Strength:** AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 members.
Location/Area of Operations: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: AQIS likely receives funding from al-Qa’ida senior leadership and engages in general criminal activity, kidnapping, and extortion.

Haqqani Network

Aka HQN.

Description: The Haqqani Network (HQN) was designated as an FTO on September 19, 2012. HQN was formed in the late 1980s, around the time of the then-Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. HQN’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid-1980s and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Haqqani retreated to Pakistan, where his son Sirajuddin continued to direct and conduct HQN’s terrorist activity in Afghanistan. In 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed deputy leader of the Taliban. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed as the Taliban’s then so-called Minister of the Interior.

Activities: Before the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces in 2021, HQN planned and carried out numerous significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Ghani administration officials, and civilian targets. In 2011, HQN wounded 77 U.S. soldiers in a truck bombing in Maidan Wardak province and conducted a 19-hour attack on Embassy Kabul and International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, killing 16 Afghans. In 2012, an HQN suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100 others.

In 2016, HQN was blamed for an attack in Kabul against a government security agency tasked with providing protection to senior government officials, killing 64 people and injuring more than 300. In 2017, Afghan officials blamed HQN for a truck bomb that exploded in Kabul, killing more than 150 people. Later that year, an American woman and her family were recovered after five years of HQN captivity. HQN was believed to be responsible for a 2018 ambulance bombing in Kabul that killed more than 100 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for a 2018 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul that killed 22 people, including four U.S. citizens, and Sirajuddin Haqqani held a ceremony at the Intercontinental Hotel in 2021 honoring deceased suicide bombers. In 2019, HQN released two hostages, including a U.S. citizen, who had been kidnapped at gunpoint in 2016. In 2020 the Ghani administration identified HQN as responsible for an attack on a military court in Paktika province killing at least five, as well as for a bombing in Kabul that killed three civilians.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, several HQN leaders were appointed to positions in the so-called “interim government” announced by the Taliban. In addition to Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as the Taliban’s so-called interior minister, Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani was appointed as the Minister of Refugees. In 2022, senior HQN leaders provided now-deceased al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri safe haven in Kabul before the U.S.
counterterrorism operation that killed Zawahiri in August. HQN did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Before the Taliban takeover, the HQN was estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** HQN is funded primarily from taxes on local commerce, extortion, smuggling, and other illicit activities and illicit business ventures. In addition to the funding it receives as part of the broader Afghan Taliban, the group has received some funds from donors in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf region.

**Harakat-ul Jihad-i-Islami**


**Description:** Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was designated as an FTO on August 6, 2010. HUJI was formed in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the group redirected its efforts toward India. HUJI seeks the annexation of the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and has supplied fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

HUJI historically focused its activities on the Afghanistan-Pakistan front and was composed of Pakistani terrorists and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. The group experienced internal splits, and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida.

**Activities:** HUJI claimed responsibility for the 2011 bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 persons dead and an estimated 76 wounded. The group emailed the press, stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. HUJI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

**Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh**

**Description:** Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was designated as an FTO on March 5, 2008. Formed in 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans, HUJI-B seeks to establish hardline Islamist rule in Bangladesh with the use of violence. In 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. HUJI-B leaders signed the 1998 Fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared U.S. civilians legitimate targets. HUJI-B has connections to al-Qa’ida and Pakistani terrorist groups advocating similar objectives, including HUJI and Lashkar e-Tayyiba.

**Activities:** In 2008, three HUJI-B members, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, were convicted for the 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British high commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria in a 2005 grenade attack. In 2013, Bangladeshi police arrested a group of terrorists, including HUJI-B members, who were preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals.

In 2017, Bangladeshi authorities executed HUJI-B leader Hannan and two associates for the 2004 grenade attack. In 2019, Dhaka police arrested three HUJI-B operatives reportedly attempting to revive the group’s operations. From 2020 to 2022, Bangladeshi courts continued to sentence members of HUJI-B to death for their involvement in HUJI-B attacks. HUJI-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans; its total membership is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bangladesh and India.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B.

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**Harakat ul-Mujahideen**

Aka HUM; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Ansar ul Ummah.

**Description:** Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. HUM seeks the annexation of the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan. In 2005, HUM’s long-time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in 2001. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar; Pakistan banned the group in 2003.

**Activities:** HUM has conducted numerous operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in India’s northeastern states. In 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner, which led to the release of Masood Azhar, an important
leader who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India also released Ahmed Omar Sheikh as a result of the hijacking. Sheikh was later convicted of the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. HUM has conducted attacks targeting Indian interests including the late 2015 strikes in Handwor and Poonch, which resulted in the deaths of five Indian Army personnel. HUM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** After 2000 a significant portion of HUM’s membership defected to JeM, and only a small number of cadres are reported to be still active.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HUM conducts operations primarily in Afghanistan and in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It operates from Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir and in other cities in Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUM collects donations from wealthy donors in Pakistan.

