The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Plan for Haiti

2022-2032
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Executive Summary

The United States is committed to helping Haiti become a safer, more stable, and democratic country, reflecting the deep people-to-people ties between our countries. Haiti faces a uniquely challenging moment in its history – in July 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated. Since early September 2022, a dramatic deterioration in security has paralyzed the country. Criminal gangs – many backed by corrupt political or economic actors – took control of vital strategic installations, including the Port International de Port-au-Prince and the country’s main fuel terminal (Varreux) for two months in 2022. The blockage of the fuel terminal brought critical services such as water distribution and sanitation, garbage collection, electricity, and health centers to a virtual stand-still.

This acute situation is further exacerbated by Haiti’s extreme vulnerability to environmental shocks. International diplomatic and assistance efforts have achieved mixed results, and their impact has been the subject of scrutiny and debate. Gender-based violence (GBV) and severe gender inequality threaten to undermine stability in Haiti, and women and girls suffer disproportionately from climate change, violence, lack of rule of law, and food insecurity in the country.

In April 2022, President Biden announced the U.S. government would focus on Haiti as a priority country for advancing the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS). Haiti’s selection was based on its strategic relevance and proximity to the United States and the need for a more coordinated long-term approach to address drivers of instability in the country. The security situation in Haiti continues to significantly deteriorate, which only underscores the urgency to take a long-term approach to buttress and integrate U.S. diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement in Haiti. This plan provides a framework and sequenced approach for U.S. efforts, which can be scaled and sequenced based upon political and security openings in the country.

This plan was developed through an embassy-led interagency process. Thorough consultations with over 230 individuals representing Haitian government and civil society, multilateral and bilateral organizations, the private sector, academia, Haitian
diaspora, and experts and practitioners shaped the plan, as did broader U.S. interagency policy deliberations on Haiti outlining a long-term strategic vision for Global Fragility Act (GFA) efforts in country. This working group will continue as a coordination mechanism during its implementation. The plan supports and will inform all U.S. government diplomatic and foreign assistance strategies for Haiti, including the U.S. Department of State Integrated Country Strategy and the 2020-2024 USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework.

The plan seeks to orient and align U.S. efforts over time toward a long-term goal: that Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive environment for long-term stability. This goal envisions that government institutions become more capable and responsive to the basic needs of Haitians, and at the same time, Haitians develop sufficiently increased trust in public institutions to participate in Haiti’s civic and political processes.

Under this plan, the United States will marshal diplomatic engagement and assistance over time to support two overarching objectives:

- **Objective 1**: Advancing responsive and accountable governance and security.
- **Objective 2**: Supporting an engaged and prosperous citizenry.

The plan envisions a phased approach, prioritizing security and justice sector efforts at the outset in light of Haiti’s current context. During this first phase, U.S. government efforts will engage and leverage partners among Haitian civil society and the Haitian National Police (HNP) to inform and implement programming to strengthen citizen security and the rule of law, while ensuring the protection and promotion of human rights and accountability. Initial efforts will focus on key high-crime and high-violence neighborhoods and key transportation and economic hubs.

Following the targeting of security and justice needs under Phase I, Phase II will begin addressing root causes of instability, building on justice sector reform while addressing civic engagement and economic opportunity. Phase III will help expand Haitian-owned systems to have sustainable impact and fundamental institutional change. Phasing will
enable the U.S. government to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, including capitalizing on targets of opportunity.

The plan places a strong emphasis on partnering with Haitian leaders and stakeholders. To ensure greater sustainability and impact, the U.S. government will encourage local direction and ownership of all efforts envisioned under this plan. Cognizant of the ongoing challenge of engaging with the government amid the current crisis, the United States will seek and engage reform-minded leaders at both national and local levels. This plan outlines a local partnership approach to engage as wide a representation of stakeholders as possible, ensuring that Haitians are protagonists in shaping and implementing their country’s development path. It also includes a strategic communication plan to ensure U.S. government-funded efforts are effectively amplified throughout the country.

This plan acknowledges that despite best intentions and having invested significant resources to date, U.S.-led and other international diplomatic and assistance efforts in Haiti have not always achieved their aims or resulted in inclusive, equitable outcomes. In line with the SPCPS’s goals, the U.S. government is committed to promoting innovative and evidence-based approaches. The plan will respond to and incorporate lessons learned from decades of interventions in Haiti and elsewhere: that lasting results require whole-of-government collaboration, a more holistic, systems approach to address Haiti’s drivers of instability and a planning horizon that extends beyond traditional funding cycles. In addition to working with Haitian government actors where possible, the U.S. government will deepen engagement with Haitian civil society, including religious groups and NGOs, as well as other international donors, Haitian diaspora organizations, and multilateral organizations to advance this plan.

Specifically, the U.S. government is committed to advancing the following areas of innovation through this plan:

- **Applying a phased and targeted approach**: Taking a long-term, holistic view, that seizes upon political will and opportunities for partnership.

- **Focusing on progress over programs**: Emphasizing a forward-thinking rather than reactive mindset that prioritizes sustainable outcomes in priority areas.
• **Seeking innovation while scaling success**: Identifying innovative as well as proven, evidence-based initiatives that can be scaled.

• **Spurring an increased level of internal U.S. government coordination**: Ensuring that U.S. government efforts across departments and agencies are well-aligned and optimized along a shared strategy.

• **Prioritizing locally driven solutions**: The plan ensures that local partnership and coordination undergird all elements of the strategy, ensuring greater sustainability and impact of U.S. efforts.

• **Fostering intentional international coordination**: The plan outlines a strategy for international coordination to promote donor alignment, guard against duplication, and maximize impact.

The plan explicitly acknowledges and seeks to address many risks inherent to the approach which, unmitigated, could hinder achievement of the objectives. This includes the overall political and security situation in Haiti. U.S. government efforts are intended to be able to adapt to the changing environment on the ground. Where opportunity exists for greater impact, the U.S. government will scale up support, and where efforts are less successful, will scale back or terminate programming or alter approaches. Rigorous monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) will be central to the success of this plan. We will ensure we learn lessons from prior efforts in Haiti and feed these into program and policy development, both in the design phase and through real-time adaptation.

**Introduction**

This 10-year plan creates an opportunity to chart a new way forward for the U.S. government approach in Haiti, fully cognizant of our past and current challenges and ready to capitalize on the strengths of a committed interagency team. Haiti's persistent instability has reached unprecedented levels, and while our work is more relevant than ever, conditions necessitate targeted and carefully sequenced approaches. The plan focuses efforts and resources on neighborhoods and individuals most at risk of being targeted by or participating in crime and violence, evaluates and adapts to shifting
conditions on the ground, and integrates lessons learned through successful citizen security interventions across the region, including Central America and elsewhere in the Caribbean. Given the unique challenges and evolving dynamics in Haiti, the U.S. government is committed to regularly evaluating conditions on the ground and reassessing efforts as warranted.

The plan envisions a phased implementation to reach a long-term goal where Haiti’s citizens and government can advance a shared vision and begin to create a permissive environment for long-term stability. Establishing pathways for sustainable progress through Haitian-owned initiatives and building on existing resources and relationships, Phase I will target safety and security, the most obvious symptom of instability and currently the most urgent constraint to all other progress. This work brings together local commitment, energy, and resources from civil society and the HNP to promote both immediate and lasting progress on safety and security. Building on a local systems approach to promote sustainability and broaden impact, Phase II will leverage improved security to begin addressing root causes of instability, emphasizing justice sector reform, civic engagement, and economic opportunity. Phase III will build on successes to begin developing Haitian-owned systems for the lasting, long-term impact on local systems required for fundamental institutional change. Phasing will adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, including targets of opportunity. All programs and efforts referenced in the plan are based on current planning and are subject to change and subject to the availability of funds.

An Embassy-led interagency group carried out extensive and thorough consultations with over 230 individuals representing Haitian government and civil society, private sector, academia, multilateral and bilateral organizations, the Haitian diaspora, and experts and practitioners to develop the plan. The feedback from those consultations shaped the plan’s objectives, partner coordination strategies, and cross-cutting efforts. Ongoing consultations, as well as evidence from MEL, will inform this intentionally iterative plan.