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**Hizbul Mujahadeen**

Aka HM; Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

**Description:** Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was designated as an FTO on August 17, 2017. The group was formed in 1989 and is one of the largest and oldest militant groups operating in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. HM is led by Mohammad Yusuf Shah and officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group concentrates its attacks on Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. HM is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

**Activities:** HM is suspected of or has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, including the 2018 abduction and killing of three police officials; a 2019 grenade attack on a bus stand that killed a teenager and injured 32 other people; and a 2020 attack by three HM militants who opened fire on Indian soldiers during a search operation, killing one soldier. In 2021, a top HM commander was killed in a gunfight with police after opening fire on security personnel accompanying him during a search operation at his hideout.

In March, Indian police arrested three HM members in connection with the killing of a village leader. In May, Indian police killed two HM members, recovering weapons and ammunition in the encounter.

**Strength:** HM is estimated to have up to 1,500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown, but HM is suspected to receive some funding from sources in Pakistan as well as from local fundraising.
Indian Mujahedeen


Description: The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as an FTO on September 19, 2011. The India-based terrorist group has been responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other terrorist entities, including ISIS, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami. IM’s stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their alleged oppression of Muslims.

Activities: IM has carried out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas to maximize terror and casualties, including 16 synchronized bomb blasts in 2008 aimed at crowded urban centers, killing 30 people in Delhi and 38 people at a local hospital in Ahmedabad; a 2010 bombing of a popular German bakery frequented by tourists in Pune, India, killing 17 people and injuring more than 60 others; and a 2014 low-intensity blast near a restaurant in Bangalore that killed one woman and injured three other people. Three IM militants were arrested in 2015, and authorities also uncovered that the group planned to carry out attacks on India’s Republic Day and had provided explosives for attacks in other parts of the country.

In 2016, IM was increasingly linked to ISIS. That year, six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India. A month later, it was reported that an IM cell linked to ISIS was plotting attacks on multiple targets in Hyderabad and had purchased chemicals to make high-grade explosives for the planned operations. In 2017, Indian law enforcement uncovered the plans of an IM militant in custody to conduct attacks in India, including targeted killings and bombing a temple in Gaya. IM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: India.

Funding and External Aid: IM is suspected of obtaining funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

Islamic Jihad Union

Aka Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; the Jamaat Mojahedin; the Kazakh Jama’at; the Libyan Society.

Description: Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) was designated as an FTO on June 17, 2005. The group splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s. Najmiddin Jalolov
founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group in 2002, but the group was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in 2005. Although IJU was formed to overthrow the Government of Uzbekistan, today it is active primarily in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Syria, where many of its members relocated from Afghanistan.

Activities: IJU remains a threat to Central Asia. IJU claimed responsibility for attacks in 2004 in Uzbekistan, which targeted police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In 2004 the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbekistani prosecutor general’s office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent.

In 2007, German authorities detained three IJU operatives, including two German converts, disrupting the group’s plans to attack targets in Germany — including Ramstein Airbase, where the primary targets would have been U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and civilians. In 2013, two IJU videos showed attacks against a U.S. military base in Afghanistan and an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier. In 2015, IJU participated in the five-month-long Taliban siege of Kunduz city. At least 13 police officers and hundreds of civilians were killed in the attacks.

In 2017, IJU released a video showing its militants using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades to fight Afghan troops in late 2016. IJU released a second video in 2018 showing a joint raid with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. In 2019 the UN confirmed that IJU was operating inside Syria under control of al-Nusra Front. IJU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: IJU consists of 100 to 200 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Syria, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Aka IMU.

Description: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was designated as an FTO on September 25, 2000. IMU was established to overthrow the Uzbekistani government and establish an Islamic state. For most of the past decade, however, the group has recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe. Despite its stated objective to set up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group operates in northern Afghanistan, where it previously fought against international forces. Several IMU members are also suspected of having traveled to Syria to fight with terrorist groups.

IMU has had a more than decade-long relationship with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan. Top IMU leaders integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow
government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces when the Taliban battled the Afghan government. In 2015, IMU leader Usman Ghazi publicly announced the group’s shift of allegiance to ISIS; it has since cooperated with Islamic State’s Khorasan Province. In 2016 a faction of IMU announced its continued commitment to the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, marking a split with Ghazi and the rest of the group. Numerous IMU members, including possibly Ghazi himself, were subsequently reported to have been killed as a result of hostilities between ISIS and IMU’s former Taliban allies.

**Activities:** In 2014, IMU claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi’s international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people. Throughout 2015, IMU actively threatened the Afghan government, primarily in the northern part of the country. In 2015 the group released a video showing IMU members beheading an individual they claimed to be an Afghan soldier and threatened to behead Hazaras (a historically persecuted ethnic group in Afghanistan) whom they were holding hostage, in supposed retaliation for the Afghan security forces’ capture of several female IMU members.