This plan is intentionally iterative, understanding that contextual changes and new opportunities may indicate the need for adaptive management throughout the course of implementation. We will base any changes on robust and consistent evidence gained
through MEL. The MEL plan begins with establishing solid baseline information and identifying key points for analysis and anticipates learning events to guide strategic decisions in the future. To support the consistency and efficacy of MEL efforts, additional MEL staff will be dedicated to the implementation of this plan and its integration with other U.S. government interventions.

This plan represents a new approach to guide U.S. government engagement and assistance in Haiti. Lessons learned from decades of interventions have shown that lasting results require whole-of-government collaboration (not just coordination), assistance that target the sources of instability (not just symptoms), a planning horizon that extends beyond traditional funding cycles, and an emphasis on Haitian-owned and implemented initiatives to the maximum extent feasible to ensure local buy-in and sustainability. Rather, this plan focuses over time on the key root causes of instability that present a bottleneck to broader social, economic, and political reform and have, simultaneously, received less attention from U.S. government programming. Haitians must play the central role in shaping and implementing their development path.

1. Analysis

Haiti’s current crisis cannot be understood through the lens of a traditional armed conflict characterized by parties, position, or interests; it is instead driven by a complex confluence of social, political, and economic dynamics. Through extensive consultations and analysis, U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince and interagency partners identified three key dynamics driving instability in Haiti today – characterized by escalating gang violence and political turmoil – that must be addressed over time to promote stability: lack of safety and security, economic inequality, and weak governance. For each of these dynamics, this section describes the linkages between conflict and fragility and provides a data-driven assessment of the current country context. The analysis examines several cross-cutting themes and their impacts on instability and violence in Haiti. These themes include climate change, food insecurity and malnutrition, corruption, gender inequality, and migration. The analysis also outlines several potential conflict scenarios and tools to monitor trends that could provide early warning. Finally, the analysis identifies areas of resilience and opportunities.
Instability Dynamics and/or Risks

Lack of Safety and Security

Security issues were raised in every consultation as Haiti’s most significant challenge. Respondents emphasized the decline in personal security, the inability to circulate freely, and the increased difficulty and cost of obtaining necessary goods and services due to disruptions caused by violence. Broad consensus suggests that improved security will be a precondition for the successful implementation of U.S. strategies to address longer-term drivers of instability and insecurity. As such, the plan deliberately prioritizes security interventions in Phase I.

Insecurity has left lasting trauma on people and communities. Survey data shows Haitians most commonly rely on “each other” and “the community” to manage hard times. However, rising insecurity and the growth of gangs have weakened communities and created adversarial relations across these populations. Consultations with women’s groups indicate that women and girls suffer a growing epidemic of GBV and face additional hurdles in accessing justice and reproductive and sexual health care in the wake of violence. At the time of writing, Haiti faced a resurgence of cholera. Gang obstruction of fuel access placed direct constraints on health and humanitarian actors’ ability to respond to and contain a resurgent cholera epidemic (through access and logistical issues) and the population’s ability to protect itself (by accessing clean water and hygiene products).

Violence in Haiti has increased in recent years. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) included Haiti on its list of “10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022.” According to ACLED, conflict and protest events, as well as fatalities from violence, have been on the rise.¹ With 944 fatalities recorded as of September 2022, the number of deaths from political violence has already surpassed the levels of each of the prior four years. Demonstrations (protests and riots) have also

¹ ACLED data in Haiti likely undercounts conflict events and fatalities. Instances of gender-based violence are particularly inaccurate.
become more violent since 2020, with 61 percent of demonstrations turning violent so far in 2022. Abductions and forced disappearances have also increased markedly since 2018.

**Economic Inequality**

Analysis reveals that deep inequities among marginalized or excluded groups in Haiti are linked to instability. The centralization of resources and state power in Port-au-Prince – largely in the hands of a small number of Haitian elites – has played a key role in exacerbating those inequities, particularly for those residing in rural areas. Women, for instance, face significant barriers to full economic participation. Women are often the sole breadwinner of the household, and insecurity and economic instability – coupled with discrimination around access to credit, insurance, and other financial products – magnify the burdens of participation in formal and informal economies. Girls are also often pulled out of school to help support their families but lack access to financial literacy education.

With an economy dependent on the informal sector, there is little available tax base, further constraining capital for public sector investment or the delivery of public services. In 2022, an estimated 90 percent of Haiti’s workers and 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) function in the informal sector, and 95 percent of formal sector businesses are microenterprises. The extent of the informal sector means few protections (or benefits) for workers, and the small scale of enterprise activity implies limited job opportunities. This suggests a lack of structure and opportunity to build demand for skills or to incentivize investment in human capital. Further, insufficient internal revenue and subsequent reliance on external aid decrease Haiti’s ability to adapt to man-made and environmental shocks, exacerbating instability.

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Marginalized, excluded, and/or vulnerable groups may include—but are not limited to—people with disabilities, women and girls, people in rural areas, smallholder farmers, the LGBTQI+ community, internally displaced persons (IDPs), trauma survivors, victims of natural disasters, gang members, survivors of sexual violence, trafficking victims, returned migrants, and/or children, and youth. Importantly, there is overlap in many of the aforementioned vulnerabilities.
Poor and deteriorating infrastructure allows gangs to effectively control roadways and hampers investment and trade. Haiti’s economic infrastructure systems – transportation, electricity, water, and communication – lack investment and maintenance such that coverage is limited and unreliable. Haiti’s road system remains poorly maintained despite large investments from multilateral organizations, and approximately half of all roads are unpaved. Gangs have taken advantage of the limited number of national routes to set up choke points, which further reduces connectivity and inhibits the movement of people, products, and services. Gangs’ ability to create such choke points and paralyze operations have, in turn, enabled corrupt members of the elite to utilize gangs for political leverage, perpetuating cycles of violence and instability.

Haiti’s economy demonstrates low economic productivity, high unemployment, high inflation, high economic inequality, persistent fuel shortages, and a volatile currency. The Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index ranks Haiti 5th out of 179 nations for economic inequality. Haiti’s GDP contracted by 1.8 percent in FY21 compared to FY20, marking the third consecutive fiscal year of economic decline, and is expected to contract further in FY22. According to the World Bank, unemployment was estimated at nearly 16 percent in 2021, higher than the average of 10 percent for all Latin American and Caribbean countries (excluding high-income countries). Inflation has also reached new highs: according to the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI), the consumer price index in July 2022 reached 30.5 percent year-on-year. The government eliminated fuel subsidies on September 14, 2022, which was seen by economists and international partners as a necessary and long-overdue decision, but the resultant increase in fuel prices contributed to social unrest, largely driven by the deteriorating security situation and the political impasse.

According to IHSI and other sources, food prices rose considerably over the course of 2022, with security problems contributing to the rising costs (see more details on food insecurity below). Remittances have grown as a source of Haitian household support over the last 10 years and likely make up about one-third of the Haitian economy. Although remittances provide critical financial support to Haitians, the
country’s reliance on imports for food and other goods means that very little remains to invest in the local economy.

**Weak Governance**

In the wake of the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti lacks a president and a national legislature, elected local officials, and an independent judiciary. Haiti’s parliament’s last 10 senators left office in January 2023 after the conclusions of their terms and the institution has been dysfunctional since January 2020 as a result of the country’s failure to hold scheduled legislative elections in fall 2019. Judicial vacancies and the death of the Supreme Court Chief Justice from COVID-19 in June 2021 have left the Supreme Court largely non-functioning. Most stakeholders consulted for this plan described perceptions of widespread corruption, zero-sum rent-seeking dynamics, and a lack of resources to implement any desired change. In the absence of new or updated legislation from successive elected parliaments, Haitian presidents have resorted to issuing decrees and executive orders to govern. This has led to limited policy enforcement and regular diversions of funding. Accountability mechanisms are also lacking, and official checks and balances are non-functional. Civil society has only a limited ability to serve in a watchdog capacity, due to an inability to engage with functional government offices and threats of retaliation for whistleblowing.

Haiti’s infrequent elections exhibit unethical practices and violence. Haitians consequently have minimal trust in politicians and government institutions. Political parties often do not represent the interests of Haitians at-large, and many smaller parties have been unstable. Policy decisions and budgetary allocations lack transparency and accountability. The result is a government that is largely unresponsive to the needs of constituents. Public services are chronically underfunded, contributing to weak performance across the spectrum of development indicators. The Haitian population interprets the dearth of social services as government neglect. Frequently, international NGOs step in to provide such basic services, helping to meet the needs of constituents but perpetuating government inaction and leading to increased dependency on external donors. With little hope of addressing frustrations through political processes, those
in marginalized communities, especially younger men, have increasingly turned to violence.

Haiti has seen a decline across several key democracy, human rights, and governance indicators. Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom in the World report rated Haiti as “Not Free,” a decline from its “Partly Free” rating in 2021. This decline is due to continued deterioration of democratic institutions, the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and the increase in violent crime and gang violence. Free and fair elections that democratically represent the will of the people are a precursor to positive advancements towards accountable and transparent governance.

Haiti maintains some of the world’s lowest human rights scores. The country’s Political Terror Scale remains 3 out of 5, indicating torture, political imprisonment, and killings are common. Haiti’s overall Liberal Democracy Score (V-Dem) is low (0.21 on a scale from 0 to 1) and has been declining consistently since a peak in 2007. Lack of adherence to rule of law is particularly high in Haiti, with a ranking of second out of 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere and eighth out of 194 nations globally. The level of political exclusion of groups based on religious, ethnic, or political identity is higher than the average for Latin America and the Caribbean (0.64 on a scale from 0 to 1 compared to 0.42 for the region). Freedoms of expression and association have also been trending down in Haiti, and scores are slightly lower than the regional averages.

**Climate Change**

Haiti is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and, at present, insufficiently prepared to adapt. Experts assess that climate change will drive an increase in mean temperature, as well as an increase in numbers of hot days and nights; a decrease in dry season precipitation and lengthening of drought season, as well as a slight increase in intense precipitation events; an increase in intensity of hurricanes in the Atlantic; sea level rise; and an increase in storm surge strength.

Hurricane Alley is an area of warm water in the Atlantic Ocean stretching from the west coast of northern Africa to the east coast of Central America and Gulf Coast of the Southern United States.
infrastructure, and insufficient governance capacity all contribute to its significant vulnerability to climate change. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative’s (ND-GAIN) Country Index, which reflects a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience, ranks Haiti 168th out of 182 nations. A significant factor contributing to Haiti’s high vulnerability is low adaptive capacity, including poor agricultural capacity (limited ability to acquire and deploy agricultural technology), insufficient medical staff, and low dam capacity. Women and girls are disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change, which includes encountering gender-based violence and conflict related to natural resources, loss of livelihoods, food insecurity and malnutrition, and poverty.

The significant near-term impacts of climate change, combined with Haiti’s limited coping capacity, demand immediate adaptation investments. At the time of this plan’s publication, Haiti’s draft National Adaptation Plan (NAP) for 2022-2030 focuses on four principal objectives:

1) implement large-scale gender-sensitive programs and projects to increase climate resilience in priority sectors;

2) strengthen human capital, particularly that of women and girls, for adaptation planning at the local level – specifically in those localities most vulnerable to climate change;

3) improve institutional and legal frameworks for adaptation in priority sectors; and

4) formulate and implement municipal adaptation plans for at least half of the country’s municipalities. The NAP focuses on the agriculture, health, infrastructure, and water resources sectors. However, the current government’s ability to implement the NAP remains severely limited amid continuing political instability.

5 According to ND-GAIN’s index breakdown.
Haiti’s NAP focuses on sub-national/municipal-level climate adaptation plans, which provides an opportunity for adaptation actions to be coupled with community violence prevention initiatives at the local level to address some of the shared drivers of conflict risk and climate vulnerability. Fragility can be both a driver and a consequence of vulnerability to climate change. Factors contributing to fragility, such as weak governance, poor infrastructure, and low economic development, can make it challenging for countries to cope with the impacts of climate change. Conversely, the impacts of climate change can overwhelm capacities and worsen fragility.

**Food Insecurity and Malnutrition**

Food insecurity in Haiti worsened in 2022 and will remain severe in 2023. Factors such as climate change, global conflict, gang violence, the COVID-19 pandemic, and economic mismanagement contributed to food insecurity and rising food prices. Haiti’s low levels of domestic food production and reliance on imported goods make it particularly vulnerable to external shocks. According to the Humanitarian Information Unit at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Haiti is in the top 15 countries with populations facing acute food insecurity, with 4.5 million people currently facing crisis- or emergency-level food insecurity. The Economist’s Global Food Security index ranks Haiti 106th out of 113 for food security with an overall score of 37.8 (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 is the most favorable food security environment). Although Haiti’s overall food security score improved slightly in 2021, as compared to 2020, trends in three of the four component categories (affordability, availability, quality and safety, natural resources, and resilience) have been declining since 2012. Haiti’s weakest indicators include change in average food costs, food security and access policy commitments, and political commitment to adaptation.

Food insecurity and conflict are linked in Haiti. A 2022 analysis from the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) on the impact of food prices on political violence found that the local Food Price Index in Haiti is associated with a higher probability of violence and fatalities during instances of conflict, so as food becomes scarcer and more expensive, increased violence is
likely to follow. Conversely, violence and conflict can exacerbate food insecurity and drive up food prices. As of 2022, gang warfare in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Martissant and elsewhere has blocked main routes from areas of agricultural production in the south, making it difficult for producers to transport goods to major Port-au-Prince markets, resulting in increased transport costs and higher prices.

Malnutrition is prevalent in Haiti; it is linked to food insecurity and is further exacerbated by conflict, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s 2022 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, the prevalence of stunting in children under five years of age in Haiti is approximately 20 percent, which is considered high in a population. Stunting has significant negative impacts on long-term development and harms the ability of future generations of Haitians to engage in society and reach their full potential.

**Corruption**

Corruption affects every sector of the country. Public sector corruption (V-Dem) is high (0.66 on a scale from 0 to 1, compared to the regional average of 0.47). Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index gives Haiti a score of 20 out of 100, making it one of the worst in the world with a rank of 164 out of 180. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators report ranks countries across six dimensions of governance, including: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Haiti ranks extremely low in each of these categories. These statistics show the persistent challenge for successive Haitian governments to create sustainable development plans in an environment mired in corruption. These continued failures have eroded the government's legitimacy in the eyes of Haitians and made future stability and development more difficult.

Corruption within cross-border trade in Haiti is another significant area of concern. The Caribbean remains a prime thoroughfare for smuggling and other criminal activity between North and South America. This makes Haiti a target for several
transnational threats, including the trafficking of drugs, people, and weapons, as well as organized crime and terrorism. Dysfunctional governance that shields corruption is not only incapable of addressing these issues but can make them worse. Corruption at the border also negatively impacts Haiti’s already dire economic situation. Illegal border trade fueled by corruption hinders employment, depresses economic growth, and diminishes government revenues.

**Migration**

Haitian migration remains a significant factor in the social and economic dynamics of Haiti and the Western Hemisphere and contributes to a loss in Haiti’s human capital; there are an estimated 1.7 million Haitian migrants worldwide. The vulnerabilities that drive irregular migration include socio-economic conditions, political unrest, gender-based violence, food insecurity, social tensions, and insecurity, especially acute spikes in violence. Migrants use irregular routes to cross porous land borders on the island of Hispaniola, maritime corridors to neighboring islands, and air routes to Central America to arrive at the U.S. southern border. Haitians face dangerous conditions that leave them vulnerable to gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, and other forms of abuse or violence on all of these routes. Focus group discussions revealed that these vulnerabilities are often exacerbated for repatriated migrants who may have expended significant assets to arrange for their migration. In addition, repatriation carries a perceived stigma of criminality, so many repatriated migrants, particularly those without identification documents, are targeted as outsiders and ostracized in the communities to which they return. Many Haitians who have the means pursue legal migration channels; this exodus of the middle class has resulted in a significant loss of human capital, thereby weakening institutions.

**Gender Inequality**

Women and girls are a significant part of the Haitian economy and half of Haitian households are women-led. Women represent the majority of street vendors and are a vital part of agricultural supply chains. However, women face significant barriers to full economic participation, including discrimination in access to credit,
insurance, and other financial products, and the adverse impacts of physical security on women's ability to obtain and keep jobs. Women and girls are disproportionately impacted by challenges like climate change, violence, lack of rule of law, and food insecurity.

Civil unrest, political instability, lack of rule of law, and poverty all contribute to high rates of GBV in Haiti. As a result, one in three Haitian women ages 15 to 49 have reported experiencing physical and/or sexual violence. Laws criminalizing rape and domestic violence in Haiti were not enacted until 2005, and women and girls often face unequal legal protection. Sexual harassment often occurs with impunity, and the survivors of sexual crimes are frequently blamed for the rape and abuse they endure.