In 2016, Uzbek refugee Fazliddin Kurbanov was sentenced by a U.S. federal court to 25 years in prison for planning a bomb attack in Idaho. Kurbanov had been in online contact with members of IMU, seeking advice on how to make explosives and discussing attacking U.S. military bases. IMU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** IMU consists of up to 500 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Türkiye, and Central Asia.

**Funding and External Aid:** IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia.

**ISIS-Bangladesh**

**Aka** Caliphate in Bangladesh; Caliphate’s Soldiers in Bangladesh; Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh; Khalifa’s Soldiers in Bengal; Islamic State Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bangladesh; ISB; ISISB; Abu Jandal al-Bangali; Neo-JMB; New JMB; Neo-Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh.

**Description:** ISIS-Bangladesh was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. Created in 2014, ISIS-Bangladesh has described itself as ISIS’s official branch in Bangladesh and was born out of ISIS’s desire to expand its campaign to the Indian subcontinent. Coinciding with the announcement of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, a group of Bangladeshi nationals pledged allegiance to ISIS and vowed to organize Bengali Muslims under the leadership of then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

**Activities:** ISIS-Bangladesh has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the 2015 Christmas Day suicide attack at a mosque packed with Ahmadi Muslims; the 2016 assault on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka that killed 22 people, including one U.S. citizen; twin 2017
explosions that targeted a crowd in Sylhet, Bangladesh, killing six persons; and several 2019 explosions against police officers, civilians, a Bangladeshi minister and the Awami League.

In 2020, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for an IED blast near a police box in Chattogram and a bomb attack at a Hindu temple in the Naogaon district. That same year, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Dhaka that injured five persons, four of them police officers. ISIS Bangladesh did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

**Strength:** ISIS-Bangladesh has several hundred supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bangladesh.

**Funding and External Aid:** Although ISIS-Bangladesh’s sources of funding are largely unknown, the group does receive some support from ISIS.

**Islamic State's Khorasan Province**

**Aka** The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province; the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan; Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in Khorasan Province; Islamic State Khurasan; ISISK; ISIS-K; IS-Khorasan; ISKP; IS-KP; ISIS Wilayat Khorasan; ISIL’s South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL; ISIL Khorasan.

**Description:** Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2016. The group is based in Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is composed primarily of former members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. ISIS-K’s senior leadership pledged allegiance to then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which was accepted in 2015.

**Activities:** In 2020, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Sikh house of worship in Kabul that killed 25 worshipers and wounded 8 others. Also in 2020, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, that killed at least 29 people and injured more than 50 others and a suicide bombing outside an education center in Kabul that killed at least 18 people and injured at least 57 others.

In 2021, ISIS-K attacks increased following the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, including a suicide bombing against the Kabul airport as the United States and other governments conducted a large-scale evacuation of their citizens and vulnerable Afghans from the country. At least 185 people were killed in the attack, including 13 U.S. servicemembers supporting evacuation operations; at least another 150 people, including 18 U.S. servicemembers, were wounded. Also in 2021, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for multiple IED attacks in Jalalabad that killed at least 35 Taliban members and three civilians; a suicide bombing of a mosque in Kunduz that killed at least 50 civilians and injured 143 others; a suicide bombing of a mosque in Kandahar that killed at least 47 civilians and injured at least 70 others;
and an attack against a military hospital in Kabul that killed at least 20 people and injured dozens more.

In 2022, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for attacks conducted across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, including a March suicide bombing of a mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan, that killed at least 60 civilians and injured 200 others; an April bombing at a mosque in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, that killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 90 others; an April attack on a bus in Kunduz, Afghanistan, that killed at least four persons and wounded 18; an April rocket attack against Uzbekistan; a May rocket attack against Tajikistan launched from Afghanistan; a June attack on a Sikh Temple in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed two persons and wounded seven others; a September suicide bombing targeting the Russian Embassy in Kabul that killed at least six persons and wounded at least 10 others; and a December attack on the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul that injured one person.

**Strength:** ISIS-K is estimated to have about 2,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-K receives some funding from ISIS-core. Additional funds come from illicit criminal commerce, taxes, and extortion on the local population and businesses.

### Jaish-e-Mohammed

**Aka** Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed.

**Description:** Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001. JeM was founded in 2000 by former Harakat ul-Mujahideen senior leader Masood Azhar. The group aims to annex the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States.

**Activities:** JeM continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan, conducting fatal attacks in the region, despite the country’s 2002 ban on its activities. The group has claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in Jammu and Kashmir, including a 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government publicly implicated JeM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, in the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine persons and injured 18 others. In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JeM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. In 2003, Pakistan implicated JeM members in two assassination attempts against then-President Pervez Musharraf.

In 2019, JeM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed 40 personnel from India’s Central Reserve Police Force in the city of Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir.
In April, suspected JeM members attacked a bus transporting Indian security forces, killing one security officer and injuring nine. In August, two suspected JeM members conducted a suicide attack against an Indian Army camp that killed four soldiers.

**Strength:** JeM has several hundred armed supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** To avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani government, since 2007 JeM has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods. JeM also collects funds through donation requests, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations.