Natural disasters have devastated Haiti over the past two decades, and because natural disasters exacerbate existing social conditions (and women are often more socioeconomically disadvantaged than men), women are more vulnerable to the consequences of these unmitigated events. Despite women’s increased vulnerability, Haitian women’s organizations have not been adequately included in post-disaster needs planning.

**Women, Peace, and Security:** Women are also chronically underrepresented in decision-making roles and have been left out of key judicial, administrative, legislative, and democratic systems within Haiti. Only 11.5 percent of the judiciary and three percent of parliament seats are currently filled by women. Haiti ranks 187th out of 190 countries in terms of women’s political representation, well below other Latin American and Caribbean countries in terms of women’s judicial and political representation. Haiti adopted a constitutional amendment in 2012 which stipulates that 30 percent of all public positions are reserved for women. However, there is no penalty for non-compliance, the gender quota remains largely ineffective, and participation remains low. Within the HNP, women comprise only 11 percent (approximately 1,950) of the total HNP police and administrative workforce of 17,831. Beyond formal democratic institutions, women remain underrepresented at the leadership level in political parties, civil society, and media
organizations. The Government of Haiti has not developed a WPS National Action Plan.

**Resilience Opportunities**

**Civil Society**

Haitian civil society is active and vibrant. Historically, political elites have largely dismissed Haitian civil society efforts due to winner-take-all strategies prioritizing individual benefit over basic service delivery, constituent responsiveness, or good governance. Furthermore, institutional barriers to inclusive governance, marginalization of civil society voices in policy decisions, and pervasive lack of trust in government have stifled robust civil society participation in sectors of society. The plan provides an opportunity to increase meaningful inclusion of civil society and marginalized groups, including women, youth, and those living outside of the capital, to strengthen the foundation for constituent-accountable, inclusive, and transparent governance. Religious groups are a particularly influential sector of society that can be tapped into to support civil society political participation.

**Renewable Energy**

Renewable energy production presents an opportunity for economic growth in Haiti. There is strong demand in Haiti for power generation, and Haiti currently faces challenges in generating and distributing energy reliably. Proper support and investment in renewables such as solar, wind, hydropower, and biomass systems could make Haiti an attractive energy market opportunity. Haiti’s location in the tropics makes for an ideal potential solar production market. Solar power could be a significant growth sector and power agricultural work, hotels, hospitals, schools, commercial endeavors, and public lighting in cities and villages. Finally, Haiti’s urgent need for climate adaptation measures provides an opportunity for improved government service capacity to ensure access to water resources.
Diaspora

More must be done to effectively engage the Haitian diaspora to promote political and economic development in Haiti. The Haitian diaspora has increasingly engaged in local government, business, and service delivery, making it a potentially influential force to positively support Haiti’s democratic revitalization. The Haitian diaspora is a critical contributor to Haiti’s economy and holds strong familial and community ties, serving as a key stakeholder to support the country’s path to stability. In FY21, remittances represented about one-third of the country’s GDP. As such, the diaspora can play a constructive role in encouraging needed institutional and security reforms.

2. Political Vision and Approach

Long-Term Political End State

Over the next ten years, through this plan, the U.S. government seeks to achieve concrete progress and pathways toward the following long-term political end state:

Haiti’s citizens and government advance a shared vision and a permissive environment for long-term stability.

This plan envisions a long-term outcome in which the Haitian government and citizens jointly create an environment that establishes a foundation for long-term stability. This means that government institutions become more willing and able to respond effectively to the basic needs of Haitians, and at the same time, Haitians are motivated to participate in Haiti’s civic and political processes. Throughout consultations and across empirical literature, Haiti’s persistent instability is consistently linked to a vicious cycle of unresponsive governance that erodes quality of life for Haitians and damages the ability to create an environment that fosters consistent and equitable growth. The plan is thus driven by an overriding theory of change that if responsive and accountable governance combine with a more engaged and cohesive populace, then Haiti’s citizens and government will be
able to advance a shared vision and begin to create a permissive environment for long-term stability.

A more stable, prosperous, and democratic Haiti implies improved security and opportunity for the island of Hispaniola, the United States, and the Latin America and Caribbean region. Improvements in security and expanded economic and social opportunities will mitigate drivers of irregular migration to the United States and the region. A more prosperous Haiti will also create greater opportunities for trade and investment to open new markets for U.S. goods and services. As Haitian institutions become stronger, Haitian government counterparts will also more actively and effectively contribute to international efforts to control the flow of illegal narcotics, weapons, and persons, enhancing the security of the region overall.

This plan is linked to and aligned with the relevant State Department Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), USAID Strategic Framework, and DoD theater campaign and regional plans to ensure coherence across U.S. efforts. As the embassy next reviews and updates Haiti’s ICS, required at least annually, the embassy will seek to strengthen linkages to this plan and the subsequent objectives and sub-objectives as needed and appropriate. Missions will similarly seek to incorporate the objectives and sub-objectives of the 10-year plan into the regular Strategic Framework stocktaking efforts and/or annual portfolio reviews, as needed and appropriate.

**Political Approach**

Progress under this 10-year plan must be demand-driven, desired, and supported by a critical mass of the Haitian population. Building that support means addressing the key constraints impacting Haitian households on a daily basis: insecurity and a lack of economic opportunities. This plan sees the strengthening of security and the expansion of economic opportunity as critical steps toward reducing violence and youth gang recruitment during Phase I of implementation. As safety and security concerns become less urgent, Phase II efforts will seek to improve civic participation; rebuild trust in and performance of government institutions; and better protect and empower women, girls, and vulnerable populations. In Phase III, efforts
will seek to reestablish a permissive environment for long-term stability in Haiti. It is important to note that progress between phases moves along a continuum and that interventions may overlap at the end of one phase and the beginning of the next. The below graphic (Figure 1) conveys an illustrative timeline associated with each of the three phases; note that conditions for transitioning between phases will be context dependent.

It is essential to recognize the depth, longevity, and complexity of Haiti’s challenges and the reasonable scope of influence that interventions could be expected to manifest. It is important to acknowledge that this plan envisions an end state beyond the time horizon of the 10-year plan. Although the 10-year planning horizon allows the opportunity to advance system-level transformation, the approach is, above all, respectful of Haiti’s sovereignty and focused on building the well-being of Haitians and the trust in public institutions that will help the country address its challenges in a sustainable way.

**Figure 1. Phased sequencing of interventions and illustrative timeline**

The above graphic conveys the three phases over the next 10 years: Phase I will seek to address citizen security, Phase II will seek to address root causes, and Phase III will seek to create sustainability.

This plan seeks to cultivate the foundation for Haiti’s people and institutions to play a leading role in addressing its most pressing challenges. This means improving safety and security such that Haitians can engage in productive and longer-term planning; fortifying justice systems to advance fair and equal treatment under the
law; creating opportunities that attract investment; and building the ability of Haitian people, infrastructure, and systems to rebound from shocks and stresses. Under these improved basic conditions, accountable Government of Haiti (GoH) institutions and an engaged Haitian citizenry can begin to rebuild an environment that promotes long-term stability and equitable, internally driven growth.

Recognizing that there are individuals and entities that will be threatened by the proposed outcomes of this 10-year plan – emphasizing shared prosperity, inclusive participation, and rule of law – a conflict-sensitive approach will guide this plan to ensure that it accounts for potentially perverse dynamics.

In advancing this plan, the U.S. government will take a systems approach, visualizing the interconnections across challenges, seeking opportunities that build up network capacities, and taking into account the opportunities to leverage and align with existing and forthcoming U.S. government initiatives. Phase I activities are strategically targeted to serve as springboard activities that alleviate bottlenecks and propel the results of complementary activities to have a larger and more lasting overall impact.

The U.S. approach through this plan will emphasize inclusive prosperity. The absence of positive pathways to prosperity for the vast majority of Haitians reinforces a downward socio-economic spiral and enables outward migration, gang recruitment, crime, and violence. Prosperity in this context means creating the conditions to increase the availability of basic services, improve food security, and strengthen livelihoods through sustainable means that build on local human capital and increased investment in productive capital. If community safety and security are improved in Haiti and democratic governance is strengthened and broadly accepted, then Haitians will be better able to progress toward lasting and equitable prosperity.

The U.S. government seeks the deep and direct involvement of Haitian stakeholders from the inception and through the implementation of this plan. Externally imposed approaches that lack local leadership have had little success in Haiti. Following the diverse and in-depth stakeholder consultations in the design stages, the plan initiates a collaborative process that enables local actors to identify
challenges, co-create solutions, and participate actively in implementation. This approach is explicitly focused on active listening followed by engaged collaboration, a model that has proven successful in Haiti with the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program and supported through USAID’s agency wide localization initiative.

3. Prioritized Objectives and Sub-Objectives

**Foundational Premise: Improve Safety and Security of Haitian Communities**

Haiti’s dire security environment presents the primary and most pressing concern negatively affecting stability and the well-being of Haitians. Haiti’s high levels of historical violence make criminal activity an attractive path for society members under stress. Following the assassination of President Moïse in July 2021, a prolonged political impasse and a historically under-resourced police force have enabled powerful gangs to increasingly gain control of parts of Haiti’s capital. Haitians find their personal security under constant threat. Many humanitarian actors have difficulty gaining access to vulnerable populations in gang-controlled areas, and the resulting lack of humanitarian assistance can be a contributing factor for irregular migration. Gangs have increasingly targeted women and girls as a weapon of gang warfare, contributing to a rise in sexual and gender-based violence. As many heads of households are women, GBV impacts the entire family and community. This insecurity has paralyzed parts of the country, particularly in Port-au-Prince, and taking steps to address the security situation will be a critical precondition for addressing the underlying drivers of fragility in the country.

**Objective 1: Advance Responsive and Accountable Governance**

**Theory of Change:**

- IF security-related and law enforcement programming helps the HNP and GOH restore security; and
IF Haiti’s governance structures and political processes are strengthened and help enable a rule of law culture; and

IF security, justice, and other public service institutions have the capacity to implement solutions to serve citizens, including vulnerable populations.

THEN Haiti’s governance will have more transparent and accountable processes that are responsive to citizens.

Recognizing the enduring roles of corruption, violence, and impunity in Haiti’s institutional landscape, the plan’s first objective seeks to strengthen Haiti’s governance structures and mechanisms to better respond to the needs of Haitians. Consultations across multiple sectors of civil society and government highlighted an overarching need to first prioritize addressing safety and security. Following improved security conditions, the plan will then focus on reviving quality public service delivery, reestablishing political processes, and strengthening the justice sector to build trust in government institutions and leaders. The U.S. government will marshal the full range of U.S. foreign policy tools, including diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance, to advance this objective.

Consultations for the plan provided a roadmap to improve Haiti’s governance structures and mechanisms. This highlighted the need for the Haitian government to provide protection and physical safety, hold free and fair elections, and support justice sector capacity and reform. The expansion of justice sector services for survivors of violence was cited as critical to fostering credibility and support for the rule of law. Further, supporting government provision of basic services in targeted communities, such as water and sanitation, electricity, and quality social services, will advance responsive and accountable governance while also supporting outcomes under objective 2 to reestablish a permissive environment for long-term stability in Haiti.

Phase I (approximately the first three years) will implement a focused, “place-based” strategy that combines police capacity building with community development and expanded social services to reduce insecurity and increase resilience in key locations such as high-crime and high-violence neighborhoods and key
transportation and economic hubs. The approach concurrently reinforces the place-based strategy by building the capacity of the institutions responsible for providing security in Haiti, including the HNP. Activities further outlined under objective 1 will address widespread insecurity, including gang violence and kidnapping, through a multi-sectoral approach that increases the capacity of the HNP while also addressing the underlying drivers of violence, providing licit alternatives to youth, and offering an “off-ramp” to those wishing to leave gangs. In addition, activities will support an inclusive, Haitian-led process that achieves sufficiently broad consensus to generate legitimacy among political, private sector, and civil society actors.

**Sub-objective 1.1: Increase the provision of quality basic public and protective services.**

Phase I efforts under this sub-objective will increase the capacity of the HNP to deliver high-impact policing interventions while also expanding community access to social services that reduce crime and violence. A critical element of restoring safety and security to the Haitian people is expanding the capacity of the HNP to protect communities and the most vulnerable populations through training and non-lethal aid to support specialized units capable of disrupting gangs and criminal organizations. Phase I activities will also support the expansion of the HNP’s capacity to implement community-oriented policing models that build community trust in police, increasing their effectiveness and helping to establish them as credible partners for the community.

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in consultation with the HNP, is prioritizing ongoing activities in Cité Soleil as the preliminary community of focus due to high levels of crime and violence as well as significant population density. The interagency team is considering five additional locations for potential expansion of community violence prevention programming beyond Cité Soleil. The additional areas will include critical areas featuring major thoroughfares currently blocked by gangs, as well as neighborhoods in transition, where gangs have yet to fully take control. To the extent practicable, the interagency team will encourage the Haitian government to focus its resources on these locations to maximize impact. As the interagency works collaboratively to
address the security situation, USAID will simultaneously undertake activities to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations most in need which are often in areas affected by gang violence.

In addition to the focused work of the place-based strategy, the 10-year plan’s approach will strengthen the institutional capacity of the HNP, including providing technical assistance to develop new training curriculums for the police academy and supporting the development of standard operating procedures that improve the effectiveness of the HNP and help to increase recruitment. These efforts will also focus on the recruitment of women and increasing their representation in leadership positions. In phases II and III, implementation will also ramp up efforts to institutionalize reforms and best practices that improve the overall organizational health of the HNP, including strategic planning, budgeting, human resources management, and public relations. These medium- to long-term interventions will help improve the public image of the HNP and strengthen its credibility with the Haitian people.

**Social service provision in target communities:** Robust evidence from successful citizen security interventions across the region demonstrate that access to key social services can help reduce violence. Phase I will focus on expanding access to these services in target communities. Activities will aim to improve the availability and quality of social services for survivors of violence, in particular survivors of GBV. This sub-objective will closely align with the community priorities identified under sub-objective 2.2 (Enhance Economic Security).

**Services that address youth risk factors:** Recognizing that some children and youth demonstrate risk factors that may make them more likely to participate in crime and violence, sub-objective 1.1 will pilot and expand interventions that increase tailored services for at-risk youth and address risk factors for violence. This approach, which borrows from best practices developed in the public health field, has proven highly successful in reducing crime and violence in major cities around the world, especially when paired with effective law enforcement interventions. While over the course of the plan’s implementation, programs will collect data on risk factors unique to the Haitian context, initial programming will prioritize interventions
that have existing evidence demonstrating their effectiveness, including individual and family counseling interventions such as cognitive behavioral therapy.

Evidence collected on risk factors for violence also demonstrates the significant commonalities between the risk profiles of victims and perpetrators of violence, highlighting how addressing the needs of survivors of violence plays a critical role in interrupting cycles of violence. In interviews with key stakeholders, a lack of coordination of existing services is the biggest challenge facing the GBV prevention and response infrastructure in Haiti. As such, Phase I efforts under this sub-objective will also focus on strengthening referral networks that connect survivors of violence, in particular survivors of gender-based violence, with the support they need and building the capacity of the service providers within these networks. These networks will help address the immediate needs of survivors of GBV, including providing medical care and counseling, as well as helping them with their longer-term needs during the recovery process. Protective services seeking to address psychological and physical trauma inflicted by violence will complement these activities. As defined by local needs, other groups disproportionately affected by violence may be identified for limited assistance, including members of the LGBTQI+ community, sex workers, individuals with disabilities, and returned migrants.

Phase II will expand efforts under sub-objective 1.1 to encompass support for the efficient management of government resources to deliver citizen-responsive basic social services and promote locally owned development in targeted communities. Beyond the services prioritized during Phase I, key basic social services will be defined by community needs and will prioritize essential services such as water, sanitation, and hygiene services. In order to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change, efforts to support government service delivery will be complemented by the use of climate data, such as the incorporation of climate data in system design, construction, and operations of water, sanitation, and hygiene service provision. Recognizing the critical role civil society has played in public service provision – often stepping in when the Haitian government lacked necessary resources – U.S. government activities will continue to support and work with Haitian organizations and institutions to ensure access to services. Initiatives will benefit from efforts to strengthen the Haitian government’s strategic leadership and hold public institutions
accountable. Work under this sub-objective will synchronize with ongoing efforts such as the Department of Defense’s humanitarian assistance support to critical Haitian service providers, including first responders like local fire departments and Emergency Operation Centers/Disaster Relief Warehouses.