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**Jaysh al-Adl**

*Aka* People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran; Jundallah; Jondullah; Jundollah; Jondollah; Jundallah; Army of God (God’s Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM); Jeysh al-Adl; Army of Justice; Jaish ul-Adl; Jaish al-Adl; Jaish Aladl; Jeish al-Adl.

**Description:** Jaysh al-Adl was designated as an FTO on November 4, 2010, under the name Jundallah. Since its inception in 2003, Jaysh al-Adl has engaged in numerous attacks, killing and maiming scores of Iranian civilians and government officials. The group seeks to secure recognition of Baloch cultural, economic, and political rights from the Government of Iran and spread awareness of the plight of the Baloch people. The group adopted the name Jaysh al-Adl in 2012 and has since claimed responsibility for attacks under that name.

**Activities:** Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including a 2009 suicide bomb attack in Sistan and Balochistan Province that killed more than 40 people and was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s; a 2010 suicide bomb attack inside the Iman Hussein Mosque in Chabahar, which killed an estimated 35 to 40 civilians and wounded 60 to 100 others; and the 2010 attack against the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing about 30 people and injuring an estimated 300.

Jaysh al-Adal also has claimed responsibility for attacks against Iranian security personnel and officials, including the 2018 abduction of 12 Iranian security personnel on the border with Pakistan; a 2019 suicide car bombing in southeastern Iran that killed 27 Iranian government officials; and two 2020 roadside bombs on the course of an Iranian military convoy (one of the bombs detonated, injuring one person).

In September, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station that killed 19 people.
Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of support are unknown.

Lashkar e-Tayyiba

Aka al Mansoooreen; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama’at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama’at-i-Dawat; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; Jama’at-ud-Da’awa; Jamaat-ud-Da’wa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmate-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiF; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; Falah-e-Insaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity; Humanitarian Welfare Foundation; Human Welfare Foundation; al-Anfal Trust; Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool; TehrikeTahafuz Qibla Awwal; al-Muhammadia Students; al-Muhammadia Students Pakistan; AMS; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir; Kashmir Freedom Movement; Tehreek Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; TAJK; Movement for Freedom of Kashmir; Tehreek-i-Azadi-i Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Jammu and Kashmir; Milli Muslim League; Milli Muslim League Pakistan; MML.

Description: Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) was designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001. LeT is an anti-India-focused terrorist group, originally formed in the late 1980s as the terrorist wing of Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad, a Pakistan-based extremist organization and charity originally formed to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The organization is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Shortly after LeT’s FTO designation, Saeed changed the group’s name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and launched humanitarian projects to circumvent sanctions. LeT disseminates its message through JUD’s media outlets.

Elements of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) have combined with other groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen to mount anti-India attacks. The Pakistani government banned LeT in 2002 and arrested Hafiz Saeed temporarily, following the 2008 Mumbai attack. In 2017, Pakistan placed Saeed under house arrest; however, he was released 10 months later after a Lahore High Court judicial body rejected a government request to renew his detention. In 2019, Pakistani police again arrested Saeed and charged him with financing terrorism. In 2020, Saeed was found guilty on charges of terrorism financing and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Activities: LeT has conducted operations, including several high-profile attacks, against Indian troops and civilian targets since 1993, including the 2008 attacks in Mumbai against luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a popular café that killed 166 people, including six U.S. citizens, and injured more than 300 others. In 2010, Pakistani-American businessman David Headley pleaded guilty in a U.S. court to charges related to his role in the 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai and to charges related to a separate plot to bomb the Danish

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newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. Headley testified in the trials of other LeT supporters in 2011 and 2015.

In 2017, LeT conducted an attack in Jammu and Kashmir that left six police officers dead. The following month, LeT militants attacked a bus of pilgrims returning from the Amarnath Yatra shrine, killing seven persons. In 2018, LeT claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an Indian Army camp in Jammu and Kashmir’s Bandipora district that killed three soldiers.

In May, two suspected LeT members shot and killed a government employee in his office in Kashmir’s Budgam district. Also in May, suspected LeT members attacked a store in Kashmir’s Baramulla district, which injured four persons. In June, suspected LeT members threw a grenade at civilians in Shopian district, Kashmir, killing two persons.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** LeT collects donations in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states as well as from other donors in the Middle East and Europe — particularly the United Kingdom, where it is a designated terrorist organization. In 2019, LeT and its front organizations continued to operate and fundraise in Pakistan.

**Lashkar i Jhangvi**

Aka Army of Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi al-Alami; Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi al-Almi; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi; LeJ al-Alami.

**Description:** Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) was designated as an FTO on January 30, 2003. LJ is the terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ carries out anti-Shia and other sectarian attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan banned the group in 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence, causing many LJ members to seek refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom the group had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists and have since provided them with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities. LJ works closely with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.

**Activities:** LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted to killing Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan, including the 1999 attempt to assassinate then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, chief minister of Pakistan’s Punjab province.