Recognizing the need to strengthen adaptive capacity to the impacts of climate change at both the national and local levels, Phase II efforts will simultaneously focus on equipping Haitian decision-makers, community leaders, and citizens with the skills, knowledge, networks, and outlook needed to adapt to climate impacts. Implementation will focus on addressing long-standing gaps in adaptation that disproportionately affect women, youth, and low-income and marginalized groups that have historically been excluded from adaptation planning and action, yet often face the greatest risks.

Finally, Phase II will support efforts to develop a national citizen security strategy, which will serve as a policy framework for delineating key roles for various local law enforcement agencies. This process will help the Government of Haiti identify gaps and properly prioritize resources in order to achieve holistic and sustainable improvements in security. This process will continue under Phase III.

Phase III efforts will include initiatives to rebuild public administration/civil service, strengthen sub-national units of government, improve rulemaking and legislative capacity, counter corruption, reinforce financial management and local revenue mobilization, and expand e-governance capacity. Prioritization of these initiatives will take place as program performance, future conditions, and local needs dictate. Beyond helping central and municipal governments rebuild and strengthen their systems and capacities to provide social, judicial, and financial services, long-term success will require supporting efforts to help the government strategically prioritize, develop, pass, and successfully implement the legal and regulatory reforms necessary to ensure continued investment in essential public services. Sustainable provision of quality public services is a key factor in long-term stability in Haiti that will help develop the resilience of government institutions to withstand natural and man-made shocks, minimizing adverse consequences to livelihoods and public well-being.
**Sub-objective 1.2: Strengthen the timely and equitable application of the law.**

This sub-objective will focus on strengthening the rule of law, with a focus on building a foundation for the Haitian judicial system to carry out basic functions as an independent entity to effectively prosecute cases and advance the administration of justice in a timely manner. Combating endemic corruption and administering justice and accountability in Haiti requires addressing illicit financial and criminal networks and activities that extend beyond the country’s borders, and as such, will require the U.S. government to have an integrated and layered approach.

Phase I efforts recognize that increasing access to justice is a critical element to restoring security in Haitian communities. As part of the place-based strategy implementation, activities under this sub-objective will focus on solutions. This includes exploring the feasibility of mobile courts and integrated justice centers that expand access to the formal justice sector, including for survivors of gender-based violence, a pervasive issue in communities affected by gang violence. This plan will also support informal justice sector initiatives such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that allow community members to peacefully resolve disputes without resorting to the formal justice sector. These interventions will mitigate the influence of gangs, which exploit the lack of access to justice to solidify their control over communities, and also help to rebuild the social contract with local authorities.

The United States will also increase coordination of domestic whole of government actions to reinforce accountability and the rule of law in Haiti. These efforts will be coordinated with DOJ and other departments and agencies who have equities and expertise with respect to rule of law and justice sector matters. INL, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Defense continue to provide support, equipment, and training to the Haitian Coast Guard, which strengthens its ability to execute interdictions of illicit shipments.

Phase II efforts will focus on supporting the operational capacity of the Haitian judicial system to fairly and efficiently conduct criminal investigations and trials, such as the deployment of mobile courts in targeted communities, provision of technical expertise to build secure evidence-based collection, and professional trainings to
Ministry of Justice and Public Security officials, who cited a need for technical and administrative trainings. This effort must move in tandem with holistic improvements to the Haitian corrections system, particularly anti-gang efforts inside facilities, access to social and rehabilitation services and appropriate use of parole. Other potential lines of effort can also include standing up special courts for anti-gang and/or public corruption cases. Activities will also focus on building the technical capacity of local courts to prosecute specialized cases affecting marginalized communities, such as gender-based violence and violence against women, a critical need throughout the country. This will be done in close coordination with key non-government partners who hold community-specific expertise and trust, such as women’s rights and gender-based violence organizations, as well as government entities that are actively seeking to address these issues, such as the regional multi-sector government and civil society organizations focused on gender issues convened by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes, or MCFDF). Such activities will simultaneously identify areas of opportunity to positively engage men and boys, who may also be victims, and are key to reducing violence against women, as allies in these efforts.

Phase III efforts will focus on integrating efforts between Haitian stakeholders, with the support of international partners, to harness relevant expertise and identify needed institutional reforms strengthening Haiti’s justice sector. Such stakeholders include the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the private sector, Haitian bar associations, civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of American States. Activities can include evaluating existing legal instruments and identifying legal reforms required to adequately address the inclusion of minority and marginalized groups, including women and girls; gender-based violence; and craft necessary measures to institutionalize land ownership and property rights, a key issue exacerbating inequality and conflict at the community level.

**Sub-objective 1.3: Strengthen participatory democratic processes.**

This sub-objective will address the lack of productive dialogue between political elites, civil society, and the private sector by supporting and building the capacity of
Haiti’s diverse stakeholders to generate meaningful Haitian-led dialogue and foster greater civil society inclusion, transparency, and political participation.

Phase I efforts under this sub-objective will focus on ensuring that political processes are inclusive across the Haitian population. In the first two years, activities will focus on ongoing U.S. support to Haitians to develop a broad-based political accord and carry out free and fair elections, which will be a critical, immediate step toward the restoration of constitutional governance. Under the first year of funding, the U.S. government supports activities to overcome the prolonged political impasse by promoting meaningful Haitian-led dialogue and building the capacity of civil society to fully engage in the process. Such efforts will help to strengthen the foundation for constituent-accountable, inclusive, and transparent governance. The program will be adaptable and flexible based on changing dynamics and Haitian needs. A sustainable political resolution must be Haitian led, address the interests of key political actors and stakeholders, and include a broad range of voices to support durable systems that allow for the long-term, meaningful inclusion of diverse and representative voices, women in particular, in Haiti’s democratic institutions.

Based on progress made in Phase I on safety and security, Phase II activities will work with the GoH to provide technical assistance to improve the independence and oversight capacity of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and other electoral institutions to improve transparency, engagement, and responsiveness to citizens and civil society needs.

Phase II efforts will also work in coordination with the GoH, Haitian partners, and international organizations supporting the UN-administered Elections Basket Fund. It is envisioned that institutional assistance will support civil society, and possibly media organizations, to ensure that votes are counted and reported accurately throughout the country. Work under this sub-objective will also include working with Haitian media to counter disinformation and promote freedom of speech and supporting organizations that serve marginalized communities such as women, youth, and LBGQTI+ to engage and conduct outreach.
Objective 2: Promote a Prosperous and Engaged Citizenry

Theory of Change:

- IF civic participation strengthens and can contribute to an inclusive and responsive government; and
- IF access to workforce development services and sustainable livelihoods strategies increases and is sustained.
- THEN citizens will participate in and help sustain an increasingly inclusive government and productive economy that improves their livelihoods.

In a recent Congressional hearing, a Haitian witness stated, “When we live in fear, when we are hungry, and when the future seems closed, the vote becomes a useless luxury.” This objective recognizes the link between citizen engagement and prosperity. Prioritizing elections in the near term, for example, will likely have a perverse effect unless basic security and economic conditions are met. Citizen engagement is contingent on a people’s ability to meet their basic needs and to perceive that the government is responsive to those needs. Accordingly, objective 2 will support Haitians to simultaneously strengthen opportunities to constructively engage with government at all levels (sub-objective 2.1), and it will enable them to lay the foundation for enhanced household economic security (sub-objective 2.2).

The implementation of Phase I under objective 2 will focus on building social cohesion and enhancing economic opportunities in gang-affected areas as an integral component of the place-based strategy. It will support communities to advocate for their policy preferences and ensure their members can participate meaningfully in future elections and political processes. Phase II will expand these activities to conflict-affected regions outside of Port-au-Prince as a means of promoting stability nationwide. Phases II and III will also increasingly work to address the underlying drivers of conflict and instability. In this regard, consultations
identified the following key opportunities as a means of promoting inclusion and prosperity: building the capacity of civil society organizations; leveraging konbit (a traditional Haitian labor practice defined as coming together for the communal good) and other long-standing mechanisms for promoting social cohesion; enhancing formal and informal civic education opportunities; supporting climate-smart agriculture in rural areas to counterbalance urbanization and economic centralization; encouraging domestic and international investment; promoting domestic food production for domestic consumption; increasing women’s participation in all sectors of the formal and informal economies; balancing humanitarian response with longer-term development assistance; and addressing trauma linked to violence and natural disasters.

The sub-objectives detailed below will guide the implementation of Haiti’s 10-year plan. They will support Haitians as they lay a foundation for broader and inclusive prosperity in their country.

**Sub-objective 2.1: Strengthen citizen engagement.**

This sub-objective will focus on strengthening community-based civil society mechanisms for effectively engaging with the Haitian government and holding it accountable. In Phase I, in gang-affected neighborhoods, these mechanisms will serve to reinforce social cohesion, inviting participatory collaboration. In Phases II and III, activities will expand to support engagement with electoral and other political processes.

Efforts to advance this objective will be targeted based on community-led assessments of the community-level risk factors that contribute to a high prevalence of crime and violence and may include improvement projects that follow the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) guidelines for creating public spaces that help reduce crime; community initiatives that help to build social cohesion; youth civic engagement activities; and, where appropriate, community dialogues or reconciliation activities to help address conflict within and between communities. As part of the place-based strategy, these efforts will also be closely integrated with the community policing work being carried out under sub-objective
1.1 (Increase the provision of quality basic public services) and will help promote police integration with the communities they serve.

Phases II and III efforts will 1) seek to strengthen civic education, participation, and inclusive, positive representation in politics; 2) enhance oversight and advocacy by civil society and other groups to improve the credibility of electoral and political reform processes; and 3) inform and strengthen the engagement of Haitian citizens and civil society groups in elections and political processes. U.S. government assistance will support improved communication and transparency across government planning, processes, and service delivery along with audit mechanisms that provide oversight and report to both legislatures and the public. U.S. government assistance will also work with watchdog civil society organizations to increase public oversight to improve accountability. Promoting citizen-responsive governance and, specifically, service provision (see sub-objective 1.1) will, in turn, enhance trust and confidence in political processes. Establishing a baseline and identifying gaps in Haiti’s current civic education curriculum and how the education system conceptualizes Haitian citizenship, including civic participation and responsibility, is a critical first step to fostering a culture that encourages voting, participation in democratic processes, respect for the rule of law, and promotion of good governance values. Activities will advance civic education curricula that support citizen demand for transparent and accountable governance. Civil society groups have also emphasized the need for increased women’s participation in politics as a path to transforming the security and justice systems and to reduce impunity.

**Sub-objective 2.2: Enhance economic security.**

Sub-objective 2.2 enhances economic opportunities for Haiti’s workforce while simultaneously promoting households’ resilience in the face of shocks. In Phase I, this will focus on the economic security of households in gang-affected areas as part of the place-based strategy.

Phase I efforts will provide alternative paths for young people affected by gang violence, including by linking them with licit economic opportunities. Short-term
programs to deter youth from crime and violence are only sustainable if the targeted populations have opportunities to acquire the technical skills needed to obtain jobs and reintegrate into their communities. This requires moving beyond the development of strong life skills to increase the supply of qualified workers and support the creation of economic opportunities for youth to become productive members of society and future leaders. Activities will use technical training to increase opportunities for at-risk youth to find meaningful work and become productive members of society. Expanding on youth programs already in place in targeted communities, activities will consult and collaborate with GoH counterparts, including the Youth Explorers Program of the HNP Community Policing Project, and the private sector to address the supply and demand sides of youth employment. Sub-objective 2.2 will target key sectors of the economy and the sets of workforce skills necessary to achieve success and will address the social and economic challenges that women face to enter the formal workforce in Haiti. Interventions focused on job creation will abide by global and fair labor standards, including decent wage and respect for workers’ rights and dignity.

The U.S. government will seek to support municipal governments and the private sector to create a more stable economic and security environment. When communities are secure and stable, the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, are more willing to invest in and open new businesses. This in turn leads to greater community-level job creation, income generation for families, and an expanded tax base for the local government. In collaboration with INL and municipal authorities, this activity will engage the private sector in locally led processes to identify security constraints and develop local solutions that include countering corruption and allowing business activities to flourish. Organized by sector and geography, U.S.-supported activities will allow the private sector, civil society, municipal governments, and law enforcement to work together to effectively promote the development of safe communities that protect and support business activities.

Phase II will expand geographic focus to other conflict-affected areas outside of Port-au-Prince and to USAID’s identified Resilience Focus Zones (RFZs). In Port-au-Prince and peri-urban areas, activities will identify untapped opportunities in Haiti’s industrial sector. Skills-based training, including vocational training, will be
guided by clear linkages to the demand for labor. Focusing on rural and underserved parts of the country will be essential, not only in promoting inclusion and equitable access to resources, but also to combat urbanization and the highly centralized economy. In the RFZs, where most of the population is engaged in agriculture, activities will focus on enhancing food security by complementing food availability with high-value crop production for local and international markets. These activities will also explore opportunities to support marginalized and vulnerable population subsets. For example, activities will acknowledge traditional gender-specific roles in the agricultural value chain while also opening equitable avenues for individuals to participate in agriculture in ways that leverage skills, interests, and abilities.

Phase III under sub-objective 2.2 will expand access to and creation of sustainable livelihood strategies, prioritizing groups historically excluded or marginalized, including populations that are vulnerable due to man-made or natural disasters or are otherwise excluded. Assistance in the longer term will leverage existing initiatives that enhance markets and investment opportunities; help Haitian entrepreneurs and small businesses create jobs and diversify livelihoods; support Haiti’s smallholder farmers through market-based approaches and enterprise-driven development; and increase access to and availability of credit. Initiatives will align with the National Adaptation Plan (Plan National d’Adaptation) and the National Policy and Strategy for Food Sovereignty and Security and for Nutrition in Haiti (Politique et Stratégie Nationales de Souveraineté et Sécurité Alimentaires et de Nutrition en Haïti).

4. Local, National, and Regional Partnerships

Engagements to Date

Following Haiti’s selection as a priority country for advancing the SPCPS, U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince and interagency partners publicly launched the consultation process. The Haiti GFA interagency working group (“the working group”) developed an initial outreach plan, consultation approach, and qualitative data collection strategy, which was conducted by officials across the interagency at Embassy Port-
au-Prince and in Washington. The working group conducted over 75 consultations with over 230 representatives across multiple categories of Haitian stakeholders in two phases. The purpose was to build upon previously conducted, pre-announcement discussions in a way that offered the granularity necessary for the formulation of this plan. In phase one, from April to June, this new round of consultations validated the analysis of Haiti’s challenges, elicited Haitians’ views of a 10-year vision for Haiti and identified the steps necessary to achieve it. Findings from these consultations directly informed the identification of objectives and development of the 10-year goal. In phase two, from June to September, consultations validated and sought feedback on objectives and identified sub-objectives to sequence over the 10 years.

GFA working group representatives committed to maintaining the anonymity of participants to protect their privacy. Major engagements through September 2022 included:

- Academia representatives
- Bilateral and multilateral organizations
- Diaspora organizations
- Faith-based organizations
- Government ministries
- LGBTQI+ representatives
- Local authorities
- Political factions
- Private sector representatives
- U.S.-based stakeholders, including think tanks and NGOs
- Women’s organizations
- Youth representatives
Approach to Engagement

Consultations have highlighted a general desire among Haitian partners to employ a long-term, sustainable approach for peace and stability in Haiti, as well as a willingness to partner and engage with the U.S. government on implementation of the plan. Establishing safety and security, fostering inclusive opportunities and economic growth, and advancing accountable and responsive governance were cross-cutting priorities and mutual interests among local, national, and international partners. Close coordination and synchronization of efforts will be critical to strengthen Haitian-led solutions and sustain advancements beyond the scope of this 10-year plan.

Guiding Partnership Principles

Previous international assistance efforts in Haiti have faced challenges that the plan aims to address differently. The plan commits to the following principles for robust and productive collaboration on implementation.

1. **Be consistent:** Maintain relationships and follow up with those previously engaged to provide updates on implementation and opportunities for strategic partnership.

2. **Listen and adapt:** Provide feedback mechanisms to meaningfully integrate consultation recommendations and adapt priorities as reflected by the needs of local partners.

3. **Maintain transparency and manage expectations:** Be clear and level-set expectations on funding opportunities and limitations.