Since at least 2014, LJ has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against the Shia community, including a 2014 bus bombing targeting Shia pilgrims, killing 24 people; the 2015 suicide bombing that targeted a market in the predominantly Shia town of Parachinar, Pakistan,
killing at least 23 people; and the 2019 bombing of a market in Quetta that killed 20 people and
injured 48 others. The Quetta attack reportedly targeted the local minority Shia Muslim Hazara
community. In 2021, three LJ members were allegedly involved in a bomb attack on the Shia
minority community in Punjab that killed at least three persons and wounded 50 others. LJ did
not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: LJ’s membership is assessed to be in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: LJ’s funding comes from wealthy donors in Pakistan and the Middle
East, particularly Persian Gulf states. The group engages in criminal activity, including extortion,
to fund its activities.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Aka LTTE; Ellalan Force; Tamil Tigers.

Description: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was designated as an FTO on October
8, 1997. Founded in 1976, LTTE is a Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka. Despite its
military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government in 2009, the LTTE’s international
network of sympathizers and financial support has persisted.

Activities: Although largely inactive since 2009, the LTTE was responsible for an integrated
insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan leaders. In early 2009,
Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE’s key strongholds, including its capital of Kilinochchi. In
2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed members of its leadership
including leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, and declared military victory.

There have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka attributed to the LTTE since 2009, but LTTE
supporters and members have been arrested in India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka for allegedly
planning attacks and fundraising for the LTTE.

In January, Indian authorities arrested a Sri Lankan national and alleged LTTE member allegedly
seeking to raise funds for LTTE using fake documents. In March, Indian authorities arrested six
Sri Lankan nationals and alleged LTTE members transporting narcotics and weapons to raise
funds for LTTE activities.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Sri Lanka, India, and Malaysia.
Funding and External Aid: The LTTE’s financial network of support continued after the group’s military defeat in 2009. The LTTE has employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for its activities.

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Aka Pakistani Taliban; Tehreek-e-Taliban; Tehreek-e-Taliban; Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; TTP.

Description: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was designated as an FTO on September 1, 2010. Formed in 2007, TPP is a Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based terrorist organization that opposes Pakistani military efforts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the former tribal areas, and other areas of the country. TTP aims to push the Government of Pakistan out of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and establish Sharia by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani military and state. TTP draws ideological guidance from al-Qa’ida, while elements of al-Qa’ida rely in part on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border. This arrangement has given TTP access to both al-Qa’ida’s global terrorist network and its members’ operational expertise.

Activities: TTP has carried out and claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests, including a 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens, and a 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens. TTP is suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The group directed and facilitated Faisal Shahzad’s failed attempt to detonate an explosive device in New York City’s Times Square in 2010.

Between 2011 and 2018, TTP continued to carry out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and Pakistani civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. These attacks killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and Pakistani government and law enforcement officials. In 2014, TTP carried out two consecutive attacks against Karachi’s international airport and a siege on a primary school in Peshawar that killed 145 people, 132 of whom were children.

TTP’s rate of attacks increased after it announced a merger with splinter groups Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar in 2020. In 2021, TTP claimed responsibility for an increased number of attacks in the months following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, claiming 69 attacks in a two-month span. In 2022, TTP and its affiliate groups conducted more than 290 attacks, most of which targeted Pakistani security forces and occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. In June, TTP agreed to an indefinite ceasefire with the Government of Pakistan as part of peace talks brokered by the Taliban, though their attacks continued. In late November, TTP ended the ceasefire and dramatically increased attacks against security forces throughout December.

Strength: TTP is estimated to have between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** TTP likely raises most of its funds through kidnapping-for-ransom payments, extortion, and other criminal activity.

### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

**National Liberation Army (ELN)**

**Aka** ELN; Ejército de Liberación Nacional.

**Description:** The National Liberation Army (ELN) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ELN is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964. It remains focused on attacking the security services and economic infrastructure — in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons — and on extorting foreign and local companies. ELN commits crimes and acts of terror throughout Colombia, including violence against civilian populations there and in Venezuela.

**Activities:** ELN continued to target Colombia’s infrastructure. It has also launched mortar attacks on police stations and the military; placed explosive devices near roads; engaged in sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes; and kidnapped civilians and members of Colombia’s security services.

In 2017 the Government of Colombia and ELN conducted peace talks but did not ultimately reach an agreement. Peace talks were intermittent throughout 2018 after being suspended early in the year following a series of ELN bombings that killed several police officers and injured dozens more. The government ended talks following a 2019 VBIED attack by ELN on the General Santander National Police Academy. The attack was the deadliest Bogotá had experienced in years, killing 22 police cadets and injuring 87 more.

In 2022, ELN militants blew up a bridge in Caesar Department, Colombia, set fire to vehicles along the road connecting the Colombian cities of Popayán and Cali, and set off bombs between the Colombian municipalities of Socorro and San Gil, which injured eight persons.