4. **Continue inclusive and conflict-sensitive outreach and engagement:** Continue and expand outreach to marginalized populations and all departments throughout Haiti to ensure a diverse set of perspectives are represented.
Non-Government and Local Partnerships

Haitian civil society and the private sector actively implement a variety of efforts to advance social cohesion and reconciliation, foster economic opportunities, provide essential social services in communities where lacking, and support the administration of justice for violence-affected populations. In many ways, Haitian civil society functions as the lifeline of Haiti’s overall well-being. It will be critical to harness and elevate the immense work already being done and work in conjunction with local stakeholders across the country to foster meaningful cooperation and partnership. It will also be important to build bridges and foster trust and cooperation between Haitian civil society and the private sector to better match Haitian-generated solutions with Haitian sources of revenue to implement them. U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince and interagency partners will continue the following processes to strengthen non-governmental partnerships:

- **Outreach and engagement:** Organized civil society, even at the grassroots level, only represents a fraction of the Haitian population. USAID’s additional outreach to historically marginalized populations in early September 2022 included focus group discussions in four of Haiti’s 10 departments with members of the following populations: LGBTQI+ individuals, rural smallholder farmers, returned migrants, survivors of the 2021 earthquake, at-risk youth, and survivors of sexual violence. In Washington, the interagency will continue meaningful engagement with the Haitian diaspora, which will be a key to the plan’s implementation.

- **Individual consultations:** Most consultations through September 2022 were conducted with individual entities to protect the anonymity of participants and to ensure their comfort in speaking freely. Multiple consultees noted a pervasive level of distrust in Haitian culture; they suggested individual consultations were the most appropriate means of garnering honest, thoughtful input. Accordingly, the interagency is committed to ongoing consultations with Haitian stakeholders.
● **Workshops with partners:** There is value in convening external stakeholders with the purpose of assessing the status of the plan's implementation and inviting recommendations on ongoing priorities. Regular – perhaps quarterly – workshops with different and diverse stakeholders will be held throughout implementation.

● **Partnership:** The plan aligns closely with USAID’s commitment to localization – expanding and enhancing partnerships with local, new, and non-traditional partners. Indeed, USAID has committed to ensuring that 25 percent of new awards go directly to local partners within the next four years and that 50 percent of new awards are locally led by the end of the decade. USAID/Haiti is on track to meet or exceed these targets.

**Government of Haiti**

Haiti’s political and social context is constantly evolving. Partnership will require a multi-level, holistic approach to engagement with the government. Recognizing that the Government of Haiti is not a monolithic entity, the United States will continue to look for opportunities to engage at both the local and national levels.

The United States will pursue the following processes and approaches to foster engagement with national-level actors over time:

● **Working-level consultations and coordination:** The U.S. government will focus on continued engagement and coordination with relevant career working-level officials across Haitian government ministries and sub-national authorities.

● **Continue ongoing partnerships:** U.S. government agencies and offices, such as USAID, State, DHS, and the DoD, are actively working with Haitian authorities on several initiatives and will continue to do so.

● **Align on existing Haitian government strategies and priorities:** Consultations underscored that most Haitian government ministries have a number of existing and forthcoming strategies, and many of these initiatives align with the identified priorities in the plan. The U.S. government will consult and seek collaboration with appropriate ministry partners, as noted under sub-
objective 2.1’s focus on aligning with the National Policy and Strategy for Food Sovereignty and Security and for Nutrition in Haiti. Partnerships will also be expanded with newly identified partners, such as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.

**International Coordination Strategy**

International diplomatic and assistance efforts have achieved mixed results, and their impact has been the subject of scrutiny and debate. A series of consultations with multilateral and bilateral stakeholders, alongside those with Haitian government and civil society stakeholders, highlighted problems related to international coordination stemming from, among other areas: a lack of coordination and information sharing that leads to duplication, gaps, and in some cases contributes to corruption; challenges related to transitory personnel both among international actors and local government that saps continuity and relationship building; and an emphasis on short-term wins rather than long-term needs.

Based on this feedback, the plan will apply the following guiding principles as a starting point, evolving as new gaps and opportunities present themselves over the course of implementation:

1. **Building Success**
   - Build on successful existing platforms. International partners should prioritize ensuring the Haitian government has the capacity to participate in all relevant international partner coordination meetings.
   - Coordinating mechanisms that have survived high government turnover and political uncertainty in other countries can serve as a model.

2. **Addressing Root Causes**
   - Donors must focus on root causes. Favoring “quick wins” for political gain rather than addressing long-term structural issues will result in prolonging the issues funding is meant to address.
3. Creating a Shared Understanding

- Donors have varying levels of justification requirements for funding to prevent corruption. Donors should concur on a base level of requirements to ensure consistency in anti-corruption measures across funding streams.

- Multilateral and bilateral organizations are working from different bases of information. To create a shared understanding, international partners should encourage ministry meetings with multiple partners at the same time. The international community should develop a network to share information on activities as needed.

- International coordination should create not only a shared understanding but, to the degree possible, a shared vision. International partners should seek an honest broker to facilitate conversations around strategic goals in addition to sharing information on current activities. To the extent possible, diplomatic initiatives should be linked with development.

4. Being Agile

- International coordination efforts should include mechanisms to monitor and respond to changes on the ground. Political realities, not only predetermined plans and funding streams should feed into decision-making on initiatives.

5. Sustainability

- International coordination should lay the groundwork for Haitian ownership of programs and take steps to ensure their continuation after donors finish their involvement.

When possible, the plan will build on and strengthen existing mechanisms. Notable mechanisms include the Coordination Framework for External Development Aid, a GOH-led coordinating body known by its French acronym CAED, as well as donor-led secretariat meetings at the technical (Concertation Technique des Partenaires, or CTP) and political levels (Chefs de Mission, or CdM). These exist alongside
informal networks that support coordination. The plan will adapt to the introduction of new actors and mechanisms as appropriate.

5. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL)

Overview

In July 2022, an interagency monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) working group (WG) formed to develop this MEL plan framework for Haiti.

During development of the 10-year plan, the interagency working group used a participatory process with more than 230 consultations with local partners and stakeholder groups. This approach brought legitimacy and value to the draft 10-year plan as well as the MEL planning process. We will continue to prioritize local voices during MEL plan development and implementation, including but not limited to USAID's approach to collect and use beneficiary (partner/stakeholder) feedback.

Approach to Monitoring

Performance and context will be monitored to determine whether the implementation of the 10-year plan is on track, its expected results are being achieved, and how risks are evolving, including if external factors are affecting assumptions.

An important tenet to monitoring and evaluating differently is providing timely and rapid assessments of program implementation throughout the ten-year effort. The purpose of timely and rapid assessments is to better understand what works and what does not in real time with on-the-ground truth. Rapid assessments of program activities enable implementers to use information and analysis to avoid obstacles and seize opportunities that implementers cannot always gain through periodic evaluations over a course of 1-3 years. Hence, the MEL plan will reflect these monitoring priorities, ensuring the right focus and resources are placed on monitoring, assessments, and evaluations, while leveraging data from secondary sources.
A team of dedicated MEL officers from the interagency will coordinate and work with partners to facilitate and increase learning throughout the program’s lifespan. Data collection will seek to answer learning questions and performance indicators, while providing valuable evidence about anticipated and unanticipated outcomes and other changes. The SPCPS MEL principles, which are integral to these MEL approaches, include a focus on gender sensitivity in programming monitoring and conflict-sensitive monitoring.

**Approach to Evaluation**

Successful implementation of the 10-year plan will require the use of independent and objective evaluation findings to inform decision-making. Evaluations and other assessments are important learning tools for documenting evidence and outcomes and verifying strategic and activity-level theories of change and assumptions. The interagency also expects recurring ad hoc requests for evidence to support and justify funding. As such, the evaluation plan will be flexible and build in fit-for-purpose methodologies and rapid impact evaluations, as appropriate. In addition to planning for new evaluations, the MEL working group is identifying planned evaluations that could provide useful information. The working group is also exploring evaluations that could cut across objectives and technical sectors, particularly in areas where multiple activities are operating in Haiti.

**Approach to Learning**

Fulfilling the intentional learning goals of this MEL plan requires interagency dedication to collaborate with stakeholders to share knowledge and leverage initiatives, to learn systematically by drawing on evidence from MEL sources, and to adapt by taking time to reflect on new evidence and context shifts and adjusting as necessary.