**Strength:** ELN consists of about 2,500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Colombia and Venezuela.

**Funding and External Aid:** ELN draws its funding from its involvement in drug trafficking activities, extortion of oil and gas companies and landowners, and illegal mining in Colombia and Venezuela. Additional funds are derived from kidnapping-for-ransom payments.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP)

**Aka** FARC-EP; Central General Staff; Estado Mayor Central (EMC).

**Description:** FARC-EP was designated as an FTO on November 30, 2021. Using the moniker of the former FARC, FARC-EP is responsible for the vast majority of armed attacks attributed to FARC dissident elements since 2019. The FARC-EP is led by Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias Ivan Mordisco. In May 2022, former second-in-command Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, was killed in Venezuela, allegedly during a confrontation with drug trafficking groups.

**Activities:** FARC-EP has been responsible for the killing of political candidates and former FARC members, and the kidnapping of a political operative. In 2021, FARC-EP claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack at the mayor’s office in Corinto, Colombia, which injured 43 people, among them several public officials; and for a June attack against a Colombian Army base, which wounded 44 people, including two U.S. military advisers. Also in June 2021, FARC-EP shot at a helicopter carrying then Colombian President Ivan Duque. In 2022, FARC-EP conducted an ambush of a Colombian Army patrol in Cauca, killing six soldiers.

**Strength:** FARC-EP is estimated to have 2,700 to 3,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Colombia and Venezuela.

**Funding and External Aid:** FARC-EP is funded primarily by involvement in illicit activity, including extortion, international drug trade, and illegal mining.

Segunda Marquetalia (SM)

**Aka** New Marquetalia; Second Marquetalia; La Nueva Marquetalia; FARC dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; FARC-D Segunda Marquetalia; FARC-SM.

**Description:** Segunda Marquetalia was designated as an FTO on November 30, 2021. In 2019, former FARC commanders, led by Luciano Marin Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, established Segunda Marquetalia after abandoning the 2016 Colombian Peace Accord.

**Activities:** Segunda Marquetalia has been responsible for the killings of former FARC members and community leaders. Segunda Marquetalia conducts armed assaults, assassination, extortion operations, and hostage-takings, including the kidnapping and holding for ransom of government employees and the attempted killings of political leaders. In 2020 the Colombian police foiled an attempt by Segunda Marquetalia to assassinate former FARC commander and current president of the Comunes — also called Common People’s party — Rodrigo Londono Echeverri, alias Timochenko. Segunda Marquetalia did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.
Strength: Segunda Marquetalia is estimated to have as many as 1,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Colombia and Venezuela.

Funding and External Aid: Segunda Marquetalia is funded primarily by involvement in illicit activity, including extortion, international drug trade, and illegal mining.

Shining Path (SL)

Aka Sendero Luminoso (SL); Militarized Communist Party of Peru (Militarizado Partido Comunista del Peru-MPCP); Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (PCP-SL).

Description: Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The Peru-based terrorist organization was founded in 1969 by former university professor Abimael Guzmán, whose teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. During the 1980s to the early 1990s, SL was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. In 1992 the Peruvian government captured Guzmán and key accomplices and sentenced them to life in prison; Guzmán died there in 2021. SL is led by Victor Quispe Palomino, alias Comrade Jose, and Tarcela Loya Vilchez, alias Olga. Historically, the group aimed to overthrow the Peruvian government.

Activities: SL typically targets Peruvian security services and has been known to conduct attacks against civilians. In mid-2021, members of an armed group affiliated with SL murdered 16 civilians, stating that the victims’ activities were inconsistent with the group’s beliefs. SL conducts a range of illicit activities, inducing extortion, murder, and drug trafficking. In 2022, SL conducted at least five attacks.

Strength: Estimates of SL’s strength vary, but experts assess it to number between 250 and 300 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Peru

Funding and External Aid: SL is funded by drug trafficking and collecting taxes from drug trafficking organizations operating in remote eastern part of Peru known as the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley, a vast jungle area near the Andes mountains where most of Peru’s coca cultivation and production occurs.
Chapter 6. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 is submitted in compliance with Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f or the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutory excerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a discussion of the interpretation and application of those terms in this report are included below.

Excerpts and Summary of Key Statutory Terms

Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(a)) states as follows:

(a) ... The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing —

(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country;

(i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;

(ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to section 4605(j) of Title 50 [deemed under Section 1768(c)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA FY19) to refer to section 1754(c) of the NDAA FY19 as of August 13, 2018]; and

(iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report; and

(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations;

(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 4605(j) of Title 50, any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;
(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on —

(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and

(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656f(a) as follows:

(1) The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(2) The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

**Interpretation and Application of Key Terms.** For purposes of this report, the terms “international terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitions assigned to them in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d) (see above). The term “non-combatant,” which is referred to but not defined in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.

It should be noted that 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d) is one of many U.S. statutes and international legal instruments that concern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which use definitions for terrorism and related terms that are different from those used in this report. The interpretation and application of defined and related terms concerning terrorism in this report are therefore specific to the statutory and other requirements of the report, and not intended to express the views of the U.S. government on how these terms should be interpreted or applied for any other purpose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlation between the interpretation of terms such as “non-combatant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribed to similar terms pursuant to the law of war (which encapsulates the
obligations of states and individuals with respect to their activities in situations of armed conflict).

**Statistical Information.** Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(b), this report should contain “to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year.” This is satisfied through the inclusion of a statistical annex to the report that sets out statistical information provided by Development Services Group, Inc. (DSG). The statistical annex includes a discussion of the methodology employed by DSG in compiling the relevant data. This report does not contain statistical information specifically concerning combatants. The focus of the terrorism report, as is clear from the definition of terrorism, is on violence against noncombatant targets.

**Contextual Reporting.** Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national population is not meant to imply that all members of that population are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything other than a tiny fraction of such larger populations. It is terrorist groups – and their actions – that are the focus of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence.

Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily “international terrorism” and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.
Appendix B. Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, and Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens

Provided by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The term “Private U.S. citizen” refers to any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government; therefore, these figures do not include U.S. military personnel killed or injured in a terrorism-related incident while on active duty or employees of the Department of State and other federal agencies while overseas on U.S. government orders. Members of U.S. government employees’ households and U.S. citizens working for contractors hired by the U.S. government, however, are considered private U.S. citizens for purposes of this report.

Although every effort was made to include all terrorism-related deaths and injuries involving private U.S. citizens overseas, the figures below reflect only those cases reported to, or known by, the Department of State. These figures were acquired through consular systems. Embassies and consulates abroad report overseas deaths in consular systems and specify the cause of death. Terrorism-related deaths are evaluated by first collecting those data and then contacting posts individually to determine whether there is sufficient official documentation to designate the death as terrorism-related. These figures may not reflect actual numbers of injured, which may not always be reported, depending on the severity of injuries and other factors. In the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence.

2022 (January 1 to June 30)

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 1
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens During January 1 to June 30, 2022 (by Country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2022 (July 1 to December 31)

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 2
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 10
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens During July 1 to December 31, 2022 (by Country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date of Death</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>September 28, 2022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Koya, Erbil, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>November 7, 2022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2021 (January 1 to June 30)**

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

**Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens During January 1 to June 30, 2021 (By Country)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2021 (July 1 to December 31)**

U.S. citizens overseas killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0
U.S. citizens overseas kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 0

**Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens During July 1 to December 31, 2021 (By Country)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C. Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Asbat al-Ansar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Abdallah Azzam Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>al-Ashtar Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>Ansar al-Dine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAH</td>
<td>Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>Ansar al-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMB</td>
<td>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS-B</td>
<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS-D</td>
<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS-T</td>
<td>Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Armed Peasant Association (Agrupación Campesina Armada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFG</td>
<td>Africa Focus Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afripol</td>
<td>African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGIR</td>
<td>Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIA</td>
<td>Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML/CFT</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMNO</td>
<td>Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>al-Muhammadia Students Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANF</td>
<td>al-Nusrah Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>Army of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APG</td>
<td>Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Advance Passenger Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APML</td>
<td>Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (Serbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQY</td>
<td>al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>al-Shabaab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTMIS</td>
<td>African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS-G</td>
<td>U.S. Automated Targeting System-Global (software)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Tribunal (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATU</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Unit (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSEC2021</td>
<td>Aviation Security 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWD</td>
<td>Atomwaffen Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARMMM</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCIJ</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basic Court in Pristina (Kosovo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Battlefield Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIFF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLA</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLM</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNPT</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Agency (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPRM</td>
<td>Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSIAT</td>
<td>Brigade Spéciale des Investigations Antiterroristes (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5+1</td>
<td>the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABMI</td>
<td>Central Asia Border Management Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Canadian dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM IMPACS</td>
<td>Implementing Agency for Crime and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Community Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBY</td>
<td>Central Bank of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDO</td>
<td>Center of Coordination for Decisionmaking Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCE</td>
<td>Commission for Countering Extremism (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Cabo Delgado Province (Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMOC</td>
<td>Joint Military Staff Committee (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTIF-CI</td>
<td>National Unit for the Processing of Financial Information in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA franc</td>
<td>currency used in eight West African countries and six Central African countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFT</td>
<td>Countering the Financing of Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHEDS</td>
<td>Centre des Hautes Études de Défense et de Sécurité (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christchurch Call</td>
<td>Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICO</td>
<td>Interministerial Framework for Intervention and Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations (Senegal)</td>
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<td>CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
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<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITCO</td>
<td>Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Digital Security Act (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Dubai State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Directorate of Territorial Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAG</td>
<td>Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDCHC</td>
<td>Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGP</td>
<td>Ejército Guerrillero Popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army (Colombia))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EML</td>
<td>Mariscal López’s Army (Ejército del Mariscal López)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Ejército Popular de Liberación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>Paraguayan People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAAMLG</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESO</td>
<td>External Security Organization (Hizballah)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETIAS</td>
<td>European Travel Information and Authorization System</td>
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<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkistan Islamic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-9</td>
<td>composition of the European Union beginning on January 1, 1973: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurojust</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXBS</td>
<td>Export Control and Related Border Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMa</td>
<td>Mali’s Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FDS</td>
<td>Mozambican Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FETO</td>
<td>Fethullah Terrorist Organization</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>International Federation of Association Football</td>
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<td>FINTRAC</td>
<td>Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIO</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNC</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Corsica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMD</td>
<td>Financial Monitoring Department (Tajikistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN Region</td>
<td>Far North Region (Cameroon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAP</td>
<td>Research and Assault and Protection Force (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Foreign Relations Department (Hizballah)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUD</td>
<td>Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal Security Service (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>foreign terrorist fighter</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence and Investigations Team</td>
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<td>Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin</td>
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<td>Korps BRIMOB I</td>
<td>Mobile Brigade Corps (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad</td>
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<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
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LeT  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
LFI  licensed financial institution
LGBTQI+ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and their compatriots
LH  Lebanese Hezbollah
Lebanese Hizballah
LJ  Lashkar i Jhangvi
LMT  Local Multidisciplinary Team
LNA  Libyan National Army
LPC  Local Prevention Council
LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MAK  Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie
MASAK  Financial Crimes Investigation Board (Turkey)
MEHE  Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Qatar)
MENAFATF  Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
MILF  Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSMA  United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
ML  money laundering
ML/TF  money laundering and terrorist financing
MML  Milli Muslim League
MND  Ministry of National Defense (Algeria)
MNDF  Maldives National Defense Force
MOD  Ministry of Defense
MoIA  Ministry of Internal Affairs (Tajikistan)
MOJ  Ministry of Justice
MONEYVAL  Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
MONUSCO  United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU  memorandum of understanding
MPCP  Militarized Communist Party of Peru
MPS  Maldives Police Service
MSC  Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
MUIS  Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
MUJAO  Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MWL  Muslim World League
NACTA  National Counterterrorism Authority (Pakistan)
NAP-CVE  National Action Plan for Countering Extremism
NBT  National Bank of Tajikistan
NCCVECT  National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (North Macedonia)
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center
NCTV  National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NDF  Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
Neo-JMB  Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
NIA  National Investigation Agency (India)
NISS  National Intelligence and Security Service (Ethiopia)
NPA  National Prosecuting Authority (South Africa)  and  New People’s Army
NPF  Nigeria Police Force
NPO  non-profit organization
NPP/CPP  Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army
NRM  Nordic Resistance Movement
NSCDC  Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
NSO  National Socialist Order
NWG  National Working Group
OAS  Organization of American States
OAS-CICTE  Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
OCPO  Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office (Serbia)
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPCW  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPDAT  Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training program
PA  Palestinian Authority
PAP  People’s Armed Police (People’s Republic of China)
PASF  Palestinian Authority Security Forces
PBOC  People’s Bank of China
PCLU  Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (South Africa)
PCVE  Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PET  Danish Security and Intelligence Service
PF  Brazilian Federal Police
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PIJ  Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PISCES  Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PIU  Passenger Information Unit
PJ  Judiciary Police (Macau)
PKK  Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PLC  Presidential Leadership Council (Yemen)
PLF  Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
PM  Prime Minister
PMF  Popular Mobilization Forces
PMRI  People’s Resistance Movement of Iran
PNP  Peruvian National Police
Philippine National Police
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<td>preventing violent extremism</td>
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</table>
SCRA State Commission for Religious Affairs (Kyrgyz Republic)
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist
SEARCCCT Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism
SENAFRONT National Border Service (Panama)
SEPBLAC Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses
SGSecure Singapore’s community response to the threat of terrorism
SIAs Special Interest Aliens
SL Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*)
SNA Somali National Army
SNP Spanish National Police
SPF Singapore Police Force
SPRK Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo
SSB Qatar State Security Bureau
SSD State Security Directorate (United Arab Emirates)
SSSG State Security Service of Georgia
STC Yemeni secessionist Southern Transitional Council
STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon
STRIVE Asia Strengthening Resilience Against Violent Extremism in Asia
SZPLIV Serbian Border Police’s System to Check Persons and Vehicles
TAJK Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir
TBA Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
TCO regulation EU Regulation 2021/784 on measures against the spread of terrorist content online
TF terrorist financing
TFN Taskforce Nightingale (Trinidad and Tobago)
TFS targeted financial sanctions
TFTC Terrorist Financing Targeting Center
TNI Indonesian Armed Forces
TNP Turkish National Police
Tracfin Intelligence Processing and Action Against Illicit Financial Networks Unit
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TT Trinidad and Tobago
TTP Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UAE United Arab Emirates
UIF-Mexico Financial Intelligence Unit-Mexico
UIGN Intervention Units of the National Gendarmerie
UIP National Unit of Passenger Information (Algeria)
UN United Nations
UNCCT UN Counterterrorism Center
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<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
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<td>WMDT</td>
<td>Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZON</td>
<td>Northern Operational Zone (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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